The Equipment of the Virginia Soldier in the American Revolution

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THE EQUIPMENT OF THE VIRGINIA SOLDIER IN THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of Anthropology
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

by
Andrew J. Gallup
1991
APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

PPS  PHILADELPHIA PUBLIC STORE
PTJ  PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
VG   VIRGINIA GAZETTE
WGW  WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON
CVSP CALENDAR OF VIRGINIA STATE PAPERS
ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to ascertain whether the military material culture used in the American Revolution by soldiers of Virginia reflects societal attitudes toward war.

The equipment used by the Virginia soldier is determined through the records of the Williamsburg and Philadelphia Public Stores and other primary sources. Selected secondary sources are also used.

Collector's guides and other works illustrating the military material culture were consulted. Examples from these works were matched to the descriptions of equipment used by the Virginians. These examples comprised the data for analysis and interpretation.

Individual attributes of selected examples of the military equipment were compared and contrasted with similar features of British and other European equipment. This was integrated into assumptions concerning state militarism, societal attitudes about war, and how it would be reflected in a society's military material culture.
THE EQUIPMENT OF THE VIRGINIA SOLDIER IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
Introduction

Military forces in every age reflect the societies they are created to defend (Louis Morton, in Glatthaar 1985:xiii).

Dr. Glatthaar supports the statement quoted above with a review of the actions and personal writings of the men of the Federal army that marched from Atlanta to Savannah, Georgia and into the Carolinas under William Sherman during the final year of the American Civil War. If the theory is correct, and Glatthaar's work advances an argument that it is, then this should be true for the military forces of other periods of American history. Also, if material culture produced and used by a society reflects that society, then the material culture used by the military forces would serve as an insight into that society.

A general hypothesis of this study, and perhaps of all material culture studies, is that material culture reflects characteristics of the society that produced and used particular artifacts. This study will concentrate on a more specific hypothesis: that the equipment of the soldier reflects the attitude of his society toward war. The artifacts to be studied are those that constitute the equipment used by the soldier, recruited by the state of Virginia, who served with the Continental Army during the
American Revolution, 1775-1783. It is assumed that these artifacts will, taken as a whole, suggest social attitudes concerning the conflict of which they were a part. This will, of course, view a particular social group at a particular point in time. Yet, if the results of this goal are creditable, then perhaps further reflection might be possible into attitudes that may have continued through time.

This study will not provide a quantitative analysis of the military material culture of the American Revolution. These artifacts, with sufficient documentation, do not exist in the quantities necessary to allow statistical manipulation. Although it can be established through documentary sources that a particular type of item was used, there may be only one example of this item in existence. The problem of the lack of repetitive examples will be compensated by examining the total group of artifacts.

The lack of a quantitative analysis will make this study more art than science. However, material culture study is a relatively new mode of inquiry; and if it serves no other purpose, this study may produce further questions concerning the artifacts involved or the method. Material culture studies combines many disciplines. Thomas Schlereth in describing the current state of material culture studies uses the term "missionary effort" (Schlereth 1982:xiv).

This study can be considered part of this effort. This study also attempts to respond to another point made by
I feel very strongly, however, that research on artifacts and the American past must move beyond the merely descriptive stage of investigation into the more problematic area of historical analysis and interpretation (Schlereth 1980:5).

The words, "historical analysis and interpretation" demonstrates Schlereth's bias in material culture studies. He is very clear about his use of artifacts. "I view the study of artifacts and the American past as a thoroughly historical study and, hence, a totally humanistic enterprise" (Schlereth 1980:3). However, he does not suggest that history is the only discipline that uses artifacts in cultural studies. He notes contributions from subfields "such as history of technology, folklife studies, cultural anthropology, historical archeology, cultural geography, and art history" (Schlereth 1982:xiii).

Schlereth acknowledges a debt to archeologist James Deetz for providing a broad definition of material culture that has had an affect on his view of material culture.

Deetz would have material culture include:

"... cuts of meat as material culture since there are many ways to dress an animal, plowed fields, even the horse that pulls the plow, since scientific breeding of livestock involves the conscious modification of an animal's form according to culturally derived ideals. Our body," argues Deetz, "itself is a part of our physical environment, so that such things as parades, dancing and all aspects of kinesics-human motion-fit within our definition. Nor is the definition limited only to matter in the solid state. Fountains are liquid examples, as are lily ponds, and material that is partly gas includes hot air balloons and neon signs". Deetz has also suggested, in Invitation to Archaeology, that even language is part of material culture, a prime
example of its gaseous state. Words, after all, are air masses shaped by speech apparatus according to culturally acquired rules (Schlereth 1980:3).

The many subfields mentioned by Schlereth and the substantial credit he gives Deetz suggests that the many disciplines that study artifacts within their particular theoretical and methodological sphere are bound, and perhaps interwoven, by the use of material culture. This study borrows from anthropology and history. This combination is not incompatible. Deetz recognizes this compatibility in historical archeology.

... the documentary record and the archeological record compliment each other (Deetz 1977:8).

... there are factors at work on form and function of the artifacts of the past that are beyond recovery, either by logic, hypothesis and deduction, or endless guessing. They are available, however, to the historical archeologist if intelligent and imaginative use is made of the rich supporting materials, and at least can serve as a suggestion of a more diverse set of factors than have been heretofore considered in prehistory (Deetz 1977:23).

This is not to suggest that historical documentation is a panacea for all problems faced by a researcher in historical archeology or any discipline. Stanley South sees pitfalls in excessive reliance on documentary evidence.

As archeologists we must depend on our archeological tools for interpretive statements of archeological data, and not resort to the easy expedient of superimposing the historical preconceptions onto the archeological record. We do, of course, use both the archeological and historical data, but we should not use history as an interpretive crutch to prop up statements purporting to be archeological in nature. If we develop such habits, and then find ourselves in a situation where there is no documentation to lean on, we may well find that our archeological tool kit is empty, or that we do not have the skills
to use the tools we have available. Such a lean-on-the-arms-of-history approach is rendering a disservice to archeology by not utilizing to the fullest the information manifest in the surviving patterned material remains of culture from both history and archeology.

There is apparently an assumption in historic site archeology that archeological data must have a direct historical counterpart. There is, of course, nothing wrong with archeological-historical connections, but this is not the primary goal for the archeologist. As archeologists we are dealing primarily with patterned material remains of past behavior, with the processes responsible for that behavior not necessary recognized by the people or the society in the system from which the pattern emerged (South 1977:326).

Although Deetz appears a bit more enthusiastic about the use of documentation than does South, their statements are not in opposition. Each advocates a balance in the use of historical documentation. However, that balance may be individual to the researcher. The relationship of the historical record to the material culture used for this study is critical. Although not as rigorous, or even similar, to South's method, this study depends on pattern recognition. This exercise might not be possible if limited to materials available through archeological excavations. Remnants of firearms, buttons, glass, gun flints, buckles, and perhaps some tin would be the result of excavation. Spatial and temporal patterns may be observed, especially in winter camps, but the armies were, for the most part, transient. A winter camp would have a duration of approximately five months. Distribution patterns would be limited.
Pattern recognition of attributes, the basis of this study, may well be possible from an archeological assemblage. Yet, the inclusion of material that would probably be missing, notably clothing, will strengthen the final analysis and interpretation. The bulk of the documentation used for this study deals primarily with clothing. Clothing is as illustrative as other categories of military equipment; and since it did not survive below, or above, the ground, historical documentation is the only avenue to the inclusion of this item.

South's warning concerning the possible negative affect of historical documentation on the archeological tool kit is applicable to a broader anthropological perspective. The use of historical documentation in this study does not violate this concern. The primary use of historical materials is to establish the material culture base for the study. The identification of patterns in the material culture is a result of observation, not historical reference.

The conclusions of this study will draw upon subjective works of scholars which have a direct or indirect bearing on the analysis and interpretation of the material culture. Apparently, there are no similar examinations of American military material culture. Previous works have been limited to histories highlighting technological change or simply cataloging the equipment of a particular category or time period. This study attempts to relate, in an elementary
way, a societal attitude about armed conflict through the material culture associated with that activity.

The relationship of the military equipment to the attitudes of the society would probably not be recognized by the society. Also, this relationship is not independent of other cultural forces which, in part, helped determine the equipment used by the Virginia soldier. These forces are numerous and their relationship complex; therefore, the examination of this larger view will be limited to economics and religion, two of the most powerful forces shaping the period of the American Revolution.

The economic condition of the United States at the beginning of the Revolution required the Americans to seek assistance from European nations. The United States was not a poor country, but its wealth was in raw materials and agricultural commodities. It suffered from lack of manufacturing resources and cash.

Representatives of the individual colonies and the national government went to Europe to obtain assistance. Recognition of the new nation and military alliances were slow to develop but financial assistance was awaiting their arrival.

Before a single patriot commissioner reached Paris, Louis XVI directed that one million livres be extended to Caron de Beaumarchais, playwright, poet, darling of the salons, sometime secret agent. Beaumarchais, working with Vergennes, played a part in influencing the King, even to proposing the form that clandestine support would take: creation of a fictitious mercantile firm, Roderique, Hortalez and Company, actually Beaumarchais himself, who would
spend the million livres to buy munitions for the Americans, from French arsenals. Spain promptly advanced a like sum, and the next year France repeated her initial contribution (Higginbotham 1971:233).

The focus of this aid has often been French muskets. Although they were welcome, especially as they provided uniformity which eased problems in ammunition supply. Muskets were not the highest priority item.

The muskets arrived in quantity in 1777. The Continental Army fought numerous major battles, Lexington, Breed's/Bunker Hill, New York City, Trenton, prior to obtaining French muskets. The need for personal protection on the frontier, as well as hunting, had established a tradition of personal ownership of firearms and a firearms manufacturing industry in America prior to the Revolution. Although colonial firearms makers could not meet the initial wartime need, American gunsmiths did contribute to the war effort by repairing firearms, as well as limited production.

There was, however, a need for gunpowder. This, along with salt, was the most needed item from abroad (Herndon 1981:17). Approximately 90% of the powder used by the Americans in the Revolution was imported (Neumann and Kravic 1975:132). The importance of this commodity is demonstrated by Virginia's first crisis of the Revolution. The reaction to Lord Dunmore's order to seize the colony's supply of gunpowder caused the Royal Governor to leave Williamsburg and seek the safety of a British warship (Goodwin 1962:3). The reliance on imported gunpowder may well have resulted in
shortages at times. An order given on August 23, 1779, instructs the soldiers to lay their cartridges on blankets in the sun to dry (Gamble 1892:233).

Virginia's imports included firearms during the early part of the Revolution. By August 1777, however, the need for firearms and ammunition had been met and cotton and wool cards, clothing, rum, and sugar were high priorities. Salt continued to be imported throughout the war (Herndon 1981:21, 23).

The importation of cotton and wool cards suggests an attempt by Virginia to produce textiles. The Williamsburg Public Store records of this period (August-September 1777) shows the early war practice of issuing cloth, as well as clothing, continued (Goodwin 1962:132-137). It is difficult to determine if the clothing or cloth was imported or locally manufactured. It would appear, however, that the cloth was available in larger quantities than prepared clothing. This may be a result of cost or other market forces. It is possible that the importation of cloth rather than clothing was due to the desire of the Virginians to control the form of the end product. The reasons for this are discussed below.

The need of the Army for foreign goods is somewhat confused by the power of the government to control purchasing and distribution and the actions of the soldiers themselves.

The army's needs and the difficulty of importing
from Europe made cloth and clothing scarce and expensive. The symbolic patriotic homespun did not appear in sufficient quantity to end the shortage [Valley Forge, 1777-1778]. Despite the occasional charitable contributions of clothing to the army, civilians most often competed with soldiers for clothing. Money often determined which group won the competition, and the army frequently lost. Soldiers who sought money for food or liquor sold their clothing and even their muskets to civilians—in violation of both state laws and military orders. A newspaper writer asked, "How can it be, that any and every individual, can purchase shirts, stockings, shoes, etc. and the vulture-eyed agents, etc. be unable to purchase for the soldiery" (Royster 1979:192).

The lack of control over the economy caused Benjamin Franklin to wonder why Congressional credit was being used to pay for tea, gewgaws, and superfluities while funds for arms and ammunition were difficult to find (Royster 1979:271). The answer is, of course, that the market was supplying individuals with the ability to pay, rather than the Continental Congress or state governments where payment was made with paper money of questionable value.

The economic problems were somewhat mitigated by the belief in the Revolution. The patriotism of the Americans had a strong religious component. This had an impact on the form of the material culture of the period.

Historian Edmund S. Morgan states that religious beliefs had a primary affect on the American Revolution.

Without pretending to explain the whole variety of the Revolution, I should like to suggest that the movement in all its phases, from the resistance against Parliamentary taxation in the 1760's to the establishment of a national government and national policies in the 1790's was affected, not to say guided, by a set of values inherited from the age of Puritanism (Morgan 1968:236).
Morgan interprets the Puritan Ethic as a value system based on every man being called by God to serve Him, society, and himself in a productive manner. A man should also be thrifty. These values would cause a distrust of the idle rich and merchants, the former because they did not produce or serve, and the latter because he was seen to overcharge for his services (Morgan 1968:236-237). As the nobility and the merchant class represented the power of England it is not surprising that the colonists developed a distrust of the mother country.

This value system was perhaps strongest in the Congregationalists of New England: however, Anglicans such as Henry Laurens and Richard Henry Lee demonstrate agreement, as do deists, Franklin and Jefferson (Morgan 1968:239). The religious revival of the mid eighteenth century had a strong enough affect on Anglican Virginia to create a "party spirit" in the politics of the colony (Heimert 1978:437).

Frugality and avoidance of extravagance would have an effect on the material culture. This would be amplified by the boycott movements preceding the Revolution. Boycotts, designed to repeal British tax laws, included artisans wearing leather work clothes, students refusing to drink beer, an avoidance of mutton to increase wool supplies, and in the case of the Stamp Act, a boycott of all British goods (Morgan 1968:240).

These non importation boycotts, in the opinion of some,
renewed ancestral values. It also spurred a movement toward self-sufficiency. Abigail Adams wrote that she would work with her hands. Although the movement toward industry fell short of providing the production necessary to supply the war effort, it did instill a belief that the colonists had the ability to provide their own manufactured goods. They were developing a sense of political and economic independence (Morgan 1968:241, 245, 251).

Frugality and avoidance of extravagance, based upon religious/ethical beliefs, are characteristics of the military material culture discussed in this study. The economic condition of the United States, likewise, had an affect on the form of this equipment. The question posed by this study, that the equipment reflects the society's attitude towards militarism and war, is not incompatible with these cultural forces. The attitude of the eighteenth century American toward war was a product of the same belief system that preached frugality.

According to American ministers, war was a sin and a product of sin. God permitted it and guided it for the improvement of His people. In practice, this meant that Britons sinned in waging war, while Americans suffered the consequences of war because of their own sins... (Royster 1979:13).

If a system of religious/ethic beliefs dictated a purpose to war, would not the economy and frugality concerning material culture contained in that system be part that the war effort? If the war effort is successful it is because of God's guidance and justifies the cause. The
material culture of the Virginia soldier represents frugality especially when compared to the extravagance found in the non-functional decorative attributes of European equipment. The success of the American cause includes the equipment that made victory possible.

METHOD

As was stated in the second paragraph of this introduction, the purpose of this study is to test the hypothesis that the equipment of a soldier reflects the attitude of his society to war. In order to proceed with this work it is necessary to accept the validity of related hypotheses. (1) Material culture reflects attitudes of the producer and user society. (2) The military material culture will reflect the attitude of a society toward the role of the military in that society. (3) As the role of the military is war, or the threat of war, for political purposes, a society which sees this activity in relatively positive terms is a militaristic society. A society which views this activity in relatively negative terms is a nonmilitaristic society. (4) The military material culture of a militaristic society will differ from a nonmilitaristic society. Although these hypotheses will not be directly tested, related material will be presented in the course of this study.

This study is, in essence, a cross-cultural comparison of North American and western European societies of the
second half of the eighteenth century looking at their attitudes toward war as reflected in the military material culture. The American Revolution was a major conflict for these societies. The equipment used by the American and British soldier to fight this war will be the focus of this study.

It is necessary to further narrow the parameters, for manageability, while providing a sufficient amount of data to establish some degree of confidence in the analysis and interpretation. It would be difficult to deal with the total military equipment of the American Revolution. Therefore, this study is limited to the equipment used by the Virginians who served with the infantry of the Continental Army. The reasons for this choice are:

1. The Continental Army was made up of units (regiments/battalions) provided by the individual states. The state was responsible (it did not always meet this responsibility) for the equipment used by its soldiers. This made each state's troops somewhat unique. Although any state's troops would have served the purpose of this study, the Virginia troops are used as Virginia was a leader in the Revolution and the attitudes of this regional society contributed to the beginnings of a national character during and after the War.

2. Infantry equipment was chosen as infantry made up the bulk of the Army and represented the population as a whole. The other branches, cavalry and artillery, were, by
comparison, specialized units. constituting numerically a small proportion of the total army. The material culture associated with these soldiers might not be representative due to the specific and limited function of these units. Also, these units, considered prestigious in the military of the period, tended to be led by individuals from the upper socioeconomic classes.

3. Although Virginia organized and supported militia and regular units for service within the State, the units with the Continental Army had the opportunity to mix with units from other states. This opportunity was unusual in a country where geographic isolation was common. The Virginians of the Continental Army were part of a shared experience with men from other regions.

There are many surviving pieces of military equipment from the American Revolution. Unfortunately, most of this equipment has no documentation concerning where it was used or by whom it was used. This problem dictated the first step of a three step process for this study. It was necessary to discover what equipment was used by the Virginians which would then allow a representative example of existing equipment to serve as an illustration.

This required that primary, and selected secondary, documentary materials be reviewed to construct a list of equipment. This list was then used in conjunction with works that illustrated eighteenth century artifacts to match descriptions with examples. These examples could then be
compared to ascertain patterns in the various attributes. The resulting evidence can be interpreted and conclusions drawn.

The documentary evidence of equipment used by the Virginia soldier is not overwhelming in amount or detail. What is available provides a general impression of the clothing, arms, and other items. The quality and quantity of this evidence varies through the eight years of the war. The periods of late 1775-early 1776 and late 1778-early 1779 are comparatively rich in records. The interim period is sketchy, at best. The final years of the war, 1780-1783, has little substantive information.

The equipment issued by the state to the soldiers early in the war is documented in the records of the Williamsburg Public Store. These records were transcribed and annotated in "Clothing and Accoutrements of the Officers and Soldiers of the Virginia Forces 1775-1780", by Mary Goodwin in 1962 (unpublished manuscript). These records, although they cover nearly six years of the war, are of most value in understanding the initial supply of the soldiers mustering at Williamsburg in the autumn 1775-spring 1777. The later years provide little information concerning supply to specific units.

What is noted in the later years of the Williamsburg records is the shipping of equipment north, much of it probably destined for distribution in Philadelphia. "Records of the Public Store, Philadelphia", detail the
distribution of equipment to the Virginia regiments during the autumn, winter, and spring of 1778-1779. The large amount and variety of items issued in this period not only provides an impression of the appearance of the Virginia regiments as a result of this supply, but also speaks indirectly to the need of these troops prior to the issue.

The period between the initial equipment issue in Williamsburg and the substantial resupply in Philadelphia is covered by deserter description that appear as advertisements in two newspapers, the Virginia Gazette and Pennsylvania Packet. These provide a very small sample and are therefore of limited value in understanding the equipment of the Virginia regiments during this period. These descriptions suggest variety rather than uniformity in the Virginia line. Although the descriptions are of value, their weight in providing a balanced picture of the soldier's equipment must be limited.

Another primary source available to this study are the collected writings of military and civilian leaders such as George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, George Weeden, Robert Gamble, and Nathaniel Greene. These sources contain correspondence and army orders which refer to equipment need, equipment supply, and quality. That equipment was supplied is often inferred from the lack of further requests. These sources were essential in determining the type of musket that was used by the Virginia soldier.

The second part of this study uses sources which
illustrate the military material culture of the American Revolution. These works, many of which were stimulated by the bicentennial of the war, are used by the collector of military equipment to identify and authenticate items. Artifacts are usually grouped into categories such as weapons, clothing, camp equipment, etc. These may be subdivided by ethnicity or in which branch of the army they might be found; infantry, artillery, cavalry, medical service, etc.

These sources rarely provide information concerning the history of a specific piece of equipment. Nor do they provide a sample that is detailed or sufficiently large to accommodate a quantitative study. However, these sources do provide a sufficient amount of examples for the purpose of this study.

Another source of information, or perhaps bias, that must be noted is the author's use of accurate reproductions of the equipment in this study. A decade and a half of participation in living history programs using these reproduced artifacts has perhaps provided unique insights concerning these items. An attempt has been made not to include specific ideas and thoughts gained from this experience, as this activity has been approached as a hobby rather than experimental archeology, although the possibility of research is present and questions have been pursued. Consequently, there is a possibility that this study has been influenced by these experiences.
The third, and final step, is comparing and contrasting attributes of selected artifacts in regard to the five assumptions stated above. There are easily recognizable differences between the individual pieces of equipment used by the Virginian and his opponent. Yet, do these differences present a pattern in the entire assemblage of military material culture? Does this pattern relate to differences in the respective societies?

This study is limited to suggesting that the material culture presented reflects differences in the societies that produced and/or used the items.

Obviously, the societal attitude represented by the material culture is also affected by diverse cultural and environmental forces. Economics and politics impacted heavily on the military equipment used by the Virginians. However, a pattern does develop. This pattern may well have continued after the war and thereby suggests an attitude not exclusive to Virginia but shared by the new American nation.
This study is concerned with differences in the military material culture of the opponents in the American Revolution. These differences, of course, did not result in isolation from the forces that cause cultural change in society. Although a large portion of the colonial population of North America, south of Canada, was English, or of English ancestry, the military system that evolved in the colonies differed greatly from that of the home country. An overview of the respective systems, and the confrontation between those systems, would be of value before examination of the equipment produced for and by these systems.

The differences between the British and North American military systems can be examined through their development during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The British system was well developed by the beginning of this period. Change in the British military faced the challenge of tradition and special interests, economic and political, which profited by maintaining the status quo. The system present in North America faced a far different environment, socio cultural and natural. This difference included actual and potential foes, the distance from the support system of the mother county, and the natural environment which presented problems unknown to western Europeans.
The military system of England developed from the feudal system which focused on a warrior class. Successful individuals in this class were rewarded with land holdings. The land included responsibility for political administration. Consequently, a close relationship between the military and government developed. As England developed an ever increasing role in regional and global trade and the protection of that trade, the need for maintaining a standing army was realized. Prior to this the warrior raised a force to serve as needed by the King or the noble he served.

The maintenance of a standing army required centralized control. Yet, the monarch in many cases did not maintain control of the army. He contracted much of the need to private business. These businessmen, who had gained power through trade, shunned actual service preferring to buy it as they did other necessary labor. (Vagt 1959:46). Leadership was provide by the descendants of the warrior class. These nobles, or gentry, maintained great power within the military and substantial influence in the government.

In the decades preceding the American Revolution the dual role of soldier/politician was not uncommon. The English Parliaments of 1732-1733 and 1754 had 54 members who were army officers. The parliament of 1761 had 64 officers including John Burgoyne, William Howe, and Charles Cornwallis (Vagt 1959:66). These three men were major
figures in the American Revolution.

Perhaps the militaristic society of eighteenth century England did not compare with that of Prussia. "In England the first people of state held the military positions, and not, as Frederick demanded in Prussia, the reverse - the military taking the uppermost state positions" (Vagt 1959:66). However, by comparison to the system developed in the North American colonies it was indeed militaristic. "Europe, almost to the end of the ancien regime, remained a society in which the ruling class was also a military class. The sword, accoutrement de rigueur of anyone pretending to the title of gentleman, was the outward symbol of that identification" (Keegan 1987:4).

In England, and Europe in general, the gentry provided the leaders of a professional, standing army (England maintained a militia system for home defense but it was seldom embodied). This system was to begin to break down with the French Revolution in 1789. The seeds of this change were, however, in existence before this time. The vanguard of change came in the form of writers of the Enlightenment. They were highly critical of militarism and standing armies (Vagt 1959:75-78). In the British North American colonies much of this "enlightenment" was already in practice.

Until the final French and Indian War in the 1750's England provided very little military support to the North American colonies. The colonists were on their own to deal
with whatever force the French, Dutch, Spanish, or Native Americans might use. "As the charter of Massachusetts Bay made clear, the inhabitants alone were 'to incounter, expulse, repell and resist by force or armes, as well by sea as by lands' any attempt to invade or destroy their community" (Higginbotham 1971:1).

The need for an organized system for protection produced local military units. This was in keeping with the local organization and control of other institutions such as the county court, the town meeting, and the church congregation. The militia, under local leadership, was meant to meet local need (Higginbotham 1971:7).

The local nature of the militia did not prevent operations that could justifiable be called a campaign. From 1690 through 1746 the colonists mounted major expeditions against the French. Though most were unsuccessful, the 1745 attack on the French stronghold of Louisbourg on Cape Breton Island was a victory. The fort was returned by England to France by treaty only to be recaptured a decade later (Higginbotham 1971:9-10). Obviously, this action was not popular with the colonists.

It is important to note that the militia managed to accomplish what was expected and therefore the system was retained. This system had three features that set it apart from the English militaristic system. It was embodied only as needed, for training or an emergency. Its members included the entire community. It was governed by local
authority.

That these features made the colonial system different from the European is reinforced by the European "enlightenment". Voltaire call soldiers hired murderers. Rousseau said that armies were a pest. Enlightenment thinkers thought an army should embody the principles of nature, rights of man, and reason (Vagt 1959:75-77).

Rousseau thought every citizen shall be a soldier from duty, and be ready, but only when called upon (Vagt 1959:77). It can be supposed that colonial leaders read these writings and saw that the militia system, already in place in North America, met the ideal. This would further reinforce the value of the system.

The English militaristic system and the North American military system met in conflict over a thirty year span 1753-1783. This time can be divided into three distinct periods. 1753-1761 was a period in which the two systems cooperated against a common foe, France. 1761-1775 the English system confronted the colonies by the maintenance of garrisons in North America. The final period 1775-1783 was the American Revolution. Here the two systems were in confrontation.

The first period includes the French and Indian War. British regulars and colonial troops, in essence embodied militia, served side by side. Although, many of the colonials served in a logistical position or as reserve troops, they were witness to the vulnerability of
professional soldier (Higginbotham 1971:22). They saw overwhelming defeats of the British at Fort William Henry in 1757 and at Ticonderoga in 1758. They compared this to the provincials victory under Sir William Johnson in 1756. This undoubtedly brought the relative quality of the systems into question.

Also, the adaptability of colonists to the environmental conditions should be examined. Beginning with a rearguard action by colonial troops at Braddock's defeat, through the Saint Francis expedition by Rogers' Rangers in 1759, colonials adjusted tactics and equipment to meet the challenge of the enemy. That the British army would adopt modifications in their organization and equipment (example, use of rifles and formation of a light infantry regiment, the 80th) based on the colonial example must have suggested to the colonists the relative value of the two systems. Hamilton 1962:217. Knox 1980:159)

The second period highlights the incompatibility of the two systems. The British militaristic system, represented by the British soldier, remained on North American soil. The colonists, left on their own for more than a century, found it unacceptable to have these troops remain, especially after the main threat, the French, had been removed. Added to the presence of the troops, a standing army, were unpopular demands, laws, and taxes, in some cases enforced by the British soldier (Higginbotham 1971:29-31).

The capture of many frontier forts during Pontiac's
uprising in 1763 again gave question to the value of the British military presence. At the end of the period the defeat of the Shawnee at the battle of Point Pleasant by colonial troops reinforced the belief that the colonists could fend for themselves.

The third period, the American Revolution, was not meant to be a test of these systems yet the outcome might well have been used by the French revolutionists and others to suggest the "righteousness" of the cause, or perhaps a more important point, it could succeed.

What part the two systems played in the outcome of the American Revolution is part of the complexity of the event. It must be balanced against various economic, political, social, geographical, and environmental factors. The North American military system had been tested for a century and a half on the ground of, and prior to, the American Revolution. The British system could make some adaptations but was unable to adjust as was necessary to win.

The result of the American victory would be to further solidify the belief in the system. Washington, who had advocated a regular army during the war, now referred to the militia as a bulwark of liberty and independence. He called for a system in every state that would include almost all men. They would be trained an organized under a common plan. From this national militia a ready reserve would be formed from men ages eighteen to twenty five. They would be
trained twenty five days each year in their own companies but also in battalion and brigade formation (Higginbotham 1971:442). This system would have pleased those who feared the standing army and the militaristic system it represented.

Much of the British system was maintained into the early twentieth century when the complexities of warfare due to technological change and larger armies forced a change. Although conscription was avoided until World War I, the army was reorganized in the years before the war. For the first time a general staff was formed similar to that found in the Prussian tradition. A military intelligence organization was established. The old militia system was discarded in favor of the Territorial Army. Officer training programs were founded in public schools. The war itself was to be responsible for finally "obliterating the traditional distinction between soldier and civilian" (Arnstein 1976:229-230, 244).

The North American colonists, although of British stock, were not of the group that provided the leaders of the British military. The lack of this ingredient in the traditions which were imported from the home country allowed them to adopt a military system which proved better suited to the environment of North America. This system was distinct from the British military system in that it was universal, involving the total population, was under civilian control, and was only embodied as necessary. This
distinction is illustrated in the equipment used by the opposing forces in the American Revolution.
CLOTHING

Clothing and equipping the soldiers of the Virginia Line may have well been more difficult than finding the men to fill the 15 regiments demanded by the Continental Congress. Virginia did, however, send 15 regiments to the Continental line, plus two regiments of the Virginia State Line. It would appear that every effort was made to supply these men with the equipment needed to do the job.

Clothing, as with other kinds of equipment, did not consistently meet the ideal of an eighteenth century army. The Virginians marched to join Washington as soon as the regiment was of sufficient strength and equipment to leave. Therefore, an individual's equipment would be dependent on what was available when he received his "issue". If blue breeches were available he received blue. The next man, perhaps from the same company, might be the first to get a issue out of the next bale and these breeches might be green.

As time went on the soldier's clothing would wear out and he might be issued new britches made out of linen or buckskin. If he had money he might buy his own from a
civilian tailor. His clothing may have worn out at a
different rate than that of other men in his company. If
they were all uniform at one point in time, six months later
there would be variety in the uniforms.

Soldiers would sell excess clothing if they had it or
use it in gambling. Clothing was taken from the dead, sick,
and discharged soldier. This would be reissued. If
anything was uniform about a Virginian's clothing it might
well be a lack of uniformity.

The documentation of the clothing worn by Virginia
troops comes from three sources. Deserter descriptions were
published in newspapers. The descriptions give the clothing
of the deserter, his regiment, and the date. This gives, of
course, a very small sample to justify proposing that this
represented the "look" of a particular regiment. The
factors that led to diversity in uniforms, as stated above,
suggest that deserter descriptions have limitations as
resources and may or may not be accurate in describing the
appearance of the soldier's comrades.

State records provide a list of items issued but lack
detailed descriptions. The numbers of breeches, shirts, and
hats are given with occasional reference to type of material
and/or color. These records include yard goods issued to
individual regiments and companies. This material was made
into garments by soldiers with skill as tailors and by
civilian tailors. This probably caused diversity due to the
skill of the individual workman.
The third source of documentation are references gleaned from orders, letters, and elsewhere that mention clothing needs. There are references to the men being naked or ragtag. These references often lack a point of comparison. A man in the eighteenth century without a coat was considered undressed. These descriptions will be used with others to attempt to build a picture of the Virginia soldier.

In this chapter each of the 15 Virginia Line Regiments and the 1st and 2nd State Line Regiments will be examined in light of the documentation concerning their uniforms. Also the Light Infantry Brigade of 1779 will be included as Virginians were a part of this special detachment.

1st VIRGINIA REGIMENT [Old 1st, and 9th]

The 1st Virginia Regiment was initially supplied by companies drawing equipment from the Williamsburg Public Store from October 1775-February 1776. Companies commanded by John Green, William Davies, John Seayres, John Markham, Robert Ballard, John Fleming, William Campbell, and George Gibson received supplies (Goodwin 1962:20-32, 44-45, 50, 52-61, 63, 65, 68). These nine companies would account for most, if not all, the personnel of the regiment.

The need for shoes was common with all companies except Gibson's. All companies, except Campbell's received blue
wool suitable for leggings. They received buttons which indicates they were making their own clothes and/or issued clothing came without buttons. Six of the eight companies received hats and material for hunting shirts. Five companies received shirts or the material to make shirts. Three companies received checked shirts. Three were issued stockings.

Markham and Seayres company's received green flannel. Markham got 87 yards and Seayres 86 3/4 yards. They also got 73 yards and 82 1/2 yards of oznaburg for breeches lining which suggests the end use for the green flannel (Goodwin 1962:30-31). Ballard's and Davies' Companies received red duffle for "Capes and c.[such] for hunting shirts" (Goodwin 1962:32). There was some blue cloth and coating issued with no specifics as to end use.

The Williamsburg Public Store records indicate that the soldiers of the 1st Virginia appeared uniform in clothing as they marched North in 1776. They wore hunting shirts probably of the same style and color, usually brown or other dark color. They had blue wool leggings. Three companies, at least, had checked shirts. Their hats were probably the short brimmed round hat popular with light troops, although it is possible they wore a full military cocked hat. They wore the knee length breeches of the 18th Century with coarse woolen stockings and the common shoe. Probably the men wore a waistcoat, wool or linen, the color(s) undetermined.
The reference to red duffle for capes and c. would provide evidence that the hunting shirt trim was of this material. Usually the collar and cuffs contrasted with the body of the garment. The term cape may mean a simple collar or a piece of material that spread over the shoulders as an added protection from the weather. This was a normal feature of some hunting shirts although it was usually of linen. It would be unusual to use wool for a cape over linen but it would be very functional. The wool would provide warmth and better protection against rain than linen. The body of the hunting shirt, made of linen, would allow air circulation and the evaporation of perspiration.

This uniform did not compare with the standard European military fashion but it was a relatively inexpensive and a very functional alternative. The upper body was protected by a heavy linen hunting shirt with an extra layer of material over the shoulders. A waistcoat underneath added warmth. The hunting shirt extended to mid thigh where it met the top of thick wool leggings. These protected the legs, breeches, and stockings from the damage caused by plants and grasses when off the road, as well as, undergrowth in the woods. They also provide warmth and, by extending over the shoe tops, kept stones and such from getting into the shoes. The colors of these garments, blue, green, and brown provided a camouflage in the extensive forests of North America.

After the initial outfitting of the 1st Virginia, and
this is the case with the regiments that follow, the Williamsburg Public Store records are of limited use. Only one entry for the regiment appears in 1777. Captain John Green received 16 hunting shirts and 73 pair of leggings on April 12 (Goodwin 1962:120). The appearance of this regiment in later service with the Continental Army is found in deserter descriptions.

The Virginia Gazette, October 24, 1777, described a deserter from Lt. Francis Mennis' Company of the 1st Virginia as wearing a blue coat, white waistcoat and breeches, and white hat (Lefferts 1971:141). This is similar to an earlier advertisement in the Gazette on January 17, 1777 for a deserter from Captain Nelson's Company. This man had a blue regimental coat, faced red (collar, cuffs, lapels), white small clothes (waistcoat, breeches), and a white hat. This clothing shows a change from the frontier costume, described above, to a look more in keeping with that of a European soldier.

This uniform may not have been available to all as suggested by the issue of hunting shirts and leggings to Capt. Green mentioned above. The Virginia Gazette ran an advertisement on May 23, 1777 for a deserter wearing a yellow hunting shirt. The color seems unusual in comparison to the dark colors usually chosen. This could be as a result of environmental effects on the garment dye. The author of this study has had linen reproduction clothing, dyed brown, fade to a pinkish-brown hue. Another
explanation might be that with field experience this regiment chose a bright color feeling confident to meet the enemy in the open field and the concealment a dark color provided in the forest was no longer a concern.

In the autumn of 1778 recruits for the 1st Virginia were issued a suit of regimental cloths, a hat, 2 shirts, 2 pairs of stockings and 2 pairs of shoes (Goodwin 1962:146). This was in compliance with a law for raising volunteers passed earlier that year. The suit of regimentals consisted of a coat, jacket, and breeches. The term jacket is not easily defined. This may be a waistcoat with sleeves, a garment used by British light troops and popular with both sides in the French and Indian War.

The troops already in the field were not neglected. The Schooner May Flower was sent North at the end of October 1778 with a cargo containing 369 suits, 32 coats, 7 jackets, and various pieces of cloth (Goodwin 1962:146-147). It seems possible that this was not the only shipment as it would have been insufficient for the entire Virginia Line.

These supplies may have gone directly to the army or may have been delivered to the Virginia Public Store in Philadelphia. In late 1778 and early 1779 the Public Store issued a tremendous amount of clothing and miscellaneous equipment to the individual regiments of the Virginia line. In September of 1778 the Line had been consolidated into 11 regiments and the 1st and 2nd Virginia State Line were serving with the Continental Army (Sellers 1978:49).
The records show the 1st Virginia received in September and October, 1778, 456 pairs of shoes, 642 pairs of stockings, 238 soldier's shirts, 47 stocks, and 17 coats (PPS 1778-1779:9-11). The monthly strength report of this unit in October of 1778 show the regiment had 279 officers and men on duty out of a total of 491 on the roster (Lesser 1976:88). The amount of equipment issued compared to the number of men on duty indicates that the men of this regiment were in need of supplies. Similar amounts of supplies are issued to all the regiments at this time. The 1st Virginia and the entire Virginia Line, probably "rag tag" in appearance in the summer of 1778, became well uniformed by the spring of 1779.

The issue of specific items of clothing is only part of the supplies received. The 1st Virginia also got scarlet, buff, and black cloth, thread, woolen caps, flannel waistcoats, cloth waistcoats, cloth breeches, stock buckles, coat buttons, vest buttons, and linen yard goods (PPS 1778-1779:9-11). It is obvious that the Army was producing its own clothing as well as receiving contracted uniforms.

It is also possible that the 1st Virginia and the other regiments that received equipment at this time were issued clothing produced in France. The French coat was blue faced red, waistcoats red or blue, and breeches red or green (Mollo 1975:193-194).

There is no specific documentation as to the 1st Virginia receiving clothing between the spring of 1779 and
May of 1780 when they surrendered with the garrison of Charleston, South Carolina. They left the main army with the other Virginia regiments in the autumn of 1779 and marched to Virginia where the Line was reorganized into three detachments and were to receive supplies before marching for Charleston. The supply problems slowed the 1st Virginia Detachment's (the old 1st Virginia was part of this unit) move south. They, and the 2nd Virginia Detachment, did not reach Charleston until April 1780 (Sellers 1978:62-63). The 3rd Virginia Detachment due to supply problems was not ready to take the field until after Charleston had fallen (Sellers 1978:68).

The 1st Virginia served as long as any unit of the Virginia military in the Revolution. There is no evidence to suggest that they were any better, or worse, supplied than any other unit. Similarities in supply of other units with that of the 1st Virginia will allow reference to the description of this unit's clothing in type and source. This will avoid needless repetition.
The records of the Williamsburg Public Store list equipment issued to the 2nd Virginia Regiment during the same period the 1st Virginia received supplies, late 1775 through early 1776. Six companies are mentioned in these lists, commanded by Captains George Johnson, Richard Parker, William Taliferro, Richard Meade, Samuel Haws, and William Fountain (Goodwin 1962:21, 27, 30, 32-34, 42-44, 46-50, 69, 75, 83). As this unit received equipment from the same store and at the same time as the 1st Virginia, it is not surprising that the material is similar as would be the appearance of the Regiment.

Five of the six companies received oznaburg for hunting shirts. The exception is William Fountain's Company which is noted as a rifle company (Goodwin 1962:47). The hunting shirt was a traditional item of clothing for the rifleman therefore it is possible that Fountain's command came to Williamsburg with this garment. Also, two early deserter descriptions in the Virginia Gazette of September 6, 1776 and January 24, 1777, list brown hunting shirts (Lefferts 1971:141). This sample, although small, suggests a uniform color for this Regiment.

Five companies received stockings, three specifically blue hose. Four companies received shoes and four hats. All the companies were issued blue material suitable for leggings. Haw's Company got oznaburg for this purpose.
rather than wool (Goodwin 1962:75).

The style of these leggings is questionable. Two different styles were familiar to the Americans. During and after the French and Indian War period military fashion included a high legging, or full gaiter, made of heavy linen, which extended from the shoe top to above the knee. This buttoned on the outside of the leg. A similar garment of leather or wool was worn by Native Americans which had sewn or laced seam rather than buttons. William Taliaferro's Company received horn buttons for leggings (Goodwin 1962:42). This indicates that the leggings were of the military variety.

Richard Meade's Company received 40 yards of oznaburg for breeches lining and 70 yards of flannel with no end use specified (Goodwin 1962:48). The flannel may have been for constructing breeches and the discrepancy between the yardage of flannel and oznaburg might be due to colonial garments not being fully lined.

Documentation of the clothing of this regiment between the initial Williamsburg issues and the issues from the Philadelphia Store in late 1778-early 1779 is, as with the 1st Virginia, limited to deserter descriptions. In January 1777, the Virginia Gazette ran advertisements for deserters from the 2nd Virginia. One man had a blue coat, the other a brown coat. One had brown linen trousers, the other buckskin. One had a flapped hat, the other a macaroni hat with a black band and silver buckle (Lefferts 1971:141-142).
This is a small sample but it suggests a lack of uniformity in contrast to the troops that marched North.

The Pennsylvania Packet on March 11, 1778 gives a deserter description. The man has a blue coat with blue velvet collar, green waistcoat, buckskin breeches, and a round hat. The velvet collar is out of the ordinary, however, the blue coat does match the coats of three deserters mentioned in a deserter description on September 5, 1777. These coats had white binding (Lefferts 1971:141).

The 2nd Virginia, like the 1st, may have benefited from the material shipped from Williamsburg in the autumn of 1778. They received a substantial amount of equipment from the Philadelphia Store (PPS 1778-1779:11-12). Like the other units it probably was the last major supply received before the surrender at Charleston (Sellers 1978:62).

The material issued from the store at Philadelphia included large numbers of shoes, stockings, shirts, hats, and caps. Linen and other cloth, as well as, buttons and thread were issued (PPS 1778-1779:11-12). The new clothing would help make the winter more comfortable, however, the issue of neck stocks indicates a soldierly appearance would be required.

The 2nd Virginia's appearance did not greatly differ from the other regiments of the Virginia Line. The white binding on the coats, mentioned above, instead of coats "turned up" with a contrasting color was somewhat unique. Yet, for most of the war the 2nd Virginia probably suffered
shortages and benefited from adequate supply with their fellow Virginians.

3rd VIRGINIA REGIMENT

Documentary evidence concerning the 3rd Virginia is limited. The Williamsburg records refer to only one company of this regiment, commanded by John Chilton. Chilton received oznaburg for hunting shirts and blue half-thick, a wool material suitable for leggings (Goodwin 1962:41). This issue was during the same period the 1st and 2nd Regiments received supplies and suggests the 3rd Virginia's appearance might be the same as these other units.

The Pennsylvania Packet of September 5, 1778 provides the only deserter description for this Regiment. Two men left wearing light blue drab coats with pale blue facings, green vests, and linen overalls (Lefferts 1971:142). The green vests, which also appear in the 2nd regiment, indicate uniformity. The overalls, like the hunting shirt, are a very functional piece of clothing combining breeches and leggings into one garment.

The 3rd Virginia received a large quantity of supplies from the Philadelphia Store in 1778-1779. They were issued shoes and shoe buckles, stockings, shirts, coats, wool and linen vests, wool caps, and stocks and buckles. They got linen and wool cloth, thread and buttons (PPS n.d.:13-14).
The need to manufacture their own clothes, as others were doing, indicates the need of this regiment were those faced by the other units of the Virginia Line.

4th VIRGINIA REGIMENT [Old 4th and 8th]

The 4th Virginia is represented in the Williamsburg Store record by a single company commanded by John Brent. They received oznaburg for hunting shirts and blue coating which may have been for leggings (Goodwin 1962:71). This documentation is augmented by a early deserter description in the Virginia Gazette on September 27, 1776. This man is described as having a hunting shirt faced with red, checked shirt, and trousers (Lefferts 1971:142). The red facing refers to collar and cuffs and corresponds to the evidence cited in the discussion of the 1st Virginia.

The Philadelphia Store records lists the 4th Virginia as receiving the same type of supplies as the other units, stockings, shoes, stocks, shirts, coats, wool caps, shoe buckles, flannel waistcoats, cloth breeches, and hats. The 4th also received cloth, linen, thread, and coat and vest buttons (PPS 1778-1779:14-15).

5th VIRGINIA REGIMENT
The 5th Virginia Regiment appears in the Williamsburg Store record as of March 4, 1776 when Captain George Stubblefield received oznaburg for hunting shirts and leggings (Goodwin 1962:70). Two other companies are recorded. John Pleasant received coating and frieze for leggings and Ralph Faulkner was issued blue hose (Goodwin 1962:76,77). The 5th became part of the 3rd Virginia during the reorganization of the Virginia Line in September, 1778.

6th VIRGINIA REGIMENT

The 6th Virginia Regiment is better documented than other regiments. An orderly book contains the following regimental order dated April 3, 1776.

The Captains of the 6th Battalion, together with the other Officers, are immediately to provide themselves with Hunting Shirts, short and fringed; the men's shirts are to be short and plain, the Sergeants' shirts to have small white cuffs and plain; The Drummers shirts to be with dark cuffs. Both Officers and Soldiers to have Hats cut round and bound with black; The Brims of their Hat's to be two inches deep and cocked on one, with a button and loop and cockades, which is to be worn on the left. Neither men nor Officers to do duty in any other Uniform. The Officers and soldiers are to wear their hair short and as near a like as possible (Goodwin 1962:11).

The Williamsburg Public Store supplied five companies of the 6th Virginia from March 4, 1776, through September 14, 1776. The companies were commanded by William Gregory, James Johnson, Thomas Massie, Samuel Cabell, and Oliver
Towles (Goodwin 1962:70, 74-75, 77, 81-82, 89, 93-96). A deserter description in the Virginia Gazette, May 10, 1776, refers to a company commanded by Thomas Hutchings (Lefferts 1971:142). Hutching's Company is not mentioned in the Williamsburg Public Store record.

The Williamsburg record and deserter descriptions do not necessarily support the uniformity called for in the regimental order quoted above. Gregory's and Johnsons Companies received oznaburg for hunting shirts, however, Towles received close bodied coats and jackets (Goodwin 1962:74, 89, 96).

Deserter descriptions from the same period suggest a variety of clothing. The deserters from Hutching's Company had the following clothing:

- hunting shirt dyed black
- blue duffle coat
- blue leggings
- black and white mixed virginia cloth coat and waistcoat
- copperas striped coat and waistcoat of virginia cloth
- light colored kersey coat
- leather breeches (Lefferts 1971:142-143).

Deserters from Samuel Cabell's Company were described in the Virginia Gazette, July 5, 1776, as having,

- new suit of gray broadcloth
- hunting shirts trimmed in red [two examples]
- leather breeches
breeches of light colored sagathy (Lefferts 1971:142)

Later in the year, October 18, 1776, the Virginia Gazette described two deserters from the 6th Virginia:
- snuff colored coat and waistcoat
- silver button and loop to his hat
- dark colored hunting shirt
- striped Virginia cloth coat and waistcoat
- russia drab breeches

The variety of clothing in these descriptions and that supplied from the Williamsburg Public Store does not support compliance with Order of April 3, 1776. The Public Store did issue shoes to four of the five companies and four of the five received leather breeches.

The leather breeches appear again in a deserter description in the Virginia Gazette, November 8, 1776. Two of three men mentioned have leather breeches, all have hunting shirts trimmed red and one has a gray broadcloth waistcoat (Lefferts 1971:143). The waistcoat description is the same as the deserter from Cabell's Company mentioned above. The gray colored material appears once more in a deserter description in the Pennsylvania Packet, May 13, 1778. This man had a light gray coat with green facings, a gray waistcoat, oznaburg overalls, and a small round hat with a piece of bear fur on it (Mollo 1975:176). The 6th Virginia was incorporated into the 2nd Virginia during the
reorganization of the Virginia Line in September, 1778.

7th VIRGINIA REGIMENT [old 11th]

The Williamsburg Public Store record provides much information concerning the clothing of the 7th Virginia. Four companies were recorded as receiving supplies. These companies were commanded by Gregory Smith, Holt Richardson, Charles Tomkies, and Joseph Crockett (Goodwin 1962:73, 75-76, 80, 86, 89, 103). Another company, commanded by Nathanial Cocke, is mentioned in a deserter description in the Supplement to the Virginia Gazette of May 10, 1776.

Two of the four companies received oznaburg for hunting shirts. The deserter description mentions two men with dark colored hunting shirts and a third with a hunting shirt of Virginia striped cloth dyed almost black. This dark color appears in a later deserter description in the Virginia Gazette, April 4, 1776 (Lefferts 1971:143).

Other clothing items issued to the 7th Virginia in Williamsburg include hats, cloth for breeches, buttons, shoes, and coating for leggings. Tomkie's Company received twenty coats (Goodwin 1962:96). It is unclear if this meant a uniform coat. The deserter description of May 10 mentions a snuff colored coat (Lefferts 1971:143). This may be a similar garment.

The Regiment's commander, Colonel William Dangerfield,
received a large amount of supplies from The Williamsburg store on May 13, 1776. It would not be unusual in the normal operation of the military in the eighteenth century for a regimental commander to be charged with equipment issued to his men. This is, however, unique to the Williamsburg record due to the large amount of supplies. Dangerfield received, 425 yards drilling

- 504 yards check
- 252 yards white linen
- 159 1/2 yards stripes
- 159 1/2 yards stripes
- 174 yards white sheeting
- 96 3/4 yards douls
- 836 1/4 yards oznaburg
- 80 felt hats
- 248 pair shoes
- 4 pieces cotton 82 yards
- 24 dutch blankets best kind
- 4 lb brown thread
- 3 lb brown thread
- 2 lb ditto
- 1 1/2 lb nuns thread
- 8 yards duck (Goodwin 1962:86).

The 836 1/4 yards of oznaburg would produce 152 hunting shirts at 5 1/2 yards per shirt. This would be a sufficient supply for three companies using the desired number of 50
men per company. If the material issued to the companies mentioned earlier is included this would have been sufficient to provide hunting shirts to the entire regiment.

A question is raised, however, due to the two issues of Virginia striped cloth to Dangerfield. The deserter description, mentioned earlier, describes a hunting shirt of Virginia striped cloth dyed almost black. If Virginia cloth was used for hunting shirts the oznaburg may well have been used for leggings. This was not uncommon. Since Dangerfield was not issued any heavy wool cloth, the heavier linen, oznaburg may have become leggings. The fact that two companies of the 7th received coating for leggings in an earlier issue would support the belief that heavy wool was not available.

The goods issued to the 7th Virginia suggests they were able to leave Williamsburg with a uniform appearance. Yet, by the spring of 1777 this uniformity was probably gone. The Virginia Gazette printed two deserter description on April 4 that suggests a much different appearance for the regiment. One describes a man wearing a uniform coat of pale blue turned up with red calmanico. The other, which covers four deserters, lists dark colored hunting shirts, red waistcoat, light colored coarse cloth coat, and brown frieze leggings. This description specifies that one man's hunting shirt is fringed around the capes, ruffles, tail, and down the breast (Lefferts 1971:143). This is much more elaborate than the plain garment called for in the
Regimental Order of the 6th Virginia. This also strongly suggests, due to the fringe running down the breast, that this hunting shirt was of the variety that was open in the front rather than a pull over. In the Philadelphia issue of 1778-1779 the 7th, now renumbered the 5th Virginia, like its fellow units, received shirts, wool caps, cloth breeches, red waistcoats, waistcoats [no color specified], breeches, flannel waistcoats, stockings, stocks and buckles, hats, and shoe buckles. This is the only regiment that did not receive shoes. They also received linen, cloth, thread, and buttons (PPS 1778-1779:15-16).

8th VIRGINIA REGIMENT

General Charles Lee stated on August 2, 1776 that the 8th Virginia was the best armed, clothed, and equipped for immediate service (Sanchez-Saavedra 1978:56). A deserter description of this period describes the man as wearing a hunting shirt, breeches and flapped hat (Lefferts 1971:143). Lee was a former British army officer. He was familiar with the standard appearance of a European army. His statement, with the deserter description specifying the "regular" American uniform, indicates that, in his opinion, the equipment was the best that could be provided by the authorities in Virginia.

Only one issue to the 8th Virginia appears in the
Williamsburg Public Store record. The regiment's commander, John Peter Gabriel Muhlenburg, received the following supplies on May 11, 1776:

- 432 yards drilling
- 79 yards Ravs. duck
- 504 yards check
- 240 yards white linen
- 316 yards blue stripe
- 174 yards white sheeting
- 36 yards brown sheeting
- 80 yards douls
- 872 1/2 yards oznaburg
- 19 small blankets (Goodwin 1962:85)

The oznaburg probably was intended for hunting shirts. The check probably was for shirts. The other material it can be assumed was made up into breeches, waistcoats, and perhaps leggings.

Any uniformity suggested by the Williamsburg issues or Lee's statement seems to have been gone by 1777. Separate deserter advertisements appeared in the Pennsylvania Packet for men from the same company. One advertisement, May 6, 1777, described the man as having a hunting shirt, blue waistcoat, blue germantown milled stockings, and a macaroni beaver hat. The other advertisement, August 19, 1777, lists the clothing as a short blue coat, linen jacket, breeches, and thread stockings (Lefferts 1971:143). The 8th Virginia
was incorporated into the 4th Virginia in the reorganization of the Virginia Line in September 1778

9th VIRGINIA REGIMENT

The 9th Virginia Regiment is represented in the Williamsburg Public Store record by two companies commanded by James Innis and Samuel Woodson (Goodwin 1962:71-72, 79-80). On March 29, 1776, Woodson was issued 370 yards of Oznaburg for hunting and body shirts. The use of the heavy oznaburg for body shirts suggests that lighter weight linen was unavailable. Shortages might also be indicated by Woodson receiving frieze and coating for leggings. The coarse frieze was a usual legging material but the coating was of lighter weight and greater cost and would not normally be used for this purpose.

Woodson also received hats, shoes and socks. Innis was issued a variety of material including broad cloth, frieze, douls. and coating. He also got shoes and hose.

The 9th Virginia served as part of the garrison at Fort Pitt. Garrison duty may have caused less wear on uniforms but the frontier location may have caused irregular supply. The only deserter description appeared in the Pennsylvania Packet, April 15, 1777. The deserter, from Captain Levin Joynes Company, was wearing a light brown coat with red facings (Lefferts 1971:144). The 9th Virginia became part of the 1st Virginia in the reorganization of the Virginia
Line in September, 1778.

10th VIRGINIA REGIMENT

The 10th Virginia Regiment does not appear in the Williamsburg Public Store records. There is only one deserter description. This description from 1777 lists the man, from Captain Thomas West's Company, as wearing a hunting shirt, drawers, and leggings (Lefferts 1971:144).

The 10th Virginia, renumbered the 6th Virginia, was in as much need as the other regiments in the autumn of 1778. Between September 25 and February 2, the 6th received shirts, stockings, shoes, woolen caps, soldiers hats, stocks and stock buckles. They also received linen, wool cloth, thread, and buttons (PPS 1778-1779:16-17).

11th VIRGINIA REGIMENT

The commander of the 11th Virginia Regiment was Daniel Morgan. Morgan was best known for his association with the use of riflemen throughout the war. It has been assumed that Morgan's regiment contained many riflemen probably wearing the traditional dress of riflemen including the hunting shirt (Higginbotham 1961:56-57). A deserter description for the 11th does little to confirm or refute
this assumption. Two men left James Calderwood's Company wearing long, light colored, coats and jackets (Lefferts 1971:144). These may be hunting shirts as these garments have been illustrated as being knee length.

The Philadelphia Public Store records show that the 11th Virginia, now renumbered as the 7th Virginia, did not receive supplies until January 7, 1779, which is later than other regiments of the Virginia Line. The supplies the regiment received does not suggest that they were any less in need. They received brown linen, cloth, thread, and buttons. In clothing they received red cloth waistcoats, cloth breeches, woolen caps, stocks and buckles, shoes, and shirts (PPS 1778-1779:18).

The issues to this regiment were recorded in January and February, 1779, and are of lesser quantities than other units. This is probably due to the regiment mustering less than 60 officers and men fit for duty during those months, most of the regiment on furlough (Lesser 1976:100, 104).

12th VIRGINIA REIMENT

The 12th Virginia is not mentioned in the Williamsburg records. Documentation of this regiment's uniform before the issue in Philadelphia comes from deserter descriptions. Captain William Vause lost five men. The descriptions in the Pennsylvania Packet, August 13 and 19, 1777, lists three
of the men wearing hunting shirts and leather breeches. One man wore a hunting shirt and trousers or overalls, and the last man, hunting shirt, trousers and a small round hat. The Pennsylvania Packet of August 19 also lists a deserter from Michael Bowyer's Company wearing a coarse linen frock and overalls (Lefferts 1971:144). This coarse linen frock may be a hunting shirt the difference due to terminology used by the company commander or an army clerk.

The 12th Virginia, renumbered the 8th Virginia in the reorganization of September 1778, received a large amount of equipment from the Philadelphia Public Store in late 1778-early 1779. They were issued flannel and cloth waistcoats, cloth breeches, shoes, stockings, shirts, woolen caps, coats, stocks, and hats. As with the other regiments the 8th received wool and linen material, thread, and buttons (PPS 1778-1779:19-20).

13th VIRGINIA REGIMENT

The 13th Virginia does not appear in the Williamsburg Public Store record. Deserter descriptions do, however, provide a small sample that suggests uniformity in this unit. The companies of James Neal and Davis Steele placed advertisements in the Pennsylvania Packets on April 22 and July 15, 1777, and in the Pennsylvania Evening Post on August 16, 1777. Each description includes a blue
regimental coat cuffed or faced with yellow (Lefferts 1971:144). The reason one description specifies cuff color and another facing may be due to the individual who wrote the advertisement or perhaps slight variation in uniform coats. The 13th Virginia was sent to garrison Fort Pitt in May 1778 (Lesser 1971:70). The regiment was redesignated the 9th Virginia in the reorganization of September 1778. The 9th Virginia is not listed in the Philadelphia Store record.

14th VIRGINIA REGIMENT

The only record of the 14th Virginia directly receiving supply from Williamsburg is 300 pair of hose on April 9, 1777 (Goodwin 1962:119). A deserter description in the Virginia Gazette, July 4, 1777, suggests that the need, at least to approach uniformity, might have been greater than stockings. Nathan Reid's Company lost two men, one wearing a striped cotton fly coat and waistcoat, linen drawers, and leggings. The other man had a white hunting shirt, leather leggings and moccasins (Lefferts 1971:144).

The 14th Virginia, renumbered the 10th Virginia in the reorganization of September 1778, received considerable supply from the Philadelphia Public Store between September 1778 and February 1779. They were issued shoes, stockings, shirts, woolen caps, breeches, waistcoats, hats, stocks, and
stock buckles. They also received cloth, linen, thread, and buttons (PPS 1778-1779:20-21).

15th VIRGINIA REGIMENT

The 15th Virginia regiment appears in the Williamsburg store record with an issue to 1 soldier on November 24, 1778. He received a regimental suit, 10 1/2 yards of check, two pairs of hose, two pairs of shoes, and a hat (Goodwin 1962:150). The yardage of check would be sufficient for two shirts. This issue was made at the same time this regiment was receiving supplies in Philadelphia. It is likely that the men with the Army received similar supplies.

The Philadelphia Store issued to the 15th Virginia, now the 11th Virginia, the same equipment issued to the other units. They received cloth breeches, flannel and cloth waistcoats, stockings, woolen caps, stocks and buckles, shirts, and hats. As was true of the other units, they received cloth, linen, thread and buttons (PPS 1778-1779:22).

1st VIRGINIA STATE LINE REGIMENT
The 1st Virginia State Line Regiment appears in the Williamsburg Public Store record beginning March 15, 1777. Five companies and the regiment, through the commander, received supplies. The supplies included hose, shoes, checked shirts, and hats. In addition to this clothing they got oznaburg, sheeting, shalloon (a light wool used for coat lining), thread, and buttons (Goodwin 1962:112, 115, 118-121, 123-124, 129, 155-156).

Deserter descriptions from this same period do not suggest that the Williamsburg Store material produced a uniform appearance. An advertisement in the Virginia Gazette, May 2, 1777, lists a striped Virginia cloth coat and breeches. On June 6, 1777, the Gazette advertised for a man wearing a short striped jacket. The Gazette of June 27, 1777, lists a light colored coat and breeches (Lefferts 1971:145).

The 1st State Line Regiment was serving with the Continental Army during the autumn of 1778 and the winter/spring of 1779. Therefore, they received the issue of equipment from the Philadelphia Store. Not unlike the Virginia Line regiments they received stockings, shoes, shirts, coats, stocks and buckles, woolen caps, hats, waistcoats, and breeches. They also received cloth, linen thread, and buttons (PPS 1778-1779:23-24).

It is important that this regiment received much the same equipment as the other units as a deserter description in the Spring provides an excellent view of the uniform
which may have been a result of the supplies issued from Philadelphia. The deserter wore a blue coat turned up red, red waistcoat, and breeches. This is the uniform specified in regulations. It can be assumed with some confidence that this was the appearance of the entire Virginia Line in the Spring of 1779.

2nd VIRGINIA STATE LINE REGIMENT

The 2nd Virginia State Line Regiment received their first issue from the Williamsburg Store in March, 1777 (Goodwin 1962:115). Three companies received shoes and a variety of cloth and linen. Benjamin Spiller's Company received cloth specifically for coats and jackets and red cloth for facings (Goodwin 1962:136). Robert Lovell's Company was issued blue frieze for coats and large plain buttons (Goodwin 1962:141). It seems obvious the regiment was manufacturing, or having manufactured, blue coats faced red, the desired uniform for the Virginia soldier.

This model uniform is supported by a deserter description which appeared in the Virginia Gazette, September 5, 1777. The soldier, from John Dudley's Company, lists a blue coat turned up red (Lefferts 1971:145). This advertisement, only four months after the issue from the Williamsburg Stores, suggests this soldier is probably wearing the coat he received in Williamsburg.
The 2nd received a substantial quantity of equipment from the Philadelphia Store in 1778-1779. They were issued shoes, stockings, shirts, neck stocks and buckles, waistcoats, hats, woolen caps, breeches, and coats. They received cloth, linen, thread, and buttons (PPS 1778-1779:24-25). Their need seems to be equal with the other units. The evidence supports that the Williamsburg issued supplies certainly could not stand a full year of wear and tear. The winter of 1777-1778 was spent at Valley Forge and many accounts of the appearance of the men during that winter suggests that the equipment, new in the spring, was now no better than rags in the winter. This provides a hint as to the longevity of uniform clothing of the Virginia soldier.

THE CORPS OF LIGHT INFANTRY, 1779

Virginia Line regiments provided a large portion of the the Light Infantry Brigade during the 1779 campaign and documentation of this service is important to the discussion of the uniforms of the Virginia soldier. During the campaign season the Light Infantry was combined for special duty. In the Continental Army each regiment was to designate one company as its light company to be composed of its best soldiers, elite troops. This company would be detached to the Light Brigade or Light Corps.
The Light Infantry would be recognized on the field by modifications to the regular uniform. The coat may be shorter and the cocked hat of the regular would be replaced by a leather cap decorated with a horsehair plume or other devise. American equipment shortages prevented major uniform changes. However, it seems the commander, Anthony Wayne, attempted to make the appearance of the Corps unique and this caused problems for the Virginians.

The Virginian's had received caps as members of the Light Corps but they fell short of regulations. The orderly book of the 1st Regiment of the Corps states on October 22, 1779,

> General Wayne has observed with great concern that the Virginians are the only troops in the Light Infantry that has not procured hair for their caps (Gamble 1892:250).

The concern for a properly decorated cap seems to be a small problem as the 1st Regiment's orderly book states on September 30, 1779, that barefoot men are to be returned to the Army (Gamble 1892:256). This suggests that the shoes issued in quanity to the Virginians in early 1779 did not hold up for a campaign season.

The documentation indicates that the Virginia Regiments that served with the Continental Army received equal treatment from the state in regard to clothing supplies. It also seems that the state attempted to provide the regulation uniform and, if that was not possible, tried to see the men had something in terms of clothing.
Where there are differences in uniforms between regiments the variety can be attributed to the location of the unit when supplies were available. Yet, even within a unit there was variation. A regiment viewed at two hundred yards might well seem uniform, at ten yards it would be apparent that no two men were alike. Differences in uniform color, cut, fabric, quality of construction, and personal modification was probably the norm.

If the documentation would allow, each company should be studied. Individual companies would be assigned to duty away from their regiments. This may have allowed them to acquire clothing that the rest of the regiment would not receive. Also the detached company could possibly miss receiving an issue made available to their regiment during their absence. This detached service may have caused more, or perhaps less, wear on the clothes than that experienced by the remainder of the unit.

Soldiers individually bought, sold, traded, and gambled for extra clothing. An issue of a new garment might require the soldier to produce a worn item to prove need. A competent "scrounger" might be well dressed and the individual next to him in the ranks might be in rags.

The appearance of the Virginia soldier in the Revolution changed over time. In order to understand how he was clothed a number of variables must be specified such as what period of the war and which regiment. The state of Virginia made every effort to equip her soldiers. There
were times that clothing was adequate in quantity, and times of hardship. This hardship may be magnified through twentieth century eyes.

FIREARMS

The American Revolution, 1775-1883, is within a period of firearm technology which is dominated by the smoothbore flintlock musket. This applies to military and civilian weapons. This period extends from the beginning of the eighteenth century to the 1840's. The smoothbore musket replaced the pike or polearm as the standard infantry weapon and remained dominant until replaced by the caplock rifled musket.

The flintlock ignition system was developed c.1550 and for the next century and a half competed with the matchlock and wheel lock systems. The matchlock, which replaced the longbow and crossbow in warfare, was by comparison to the other two systems slow to fire, bulky in size, and undependable in bad weather. The wheel lock fired faster than a matchlock and was far more dependable. It rivaled the flintlock in this regard. However, it was a much more complicated mechanism and required precision in manufacture and maintenance (Neumann 1967:1-12).

The flintlock saw distinct stages in its development but by the middle of the seventeenth century had achieved the form that is found on the muskets of the American
Revolution. Its function was the same as the other systems, to ignite a quantity of gunpowder which would propel a projectile. This was accomplished by loading the barrel of the firearm with a measured amount of gunpowder followed by a round lead ball which may be wrapped in cloth, leather, or paper to seal the area between the ball and the barrel wall. The ball and its wadding would be pressed tight against the powder charge with a rod.

The flintlock ignition system is mounted on the side of the firearm at the breech end of the barrel with the lock's pan in line with a small opening in the barrel called a touch hole or vent which leads to the powder charge. A small quantity of gunpowder is put into the pan of the lock. When the trigger is pulled the cock is released and the flint strikes the frizzen which produces a shower of sparks as it opens the pan cover to expose the powder. The sparks ignite the powder in the pan, the flash travels through the vent igniting the main powder charge discharging the weapon. Given good design, craftsmanship in manufacture, and a moderate amount of moisture in the air, this process, from trigger pull to discharge will appear instantaneous. However, this may have been the exception rather than the rule.

The failure of the weapon to fire in the hands of a colonist hunting ducks or deer may have been inconvenient. The failure to fire in the hands of a soldier may have been fatal, for himself and his comrades. Where the colonist may
have had his weapon produced by a local craftsman whose livelihood depended on the quality of his product, the soldier's weapon may have been produced under a government contract. Cost control dominated the production of the weapon and the reputation of the producer was of little consequence.

The potential problems of the military musket were offset by an additional piece of equipment and appropriate tactics employed by the armies of the period. The military musket was fitted with a bayonet to make it useful when it failed to operate for whatever reason. The bayonet was first introduced in a plug type. This was a metal blade with a round wood handle which was forced into the muzzle of the musket's barrel (Neumann 1967:48). This had two problems. The bayonet had to be removed if the musket was to be loaded and fired. Also, the bond between musket and bayonet was not sound. Movement of the musket or the use of the bayonet would affect its attachment to the musket.

An improvement was made in the bayonet by the introduction of the socket type. This was done by connecting the blade to a metal tube with a short piece of metal. This tube would fit over the muzzle of the barrel and could be made secure by the use of a groove in the tube engaging a metal lug welded to the barrel. The blade would then be parallel to the barrel but offset. This arrangement allowed the musket to be loaded and fired without removing the bayonet (Neumann 1967:48). The socket bayonet was the
type which saw service in the Revolution. However, the plug bayonet may have been used early in the war. Civilian arms were pressed into service and the plug bayonet would be easy to adapt to these arms. Also, the rifle, which most often had an octagonal shape to the exterior of the barrel would not accept a socket bayonet which had to be turned to secure it to the weapon. The plug bayonet may have been used to offset this deficiency.

The effective use of the bayonet and the inherent inaccuracy of the musket dictated the tactics of the period. The massing of troops to concentrate the fire of the muskets or to present a "wall of steel" when relying on the bayonet, not unlike the pike which it replaced (Neumann 1967:14-15). It must be noted that the purpose of this study is to examine military material culture. Yet, the use of this material was aimed at destroying the morale of the opposition. Therefore, the ability of a soldier to withstand the effects of the opponent's weapons is as important, or more so, than the affect of his own. Although outside the scope of this paper, the morale of opposing forces must be a part of a more comprehensive study of this conflict.

The tactics of the Revolution, referred to as linear, were designed to take best advantage of the characteristics of the military musket. The opposing forces lined up facing each other in ranks two or three deep and fired in the general direction of the opponent. The musket may have had
the range to send a ball 200 yards but it generally could not consistently hit a man at more than 80 yards. Muskets were not provided with a rear sight which is necessary for accuracy in aiming the weapon. Rather than drilling the soldier in shooting accurately, the soldier was drilled in speed of loading. The quantity of fire rather than the quality was considered the measure of a good army (Peterson 1968:26-27).

The tactics dictated by the limitations of the flintlock muskets revolved around an attempt to bring a superior force, in numbers, against an inferior opponent. This equation will, of course, be modified by the ability, experience, and morale of the combatants. The advantage went to the British forces early in the war. However, the Americans began to demonstrate an ability to hold their own during the Battles at Saratoga, New York, in 1777. The Southern Campaign, 1780-1783, involved two opponents apparently equal.

Virginia and her sister states did show an ability to put soldiers in the field, but equipping the soldier with the tools to do his job was another matter. Firearms were a major problem. French assistance eased the problem in 1777. Yet, for the first two years of the war procurement of suitable weapons was Virginia's major supply problem.

There were four sources of supply available to the state. Some volunteers brought a personal weapon with them. There were weapons captured in armories and early battles.
Virginia, like other states, contracted with local craftsmen to produce weapons in quantity and encouraged a fledgling weapons industry. Finally, the state attempted to purchase firearms in Europe (Goodwin 1962:162. Neumann 1967:22).

All of these sources produced weapons for the Virginia soldier. Although the results may have met the initial problem of supplying the soldier with a gun, the variety of weapons were a supply nightmare. Ammunition supply had to service barrel bore diameters which ranged between .65 and .80 inches. Although a musket is much more forgiving in the tolerances between bore and ball size than a rifle, the Army Quartermaster had a problem. Also, spare parts were needed from time to time. Interchangeable parts were, of course, not available. In order to fit a part on a flintlock the armorer first had to have a part that approximated the part to be replaced. The supplies had to include parts for British, Dutch, German, and locally produced weapons.

Colonial militia custom required that every man provide his own equipment, this included a firearm. Therefore, it can be assumed that many personal arms were to be found in the camps at the beginning of the war. These weapons were for hunting, although they may have served a self defense role in the western Virginia counties and for Virginians that were exploring further west. Many of the soldiers who lived in the western counties favored rifles rather than smoothbore weapons. The rifle will be discussed later.

These personal weapons presented a wide variety of
types. Long barreled fowling guns, or fowlers, designed to be loaded with shot for duck or goose hunting were probably found among the men from tidewater counties. Locally produced arms with a mixture of colonial produced and European parts might be found in any part of the state, as might obsolete military muskets and economically produced weapons for the Indian trade. A well-to-do gentleman would provide his own fusil, a proportionally smaller version of a military musket mounted with silver or other fine metal parts.

These weapons presented the ammunition and parts supply problem mentioned above. The riflemen often manufactured their own ammunition with a bullet mold provided by the riflemaker (Peterson 1968:74). This required the quartermaster to stock lead bars. The problem of appropriate ammunition was not exclusive to personal arms, many men enlisted with no equipment (Goodwin 1962:5).

The state encouraged a manufactory at Fredricksburg and contracted with individuals to produce muskets (Goodwin 1962:162). Gunsmithing is a skilled endeavor and the needs of a civilian population cannot compare with the emergency at the beginning of the war. The records are sketchy as to how well local production met demand. However, it is doubtful if there were enough skilled individuals to produce a small fraction of the need. The only firearm supply that could address the need of Virginia and the rest of the states was where firearm manufacturing had been an ongoing
activity, in Europe.

Virginia was not alone in the need for firearms. Other states and the Continental Congress had agents scouring Europe for guns. There was some success as the Virginia Gazette, August 9 and November 20, 1776, records two shipments arriving in 1776. These references unfortunately do not state the origin of the muskets. A secondary source, however, provides an undated reference to 2100 firearms reaching Williamsburg from Rotterdam (Brown 1980:320). This may indicate purchase of Dutch firearms by the State.

Documentary Evidence

A popular concept concerning the American soldiers in the Revolution is that they were undersupplied and what they did have in the way of equipment was of questionable quality. This concept has "myth" qualities, the rag-tag Continental facing the well equipped British professional. There is, like all myths, some truth to this view. The British soldier was, at most times, better supplied, although the quality of his equipment, including firearms, was only comparable to the Americans. He was a better soldier than the American at the beginning of the war, judged by European standards and the practice of military science in the eighteenth century.

At the beginning of the war the Americans, Virginians
included, faced shortages of all war materials. As is discussed throughout this paper, Virginia used whatever was at hand to put troops into the field. This is especially true of firearms. The qualities of the standard military muskets are discussed above, as are general sources of supply. Now specific references to firearms will be examined to determine what sort of firearm was used by the soldier of the Virginia Continental Line.

The state's need was met in a number of ways. As stated earlier many men brought their own weapons especially the men from the west where a firearm was an important survival tool. The need for a firearm in the settled east was less, and there were perhaps new immigrants and young men who did not have the financial ability to provide themselves with a musket.

The Virginians captured a few weapons at the Battle of Great Bridge in December 1775. Among the captured arms retained for the army by Colonel Woodford were thirty "well fixed" muskets and two silver mounted fuzees (VG, December 16, 1775). The muskets might have been either the English manufactured Long Land or Short Land pattern, both were being used by the British Army at this time. The fuzees were a shorter lighter version of the military musket. The silver mountings mark these as officer's weapons, privately furnished.

Virginians were also involved in the Christmas Day attack on the German troops garrisoning Trenton, New Jersey.
At this engagement 1000 muskets were captured (Smith 1976:822). It seems reasonable that deficiencies in arms among Washington's soldiers were made up from these stores. This may have included Virginians.

Virginia also looked to arms produced in the colonies. Between September 1775 and July 1776 the Virginia Committee of Safety purchased 3325 muskets and 2098 rifles (Gill 1974:34). These purchases may account for the six wagons from Pennsylvania mentioned earlier as that state and Massachusetts were among the largest producers of arms. Pennsylvania contractors received orders for 4500 stand of arms between October 1, 1775 and April 30, 1776 (Brown 1980:309).

Contracts were also made within Virginia. On September 28, 1776 200 stands of arms were ordered from the Hunter Iron Works, previously known as Rappahannock Forge, in Falmouth, Virginia. In addition there were a number of other works around the state. The record of production by Virginia's gun makers is unclear. However, there was a continuing demand; and they did supply what they could. Hunter's and the Virginia State Factory, at the junction of the James and Rivanna Rivers, were still operating until the invasions of 1780-1781. Virginia established a new arsenal at Point of Forks in 1783, which operated until 1803 (Brown 1980:313).

These multiple sources of arms seems to have been sufficient to allow Virginians to take the field in the
North with Washington. Although they had weapons, the supply of suitable ammunition, as well as spare parts, as mentioned earlier, continued. The situation is illustrated by an order issued by a Virginia Regiment:

June 25, 1776
The Capts. in command of each company are desired instantly to give in an exact account of their arms and accoutraments, whether they be musquets or common small guns, the number of rifles fit or unfit for duty, how they are fixed for molds, and c. ; in short to give as an exact account as possible of the weakness of our regiment (Stubblefield 1887:186-187).

The most interesting word in this order is weakness. This does not necessarily mean shortage. The weakness in Stubblefield's estimation may well be the mix of weapons and the condition. He refers to muskets, common guns (civilian weapons), and rifles. The characteristics of these weapons is discussed in this chapter's introduction. This officer and his peers were becoming more proficient with the standard linear tactics, at least in drill. These tactics called for reliance on the musket with bayonet. Common guns and rifles did not have the capacity to mount a bayonet. Consequently, if facing a equal number of enemy, Stubblefield's command might have held their own in a shooting battle. They might have been superior if the tactics were limited to firing, considering they had rifles. If, however, the battle was to be decided in the accepted fashion, the bayonet charge, the Virginians were weak indeed.
This situation was not isolated to one regiment. In October 1776, General Stephens requested muskets to replace rifles in the 4th Virginia Regiment (Sanchez-Saavedra 1978:42). The 11th Virginia was commanded by Daniel Morgan who led the first Virginians, riflemen, north to Boston in 1775. There were, undoubtedly, a large proportion of rifles in his command.

In 1777 Washington had a Corps of Riflemen formed under the command of Morgan. This was an attempt to use the rifles in a role that suited their characteristics, long range shooting with accuracy, but with the protection of Line troops when threatened with enemy bayonets. Unfortunately, the problems in the Line regiments plagued Morgan at the beginning.

13 June 1777
Rifles are to be given to Morgan's corps for muskets if not enough they are to exchange or purchase private property (Heth 1892:357).

It can be assumed that the problems confronting the regiments mentioned above were shared by other Virginia units. A noticeable improvement occurred when the imported French muskets reached the army.

When the Virginia Line surrendered with the Charleston garrison in May 1780 it gave up its arms. British records show that 5500 men surrendered 5416 French muskets (Taliferro 1980:34-35). It must be concluded that at this point in time the Virginians were armed in large part, if not completely, with French muskets. The problem remains to
determine when they first received these arms and what firearm did the French musket replace.

France was the major supplier of muskets for the Americans. It is estimated that 102,000 muskets were received from France between 1776 and 1781. Although the quantity is large the quality may be questioned, if for no other reason than the French probably sent a variety of models of their obsolete military muskets. There were possibly nine different models shipped: M1717, M1728, M1746, M1754, M1763, M1766, and M1768 (Butler 1971:27-28). Although these model numbers indicate the year in which a particular design was accepted, individual arms might not have conformed to the ideal. The mixture of models and the differences in quality is reflected in a letter from General Nathanael Greene to George Washington:

A Brigg arrived this day from Nantz [Nantes]. Her cargo consists of 272 Chests of arms containing 6800, sixty chest of which not being fully proved, the Capt. says he cannot so fully engage for their goodness, but the remaining 212 chests are very fine proved arms. Also, 1500 excellent double bridled locks (Greene 2, 1980:48).

Greene served for a time as Quartermaster General and as a field commander. Washington had great confidence in him and his record in each position is commendable. His opinion concerning these arms can be accepted with confidence. His reference to double bridled locks and very fine proved arms might indicate later model muskets, most likely M1763.

The French arms, after arrival, had to be delivered to
the army and transportation difficulties caused some delay. The ships from France would naturally seek a port of least resistance from the British Navy. The navy would be attempting to intercept these supplies. The navy, however, had the added responsibility of supporting the army. Consequently, the majority of naval vessels were in waters near the conflicting armies: New York City, New Jersey, and eastern Pennsylvania. This is supported by records of shipments to Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and Williamsburg, Virginia.

Portsmouth is the most frequently mentioned port of delivery. 41,680 French muskets were delivered here between October 1776, and December 1777 (Brown 1980:319). In March 1777, a vessel reached Portsmouth with 12,000 muskets (WGW 7, 1932:216). 11,987 were delivered in April 1777 (Brown 1980:319). These two deliveries account for half the total received through Portsmouth.

Philadelphia was closer to the normal area of operations of Washington's army. Shipments arriving here would make delivery of the muskets and other supplies to the troops much easier. The problem was that getting to Philadelphia would have been much more dangerous for the vessels as Royal Navy activity would have been heavier on the mid Atlantic coast. This activity was not only to intercept supplies for the colonists but also to protect the supplies for the British army from American privateers.

The risk seems to have been worthwhile. Between
February 1776, and February 1779, 14,156 muskets were delivered to Philadelphia (Brown 1980:319). Washington notes that 11,000 were in Philadelphia in March 1777 (WGW 7, 1932:216). The importance of this city as a supply port may have been one of the reasons for the British campaign of the fall of 1777 to capture it. The British abandoned it in the spring of 1778 and returned to New York City.

French and other European arms were not being shipped exclusively to northern ports. The Virginia Gazette periodically reports the arrival of arms and other supplies in nearby waters. On March 21, 1777 a ship arrived in the James River from Nantes with 1500 stands of arms. Again on April 4 of the same year the brig Sally arrived with 10,000 stand of arms and gun locks. A French warship and two merchant vessels from Rochefort arrived on May 29, 1778 with arms and dry goods. There were, undoubtedly, other shipments direct from Europe, from Europe via the Caribbean, and from the activity of privateers.

The abundance of good harbors and a intercoastal waterway on the Atlantic coast produced an active water-based shipping trade early in American history. This was to the detriment of a road system. Unfortunately, during the Revolution the waterways, as mentioned above, were the domain of the Royal Navy. This made overland shipment of arms and other supplies necessary. Transportation may have been the major reason for lack of supply to the army rather than inept administrators and inefficient contractors.
The potential transportation problem can be illustrated by considering the movement of muskets from the coast to the army. References of numbers of chests of arms to total arms place the number of muskets per chest between 25 and 32. If the smaller number is used and the weight of a musket is 10 pounds then, with the weight of a stout wood container, each chest would be in excess of 250 pounds. A conservative estimate of the size of each chest (62" by 18" by 18") would allow perhaps 12 chests per wagon. It is questionable if a wagon could support one and one-half tons. It presents a larger problem when the quality of colonial roads is considered. It is perhaps more realistic to consider a wagon load at half the size or six chests or 150 muskets. This would supply one, understrength, regiment. This, plus other supplies such as food, ammunition, and uniforms, must have made transporting supplies a major problem.

The arms supplies from France peaked in early 1777. This abundance seems to have reached the Virginia Line late in the summer of that year. An order issued by General George Weedon to his Brigade of Virginia Line, in August of 1777, to return chests for extra arms suggests that arms have been issued recently and the remaining need for extra arms suggests that present needs have been filled (Weedon 1971:26). The time of Weedon's order strongly indicates that his brigade received French muskets. The army made an effort to keep uniformity of firearms within related army units. Consequently, it is probable that the the other
Virginia Brigades received French muskets. Washington issued orders to have each brigade or division be armed with weapons of the same size bore, "as many happy consequences would flow from it" (WGW 9, 1933:363).

The winter of 1777-1778 must have been hard on firearms as well as the soldiers. In May of 1778 Washington requested that the Commissary of Military Stores in Springfield, Massachusetts, send 2000 arms, as "The distress of this Army for want of arms is very great." A postscript requests, "Let 1000 more arms be packed up, to be sent on, on orders being given" (WGW 11, 1934:409).

The next day Washington writes to the President of Congress:

I think the Arms and Clothing expected from France, should be brought forward without a moments delay after they arrive.... Our distress is amazingly great. We have many men without firelocks, and many coming in, in the same predicament. (WGW 11, 1934:416).

This seems to indicate that new recruitment is causing part of the supply shortage.

The problems were apparently solved, as there is no mention of similar problems in Washington's writings or other records. The problems of late 1778, and early 1779, centered on clothing. There is little reference to arms problems in the Virginia Line until the surrender at Charleston in 1780.

Virginia's commitment to the war effort after the loss of the state's regiments at Charleston faced many problems.
Perhaps the largest was that the war had come to Virginia's soil. British troops raided supply locations, destroyed manufactories, and chased the government for much of 1780 and 1781. During this period Virginia attempted to recruit replacement troops, supply them, and supply detachments under Von Steuben and LaFayette who had been sent south to do what they could against the British. In addition to defending herself, Virginia was asked to furnish men to the small army in the South under General Horatio Gates and later Nathanael Greene.

The problems facing Virginia's "Government on the run", also resulted in limited records. What is available shows that arms supplies became short during this period. Prior to the problems of 1780-1781 there was a good supply of arms in the state. The Virginia Board of War reported on August 28, 1779, that 5000 imported stands of arms had been retained in Virginia (PTJ 3, 1951:78). In January 1781, the picture had changed. Jefferson's papers show that the supply in magazines had dwindled to 68 (PTJ 4, 1951:470-471).

As was the case early in the war, supply of arms amounted to make do with what was available. In March 1782, William Davies, who commanded Virginia's military effort, wrote to the Governor requesting that General Von Steuben be required to return the arms furnished him when he was operating in Virginia in 1780-1781 (CVSP 3, 1968:86). He suggests that these be replaced with those captured at
Yorktown in 1781. These arms were, of course, British, and having a different bore size would have brought on the old problem of ammunition supply. Fortunately for the Virginians, this was late in the conflict and had no effect.

The firearms used by the Virginia soldier can be divided into three periods. The period of uniformity, 1777-1780, due to French supply is sandwiched between two periods of making do with what was at hand. The greatest variety of arms is found at the beginning of the war. The problems connected with this variety of arms, and the solving of these problems by the availability of the French musket, had a lasting affect on Virginia and the nation. This affect will be discussed at the end of this study.

ACCOUTREMENTS

Cartridge Boxes, Shot Pouches

The ammunition system familiar to the colonists was a powder horn and a shot pouch. The weapon, rifle or musket, was loaded by pouring powder from the horn into a measure, the measure was then emptied in to the barrel of the weapon, and the powder was followed by a ball or shot. The ball would be wrapped in a wad, a piece of cloth, which would fill the space between the ball and the barrel wall. This provided a gas seal and held the ball in the barrel. If shot was used it would be "sandwiched" between wads.
Regardless of which projectile system was used, it was seated firmly upon the powder charge. The amount of powder, type of wadding, and type and size of projectile were dependent on the individual weapon and the task to be performed.

The ammunition system used by the military was different. The soldier was supplied with paper cartridges that included the powder, ball, and wadding. The cartridge was a tube of paper sealed at each end. The soldier had to rip the cartridge open with his teeth, pour a small amount of the powder into the priming pan on the lock, pour the remainder of the powder into the muskets barrel, and ram the ball, with the cartridge paper acting as wadding, on top of the powder charge (Peterson 1968:24-26). This system was faster than the system employed by a hunter, as described above. However, it had a negative affect on the accuracy of the weapon. As discussed earlier, the tactics of the period were designed to emphasize rate of fire rather than accuracy. To the hunter turned soldier this may have been viewed as a waste of ammunition, an expensive commodity. Many of these soldiers were armed with rifles and the paper cartridge system was unsuitable for this weapon.

Another drawback to paper cartridges were their susceptibility to dampness. The paper provided only minimal protection to the powder and damp powder was useless. To solve this problem the soldier carried his ammunition in a leather cartridge box. Its design was based on two
functional requirements, to protect the cartridges from the environment, while providing easy access to the ammunition to maintain speed in loading the musket.

The requirements for the cartridge box allowed for some variety, but a quality box would feature some standard attributes. The box was a rectangular bag cut and sewn to accommodate a wood block, which had holes drilled in it to hold the paper cartridges. There was a thin leather flap, one side of which was sewn to the body of the box in a way to allow the flap to lay on the top of the cartridges. There was an outer flap which extended over the ends of the box and across the face of the box. This flap could be secured to the box by a tab attached to the flap which could be fixed to a button on the bottom of the box. The outer flap was shaped in such a way that even when not fastened it would remained closed (Peterson 1968:64-69).

The documentation and examples which will be reviewed demonstrate that the Virginians of the Continental Line did adopt the cartridge box. The exact type used, however, is open to speculation. It is also obvious that the well constructed box, described above, was rare.

The first method of keeping ammunition on the soldier's person was the familiar powderhorn and shot pouch. Although horns are not mentioned in the Williamsburg Public Store Record, it can be assumed they were used, as the companion shot pouches appear repeatedly in the early part of the record. Twill and duck, heavy canvas materials, were often
issued for the purpose of making shot pouches between October 12 and November 13, 1775. Whether this material was to make up deficiencies, as many men must have brought their own equipment, or if some companies were striving for uniformity is not clear (Goodwin 1962:159-160).

The system soon changed. An order for various items to William Lux and Company on December 13, 1775, included cartridge paper (Goodwin 1962:160). It is possible that pouches were used for paper cartridges; however, they would not provide the protection afforded by the leather cartridge boxes. Probably the Virginians used a variety of methods to keep their ammunition. An order issued on March 18, 1776, asks for the number of cartouch boxes, powderhorns, and shot pouches that are needed (Stubblefield 1887:155). The only mention of cartridge boxes in the Williamsburg Store is on April 10, 1777. A listing for the magazine is an entry for 200 cartouch boxes (Goodwin 1962:161). It would appear the cartridge boxes used by the soldiers of the Virginia Line were supplied by the Continental Army.

The Continental Army also used a tin cannister to carry ammunition. This was a simple rectangular tin container with a hinged lid whose edges fit over the body of the box. This provided a relatively waterproof container. The quality of this box is illustrated by an order of General Weedon noting the use of the tin ammunition canteens for other purposes (Weedon 1971:56). These other purposes are revealed in court action against Lt. Rains of the 15th
Virginia for sending a soldier to bring water in a tin cartridge box (Weedon 1971:98).

The tin box had no divider and the cartridges were laid on top of one another. This would have not answered for the quick access to the ammunition provided by the leather cartridge box. The tin box, although possibly used for the soldier's primary supply of ammunition, was designed for an auxiliary supply. An extra supply of ammunition would be especially important to troops on detached service away from the army's regular supply system. On July 25, 1779, Washington ordered that ammunition cannisters be delivered to the Light Infantry (WGW 15, 1936:476). During the 1779 campaign the Light Infantry operated independently, including its assault on the British fortifications at Stony Point, New York.

Virginians made up a large portion of the Light Infantry in 1779 and would have used the tin boxes. This was, however, not their first use of this piece of equipment. On September 1, 1777, Weedon ordered that 278 tin boxes for extra cartridges be divided between Muhlenberg's and Weedon's brigades (Weedon 1971:27). On September 25, 1777 Weedon ordered that the men were to carry only their cartridge boxes and tin cannisters full (Weedon 1971:60). This suggests that the soldiers may have carried cartridges in their haversacks. Having both types of boxes may not have been the norm throughout the Army. An order from Washington on October 13, 1777, calls for tin
cannisters to be taken away from men with cartridge boxes to supply the men with none (WGW 9, 1933:363).

The men with the tin boxes may have been reluctant to give them up. They provided a reasonable assurance of usable ammunition. The quality of the leather boxes was always suspect. Timothy Pickering the Adjutant General of the Army remarked on this problem in September of 1777: Having been under arms nearly all day during an incessant rain, the ammunition and the cartridge boxes (which are badly made) was spoiled. This obliged us to keep out of striking distance but as near to the enemy as was compatible with that object until the army could safely encamp and make up musket cartridges. This occasioned two or three night marches (Wright 1963:69).

Washington was probably reacting to the same concern when he wrote to the Board of War three months earlier:

Be pleased to send on all the Tin Cartridge Cannisters and have as many more made as possible, they will save an immense amount of ammunition (WGW 8, 1933:272-273).

Washington's concern over the quality of the cartridge boxes continued, as is evident from the following letters.

On October 13, 1777, he wrote to the President of Congress:

None but the best and thickest (leather)... small inner flap.... the flaps in general, are too small and do not project sufficiently over the ends or the sides of the boxes (WGW 9, 1933:366).

To the Board of War, November 3, 1777:

Lining the flap with painted canvas will certainly be of service, considering the badness and thinness of the leather in general; but the greatest preservative to the cartridges, is a small inside flap of pliant leather, which lays close upon them and not only keeps them dry but from being rubbed (WGW 9, 1933:497).

The campaign of 1778 saw the quality of the cartridge
boxes was secondary to the problem of availability. Again Washington writes to the Board of War on June 6, 1778: ... we are exceedingly distressed for Cartouch Boxes. By an exact return made a few days ago 1700 were wanting for the new recruits, and to replace old ones,... (WGW 12, 1934:25).

Washington in a letter to General William Maxwell on August 13, 1778, states the situation clearly: "Commissary of Military Stores has no cartouch boxes or tin cannisters" (WGW 12, 1934:318).

It may be that necessity is the mother of invention, or at least production. At least one factory in Philadelphia was turning out 60-70 boxes per day in the spring of 1779 (WGW 15, 1936:158). It would seem that this rate of production and the general inactivity of the Army in 1779 would have contributed to the easing of concern connected to the availability of cartridge boxes.

The problem that remains is to understand what style of cartridge box was carried by soldiers of the Virginia Line. There is no description or other identification of any particular model. The only clue available from the documentation is the number of rounds issued to each soldier. Since the individual cartridge was susceptible to damage from various causes, it seems likely that the soldiers were only issued a quantity of ammunition that could be accommodated in the cartridge box.

A division order and general order issued by General Weedon on September 13, 1777, calls for each man to get 40 rounds and extra ammunition to be carried in such a way to
prevent injury and loss (Weedon 1971:46, 48-49). Does the issue of 40 rounds correspond to the capacity of a box? Some of the men had tin cannisters in addition to the leather box. The tin cannisters had a capacity of 36 rounds. The wooden block in a leather box had from 9 to 36 holes for cartridges (Neumann and Kravic 1975:66,67). It would appear the tin cannisters were considered in orders for ammunition issues at this particular time. Yet, on January 26, 1778, Weedon again issues an order for 40 rounds to be issued to each man (Weedon 1971:209). This comes after an order on January 10, 1778 to return all tin cannisters (Weedon 1971:189).

The Virginia soldier used a tin cannister through much of the war in addition to the regular leather cartridge box. The cannister, it appears, came in only one variety. The leather box may have been of local manufacture, a French import, or a captured British or German box. Ammunition issue is the only clue to the style of the box based on capacity. The box of the soldier probably changed through the war. The first boxes were simple militia boxes adequate for short periods of service. These may have been followed by captured boxes and French imports. Evidence suggests that later in the war Continental production supplied the need. It seems probable that, like clothing and other equipment, there may very well have been a mixture of cartridge box styles within a regiment.
Bayonets

An order from the state of Virginia for 200 "stands of arms" specified that this included a bayonet (Goodwin 1962:162). The nature of eighteenth century warfare would allow the assumption that military muskets, regardless of source, had a bayonet as part of a "stand of arms". There was not, it appears, a shortage of bayonets except in the winter/spring of 1778. Weedon complained of deficiencies of bayonets on January 17 (Weedon 1971:194). On March 20 Washington wrote to the Board of War concerning the problem but he also says that the army is manufacturing its own (WGW 11, 1934:112). Fabricating a bayonet would not be a problem for a blacksmith.

If shortages did occur it may have not have been in the number of bayonets available in stores but rather a proper bayonet for a particular musket. As with other spare parts one size did not fit all. However, minor adjustments could easily be made by an army artificer.

Another reason for need may have resulted from breakage due to improper use. The bayonet was used as a screwdriver (Taliferro 1980:74). It would certainly serve to hold a hunk of meat over a cook fire. The effect of this heating may have made the metal quite brittle, and when the bayonet
was used as a pry bar to open a box or barrel it could easily break.

The bayonet design was, like the musket, unique to its place of manufacture. Therefore, if the musket used by the Virginia soldier can be identified the bayonet style will likewise be identified. Probably, there were locally made replacements for lost or broken bayonets used on imported muskets. This diversity is probably no greater for bayonets than any other piece of equipment.

OTHER EQUIPMENT

The soldier of the Virginia Line regiments had access to all the material culture of the period. Some of this was military issue, uniform, musket, bayonet, cartridge box, belts, haversack, knapsack, and canteen. Other items, obtained by the soldier individually, or perhaps issued by the military, were procured from civilian vendors and did not differ from the item available to the civilian population. This group of items includes razors, combs, writing materials, eating utensils, gaming equipment, etc. The documentation available only lists the items. Type and style is open to conjecture.

Haversacks
The haversack was the soldier's pocket and was with him at all times. He kept his personal possessions in his haversack. Also, if the army was on the move, food would be prepared and kept in the haversack to eat on the move or if cooking fires could not be used.

The haversack was a simple rectangular bag made of linen. They appear in the Williamsburg Public Store record as an end use for material being issued (Goodwin 1962:22, 90). The simplicity of the item would make it possible for the soldier to fabricate his own haversack, and it could have been constructed from used material such as worn clothing or tents.

Knapsacks

The material used in haversacks was also used for knapsacks (Goodwin 1962:159-161) The knapsack was for the soldier's extra clothing. The knapsack was slung on the back by a single or double strap. If the army needed to move quickly the men might leave their knapsacks, which followed in wagons. Although they were designed so the soldier could fight while wearing his knapsack, it was often removed if action was expected. An order issued by Weedon on October 3, 1777, while trailing the British army marching in Philadelphia, calls for the men to leave their packs [knapsacks] and blankets, provisions to be carried in
haversacks (Weedon 1971:74).

Tents

The Virginia Gazette, October 7, 1775, had an advertisement by William Aylett, a contractor for the army, which included a request for large quantities of ducking or russia drab for tents (Goodwin 1962:8). The Williamsburg Public Store record has numerous references to tents from 1775-1779 (Goodwin 1962:208). As with other items, it appears that the state made an attempt to provide its troops with shelter.

References to tents usually involve the number of men assigned to each tent. General Heth, at one point, was able to provide a tent for every five men (Heth 1892:340). Weedon, however, had to have eight men to each tent. It should be noted that probably two of the eight would be on guard or other duty.

Cookware and Foodservice

The advertisement, referred to above, by William Aylett also calls for kettles. It specifies tin or brass (Goodwin 1962:8). The Williamsburg Store record has numerous references to these items being purchased and issued
Iron pots were not sought in the advertisement, perhaps because of weight. The Williamsburg Store record does show, however, they were purchased and issued (Goodwin 1962:184).

The kettles came in various sizes. The ideal, it seems, was a two gallon size that would feed six men (Jefferson 3, 1951:240, 302). Evidence that kettles continued to be used by Virginians in the war is substantiated by Weedon (Weedon 1971:20, 219).

Kettles appear to be the only issued item connected with food preparation or consumption. There is only one reference to forks and spoons being issued from Williamsburg and that was to an artillery company (Goodwin 1962:143). These items, as well as, plates, cups, and bowls, if used, were the soldier's responsibility. This, undoubtedly, resulted in great diversity in these items.

Canteens

The Aylett advertisement calls for canteens and they were issued from the Williamsburg Store (Goodwin 1962:8, 160, 161). Canteens were commonly made of wood; however, tin was also used (Neumann and Kravic 1975:59-64). Glass bottles may have been used and possibly covered with leather or other material for protection.
Blankets

Blankets were an item provided by the state. Blankets are mentioned in the Williamsburg record and in the Philadelphia Public Store record as being issued to every regiment of the Virginia Line (Goodwin 1962:168-172; PPS 1778-1779:9, 12-25). The blankets were probably a variety of colors and styles depending on the source and the material available to the manufacturer.

Razors and Combs

These items were shipped from Williamsburg and made available through the Philadelphia Store (Goodwin 1962:148-149; PPS 1778-1779:9, 12-25). The combs were made of horn, ivory, bone, tortoiseshell, brass, pewter, and close grain wood (Neumann and Kravic 1975:89). It can be assumed that these items were made available to the soldier with an end use in mind, although the frequency of the use is questionable. The Light Infantry Orderly Book recorded, ...
...the soldiers who mount guard coming on guard with long beards and unpowdered and other the powder slovenly put on... (Gamble 1892:255).
CLOTHING

Hunting Shirts (Figure 1a.)

Hunting shirt is the term most used in the documentation in reference to an outer garment for the upper part of the body. The term rifle shirt, rifle frock, or hunting frock may appear in primary or secondary sources to describe an identical garment. The hunting shirt was subject to modification using a combination of three major characteristics: length, fringe, and front opening (Neumann and Kravic 1975:242-243). Regardless of the design the function remained the same.

It appears Virginia, at the beginning of the Revolution, was unable to provide the soldiers with the standard military coat and the hunting shirt was substituted (Goodwin 1962:viii-ix). It was simple to construct, comfortable, and if dyed a dark color, it would provide the soldier with camouflage in the woods. It was recognized as the common dress of riflemen and this had an additional benefit.

Washington urged its adoption because of its practicality and economy, and because "it is a dress which is justly supposed to carry no small terror to the enemy,
who think every such person a complete marksman" (Huddleston 1978:16).

The hunting shirt can be documented as being used by 12 of the 15 Virginia Line Regiments. It can be assumed that the remaining three had the garment. The 11th Virginia, not mentioned in the documentation as having hunting shirts, was commanded by Daniel Morgan. Morgan was best known for commanding special rifle detachments, and it seems likely that at least some of the men of his regiment would have been riflemen or adopted the dress of the riflemen. The other regiments who are not mentioned as receiving hunting shirts are the 13th and 15th Virginia. These regiments were raised during the same period as the 12th and 14th Regiments who were issued this garment or the linen material for it (Lefferts 1971:144). It seems likely the 13th and 15th Regiments received a similar issue.

Although it is clear that hunting shirts were used by soldiers of the Virginia Line, details concerning the style are vague, limited, in most cases, to color. Yellow appeared on a member of the 1st Virginia, brown on a soldier of the 2nd, black in the 6th, almost black in the 7th, and white in the 14th (VG, May 23, 1777; Lefferts 1971:141-144).

Material of contrasting colors was used on the collars/capes and cuffs to provide a specific identity to individual regiments. Red wool was issued to the 1st Virginia for this purpose (Goodwin 1962:32). The hunting shirts of the 6th Regiment were to have white cuffs for
sergeants and dark cuffs for drummers (Goodwin 1962:11).

The length and decoration, like the color, varied from unit to unit. The 6th Virginia was to have a short, plain shirt (Goodwin 1962:711). The 7th Virginia had at least one member with a fringed shirt (Lefferts 1971:143). The apparent variety in this garment prohibits a single model for illustration.

In order to describe this garment it will be divided into two types. The hunting shirt is a garment that is opened only a short distance in the front and is put on over the head. The hunting, or rifle, frock is open in front for its full length and is put on like a jacket.

The first variable characteristic is length. The frock may have been short extending only to the hips or may have terminated below the knees. The shirt, not open in front, would probably have been mid-thigh length at the extreme. If it was any longer it would have constricted movement.

The second variable is the use of capes and fringe. These elements could have been used on either type, depending on regulations, availability of material, and personal preference. Although decorative, capes and fringe served a functional purpose. The capes gave extra protection to the shoulders and the fringe helped "channel" the water from the garment, acting like a wick.

Also of interest is that the garment is from a civilian rather than a military tradition. This is revealed in the narrative of a Massachusetts militiaman, Simeon Alexander,
in his pension application. He comments on Daniel Morgan's riflemen. His reference to Morgan's regiment should not be understood to be the 11th Virginia. Morgan, at this time, was leading a company of riflemen who he had recruited and marched north to join the army besieging the British in Boston.

The uniform of Morgan's regiment was a short frock made of pepper-and-salt colored cotton cloth like a common frock worn by our country people, except that it was short and open before, to be tied with strings, pantaloons of the same fabric and color, and some kind of cap, but I do not now remember as to its form (Dann 1980:106).

It is doubtful if the material was cotton. Oznaburg, a course linen material, is regularly mentioned as the material of choice for hunting shirts or frocks. The reference to the garment being short should not suggest that this was usual. Four illustrations of the period showing soldiers in frocks depict one as waist length, two mid thigh, and one below the knee (Huddleston 1978:62-64, 66).

Perhaps the only surviving example of a Revolutionary War rifle frock is at the Washington Headquarters Museum, Newburgh, New York. It is illustrated in the Sketchbook 76; and its construction, as well as, the speculation of the author concerning other hunting shirts, is described as follows.

The body was made of one piece of fine linen, folded at the shoulder with an opening cut for the neck and front-gussets were set in the neck opening and the opening was then gathered to fit the collar—the cape was then stitched on where the collar joins the body-buttons were cloth covered wood, or of bone or pewter. Fringe was made by cutting strips of linen,
then by pulling out the threads on both edges, and folding the strip down the center-fringe was added or omitted to suit the wearer or any regulations in force. The pleated or plain sleeve was made with a gusset set in the underside where it joins the body. The cuff is sewn inside the sleeve and has a button and loop-descriptions seem to indicate the shirts were made in many colors—white, black, blue, brown, grey, ash, and shades of green (Klinger 1967:17).

The pleated sleeves may be an exception rather than a rule. It is doubtful if the Virginians used such an elaborate version of this garment. This example does, however, present all the components of a frock.

Small Clothes

Waistcoat (Figure 2d.)

The waistcoat worn by the Virginia soldier, like the shirt, probably did not differ from the civilian garment. Although waistcoats were made of linen, the records indicate that the waistcoat issued to the Virginia troops were made of wool, either broadcloth or flannel. The use of wool would provide warmth if wool coats were not available and the men used hunting shirts as an outer garment.

Deserter descriptions include waistcoats of a variety of colors. However, the Philadelphia Store Records and descriptions of deserters from units that would have been supplied by stores in Virginia, indicate that red was the
The standard color of issue. The Philadelphia records also list vest buttons as being issued. This could mean the waistcoats were issued without buttons or that the linen and wool material that was issued was being made up into waistcoats.

An illustration of a waistcoat based upon surviving specimens of garments worn by Generals Washington and Gansevoort appears in Sketchbook 76. It is close fitting to the body. It is constructed of four main pieces, two make up the back, and two the front. There are pocket flaps on each side which may or may not have been functional. A regular soldier's waistcoat was not as fine as that of an officer. The waistcoat closed with approximately a dozen buttons (Klinger 1967:7-8).

Breeches, Overalls, Trousers (Figure 2a., 2b., 2c.)

The Virginia soldier undoubtedly had access to, and used, trousers and overalls during the Revolution, but the documentation would suggest that breeches were, by far, the most common garment below the waist. They were manufactured from linen, buckskin, and wool (both broadcloth and flannel). The colors included red, brown, buff, green, and blue.

The style of the breeches was that of civilian garments. Trousers and overalls were similar in
construction except the terminated at the foot rather than the knee. Each of these garments had a wide waistband that buttoned in front and was adjusted to fit using laces in the rear which were tied. There was a wide flap, or fall, in the front which buttoned at the waistband. The seat was full, the extra material allowed the wearer to sit as these garments were tight fitted at the knee. This was accomplished by buckling a knee band, which was part of the leg of the breeches. The trousers and overalls were held at this point by a leg garter which consisted of a separate narrow leather band, buckled over the material.

Trousers and overalls continued to the ankle. The trousers terminated at this point with a simple hem. The overalls reached to the shoe and a tongue or flap was added to the front to cover the shoe. A strap ran under the arch of the shoe to hold the leg of the overalls down and they were fastened tight to the ankle with buttons along the outside seam. This, in effect, replaced the full or half gaiters protecting the leg and preventing stones and other matter from getting into the shoe.

Shirt (Figure 3a.)

The shirt was not unlike the basic hunting shirt discussed elsewhere, the major difference was the weight of the fabric. White or natural color linen, plain or checked, was cut into rectangular pieces consisting of the body,
arms, collar, cuffs, and gussets. Intended to be rather loose fitting except at the collar and cuffs, the construction was simple.

The main body of the early shirt is made from one length of fabric. Sometimes the warp direction of this piece runs vertically up the front, over the shoulders, and down the back; there is no shoulder seam-only a fold-and the lower edge of the shirt must be hemmed. There are two side seams where the fabric is joined from the underarm region to the hem. Not infrequently both edges of the fabric are selvage, indicating that the material was utilized at full loom width. In many shirts a single piece of material was wrapped horizontally around the body. With this arrangement there is generally but one seam, the lower edge often is a selvage, and a shoulder seam is necessary. With either method of construction, a reinforcement of extra fabric from the sleeve top to collar was sometime used.

To this basic length of fabric forming the shirt body were attached two additional rectangles for the sleeves, smaller rectangles for the collar and cuffs and a full compliment of gussets which, with strategically placed gathers, provided ease and fit. This basic format readily lent itself to variations in size, length, fullness, fabric type and width, and embellishment as dictated by the size and personal preference of the wearer, its intended use for work or dress, slight local variations, and availability of fabric. Not all the characteristics found in the Pennsylvania shirts described are by any means exclusive to this state or even to America (Gerhret 1976:99).

Although the description above is of shirts found in Pennsylvania, it would probably be applicable to most eighteenth century shirts. Nor is there any evidence that the shirts used by Virginia soldiers would have been other than this type, the material and design of which was taken from the civilian traditions. The term "soldier shirt" or "officer shirt" found in the Philadelphia Store Record probably indicates the quality of the fabric and the use of
embellishments rather than a different style.

Headgear (Figure 4)

The headgear worn by the Virginia soldier can be divided into three types: hats, caps, and woolen knitted caps. The hat is constructed from felt and has a brim of varying width which extends the entire circumference of the crown. The cap resembles our modern baseball cap. It is of leather with a brim over the eyes. Also, these may have been made from a felt hat with brim removed except in the front. The woolen knitted cap is similar to the modern winter stocking cap except that it was longer.

The infantry soldiers hat of the eighteenth century was fashioned from felt with a low, rounded crown. The brim was cut to a specific width and turned up, or cocked, according to regulation or personal preference. The style most frequently found in the military of the period was a hat turned up on three sides (Figure 4a.), not unlike the tricorn, or three cornered hat, common to the civilian population. The major difference is that the military cocked hat was turned up slightly off center which brought the front point of the hat over the left eye rather than the nose of the wearer, which was the case with its civilian counterpart (Neumann and Kravic 1975:136). This was done to allow a flat side of the hat to align perpendicular to the
soldier's left shoulder. The military drill of the period called for the musket to be carried on the left shoulder which would have caused the firearm to hit the civilian tricorn. The military cocked hat was decorated with a button and loop on the left side, a cord that ran around the base of the brim, and a cockade. The edges of the brim were covered, or bound, with a narrow piece of cloth.

There were other treatments of the soldier's hat. One method, apparently popular with Virginians early in the war, was the round hat (Figure 4b.). This variety is illustrated by an order to the 6th Virginia Regiment.

Both officers and soldiers to have hats cut round and bound in black; the brims of their hats to be 2 inches deep and cocked on one side, with a button and loop and cockades, which is to be worn on the left (Goodwin 1962:11).

Another treatment which appears in at least one deserter description is the flopped or flapped hat, which is simply a hat with the brim left wide and unturned (Neumann and Kravic 1975:138).

The basic hat may have had the brim cut off at the bottom edge of the crown except for a few inches in front. The remaining brim, of what was then a cap, might now be turned up and hooked to the crown. Common terms for this cap were jockey or light infantryman's cap (Neumann and Kravic 1975:142). This variety of cap was also manufactured from leather with a brim perpendicular to the crown (Figure 4c.). Another piece of leather, called a shield, mounted vertically in front of the crown, was fixed to the cap at
the junction of the crown and brim. The shield may have been painted along the edge and had the regimental number in Roman numerals. Some varieties have decorative metal chains, horsehair plumes, and/or a cloth band, or turban, tied around the crown (Neumann and Kravic 1975:137).

This hat was usually reserved for elite troops such as light infantry. It was worn by the Virginians attached to the light infantry corps of the Continental Army during the campaign of 1779. The Virginian's cap did not have a hair plume (Gamble 1892:250). Any other decoration would be speculation.

The Philadelphia Public Store distributed woolen single and double caps to the Virginia Line in the winter of 1778-1779 (PPS 1778-1779:9-25). These were probably knitted stocking caps. The double cap was a tube which tapered to both ends and then one end was inserted into the other providing a double thickness of material (Hanson 1981:11).

Gaiters

Gaiters were part of the early uniform and probably used throughout the war. They were made from thick woolen cloth and heavy Linen. There were two types of gaiters: full gaiters and half gaiters or spatterdashes. The full gaiters extended above the knee and the half gaiters above the ankle to approximately the bottom of the calf.

Both types of gaiters buttoned their full length on the
outside of the leg. They had a tongue of material inserted at the front to cover the front of the shoe. A strap attached to each side at the bottom ran under the arch of the shoe. The full gaiters were bound below the knee with a garter, usually a leather strap with a buckle. Possibly a strip of cloth might be used for this purpose. Although the gaiter is often compared to the leggings worn by Native Americans, the garment was common to the European soldier of the period and was probably used by civilians whose work would cause unusual wear on breeches, stockings, and shoes.

Shoes (Figure 3c.)

The lack of shoes was a continuous problem for the Continental Army. Obviously, this item of equipment would have received the most wear. The problem was one of quality as well as quantity and is summed up in this statement by General Washington on March 6, 1778:

... we have suffered more for want of shoes than for any other article (and those imported from France afford little more than a days wear) (WGW 11, 1934:35).

The problem had not improved since the previous fall. The following quote from General Weedon would suggest the problem was especially difficult and little was expected from the states. The Commander in Chief offers a $10 reward for the person who produces the best substitute for shoes

The soldier's shoe was the common shoe of the period. Produced on straight lasts it could be worn on either foot. It may have had a square or rounded toe. Although it could be modified to tie with laces, a buckle closure was common (Neumann and Kravic 1975:122-123). Shoe buckles were issued to the Virginians in 1778-1779 (PPS 1778-1779:14-16).

Regimental Coat (Figure 1b.)

There are no known example of an American enlisted man's coat. Models are constructed from English coats, period illustrations, and coats of American officers. As the deserter descriptions have shown, Virginians used a wide variety of coats, civilian and military. The model described is that which was called for in regulations and probably was available to the Virginia Line from 1778 to the close of the war.

The Virginian's coat was standardized along with the rest of the Army in a general order issued on October 2, 1779. Each state's line regiments were to conform to a program calling for blue coats, faced with a specific color. Virginia, along with Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland, was to use red facings. All infantry coats were to have white linings and white buttons
The coat was constructed to fit close to the body. It came to about mid thigh. The body of the coat was wool broadcloth; the facings, cuffs, and collar were perhaps of a different wool material. The buttons, cast in white metal, were used on each facing, the cuffs, and in back. They may have been plain or the continental button with the letters USA in relief. The coat had pocket flaps on each side.

The collar of the coat turned down. The coat closed in front from the collar to mid chest with hooks and eyes. In cold weather the facings could be unbuttoned, folded across, and buttoned on top of the other facing. Also the cuffs could be unbuttoned and turned down in cold weather. The tails on each side of the coat were turned back and fastened with a hook and eye reinforced by a small heart shape pieces of material sewn on the lining. These could be let down in cold weather (Klinger 1967:13-15).

OTHER EQUIPMENT

Haversacks (Figure 5a.)

The Williamsburg records shoe material was issued for haversacks and it seems likely haversacks were carried by the soldiers throughout the war. The haversack served as
the soldier's pocket. It held personal belongings as well as food. The soldier probably never left his haversack out of sight for other than a very short period of time. The haversack was easily constructed from rectangular piece of linen. A fold created a bottom and the sides were sewn to create a bag. A small amount of the material remained at the top to fold over and cover the opening. The top buttoned to the front of the bag. A strap was attached to allow the soldier to carry the haversack slung from the shoulder (Klinger 1967:30).

Knapsacks (Figure 5b.)

As with haversacks, the soldiers were issued material to construct knapsacks. The style of knapsacks carried by Virginians is not known. They may have had single bag or double bag models. The single bag may have been a larger version of the haversack with two straps to allow it to be carried from both shoulders. It may have had one strap which allowed it to be carried slung diagonally across the back. A variation of this model has two bags connected at the top which fold against one another, the openings inside. This knapsack was slung from a single strap across the chest. The side of the knapsack exposed to the weather might have been painted to protect the contents (Klinger 1967:29-30).
The documentation shows the Virginians used leather cartridge boxes and tin cartridge cannisters to carry paper ammunition cartridges. Examples of tin cannisters are a deep rectangular container measuring 6 1/2" by 3 3/4" by 2 7/8" (Figure 6b.). It has a hinged lid with edges turned down to fit close to the body of the cannister, sealing it from the weather. The cannister was slung from a shoulder strap that passed through 1 1/2" wide tin loops soldered to the sides. The cannister held 36 cartridges in layers of 4 across (Neumann and Kravic 1975:67).

The variety of leather cartridge box used by the soldiers of the Virginia Line is not clear. Quite probably they used many varieties. The function of the box was to protect the paper cartridges from the environment, while providing easy access to a soldier during battle. This was accomplished using a number of components, all of which were seldom were found on boxes used by the Continental Army.

The cartridge box was simply a rectangular pouch which held a wooden block with cylindrical holes to hold individual paper cartridges. A leather flap was sewn to the back of the pouch, crossed over the top and front of the box and fastened on the bottom. This flap would be slightly wider than the box. A leather or linen strap allowed the box to be slung from the shoulder. The leather strap may have been two pieces with a buckle (Neumann and Kravic
Various refinements were made to the basic model described above. The end pieces of the body of the box were made higher to extend above the top of the block. These pieces were rounded on the top to conform with the bend of the flap as it closed over the box. Often a piece of thin leather was sewn to the back of the box inside the outer flap (Figure 6a.). This laid on the cartridges for added protection. Canvas may have substituted for leather in some boxes.

Boxes used late in the war may have had tin trays under the blocks which held musket tools and/or extra flints. A small flap of leather on the front of the box covered an opening which allow access to this tray without removing the block. These tool and flints may have also been carried in small pouches attached to the front of the box (Neumann and Kravic 1975:76, 78).
Muskets

The documentary evidence strongly suggests that the soldier of the Virginia Continental Line carried an imported French musket from the summer of 1777 until the surrender at Charleston in 1780. Therefore, this part of the study will concentrate on the French musket. The English musket and American muskets, which were used by Virginians, will be discussed for comparative purposes.

All military muskets used in the American Revolution were essentially the same. They were, by modern standards, long and heavy. They were fired by means of a flintlock ignition system, the barrels were smoothbore, and they loaded from the muzzle.

These arms saw minor changes throughout the eighteenth century. The changes may have had some affect on reliability, operation, and maintenance. They could not, however, be thought of as evolutionary in firearm technology.

The French musket saw many more changes than the British arm. Authorities recognize two models of British muskets during a period in which there are nine models of French muskets (Neumann 1967:34-35). Although any or all of these French models may have been part of those supplied to
the Continental Army, it is believed the bulk of those imported were models of 1763, 1766, and 1768 (Peterson 1968:38, Neumann 1967:35).

The model 1763 will serve as an example of the French musket. It must be noted that individual specimens may or may not be true to the ideal. Repairs may have included parts from other models altered to fit or parts manufactured by the soldiers, army artificers, or civilian gunsmiths. Repairs or personal modification may have changed a musket substantially from original specifications.

The M1763 musket had a 44 1/2-inch barrel with a .69 caliber bore. It was held to the wooden stock with three bands. The lock had a flat cock and plate 6 3/4 inches long. The bands, lock, and other metal parts were iron.

One example of the M1763 musket is 59 3/4 inches overall. The lock measures 6 3/4 inches by 1 3/4 inches. The trigger guard is 12 5/8 inches and the butt tang, 2 1/2 inches. It weighs 9.3 lbs. This musket has CHARLEVILLE engraved and US stamped or engraved on the lock plate (Neumann 1967:72). Charleville was one of three French armories. The others were Maubeuge and St. Etienne. The author of this study has seen only one musket marked St. Etienne and many marked Charleville. Charleville has become a common name for any French musket of the Revolutionary war. The US marking establishes the musket as property of the United States.

Sling swivels were mounted on lugs on the middle barrel
band and in front of the bow of the trigger guard. A sight was fixed on the front barrel band. The ramrod was iron (Neumann 1967:72).

The musket carried by the British soldier, and some Americans, was functionally identical to the French. There are, however, differences which are readily visible. These differences may well have affected individual perceptions of the muskets quality.

The English military musket is commonly known as the Brown Bess, although it is questioned as to whether this term was used before or during the war (Brown 1980:231). There are two models of the Bess used by the British army during the American Revolution: the Long Land pattern or first model, and the Short Land pattern or second model.

The Long Land pattern appeared in the early 1720's. It had a 46-inch barrel which was attached to the wooden stock with pins. The pins passed through the stock and engaged lugs on the bottom of the barrel. The earliest muskets had iron furniture, a hold over from the Queen Anne muskets. Brass replaced iron as the latter was used up. By 1730 brass was the standard (Neumann 1967:33).

A 42-inch barrel, the main characteristic of the Short Land pattern musket, appeared in 1722, although it was not officially accepted until the 1740's. The Short Land pattern was formally adopted in 1768. The Long Land pattern, however, continued to be produced until 1790 (Neumann 1967:33-34).
Differences between the French and English muskets included the pinning of the barrel on the English weapon. This required that more wood be left in the stock than was the case with the banding technique on the French gun. This accounted in part for the English arm being heavier than the French. The M1763, previously noted, weighed 9.3 lbs. This is a heavy example. Other muskets, including a M1754, M1746-1763, M1766, and M1768, weighed 8.5, 8.8, 8.0, and 8.4 lbs. respectively. Examples of English muskets weighed between 9.4 and 10.5 lbs. for the Long Land pattern and 10.0 to 10.8 lbs. for the Short Land pattern (Neumann 1967:58-62, 70-74). Weight is a characteristic which would be readily noticeable and important to the soldier. Many soldiers in the Continental Army, Virginians included, had experience with both weapons (Peterson 1968:27, 36-38). This experience was to contribute to the selection and production of American military arms in the future.

It might also be assumed that the iron furniture of the French arm was preferred to the brass found on the English gun. The maintenance of the musket in the field was the responsibility of the soldier. This included the cleaning of the metal parts. Both iron and brass are susceptible to surface corrosion. The shine of brass which would indicate a well maintained arm is not possible on iron. Therefore, the soldier with an iron mounted gun would not have to produce the very visible results required of a brass mounted gun.
American produced muskets tend to resemble the English models. This was, undoubtedly, a result of tradition and the availability of parts scavenged from obsolete and broken muskets which may have been in local magazines or left over from the French and Indian War. Although the American product resembles its English counterpart, there are significant differences.

A small sample of seven American made muskets attributed to a period 1775-1783, support the points stated above. Five of the examples have bore diameters smaller than the English muskets whose bore was approximately .75 caliber. Four of these muskets are .71-.74 caliber and one is .67. The musket with the .67 caliber bore is closer to the bore size of a French musket than an English. This weapon also has a French style side plate and butt plate, which, like the rest of the furniture, are brass. It is lighter, 9.3 lbs., than the other examples which range up to 11.0 lbs. The lock is an English style. This musket, although thought to be manufactured during the revolution, is marked "6 V. SPOTSYLVANIA", a marking system attributed to the 1790's (Neumann 1967:108-112).

The reasons for the differences in these weapons from the English arms which provided the pattern, might well be just a case of working with the available resources. However, the smaller bore size would have allowed for economy in the amount of lead used in ammunition. This economy is thought to be important to the gunsmiths of
Pennsylvania (see Rifles below). Perhaps it was a reflection of a break with tradition.

Rifles

It is clear from the documentation that early in the war many Virginia soldiers, including those in line regiments, were armed with rifles. There is no evidence to suggest that rifles were issued in any quantity to these men, therefore, the weapons were probably personal property. There was no standard model as was the case with the muskets. This weapon would have been produced in the region of the soldier's home. This would have caused a wide variety of rifles to have been used in the Virginia Line.

The variety of rifles would be due to Virginia being geographically between two regional traditions in gun making. These traditions, Pennsylvania and Southern, or Southern Mountain, exhibit very different characteristics in their product. Virginians would have been exposed to one or both of these styles.

The Pennsylvania rifles have been well documented as a combination of the gun making traditions of Central Europe, brought to Pennsylvania in the early eighteenth century by German immigrants, and the adaptation to the environment of North America. The rifle in Europe, commonly known as the Jaeger, was a short, heavy weapon with a 28 inch barrel of
.60 to .70 caliber. The thick wood stock had a patchbox with a sliding wood cover. The furniture was brass (Neumann 1967:134).

By the time of the American Revolution this tradition, as practiced in Pennsylvania, had produced a very different variation of this weapon. For greater accuracy, the short barrel had been lengthened (to consume all the powder charge and provide a longer aiming span); for economy of lead and lighter weight, the bore was reduced; for a flatter trajectory, a higher ratio of powder to ball evolved; and for better balance in carrying through rough country, the stock was reshaped. By 1770, the American rifle destined for use in the Revolutionary War had acquired many of its basic characteristics: a barrel length over 40 inches; a bore averaging .40 to .60 caliber (with seven or eight grooves); a long thin stock extending to the muzzle; a gooseneck cock; an elevated handgrip on the rear of the triggerguard; raised carving around the fittings; and a patchbox with a wooden, iron, or simple brass cover (Neumann 1967:134).

An example of this type of weapon was used by Nicholas Allen of Virginia who served under Daniel Morgan. The sideplate is engraved "NA 1770". The builder is thought to be Jacobus Scout, a Pennsylvania gunsmith. The furniture is brass and the patchbox appears to be hinged on the bottom. Its overall length is 4 feet 11 inches (Moore 1967:177). This weapon closely conforms with the description quoted
The Southern rifle is quite different. Although it shares basic characteristics, length and profile shape, it lacks the refinements of the Pennsylvania gun. There is little, if any, carving, and it is limited in most cases to a cheek piece. The furniture is iron and these parts were limited to a buttplate and ramrod pipes, with the rear ramrod pipe often omitted. A simple grease hole was drilled or cut into the stock in place of a patchbox. This held a thick lubricant to moisten patches.

An example of this type of weapon, with some interesting variations is attributed to a Virginia gunsmith active before and during the war. The rifle, marked "M. SHEETS" on the barrel, is 64 3/4 inches overall with a 49-inch, .55 caliber, octagonal to round barrel. The stock has no cheekpiece, grease hole, or any other carving. This gun has brass furniture, not usual on a Southern rifle, although it conforms with the simple style of these weapons and does not have an elevated handgrip on the trigger guard (Neumann 1967:146).

Virginia bordered both the Pennsylvania and Southern gun making traditions. The rifle carried by the Virginia soldier was probably purchased near his home and was of the style of that region. The Nicholas Allen rifle, described above, would support this contention. Many of Morgan's men came from the area of his home near Winchester, Virginia. This northern Virginia location would have made Pennsylvania
built rifles accessible to the local market.
PART III

EQUIPMENT AND ATTITUDES

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The opening scene of the motion picture Patton has General George S. Patton, Jr., portrayed by actor George C. Scott, giving a speech to troops training under him in Louisiana at the beginning of World War II. Standing in front of an American flag, which fills the entire background, the character, in ornate military uniform, tells the men that America loves a fight, that "all real Americans love the sting of battle" (Twentieth Century Fox 1969).

Although he was known for his theatrics, General Patton may have believed that Americans love war. However, an overall review of American history would cause this idea to be questioned. Furthermore, if institutionalized militarism can be directly related to a society who accepts war as normal activity, then the absence of militarism in the cultural make-up of the United States would also make a statement concerning American attitude toward war.

The specific hypothesis of this study is to determine if the equipment used by a soldier, in this case the Virginia soldier in the American Revolution, reflected the attitude of his society toward war. The examples of
equipment provided in this study, as well as political action concerning the organization and limitations of the military during and after the war, strongly suggest a close positive relationship.

The effort to prevent the establishment of militarism in the United States was begun during the founding years of the nation and can be directly related to the experiences of the American Revolution. The Americans had gained independence from Great Britain. The military forces of Britain, and those of its German mercenary allies, were products of a militaristic system. The leaders of the new nation realized that a military system was necessary and that the design of this system could prevent the establishment of militarism.

In the system later developed within the framework of the Constitution, many details also stood out in sharp contrast to the Continental system and even the British system: (1) although Congress was given unlimited power to raise armies, the principal reliance for manpower was long placed on the militia of the states, with its democratic relations between officers and men; (2) the standing army, though added to the militia, was kept small, even minute at times, until the end of the nineteenth century; (3) training for officers was finally provided by the establishment of the military academy at West Point, but this provision was countered in a manner to prevent the rise of a hereditary officer caste-by the distribution of cadetships among the states and congressional districts through the agency of political senators and representatives; (4) the concentration of army discipline was upon immediate usefulness in civil disturbances and wars rather than displays and ceremonials, as often in Europe: the army was restricted by what was considered usefulness, which included the guarding of the frontier and public works; and (5) reliance was placed upon volunteers for the standing army in time of peace and hence
having foot-loose youths usually from the lower strata of society.

In other words, the American system at the outset was a military system, not a militaristic system. It conceived of the army as an agency of civil power, to be organized and disciplined with that purpose in view, and not as an end in itself (Vagts 1959:103).

The American military system, as described above, was formed in direct relation to its function. It is not a system that suggests an advocacy of war. The material culture documented and illustrated in this study was part of the conflict in which this military system was born. The equipment of the soldier of the Virginia Line exhibits characteristics that suggest, like the military system that was to develop, function dominated form.

The tools of war used by the Virginians in the American Revolution as a whole, and singularly in most cases, suggest concern for function and simplicity. The design seems oriented to the task and avoids the decorative, nonfunctional attributes, common to the equipment of the European soldier, a product of a militaristic system.

The individual pieces of equipment used by the Virginians were a result of the limited resources of the state, as well as, the pressing need. Yet, although the equipment was a result of these factors, much of the postwar equipment retained similar, if not identical, characteristics.

This is best seen in the main tool of war: the weapon. In this case the weapon most familiar to the Virginian was
the imported French musket. The M1763 musket became the model for the American M1795, the first firearm developed and produced by the American military. This style is seen in American military arms throughout the nineteenth century with technological advances such as the caplock, rifled barrel, graduated rear sight, and breech loading mechanism, being incorporated into the basic design. Although the operation of the M1763 musket was identical to other weapons of this period, it had many features that suggest that function dictated the form.

The barrel of the musket was secured to the stock with bands rather than pins that were used on the English gun. This system allowed for less wood in the musket's forestock. The bands could be removed by simply sliding them over the muzzle. Then, with the removal of a screw in the tang of the breechplug and one of the lock screws, the barrel could be removed from the stock. This operation could be accomplished in the field.

The same operation performed on the English musket required the removal of the barrel pins as well as the screw in the tang of the breechplug. The pins had to be brought above the surface of the stock to be withdrawn. This required that a punch and mallet be used with some care to drive one end of the pin to the surface. This operation was best done at an armory by a skilled workman. The removal and inserting of these pins had the potential to cause damage to the stock.
The M1763 musket had a reinforced, double throated, cock (Figure 8d.). The cock was subject to repeated abuse when it struck the frizzen. The reinforced design helped resist damage. The screw which tightened the jaws of the cock to hold the flint had a hole at its head, below, and perpendicular to the slot for the use of a screwdriver. This allowed the jaws to be tightened with any metal rod that would fit in the hole, if a screwdriver was not available. This might well speed up the changing of a flint in battle. The English musket need a screwdriver to tighten the jaws of the cock. The cock was S-shaped (Figure 7e.), thin and delicate in comparison to the French.

The relative ease of maintaining the iron furniture of the French musket compared to the brass of the English was discussed earlier. The design of this furniture also illustrates the functional simplicity of the French arm. The English weapon had a decorative serpentine side plate (Figure 7a.), finials on the trigger guard (Figure 7c.), and a long tang on the butt plate (Figure 7d.). The French musket had a simple, flat side plate (Figure 8a.) and rounded ends on the trigger guard (Figure 8c.) and butt plate Figure 8b.). Also, the French musket did not require ramrod pipes, as the barrel bands served this function. The English gun had an escutcheon plate (Figure 7b.) on the top of the wrist portion of the stock. This part may have had identification numbers but was otherwise decorative.

A smaller bore size of the French musket suggests
functional considerations.

A smaller bore used a smaller ball. This allowed more balls to be produced from each pound of lead. The smaller ball and bore would allow less powder to be used. The lighter weight of the individual cartridge would mean the soldier would have less weight to carry, an important factor on the march, or could carry more ammunition into battle, an important factor in this situation.

The comparisons of these weapons supports the assumption that the French design was functionally superior to its English counterpart. The selection of this weapon as a model for American produced weapons might be based on this reason. Another reason might be an anti-British, pro-French attitude following the war. It must be noted, however, that the first official American musket, M1795, was adopted during a Federalist, pro-British national administration and at the time of a quasi-war with France. Also, with the adoption of the French design, the English tradition, followed during the war in American musket manufacturing, was completely abandoned. It appears functional concerns played a pivotal role in the selection of this design. The avoidance of decorative elements further suggest a nonmilitaristic attitude.

Lack of decoration and functional considerations are also apparent in the clothing of the Virginia soldier. As with the musket, clothing was subject to the state's resources as applied to a pressing need. Yet, the style of
clothing used in the Revolution, although a result of shortages and improvisation, was retained in many cases through the War of 1812 and beyond.

The hunting shirt is covered extensively in this study. Virginia provided this garment in abundance to its troops. It was constructed from durable linen from a simple pattern that did not require expert tailoring. The basic garment (Figure 1a.) could have a cape, attached to the collar, which laid over the shoulders providing a double layer of fabric for added protection from the weather. If wet it would dry faster than a wool uniform coat. Contrasting colors could be incorporated into the collar and cuffs for identification of the wearer's regiment, rank, and special skill, such as a musician. Though it lacked the warmth of a wool coat, a wool waistcoat worn underneath would compensate somewhat for this deficiency. The hunting shirt was adequate for the weather encountered during the regular campaign season, spring through autumn. Winter limited army activities, lessening problems due to the lack of a wool coat. It probably continued to be used by the civilian population after the war, particularly on the frontier, and reappeared as a military garment in the War of 1812.

The wool uniform coats worn by Virginians (Figure 1b.) were probably of the same basic tailoring pattern used for uniform coats in Europe. Yet they lacked the decorative elements common to British soldier's coats. The decorations common to the British coat included binding around the
button holes on the collar, lapels, and cuffs. The material used, commonly called lace, was woven with a distinctive pattern unique to each regiment. There is no evidence of the use of lace on Virginia regimental coats.

Another decorative treatment employed by the British was the use of shoulder wings. These were pieces of material that covered the outside of the shoulder and upper arm. The wings were also laced. Wings were used to identify the regiments elite companies (Mollo 1975:190, plate 114). There is no evidence of wings being used on Virginia regimental coats.

The small clothes, breeches and waistcoats, and shirts did not differ from the same articles of civilian clothing. This would support a nonmilitaristic attitude. The exception in this group of clothing is the use of military overalls (Figure 2b.), which were not worn by the civilian population. The overalls provided, in a single garment, the protection to the lower part of the body that required breeches and a pair of gaiters. This functional item of clothing continued in use in the American military through the War of 1812.

Other equipment carried by the Virginia soldier included the simple haversack, knapsack, canteen, and bayonet in a leather scabbard. These items may have had a painted regimental identification but no other decorative elements. This would also be true of the European soldier's equipment, with the exception of the knapsack made with goat
skin with the hair remaining used by some British troops. The hair may have provide protection, and therefore be functional, but such a knapsack would have also been very visible against a red coat, part of a military image.

The final piece of equipment to be examined is the cartridge box. The sources examined for this study did not reveal what particular model of leather cartridge box was carried by the Virginian. It is likely he used a variety of models during the war. There is no evidence that any of these boxes had decorative elements. This was not the case with the European troops.

British cartridge boxes had a plate which differed by regiment. This brass plate was fastened to the outer flap of the box. It bore the royal cipher and the number of the regiment. Many of these boxes also had another plate fixed to the shoulder belt. It was also marked and was worn in the middle of the chest at the point where this belt crossed with the sling, or belt, of the bayonet scabbard (Neumann and Kravic 1975:224-226).

The documentation does confirm that the Virginia troops carried a tin cartridge cannister (Figure 6b.). This simple rectangular container carried thirty-six cartridges and was waterproof. These features were not met by any leather box. Although it may have presented problems for the soldier in handling the cartridges, the protection it provided solved an ongoing problem caused by poor quality leather boxes.

The equipment used by the soldier of the Virginia Line
consistently demonstrates that form was subservient to function. This fact is reinforced when the Virginian's equipment is compared to the equipment of British and German troops. This functional simplicity was carried on after the war and it can be argued it continues to the present.

The points made earlier concerning the development of the American military system in contrast to the European militaristic system depict a widely different attitude on the part of these societies toward the military. The military equipment of these societies is, likewise, different. The Virginian's equipment is just a tool for the job in comparison to the decorative items of the European that suggest image is as important as results. The relation between the system and its associated material culture seems evident.

The question of whether a society with a militaristic system views war differently than one with a military system remains. Although a definitive answer to this question is beyond the scope of this study, it was stated at the beginning, for the purposes of this study, there is a difference. The militaristic society sees war in a more favorable light than does a nonmilitaristic society.

The political relationship of the military and the civilian authority as arising from the experiences of the American Revolution has been briefly reviewed and compared to the the material culture that was used in that conflict. It appears that the military equipment demonstrates dominant
functional, nondecorative attributes that are consistent with the development of a nonmilitaristic, American military system. This strongly suggests the validity of the hypothesis of this study; that the military material culture of the soldier does represent the attitude of his society toward war.

If the military system of the United States is nonmilitaristic, and comparisons to other societies would indicate this is true, and if nonmilitaristic societies do view war in negative terms, then the opinion attributed to General Patton is incorrect. Americans do not love war. Furthermore history would suggest that the United States has avoided war and when involved has taken action to end the conflict as efficiently and quickly as possible. The American material culture of war speaks to this efficiency and is a strong indication of this society's negative attitude toward war.
The service of Virginians in the Continental Army spans most of the American Revolution. At the beginning the Virginians were slow to move north, due primarily to lack of equipment. Through the middle years, 1777-1779, Virginians were a major part of the army. In the closing years of the war, 1780-1783, Virginia's manpower contributions were limited to the Southern Department as the bulk of the veteran Virginia Continental Line surrendered at Charleston in 1780.

The war effort in Virginia began as all threats of this type were handled at this time: the militia was called into service. This threat, however, was beyond the ability of independent county based militia. As it became apparent that the conflict was going to become general in nature, Virginia took action to institute a regular military establishment.

Between July and December of 1775, Virginia raised, on paper, nine regiments of infantry. Two were completed by November, five were ready by February 1776, and two in the Spring (Sellers 1978:2). Threats within the state by the Royal Governor, Lord Dunmore, and the threat to Charleston, South Carolina, to which the 8th Virginia responded, delayed
the movement of the Line Regiments to join Washington (Sellers 1978:3-5).

The threat to Charleston was repulsed in the summer of 1776. Dunmore left Virginia after the defeat of his forces at Great Bridge in December of 1775. This ended threats to the region and the Virginia Line was able to march north.

The British had been driven from Boston. They regrouped and in the late summer of 1776 they attacked New York City. The waterways in this area were key to the defense and the were dominated by the British navy. Washington's army fought a series of unsuccessful battles in defense of the city. The 3rd Virginia Regiment arrived in time to take part in the Battle of Harlem Heights (Sellers 1978:6-7). The 1st Virginia joined the army as it left this area and marched into New Jersey (Sellers 1978:9).

On November 23, 1776, the 4th, 5th, and 6th Virginia Regiments joined the army at New Brunswick, New Jersey (Sellers 1978:11). These three regiments formed a brigade of 745 men (Lesser 1976:40). The other Virginia Regiments, brigaded under the command of General George Weedon, mustered only 683 (Lesser 1976:37). These two understrength brigades, totaling 1428 men, represented one-third of Washington's army.

This was the low point of the war. Washington was under pressure to revive morale, and this resulted in his attack on the Hessian post at Trenton, New Jersey, on Christmas Day, 1776. The army returns dated December 22,
1776 show that The army had 6104 men fit for duty. Virginians in this figure amounted to 915. 764 others are listed as sick, 692 of these men from the 1st and 3rd Virginia (Lesser 1976:43).

The Virginians were among the first to cross the Delaware River. Stephen's Brigade, 4th, 5th, and 6th Virginia, was given the task of securing the landing on the New Jersey shore. This brigade then led General Greene's column on the Pennington road. The other Virginia troops were in the main column (Ward 1952, 294).

The attack on Trenton and the raid on Princeton which followed were, in terms of numbers of troops, small events. They were, however, important. The morale problem which led to the actions was improved. It gave the Americans a success in tactical maneuver against professional European soldiers. Also, it may have had an affect on aid from France and others.

In January of 1777, the 2nd and 7th Virginia were ordered to march north. They experience delays due to sickness and reached the army in April. The 8th Virginia, arrived in late March. The 13th Virginia had been ordered north, but was then assigned to the garrison at Fort Pitt (Sellers 1978:22-24).

The campaign of 1777 was a turning point in the war. Washington's forces did not have the numbers or ability to conduct an offensive campaign and, therefore, had to follow the British lead. The British plan was to divide New
England states from the rest by capturing the Hudson River-Lake Champlain line from Canada to New York City. An army, under General John Burgoyne, was to move south from Canada and eventually link up with the main British force moving north from New York City.

There was reason to believe that the British also had designs on capturing Philadelphia, which was the meeting place of the Continental Congress. Washington was forced to deal with both possibilities. The Northern Department was reinforced and Washington positioned himself to protect Philadelphia, but also to be able to march north if required.

There are no army records of troop strength for June through September 1777. The May return shows 12 Virginia Line regiments (1st-12th) with the army totaling 2512 men fit for duty. The Virginia contingent represented more than a third of Washington's force of 7363 infantry (Lesser 1976:46).

The British moved against Philadelphia by sailing from New York and up Chesapeake Bay. Washington positioned his army along Brandywine Creek which blocked the British line of march. On September 11, 1777, the British demonstrated against the American center, while Lord Cornwallis led the British left to flank the American right. The move was successful and the Americans were routed. Complete disaster was avoided when General Nathanael Greene established a rear guard with the American reserves. This force included
brigades commanded by Weedon and Muhlenberg, which were predominantly made up of Virginians, including the 13th and 14th Virginia. These regiments, along with the 15th Virginia had apparently joined the army after the May return was recorded. These regiments, in their first action, held the British force for 45 minutes, until sunset, and then executed an orderly withdrawal (Ward 1952:352).

Washington had avoided a decisive defeat, but the way to Philadelphia was now open. Washington reorganized and followed the British and attacked at Germantown. The attack was initially successful and Greene's command, including the Virginian's, penetrated the British line beyond support of the rest of the army and were cut off. They fought their way out with heavy losses. The Virginian's losses, including killed, wounded, and missing were 348. The army's total was in excess of 1173 (Sellers 1978:39).

Washington, in order to maintain a watch on the British, established the army's winter quarters at Valley Forge. Enlistments in the Virginia regiments were expiring and the state was having trouble meeting its quota. The number of companies in each regiment were reduced from ten to eight. This would allow for officers to leave the army for recruiting duty but did not make up for the manpower shortage. The state had no alternative but to release the 1st and 2nd State Line Regiments for service with the Continental Army (Sellers 1978:43). The service of the units was intended to be within the borders of Virginia.
The British left Philadelphia and returned to New York City in the spring and summer of 1778. An attack on the British rearguard resulted in the indecisive Battle of Monmouth, the last major engagement of the war in the middle and northern states. The Continental Army, under Washington, was to sit and wait until the move south to Yorktown, Virginia, in the autumn of 1781.

The manpower problems of the Virginia Line continued. In September 1778, the Virginia Line was reorganized by consolidation of understrength units and the renumbering of regiments. The 15 regiments were reduced to eleven (Sellers 1978:49). This allowed many officers to begin recruiting activity.

The recruiting effort included increased bonuses. It must have been successful, as comparisons of officers and men available for duty increased from 1090 in February 1779 to 2281 in August of that year, although this increase is not entirely attributable to new enlistments (Lesser 1976:104, 128).

There were two small actions in 1779. The corps of Light Infantry captured the British post at Stony Point, New York, and a force under "Light Horse Harry" Lee raided a post at Paulus Hook, New Jersey. Virginia troops were involved in these actions. The posts were abandoned and then reoccupied by the British, so the activity seems to have had no strategic value and was probably a result of the aggressive personalities of the commanders. The year ended
with the Virginia Line being ordered south to counter the
new British plan to separate the southern states, which were
believed to hold loyalist sentiment.

The final return of Virginia Line serving under
Washington is in January 1780 and reflects a combination of
units that first appears in the returns of the the Southern
Department in April 1780. Before joining the garrison
defending Charleston, South Carolina, the 1st, 10th, 5th,
11th, and 7th Regiments had become the 1st Virginia
Detachment. The 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Regiments had become the
2nd Virginia Detachment. The 6th and 8th Regiments, and an
independent command under Nathaniel Gist, became the 3rd
Virginia Detachment. The 3rd did not join the garrison of

Charleston surrendered on May 12, 1780, with over 700
Virginians among the garrison of 5000 (Sellers 1978:62, 67).
The remaining Virginia unit, the 3rd Detachment, was caught
near Waxhaws, South Carolina, by British forces and
overwhelmed. Virginia attempted to reconstitute the Line by
raising seven new regiments recruited for 18 months.
However, by the time of the Battle of Camden, August 16,
1780, not one regiment had been completed. The state had
sent 1400 militia to the Southern Department (Sellers

Virginia did supply Line regiments to the Southern
Department by February 1781 (Lesser 1976:196). Virginia
troops remained in this area until the end of the war. They
took part in the Battle at Guilford Court House which eventually led to Cornwallis retreating to Yorktown, Virginia. A detachment of Virginians remained with the army until mid-March 1783 when the last Virginia soldiers were discharged (Sellers 1978:72-73, 75).
### SOURCES OF ILLUSTRATIONS

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