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Quebec nationalism and separatism: A study of a continuing Canadian crisis

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QUEBEC NATIONALISM AND SEPARATISM
A Study of a Continuing Canadian Crisis

A Thesis
Presented To
The Faculty of the Department of Government
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

by
Robert M. Berry
1983
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Robert M. Berry

Approved, May 1983

George W. Carson
Margaret L. Hamilton

Alan J. Ward
To my parents, Robert E. and Ruth W. Berry
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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to trace the origins of the Quebec separatist movement and to place the movement in the context of Canadian history from 1763 to 1983.

The study concentrates on five principal aspects of Quebec separatism. 1) The culture and world-view of French Canadians during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; 2) the origin and development of French Canadian nationalism; 3) French Canadian expectations concerning federalism, and how the Canadian federal system has responded to the demands placed upon it by the separatist movement; 4) the debate between Pierre Trudeau and Rene Levesque concerning the advantages and disadvantages of a separate state of Quebec; and 5) the rise of the Parti Quebecois in the context of twentieth century separatist parties.

The study places heavy emphasis on historical developments in the belief that the Quebec separatist movement can best be understood in the perspective of time and by the analytical possibilities it offers. The study is based on the assumption that the American reader lacks a clear understanding of the forces which have shaped Canada—particularly French Canada—and that only by examining current events in an historical context can a thorough comprehension of Canada's present dilemma be reached.

It is suggested that the primary goal of French Canadians during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was the
survival of their language and culture through isolation. It is also suggested that, in modern times, the nationalism of survival changed to an aggressive and outward-turning nationalism that sought to protect French Canadian language and cultural rights not only in Quebec, but nationwide.

It concludes that the Parti Quebecois is the latest manifestation of modern Quebec nationalism, and that the party seeks to secure French Canadian rights through the threat of the secession of Quebec if such rights cannot be achieved within the Canadian federation.
QUEBEC NATIONALISM AND SEPARATISM
A Study of a Continuing Canadian Crisis
INTRODUCTION

On a state visit to Canada in 1967, French President Charles De Gaulle stepped on the balcony of the Montreal City Hall. "Vivre le Québec!," he proclaimed, "Vivre le Québec libre."¹

De Gaulle's choice of words to end the speech had done more than excite a cheering crowd of enthusiastic French Canadian well-wishers. His use of a separatist slogan sparked consternation in governmental circles in Ottawa, and many believed his visit would only foment a rising tide of separatist sentiment that called for the establishment of an independent Quebec. Nonetheless, while his speech angered some officials and Prime Minister Pearson cut short De Gaulle's visit, no one was expecting an immediate fulfillment of his prophecy. Indeed, in subsequent elections in 1970 and 1973, separatists made a poor showing; if anything, people felt, demands for Quebec's independence had subsided.

Nine years later, however, "Vivre le Québec libre" would again be heard throughout Montreal and the rest of

La Belle Province, but this time not as a far-fetched, romantic notion. The new Parti Québécois, under the able leadership of René Levesque, had gained in stature. On November 15, 1976, it defeated the Liberal Government of Robert Bourassa by winning 71 seats in the 110 seat provincial parliament (42 percent of the popular vote), a stunning upset which took the country by surprise.

Prior to the election, P.Q. leader Levesque had announced the intentions of his party: to establish an independent Quebec, based on the principles of "sovereignty-association." Although Levesque had no detailed manifesto of exactly what "sovereignty-association" entailed, he said that he envisioned a state that would be autonomous in all respects—political, social, and cultural—while retaining certain economic ties with the rest of Canada such as a common currency, certain defense ties, and trade relations based on the pattern of the European Common Market.

Levesque had stated that the implementation of "sovereignty-association" would take place after he had achieved a consensus of the Quebec electorate. He declared, therefore, that within five years of his election to power, he would place a referendum before the people which would decide the issue of Quebec's independence from the rest of Canada.
During the interim period between the election of the P.Q. and the referendum of 1980, separatists and federalists waged an intense battle in the province to win the support of Quebec's electorate. Separatists argued that the time had long passed when Quebec's economic and social life should be controlled by a minority of English-speaking people. Federalists argued with equal fervor that to separate from Canada in the fashion described by Levesque would bring about tremendous economic hardships in the province that neither the government nor the French-speaking business community was prepared to handle. The Quebec legislature, under P.Q. leadership, tested the waters by passing various pieces of legislation designed to ensure the use of the French language in schools and businesses in Quebec. It required that all persons coming to live in Quebec send their children to French-speaking schools; it mandated that companies operating in Quebec be able to communicate with their employees and the public in French or be fined. Further, companies were given until 1983 to meet the requirements: 1) that executives and personnel have a satisfactory knowledge of French; 2) that the number of French-speaking personnel at all levels be increased; and 3) that French be used in all documents and internal communication. It authorized the establishment of a
French language office to see that regulations were carried out and enforced.

English Canadians in Quebec reacted sharply to the measures. Prime Minister Trudeau termed the legislation "unacceptable" and a violation of the "human rights" of English-speaking Canadians. As a practical politician, Trudeau realized that he would have to negotiate a compromise with the separatists if he wanted to keep the confederation intact. Declaring in an address before Parliament that his government was willing to consider constitutional changes to advance the cultural aspirations of the disaffected French-speaking minority, he announced the formation of a new governmental group to be called the Task Force on Canadian Unity, and declared that to save Quebec and halt the developing rift between the two language groups, English-speaking Canadians must become reconciled to more French in their lives. He urged Quebeckers to forsake the unilingualism of the PQ and to accept the argument for a truly bilingual Canada.

Importantly, for the first time, Trudeau acknowledged a willingness to face the constitutional issue. "I cannot emphasize strongly enough," he said, "that the question of unity is not confined to the issues of language nor
confined geographically to the province of Quebec." He listed numerous dissatisfactions in other provinces, such as the feelings of westerners that their interests were underrepresented in a central government dominated by more populous Ontario and Quebec, and the unhappiness of the once prosperous eastern provinces over their economic imbalance with the more affluent central and western areas. As a temporary concession, Trudeau announced that the government would be willing to allow the Parti Québécois to go ahead with its proposed provincial language legislation because of what Secretary of State Roberts called the "insecurity of French Canadians about the future of their language in an overwhelmingly English-speaking country."

Levesque's initial victories proved chimerical, however. The Supreme Court of Canada, by an overwhelming majority, declared unconstitutional language Bill 101, which had made French the exclusive language in Quebec. Levesque's hoped-for referendum victory on the "sovereignty-association" proposal was also defeated by a wide margin in 1981, leaving the future of the Parti Québécois and its drive for an "associate state" in doubt.

Hypotheses, Aims and Methods

In 1977, when this thesis was conceived, I hypothesized

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that the P.Q.'s election would lead, inevitably, to a separate nation of Quebec. Time and circumstances have eclipsed that hypothesis, and I am forced to conclude with Eric L. McKitrick that "nothing is more susceptible to oblivion than an argument, however ingenious, that has been discredited by events." This being the case, it will be necessary to review the development of French Canadian separatism in the context of more recent history.

Much has happened in the last six years to warrant further study concerning the reasons for the P.Q.'s initial victory and the causes for its subsequent defeat on the referendum issue. To the changes in the political climate which brought about the decline of support for the P.Q.'s drive for "sovereignty-association" one must add the fact that Canada's constitution, since 1867 subject to the approval of the English Parliament concerning its amendment process, has now been patriated, leaving constitutional amendment exclusively in Canadian hands. This certainly must rank as the major political change in French Canadian/English Canadian relations to take place in over a century. One must also question the role of the French Canadian Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, who has been in power longer than any other Prime Minister in Canadian history, in shaping the federal response to the separatist challenge. What factors were
responsible for Trudeau's decision to patriate the constitution? Have the constitution's new provisions concerning the entrenchment of French Canadian culture and linguistic rights done anything to assuage French Canadians' dissatisfaction with the current state of their minority position? What can be expected of English Canadians in terms of their willingness to give French Canadians a larger role in Canadian affairs in general, one not relegated to Quebec alone? Will there be a greater effort on the part of English Canadians toward wider use of the French language throughout Canada and to incorporate French in business and government outside the province of Quebec? These are questions which may not be fully answered for some time to come and, with the exception of Trudeau's motivation for constitutional reform, will not be attempted in this thesis.

What will be attempted in this thesis is an examination of French Canada's role in the Canadian federation and the efforts English and French Canadians have made to seek accommodation over the years. It will attempt to examine not only the major issues that have come to the fore in English Canadian/French Canadian relations in recent decades, but also the structures and patterns within which accommodation has been sought—if not always achieved.
Chapter 1 will survey the background of the French-speaking population in Canada and the subsequent conquest of French Canada by the British. It will examine the sources of conflict between the two groups and how the groups achieved a modus vivendi despite strident—and often violent—confrontations.

Chapter 2 will explore the origins of French Canadian nationalism, its form and content, style and purposes, methods and leadership. It will attempt to show how the above-mentioned elements have changed over time to accommodate new circumstances and different strategies and goals. It will hold as its central theme that the tactics of French Canadian nationalism have fundamentally changed from violent confrontation to political action, or, in other words, the abandonment of revolutionary nationalism for ballot-box change. It will trace this development from the eighteenth century, through the separatist parties of the 1950's and 60's and will conclude by looking at the current status of the separatist Parti Québécois.

Chapter 3 will focus on the constitution and the federal process in Canada. Specifically, the chapter will concentrate on the reasons for Quebec's entry into the confederation; the degree of French Canadian support for the concept of federalism; the specific provisions of the constitution that are sources of dissatisfaction to French Canadians; the question of repatriation of the constitution and the entrenchment of French Canadian rights.
The chapter will include a section on specific weaknesses of the constitution that have been the focus of academic discussion and debate among English and French Canadians alike. It will develop the hypothesis that the "consociational" model is the most useful in explaining how a nation such as Canada, with strong cultural cleavages, has managed to accommodate the factionalism inherent in societies where ethnic, linguistic and religious differences prevail. In addition, the thesis will attempt to show that the consociational pattern of accommodation, which prevailed in the past, has begun to break down in the wake of a change of leadership in Quebec.

Finally, the chapter will attempt to analyze the provisions of the new constitution, specifically, those dealing with the entrenchment of French Canadian language and cultural rights.

Chapter 4 will explore the underpinnings of separatist philosophy, examine the origins of separatist parties in Quebec during the twentieth century, and survey the evolution of separatist methods--both revolutionary and electoral--and trace their development up to the victory of the Parti Quebecois in 1976.

Chapter 5 will examine closely the two major protagonists of the current Quebec debate: Pierre Trudeau and Rene Levesque. Specifically, it will address the fundamental issues of Trudeau's concept of federalism and Levesque's
separatism. This debate has been going on since the 1960's and is the backdrop of everything that has occurred in the 1970's and 80's. In addition, it will draw on the ideas expressed by each man concerning his vision of what French Canada is and what each expects it to be. It will trace the development of each man's personality and the factors which have shaped the world-view of each.

Chapter 6 will deal with recent events in Quebec since the P.Q. victory in 1976. It will examine the sources of P.Q. support in 1976, the measures taken by the P.Q. in the areas of language rights, education, business regulation and public policy. It will attempt to explore the reasons behind the P.Q.'s loss on the sovereignty-association issue, and the prospects for the future of the P.Q. in light of the referendum defeat.

Finally, chapter 7 will draw some general conclusions concerning the future of French Canadian nationalism, the prospects for Canadian federalism, the conflict between Trudeau and Levesque, and the obstacles facing both Levesque and the P.Q. concerning Quebec independence.
CHAPTER I
QUEBEC AND THE FRENCH CANADIANS
THE SEEDS OF A SEPARATE STATE

The Land

The geography of Quebec provides an immediate introduction to the idea of an independent state. With its enormous size and its very distinct boundaries, it is not difficult for one to think of Quebec as a separate nation. Quebec is the largest Canadian province; it covers approximately 600,000 square miles—fifteen percent of the total land area of Canada. Further, it is separated from both the United States and the rest of Canada almost entirely by water (especially if its boundary with Labrador is ignored, as it is on Quebec's official maps). Hudson Bay borders it on the west, Hudson Straight and the Atlantic Ocean on the north, the Gulf of St. Lawrence on the east, and the Ottawa and St. Lawrence Rivers on the south.1

Quebec's internal geography is also of primary importance

because it proved to be a source of division for the Quebecois: it first precluded rapid economic growth, then its most promising areas came under the control of the English rather than the French. Essentially, Quebec can be divided into three regions running northeast to southwest. On the southern extreme is the St. Lawrence Valley, a fertile agricultural area that is the center of the densest population. Directly north are two mountain ranges, the Laurentians and the Appalachians, that would effectively keep the Quebec population along the St. Lawrence. Though not impassable, they did discourage emigration out of the semi-fertile valleys until it was necessitated by overcrowding.² Furthest north is the tundra-like region that has some economic value in its mineral resources but which even today remains practically uninhabitable (under two people per square mile).³ Thus it was that during the early history of Quebec, population was concentrated along the only navigable waterway where settlement was relatively easy—the St. Lawrence.

The People

The French colonial presence began in 1608 when Samuel Champlain sailed up the St. Lawrence and founded what was to


become Quebec City. He was soon followed by Jesuit priests, among them Father Marquette, and the fur traders. Remarkably, the French were able to endure and expand their tiny colony throughout what was called New France despite Indian attacks and harsh winters. By 1682, exploration had taken place as far as the western tip of Lake Superior and all the way down the Mississippi. The entire watershed was claimed in the name of Louis XIV of France. Meanwhile, of course, the British were firmly entrenched along the east coast of the present-day United States and around Hudson Bay. Gradually, animosity grew as the British poached in French lands to the south of Hudson Bay and expanded further westward from the colonies. War broke out occasionally in the early 1700's but with relatively little effect on either side.

The French who settled in the St. Lawrence valley soon realized that they were not merely travelers or explorers visiting the region or French officials on duty in the colony. New France was their country, and to show their intention to identify themselves in the new land, they took the name habitants. The word meant that they were there to stay as residents, to inhabit. Later generations born in the colony would come to be known as Canadiens, whose worldview, habits and collective traits would make the French of Canada different from those of France.

5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
By 1754, New France, except in physical expanse, was still a tiny colony. Its total population was only about 55,000 and there were only two cities of any size, Montreal and Quebec City (8,500 and 5,000 respectively). The economy was based on small farms and fur-trading outposts; there was little industry. Surrounded as the French were by hostile elements, the Catholic church served as a bastion of French culture in the wilderness; and in addition to gaining profits from the fur trade the habitants spread the gospel among the Indians, thus giving their colonizing efforts a distinct missionary zeal.

With the outbreak of the Seven Years' War in 1756, the competition between England and France in the Old World was transferred to British and French outposts in the New World. This conflict would set the stage for France's final struggle to remain a colonial power in Canada.

At 10 o'clock on the morning of September 13, 1759, two armies faced each other on the high plateau above the cliffs of Quebec. It was there, on the Plains of Abraham, that France's dreams for further exploitation were dashed when General James Wolfe's army overran the French position and defeated Montcalm. That evening, the remainder of the French army retreated from the east of Quebec. The city was left virtually defenseless, and on September 17 it capitulated.

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7 Ibid., p. 58.
Long before that, however, Montcalm was dead. "I shall not live to see the surrender of Quebec," he had said.\(^8\)

The Treaty of Paris in 1763 ceded all possessions in the northern part of North America except two small islands to Britain, but that was not to end the French presence. The military and most of the elite deserted Canada but some 60,000 farmers, trappers and voyageurs were left behind to fend for themselves. They clung together, working, teaching, and praying in French.\(^9\) In this solidarity can be found the roots of French Canadian nationalism. From the 1760's, as the French held together and turned inward, survival or la survivance became the goal of French Canadians after the conquest. Je me souviens --"I remember"-- was the watchword.\(^10\)

The British Canadians reached out to both the American colonies and the Commonwealth, while the French Canadians were more concerned with preserving their traditional way of life. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conclude that the English were the sole cause of French isolation.\(^11\) Indeed, the British military governors were well disposed to the French and, although the official British position was to assimilate the Québécois, the Quebec Act was signed in 1774 as a result of Governor Guy Carlton's bringing pressure to bear on the British Parliament.

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\(^9\)Lamb, p. 65.

\(^10\)Saywell, p. 56.

\(^11\)Lamb, p. 69.
Mason Wade, a French Canadian historian, calls the Quebec Act their Magna Carta. He notes that the problem with the Québécois was not that they were French but that they were Roman Catholic and, as such, excluded from all civil rights. For example, all the other provinces were given elected assemblies before 1774. In the Quebec Act, Quebec itself was given only an appointed council because the British did not trust the French electorate. Nonetheless, the Quebec Act did assure some measure of religious freedom for the Québécois.

The Québécois were finally granted representative government by the Constitutional Act of 1791. This Act also divided Canada into two separate regions: Upper Canada, controlled by the United Empire Loyalists (present-day Ontario); and Lower Canada (the present province of Quebec). Nevertheless, the French were relegated to minor positions in the appointive legislative and executive councils, even as their numbers assured them an overwhelming majority in the legislative assembly.

The English who took up residence in the newly-conquered territory were divided among those who tried to gain the sympathy of the local population, liberal-minded British military officers, and those who came for the sake of profits and displayed an openly hostile attitude toward both native


French and immigrant British administrators, merchants and adventurers, mostly from New England. Many of these new arrivals were British Loyalists, who flocked to settle in Canada along the St. Lawrence from Montreal westward. Some had settled on the land but most had come to engage in trade and commerce. It was not long before the British minority and the French majority were engaged in competition. Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century Montreal was outdistancing Quebec in importance, and the city of Montreal was, in fact, populated by a British majority.

In the economic field, the British wanted to develop trade and commerce and to levy taxes to build harbors and canals; the French, who lived largely on the land, objected to paying taxes to assist the commercial English-speaking city-dwellers. Politically, the English continued to enjoy positions on the British governor's appointed council, and the French protested that the governor should listen to their advice and not that of the English-speaking merchants and bankers.  

In 1837, the battle of words became a battle of acts. Louis Joseph Papineau, the French leader of the assembly, roused his followers, the Patriotes, to arms, inveighing against the English-speaking Chateau Clique for its


15 Ibid., p. 71
favoratism toward the mercantile interests of Montreal businessmen, and against the British leaders who refused recognition of ministerial "responsibility" to the French majority in the House. In his famous Ninety-Two Resolutions he enumerated the province's political grievances. However, Lord Russell, speaking for the British government, made clear that the demands for autonomy would not be conceded. In May of 1837, Papineau declared, "The democratic flood has poured irresistibly down the slope of time and growing faster and faster, will topple the barriers which may be erected against it."  

The first violence of "Papineau's Revolt" flared after a meeting called by the Patriotes in November of 1837 in Montreal. Although Papineau fled the city, the government mistook this move as an attempt to arouse rebellion in the countryside and dispatched military units to areas of known Patriote sympathy. Because the rebellion had been ill-conceived and poorly executed, most of the rebels were either killed or captured during an encounter with British troops at St. Eustache. Papineau and his immediate circle fled to the United States. The British, meanwhile, dispatched Lord Durham to conduct a full investigation of the causes of the rebellion.  

16 Saywell, p. 56.  
17 Wade, p. 184.  
18 Careless, pp. 192-193.
There were, in fact, a number of reasons for the rebellion, but Lord Durham saw it primarily as a racial question. In his famous report, he wrote:

I expected to find a contest between a government and a people. Instead, I found two nations warring in the bosom of a single state, not of principles but of races; and I perceived that it would be idle to attempt any amelioration of laws or institutions until we could first succeed in terminating the deadly animosity that now separates the inhabitants of Lower Canada [Quebec] into hostile divisions of French and English.19

Durham criticized the French Canadians, characterizing them as "a people with no history, no literature." Believing that the French were backward and the British merchants progressive, Durham maintained that the only answer to the racial conflict was to swamp the French population. Unite Upper and Lower Canada, he argued, and in a short time the combined English-speaking population of the two colonies would outnumber the French. Assimilation of the French would then only be a matter of time.

Since, as Lord Durham pointed out, there were also good economic reasons for the union of the two colonies, the British government followed his advice and united the colonies in 1841. But Durham's attack only served to make the French Canadians more determined to maintain their own

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19 Saywell, p. 57.

20 Ibid., p. 58.
culture; to make them attach themselves more firmly to their language, religion, and the values of their rural, agricultural society; and to make them impress je me souviens even more indelibly on their children. In politics, French Canadian leaders were quick to oppose any move that smacked of inequality or threatened their survival. This elaborate game of chess, largely played out in the assembly, paralyzed the government of the colony and was one of the reasons for confederation in 1867. 21

Confederation once again divided the two Canadas, this time into the provinces of Ontario and Quebec—the former overwhelmingly English-speaking and the latter overwhelmingly French—and united them along with the other colonies in the Canadian federation. Politically, the federal union did not reflect a desire on the part of the English and the French to live more closely together, but it was a reflection of the fact that they could not live together under a unitary system of government. Moreover, the federal union was based on the hope that the two peoples could live together if there were nothing to fight over. The constitution, therefore, gave to the provinces all matters of special concern to each cultural group, while the federal government was given direct responsibility for broad national policies that did

21 Ibid.

not involve religious, linguistic, or cultural interests. The Constitution also guaranteed the educational rights of the Protestant English minority in Quebec and the Roman Catholic religious minorities outside Quebec, and the use of the French and English languages in the Canadian Parliament and the Quebec legislature.\textsuperscript{23} Thus, the founding fathers of the Confederation hoped that Quebec would no longer be obsessed with survival for, although it represented a minority in Canada, it had control of its own institutions in the Province of Quebec.\textsuperscript{24}

In the economic sphere, following confederation, however, the French and British were far from equal. Confederation did usher in the industrial revolution for Canada. Railroads were started in Montreal and spread to the West; but from Montreal east to Quebec there were still only small farms inhabited by Roman Catholic families. In 1867, Quebec was still a rural region while Ontario, the Maritime Provinces and the Prairie Provinces, either populated or dominated by the British, showed signs of emerging into the industrial era.\textsuperscript{25}

Once again, geographic factors determined the patterns of development. The mountain ranges running parallel to the St. Lawrence valley, plus a lack of capital to invest


\textsuperscript{25} Warkinton, p. 305.
in mining ventures, forced Canadians to look to the United States for supplies of iron ore and coal. Although parts of southern Quebec, specifically Montreal, could get some raw material from coal fields in western Pennsylvania and the iron ore mines near Lake Superior, for the most part the metallurgical industry developed in Ontario. Since the regions east of Montreal could not import these essential raw materials because the St. Lawrence was shallow and could handle only limited shipping, Ontario emerged better off than all of Quebec. Added to this was the fact that the British parts of Quebec, Montreal and the southern parts of the province, were economically more advanced than the French parts. Nowhere was this more obvious than in the disparity of wealth between Montreal and Quebec City. With the continued expansion of the railroads between Ottawa and Montreal, the latter was able to make up ground on the former. Moreover, industrialization could proceed at a moderate pace in Montreal because it had access to large amounts of investment capital, whereas eastern Quebec could not secure the necessary funds.25

The net effect of this pattern of industrialization was

a shift in population from the French sector to the British. Indicative of their will to survive, the French relied on the *revanche du berceau*, "revenge of the cradle," and increased their numbers one hundred times in two hundred years. This population increase did serve the purpose of preventing French Canada from being overwhelmed by the British; but it neither lessened the British domination of such financial centers as Montreal nor made the French Canadians any wealthier. Thus, it was that Quebec was left with a substantial French majority which had the bulk of its wealth controlled by the English.

For their part the French, who found themselves lagging farther behind in the economic sphere also found themselves discriminated against in the cultural realm. The ink on the British North America Act was hardly dry when the French Canadians found that the conflict of cultures could not be removed from national life. Moving beyond the borders of Quebec, French Canadians soon realized that Canada was basically an English-speaking country. They encountered an alien and often hostile culture that refused to provide schools where their children could be educated in their own language and religion, and forced them to work in English if they wanted to succeed. Even the province of

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26 Jay and Audry Walz, p. 172.

27 Warkinton, p. 351.

28 Donald Reisebrough, *Canada and the French* (New York: Facts on File Publications,
Manitoba, where there was a large French-speaking population
and where French language rights had been guaranteed in 1870,
abolished French schools and ended the right of members to
speak French in the provincial legislature in 1890.

Within the province of Quebec, the Québécois found
that their language and culture hindered them from assuming
positions of influence within the Anglo-dominated commercial
center of Montreal. More important, however, was the fact
that Quebeckers found their traditional system of education
precluded them from gaining entry to the business world.
Since the time of Champlain, the Catholic Church had main-
tained control of Quebec's educational establishment, and
the Church was more interested in training the young in law,
religion or education rather than in the more "worldly"
vocations. By contrast, English youths had been schooled in
such areas as engineering, finance and business adminis-
tration. Thus, whatever economic development took place in
the province, took place under British control. 29

Because the French Canadian realized that he was often
powerless in Ottawa, Quebec assumed a larger importance: it
was only in Quebec that he had a province where his language
and culture would be respected. As Henri Bourassa, a
brilliant French Canadian nationalist, put it, the French

29 "Quebec, Uneasy Province," Christian Century 86
Canadian was like an Indian who had no rights once he left the reservation. Only in Quebec could he remain French. La survivance became the touchstone of French Canadian life.

An example of the fact that Ottawa turned a deaf ear to French Canadian feeling came outside Quebec in 1885 when the Métis, French-speaking half-breeds in the Northwest Territory, rebelled against the Canadian government. Even though federal authorities had been guilty of serious mismanagement in western Canada, the rebellion was quickly crushed and its leader, Louis Riel, captured. English Canada demanded that he be executed; but the French Canadians asked for mercy, pleading that he was fighting for the survival of a people and arguing—with some justification—that he was insane. Pressured by a united English Canada, the government followed the letter of the law despite an almost unanimous chorus from Quebec demanding that Riel’s life be spared.

As Quebec entered the twentieth century it found itself in a quandry. Even as Quebec became more industrialized as a result of the development of hydro-electric power from the St. Lawrence and a booming lumber business, the French became anxious about the preservation of their language, culture and heritage. They had to face the prospect of
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modernization or lose control of their destinies to the Anglo-Saxon entrepreneurs. The dilemma was that they could not enjoy the benefits of their heritage and modernization at the same time. This situation was to obtain throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Quebec lagged behind the other provinces in both education and income [see tables 1 and 2] while at the same time it struggled against the assimilative pressures resulting from industrialization and economic integralism.

The next serious political confrontation between French and English Canada came with the conscription crises of 1900 and 1917. English Canada demanded that the nation send troops to assist Great Britain in the Boer War in South Africa, but French Canada argued that the conflict was of no vital concern to Canada and opposed participation. Nonetheless, Sir Wilfred Laurier, then Prime Minister and himself a French Canadian, had to bow to the demands of the English Canadian majority. Likewise, the conscription crisis of 1917 fueled French Canadians' animosity toward their English counterparts. With Canadian forces suffering higher losses in Europe in the first half of 1917, and with the government getting fewer and fewer recruits, Ottawa decided that a draft was necessary. For the most part, English Canada supported the federal position, but Quebec was vehemently opposed. The Québécois
felt no responsibility to serve a federation that was doing little for them. Henry Bourassa, Premier of Quebec, warned that conscription "would soon transform the most peaceable perhaps most orderly, population of the Americas into a revolutionary people." Riots broke out in Quebec and the first talk of leaving the federation was heard from French Canadian nationalists. As it turned out, the war was over sooner than expected and only 50,000 conscripts were sent overseas. But from these crises and defeats—and every crisis was a defeat—French Canada learned the painful lesson that national politics could center on racial issues.

The Fragmented Canadian Identity

In addition to the historical, geographical, social, and economic factors which have tended to distinguish Quebec and its inhabitants from the rest of Canada, there are also a number of very important psychological considerations which have made a sense of national unity between French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians difficult to achieve and have tended to fragment the Canadian identity.

From the historical perspective, for example, Seymour M. Lipset has remarked that two nations, the United States and Canada, resulted from the American Revolution. Two other

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30 Saywell, p. 23.

observers of the Canadian scene, S.D. Clark and A.R.M. Lower, suggest that Canada, the North American nation formed from the losing side in the American Revolution, has a counter-revolutionary tradition which is also a clue to understanding Canadian values.\textsuperscript{32} What is more, as Mildred Schwartz observes, "Whereas after the revolution many supporters of the American cause left behind north of the new international border emigrated south, many thousands of Tories moved north. And from what emerged as a separate Canadian identity has been justifying itself as not being American." \textsuperscript{33} S.D. Clark adds that "Canadian life can almost be said to take its rise in the negative will to resist absorption in the American Republic." \textsuperscript{34}

With respect to Quebec's traditional values, Porter notes that because of Quebec's parochial structure, its traditional resistance to liberal ideas, and because the Catholic Church held sway in Quebec immediately following the conquest, Quebeckers feared the revolutionary doctrines espoused by the United States. Consequently, when American


\textsuperscript{34} Clark and Lower, p. 22.

forces invaded Canada during the American Revolution, Quebec did not grasp the opportunity to throw off British colonial rule and side with the U.S. against England. Further, when the 1789 Revolution broke out in France—with its decidedly rationalist and anti-clerical overtones—the French Canadian clergy sought to cut the people off from both sources of contamination: the United States and France. Thus it was that the Quebec leadership found union with the British monarchy preferable to the radical doctrines of the Enlightenment.

As for the outward symbols of national identity, the British flag flew over Canada until the 1960's, and the highest court of appeal was the Judicial Committee of the British Privy Council until approximately the same time. Until 1982, the Canadian constitution was the British North America Act, passed by the British Parliament in 1867. Any amendment to the Act was subject to the pro forma ratification of the British Parliament.

All of this has tended to prevent Canadians from having a strong sense of national identity. S.M. Lipset observed that although Canada has been very successful in achieving economic growth and a high standard of living, it still lacks a strong sense of national pride and identity. "It
is still not certain what it is," Lipset claims. "A North American nation, not much different from the United States, which a significant minority thinks might join the United States, a British nation with a large French subculture, two nations, one French and the other English, which exist in a loose confederation, or some combination of these and other concepts." 36

The Unified French Identity.

It is with respect to identity that the French-speaking Canadian (Québécois) has a distinct advantage over his English-speaking counterpart. Whereas the British Canadian is somewhat uncertain of what Canada represents to him, the French Canadian is quite sure of the meaning of Quebec. He knows the traditions and folkways of his ancestors, their rural way of life and their strong attachment to the Roman Catholic faith. He has been taught the names of French Canadian heroes of the past—Champlain, Riel, Papineau, Bourassa—who fought for, and sometimes died, to preserve his culture. He is painfully aware of le conquête, the forceful subjugation of his homeland, the dominance of the British. Overarching all of these things is his cherished language, the most salient feature of his lifestyle and his means to transmit what he has learned to his progeny. Thus it is that through his culture and his territory, the French Canadian feels himself part of a distinct nation.

36 S.M. Lipset, Intrdudction to Public Opinion and the Canadian Identity, p. 7.
CHAPTER II
THE PARTI QUEBECOIS AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRENCH CANADIAN NATIONALISM

In order to understand the place that the Parti Quebecois occupies in terms of the development of French Canadian nationalism, it is necessary to trace the origins of nationalist thought in French Canada. While nationalism has remained a prominent theme in the history of French-English relations in Canada, it would be wrong to conclude that its context and content have remained the same at all times. Nationalist expression has crystalized today in a way which is fundamentally different from past forms. It has changed from a rather vague nation to one of concrete demands for a separate state of Quebec. It has undergone a significant shift in emphasis, from a defensive inward-looking philosophy of survivance\(^1\) to an outward looking and aggressive orientation, symbolized by the doctrine of maitre chez nous.\(^2\)

My hypothesis is that French Canadian nationalism has passed through several distinct phases in its evolution: inward turning nationalism (defensive nationalism); constitutional nationalism; political nationalism; anti-imperialist nationalism; anti-imperialist nationalism.

\(^1\)"survival"

\(^2\)"Masters in our own house"
nationalism; modern nationalism (which includes both liberal and socialist nationalism); revolutionary nationalism; and, finally, electoral or "ballot box" separatism. Each of these phases will be considered in terms of its symbols, leaders, trends, and expressions. The psychological, social, and political factors which have given expression to French Canadian nationalism at different periods will be examined, and an analysis will be made of the institutional and associational devices which have encouraged and directed the forces of change.

The first task is to define exactly what we mean by nationalism, for the exact dimensions and nature of the subject have been a source of much academic debate and discussion in recent years. According to Michael Brunet, "nationalism is a manifestation of the national and spontaneous solidarity that exists among members of a human group sharing a historical and cultural tradition from which the group derives its distinctive identity." A somewhat different approach to nationalism is that of K.R. Minogue, who draws a distinction between "nationalism" and "patriotism." Patriotism, by Minogue's yardstick means devotion to one's country, a "sentiment of loyalty by virtue of which one feels identified with the political community;" a "spontaneous reference to the sharing of a

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common soil, language, culture, history, folkways, customs and values—all of which result in a sense of pride as well as a sense to duty to the group."^ Nationalism, on the other hand, is a response to an outward threat. In this respect, according to Minogue, "Nationalism is a political movement which seeks to defend an objective we may call national integrity."^  

For our purposes, we will consider Louis Snyder's concept of nationalism as our working definition. According to Snyder, " Nationalism is a condition of mind, feeling, or sentiment of a group of people living in a well defined geographic area, speaking a common language, possessing a literature in which their aspirations are expressed, attached to common traditions and customs, venerating their own heroes, and, in some cases, having the same religion."  

As for the precise form of nationalism that will prevail at a given time, it is necessary to define the successive stages through which nationalism passes. Minogue, for example, holds that there are three distinct stages which may be used to trace the development of nationalism: 1) stirrings—the period in which the nation becomes aware of itself as a nation suffering oppression; 2) the struggle

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^Ibid.

for independence—this may involve terrorism, guerrilla warfare, riots or a process of peaceful negotiation. During this time there is an exposition of national virtue and the emergence of heroes; 3) the process of consolidation—which is keeping the nation, once it has achieved independence, from falling apart.  

The Character of French Canadian Nationalism

Until quite recently, French Canadian nationalism was tied closely to the values of traditional society. These values tended to inhibit the expansion of the role of the state, whatever may have been the implications for economic and social development. The major premise of this traditional ideology was that the "nation" was, and should always be, essentially agrarian, and that the truest expression of the French Canadian identity lay in the parish community. Industrialization and urbanization, it was felt, could only weaken the nation. The notion of agrarian superiority held sway over many nationalist intellectuals even until the middle of the twentieth century. For example, in 1943, clerical nationalist Richard Ares wrote, "By tradition, vocation, as well as necessity, we are a people of peasants. Everything that takes us away from the land diminishes and weakens us as a people and encourages

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7 Minogue, p. 29.
cross-breeding, duplicity and treason." As late as 1956, the report of the Tremblay Commission, a provincially appointed commission on constitutional problems, declared that "the consolidation and expansion of agriculture to the extreme limit imposes itself as the first article of a programme of social restoration and stabilization." 9

By the mid-twentieth century, however, the traditional nationalist arguments had become outmoded, for the philosophy which extolled the virtues of agrarian existence did little to focus attention on social and economic problems faced by the bulk of French Canadians now living in cities. Thus, during the 1960's, there was a marked shift away from traditional ideology. Writing in 1963, Leon Dion observed that nationalist ideology had undergone significant changes in direction and scope." This nationalistic revival," he claimed," fuels the great drive for development seen in every field of activity and in every segment of the community." 10

Origins of French Canadian Nationalism

Before the British conquest of 1754, there was little nationalistic feeling among French Canadians. This, of


course, is understandable because they still regarded themselves as citizens of France. For the most part, these soil-tilling habitants, voyageurs, soldiers, seigneurs, and the clergy were occupied with establishing their colony, and had no real sense of separateness from their European origins. Their feeling of group consciousness came only after the British conquest, as a result of the conflict with a culturally alien group.

Moreover, there were other important internal forces at work which helped to restrain nationalistic expression. Because Quebec's clergy was imbued with the doctrines of royal absolutism and the principles of obedience to authority as established by Rome, these influential church leaders did much to persuade the habitants to accept British rule. Even more, there was an alignment of French Canadian notables with the British administrative class. French-English marriages took place between British functionaries and professional soldiers, on the one hand, and the daughters of the merchant and professional French Canadians. This had the effect of splitting French Canadian solidarity along class lines, and widening the gap between French Canadian rural and city masses and their intellectual and commercial leaders. It was only during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century that national solidarity grew into political consciousness. French Canadians were
then more aware of their minority status and of the fact that they were "charter members of the country." 11

**Defensive Nationalism**

Between 1754 and 1840, French Canadians began to struggle for constitutional and civil rights. Bonenfant and Falardeau have referred to this period as a time of "defensive nationalism" which climaxed in the Papineau Rebellion of 1837-38. To be sure, Papineau was familiar with the ideas of the French philosophes concerning the concept of nationality, but they claimed that Papineau was "a parliamentary liberal and a great patriot, forced by circumstances to be a nationalist." 12

Notably, a decade before Papineau's Rebellion, the Canadian Party, which had changed its name under Papineau's leadership to the *Patriotes Parti*, adopted a rallying flag which consisted of three horizontal stripes bearing the colors of green, white and red, similar in design to the French revolutionary tricolor. At the time of Papineau's


"92 Resolutions," the party included an impressive array of French Canadian political leaders and orators such as LaFontaine, Vigner, Morin, Nelson, Duvernay, Parent, and, of course, Papineau. Its philosophy drew on many of the ideas being expressed in Europe in the wake of the French Revolution: social progress, democracy, reform and liberty. The party also had a number of newspapers to disseminate its propaganda: Le Vindicateur and La Minerve in Montreal; Le Libéral and Le Canadiène in Quebec City. The latter's editor, Etienne Parent, had himself coined the Patriote's slogan, "Nos institutions, notre langue, et notre droits." Other newspapers which served the Patriote purpose were L'Echo du Pays and Le Fantasque.

The party's activists were supervised by its Comité Central et Permanent, which centralized information and propaganda and which had the duty of organizing meetings, providing speakers and literature, and otherwise uniting and stimulating "popular forces."

Developing at the same time, but independent of the Patriote party, there emerged another movement dedicated to the cause of French Canada. This was the Saint Jean Baptiste Society, which had taken root several years

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before 1837 through the efforts of Jacques Vigner and Paul Duvernay. The Society, its founders hoped, would be the first great associational device to bind together the masses and elite among French Canadians who had been drifting further and further apart.

The Society, like the Patriotes' party of Papineau, had a flag, an emblem, and a definite purpose. The motto, "Nos institutions, notre langue, et notre droits," was borrowed from Etienne Parent. Likewise, the flag had the same green, white and red colors as the Patriotes' flag. Its emblem was the maple leaf, conceived as "the symbol of destiny of the French Canadian people." Although they were separate organizations, the link between the Saint Jean Baptiste Society and the Patriotes' party was strengthened by their common purpose. In fact, it was from the ranks of the Saint Jean Baptiste Society that the leaders of the Patriotes' party's Permanent Committee were later drawn. The Society, for its part, continued to glorify and popularize, through its annual speeches and demonstrations, a reverence for tradition and the institutions of the past, and to emphasize the emotional and mythlike interpretation of the historical development of the French Canadians. This later developed into a recurrent theme of a national mission for the French Canadian people.
Constitutional Nationalism

The first phase of defensive nationalism gave way in the 1840's to a period of "constitutional" nationalism under the Union Regime. This was largely in reaction to the British attempt to assimilate the French Canadians following Lord Durham's recommendation that Upper and Lower Canada be united. The two provinces were actually united in the Act of Union in 1841.

One of the French leaders, La Fontaine, seemed ably equipped to defend French Canadian interests. Fortunately, for French Canada, the reform movement sanctioned the principles of ministerial responsibility— that is, control of the executive by the people's representatives. Lord Durham had, in fact, acknowledged the necessity of applying this principle in the colonies, as it had been in Great Britain a few years earlier. La Fontaine knew that ministerial responsibility would mean control over the executive by French Canadian representatives, and to attain that aim he became allied with the reformers of Upper Canada. This served to temper nationalistic fervor and to redirect it into more practical concerns such as education, local development, and agriculture.
While these developments were taking place in the political arena, young French Canadians were being socialized toward French Canadian values in a number of classical colleges that had been founded either by the local clergy or by teaching orders from Europe. The École Littéraire of Quebec had been fostering an ardent group of writers, poets, historians, and novelists who exalted the symbols, ideas, and values of the French Canadians. They placed emphasis on the history of the race, the mother country, the Roman Catholic Church, the language and folkways of French Canadians, and the attachment to the soil. Textbooks underlined ecclesiastical and religious landmarks of the history of the French in Canada.

Nonetheless, during this same period, there were also sharp differences among the French Canadians themselves concerning the philosophical direction of French Canada. Whereas Papineau's ideas, for example, had been drawn from the salons of Paris, the clergy opposed the ideas of the "En-lightenment." They held that its doctrines were too radical, too democratically minded, too free thinking, and too anti-clerical. The conflict between liberal thinkers such as Papineau and the clergy eventually resulted in the Church reestablishing its dominance over thought in Quebec, which in turn brought about a more conservative form of
nationalism. The church was to retain its power over thought in Quebec until the mid-twentieth century, and lost its grip only as Quebec became more secularized.

Mercier, Riel, and the Rebound of Political Nationalism

The fragile consensus between French and English Canada gave way shortly after confederation in 1867. Latent feelings of nationalist sentiment emerged in response to events not in Quebec but in the new province of Manitoba, part of the former Northwest Territories. The infringement of rights of the French Canadian minority in this area received considerable attention in Quebec, especially from Liberals and the "national" movement directed by Honore Mercier. Mercier's objective was to create a "united French Canadian front, erasing former party lines, for the defense of French Canadian rights." 15

The movement emphasized electoral reform, administrative readjustments, provincial autonomy, decentralization, tariff protection, and opposition to the Canadian Pacific project. 16

The Riel-affair in 1885 galvanized Mercier's movement.

15 Bonenfant and Falardeau, p. 25.

16 Opposition to the railroad was due to French Canadian feeling that rail-access to their enclaves in the hinterlands would result in British Canadian dominance of French-speaking areas outside Quebec.
Louis Riel, "chief" of the French Canadian half-breeds, the Métis, in Manitoba, had become spokesman for the French Canadians living along the Red River in Manitoba. While both English and French Canadian half-breeds were concerned about the fate of their free life on the plains if settlement should begin in earnest, the more numerous Métis were also concerned about the fate of their Catholic religion and French customs if English Canadians poured in. Their fears became intensified when William McDougall, the new Canadian lieutenant governor, reached the Red River to take over the colony.

Riel, a clever but somewhat unbalanced man, set up a "provisional government" on his own. He took over Ft. Gary and stopped McDougall at the border of the settlement. Riel's purpose in setting up his government was to win terms from Canada so that the Red River could enter the Dominion as a separate province with guarantees for Métis land and protection for French rights, as in Quebec. Delegates from the settlement traveled to Ottawa, and Prime Minister John McDonald sent a new representative to replace McDougall. The negotiations gave the Riel government almost everything it demanded in the hope that it would peacefully disband.

Riel, however, made a serious error in executing an
English Canadian who had defied his authority. English-speaking Canadians in Ontario demanded that Riel be brought to justice as a traitor and a murderer. Moreover, when Manitoba became part of the dominion, Ottawa came under increased pressure to assert its authority in the area, and an expeditionary force was dispatched to subdue Riel and disband the Red River colony.

Riel was quickly tried and executed once the forces sent by the federal government arrived on the scene. While English Canadians applauded the move, French Canadians regarded him as a martyr who had been victimized by fanatic "Orangists." Popular meetings were held in many French Canadian communities and villages, and there was an uproar throughout the province of Quebec.

It was on the occasion of Riel's execution that Mercier proclaimed the formation of a great "national" party which would gather in all those who resented the Riel outrage. Their first objective would be to overthrow, by all constitutional means possible, the conservative government of John A. MacDonald. Mercier's following included Quebec Liberals and Nationalist Conservatives who had broken with their party over the Riel Affair, and the Ultramondists of Quebec and Montreal (remnants of Papineau's Patriotes party).
In practice, Mercier's nationalist movement was both rhetorical and political. With the help of Sir Oliver Mowat, Premier of Ontario, Mercier found an ally against McDonald, and he again affirmed the rights of the provinces. Like the predominant nationalist leader who followed him, Henri Bourassa, Mercier focused on two important issues: 1) French Canadian interests outside the province of Quebec; and 2) the opposition to British imperialism. Mercier's slogans were echoed in such newspapers as La Verite in Quebec and L'Etenard in Montreal. Both stood for national causes such as provincial autonomy, the development of agriculture, the protection of minorities and official recognition of the French language.

Nonetheless, Mercier's brand of nationalism—though it did arouse a certain amount of popular fervor—did not reach down to a very large portion of the population. Although he himself was very popular in French Canada, his popularity tended to distract from his nationalist message. Further, Mercier encountered opposition from the traditional foes of liberalism and nationalism, the clergy. Thus it was mostly among college students that Mercier's brand of nationalism gained adherents.
What was significant about Mercier's nationalist thought was that it was highly successful in integrating the sacred with the secular point of view. Building on this success Quebec's Premier, Henri Bourassa, came on the scene at a time when recent events in French Canadian life had once more intensified the French Canadian feeling of solidarity. This was especially the case when the Manitoba school question was settled to the disadvantage of the French-speaking minority in 1890 and the provincial government renounced language guarantees given to the French-speaking citizens of the province.

In the first years after Confederation, Bourassa maintained, the federal government had been true to the concept of a bilingual and bicultural nation. Evidence of this was to be found in the Manitoba Act of 1870 and the Northwest Territories Bill of 1875, each of which had accepted French as one of the official languages and had established a denominational school system. Where the federal government had erred, however, was in allowing the territorial government of the Northwest to extinguish the legal status of French in 1890. Because the territorial legislature's ordinance, which had changed the language laws and school system,
violated the spirit of the 1875 federal law, a law superior to the law of the Northwest Territories, the territorial ordinances were actually illegal. However, by accepting the 1905 Sifton amendment, the federal government legitimized the illegal school and language ordinances, thus turning its back on the rights of western French Canadians. By giving both French and English official status in Parliament, the Fathers of Confederation made it clear that they wished both languages to co-exist everywhere in public life—in church, in court, and in government, Bourassa said. These rights would be meaningless if the English provinces prevented French Canadian children from acquiring a perfect knowledge of their own language.

Furthermore, Bourassa held that the economic pull of the United States would slowly absorb Canada and that the best way to combat such absorption was to uphold the values of the French Canadians: the rejection of materialism by the preservation of Catholicism; the value of agriculture; the maintenance of the French language and French Canadians customs.

Finally, Bourassa insisted that the failure to accept cultural duality would threaten the continued existence of the Confederation: French Canadians would never feel that
Canada was their homeland unless their culture was free to develop. Hence national duality was dependent on cultural duality and "reciprocal respect for the rights of the two races." The alternative was instability and crisis.

It should be noted that Bourassa did not favor the idea of a separate nation of Quebec; he emphasized the integrity of French Canada within the context of a broad Canadianism. Bourassa was, above all, a fierce "Canada firster." His sentiments on this can be found anywhere in his prolific writings, and particularly in his articles in Le Devoir, the daily newspaper he founded in 1910. In a pamphlet on the 1911 tariff agreement between Canada and the United States, Bourassa wrote that "the general and superior interests of Canada must have priority over the more particular class or provincial interests ... Now or never is the time to say 'Canada to the Canadians' and in doing so, to yield neither to the Americas nor to the other parts of the Empire." 18

Modern Nationalism and the Coming of the "Quiet Revolution"

The advent of the Duplessis regime in the late 1920's marked a twenty-year hiatus in the intellectual development of nationalistic thought in Quebec. This was due to the

18 Ibid., p. 39.
nature of the Duplessis government, which ran the province like a virtual fiefdom during the 1930's, 40's and 50's, and was faced with no significant opposition party during its entire tenure. Above all else, Duplessis did his utmost to stifle both criticism and constructive dialogue. Dion claims that Duplessis deliberately avoided contact with and the sponsorship of intellectuals, "because he knew instinctively that such a step would be suicidal."\(^\text{19}\)

It should be noted at once, however, that Duplessis's reactionary regime held power with the full cooperation and support of the Catholic Church, which preferred his conservative doctrines to any kind of liberal thinking. Education under Duplessis showed no evidence of modern or progressive ideas, the Church believing that the older concepts of the "virtuous" agrarian life, religious piety, and non-secular vocations should be emphasized in lieu of such worldly subjects as law, business, and economics.

Given this fact, it is easy to see why the more progressive English-speaking provinces pulled ahead because of their superiority in preparing themselves for the modern life of the twentieth century. In this respect, Quebec's backwardness may be ascribed to injurious policies implemented by its own provincial government rather than a conspiracy on the part of

\(^{19}\) Dion, *The Unfinished Revolution*, p. 4.
English-speaking Canadians to hold them back.

As Quebec moved toward modernization in the mid-twentieth century, the type of nationalism advocated by the conservatives, i.e. a nationalism which accepted a traditional society as its framework, became less and less suited to a society where isolation meant economic backwardness and educational stagnation. Nevertheless, the conservatives continued to preach a doctrine that French Canadians remain faithful to their past and preserve their Roman Catholic faith. Only by following the guidance of their clergy, by supporting local elites, and by avoiding fratricidal struggles could they hope to remain true to their roots and their calling.  

It was chiefly against industry and the cities that the conservative nationalists preached. The economy, as they saw it, had to be at the service of culture and not the other way around. Unavoidably, industry and the cities were to French Canadians places of "perdition," that is, of assimilation into the Anglo-Saxon world. Even more, the conservative nationalists argued, French Canadians should not even attempt to penetrate such "alien" reaches, for to do so would cause them to lose their unique identity. Instead, French Canadians were urged to return to the land,  

to develop farm settlements in new areas.

Politically, the conservative nationalists did not differ from their English counterparts inasmuch as they sought to consolidate Canada's independence from both Britain and the United States. However, conservative nationalists remained aloof to any proposals to stimulate pan-Canadianism. They viewed Canada as an artificial union based on a marriage of convenience. Their patrie(homeland) was still Quebec.

The conservative nationalists strongly favored decentralized federalism and made this a part of their ideology; French Canada's culture could only be protected, they argued, if the government of Quebec had broad political powers vis-à-vis the central government. Various later opinions among constitutional scholars concerning the nature of the federal compact—the "two nations theory," the "federal bargain" theory, the doctrine of "associated states" are all grounded in conservative thought. 21

As for the separatist sentiments of conservatives, one has no difficulty in finding such pronouncements in the writings of conservative thinkers such as Abbé Groulx. Groulx espoused "un état francais" that would be independent of the rest of Canada. The issue of separatism, however,

remained a divisive issue among conservative nationalists. Bourassa and his followers were fiercely opposed to a separatist solution. Groulx, though opposed to control from Ottawa, nevertheless distrusted Quebec's leadership under Maurice Duplessis, whom he accused of having betrayed the hopes that had brought him to power in 1935, and following in the steps of Honore Mercier and Alexander Taschereau in jeopardizing Quebec's natural resources for the benefit of foreigners.

In addition to the conservative nationalists' opposition to urban living, industrialization, and modernization in general, they were also opposed to the liberal philosophies of individualism and materialism which they viewed as corrosive influences on French Canadian values. They also made known their distaste for such things as majority rule, American style employers' associations, and labor unions acting as interest groups.22

As for the political functions served by the conservative nationalist creed, conservative nationalism did flourish in three cultural contexts: 1) among the higher elites, whose interests in religion, politics and business were supported by the conservative tenets of Catholicism, messianism, anti-liberalism and agriculturalism. 2)

the political culture of the lower elites and those in prominence locally (parish priests, doctors, notaries) who used its philosophy to inculcate the virtues of piety and simple living in training the next generation of French Canada's elite; and 3) among the "masses," i.e. farmers, laborers, craftsmen, and factory workers, because it made them accept their lot unquestioningly.

**Liberal Nationalism**

Although dominant in Quebec politics from 1840-1960, conservative nationalism did not remain entirely unchallenged. From 1950 on, there were a number of individuals who stood up in the name of the liberal creed. Because liberalism was often associated with anti-clericalism, it was not widely accepted. Nonetheless, Wilfred Laurier, who was Prime Minister of Canada from 1896 to 1917 under the Liberal banner, obtained widespread support from the French Canadian electorate. This was due primarily to two facts: 1) by that time the Liberal Party had lost much of its former radicalism in Quebec; and 2) the Liberals were successful in exploiting the "ethnic feeling" among French Canadians, thereby securing their votes.

It was not until 1950 and the creation of the periodical *Cité Libre* that liberal concepts became widely disseminated, thus paving the way for the domination of liberal ideology.
Its editors, Pierre Elliott Trudeau and Gerard Pelletier, fought against the authoritarianism and clericalism that were part of the conservative nationalist doctrine. The periodical argued that Quebec had to catch-up to modern times, Yet, it was not separatist in its orientation. The model it put forward for Quebec to follow was that of the European and United States liberal democracies. It made no attempt to focus Quebec's attention on the peoples of the Third World, their quest for independence, and the general trend toward decolonization throughout former colonial empires. Its editors were somewhat taken by surprise when the separatist R.I.N. (Rassemblement pour l'independance nationale) was formed in 1960.

From a political standpoint, it was the election of 1960, and the victory of the Liberal party, which marked the actual triumph of liberal nationalism. It brought to fruition modernizing sentiments that had been building up in Quebec. The conservative doctrines of Duplessis that had kept the government out of the drive for development and out of the lives of Quebec's citizens, gave way under liberal nationalism to a party that sought to modernize the province and attain a measure of political, financial and cultural sovereignty as well.

The new Liberal regime did flirt with the idea of separatism, especially in 1962-63 under Quebec's Premier,
Daniel Johnson. It was during the 1960's that Quebec's demands for greater autonomy increased over the mounting objections of the federal government and English-speaking Canada. In response to Quebec's demands and in hopes of avoiding a major confrontation over autonomy issues, the federal government established the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in 1963. Nonetheless, the members were unable to agree on any political solution to the Canadian problem. Subsequent provincial-federal conferences in 1965 and 1971 were unable to achieve any practical solution to the impasse.

The major theme of liberal nationalism was the motto "maitres chez nous," masters in our own house. Although Quebec's government did not take an active role in investment, because traditional laissez-faire practices had produced a dependence on American capital, it did take the initiative in such areas as pensions and the creation of a large number of public financial and industrial corporations, especially with respect to the nationalization of electric power companies under Resources Minister René Levesque.

In the field of education, the state assumed a new role with the establishment of a Department of Education. Liberal reforms included free schooling, open access to education, establishment of regional schools, introduction of two and
three year CEGEP's, which put an end to the elitist classical colleges, the updating of curricula, and the setting of higher standards for teacher qualification.

Civil service and governmental reform also became a major task under the Liberal administration of Jean Lesage, elected in 1960. Competence now became a key factor in determining suitability for public service rather than political patronage. On the local level, the Liberal regime encouraged community development and mobilization. In 1963, the Bureau d'aménagement de l'est Québec (Eastern Quebec Regional Development Office) was created following federal-provincial agreement.

In sum, the Liberal regime's reforms were instrumental in opening, at long last, the doors of tradition to the influence of modernization. It gave expression to the provincial government's possibilities for action, and strove for provincial self-reliance. It stressed modernization in all areas of Quebec society and attempted to strengthen social organizations to promote change.

Social Democratic Nationalism, Socialist Nationalism, Revolutionary Nationalism, and the Nationalism of the Parti Québécois

Socialism, or even Scandinavian or British-type democratic

\[24\] Collège d'enseignement général et professionnel, part of Quebec's secondary educational system between high school and university, offering two and three-year term academic and non-academic programs.
socialism, had never taken root in conservative Quebec. There were Marxists and non-Marxist socialists in Quebec well before the 1960's. However, it is only since the end of the 1950's that they have managed to surface and to form social movements with some following.

The rise of native Quebec socialism coincided with the "liberation" movement, the decline of the Union Nationale party in Quebec politics. The Liberal victory in 1960 gave the socialist movement even greater impetus. The socialists promptly took aim at the new Liberal government as their only source of opposition—the conservative Union Nationale now having been ousted from power. At the same time, the socialist movement was influenced by the changing tide in Quebec nationalism during the 1960's, and especially by strong separatist sentiments being expressed.\(^{25}\)

The difference between social-democratic nationalism and socialist nationalism in its Marxist-Leninist form is more than a matter of degree. A large ideological gulf exists between social-democratic nationalism as exemplified by the Parti Québécois and the Marxist-Leninist brand of socialism advocated by intellectuals such as the Parti pris\(^{26}\) group than exists between social democratic and liberal nationalism—

\(^{25}\) Postgate and McRoberts, p. 173.

\(^{26}\) Parti pris—(position taken)—A radical publication founded by a leader of Quebec's early revolutionary movement, G. Maheau.
particularly with respect to ideology, sources of leadership and support, and electoral motives.

While socialist nationalism is doctrinaire and attempts to arrive at a precise Marxist-Leninist definition of the theoretical bases of its course of action, social democratic nationalism is pragmatic and, when necessary, does not hesitate to adjust its ideological premises to the needs of effectiveness as shown in the ideological debates that have taken place since 1969 within the Parti Québécois. Similarly, while socialist nationalism assumes that socio-economic contradictions in Quebec are far-reaching and must necessarily lead to class struggle, that imperialist capitalism and the bourgeoisie must be chastized and the working class supported, social democratic nationalism holds a consensus view of society and tries to gain the electoral support of the middle as well as lower classes.

Perhaps the only major similarity between social democratic nationalism and socialist nationalism is that they are anti-system in their orientations. Both aim at doing away with the Canadian political community, both attack the existing political regime, and both condemn in varying degrees and for different reasons, the established political authorities. What is most significant about

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socialist nationalism, however, is that it has helped to shape the continuing political discussions within the PQ and contributed to moulding some features of the PQ's ideology. With respect to the above, Dion claims that socialist nationalists are in touch with the concerns of the PQ and often close ranks with it. Because the PQ is the only party which is leftist and advocates independence, many socialist nationalists support it for that reason and vote for its candidates during elections.²⁹

From a philosophical standpoint, socialist nationalism and the Parti Québécois' social-democratic nationalism reject the Canadian political system. They are unable to agree on the kind of political regime that would best suit Quebec. In other areas, they are more closely aligned. For example, both argue that the Canadian Confederation, the political system born out of the British North America Act, does not serve the best interests of Quebeckers, and that there is no good reason to think it can be reformed to any significant extent. In addition, both hold that the government, the House of Commons, the federal administration and the Supreme Court, all feature a permanent Anglophone majority and that it is therefore only natural that they should first of all serve the interests of the English-speaking majority.

²⁹ Dion, p. 143.
Attempts to correct the situation and to introduce "equality between the partners" have always led to resounding failures, such as the fiasco of the Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism and the ineffectiveness of the Official Languages Act.

Furthermore, in launching an offensive to promote multiculturalism throughout Canada, as the federal government has done since 1972, the government has once again shown its inability to comprehend Quebec's desires, social-democratic nationalists argue. What is more, the relative position of French Canadians throughout the country is rapidly weakening, as shown by the 1971 federal census. French-speaking minorities, except in New Brunswick, are dwindling away; it is not possible to change the demographic, social and economic factors responsible. In a few years, many claim, there will be practically no French Canadians left outside Quebec. The ratio of French Canadians to the rest of the country's population can only maintain its downward trend. Even in Quebec, given the current socio-political context, the ratio of French Canadians to English Canadians is falling off alarmingly, particularly in the Montreal area.

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Moreover, attempting to answer French Canada's demands by changing the Constitution and revamping the confederation is ludicrous, according to spokesmen of socialist nationalism. They feel that English Canada and the federal government have given ample proof of the unacceptability of such adjustments. From the socialist viewpoint, Anglophones are right to oppose political decentralization or the granting of special status to Quebec, since such measures would weaken Canada. Hence, the Canadian government and English Canada can do nothing for Quebec and, therefore, the only logical solution is to divide the Canadian political system so as to provide for two strong independent governments, subject to later arrangements between them to meet common economic, defense, and other requirements.

Social democrats and socialists also hold in common similar arguments concerning the justifications used since 1945 by the peoples of Africa and Asia to win independence and secure their rights to political self-determination. Both groups draw inspiration from the postwar experience of colonized peoples to liberate themselves from colonial powers. Various Quebec independence movements have not been equally vocal in denouncing the colonialism, from which, in their view, Quebec suffers. But they all use anti-colonialist arguments to some extent: socialist nationalists very

31 Minogue, p. 126.
aggressively; social democratic nationalists, such as those of the Parti Québécois, more moderately. Such anti-colonialist sentiments, though directed primarily against the Canadian political system, are also directed against the United States, against whose economic pull Canada itself is largely defenseless.

It should be noted in historical context that while old-style European nationalisms were predominantly liberal, those that appeared after the Second World War—in Yugoslavia, China, Korea and Vietnam, Africa and South America—tended toward socialism. More recently, national liberation movements have drawn upon more or less homegrown versions of Marxism-Leninism. Ideologically, Quebec is different from these, mainly because its postwar independence movements have had much difficulty in combining their doctrine with Marxism-Leninism in a way that is credible and attractive to a wide cross-section of the public.

This is not to say, however, that Quebec has not been the scene of violent, revolutionary nationalism that has been witnessed in both the developed and undeveloped world.

In 1963, a group of young radicals founded the F.L.Q. (Front du libération du Québec). The founding of the F.L.Q., and actually a great deal about the organization, is still

32 Ibid.
shrouded in mystery. George Shoeters, one of the founders of the organization, had ties with Castro, but anything more about potential outside influence is unknown. What is known is that the F.L.Q. and its militant wing, the Army for the Liberation of Quebec (A.L.Q.), raised a great deal of havoc throughout Montreal. Beginning with the theft of weapons from armories, they graduated to threats of blowing up a hotel where N.A.T.O. dignitaries were staying in 1963, and eventually to planting bombs in mailboxes. In a communique, they stated their desire:

"To completely destroy by systematic sabotage all symbols of colonial institutions [federal], in particular the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Armed Forces, all information media in the colonial language English that we scorn, all commercial establishments and enterprises that discriminate against Québécois and that do not use French as their official language."

Premier Jean Lesage offered a fifty-thousand dollar reward for any information leading to the arrest of members of the F.L.Q., but even with police crackdowns little progress was made because they did not know the suspects for whom they were looking. Beyond the fact that the suspects were young the only information that came in was speculative theories. Some in the police and government felt that the terrorists were Algerian secret army fanatics or communist inspired nationalists, or perhaps a lunatic fringe of the separatist movement.

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34 "Trying to Blast a Nation Apart," *Business Week* (June 1, 1963), p. 100.
Only after police raids on college campuses turned up weapons stolen from armories, leading to a few arrests, did the rash of bombings cease. Shoeters himself was arrested and charged with the murder of one of the bomb technicians who was attempting to disarm a mailbox. The fact that the violence ended so quickly after a few arrests tended to support the theory, at least in 1963, that the F.L.Q. was a very small organization.

The five-year hiatus of F.L.Q. violence ended in 1968. By mid-year there had been nine bombings, and by March, 1969, there were sixty more. On October 5, 1970, the F.L.Q.'s campaign of terror reached a climax when James Cross, the British Trade Commissioner, was kidnapped. In a communique, his abductors identified themselves as the F.L.Q. and made two demands: 1) that twenty-three "political prisoners" be paid one half million dollars and released; and 2) that the news service read and publish an F.L.Q. manifesto denouncing "capitalists" in Quebec (whether French or English-speaking) and criticizing Quebec's provincial government for allowing itself to be a tool of the "oppressors."

The government first decided on a hard line refusal to meet the terrorists demands. But as more communiques were issued, threatening Cross' execution, the government relented and read the manifesto on October 15. That same

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day, Quebec's Minister of Labor, Pierre LaPorte, was also kidnapped by the F.L.Q. Years later, investigation would show that the two acts were not planned in tandem. The F.L.Q. worked in individual "cells" of five to ten members, and it was only when the "Chenier Cell" decided that the "Liberation Cell," which kidnapped Cross, was going to let an advantage slip away that it decided to kidnap Pierre LaPorte. 36

After consultation with Robert Bourassa, Quebec's newly elected Premier, Trudeau decided that a true conspiracy of terror was underway and imposed the Emergency War Measures Act. Martial law was declared, in effect, for the entire province and over three hundred arrests were made without charges and without release of names. At some point during the period, Pierre LaPorte was killed.

After a tremendous manhunt, an exchange was finally arranged in which Mr. Cross was freed and his abductors were allowed passage to Cuba. On December 22, 1970, after an intensive investigation, LaPorte's murderers were captured. They were found to be a 27-year-old school teacher, two 23-year-old laborers, and a 19-year-old former student. 37 The War Measures Act was replaced by the milder Public Order Decree which expired in April of 1971.


The Nationalism of the Parti Quebecois

The Parti Quebecois has given increased momentum to the Liberal and Social Democratic forms of nationalism in that it, too, stresses the modernization of the province and the use of the apparatus of the state to effect change. Its goal is to ensure that Quebec becomes modern while at the same time retaining its culture and language.

In his Option Quebec, Levesque noted that traditional nationalist arguments no longer serve Quebec's current realities. "The age of automatic unanimity has come to an end," he said in Option. "We are going through a sudden acceleration of history, whose main features are the unprecedented developments of science, technology, and economic activity. There are potential promises and dangers immeasurably greater than the world has ever known." \(^{39}\)

Levesque stresses in Option that in order to achieve a society that will be in full control of its own destiny, language and culture, it will be necessary to meet three basic conditions. First, Quebeckers must secure once and for all the safety of their "collective personality." The primary prerequisite for this, he claims, is the power for "unfettered" action by the state in many areas previously assigned to the federal government, such as citizenship.

and immigration. Second, as a means of achieving this ob­jective, Levesque holds that it will be necessary to have a strong provincial state, one that will exercise jurisdic­tion over commercial and industrial corporations, financial institutions, and will have the power to monitor and, to some degree to control, the movement of investment and capital. Furhtermore, he holds that the duplication of jurisdictions in the economic sector between the federal and provincial governments creates problems for provinces seeking to plan their economic activity. It thus follows, he claims, that the third basic minimum is that the government of Quebec should exercise its power by giving direction to the economy. In sum, he argues, Quebec's overriding objective to "to seize for ourselves complete liberty in Quebec, the right to all eszential components of independence ... the complete mastery of every last area of decision-making. This means that Quebec must become sovereign as soon as possible."40

40 Ibid., p. 37.
CHAPTER III
FEDERALISM AND FRENCH CANADA

It would not be an exaggeration to say that the key point of difference between separatists, such as Rene Levesque, and federalists, such as Pierre Trudeau, is the question of Quebec's relationship to the federal structure now in place. The gravity of the constitutional issue, according to constitutional scholar J. Murray Beck, is that "what is involved is nothing less than whether Canada should remain an orthodox state or whether it should exist at all." Although a new constitution has been implemented which addresses some of the issues Quebec has raised in the past, language and cultural rights for example, there are still questions whether the new constitution will ultimately resolve the problems Quebec had blamed on the old constitution.

Quebec, it should be noted at the outset, has never rested easily within the federal framework and, from time to time, any number of proposals have been put forward to accommodate Quebec's desires while at the same time leaving Canada a united country. Extreme separatists would, of

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course, argue that Quebec has no place at all in Canada, and have urged that the province divorce itself entirely from the rest of the country. Thus far, however, this notion has not received the kind of support that would make it a viable option.

Within the past 20 years there have been numerous attempts to bring together provincial and federal representatives to discuss the status of the confederation and ways to make federalism work for all. These have taken the form of constitutional committees, federal-provincial commissions, conferences, panels, discussion groups—both governmental and academic—plenary sessions, and a host of extra-parliamentary and extra-constitutional formats. The fact that Canada's basic law has come up for discussion with such frequency may indicate to some that there is genuine desire among various groups to reach accommodation on important constitutional issues; others, however, might question (with equal justification) the soundness of Canada's federal system and the prospects for its continuation in light of this almost continuous effort to frame a new constitution. Richard Simeon, for one, holds that, in 1867, Canada's founding fathers did not foresee the necessity of extensive federal/provincial negotiations. They anticipated that federal authority would always prevail in case of conflict with the provinces, as it does in the United States.
As time went on, however, federal/provincial interaction increased. The demands of a modern state required a better means of settling conflicts, as the parliamentary institutions of the nation had failed to do.  

Within the past quarter-century the constitutional problem has, by Edward M. Corbett's measure, taken on "an increased air or urgency." This was due, he claims, to Ottawa's assumption of many areas formerly under provincial control, an action which aroused discontent "not only in Quebec but in most of the English-speaking provinces as well."  

Furthermore, Corbett notes that the B.N.A. Act (Canada's constitution) has allowed fluctuations of power over the course of its existence: from federal ascendancy during the early period of confederation to provincial autonomy in the late nineteenth century and back to "a unitary, centralized state which emerged from World War II." While, during the early 1960's, there was some evidence of a return to a degree of provincial ascendancy, he notes that "the new dynamic of French Canadian nationalism threatened the very basis of the constitutional relationship on which the confederation rests."  

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4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.
Three questions arise from the previous discussion. 1) Why has the constitutional question become more urgent in recent years? 2) Had a framework ever developed for the resolution of conflict between the federal government and Quebec? 3) If so, what was its nature and why does it not function as a means of conflict resolution today?

It will be hypothesized here that the method of accommodation previously existing was that of "consociational democracy" and that, in recent decades, the demand for increased use of extra-constitutional methods has been brought about by the demise of consociationalism in Quebec-Ottawa relations.

The Federal Idea in Canada

The decision to adopt a federal system of government in Canada was the result of the interplay of a number of factors. It is important to note that before the adoption of the British North America Act in 1867, the relationships then existing were between separate colonies and territories and the United Kingdom, not with each other. The absence of a central government was attributable to the fact that Canada had not experienced the revolution and war which had driven the thirteen American colonies together. Additionally,

Canadians had good reason to doubt the efficacy of a federal structure, for at the time Canada's founding fathers were considering which form of government to adopt the United States was engaged in a bloody civil war over states' rights.

In 1867, the British Parliament passed the British North America Act at the request of the colonies of Canada (Ontario and Quebec), Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick. This act entered the three into a federal union to form one Dominion under the name of Canada.

The British North America Act (B.N.A. Act) divided the Dominion into four provinces. The preconfederation province of Canada became the provinces of Ontario and Quebec; Nova Scotia and New Brunswick retained their former limits. In 1870, the Parliament of Canada created Manitoba. In 1871, British Columbia entered the union, and in 1873, Prince Edward Island. Alberta and Saskatchewan were created in 1895. Finally Newfoundland entered the confederation in 1949.

Provisions of the British North America Act gave Canada complete internal self-government. Later Canada assumed complete control of its foreign-policy as well. It is now a sovereign state. Until 1982, certain parts of the Constitution could be changed only by an act of the British Parliament,
but the new constitution enacted that year places all amendment powers in the hands of Canada's parliament. The sole reason that full amendment powers had not been transferred to Canada under the old constitution was that Canadians were unable to agree on an amending formula.

The B.N.A. Act gave the Canadian Parliament power to "make laws for the peace, order and good government of Canada in relation to all matters not assigned exclusively to the legislatures of the provinces." That is to say, the residual powers were vested not in the provinces as in the United States, but in the federal government. In order to preclude potential conflict, the Act added a list of examples of this general power. These included defense, raising money by any kind of taxation, regulation of trade and commerce, navigation, shipping, money and banking, bankruptcy and insolvency, patents and copyrights, criminal law and criminal procedure, and any "works" declared by Parliament to be to the advantage of Canada. Amendments have added unemployment insurance and the power to amend the Constitution, except in regard to the division of powers between Parliament and the provincial legislatures, the rights guaranteed to the English and French languages,

the constitutional rights of certain religious denominations in education, the requirement of an annual session of Parliament, and the maximum duration of Parliament. Finally, the Act gave Parliament and the provincial legislatures concurrent power over agriculture and immigration (with national law prevailing over provincial in case of conflict) and amendment provisions for concurrent jurisdiction over pensions (but with provincial law prevailing in case of conflict).

Quebec's View of the Constitution

As Edward M. Corbett notes, "If English Canada had followed the advice of the man who was largely responsible for the fashioning of the Confederation, [Lord Durham], today's critical situation would have been resolved one way or the other: French Canada would have been well on the way to complete assimilation, or cultural dualism would be accepted as a matter of course from sea to sea."\(^8\)

At the time of confederation, French Canadians were quite concerned that their language and culture be preserved in Quebec (as they felt that this was their homeland), but were not especially concerned with establishing religious, language and cultural rights in other provinces. Quebeckers

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\(^8\) Corbett, *Quebec Confronts Canada*, p. 154.
preferred the federal solution because it would allow them at least some measure of control over the province's internal affairs, particularly with respect to language, religious and educational rights. John A. MacDonald gave way on the unitary system he preferred when Quebec insisted on federalism.

There were several good reasons for Quebec to opt for confederation. For example, many feared annexation by the expansionist United States. Quebeckers were anxious to protect their own institutions and felt that a Canadian federal system would be enough to guarantee them. For a brief time, the federal solution did seem the best avenue. It provided French Canadians with a means of participating in the affairs of the nation while giving them a province where they would be in the majority. Moreover, in 1867, the provinces did control the governmental functions which seemed most important for the protection of French Canada's distinctiveness: education, civil law, and matters respecting religious life. Even such a prominent and influential legislator as Hector Langevin predicted, albeit too optimistically, as events were to prove, "in the federal Parliament there will not be questions of race, nationality, religion or locality, as the legislature will only be charged with the settlement of great national
questions which will interest alike the whole confederacy and not one locality only. 9

At the beginning of confederation, many Quebeckers did believe that Quebec would be able to maintain its own language, customs and institutions. Special provisions of the B.N.A. Act made Quebec bi-lingual in its legislature and courts. What is more, the Constitution of 1867 made French one of the two official languages of Canada. Nevertheless, not all French Canadians were totally satisfied with the constitutional arrangement. Many feared that their minority position 'would be even more vulnerable than ever in a scheme that united Quebec with the Maritime Provinces and looked forward to the addition of the Prairie West and Pacific Coast territories in the future. Others felt that the federation placed so much power in the hands of the federal government that a legislative union was being created in fact if not in name. A.D. Dorin, a Quebec legislator, expressed his reservations when he said, "I know that majorities are usually aggressive and how the possession of power engenders despotism. I can understand how a majority, animated at this moment by the best feeling might in six or nine months be willing to trample on the rights of the minority while acting in good faith and on what it considered

9 Ramsay Cook, Canada and the French Canadians (Toronto: Macmillan, 1966), p. 44.
to be its rights."\textsuperscript{10}

Another legislator, Outinard, was also concerned about the talk he had heard about a "new nationality" from the supporters of the confederation. Would this mean the assimilation of French Canada into the English-speaking "nation?" Even Future Prime Minister Wilfred Laurier, in an 1871 speech before the Quebec legislative assembly, declared, "It is an historical fact that the federal form was only adopted for the purpose of preserving for Quebec that exceptional and unique position it holds on the American continent. I am jealous to see that this position is preserved in fact and with the poet I say, 'My cup is not large, but from my cup I drink.'"\textsuperscript{11}

The years following confederation would provide both supporters and opponents of the federal scheme with evidence to support their positions. French Canadians, to be sure, benefitted from increasing economic progress and played an active role in the policies which were designed to give Canada its full nationhood status. Certainly, it could be said that they had almost complete control over political and cultural matters inside Quebec. But there were also disappointments. The first major crisis came in 1885 when the MacDonald cabinet let the death sentence of Louis Riel

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., p. 47.

Shortly thereafter, in the province of Manitoba, French schools were abolished and English became the exclusive language in the provincial legislature, even though a large French-speaking population existed in the province. Added to these "injustices" were later conflicts with federal authorities over British imperialism in South Africa and the conscription crisis of 1917. What made these conflicts even more unpalatable was the fact that while French language rights were being curbed outside Quebec, the English-speaking minority inside Quebec rested assured that nothing would ever be done to infringe upon its educational and religious privileges. These acts ultimately made French Canadians more aware of the plight of French Canadians nationwide. One student of French Canadian attitudes, A.I. Silver, suggests that, by 1900, most French Canadians had become convinced that the future existence of Confederation was based on maintaining French Canadian rights throughout Canada. He further maintains that this attitude goes directly to the root of the perennial question English Canadians ask of French Canada: "What does Quebec Want?" The answer, he says, is that as "spokes-province" of Canada's French Canadian citizens (no matter in what province they reside), Quebec

wishes to see that French Canadians' rights outside Quebec proper will always be protected. The fact that Quebec did not insist upon these rights being upheld throughout Canada in 1867 does not allow one to conclude that such demands are inappropriate today. "Living people change, and acquire new needs," he holds. 13

"Federalism in Ferment;" Minority Versus Majority

When the Fathers of Confederation convened at Charlottetown, New Brunswick in 1867, and later in Quebec City, to formulate the principles for the union for British North America, one of the first problems they had to grapple with was that of the place of a minority in a majority state. There were, of course, several types of minorities including, in Sir John MacDonald's view, the rich. But the most important minority was French Canada. When the French Canadians received their first legislative assembly through the Constitutional Act of 1791, they saw it primarily as an instrument of survival for their group, and as a defense mechanism against British authorities and the growing British population who controlled the executive and legislative councils. The Act of Union of 1841 fused the two parts of Canada into one.

13 Ibid.
although maintaining separate departments in certain fields such as justice and education. But these steps did not alter the basic social and political realities. French Canadians continued to speak French in the legislature and elsewhere, and demanded the full application of responsible government, a valuable vehicle for the defense of their interests. It is important to note that those who pressed hardest for the dissolution of United Canada in the 1860's were not the French Canadians but the English, who insisted that French influence had become excessive.

The federal scheme that came about in 1867 was a result of a process of approximately three years of negotiations. The process of confrontation and compromise among differing interests was every bit as difficult for Canada as it was for the United States in 1787. It could be said that Canada's task was more difficult, since Americans did not have to deal with a sizeable ethnic or linguistic minority in their nation. Moreover, Americans were able to reconcile differences among themselves, and Canadians have not—even in the span of 100 years—been able to come to terms with the French Canadian fact. William L. Livingston notes that, "Unlike Australia and the United States, Canada was virtually an invention for bringing together two quite different nationalities, the French and English
and the history of Canadian federalism has been very largely a history of efforts to reconcile the different values and aspirations of the two groups which comprise the Canadian nation."\(^1\)\(^4\)

The British North America Act established a limited official bilingualism, in that in debates in both houses of Parliament, members may use either English or French, the records and journals of both houses must be kept in both languages, Acts of parliament must be published in both, and either language may be used in any pleading or process in courts set up by Parliament. Furthermore, in 1969 Parliament adopted the Official Languages Act, which declared that English and French enjoy equal status and are the official languages of Canada for the purposes of the Parliament and Government of Canada.

Except for limited official bilingualism and certain educational rights for minorities, the Canadian constitution of 1867 provided no specific protection for basic rights, like freedom of worship, of the press, or of assembly. Such rights had been protected by ordinary law, but all of them could be abolished or curtailed by Parliament or the provincial legislatures. Such action would have been contrary to the Canadian tradition, however. In 1960, the

Parliament of Canada accepted in principle the concept of a Bill of Rights, though it was not then written into law, and the present government proposed a constitutional Charter of Human Rights in the early 1970's. Both measures placed such rights beyond the power of either Parliament or the legislatures and were formally incorporated in the 1982 constitution.

With respect to the amendment process, the constitution of 1867 provided that each provincial legislature has exclusive power over the amendment of the provincial constitution (except as regards the office of Lieutenant Governor, the legal head of the provincial executive), that is to say, natural resources, direct taxation for provincial purposes, prisons, hospitals, asylums and charities, municipal institutions, licenses for provincial companies, property and civil rights, and administration of justice and other matters of local or private nature.

Thus it appears that, at least on the surface, Canada's constitution of 1867 afforded all the liberties that anyone could ask for. What the constitution lacked, however, according to some constitutional scholars, was a purposeful raison d'être. Alan C. Cairns, for example, held that one major weakness was the nature of the British North America Act itself which, by Cairns's measure, "is a document of
monumental dullness which enshrines no eternal principles and is devoid of inspirational content." This is due, he claims, to the fact that Canada lacked the imperative of revolution and war that gave meaning to the U.S. Constitution. Moreover, Cairns holds that significant consequences of this lack of purpose were the threats of secession and the constant bickering over the constitution. Its apparent longevity has not made it a "living institution." The new constitution of 1982, although containing provisions enumerating specific rights, is still based on the British North America Act. Cairns sees much of the drive for a new document as based on the premise that the British North America Act is a century old and has outlived its usefulness. He claims, "the rather trite conclusion automatically follows that a constitution, or constitutional document, so heavy with years must be out of date." 

The Consociational Model: Conflict and Accommodation in Canada

Since Arend Lijphart's pioneer study of consociational democracy a number of political theorists have expanded on the concept. Lijphart's original study was an attempt to develop hypotheses concerning how segmented polities, i. e. 

16 Ibid., p. 88.
those with significant cultural, linguistic, or religious cleavages, were able to diminish conflict and achieve accommodation on issues which tended to divide the polity along lines of cleavage.17

In his study of Canada and consociationalism, Kenneth MacRae notes that consociationalism has been approached from three principal standpoints: 1) as a pattern of social structure, emphasizing the degree of religious, ideological, cultural or linguistic decision-making and conflict resolution; 2) as a pattern of elite behavior and mass-elite relationships, emphasizing the process of decision-making and conflict resolution; 3) as an underlying characteristic of the political culture arising from circumstances that may antedate the period of mass politics.18

In the first approach mentioned above, MacRae contends that the more a society is segmented around a single cleavage line, "the more it is an appropriate site for the development of consociational politics."19 What


should be examined, he contends, is to what extent lines of cleavage appear in institutional structures, and then to observe to what extent elements of cohesion and cooperation actually emerge in the political system.\textsuperscript{20}

In the second instance, consociationalism as a pattern of elite behavior, MacRae holds the most important aspect to be: "the capacity and good will of the elites."\textsuperscript{21} Citing Lijphart, MacRae points out that the most important characteristic is not what particular institutional arrangement is chosen, but rather how elites cooperate to counteract disintegrative tendencies in the system. By Lijphart's yardstick, three possible outcomes among subcultures characterize solutions of the consociational type—mutual veto, autonomy, and proportional representation; while others—repression, separatismand assimilation—do not. That separatism is given by Lijphart as evidence that a consociational arrangement no longer obtains suggests the need for a deeper analysis of what has contributed to the breakdown of consociational democracy in Canada.

The third example, and perhaps the most significant in terms of our examination of the separatist movement, is the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Ibid.}, p. 8
\item \textit{Ibid.}
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view of consociational democracy as an underlying characteristic of the political tradition. As Lijphart observes, "In this view, it is the existence of older patterns of elite cooperation in the premodern period that paves the way for a politics of accommodation in an age of mass politics." He suggests that two possible outcomes of elite cooperation are: 1) elite cooperation as a pattern of learned behavior (a deliberate response to the disintegrative perils of segmentation); and 2) elite cooperation as a long-standing characteristic of the political system (a factor which helps to moderate tensions as mass party formation develops along pluralist lines.)

If consociational democracy is to be successful, by Lijphart's definition, four requirements must be fulfilled: 1) the elites must be able to recognize the dangers of fragmentation; 2) they must have the same commitment to maintaining the system; 3) they must be able to transcend subcultural cleavages at the elite level to work with the elites of other subcultures, and 4) they must have the ability to forge appropriate solutions that will accommodate the divergent interests and demands of the subculture.

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24 A. Lijphart, quoted by MacRae, p. 126.

25 Ibid.
Other factors which contribute to elite accommodation are the existence of external threats, a balance of power among subcultures, and popular acceptance of government by the elite cartel. "Over time," Lijphart holds, "inter-elit e cooperation becomes habitual and consociational norms become more firmly established." 26

**Canadian Applications: Methods of Elite Accommodation**

In order to understand the mechanism of consociational politics in Canada, one must look for evidence of accommodation not in compromise among parliamentary parties, but within the party in power and in the workings of the federal system. With respect to this, Presthus argues that "the cabinet may be regarded as the prime symbol and ultimate agent of natural synthesis among the political elite." 27 MacRae concurrs, that "longstanding and firm traditions require the cabinet to be faithfully representative not only of the provinces but also of religion and language, even to the extent of some sacrifice of efficiency." 28

In this context, there are a number of historical examples of how consociationalism has operated in Canada. Prime Ministers during the early years after confederation sought

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26 Ibid.


28 MacRae, p. 251.
to achieve balanced representation in the cabinet, not only of provincial interests but also of language and religious groups. In 1873, Alexander Mackenzie's cabinet consisted of "five Catholics, three members of the Church of England, three Presbyterians, two Methodists, one Congregationalist and one Baptist." 29 Even prior to Confederation, there existed an institutionalized form of consociationalism during the Union Regime of the 1840's, which combined the present-day provinces of Quebec and Ontario, in which there developed a system of double prime ministerships and twinned ministerial portfolios in ministries that were carefully balanced to give equal weight to French and English sections of the province.

Moreover, both sections of the province developed a two-party system and each of the four parliamentary groups worked primarily in loose coalition with its counterpart in the other section. That is to say, the Lower Canada Bleus worked with Upper Canada Conservatives, while the Lower Canada Rouges worked with Upper Canada Reformers. Although this pattern worked for a while, during successive elections, the coalitions became increasingly unbalanced and the result was political deadlock. The proposal for

29 Ibid.
a "double majority," in which the dominant group in each section would collaborate regardless of party platform, became untenable when the dominant Blues of Eastern Canada could not work with the anti-Catholic reformers of Western Canada.

Confederation, with its division of United Canada into the provinces of Quebec and Ontario, solved the problem of provincial deadlock by giving each province its own, separate legislature. Nonetheless, the prospects for achieving the same kind of consensus between French and English-speaking groups that had been obtained in the pre-confederation days of United Canada grew slimmer as the entry of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia tilted the balance in favor of the English-speaking majority. The province of Manitoba, which entered confederation in 1870, had consociational institutions similar to those of United Canada, including an ethnically balanced Upper House, equality for the English and French languages, and a denominational school system. The provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan also adopted these same patterns.

What upset the consociational balance in all three of these newer provinces was a massive English-speaking migration during the latter half of the nineteenth century. In Manitoba, a statute of 1890 made English the sole official
language. In 1882, the Northwest Territories adopted a similar measure, with the approval of the federal government. The 1905 Sifton Amendment provided the Prairie Provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan with the constitutional means to curb minority rights in these provinces.

While French Canadian influence was curbed elsewhere in Canada, the province of Quebec itself became the channel by which French Canadians made known their discontent. Quebec's leadership thus became the tool by which French Canadians vented their dismay over what they believed to be a violation of the compact made between the two cultures during confederation, namely, that French Canada's language and Roman Catholic religion would be honored and protected nationwide. Thus, it fell upon Quebec to shoulder French Canada's cause and take it to the federal level.

Although Quebec and the rest of French Canada wished to see a restoration of French rights throughout the country, Quebec did not, however, push the issue too heavily in the federal Parliament. As long as Quebec itself did not suffer adversely, and as long as it remained conservative and traditional, nothing was done to challenge confederation. But the adoption of a federal system in 1867 did add another dimension to the consociational pattern which had prevailed under the Union Regime. Whereas before the division of United Canada, English and French groups had worked out a
pattern of accommodation within the province, confederation placed the new provincial boundaries atop the axes of cleavage already existing between English-speaking Canada and the majority of French-speaking Canadians. Thus, French Canadians in Quebec began to see themselves as a distinct religious, cultural, linguistic and political entity. As MacRae observes:

We encounter here a situation of overlapping cleavages by which province, language, and religion are linked and interrelated. In this respect, Quebec is indeed a subculture that departs significantly from all other provinces and from the Canadian averages. And if the image of a famille spirituelle can no longer do justice to Quebec's diversity, the image of a Lager, a defensive complex in a hostile environment, is not inappropriate. 30

Throughout the late nineteenth and into the twentieth century, there were other occasions where Quebec opposed federal authorities in the name of French Canada: the Boer conflict of 1900 and the conscription crises of 1917 and 1941. Two reasons that these crises did not divide the confederation were, 1) that Quebec still remained a traditional society in which its language and religion were protected, and 2) the consociational pattern of pre-confederation days had been supplanted by one in which Quebec's

30 Ibid., p. 240.
political elites reached accommodation with federal elites concerning how crises were to be managed.

The importance of the elite model lies in the fact that "even in the absence of national identity or consensus, if there are strong limited identities or subcultures it is possible for the political leaders of these units consciously to practice accommodation at the elite level in order to maintain the political system and make it operate effectively." This is done through keeping "transactions among antagonistic subcultures in a divided society—or similarly, among different nationalities in a multicultural state—to a minimum." Noel adds,

In the perfect (i.e. most extreme) case of consociational democracy each of the units in the system would be perfectly encapsulized. There would therefore be no horizontal communication whatever at the mass level. Instead, there would be only vertical communication between mass and elite within each unit, and communication across subcultural boundaries would be entirely a function of the political elite.

Two important differences, however, between the theoretical terms of the consociational model and actual political systems are, 1) that even when the actual subcultures are separated by a language barrier there is always a certain

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32 Ibid., p. 76.
33 Ibid.
amount of horizontal communication between the elite of one subculture and the masses of the other. 2) Even if it is theoretically possible that consociational democracy could function satisfactorily, if among the masses of the different subcultures there was absolutely no attachment to the national political system and no sense whatever of a national identity, some popular support is always present. What distinguishes the consociational political system, Noel notes, "is the relative weakness of its mass national sentiments and the overcoming of this weakness through accommodation at the elite level."

**Elites and the Party System**

In answer to the question "Who constitutes the elite?," MacRae suggests that the answer be sought in the polity's political parties because of their natural propensity to appeal to a wide spectrum of interests. In addition MacRae holds that a study of the elites in the political parties is useful in determining the success of accommodation efforts and is crucial to gauging how well the polity copes with segmentation.

An examination of Canadian parties and those cited by Lijphart in his studies of Europe reveals, 1) that the
Canadian political parties have traditionally had low ideological profiles; 2) Canada has an electoral system that places a high premium on winning single member constituencies; and 3) there exists a strong tendency toward single-party control of the legislatures and one-party ministries. European examples—the Netherlands, Switzerland—by contrast demonstrate a tendency toward more ideological parties, proportional representation and coalition ministries like the Swiss federal pattern. Similarly, Canadian provinces tend to single-member constituencies and one-party ministries.

The political history of Canada shows that federal politics in the first half-century after Confederation was characterized by a two-party system in which both Liberals and Conservatives sought to obtain as wide a spectrum of support as possible. Though other parties appeared on the scene during the 1920's and became an enduring part of the political edifice, the two-party system remained. Those third parties that did arise—the Progressives, the C.C.F., and Social Credit—held that their aim was not to create permanent minor groups but to simplify the party system by forcing a realignment of political loyalty nationwide. Each of these third parties sought to achieve major party status, and campaigned accordingly before the electorate. The lack of
the third parties' ability to become a significant force in federal politics may be explained by the fact that no federal party has sought to become identified as the representative of a specific province, region, religious denomination or cultural group. Thus, consociational democracy in Canada has taken place within the party in power at the federal level and not in compromise among various parliamentary parties.

The Breakdown of Consociational Politics: Causes and Consequences

The modernization of Quebec and the decline of the tradition-oriented Duplessis regime brought about a simultaneous decline in consociational politics. First, the Union Nationale was a provincial party and as such was not active at the federal level as a major party. Duplessis was content that as long as federal authority did not interfere with Quebec's traditional way of life, and his control over the province, there was no need to challenge Ottawa on any matter. Thus, the Union Nationale was autonomy conscious, but only insofar as Duplessis sought to keep Quebec out of the mainstream of the twentieth century.

The coming to power of the Liberal regime in
1960 marked an important watershed in Quebec's economic and social development. The Liberals strove for a modern state, a "Quiet Revolution," under the direction of Premier Jean Lesage. As D.C. Thompson points out, "It has been argued that the radical modernization of Quebec since the death of Maurice Duplessis in 1959, has exorcised the preoccupation with survival and replaced it with the leitmotif of epanouisement." Moreover, Lion Dion observes,

Nowhere else, perhaps than in Quebec during this period, has the new order challenged the old so suddenly and so brutally. Nowhere else, perhaps, is the social framework so channel this tide of social change. Few societies have experienced such profound changes in so short a space of time as Quebec during the last decade. demographically, in education, in religious outlook and in political life, these changes have taken on the magnitude of a revolution... At a dizzying pace, traditional values have been discarded, the elite dispossessed, the leadership contested.36

Among the most significant changes brought about by the modernization process were,1) ideological changes, in which Quebec became more secularized in its attitudes and beliefs. The Church, which had once held sway over the province's educational and intellectual establishments gave way to


36 Leon Dion, "Towards a Self-Determined Consciousness," in Quebec Society and Politics, ed. D.C. Thompson, p. 27.
state control in education and social policy; 2) demographic changes in the province's rural base, the mainstay of the Church's power and a bastion of conservative values, began to erode during the 1920's so that by the 1960's the transformation to an urban society was complete; and 3) political changes, in which Quebec's party system underwent a fundamental shift from being controlled by a tradition-oriented provincial party and came under the influence of a pro-federal party dedicated to the extension of French Canadian rights.

Although not a separatist party, the Liberal regime did seek to secure French Canadian rights, particularly with respect to the use of the French language, both in Quebec's business community and in the federal bureaucracy. The Liberals did not advocate that Quebec attempt to form a new nation, but did insist that French Canadians be given a more active role in the affairs of the entire confederacy, and that this role allow them to retain their language and culture. In order to achieve this, they adopted a much tougher bargaining stance vis-a-vis Ottawa on language and fiscal issues. As such, the Liberals did not reinforce the lines of cleavage with respect to Quebec alone, but attempted to extend the notion of a bi-lingual Canada to all the provinces and throughout the federal government.
The Parti Québécois, meanwhile, concentrated its efforts on Quebec alone. Like the Liberals, it was dedicated to a modern Quebec, but it sought to achieve a unilingual Quebec that would not have to bargain with Ottawa concerning the ways and means that French rights would be preserved. Thus, the P.Q. did seek to delineate the lines of cleavage to coincide with Quebec's provincial boundaries. Whereas under the Liberals, the "lines of correlation between political parties and any of the axes of cleavage had been conspicuously absent," Quebec under the P.Q. was to be a sovereign state with only loose ties to the rest of the confederacy. Thus also, the P.Q. by its actions, does not conform to the consociational pattern established by Lijphart in that 1) its elites do not recognize any danger of fragmentation, 2) they do not have the same commitment to maintaining the system, 3) they have difficulty in transcending subcultural cleavages at the elite level and working with elites of other subcultures, and 4) they seem unprepared to forge solutions with other elites that will accommodate divergent interests in the polity. Moreover, the P.Q. appears to fit the mold of an anti-system party which, according to

37 MacRae, p. 247.
Giovani Sartori, is a party that "undermines the legitimacy of the regime it opposes." The rise of a modern Quebec along with the establishment of a more expansion-oriented Liberal party and a separatist-oriented Parti Québécois prompted C. White, J. Millar and W. Gagne to observe that "the Confederation, and in particular French-English relations, can be viewed as a consociational democracy, which has been faltering for some time and which has since 1960 almost completely broken down." 

Response to Crisis: Federal/Provincial Diplomacy

As Simeon noted in the beginning of this chapter, Canada's founding fathers did not anticipate the need for extensive federal/provincial negotiations because they believed provincial and federal interests would not overlap. The emergence of a modern Canada, along with a modern Quebec in the 1960's, forced a reexamination of this original assumption. With all provinces now demanding a larger role in the making of national policy, the Pearson regime(1963-1968) began a series of federal/provincial conferences. These meetings provided contact between ministers and civil servants at both levels of

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so that common problems could be discussed.

The name given to these conferences, this process, was "co-operative" federalism. Prior to the Pearson regime, provincial premiers met on a one-to-one basis with federal authorities who left them "little room for maneuver" and "little choice but to accept the package deal the federal government offered them." 

Supporters of co-operative federalism, such as Jean Luc Pepin, held that federal/provincial conferences were a pragmatic way of dealing with the shortcomings of the constitution." It is illusory," he says," to expect the constitution to cover all circumstances; the broad distinction between general and particular interests has never really been valid. The aim should be to achieve the joint participation of all the governments in the principal functions of the state." 41 Moreover, supporters of co-operative federalism argue, each level of government maintains separate jurisdiction over different aspects of the same subject (even though the distinctions disappear as close co-ordination of policy is attained). As Corbett points out, when discussing relations between the central government and Quebec,

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Corbett, p. 166.

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Ibid.
The criterion is aptitude: jurisdiction is determined by what each order of government is best equipped to do in principle, but also in accord with the needs of the moment. Specialization is decided on the basis of competence, with the best qualified government assuming responsibility regardless of any additional requirements except the agreement of the two nationalities.\footnote{Ibid., p. 167.}

However ideal the concept of co-operative federalism may sound, it is not without its critics, many of whom are French-Canadian nationalists. Opponents of co-operative federalism charge that neither the federal parliament nor the provincial legislatures are given an adequate role under the system. Their major objection is that in these closed sessions, with a few dozen advisors, the Prime Minister and the provincial premiers reach decisions on important matters of mixed jurisdiction. Following the discussion, the premiers then seek legislative approval, but the result is that both federal and provincial legislators are asked merely to approve the decisions that have already been made.\footnote{Ibid.}

One suggestion to remedy this defect was put forward by Professor Norman Ward, who has recommended a Ministry of Federal-Provincial Affairs in Ottawa. This would bring issues to the floor of the House of Commons on a continuing
basis and abolish the need for federal-provincial conferences, which tend to be executive rather than democratic meetings. Ironically, the concept of a Ministry of Provincial Affairs is not new. There was a Secretariat of State for Provincial Affairs during the first few years following confederation but this office was abolished in 1873 during a time of increased federal ascendancy.

French Canadian nationalists also express reservations about the way in which co-operative federalism brings about a blurring of judicial lines implicit in ad hoc appraisals of which government—federal or provincial— is best equipped to deal with a given set of issues. As cooperation advances, the distinction between federal and provincial jurisdictions becomes lost. Hence, they argue, cooperative federalism is a major step toward a unitary state. It is a myth, they charge, that in the long run will result in a continuing intrusion of federal power into areas the Constitution allots to the provinces. Of course, if written constitutional limitations were taken literally, the federal government would have little to do with programs such as education, regional economic agencies, or social security. However, the demands of these programs are now beyond the means of the provinces and hence, by attempting to meet these demands, the federal government relies on ad hoc
solutions to avoid the separations of power defined by the Constitution. Written constitutional guarantees are thus superseded by expediency, the Quebec nationalists claim, leaving basic rights to "the mercy of governments and politicians whose successors may feel free of all restraint where the minorities' constitutional rights are concerned."^44

A.W. Johnson has outlined what he feels to be the four main alternatives for the direction of Canadian federalism. The first is to move toward more centralization, on the assumption that as all nations, including Canada, will move toward a "global community", ethnic and regional interests will become submerged. The second is to strengthen the regionalization of government, on the supposition that the advantages of unity can be preserved even though such regionalization would weaken the federal government. The third is to have greater regionalization in Quebec only, assuming that a higher degree of centralization would prevail in the rest of Canada. The fourth alternative is to "somehow marry the stronger regional governments and the strong central government on the assumption that strong federal and provincial governments can somehow reconcile and harmonize their priorities."^44

Concerning greater centralization, Johnson holds that there is a strong case for this based on the fact that greater interdependence between the provinces exists today than ever before in terms of social, and especially economic, ties. However, as a tool for solving the question of Quebec's need for more independence, Johnson readily admits that it will fail. "Quebec would rather separate than be submerged, and the peoples and premiers of English-speaking Canada would have to become uncharacteristically submissive before a substantial centralization of government could be realized." 45

Similarly, Johnson maintains that progressive decentralization offers some attractions in that it would conform to Quebec's demand that more power be concentrated in the provincial capital. This would allow other provincial governments to pursue the regional and provincial economic programs to which they are committed, and allow Quebeckers to be "masters in their own house." On the negative side, Johnson notes, "the cost of this alternative, too, is high. The vehicles of national economic policy would tend to remain static, or be diminished, as provincial economic powers grew. Federal fiscal policy would decline in

importance as the federal resources of the central government were progressively transferred to the provinces. 

B. Special Status

An additional way to balance the forces of unity and diversity in Canada—the first of the two which lie between the extremes of centralization and decentralization—is to provide for a greater regionalization of government in Quebec only. This increase in regionalization could take the form of a special status for Quebec within the present federal structure, or it could call for giving to that province "associate state" status.

Johnson acknowledges that, unlike the case with progressive regionalization throughout the whole of Canada, which would seriously weaken the central government, "it does not follow logically that the same price would be paid if that course were to be followed only in Quebec."

The four concepts that constitute the "state particulier" are:

1) that under such an arrangement, the government of Quebec would assume full responsibility for most if not all federal-provincial programs and would receive from the federal government a fiscal transfer which would fully compensate the province. The government of Quebec would also be compensated for new federal-provincial programs—such as medicare—whether or not the

46 Ibid., p. 104.
47 Ibid.
province undertook a program similar to that required in other provinces;

2) the government of Quebec would assume all responsibility for certain purely federal programs, principally the family allowances and old age security income maintenance programs, and would be compensated by means of a fiscal transfer from the federal government;

3) the government of Quebec would gain the right to be consulted with respect to other federal policies, including fiscal, tariff and trade policies and probably monetary policy;

4) the government of Quebec might expect to assume certain aspects of federal jurisdiction, such as the right to conclude international agreements in the fields of provincial jurisdiction. 48

As with the previously-mentioned possibilities, the special status option also has disadvantages as well as advantages. Concerning fiscal questions, especially with reference to taxes, some 100 percent of the individual income tax and between 50 and 100 percent of the corporation taxes would be transferred to the government of Quebec. This would mean that federal taxes would fall most heavily on provinces other than Quebec, while the economic benefits would be felt across the whole country.

The offshoot of such a special status situation would also mean that the people and governments of the other

48 Ibid., p. 106.
provinces would have to accept the application of these policies in their part of Canada, thought not in Quebec, and rely on voluntary co-operation of the government of Quebec for the application of similar policies in that province.

Federal monetary and trade policies would naturally continue to apply throughout the whole of Canada; however, they would be formulated in the context of special consultations with Quebec, unless, of course, the other provinces were to insist upon similar rights. Just how extensive this consultation would be and what it would involve is a moot point. If it were to mean, for example, that Quebec would have the right to express its views on federal policies, the situation would not be much different than it is now. If, on the other hand, there existed some constitutional obligation upon the government of Canada to gain Quebec's consent, or if Quebec had veto power over legislation, then it is difficult to visualize any region in Canada being prepared to give Quebec a priority voice in these economic policies.

Similarly, special status would call for Quebec's exercising full control over all federal regional development policies, and some advocates of special status state in their writings that Quebec should also have a voice
in general economic policies—fiscal and credit, tariff and trade, and manpower training—since regional economic measures can function properly only if they operate in harmony with these general policies. Moreover, special status in the field of economic regional policy could come to mean the use by the government of Quebec of a range of special powers for the purpose of influencing its industrial and resource development: its larger share of the corporation tax, its control over special federal regional measures, its right of consult with the central government on federal economic policy, as well as the usual loan guarantee and industrial estates programs to be found in all the provinces. The question would remain, however, if, given the different economic interests of the several provinces in Canada and the keenness of competition between them for industrial resource development funds, would "special status" be acceptable to the people and the governments of the other provinces?

Another significant question about special status is its effect on social policy and the distribution of benefits and costs of the federal programs involved. Shared-cost programs have already been the subject of intense discussion, and Quebec now enjoys a "special status" with respect to some programs in this field. Newer federal-provincial
programs, however, have not provided any special options for Quebec: the province, like all others must start a universal and public medical care program, for example, in order to qualify for the new federal medicare grants. And, like the other provinces, Quebec has been told that when its medicare program is well established, new fiscal arrangements will be considered under which it could assume full responsibility for its program. To have given Quebec special status without such a stipulation would have been tantamount to giving the province full compensation whether or not a qualifying program were started in the province. Similarly, for this program to work, it is assumed that the other provinces would refrain from asking for similar treatment.

A further question which arises with respect to the special issue is that concerning social policies which are strictly federal and designed to achieve income redistribution. The government of Quebec would become the sole agency responsible for income maintenance programs such as family allowances and old-age security pensions.

Tax issues with respect to "special status" are even more complex. It is obvious that tax revenues from the rest of Canada would have to continue to flow into Quebec
if taxes were not to rise as a result of the provincial government's assumption of full responsibility for income redistribution. Since income in Quebec is below the national average, the current federal income redistribution measures that now apply automatically across Canada result in a net influx of some 200 million dollars per year for Quebec. Under special status, Parliament would continue to make tax payments to Quebec but would forego any constitutional right to make payments to persons in Quebec. Again, there is also considerable doubt as to whether taxpayers in other provinces would be willing to accept the proposition that they ought to make contributions to maintain the revenues of the government of Quebec while having no say, through federal representation, concerning how those revenues would be distributed. And would not the possibility arise that other provinces would demand similar privileges if they felt the need in the future?

What is more, under a special status arrangement, the government of Quebec would have superior constitutional powers in relation to those enjoyed by other provinces, particularly with respect to its ability to influence Canada's economic policy and its competitive advantages in the fields of industrial and economic development. The question naturally arises, from the perspective of other provincial
governments, whether the present intergovernmental arrange-
ments would persist in the face of this new balance of power. Could not Quebec, with its special fiscal status and equalization payments, to which the citizens of other provinces have contributed, finance competitive tax incentives to industry? In short, would the special fiscal status enjoyed by one provincial government force a re-
adjustment designed to bring into balance the fiscal power and responsibilities of all provinces?

Concerning the operation of the machinery of government in Ottawa, Parliament would no longer have jurisdiction with respect to income redistribution measures, new federal-provincial programs, or regional economic development. Thus, the Quebec government would be recognized as the responsible spokesman for the views of Quebeckers concerning federal economic policies; Quebec cabinet ministers would replace Quebec's own members of Parliament on many heretofore federal matters. The Parliament of Canada would come to legislate on two classes of questions, those in which Quebec M.P.'s had a vote, and those in which the opposite was the case. Hence, the broader the range of respon-
sibilities transferred to the government of Quebec, the more Parliament would be legislating with respect to the nine
other provinces only. Simply put, Quebec's M.P.'s would have the same say in forming a federal government as did the others, although they would be less affected by it. The dilemma is that there would be two classes of voting in Parliament, but there could only be one government. On a more concrete level, Johnson concludes with respect to the above, "The extent of this transfer of powers, if carried to the conclusion advocated by some, would be a relatively independent Quebec, associated with the rest of Canada to the extent that it was advantageous to do so. Parliament would legislate for the two parts of Canada only in respect to such matters as tariffs and trade, currency and monetary matters, and defense." 49

Johnson notes that one of the major ironies of the adoption of "special status" is that although Quebeckers would be to a greater degree "masters in their own house," they would be the subjects of what would be more like a unitary provincial state and that "for Canadians in other provinces, too, special status would lead more in the direction of a unitary state, as it became easier and more convenient to centralize powers in Ottawa." 50 The resulting paradox, he claims, is that in an attempt to strengthen the forces of diversity by greater regionalization, the forces for pluralism would be diminished.

49 Ibid., p. 110.
50 Ibid., p. 111.
A final option to be discussed in this chapter is that of an "associate state." The main thrust of this option would be to create two sovereign states, one English and one French, and to delegate authority from each to a new confederal body of limited powers. This arrangement would be, according to some advocates, analogous to the European Common Market in terms of the powers given up by its members. Other proponents hold that the associate state should be given broader powers, including trade and monetary policy and international relations. Johnson notes that "whatever the case, this approach seems to assure a centralization of powers in both states—a kind of 'dual' centralism." 51

The "associate state" option, in contrast to other options previously discussed, would make the notion of a federal regime superfluous, for under this option Quebec would be, in effect, a separate country. Three features of the "associate state" option are that 1) there would no longer be a federal state or federal government machinery as currently constituted. Each state would influence common economic policies, which would be developed through negotiations written into the new confederal agreement. 2) Each

51 Ibid.
state would have its own regional development policies, subject to the agreed economic policies, and 3) each state would have its own income redistribution and its own social security measures.

Such an arrangement, in short, would do away with the need for parliamentary representatives: by substituting a confederal apparatus in which delegates appointed by the governments of the two member states would make all decisions. And it would be assumed that mutual self-interest would be relied upon to force a reconciliation of the conflicting interests of the two states.

The idea of an "associate state" comes closest to René Levesque's idea of "sovereignty-association," and for all practical purposes the two concepts are one in the same. Levesque first put forth his idea of "sovereignty association" in his book entitled Option Quebec as part of the P.Q. manifesto in 1968. However, it should be noted that, rather than being a concrete plan of action, Option Quebec could best be described as a polemic expressing Levesque's views of the inadequacies of the current federal structure in terms of Quebec's linguistic and cultural needs.

Levesque begins Option by rejecting the notion of "special status" which he describes as a concept that only "gives one the impression of security..." as if Quebec's
sovereignty meant anything more than a simple political rearrangement in a marginal area of North America." 52

What is more, Levesque says,

The moment it was suggested, the absurdity of this alternative became apparent: apart from the fact that the Canadian federation was to have inflicted upon it a constitutional deformity that would make it an object of curiosity in the world—a fact that we knew from the enunciation of the thesis—the "privileges" accorded to Quebec...would give rise to just as vehement protests in other provinces as independence itself. 53

Levesque suggests that his "sovereignty/association plan would create a Quebec that is both "sovereign" and "independent" of the rest of Canada while at the same time it would retain an "economic association" with the other nine provinces. According to Levesque, such an arrangement would "conform to the second great trend of our times: the new economic groups, customs unions, common markets, etc." 54

He envisions a "new" relationship of two nations, one with its homeland in Quebec and another free to rearrange the rest of the country at will which would be freely associated in the new adaptation of the current "common market" formula, making up an entity which would, perhaps—and if so very precisely—be called a "Canadian Union." He


53 Ibid., pp. 10-11.

54 Ibid., p 28.
suggests that such a union would included the following features: 1) a monetary union; 2) common tariffs; 3) a postal union; 4) joint Quebec/Canada administration of the national debt; and 5) co-ordination of policies. With respect to foreign policy, Levesque holds that Quebec and Canada would have equal participation in the formulation and participation in defense policy "in proportion to our means." 55

Levesque stresses in *Option* that it is necessary to create a state which is both modern and French. The old methods of retaining Quebec's uniqueness in language and culture by adherence to traditional values no longer serves Quebec's interests in a modern world. Levesque observed in *Option* that Quebec's traditional society is gone; that today most Quebeckers are city-dwellers and workers; that the old policies of *survivance* no longer serve Quebec's interests.

In order to achieve a modern society, Quebec must meet what Levesque terms "three basic minimums." First, he states that Quebecois must "secure once and for all the safety or our collective personality. The prerequisite to this, is, among other things, the power for unfettered action in fields as varied as those of citizenship, immigration and

and employment. "Second, as a means to attain the above objective, it will be necessary for Quebec to maintain a strong provincial government," one that would exercise jurisdiction over commercial and industrial corporations, money and banking, and would have the power to exercise a reasonable control over the investment of our capital." Third, it will be necessary to eliminate the duplication of jurisdictions between the federal government and the government of Quebec." The fact that certain economic tools belong to the federal government while other powers whose exercise also influence economic life belong to the provinces creates a difficult problem in the rational planning of economic activity. . . . The government of Quebec should, therefore, exercise its powers by giving direction to the economy, rationalizing its marginal industries and developing secondary industries." 58

The financial arrangements Levesque suggests between Canada and Quebec would consist of 1) a common currency and 2) a common market. The first would be achieved, he claims, by a treaty of "five years duration" during Quebec's transition period from federal state to "associate state." At the end of this initial period, he says, "we would have created for once an original model which would

56 Ibid., p.21.
57 Ibid., p.22.
58 Ibid., p.23.
be sure to inspire imitation by any number of countries." The second feature of the union, the "common market," he holds is already established elsewhere in the world." The heart of the common market," he claims,"is the customs union, which forbids member states to levy tariffs on goods exchanged between them." Like the common currency arrangement, the customs union would require the conclusion of another agreement which would call for "prior negotiations during which it would be possible to rectify certain anomalies." 60

As for how a sovereign Quebec would be financed, Levesque asserts that, "in achieving its political liberty, Quebec naturally would take back complete control of its fiscal resources." Past fiscal relationships with Ottawa, he contends, have proved disadvantageous for Quebec, as the benefits Quebec receives from federalism have not kept pace with the amount of federal taxes extracted from the province. By severing financial ties with Ottawa, Levesque holds, the "vast" sums Quebec spends on the federal bureaucracy could be channeled into projects of exclusive benefit to Quebec and would "put an end to the infernal squandering of money that has gone on shamelessly in Ottawa for years, at the expense of Quebec taxpayers as well as taxpayers elsewhere." 62

59 Ibid., p. 44v.
60 Ibid., p. 45.
61 Ibid., p. 48.
62 Ibid., p. 49.
Concerning the relationship between Quebec's government and private investment, Levesque contends that "the level of private investment in Quebec has nothing to do with (and no one has brought forth the slightest proof to the contrary) political developments." He attributes Ontario's higher level of investment to its "direct connections" to large sums of U.S. capital and Ottawa's favoritism toward the province. In an independent Quebec, he suggests, one method that could be used to obtain additional revenue for the province would be a transformation of the system of "concessions." By this, Levesque means that Quebec would be less inclined to allow exploitation of its natural resources such as forests and minerals by companies controlled from outside the province without a substantial return to the province in terms of tax revenues. Such companies would also be required to take more direction from the government of Quebec in how they ran their operations as well as conceding a larger role for Quebecois in the management of enterprises inside Quebec.

As for those who argue that such measures would bring about "capital flight" from the province, Levesque maintains that corporations such as insurance and trust companies

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63 Ibid., p. 53.
64 Ibid., p. 53.
would merely be required to incorporate in Quebec if they had not done so already. To those who raise the specter that corporations will transfer their profits abroad, Levesque states,

This happens and will always happen whatever the political system. The process will reach a level that can be termed that of "serious" flight only if conditions are unfavorable for the reinvestment of "mobile" funds. The only efficient solution, apart from emergency measures, such as the control of the movement of capital, is to create the best possible conditions for business to flourish. In no way does this require us to perform a collective act of licking the investors' boots, but rather we must pay strict attention to such things as better technical training. 65

As with special status, there are significant questions raised by the associate state/sovereignty association model. First, would the mutual interdependence of the two entities guarantee the survival of the French Canadian nation in the face of the significant economic and political pull exerted by the United States and Canada? Although proponents of an associated state assume a "common market" arrangement, it is possible that, for example, British Columbia and the Prairie provinces would prefer to align themselves closer to the United States than to Ontario and Quebec. Or, perhaps, the Atlantic provinces might draw closer to the New England states.

65 Ibid., p. 54.
Even assuming that the associate state model were established and functioned just as its advocates suggest, it seems logical to ask whether Quebec would be less exposed to external (i.e., non-French) influences than Canada, in general, is now? Struct countermeasures to obtain rigid regulation of Quebec's financial institutions might restrict capital from the rest of Canada and the U.S. to the point of choking off development and investment. Such a precipitous fall in investment capital might well cause French Canadians to abandon their cultural and language demands and seek employment outside the province, thus draining away manpower.

Steps to Patriation of the Constitution

The 1931 Statute of Westminster, which removed Canada from the authority of the Parliament of the United Kingdom except for the B.N.A. Act, recognized Canada's right to conduct its own foreign policy, and clarified the position of the Governor General as being an emissary of the Monarch and not of the government of Great Britain, began the process of patriation. However, over the ensuing three decades, the provinces were unable to agree on any amending formula, so that full patriation was not possible.

In 1964, the provincial attorneys general submitted a proposal for amendment to the provincial legislatures. However, the Quebec National Assembly vetoed the idea on the basis that it did not give greater constitutional powers
to the provinces. During the next five or six years, Quebec continued to insist that the provinces (read Quebec) be given greater powers. The 1971 Victoria Conference agreed in principle to a charter that included an amending formula, but Quebec and Saskatchewan would not give it their approval. In 1976, the provinces agreed that patriation should be tied to substantive constitutional change.

In terms of the political situation in Quebec, 1976 was also a crucial year in that the Parti Quebecois, dedicated to a sovereign province of Quebec, was elected and announced its intention to place a referendum before Quebec's electorate to determine whether the province should remain within the Canadian federation. A "yes" vote on the referendum would have made all questions with respect to constitutional change superfluous. In 1980, however, the referendum on sovereignty/association was rejected, and the federal government again stated its desire for a re-examination of federalism with the patriation question being given top priority.

Quebec's objection to patriation stemmed from the fact that, as Corbett notes, "French Canadians have traditionally been in a paradoxical position on this question. They have constantly striven for the fullest degree of autonomy, but
they have been unwilling to abandon any external safeguard against possible encroachments by the central government on the rights of the provinces or minorities." Corbett further claims that, traditionally, Quebec feared that the transfer of the amending power would permit the majority of the provinces to modify the constitutional balance of power to the detriment of one province with a French-speaking majority."

Constitutional Change, Levesque and the P.Q.

At the time federal-provincial negotiations were taking place in 1981, Quebec's Premier, Rene Levesque, gave three reasons for not signing the proposed amendment agreement. The first, he claimed, was a gap in the formula for amending the constitution. Second, the held that the clause guaranteeing Canadians freedom of movement, with the prospect of the immigration of a large number of non-French-speaking Canadians into Quebec, could alter the province's linguistic balance. Although at the time the government pointed out that the provisions of Bill 101, which established French as the language of work in the province would remain constitutional, the Supreme Court of Canada later struck the bill down, thus adding to Levesque's apprehensions.
Third, Levesque held that the Charter's provisions concerning minority language rights would limit the powers of the Quebec legislature, inasmuch as the new constitution would impinge upon the Quebec Assembly's ability to negotiate reciprocal agreements with other provinces concerning language rights. Although the government held that other provinces had offered to reciprocate on the question of the language of primary education, Levesque held that the Charter's provisions did not go far enough to protect French-speaking minorities. That is to say, the Constitution promoted a bi-lingual Canada, but Levesque desired a unilingual Quebec. Fourth, Levesque objected to the fiscal provisions of the Charter. In April of 1981, Levesque had agreed, along with seven other provincial premiers, to accept a basic formula for provincial compensation. The provision that a province could "opt out" of any amendment which impinged upon provincial powers, while at the same time the province could receive federal financial compensation, was dropped in November. Levesque held that the right to financial compensation had been crucial in his earlier decision to support that provision of the charter.
Analysis of Levesque's Criticisms

Whether the new constitution will provide the protection of language and culture that Quebec seeks remains open to question. First, Levesque's concern that the immigration of non-French-speaking Canadians would eventually dilute the French-speaking population may have some merit if it is assumed that all non-French-speaking residents will continue to have their children educated in English. English-speaking Canadians in Quebec, coupled with immigrants from outside Canada, might, over time, diminish the use of French among the province's population.

A more serious question arises in the area of constitutional amendment, for the constitution can be changed if such a change has the approval of seven provinces and at least half the population. If all the predominantly English-speaking provinces decided to amend the charter in a manner unfavorable to Quebec, they will have the requisite numbers to put the action through over Quebec's objection. Moreover, population trends might change in future years to the extent that the western provinces, Alberta and British Columbia, with their predominantly English-speaking populations, could be decisive factors in altering the nation's population patterns.

With respect to education, since there is no prohibition limiting the number of English-speaking schools in
Quebec, there is reason to assume that English-speakers in the province will increase rather than decline. Although French schools in other provinces need not fear an abridgement of their rights, as happened in Manitoba in 1890, it would be ludicrous to assert that the French in Quebec will undertake any large-scale migration in order to establish larger French-speaking enclaves in other provinces. Hence Levesque's concern that French Canadians could well find their numbers diluted, and thus his belief that immigrants should learn French, not English.

Nonetheless, there are many—among them Prime Minister Trudeau—who declare that Levesque is unduly alarmist in his assertions that French Canadian rights do not have equal protection under the new constitution and will soon be trampled upon by English Canada. In the first place, they argue, French schools both inside and outside Quebec would be in no danger of being displaced, as were those in Manitoba earlier. The only real dilemma French schools would face would be to convince immigrants that it is more advantageous to learn the French language than the English language.

Second, concerning the constitutional amendment issue, it is difficult to foresee a situation in which all the English-speaking provinces would adopt any measure so
distasteful to Quebec as to cause the province to reconsider leaving the Confederation. Now that French Canada's cultural and linguistic rights have been entrenched in the Constitution, there would be little reason for Quebec to fear the amendment procedure as adopted in the new constitution of 1982, unless English Canada deliberately sought to eliminate the entrenched provisions concerning French language rights and French Canadian culture. Although such a possibility exists, it is highly improbable that the English Canadian provinces would take such action.

The New Constitution: A New Direction for Canadian Federalism?

On April 17, 1982, Queen Elizabeth II formally signed a proclamation patriating Canada's constitution. The act placed all decision-making powers formerly held by the U.K. Parliament at Westminster into the hands of the Canadian Parliament.

The basic framework of the new constitution remains the British North America Act, now referred to as the Constitution Act of 1867. The major addition to the constitutional body of law is the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. What makes the new Charter different from the one passed by the House of Commons at the suggestion of
Prime Minister Dieffenbaker in 1960 is that it is entrenched in the constitution, whereas the previous law could be amended, repealed, or superseded by other laws. The new Charter cannot be altered except by a constitutional amendment that would require the action of the federal government and at least seven provinces which have at least half of the population.

Certain articles of the new constitution bring it in line with the constitutions of other western democracies, such as the United States. These enumerate specific freedoms, of conscience and religion, thought, opinion and expression, and association. The right of universal suffrage is guaranteed as are limitations on the duration of Parliament. Other provisions assure freedom of movement in and out of the country, prohibit illegal search and seizure, protect against arbitrary arrest, cruel and unusual punishment, and enumerate the rights of accused persons.

Section 16 specifically addresses the question of language rights. It entrenches English and French as the official languages of Canada and gives equal status and equal rights to both languages in their use in all institutions of the Parliament and government of Canada.
Presumably, this would prohibit such actions as those taken by the Province of Manitoba in 1890, which did away with French language guarantees, particularly with respect to education.

Concerning educational and linguistic guarantees, Section 23 entrenches the rights of linguistic minorities to education in their language. It guarantees all citizens of the nation who received their primary education in either French or English the right to have their children educated in the same language, if it is the minority language of the province in which they reside. The section also provides that children have the right to be educated in the minority language of the province of the province whether or not their parents had received their education in that language.

Section 25 gives further protection to minority language rights such as those of the Canadian Indians, who wish to educate their children in Cree. Section 26 holds that such language guarantees are "consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multinational heritage of Canadians." As Canada Today points out,
Section 26 has significance since Canada has always emphasized its cultural diversity. The United States in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries considered itself a "melting pot" in which immigrants became culturally homogenous. Canada pursued a different image, a "mosaic," in which distinct cultures—French, English, Ukranian, German, Scottish, Irish and many others—remained distinctive but harmonious.
Although organized separatist movements and parties are of relatively recent vintage in Quebec, French Canadians have dreamed of having their own nation ever since the time of the British conquest of 1760. This was especially true during periods of intense friction and discord such as the Riel affair, the conscription crisis and, more recently, the conflict over language rights and constitutional guarantees.

Most observers agree that modern separatism began in 1957, when Raymond Barbeau formed the right-wing Alliance Laurentienne. This movement exhibited strong clerical and corporatist tendencies, but in terms of actual support, its following was small. Three years later, another separatist movement, this one on the left, was organized under the name Action Socialiste pour l'indépendence nationale (ASIQ); it, too, had limited support.\(^1\)

A more moderate group, the Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale (RIN), appeared the same year as the ASIQ under the leadership of André d'Allemagne and


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Marcel Chaput. Chaput split with the RIN over its refusal to back him in a provincial election and formed his own separatist party, the Parti républicain du Québec (PRQ). Barbeau asked his followers to throw their support to the PRQ. Nonetheless, the PRQ proved to be a short-lived party, as it was beset by financial difficulties from its beginning.2

The Philosophy of Separatism—Causes, Reasons

Perhaps the most articulate explanation of the rationales for separatism has come from the pen of Dr. Marcel Chaput. Chaput's book, Pourquoi Je Suis Separatiste (Why I am a Separatist), is significant in that it lays down, in concise and detailed form, practically every significant pro-separatist argument that has been made either before or since the book's publication in 1961.

In his introduction to Pourquoi, Chaput makes the following claim:

The world is made up of separatists. The man who is master of his home is a separatist. Each of the hundred nations striving to maintain its national identity is separatist. France and England are mutually separatist, even in relation to the Common Market. And you who long for a real Canadian constitution, you are a separatist. The only difference between you and me is that you want Canada to be free in relation to England and the United States, and I want Quebec to be free in relation to Canada.3

2Ibid., p. 230.

Chaput goes on to describe his basic arguments in favor of a separatist solution to Quebec's aspirations. While acknowledging that a break from Canada would not resolve all of Quebec's problems and, in fact, would create many new ones, he nonetheless holds the self-determinist view that "it is highly desirable that a normal man or nation be free."4

Chaput defines what he calls the "six dimensions of separatism," which is an answer to those who ask about the actual desirability of an independent Quebec. 1) Quebec's independence would allow French Canadians to enjoy the liberty to which they are historically entitled. 2) Political independence is desirable because it would take the French Canadians out of their position of numerical helplessness. 3) Economically, political independence is desirable for Quebec because, without control over political power, economic independence remains a dream. 4) Culturally, Quebec would benefit from independence by being a unilingual country. 5) Socially, Quebec's independence would be desirable in that it would "contribute to making life in Quebec a coherent whole." Politics would support the economy and both would contribute to culture, thus allowing French Canadians to develop their own institutions oriented toward the French Canadian way of thinking. 6) Psychologically, independence

4Ibid., p. 5.
would be desirable because the French Canadian would no longer feel as a second class citizen. He would have a nation and a culture he could call his own.  

To those who say that the federal government in Ottawa would react with force against separation, Chaput claims that all free nations of the world would champion Quebec's desire for political independence, and that the United Nations would be obliged to send a peacekeeping force in the event of an invasion by either the federal government or the United States. Chaput even exclaims in *Pourquoi*, "The more I think about it, the more I am tempted to wish for such an invasion, because it would be the most certain and speedy way for us to gain independence." He sees Ottawa's reaction in such an eventuality as one of desperation and disorder, a feeble attempt to make piecemeal concessions in the areas of bilingualism and the appointment of a few French Canadians to top civil service posts. He enveighs against French Canadians considering such proposals, urging that "we don't want to correct injustice; we want to throw off our minority status." He concludes by saying in *Pourquoi* that, above all, independence is a matter of will. "If a nation is based

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essentially on a collective will to live, then its independence is essentially a matter of will ... Never in the history of the world has it been easier for conquered peoples to attain independence ... We are living in the twentieth century, the Golden Age of independence." 

Radical Separatism: Revolution and the F.L.Q.

Although all of the previously-mentioned political parties spurned violence in favor of a political solution to Quebec's demands, this changed in 1963 with the formation of the FLQ, a small group of young fanatics calling themselves the Front de la libération québécoise.

Because the FLQ, both in its program and actions, represents an aberration from the tactics used by other separatist organizations in their pursuit of an independent Quebec, the FLQ's methods cannot be considered representative of the means by which most Quebecers would seek a break with English Canada. Nonetheless, their deeds and words do demonstrate the mounting frustration felt by many young Quebecers with the status quo and the slow pace of change.

A great deal about the FLQ remains shrouded in mystery. One helpful insight has come from Dr. Gustave Morf in his Terror in Quebec: Case Studies of the FLQ. Morf has put together a number of details about the backgrounds of some

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8 Ibid., p. 70.
of the members of the FLQ through interviews he conducted with the terrorists after their confinement to the penitentiary.

The FLQ was an imported movement, modeled on the Belgian resistance during World War II, the Algerian National Liberation Front, and the Cuban revolution. In general, most of the organization's members had problems at home, unhappy family lives, and difficulty in school, while a few came from good middle-class families. In many ways, the FLQ members represented the highly emotional, demanding, and rebellious adolescent culture of which they were a part.

Because of his age and wartime experience, George Schoeters may be considered the father of the FLQ. 11 Schoeters himself was an illegitimate child, born in Belgium, who never knew his father. At the age of twelve, he became acquainted with the Belgian partisans who organized the resistance against the Nazis. The partisans employed him as a spy and messenger because of his youth and small stature. He observed the Belgians defending themselves against the Nazis with lies, deceit, fraud, civil disobedience, bombs and murder. "It is not surprising," observes Morf, "that a young man brought up in these circumstances ... would have a difficult time after the war in adapting himself to an orderly life." 12

11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., p. 21.
In 1951, Schoeters emigrated to Canada through the efforts of a friend whom he had met in Europe, and subsequently joined the "Young Catholic Movement." He was placed with a family in Montreal (his first real family) and worked, briefly, as a restaurant helper in British Columbia, moved back to Montreal after a year in hopes of becoming an electrician, and finally entered the University of Montreal, where he studied economics and sociology.

The atmosphere at the university at that time was highly nationalistic, and it may be that he was influenced by the more militant students there. It appears that he often took part in discussions and that his experience as a freedom fighter gave him a certain prestige.

In 1957, he married a French Canadian girl from a very good family and was, by his own account, quite happy. But his interests soon became diverted to other areas. Morf remarks, "He was obviously a restless person, always in search of something new, something better, something different."\(^{13}\)

Not long after his graduation from the university, Schoeters met Fidel Castro, who came to Montreal on a visit following his successful revolution in Cuba. Convinced of the sincerity of Castro's invitation for

\(^{13}\)Ibid., p. 22.
students to come to Cuba to help with agrarian reform, he and his wife went to Cuba; she returned shortly thereafter because she was pregnant. Schoeters remained in Cuba for approximately one year, but he came back a somewhat disappointed man. He saw that Castro's theories left much to be desired when put into practice.

Ever restless, he did not remain long with his family. In 1961, he visited Rome, Tunisia, Turkey, Algeria and Switzerland. While in Algeria, he was in touch with the National Liberation Front. Upon his return to Canada, he became a member of the RIN, but he did not find it radical enough. He then formed the Réseau de résistance (RR), which was inspired by the Belgian resistance but was content for the moment to paint slogans on walls.

Finally, part of the RR split away and called itself the Front de la libération québécoise, or FLQ. As with its Belgian, Algerian, and Cuban models, this was to be the underground movement devoted to defeating the English "occupant" by force. Schoeters himself had brought instructions from Algeria for making Molotov cocktails and time bombs. He himself did not participate personally in the dynamite thefts or the construction of bombs; his role was more in the nature of a co-ordinator. 14

14 Ibid., p. 23.
A detailed recital of the bombings and kidnappings of the FLQ during the 1960's and early 70's, and Trudeau's imposition of the Emergency War Measures Act, is not necessary here. Many of these incidents have been described in the previous chapter on Quebec nationalism, and thus the reader is referred to those pages. What will be asserted is that the FLQ, condemned for its acts of violence and failing ultimately to "liberate" Quebec from the clutches of the English "oppressors," nevertheless did succeed in obtaining its goals of riveting Canada's attention on Quebec and generating publicity for its cause.

While the more moderate members of separatist movements certainly loathed such violence, the concerns of the FLQ with respect to job discrimination against French Canadians and "outside" exploitation of the province were picked up by the "ballot box" separatist groups such as the RIN. Shortly after the FLQ arrests in 1963 and 1964, the RIN reiterated its demands 1) that there be more acceptance of the French language and culture; 2) that there be better job opportunities for French Canadians; and 3) that there be special rights and privileges for Quebec. It claimed that only lip service was being paid to the notion of a "bi-cultural" nation, guaranteed by the British North America Act. It cited the fact that only 13 percent of the
government jobs nationwide went to French Canadians, who represented 30 percent of the population. Also, both industry, and natural resources continued to be controlled from outside the province.\textsuperscript{15}

Premier Lesage took steps to appease the nationalists and to strengthen his position. For example, he demanded that federal tax reforms be implemented so that more revenue would flow back to the province of Quebec. Prime Minister Pearson at first delayed any fiscal revamping and instead sought to pacify the nationalists by other means. There had been a proposal to use an adaptation of the Union Jack as the Canadian national flag, which was understandably anathema to the Quebeçois. Pearson then proposed three maple leaves on a white background with vertical blue bars on each side—ostensibly representing union from sea to sea. The Quebeçois were certainly happy about the alteration, but it hardly placated their economic desires. Lesage and Resources Minister René Levesque were soon at work preparing yet another set of programs for Quebec, and further demands for Ottawa.

In March of 1965, the Lesage administration put out its long-range economic plan. Citing the dichotomy between Montreal and the rural areas, uneven growth, and per capita income in Quebec that was 13 percent below the national

\textsuperscript{15} "Trying to Blast a Nation Apart," \textit{Business Week} (June 1, 1963), p. 100.
average. The top priority was the achievement of more provincial control over tax revenues. Further, there was the omnipresent need to get the Québécois into more places of economic authority. The plan, for which Levesque is credited, included: 1) nationalization of electric power (as it was felt that the economy could be shaped in the desired direction by preferential rate schedules to French-speaking companies); 2) the establishment of the Société Générale du Financement du Québec as a general investment corporation (this would supply advanced capital to firms that were in French Canadian hands); 3) the construction of a 225 million-dollar steel mill; and 4) increased investment in human resources, especially through education.

But with the Liberal Lesage administration already spending a huge budget on agricultural development, highways, and social services, the capital needed to implement Lesage's proposals did not exist. Thus, Lesage restated his demands in modified form, requesting that a minimum of 47 percent of Quebec's personal income tax revenue be returned to the province. Pearson gave in to Lesage's demands.
In 1966, Daniel Johnson's Union Nationale Party ousted the Liberals after a six-year tenure. A post-mortem on his administration is not necessary, but the charge that he attempted to do too much (or too little, from the separatist point of view) should be answered. First, his policies were generally sound. He realized that education needed more attention and funding, and was willing to implement much-needed reforms. The fact that, as the young became more educated, they became more dissatisfied with their lot in life as French Canadians cannot be laid at Lesage's feet. French Canadians had been in an inferior position for years, and their reaction was inevitable. What many largely ignored at the time was the fact that Lesage had taken a major step toward modernizing the province and moving Quebec into the twentieth century. 16

Federalists were anxious in 1966 about how well the separatist parties would do. When the two separatist parties that ran candidates, the RIN and the newly-formed Ralliement Nationale (RN), did little more than splinter some of the Liberal vote, federalists were overjoyed. To be sure, this splintering was probably the reason for the victory of the UN party; but the achievements of the RIN and RN for the separatist cause were negligible. 17


The Formation of the Parti Quebecois

In 1967, Rene Levesque formally broke away from the Liberal party and published his Option Quebec. This six-thousand word volume outlined Levesque's vision for Quebec and Canada. As far as being a concrete blueprint for action, however, the work left much to be desired. Levesque's biographer, Peter Desbarats, holds that Option Quebec is "disjointed and emotional ... the work of a propagandist rather than a political philosopher."¹⁸

Levesque appealed in Option directly to French Canadians, whom, he asserted, constitute a nation no matter in which province they reside. It is only in Quebec, however, that French Canadians can actually claim a specific, geographical area for themselves, an area where their customs and language will be totally accepted, an area over which they must exert greater economic and political control if they do not wish to see the province dominated and controlled by outsiders, i.e. those of non-French origin.

In Levesque's view, Canada is a political entity composed of two separate nations, English and French, and the advancement of the former was achieved largely through the exploitation and domination of the latter. In order for Quebec to truly develop, it will be necessary for the

province to claim greater control over such areas as industry and commerce, citizenship and immigration, certain aspects of international relations, savings institutions, and internal agencies of development and industrialization. Other areas of importance to be negotiated with the federal government include territorial claims between Quebec and Labrador, and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. These demands, Levesque holds, are the "bare minimum" that Quebec should require.

Levesque's Option did not get the complete sympathy and endorsement of the French Canadian press. The Montreal Star editorialized that Levesque's proposal was nothing more than "a union constantly seeking ad hoc solutions through permanent consultive committees, which sounds like the federal parliament under another name." Another critic, Renaude Lapointe of La Presse, held that, as contemporary Quebécois are "better educated, more dynamic, and more influential than ever before," Levesque's suggestions should be totally rejected. He accused Levesque of failing to admit that "90 percent of our weaknesses and shortcomings are our own fault."  

The prototype of the Parti Quebécois was Levesque's Mouvement Souveraineté Association, founded in 1967. It was formed from the union of Levesque's separatist group

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19 Ibid., p. 131.
20 Ibid., p. 132.
with the RIN and the RN. The aim of the group was to unify all elements which supported independence in Quebec. Levesque found some difficulty in uniting the RN and the RIN with the MSA. The rift between these two organizations resulted largely from a personality conflict between RN leader Marcel Chaput and Pierre Bourgault of the RIN. Nevertheless, all three leaders realized that none of the separatist organizations, by themselves, were capable of mustering the necessary political and financial support to forward the separatist cause. Thus a compromise was reached when Levesque absorbed the RN and the RIN into the MSA. At the convention unifying the three groups, the MSA declared its intention to become a political party within six months.

Levesque's Parti Québécois was formally launched in 1968. In his opening address to the delegates of the PQ, Levesque did not actually call for independence; instead he advocated a new program of participatory democracy that would go against the "outdated and rigid social, economic, and political structure." 14

When the FLQ began its campaign of bombings, robbery and arson, the Quebec provincial government requested help from Ottawa to combat the terrorist wave. Levesque himself was among the most outspoken in denouncing the terrorists

Nevertheless, he continued to call for changes in the system that would, he argued, make it more responsive to the needs of Quebeckers. He appealed especially to youth and labor, stressing that society had to make a place for the newly-enfranchised students and the unemployed.

As the 1970 election campaign began to take shape, it was clear that the primary contest would be between the Liberals and the Parti Québécois. A poll conducted just prior to the election showed the Liberals with 37 percent of the popular support, the Parti Québécois with 29 percent, the Union Nationale with 15 percent, and the Creditistes with 15 percent. Levesque contributed to the success of the PQ in a number of ways: he appealed to the youth, to the left, and to the discontented. Although his program was nationalist, his tone was subdued. He asked the Québécois not to believe that the economic price of independence was too high, and pleaded with them to withdraw their old fears and their subservient attitude towards English Canada and the local establishment.

Levesque's tactics also had an effect on the strategies of other parties. The Union Nationale, for example, called for a referendum on independence before 1974 unless a new

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constitution had been drafted. Many of the Liberals in other provinces waited to see when Pierre Trudeau and the Liberal government in Ottawa would intervene to counter the challenge from Levesque. Although Trudeau did not actively intervene in the campaign, there were other federalists working hard, through various means, to assure a Liberal victory. One English-Canadian controlled investment firm advised its clients to ship their securities and liquid assets outside the province until after the election. In addition, the English language Montreal dailies played up these moves as a sure sign that a PQ victory would mean financial collapse for the province. Whether such actions had any effect in persuading the non-committed to vote Liberal rather than PQ or UN cannot be determined. What is certain is that they increased the separatists' anger and did nothing to ease the discord between French and English within the province.

The PQ and the Election of 1970

When the results of the 1970 election became apparent, it was clear that the PQ had sustained a major defeat despite what earlier opinion polls had forecast. The actual breakdown of support showed the following:

16 Saywell, p. 36.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>% of Total vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parti Quebecois</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Nationale</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creditiste</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The federalists, who touted the triumph of the Liberals as a resounding "no" to separation, could not hide the serious economic and social problems that remained. What was also obvious was the shift of electoral support for the various parties. Urban voters rejected the Union Nationale outright, while the rural areas (traditionally bastions of support for the UN) supported the Creditistes in larger numbers than ever before (taking nine seats from the UN and three from the Liberals). The Créditistes also swung the balance in the Liberals favor by siphoning support from the Union Nationale and assuring the Liberal victory.

The PQ's strength came overwhelmingly from the urban areas. In the lower-income areas of Montreal, it won five seats and did well in other areas of the city, running second to the Liberals in all other election districts of the city. Except for the four overwhelmingly English constituencies, the Liberals secured only 373,757 votes

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* Ibid., p. 44.
to 249,251 for the Parti Québecois. The PQ also showed strength in the suburbs of Montreal, polling more than one fifth of the vote. In Quebec City, it bested the Liberals in the more depressed areas and ran a close second in the suburbs.

Election observers noted that seven out of ten voters rejected separatism. This number included all those who supported the Creditistes and the Union Nationale, despite the UN's ambiguity on the constitutional issue. The PQ's analysts drew other conclusions, however. They claimed that the Liberal candidate, Bourassa, owed his victory to English-speaking Quebec. They supported their argument by citing the conclusion of one analyst, Bernard Smith, who had divided the constituencies in the city of Montreal into areas ranging from 80-90 percent to 0-10 percent French Canadian. His findings showed that English Canadians had voted Liberal and that the difference between Liberals and the Parti Québecois often varied with the percentage of non-French voters in the constituency. Only in 9 of the 38 seats in Montreal and its environs, he argued, did the Liberals secure a higher percentage of the French Canadian vote than did the PQ.

Examining the French Canadian vote as a whole, he concluded that French-speaking Quebec had given the Liberals 32.6

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18 Saywell, p. 45.
19 Ibid.,
20 Ibid., p. 46.
percent of its support, 28.7 to the PQ, 24.2 to the UN and 14.5 to others. Because of this, some believed that, with this election, the line had been drawn between French and English Canadians in Quebec.

The PQ charged that the influence of non-French-speaking Canadians tended to distort the parliamentary process. Levesque stated that the English-speaking voters (Anglophone bloc) had swung the tide in favor of the Liberals. He also charged manipulation by the English-speaking media. "I have never experienced such disgust," Levesque said, "as that which I experienced because of the way information was manipulated in the Anglo-Saxon establishment at Montreal with its propaganda media, its disrespect for a population which it treated like natives." 21

1971-76—Building Support for the P.Q.

The constitutional reforms called for by Trudeau culminated in 1971 in the so-called Victoria Charter. 22 The Charter proposed the continuation of the federal state in basically the same form, adding a few articles to entrench language rights and giving Ontario and Quebec a veto over constitutional amendment. Opposition from Quebec came swiftly, as Premier Bourassa was unable to quell the nationalists who

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21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., pp. 47-48.
23 Named for Victoria, British Columbia, where the Charter was drafted.
held that the Charter did not go far enough in areas of
decentralization or special status for Quebec. Bourassa,
complying with the nationalists' demands, refused the
Charter's provisions. The stalemate produced a situation
in which many French-speaking intellectuals were more
drawn to the idea of a separate state.

The PQ announced its intention to run separatist
candidates in the next federal election, claming that
a poll showed that 53 percent of Montreal's French-speaking
population supported its objectives. Meanwhile,
there were those like Prime Minister Trudeau who argued
that separatism was no longer a real challenge. Those
who were already for separatism might be more intense
in their beliefs, he argued, but actual support had
dropped. A different view was taken by distinguished
political scientist Lion Dion, director of research
for the Bilingualism and Bicultural Commission, who held
that without more radical and imaginative solutions than
those already proposed, the country would have to
accept the inevitability of a separate state of Quebec.
Dion proposed the right of self-determination for Quebec
and all other provinces, large-scale institutional
bilingualism in the federal civil service, major

24 Richard Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy:
The making of recent policy in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), pp. 116-117.
jurisdictional and administrative decentralization by the federal government, and an end to the thinking on such concepts as "special status" and the "two nations theory." "No power in the world," Dion said, "can stop French-speaking Québecois from seeing themselves as a unique society and nation." 25

The PQ, meantime, continued to draw support from the intellectual community and also found allies in the trade union movement. In September, 1971, the CNTU 26 came forward with a document entitled "Quebec has no future in the present economic system." The question of separatism was virtually ignored, and its only conclusion was that Quebec should be a socialist state. However, labor leader Louis Laberge called for a united front to oppose the capitalist system and came out in favor of the Parti Québécois as the best party for the workers. Subsequently, the FTQ (Quebec Federation of Labor) adopted a position paper which called for Quebec's right to self-determination, including independence, if it was achieved in accordance with the needs and aspirations of the workers. The FTQ held that French should be the only working language in the province and gave its executive a mandate to call for a general strike, if necessary.

25 Ibid., p. 56.
26 CNTU—Confederation of National Trade Unions/Confédération des syndicats nationaux.
27 Saywell, p. 58.
Support from the radical trade union movement provided the PQ with an opportunity to corner some of the vast labor vote. But it also involved a degree of risk in that the party might alienate a large segment of its middle-class support along with the more moderate trade unionists. Because Levesque refused to move any further to the left, he faced opposition from both inside and outside the party. He had contemplated resigning, but he felt he had a role to play in preventing the party from being taken over by the left.

At the PQ's 1971 convention, Levesque handily defeated the more radical André Laroque for the party's leadership position. He faced sterner opposition from 1,200 delegates who wished to abolish minority schools (i.e. schools for English-speaking residents in Quebec) in any future independent state. The left-wing elements of the party continued to exert pressure, asking for active PQ involvement in labor strikes and demonstrations. Only by a narrow vote of 6-5 was the party's executive committee able to turn down a resolution demanding the party's official participation in a planned demonstration that many felt would lead to violence. 27

Labor leaders reacted with extreme disgruntlement to the PQ's decision not to participate in the demonstration. 

27 Ibid.
Levesque, however, took a strong stand against the more radical labor leaders and invited the FTQ's Robert Burns to "go if he wants to." He attacked any who advocated violence, and reiterated that the Parti Québécois had committed itself to the achievement of independence through democratic means.

It was because of Levesque's intervention that the radical labor movement was forced to shelve, at least for the time being, its demands for a more leftist Parti Québécois. In the wake of the FLQ bombings and kidnappings of 1970, and the rift with radical labor, the PQ suffered some loss of membership. Indications were that party membership had fallen from 80,000 to 30,000 between 1970 and 1971. Nonetheless, Levesque realized that if his party were to become more than a terrorist group or radical labor organization, he would have to keep a tight rein on those who threatened to make the PQ anything other than a legitimate party with broad appeal to all classes.

Levesque's aim in 1972 was to devise a campaign strategy that would keep the Liberals on the defensive. His method was to introduce a variety of separatist charges that would attract media attention, build PQ membership, and increase

28 Ibid., p. 61.
support for the PQ in the upcoming by-elections. The PQ campaign focused on such areas as patriation of the constitution, the low number of Quebeckers in the federal civil service, the cost of federalism, the difference between Quebec's 13 million and Ontario's 200 million dollars per year of federal research money, Ontario's higher standard of living, and Ottawa's treatment of Quebec's agricultural sector.

The PQ's hopes for victory were dashed in the Tremblay by-election of April, 1972. Labor support for the PQ in the election had been questionable after Levesque's equivocation on support for the unions. After spending considerable time and effort in the campaign, and with only two parties running, the results dealt a heavy blow to Levesque and his party.

By 1973, the PQ had begun mending fences with the labor movement, pasting over differences concerning strategy and methods for a time. Although the PQ's platform of 1973 had a more socialist orientation, there were further attempts by more radical labor members to shift the party's platform still further left. For example, the platform did call for changes in economic planning, regulation of foreign ownership, financial institutions and other areas dealing

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30 Ibid.
with social policy. But some members of the radical labor movement drafted a program entitled Quand nous serons vraiment chez nous, which proposed such things as direct worker participation in management and even went so far as to require industry to turn over power to workers' soviets in an independent Quebec. Levesque, however, persuaded the party convention to drop such radical proposals.

What emerged from the PQ's convention that year was a modified program that was still far to the left of anything proposed by the other national parties. It called for increased national and regional planning, the abolition of finance companies, urged stricter controls over financial institutions, requested nationalization of such companies as Canadian Pacific, and advocated greater control over foreign investment and foreign-owned companies. Levesque's major contribution to the platform was a section dealing with the French language, which stated that French would be the sole official and working language in an independent Quebec.

In order to increase its credibility, the PQ drew up a proposed Quebec budget to accompany the 1973 platform based on the 1973-74 provincial budget. It proposed increases in the volume of services and in civil service salaries. Levesque stated that Quebec would take its share

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31 Saywell, p. 77.
of the federal debt, since a portion of that debt was incurred by Quebec. As for corporations, he said that provisions would be made for the incorporation of those companies that had previously been Canadian. Corporations would have to abide by the rules of a Foreign Investment Code as it pertained to foreign ownership, and a certain percentage of the corporation would have to fall under Quebec ownership.

The remainder of the platform called for the establishment of a central bank, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and a customs union with Canada. In addition, the possibility of a common currency between the two nations was discussed, although Levesque admitted that this would be one of the most difficult things to achieve. Quebec might have to be prepared to issue its own money in the event that Canada did not agree to a common currency.

In order to ease the economic fears of many Québécois, and despite its pro-independence rhetoric, the PQ made a concerted effort to persuade the electorate that a vote for the PQ would not necessarily mean a vote for independence. Levesque noted that two referenda had been necessary before Newfoundland entered the confederation. No moves would be made in the direction of independence until the Quebec population had given its full approval through referendum, Levesque insisted.
Support from the trade unions, which had wavered in the period 1971-72, again came to the PQ in 1973. The PQ welcomed labor's support, but was careful not to ally itself with the more militant trade union leaders. The CNTU (Confederation of National Trade Unions) issued a statement that was not absolutely PQ, but was definitely anti-Liberal. The FTQ held in its statements that the Bourassa regime was the most anti-labor government in Quebec history. FTQ leader Louis Laberge called on his members to support candidates sympathetic to the labor movement, adding that most of these could be found in the Parti Québécois. 33

The election returns in the fall of 1973 provided the Liberals with the victory they sought. Liberal leader Robert Bourassa's campaign had been skillful, and in general the province's economy was doing well despite inflation and unemployment. There had been little labor unrest, and government spending had been kept under control in four budgets without increased taxes. 34

As in 1970, the PQ increased its percentage of the popular vote, this time in every riding (election district) except East Montreal. It also showed gains of more than 10 percent in 24 constituencies, received over 40 percent

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33 Ibid., p. 87.
34 Ibid.
of the vote in 26 ridings, 21 of which were in Montreal. The Liberals, however, had a distinct advantage in that in 50 seats there was no contest at all. The Liberals received twice as many votes as their nearest competitors.

The Liberals had built their campaign on Bourassa's personality. The Liberals' slogan "Bourassa construit," "Bourassa builds," implied that Levesque destroys. The Liberals' platform, A New Plan of Action, was a 75-page "review" of Liberal accomplishments and promises to do even more. For example, it promised to create tax exemptions for small and medium-sized business and increase family allowances. In short, the government relied on its record and attacked separatism as a movement that would cause Quebec catastrophic economic and social harm.

The PQ had concentrated its efforts toward diminishing the perceived economic consequences of a separate Quebec, and stressing that cultural sovereignty would be worth the price. The Liberals countered that cultural sovereignty would continue to receive their attention, but it would not come at the heavy costs that would follow a PQ victory.

\[35\text{Ibid., p. 97}\]
During the election, Levesque had warned that a serious situation would exist if the English-speaking minority in Quebec kept a party in power that was not supported by a majority of the French-speaking electorate. This was another reference to his contention that the Anglophone bloc had too much control over Quebec politics. Ironically, the results of the 1973 election showed that, while English-speaking Quebec had overwhelmingly supported the Liberals, the PQ had gained support from the non-French-speaking electorate. The PQ had increased its percentage of the English-speaking vote to six percent, twice that of 1970. This support came primarily from the low-income sections of Montreal, but there was also a small amount of white and blue-collar support outside Montreal. No white collar support came from Montreal itself.

An opinion poll taken after the election showed that the major reason for the Liberal victory was the party's stand with respect to retaining the constitution, as opposed to actual voter satisfaction with the government's performance. While 81 percent of Liberal voters stated that they voted Liberal because of the party's stand on the constitution, only 40 percent held that theirs was a vote of satisfaction with the government.37


37 Saywell, p. 100.
Following the election, Levesque held that the Liberals' scare tactics with respect to separatism had succeeded and that one day Quebeckers would realize their dreams of becoming a separate nation. Levesque continued to mediate in the PQ's internal conflicts between moderates, like Claude Morin, and radicals such as Robert Burns. Some in the PQ, such as Morin, began to sense that a change in the party's rhetoric would be necessary before it could defeat the Liberals, and Morin himself began to speak of "independence in stages" and even of the possibility of a culturally sovereign Quebec within an economically unified Canada. This sounded almost like Bourassa's suggestion on the eve of the election that there should be a culturally secure Quebec linked economically to Canada.

The Liberals ended the year without giving further details concerning their attitudes toward constitutional reform and cultural sovereignty, but it was clear that they would have to take some initiative in these areas if they were to counter the separatist challenge and contain Levesque. The following two years would determine how successful they would be both with respect to cultural sovereignty and their management of the province's economy.
The years 1974 and 1975 proved a time of transition for the Parti Québécois in its attempts to broaden support and analyze past mistakes. Ironically, during this period, it was the Liberal Party that took the initiative in the area of cultural sovereignty. Sensing dissatisfaction within the province because immigrants were being educated in English, the Liberals passed Bill 22, making French the official language of the province, requiring that French be the language of usage in the provincial government, and mandating the use of French in the internal affairs of the business world. 38

The most controversial of the bill's provisions concerned its requirements in education. It mandated that French be the language of instruction in the public schools, and that the teaching of English could neither begin nor cease without the approval of the Ministry of Education. Further, an even more controversial point of the bill required that all children in the province take an examination to demonstrate their skills in English. All children failing to show a knowledge of the English language on this examination were to be placed in French schools. The children of Anglophone parents could continue to attend English-speaking schools and

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be educated in English, immigrant children would have to enter French schools.

The PQ Victory

Feeling secure with the Liberals' earlier victories in 1970 and 1973, Quebec's Liberal Premier, Robert Bourassa, stated in January, 1976, that he did not feel the need to call an election that year. Nonetheless, by the fall of 1976 Bourassa held that he needed a mandate to deal with the federal government on constitutional matters and the challenge from the trade unions.

Although other Liberals stated their confidence in winning any contest in 1976, much had happened in the province to undermine support for the party. Tremendous cost overruns on public projects such as the James Bay hydroelectric installation and the Montreal Olympic Games had put severe strains on the province's budget. In addition, investigations supported suspicions that some Liberal politicians had been guilty of serious maladministration of campaign funds, if not actual criminal misconduct. An indication of public discontent was revealed in a public opinion poll conducted by the Center for Public Opinion Research in the Spring of 1976. It showed that dissatisfaction with the government had increased from 35 percent in

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40 Ibid., p. 19.
41 Saywell, p. 147.

The Liberals' troubles continued to multiply throughout the spring and summer months of 1976. Teacher walkouts continued because of their dissatisfaction with Bill 22. Labor unrest among public sector employees caused work stoppages in the high schools and hydroelectric facilities that enraged the general public.

Quebec's educational establishment remained in disarray, as immigrant children were compelled to take crash courses in French. Families were upset by the government-required testing, and provincial courts were flooded with parental appeals. Some parents openly defied the law, and some school officials admitted thousands of students who had failed the English-language test.

The government announcement that it would gradually extend the use of French to include air-traffic control brought outrage from the English-speaking Pilots and Controllers Association. Only after considerable pressure from English Canada did the Quebec government relent on this plan. The French Canadian reaction to the English triumph in the air traffic control dispute was intense. Two key Quebec ministers, Jean Marchand and Guy St. Pierre, resigned, and

42 Ibid., p. 124.
the French-speaking pilots, controllers, and technicians sought to have the decision not to use French in Quebec's airports reversed by the courts. The Quebec legislature, the National Assembly, showed its support for the French-speaking controllers by passing a resolution giving the controllers $25,000 to help defray the controllers' legal fees.

All the while, the PQ took stock of the situation. Levesque in a press interview said,

The cup is full and any attempt to impose more French will provoke a violent reaction from the English-speaking community ... That is plainly what is involved; English Canada is moving now to a rejection of Quebec's demands. Without openly wishing that Quebec would leave, not going so far as to throw us out the door if we don't decide to go, it is certain that English Canada is no longer in the mood to tolerate either the smallest concession to Quebec or any acceleration of bilingualism.\(^3\)

Moreover, the PQ and other French Canadian observers noted the fact that James Richardson has resigned from the Trudeau Cabinet to protest the possible entrenchment of French language rights in any new constitution, thus adding to French Canadian suspicions that English Canada was not really interested in offering French Canada any protection for its language and culture.

\(^3\) Ibid.
By September, 1976, it was clear that many Liberal party members wanted Bourassa to call an election. First, they wished to dispel the belief that the majority of Quebeckers favored the Parti Québécois. Second, Bourassa himself held that he needed a mandate to challenge Trudeau's move to patriate the constitution. At the same time, Bourassa blasted the PQ's proposals for "sovereignty/association" as being unrealistic, unworkable, extreme and dangerous.

The Liberals made their platform public in a campaign document entitled Program 76. The program outlined Liberal initiatives in the areas of labor law, public finance, federal and provincial powers, the Supreme Court and the judiciary, and budget ceilings and equalization payments. In particular, the platform stressed reform in the right-to-strike law.

Levesque followed an astute strategy of not giving the Liberals more ammunition on the separatism issue. The PQ kept a low profile and did everything to avoid mentioning separatism. Bourassa, however, continued to challenge Levesque to a debate on the economics of separatism and federalism, and Levesque's refusal to debate brought charges of PQ cowardice from the Liberals. Levesque, however, remained unmoved.
The PQ continued to capitalize on the general dissatisfaction with Liberal economic policies. Moreover, it had vastly improved its regional and local organizational structures and was successful in raising $1,200,000 in campaign funds. The PQ made every effort to play down the separatist issue despite Liberal attempts to draw it out during the campaign. Time and again, Levesque urged PQ members to organize, to campaign vigorously, and to eschew the ideological debate. The PQ's strategy was to concentrate on Bourassa's record and to stress that it offered the only viable alternative. Carefully wording its campaign literature, the PQ also emphasized that, if elected, no move toward independence would be made without the approval of the plan through a province-wide referendum.

The Verdict—The Vote of November 15, 1976

When the results were counted, it was clear that the PQ had gained 41.4 percent of the vote, or 71 seats. The Liberals, meanwhile, had dropped from 102 seats in 1973 to 26 in 1976. Even the Union Nationale showed a gain of 11 seats, or 18.2 percent of the vote. The actual breakdown was as follows:
The breadth of the PQ victory was also apparent, with the party registering gains in West Montreal (Anglophone) and Eastern Quebec. The party dominated in urban and semi-urban Quebec, with the exception of some of the non-French ethnic ridings in Montreal. If one considers the vote in terms of language, it is clear that the PQ gained 54 percent of the French Canadian vote, while French Canadians accounted for 26 percent of the Liberal vote. With respect to the geographic distribution of the French-speaking vote, support came from Montreal, with 73 percent, and 50 percent elsewhere in the province.44

Analysis of 1976

While one observer contends that, "Although no one expected that the Liberals would emerge unscathed ... no one anticipated the slaughter of November 15," he is only partially correct. On the one hand, after the election, while most major newspapers such as the New York Times, The London Times and the Washington Post, carried stories dealing with the "surprising" results in Quebec, The Wall Street Journal, on the other hand, reported the results as casually as if Rockefeller had won another gubernatorial race in New York. Perhaps the reason

44 Hudon, p. 23.
45 Saywell, p. 12.
was that the Journal is largely unconcerned with political issues such as the "cultural problem," but, more likely, it was because the paper places heavy emphasis on economic issues. Moreover, the election that brought the PQ to power was a result of the desire for economic change that superseded the fear of the separatist movement. A sluggish economy with high inflation, high unemployment, a record budget deficit, labor unrest, and charges of corruption was an accurate description of Quebec under the Bourassa administration. These were the issues which Levesque stressed and, as in the 1973 election, he attempted to downplay the separatist part of the PQ platform. Bourassa, however, without a strong economic record to show, waged his entire campaign on the anti-separatism issue, a tactic that, in the end, failed.

Furthermore, Levesque also deserves considerable credit for a masterful campaign. He was able to keep distant from the radical movements and thus obtain the support of the middle class. He also stressed the more fundamental issues important to all citizens, such as adequate services and a higher standard of living. What is more, the separatist issue, upon which his party was predicated, was not neglected but certainly de-emphasized,
at least publically. Indeed, he tried at all times to equate Quebec autonomy with economic benefits. Bourassa, on the other hand, having torn the country apart with the language issue, and faced with a miserable economic past, had to propound on the evils of separatism as his sole campaign issue.
CHAPTER V

TRUDEAU AND LEVESQUE: THE CLASH OF IDEAS

To understand the conflict between separatists and federalists, it is necessary to examine the fundamental debate between René Levesque and Pierre Trudeau. This debate, which began in the 1960's, is the backdrop to everything that has occurred in the 1970's and 80's. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to examine the background and respective world-views of both men, to trace their relationship to the present, and to discover how their beliefs may contribute to Quebec's future in Canada.

One observer has accurately capsulized the conflict between Trudeau and Levesque. Desbarats notes that,

Trudeau saw the separatist movement as an expression of the "profound insecurity and ancient fears" of the French Canadian people, and as an anachronistic attempt to "shut the doors and block the frontiers" against the outside world. For Levesque, the movement was exactly the opposite: an escape from the stifling restrictions of Confederation to the freedom and responsibility of adult nationhood.

Both men looked at the history of French Canada since the conquest and saw the same stroy of shame and humiliation, and reached opposite conclusions. Each saw freedom in his own option, and saw the other as a prisoner of Quebec's past.¹

Trudeau's ideas are best expounded in two books, *Approaches to Politics* and *Federalism and the French Canadians*. In *Approaches*, Trudeau's aim is to examine those theories which have been used to justify the uses of power throughout history, and to point out some of the uses and abuses of power by the corrupt regime of Maurice Duplessis in Quebec during the 1930's, 40's and 50's. *Approaches* is a more general work, devoted to Trudeau's feelings concerning the relationship between ruler and ruled. In *Federalism*, however, he takes a closer look at the history of French Canadian development, and examines such things as the nature of constitutional conflict, the history of French-English relations, and the origins of Anglo-Canadian and French-Canadian nationalisms.

Levesque's ideas can be garnered from his major work, *Option Quebec*, and by examining a number of articles he has written concerning French Canadian demands and the platform of the *Parti Québécois*. It should be noted that, whereas Trudeau's writings deal with political philosophy, Levesque's tend to be more polemical and aimed at a specific audience he is attempting to convince regarding the desirability of an independent Quebec.

We shall begin by looking at Trudeau's ideas.
Trudeau and Quebec

An observer of the Canadian scene and recent biographer of Pierre Trudeau has stated: "Whatever expectations others attached to him, Trudeau himself has never made it a secret that it was the Quebec issue that led him to enter politics and eventually become Prime Minister."\(^2\)

Trudeau claims, "Each man has his own reasons, I suppose, as driving forces; but mine were twofold: one was to make sure that Quebec wouldn't leave Canada through separatism, and the other was to make sure that Canada wouldn't shove Quebec out through narrowmindedness."\(^3\)

Any attempt to deal with Trudeau's handling of the Quebec issue must take into account the fact that many of the problems existed long before he became Prime Minister; some of them were beyond his control and a few are a direct result of his own actions. Some observers contend that, in some ways, Trudeau contributed to the spread of separatist sentiment in Quebec. Others, however, hold that he contributed far more to the containment of that sentiment, and that there is reason to believe the situation might have been far worse without the role he played.\(^4\)

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\(^4\)Radjwanski, p. 312.
Brief Biographical Sketch

Pierre Elliot Trudeau was born in Montreal in 1919. After graduation from Brebeuf College in 1940, he studied law at the University of Montreal. While at the university, he opposed the conscription of Canadians for service in Europe during World War II and actively campaigned for Jean Drapeau, the mayor of Montreal and an anti-conscription candidate. Following his graduation from law school in 1943, he worked as a law clerk for a short time. Shortly thereafter, he quit work and embarked on a world tour which lasted several years. During the 1950’s, Trudeau became actively interested in politics and founded a political journal, Cité Libre. He joined the Liberal party in 1965 and was a successful candidate for a seat in the Canadian Parliament in 1966. He became Minister of Justice in 1967 and was elected Prime Minister in 1968.

Federalism and the French Canadians

Trudeau states in his forward to Federalism and the French Canadians that the only common factor to be found in his thinking over the years has been his opposition to accepted opinion. Like many progressive Canadians of his
day, Trudeau observed the stifling influence of the Duplessis regime on Quebec's society: its opposition to modernization; its corruption; its lack of progressive ideas. "I fought this regime until its downfall in 1960," Trudeau remarks.

Trudeau argues that, while he desired change during the Duplessis days, he was also a fierce supporter of provincial autonomy. With the coming of the "Quiet Revolution" and the Lesage administration, however, the forces of change and modernization carried the notion of provincial autonomy to the extreme. The province's politics lacked a balance between provincial autonomy for Quebec, on the one hand, and the possibility of excessive federal dominance, on the other.

Moreover, while the Quebec modernization drive produced a greater sophistication, a higher level of education, and a more urban outlook among Quebequois, the forces of Quebec nationalism, instead of lessening, turned from being inward-looking and defensive to being aggressive, demanding, and, in some cases, separatist.

5Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians, p. xix.
This modernized nationalism produced a greater sense of grievance toward English Canada. It found its greatest appeal among the province's youth and the labor movement. Trudeau claims that his decision to enter politics in 1965 came in response to his desire to counter this extreme form of nationalism.

Trudeau inveighs against the notion of nationalism primarily because he feels it is a threat to democracy. His stance is grounded in the belief that "a truly democratic government cannot be 'nationalist' because it must pursue the good of all its citizens, without prejudice to ethnic origin." Moreover, Trudeau maintains, the history of nationalist movements has brought about the worst possible situations for people caught up by their spurious logic. The greatest tragedy of nationalism, he claims, is that much suffering and death have taken place to defend an absurd concept. "That is why the principle of nationalism has brought to the world two centuries of war, and not one single final solution," Trudeau argues.

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6 Ibid., p. 156.
7 Ibid., p. 158.
As for the separatists who espouse the doctrine of sovereignty, Trudeau holds that "those who proclaim it for the nation of French Canada are not only reactionary, they are preposterous." He holds that the French Canadians could not constitute a perfect society any more than "the five million Sikhs of Punjab."\(^8\)

Trudeau also holds that separatists err in their assumption that independence and progress are essentially the same. Unlike many nationalistic thinkers of the developing world, Trudeau rejects the notion that "good government is no substitute for self-governmment."\(^9\) He adds that such emphasis on sovereignty above all else gives indication of the separatists' "muddled thinking" because self-government does not mean national self-determination or "showing off one's linguistic brilliance."\(^10\) He attacks nationalists such as Marcel Chaput, who draw on the experiences of Asian and African states to claim independence. The fact that a state has within its boundaries people who speak more than one language or have more than one religion, Trudeau argues, does not necessitate a separate state for each one of these groups. India, Trudeau notes, is a sovereign republic in which four languages are recognized along with eight principal religions, several

\(^8\) Ibid., p. 170.
\(^9\) Ibid., p. 151.
\(^10\) Ibid., p. 152.
of which are implacably opposed to each other. Other states, such as Sri Lanka (Ceylon), Malaya and Burma, also have wide divergences in ethnic and religious character. If all of these states incorporate so many different languages, attitudes, religions, and ways of life, why cannot the Canadian federation embrace two cultures and two languages, Trudeau asks?

The history of progress and civilization, Trudeau claims, is the chronicle of subordination of tribal "nationalism" to wider interests. The nation is not a biological reality, that is, a community that springs from the very nature of man, and history has shown that man has done very well without it. What is more, he remarks, "the tiny portion of history marked by the emergence of nation states is also the period of the most degrading collective hatred the world has ever seen."¹¹ Like the protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, Trudeau argues that nationalism often gives rise to power-seeking megalomaniacs, like Napoleon. "Napoleon," Niebuhr claimed, "could bathe Europe in blood for the sake of gratifying his overweening lust for power, as long as he could pose as the tool of French patriotism and as

¹¹Ibid., p. 157.
the instrument of revolutionary fervor."

**Federalism and the Constitutional Question**

Trudeau is both sympathetic and highly critical of the way in which Quebec has managed its own affairs over the years. On the one hand, he acknowledges that Quebeckers have suffered under an intense prejudice from Anglo-Canadians. "From the moment of delivery of the Royal Proclamation of 1763," he claims, "the intention was obvious: the French Canadian was to be completely assimilated." Because the British would not allow themselves to occupy an inferior position, "they invented all kinds of strategems by which democracy was made to mean government by the minority." 

The fact that Quebec remained a solid bastion of French culture and language gave rise to an aggressive Anglo-Canadian nationalism that, in turn, resulted "inevitably" in a more intense French Canadian nationalism. Quebeckers were thus faced with two choices, according to Trudeau: 1) they could respond with a rival version of the French Canadian nation; 2) they could scrap the idea of a nation state and move toward making Canada a multi-national state. The first choice, he notes, was, and still is, that of the separatists or advocates of independence.

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14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., p. 164.
English intransigence aside, Trudeau is quick to point out that French Canadians themselves did a number of things to exacerbate an already miserable situation. For one thing, he takes a critical view of the place democracy has had in Quebec's past. French Canadians, he holds, never really believed in democracy for themselves "and English Canadians have not really wanted it for others." Before 1763, Trudeau notes, French Canadians were under the authoritarian rule of the French monarchy, the Church and the seigneurial system. British rule, according to Trudeau, brought to French Canada the first principles of self-government. He cites the observation of Lord Dorchester to the Colonial Office in 1788 that three quarters of the French Canadians were actually opposed to any form of self-rule. Thus, when the Constitutional Act of 1791 brought in some measure of representative government, "Canadiennes were neither psychologically nor politically prepared for it." Moreover, once Quebec had actually joined the Confederation in 1867, its government made no attempt to make the best of the situation by modernizing the province, Trudeau says. It did nothing to use manpower and investment advantageously and was "downright regressive in the measures it took." The basic characteristic of Quebec's economy

16 Ibid., p. 103.
17 Ibid., p. 104.
18 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
for more than a century was the absence of a coherent policy on both public and private investment. He then compares the policies of the English-speaking provinces favorably with those of Quebec in terms of their emphasis on directing corporations, nationalization, education, health insurance, and all public projects to the benefit of all those in the province.

Quebec's major fault, therefore, lay in the failure of its government to assume the role that modern governments have taken in assuring an activist direction and regulation of economic forces. In the name of French linguistic and religious values, and believing in a non-interventionist role for the provincial government, Quebec severely hampered its ability to compete with those provinces which had modernized. Hence, Quebec remained in the backwaters largely due to its own decisions—or at least the decisions of certain groups within the province, namely the bourgeoisie and the clergy.

To be sure, English Canadians had contributed to the skepticism with which French Canadians viewed their democratic institutions. Trudeau cites the facts that: 1) although French Canadians comprised 94 percent of
the population of Quebec, they comprised only 60 percent of the representatives of the provincial assembly; 2) French Canadians were in a minority in both the elective and non-elective bodies—the Legislature and Executive Council. Moreover, some British administrators, such as Governor Craig, "did much to quash what might have been a nascent belief in democracy." 19

The French Canadians were left with two possible choices for the democratic institutions at their command: 1) to obstruct and sabotage the federal parliament, similar to the Irish strategy at Westminster or 2) the outward acceptance of the parliamentary game but without any inward allegiance to its principles. The French Canadians opted for the latter, Trudeau says, "because the rebellions of the 1830's and 1840's showed that sabotage led to suppression." 20

The result of all this was that French Canadians spurned all ideologies except nationalism and supported those which stood for ethnic rights. Because they felt unable to share equally with Anglo-Canadians the rights and privileges of Canadian citizenship, they "resolved to pursue only the French Canadian weal, and to safeguard the latter, they cheated against the former." 21

19 Ibid., p. 105
20 Ibid., p. 106.
21 Ibid., p. 107.
The Realities of Separatism

With the forgoing arguments as background, Trudeau turns his attention in Federalism and the French Canadians to the realities of Quebec's economic and political situation in North America and the possibilities for achieving independence. First, he notes, the economy of Quebec is closely linked to that of Canada, and both are dominated by the United States. Each of these areas tends to benefit from the free-flowing movement of capital, employment, and technology. Second, French is the mother tongue of five or six million people, while English is spoken by one hundred and eighty-two million. Hence, Quebec is one of the few territories in the entire Western hemisphere in which French-speaking people are grouped in sufficient numbers to be a political society.

However, the realities of the North American economy and the linguistic dimensions of Quebec society are such that "no amount of exhortation—even incorporated into a constitutional document—can change." What is always ignored among separatists, Trudeau states, is the fact that all classes benefit from the free movement of goods and knowledge, capital and technology, while all classes suffer a lower standard of living if the state takes

\[22\text{Ibid.}, p. 9.\]
steps—in the name of linguistic and cultural autonomy—to interdict the flow between provinces and states not of the same language. For Trudeau, the consequences of a separate state of Quebec would bear most heavily on the working classes. It is they, he says, "in the end always have to pay; it is they who would suffer most from a lowering of the standard of living, who would be hardest hit by a period of political and social stagnation, and who would be the first to suffer from unemployment and destitution." 23

The flow of technology and the creation of research facilities is of primary importance in the economic development of a nation, Trudeau says. He cites the observations of French economist Louis Armand, who noted that the possession of raw materials, capital, and labor are not enough to allow a nation to advance in the modern world. What is important is "the number and quality of research workers ceaselessly contributing to the progress of science and technology. What their researchers need is equipment that costs billions of dollars, and quickly becomes obsolete." 24 To have these items, Armand says, "it is not enough to be wealthy: you must be colossally rich." Armand concludes that "needs destroy the ideas of nations, impose a sharing of manpower, markets and capital. There are no longer any solution on a national scale." 25

23 Ibid., p. 15.  
25 Ibid.
Trudeau feels that Armand's warning should be heeded. Laws and constitutions that bring about a situation that is not favorable to the entry of capital and technology result in a "country ... hopelessly outclassed economically ... its industries soon outdated and inefficient." He urges that nations must be willing to sacrifice some of their national sovereignty or be willing to pay the price in economic and social backwardness. Those who argue that such openness to foreign capital results in economic dependence, sometimes described as "colonization" or "colonialism," have missed the point entirely, Trudeau claims. "The answer," he says, "is to use foreign capital within the framework of rational economic development; to create indigenous capital and direct it toward key sectors of the future: computers, services and industry in the age of nuclear energy." Hence, Trudeau maintains, the separatists' approach to economic independence is so much wasted effort; it is a solution "whereby more energy is consumed in combating disagreeable but irrevocable realities than in contributing some satisfactory compromise."  

Federalism and Constitutional Change

In answer to those who claim that constitutional guarantees are the solution to Quebec's problems, Trudeau holds

27 Ibid., pp. 11-12.
28 Ibid.
that it is an illusion to think that language and culture can be safeguarded merely by changing the wording of a document. Trudeau addresses French Canada's two major demands for constitutional change: 1) the demand for an "entrenched" Bill of Rights that would enumerate and make unassailable French Canadians' rights with respect to language and culture, and would prevent discrimination against French Canadians in employment; 2) the demand for a "special status" for Quebec within the framework of the Canadian federation.

Trudeau, however, has always opposed a special constitutional status for Quebec, arguing that it would be utterly impossible to implement. How, for example, could a constitution be created that would give Quebec greater powers than other provinces without simultaneously reducing Quebec's power in Ottawa? How could Quebec be made the national state of French Canadians with really special powers without abandoning at the same time demands for the parity of French and English in Ottawa and throughout the rest of the country? Moreover, he says, a culture "makes progress through the exchange of ideas and through challenge." and special status is "an option that in the long run ... can only tend to weaken values protected ... against competition." 29

29 Ibid., p. 33.
 Reasons for Quebec to Opt for Federalism

Trudeau holds that Quebec's most viable option is to remain within the current federal structure, though with some changes. The federal system now in place offers more in the way of concrete, practical solutions to Quebec's needs, he believes, than any sweeping changes proposed by the separatists. Formal proposals could be made to incorporate a "Bill of Rights" into the constitution, to change the organic law relating to the central government to give it a more authentically federal character, and to enact provisions for greater decentralization. Trudeau argues that "natural forces are presently favoring provincial autonomy," and that if those who ask for constitutional change would wait a bit longer the provinces then will have established more autonomous administrations that will be difficult to dislodge, "and Quebec will have found several allies in its struggle for an improved federal system."

While the Canadian constitution created a country where French Canadians could compete on an equal basis with English Canadians, Trudeau notes that "unfortunately ... the rules of the constitutional game were not always upheld." This meant that French Canadians' educational

30 Ibid., pp. 44-45.
31 Ibid., p. 45.
32 Ibid., p. 47.
and political rights were ignored throughout the country, and thus they came to believe that they were secure in those rights only in Quebec. What will be required, he states, is a transformation of these "rules of the game."
The constitution must be worded so that any French-speaking community, anywhere in Canada, can fully enjoy its linguistic rights. Specifically, this would mean that, in education for example, French-speaking people must have identical rights concerning taxes, subsidies, and legislation on education. Moreover, absolute equality for the two languages would be required at the federal level, and "official status" would be given to the two languages in any province where French-speakers constitute 15 percent of the population or more.

Trudeau notes that while written constitutional guarantees would be of great help in solving the current impasse, "an immense transformation of attitudes" will be necessary on the part of both French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians:

If this is achieved sterile chauvinism will disappear from our Canadian way of life and other useful reforms will follow suit without much difficulty. If, on the other hand, this essential is not achieved, there is really no point in carrying the discussion any further, for this will mean that Canada will continue to be swept periodically by the storms of ethnic dispute, and will gradually become a spiritually sterile land, from which both peace and greatness have been banished. 34

33 Ibid., pp. 50-51.
34 Ibid., p. 52.
John Saywell has written of the man behind the current Quebec independence movement:

The catalyst in the movement for independence was René Levesque. Without him it is unlikely that the election victory of November 15 would have happened—certainly not as early as 1976. Not only did Levesque ensure high visibility and credibility to the movement for independence, but he also earned, in Quebec and across Canada, a reputation as a sound and progressive politician. In less than ten years he had built a party that could appeal as a real, indeed the only, alternative to the Liberal government of Robert Bourassa. It was a remarkable accomplishment. 35

Levesque's career, even before his entry into politics, was every bit as varied and cosmopolitan as that of Pierre Trudeau. In fact, were one to make characterizations, one could say that Trudeau's exposure to politics and world affairs came as a result of a bohemian wanderlust coupled with the fact that he was rich enough to fulfill his dreams. Levesque, on the other hand, worked his way around the world and showed more drive and purpose in reaching his goals than Trudeau, who is where he is today largely by chance.

Like Trudeau, Levesque was a product of the professional

class. His father, Dominique Levesque, was an attorney in the town of New Carlisle on the Gaspé peninsula in Quebec. Rene himself was born on August 22, 1922, in the village of Paspebiac, not far from New Carlisle.

Levesque attended the local, secular elementary school, where he recalls that the teacher spoke better English than French, because it was a bilingual school. At age eleven, he entered a Jesuit seminary school, where, he remembers, he became more conscious of problems other than his own: politics, nationhood, language and French Canadian rights, for example. He notes that Quebec during the 1930's was a province under the control of business monopolies, such as the one which controlled hydro-electric power. Many, including the Jesuits, called for government-sponsored economic reforms, to "put an end to economic dictatorship" and ensure a more equitable distribution of wealth. 37

Levesque remembers that during his high school years, a group of young political activists formed Action libérale nationale, or National Liberal Action Party, which espoused social and economic liberation for French Canadians and which, as Provencher notes, was at that time "the only real provincial party." Other groups, such as

38 Ibid., p. 21.
Jeune Canada, L'Association Catholique de la Jeunesse Canadienne (Catholic Association of Canadian Youth), and Jeunes Patriotes (Young Patriots) demanded roles of greater importance for Quebeçois in the province's industries, decried the domination of foreign capital and rejected confederation. One youthful organizer, Rudolphe Dube, published Leur inquietude under the pen name of François Hertel. Hertel argued that independence for Quebec was inevitable:

Why is Quebec always crawling on all fours? Because of Ottawa. In my opinion, as long as the federal system keeps Quebec under Ottawa's wing, we will never accomplish anything. Whichever political party saves us will have to present as the first and most important part of its program withdrawal from Confederation. 39

Interestingly, in 1960, when the Liberal Party program was being re-examined, Levesque would recall the platform of the Action liberale nationale.

Between 1933 and 1937, while Levesque attended Laval secondary school, he continued to hone his writing talents, publishing short stories in the student newspaper. In 1937, he became an announcer and news editor at the local radio station in New Carlisle, a position that was to influence

39 Ibid., p. 22.
greatly his later career. Following his father's death the same year, however, his mother moved the family to Montreal.

In 1938, Levesque enrolled at Gernier College, another Jesuit-run institution. His journalistic interests continued there, as he became a regular contributor to the school newspaper, often writing on economics and international affairs. His pattern of political success in later life may have been foreshadowed by an article called *L'esprit sportif dans la vie* (The Sporting Spirit in Life) in which he wrote, "If you have higher goals than your own personal success, do not forget that you are a French Canadian, that your young people have been mired in lassitude for generations and that if the masses do not act this nation—your nation—is lost. Every descendant of the 60,000 defeated in 1760 must stand up and be counted."  

Following his high school baccalaureat in 1940, Levesque worked part-time in broadcasting at a radio station in Quebec City while pursuing studies in law at Laval University. It was at Laval that Levesque ran afoul of the school's strict disciplinary code. He

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was expelled for smoking and forced to stay out of class until he apologized. He did not apologize and did not return to class. He told his mother, after the rector appealed to her to persuade him to return, "I'm not interested in passing those exams, because I'll never practice law. All I want to do in life is write, nothing else."

By 1943, he turned to professional reporting. In December, he enlisted with the Office of War Information (OWI) in Montreal to cover the war in Europe. His bilingual abilities assured his position, and he was sent to London to cover the last two years of the war. His work brought him recognition from both European and North American broadcasters, and upon his return from Europe in 1946 Levesque was offered a position on the staff of the Canadian Broadcasting Company's International Service. In 1951, he returned to war reporting, this time as a correspondent with the Canadian brigade attached to the United Nations Combat forces in Korea.

Levesque's return to peacetime broadcasting gave him the opportunity for numerous assignments and interviews. He covered the coronation of Queen Elizabeth and was granted the first interview allowed a western journalist.

41 Ibid., pp. 42-43.
with Nikita Khrushchev after his rise to power.

In the mid-1950's, Levesque resigned his position with the CBC to become a freelance journalist. He was quickly offered the opportunity to produce and host a weekly news and information program, Point de Mire, which drew praise from both journalists and the general public for its high standards and accuracy.

Before the late 1950's, Levesque had shown little interest in anything other than journalism. This changed when he became involved in a labor dispute between the producers and management of the CBC. In 1959, the producers appealed directly to the federal government to intervene to break the stalemate between the two parties. Prime Minister Dieffenbaker and Labor Minister Michael Starr refused, an action Levesque later said persuaded him to enter politics.

Levesque accounts for his decision to enter politics in four ways: first, he had developed a taste for politics during the producer-strike; second, he felt the need to bring about the defeat of the Union Nationale; third, he approved of the Liberal program; and fourth, he was influenced by the strong sense of justice exhibited by
the Quebec Liberal leader, Georges-Emile Lapalme, along with Lapalme's fervent opposition to the Duplessis regime. What made the Liberal platform of 1960 so appealing, Levesque said, was its emphasis on educational and civil service reform, economic planning, the creation of a ministry of natural resources, the establishment of hospital insurance, and the creation of a labor code and workmen's compensation boards.

Levesque was approached by Jean Lesage, then Quebec's Premier and leader of the Liberal party, to run in the next provincial election in 1962. He was successful in his bid for the riding, despite the fact that the Union Nationale had placed another candidate named "Rene Levesque" on the ballot. Under the Liberal administration, Levesque was named Minister of Public Works.

Levesque began with a sweeping reorganization of the Ministry of Public Works. He spoke often on public policy issues pertaining to resource development, education, and culture. His public statements began to arouse discussion among both English and French Canadians, especially when he said that Quebecois were living under the "yoke of colonialism." He called for Quebecois to

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42 Ibid., p. 129.
43 Ibid., p. 131.
"realize... destiny through the exercise of intelligence and expertise and not through 'revenge of the cradle,'" He announced his intention during the next session of the government to introduce a bill proposing the creation of a general investment corporation: and stated his desire that the province’s hydro-electric industry be placed in the public sector. At an international conference on resources, he told his audience that Quebec intended to assert itself in the field of natural resources.

We in Quebec feel it is essential that the responsibility for these foundations—in this field as well as in many others—must rest with us at the provincial level. The constitution has delegated these responsibilities to us, and, in terms of our national interest, it is of vital importance to French Canadians that the day-to-day handling of economic affairs such as planning and policy-making, no matter what their nature, be left to us.45

Levesque further questioned the means and purposes of confederation. It was, he told a Montreal audience, "an experiment compromised by a cumulative series of errors repeated unthinkingly for decades. If the necessary adjustments are not made, the experiment will simply fail." Levesque’s statements had a disquieting effect on the English-speaking community. He once told a

44 Ibid.
46 Ibid., p. 172.
group of English-speaking listeners, "We French Canadians have no real need of you. The great threat to confederation lies in the fact that we are... only interested in it out of a sense of obligation rather than real concern." 47

If Levesque's statements caused concern among English-speakers, his later actions would prove even more alarming to many. For example, in 1961, Levesque announced his intention to restructure completely Quebec's hydro-electric industry. His decision stemmed, he said, from the fact that, under the Union Nationale, Hydro-Quebec had been forced to make large capital investments to produce electricity that was sold to private companies, many of which were controlled from outside the province. Quebec's consumers, he argued, were being forced to foot the bill to enrich outsiders. "Amalgamation will put to an end," he said, "to the massive subsidies being paid out to non-residents of the province." He meant, in other words, to nationalize Hydro-Quebec.

The storm of protest over Levesque's decision gave ample opportunity for public discussion of the proposal. Although his reports were filled with statistics about the use of power, he made the reasons for the decision clear in an address to the Canadian Club.

47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
Our province must grow and it must do so in a way that benefits the majority of the population. This means that—and let us be very clear and frank about this—in a way that continually benefits the French Canadian nation, which has and will only have one physical base to call its own: the Province of Quebec.

While many in the provincial cabinet disagreed vehemently with Levesque's decision to nationalize Hydro-Quebec, Premier Jean Lesage, one of the most outspoken opponents of the move at first, later backed him. The Liberals 1962 campaign slogan, "Maitres chez nous," fitted well with Levesque's action. The Liberals asked the people of Quebec to support the nationalization of electricity, principally because it would mean "the end of our colonial status and the real beginning of economic independence." The English-speaking community, however, was less enthusiastic. Mr. McDiarmid, President of Lincoln National Life, said that Levesque was a "'Robbespierre' who acted as if all aristocrats should be guillotined." Another English businessman compared Levesque to Castro. Despite these attacks, the Quebec electorate voted a resounding "yes" to the question of nationalization in a provincial referendum.

49 Ibid., p. 176.
50 "masters in our own house"
51 Saywell, p. 186.
52 Provencher, p. 177.
53 Ibid.
During the mid-1960's, Levesque continued to question the value of Canadian federalism. He told a Toronto audience that "to be honestly Canadian, I shouldn't have to feel like a native leaving his reservation every time I leave Quebec. I don't find two great cultures. I feel like a foreigner." In an interview with the Toronto Star, he said. "Confederation isn't sacred, you know. It is just a bargain made 100 years ago. It has become a bad bargain. Sometimes the only thing you can do with a bad bargain is to get out of it, and that can be done democratically."  

When questioned about what changes he would make in the 1867 BNA Act, however, Levesque was less explicit. As one observer notes, "Levesque replied that he did not know for sure and expressed the fear that discussions might be reduced to a question of semantics ... Levesque believed in the virtues of planning as a means of realizing Quebec's 'social contract,' but since that had yet to be defined, Quebec was unable to describe its basic principles to English Canadians."  

Some hint as to what adjustments Levesque had in mind came in a 1964 meeting of the Young Liberal Association. At the meeting, Levesque maintained that, "Quebec is  

\[54\text{Ibid.}\]
\[55\text{Ibid.}, \text{ p. 199.}\]
\[56\text{Ibid.}, \text{ p. 200.}\]
suffering within the confines of an outmoded, obsolete con-
federation, and the status quo is untenable. . . Either
Quebec will become an associate state within Canada, with
a status guaranteeing it the economic, political and cul-
tural powers necessary for its growth as a nation, or else
Quebec will become independent." 57

While the debate concerning confederation continued,
the radical FLQ emerged with its answers: bombings and in-
timidation. Levesque at once declared the violence an
unacceptable tool to achieve independence. His view was
that "any person or group can advocate political or social
changes, however, radical they may appear to be to certain
people, and can use legitimate channels to gather support.
In this context, physical violence and terrorist tactics
are criminal and stupid." 58

Levesque's reaffirmation of Quebec's uniqueness and
his denunciation of the terrorists struck a responsive
chord with many Quebeçois. Writer and filmmaker, Jacques
Godbout, wrote of him:

Although he thought of himself as a pop-
ularizing journalist, he had become the
first citizen to communicate intelligent-
ly with his fellow citizens. René Levesque
was a myth long before he realized it.
René Levesque, our latest and most modern
myth, came from a long line of heroes:
After all, we've made Papineau a household
word. What will happen to Levesque? A mag-
nificent burial or revolution? 59

57 Ibid., p. 205.
58 Ibid., p. 207.
59 Ibid., p. 208.
Levesque appealed especially to members of the trade union movement, whom he supported in various strike actions against such firms as the Noranda Mining Company. Although some feared that Levesque's siding with the trade unionists against Noranda foreshadowed a proposal to nationalize the mining industry, Levesque said he intended no such thing. Instead, he concentrated on his earlier questioning of the structure of federalism and constitutional reform. In an interview with the Montreal newspaper, Le Devoir, Levesque said, "Today's conflict is no longer the traditional conflict between majority and minority. It is a conflict between two majorities: the English-speaking majority in Canada and the French-speaking majority in Quebec. We've taken a long time to get started but we're on our way, and Quebec's evolution can't be stopped now."  

Levesque again threw himself into the fray with statements about the treatment of French Canadians. He said that many businesses were "arrogant and ignorant" of the fact that 80 percent of Quebec's population is French, and he warned them to be "civilized" and respect the French position while there is still time. He followed this with a statement that "the awakened French Canada is not against any group or its rights, only against the entrenched privileges of a dominant minority."  

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60 Ibid., p. 213.
61 Ibid., p. 221.
62 Ibid.
By 1966, the Liberal party's promises, though thoroughly debated, had not been implemented. Reform was slow in coming, with little evidence that the Liberals had done much to effect basic change. Lesage rearranged his cabinet, putting Levesque in charge of the Ministry of Family and Social Welfare, where Levesque announced his intention to introduce a program of medicare for the poor, a universal health insurance plan, and a comprehensive social welfare policy.

While the Liberals knew that they had not satisfied everyone with respect to their proposed reforms, the election of 1966 proved to be a tremendous upset. The Liberals gained only 50 delegates while the Union Nationale under Daniel Johnson elected 56. Some attributed the Liberal defeat to the Union Nationale's fresh approach and aggressive election strategy; others held that the newly-formed RIN (Rassemblement pour l'indépendence nationale), by being on the ballot in 13 ridings, had made the difference between Liberals and the UN. The Montreal newspaper, Le Devoir took a harsher line toward the Liberals and editorialized that,

The Liberals were the architects of their own defeat; they were too sure of themselves and at the same time incapable of masking
or repairing the numerous flaws that had appeared here and there in their machine before it was too late. They succumbed once again to their usual weakness—complacency.63

Whatever else might be said, it is certain that the defeat did lead to some soul-searching by the Liberals to discover what had actually gone wrong.

The Liberal defeat did nothing to make Levesque tone down his anti-colonial rhetoric. Provencher remarks that Levesque became more convinced that Quebec was a colony, "an underdeveloped society ... lacking in character and pride, though paradoxically well fed and comfortable, lulled by the elite and its puppet kings into the kind of utter mediocrity that would be fatal to it ....64

In 1967, Levesque escalated his campaign against Quebec's colonial status on a speaking tour of the western provinces, in which he said, "Quebec is the same as Rhodesia—a privileged minority governs a deprived majority."65 At the same time, he warned English Canada, "Either Quebec gets a new deal or eventually it will get out."66

Although still a deputy and member of the Liberal party, Levesque found himself increasingly at odds with the Liberal leadership over the constitutional question. At the Party's executive committee meeting in the fall of 1967, the agenda

63 Ibid., p. 224.
64 Ibid., p. 227.
65 Ibid., p. 231.
66 Ibid.
was set for six subjects to be given priority in the forthcoming party convention, an agenda that did not include the constitutional question. While the party executive later changed its position to allow discussion of the constitution, they charged the party's Political Commission on Constitutional Affairs with the task of preparing the report to be submitted to the delegates, leaving Levesque out of the discussion entirely.

Levesque decided that the time had come for a direct confrontation with the party's leadership. One of his supporters, from the Laurier riding, placed the question of sovereignty before the delegates in no uncertain terms in a document entitled, "What Does Quebec Want?" which declared,

> For our own good, we must dare to seize for ourselves complete liberty in Quebec, the right to all the essential components of independence, i.e. the complete mastery of every last area of basic collective decision-making. ... This means that Quebec must become sovereign as soon as possible. . . .

There is no reason why we, as future neighbors, should not voluntarily remain associates and partners in a common enterprise, which would conform to the second great trend of our times: the new economic groups, customs unions, common markets, etc. . . .
Nothing says we must throw these things away; on the contrary, there is every reason to maintain the framework.

We propose a system that would allow our two majorities to extricate themselves from an archaic federal framework in which our two very distinct "personalities" paralyze each other by dint of pretending to have a third personality common to both. 67

The Liberal leadership made it clear that they had no intention of adopting Levesque's call for an independent Quebec. Eric Kierans, a member of the party executive, stated that separation of Quebec from the rest of Canada would "hurl the people of Quebec into misery, poverty, and unemployment." The Liberal party's 1966 convention was marked by strife and disunity between members who supported Jean Lesage and those who favored Levesque. Kierans stated that it was time to "sweep separatism out of the Liberal party and Quebec once and for all." He further suggested, in his opening address, that, now that his proposal had been rejected, Levesque and his supporters should leave the party. Levesque submitted his resignation and made official his break with the Liberals.

Although Levesque had been ousted de facto from the Liberal ranks, he had the nucleus of a new political

67 Ibid., p. 240.
68 Ibid., p. 242.
69 Ibid.
organization with the other disenchanted Liberals who resigned with him. A group of Liberals and ex-Liberals gathered in Montreal on November 18, 1967, "to shape and organize the sovereignty-association thesis which has arisen in every part of Quebec."\(^{70}\) While some wanted to name the organization after Levesque himself, e.g. Mouvement Levesque, Option Levesque or Thèses Levesque, he was strongly opposed to the suggestion. "I am only an instrument of the movement and that is all I want to be," he declared. Not wishing to form a new political party, at least for the moment, the group's ad hoc steering committee decided to keep the format of a political organization, giving it the name Mouvement-Sovereignty Association (MSA).

There was still a great deal of vagueness concerning what the MSA's program would be like. Levesque held that the movement would have "no dogmas," would be "a popular movement organized by and for all the people," and would use the state as the "driving force" for political change since, the party's leaders claimed, "the majority of those measures which have done the most to shape Quebec's evolution since 1960 were taken by the government."\(^{73}\)

In order to give wider dissemination to his views on

\(^{70}\) Ibid., p. 245.
\(^{71}\) Ibid., p. 247.
\(^{72}\) Ibid., p. 249.
\(^{73}\) Ibid., p. 255.
the independence question, Levesque released his book *Option Quebec* in January, 1968. It was a book that he described as a "little sovereignty/association dictionary." The book's release did, in fact, do much to give Levesque the attention he sought, for crowds of ordinary people and journalists flocked to autographing sessions. More important, however, was that in 1968, Levesque broke away from the Liberal party and formed the *Parti Québécois*. Up to that time, the separatist movement had lacked a single, central leader. By 1968, Levesque had become a very popular figure, as he had led the opposition against Duplessis and had pushed for the nationalization of Hydro-Quebec. Moreover, he had a ready-made base of support when he left the Liberal party. During the 1960's the Liberal party was the only quasi-leftist party with any substance in Quebec politics, and it was René Levesque who provided the leftist tendencies. When Levesque left the Liberals, the party moved more to the center, leaving a vacuum which the PQ filled.

With his views on the subject of independence clear after the publication of *Option Quebec*, he now had the second necessary component of a real political force, a political party—the PQ—which he would use to implement his ideas of sovereignty/association in the 1970's and beyond.

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74 Ibid., p. 260.
Levesque's first order of business was to assure the place of the French language in Quebec society. Despite strong hostility from the English-speaking minority in Quebec, the PQ government introduced the controversial Bill 101 in the Quebec Assembly. By a 74-21 vote, the Assembly passed the measure that would make French the sole official language in the province, and it proclaimed the right of the French-speaking majority to use its language everywhere in the province: in business, in industry, and in government. It retained the controversial requirement that all persons coming to live in Quebec must send their children to French-speaking schools. The Bill also required that companies operating in Quebec be able to communicate with their employees and the public in French, or be fined. The only concession that it made to companies was to allow them to conduct court proceedings:


in English, but only if all parties to the litigation agreed. Private companies were given until 1983 to meet the requirements: 1) that executives and personnel have a satisfactory knowledge of French; 2) that the number of French-speaking personnel at all levels be increased; and 3) that French be used in all documents and internal communication. It authorized the establishment of a French language office to see that these regulations were carried out and enforced. 3

English Canadians reacted sharply to the measure. 4 Prime Minister Trudeau termed the legislation "unacceptable" and a violation of the "human rights" of English-speaking Canadians. 5 Levesque countered that, "the evolution of Quebec is that the majority is going to act like a majority, and some people can't take that ... It's too bad, but that's the way it is." 6 Trudeau further charged that the PQ was encouraging separatist sentiment and influencing public opinion by attempting to pass off its own propaganda efforts as unbiased "news." He claimed that the French section of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation was espousing separatism through biased news reports, and decried that the PQ had infiltrated television and radio news and was "destroying the country." "Almost everyone," Trudeau told the Canadian

6 Ibid.
Parliament, "including high officials of the CBC, would be prepared to concede that the overwhelming majority of CBC employees are of separatist leanings." He congratulated Andre Ouellet, Minister of Urban Affairs, for drawing up a list of those employees "out to destroy the country" and promised that they would be removed. Many, however, felt that Trudeau was not countering the separatist challenge on concrete issues, but merely engaging in a witch-hunt.

A practical politician, however, Trudeau realized that he would have to negotiate and compromise with the separatists if he wanted to keep the confederation intact. Declaring in an address before Parliament that his government was willing to consider constitutional changes to advance the cultural aspirations of the disaffected French-speaking minorities, he announced the formation of a new governmental group to be called the Task Force on Canadian unity, and maintained that to save Quebec and halt the developing rift between the two language groups, English-speakers must become reconciled to more French in their lives. What is more, for the first time, Trudeau acknowledged a willingness to face the constitutional issue. I cannot emphasize strongly enough that the question of unity is not

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8 Ibid.
confined to the issue of language nor confined geographically
to the province of Quebec." He listed numerous dissatisfac­tions in other provinces, such as the feeling of westerners that their interests were under-represented in a central government dominated by more populous Ontario and Quebec and the unhappiness of the once-prosperous eastern provinces over their economic imbalance with the more affluent central and western areas.

The Ottawa government announced that it would be willing to allow the Parti Québécois to go ahead with its proposed provincial language legislation because of what Secretary of State Roberts called the "insecurity of French Canada about the future of its language in an overwhelmingly English-speaking country." The Anglophone community was not receptive to the Liberal government's overtures to the French Canadian community concerning minority and language rights. The major English language school board in Quebec, for example, stated that it would accept pupils whether or not they qualified under Quebec's new language law. Because the defiant schools faced a cut-off of funds from the Quebec provincial government, English-speaking parents launched a drive to set up private schools to avoid having to

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12 Ibid.
send their children to French ones.

Meanwhile, the Anglophone business community in Quebec began to react to the new laws. Despite Levesque's assertions that business need not fear the PQ government, a report released in the spring of 1977 showed that 91 companies had moved their corporate headquarters out of the province between the time of the November 1976 election and February 1977. Trudeau, to whom the PQ was anathema, was nevertheless a French Canadian deeply concerned about the well-being of his home province. He "implored" and "beseeched" companies in Quebec not to play into separatist hands by stampeding to English-speaking Canada. "The best way to insure a separatist victory is not to stay and fight but to run away," he said in a Montreal press conference. Nevertheless, in a move to shore up the province's sagging economy, the Quebec government threatened to take over the Asbestos Corporation, a subsidiary of the U.S.-controlled General Dynamics Corporation, if it refused to sell its facilities to French Canadian interests. One year later, the huge Anglo-controlled Sun Life Assurance Company, Ltd. moved its headquarters from Montreal to Toronto.

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As if Trudeau's problems with Quebec were not enough, the separatist drive in French Canada prompted restiveness in the western provinces, where dissatisfaction with the federal system was much in evidence. In March 1977, British Columbia's Premier, William R. Bennett, proposed that Ottawa replace the "rigid federal system," as he called it, with a more "flexible" union of five regional groupings: the Atlantic provinces; Quebec; Ontario; the Prairie provinces-Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba; and British Columbia. Bennett held that the 110-year old framework, devised when British Columbia was still a separate territory, was unsuited to modern-day Canada. His plan called for the five regional bodies, working within the ten provinces, to exercise control over local tax spending and the executive powers now vested in Ottawa.

Bennett's proposals were carried a step further by three groups that advocated an independent western state to include British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and the Northwest Territories and the Yukon. The source of dissatisfaction for the western provinces, they claimed, stemmed from economic grievances against federally-controlled tariffs and freight rates that hit western pocketbooks especially hard. They claimed that the protective

tariffs imposed by Ottawa made imported goods more expensive than they should be.\textsuperscript{21} Fixed rates by Ottawa caught the western provinces "coming and going" one critic contended, as they kept up the cost of shipping raw products to eastern factories and bringing the same materials back in the form of fabricated articles.\textsuperscript{21} "You can make a good economic case against confederation," contended Douglas Christie, president of the New Committee for Western Independence.\textsuperscript{22}

Meanwhile, many in Quebec's English-speaking minority continued to express doubts and fears about the passage of language legislation designed to make French the primary language of the province in all matters of commerce, business, government and education.\textsuperscript{23} Quebec's legislature made no major concessions on Bill 101, and Camille Laurin, Quebec's Minister of Cultural Development, told a news conference that the English-speaking community was being "unduly alarmist."\textsuperscript{24} The English-language press countered by citing Article 37 of the Bill, which forbade employers from requiring the knowledge of any language other than French as a condition of employment, unless the employer could prove that the job required such knowledge. The PQ government continued to insist that the purpose of the

\textsuperscript{21}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{22}Ibid.

legislation was to increase the role of French Canadians in the economy, on the ground that, up to that time, they had been kept in subordinate positions.\footnote{24}{"Momentum Increasing For Quebec Separation," Daily Press, Newport News, Virginia, September 19, 1977, p. 12.}

While English-speaking groups throughout the province mobilized to resist what they felt was a grave infringement on their liberties by the PQ government, other groups, such as the Canadian Institute for Public Affairs, held discussions concerning the English-speaking provinces' lack of effort to make their French-speaking minorities feel at home, and the encouragement that such a lack gives to separatist sentiment.\footnote{25}{Henry Giniger, "English Canadians Pressed On Quebec: Many in Ontario Are Urging Greater Regard for French Canadian Sensibilities," The New York Times, March 13, 1977, p. 19.} One noted critic of Canada's language policies, Marc Lalonde, the federal minister of health and supporter of Trudeau's bilingual policies, warned a Toronto audience that if the rising elite of French-speaking young people in Quebec are deprived of opportunities in the public and private sectors, "they will find the temptation to have these opportunities in a separate Quebec quite irresistible."\footnote{26}{Ibid.} Lalonde further denounced Ontario's provincial government for "equivocal results," despite its claim to the provision of a full range of services for French-speaking Ontarians. Noting that the rate of establishment of French schools had been slow, he warned that "English-speaking Ontarians should not comfort
government on the fight to keep Canada unified, it would supplement the work of the six-man team formed earlier by Trudeau, called the National Unity Group.  

In a speech opening a two-day Parliamentary debate on national unity, Trudeau outlined his ideas for constitutional changes to deal with linguistic rivalries and other influences affecting national unity. Trudeau set up a constitutional advisory board under Donald S. Thorsen, a former Deputy Minister of Justice. Among the changes recommended was a provision transferring responsibility from the provinces to the federal government for educational affairs affecting what Trudeau called "official language minority groups." Under the transfer, the federal government would be able to provide remedies in cases where provincial governments had been slow or unwilling to provide French schools in overwhelmingly English-speaking communities. Thus, the education of Quebec children from English-speaking homes would be under rules determined by Ottawa, not Quebec. Trudeau proposed that the controversial language policy advocated by the PQ be changed to shift the emphasis to language training in the schools. This was suggested in order to accommodate reluctant and often resentful English-speaking civil servants, who were passed the age of easily learning a second language.

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31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
Levesque's campaign to secure independence with association began to take shape in the spring of 1977. From the start, the PQ government was engaged in an increasingly bitter battle on four fronts: 1) opposition from the federal government in Ottawa, 2) the other provinces, 3) the business community, and 4) the local English-speaking minority. All had in common their opposition to Levesque's attempt to make Quebec almost exclusively French.

The English-speaking minority was particularly aggressive, because it believed that Levesque's efforts were directed toward restricting its size and the use of its language. A group of 115 prominent English-speaking educators, businessmen, and members of professions denounced Levesque's proposal for the exclusive use of French as "a document which conveys the impression that the English-speaking minority can and should be suppressed."33 The group forwarded a statement to the government in Ottawa which defended bilingualism as an economic necessity for Quebec and asserted that the English-speaking minority had made great strides toward learning French. The group dismissed as outdated the "stereotype" picture fostered by Levesque's government of a monolithic, wealthy and powerful English-speaking minority dominating a poor and underprivileged French majority.34

34 Ibid.
Levesque insisted, however, that the "stereotype" picture referred to by the group was not inaccurate and was precisely the situation that obtained in Quebec. His new language policy, he said, was designed to correct the imbalance. In a radio address, he stated that, while all English-speakers were not millionaires, "collectively, as a community, the English minority in Quebec has always been in a dominant position."\(^{35}\)

Quebec's English-speaking business community strongly opposed Levesque's language measures. Its view, epitomized by Earl W. McLaughlin, president and chairman of the Royal Bank of Canada, held that businesses that conducted their affairs internationally had to operate in English, and that Levesque's language legislation would not be likely to encourage head offices to establish or to remain in Montreal. McLaughlin did not state at the time that the Royal Bank would move out of the province if the language policy went into effect, but he did say afterward that this would occur if Quebec became independent.\(^{36}\) The Montreal Board of Trade backed McLaughlin's statements by publishing a study of 13 major corporations with head offices in the

\(^{35}\)Ibid.

\(^{36}\)Ibid.
province. The study asserted that the province would lose a billion dollars per year if the head offices moved out. 37 By the fall of 1977, Quebec's language policy had, according to John F. Sims, forced 150 businesses out of the province and led both corporations and individuals to transfer hundreds of millions of dollars to other parts of Canada or the United States. 38

Levesque was careful to refute fears that a government dedicated to the preservation of its majority language, and to an independent Quebec, would disrupt common economic and military ties, especially when it came to joint management and defense of the St. Lawrence Seaway, NORAD and NATO. 39

On economic and commercial issues, however, Levesque's previous statements over many years concerning the excessive influence of foreign capital in Quebec's economy could not be ignored.

Levesque stated that his blueprint for the new economic order he envisioned, or "independence with association," was based on a "northern common market," which economic thinkers of the separatist movement claimed would include the United States. 40 Quebec's Minister of Finance, Jacques Parizeau, when questioned about barriers that might exist between Quebec

37 Ibid.
and the other provinces, stated that "it would be absurd to have a tariff battle between Quebec and Ontario." These are Canada's two great industrial centers, he noted, and a significant part of the production in the Montreal area is geared for the Toronto market and vice-versa.

A critical mistake, Quebec's Minister of Industry and Commerce, Rodrique Tremblay, held is that "Canadian national policy for 100 years has been to force Canadians to look from north to south, and instead look from east to west a policy reinforced by tariff policies, transportation and communications systems." 42

All of the PQ's statements notwithstanding, Levesque's assurances to financial and industrial leaders in Canada and the United States that a vote for "separation" (a word banned from his administration's vocabulary) would not mean nationalization" could not hide the fact that emotional issues might make Levesque's dream of a "common market" impossible. Trudeau warned Levesque not to take such an arrangement for granted. And even Parizeau himself doubted that there could be a common currency between Quebec and the rest of Canada because of the importance exchanges

41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
have in economic policy.

Amid the threats of business flight in the wake of the PQ victory and the subsequent language legislation, Levesque attempted to assuage fears that might lead to Quebec's economic collapse. Careful not to use the words "separation" or "separatism," he spoke instead of "sovereignty/association."43 He approached the financial and industrial leaders in Canada and the United States to reassure them that there would be no wholesale takeover of existing investment or prohibition of future investment, only "necessary" changes to make it more responsive to Quebec's interests.44 Again, Prime Minister Trudeau warned that Quebec (read Levesque) should not take the PQ plan of an economic association or common market for granted if the province left the confederation.

In the fall of 1977 came the revelation that a security unit of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police had illegally broken into Parti Québécois headquarters in Montreal in 1973, and had seized records and other information.45 The PQ immediately put its propaganda machine into high gear, charging federal officials with "scandalous acts" and comparing the RCMP to the Watergate conspiritors. Although


the federal government did order an investigation of the RCMP's activities, the PQ spokesmen told reporters that they had long suspected that the RCMP had been spying on them, despite the Mounted Police claim that the break-in had been undertaken for reasons of "national security." 46

At the time of the break-in, Premier Levesque was in France seeking support for his cause. French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing told Levesque that he could count on French "understanding, confidence and support" regardless of what path Quebec decided to take. 47 Before he left France, Levesque was named to the Grand Office of the Legion of Honor by Giscard; but this time France was not about to provoke an international incident similar to the one de Gaulle provoked in Quebec in 1967.

The remainder of 1977 saw both federalists and separatists jockeying for position in the propaganda war for the minds and hearts of French Canadians. Acrimoneous accusations were directed by separatists at federalists and vice-versa. Separatists charged that the province has lost almost nine billion dollars since 1961 because of its association with Canada. 48 They released several polls purportedly showing strong support for independence. 49

46 Ibid.


In the spring of 1978, Trudeau celebrated his tenth anniversary as Canada's Prime Minister, and the longest-ruling democratic leader in the West. Yet, for a man who had been elected to office largely on a platform of national unity, Trudeau might well have wondered if his ten years in office had amounted to anything. The nation was more divided that at any time since he had first been elected in 1968. The Canadian economy had gone from prosperity to financial slump, and inflation, which had been at 5.6 percent in 1976, had risen to 9.5 percent by 1978. Unemployment had risen from 5.1 percent in 1974 to 8.3 percent in January, 1978.  

By the spring of 1979, Trudeau's political fortunes had suffered a dramatic reversal. The Progressive Conservatives, led by 39-year old Joe Clark, defeated the Liberals—large on economic issues. The Conservatives won 135 of 282 seats compared with the Liberals' 114. Clark's western background—he was born in a small town at the foot of the Rockies in Alberta—led many to suspect that he was not the right man to deal with Quebec and would not be very sympathetic or effective with the French Canadians. In an interview on Public Television's


MacNeil-Lehrer Report, Clark sought to dispel notions that he could not handle the Quebec issue. He told Robert MacNeil:

First of all we will make clear that the proposal put forward by the government of Quebec [sovereignty/association] is absolutely incompatible with any Canadian federal system and that it would be most improbable that there would be any possibility of association working. They can't have it both ways; they can't have political independence and economic association ... There's just no soft option.

Nevertheless, Clark recognized that Quebec did have legitimate grievances, and he told MacNeil:

There has grown up in Quebec a legitimate determination to find more cultural freedom as a people. The great majority of the people of that province speak French, not English, as their first language. They have felt far too limited within the context of our present constitutional arrangements. They have sensed that the rest of the country, and particularly the former government, were not prepared to move to make the kind of changes that would allow them to achieve their cultural freedom here at home in Canada. So what we've got to do as a new government is to demonstrate that it is possible for us to introduce the kinds of reforms that give Quebeckers more cultural security and yet remain within a strong, large nation. The former government had taken quite a rigid line on a question like jurisdictions over resources, which is important in wealth generating terms. I think we can convince a number of Quebeckers who would prefer to stay in Canada but who are concerned that the status quo might force them out. I think we can persuade these people that they are, with a new government here, better able to find the future they've been looking for within a reformed Canadian federalism. 53

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53 Ibid., p. 7.
However much the Quebec issue concerned Clark, it was his handling of the economy which, by the spring of 1980, had turned his political fortunes around. Austerity measures to cut the inflation rate had produced even higher unemployment and fear of a major recession. His advocacy of an 18-cent-per-gallon gasoline tax was strongly opposed throughout Canada. Clark insisted that the austerity measures were necessary to rectify years of "free ride" fiscal policies under the Liberals, but Trudeau retorted that Clark's budget punished the middle and low income groups while hardly touching the affluent.

In the national elections of February 18, 1980, the Liberals regained their supremacy over the Conservatives, thus placing Trudeau at the helm once more to deal with the separatist challenge. Levesque had declared his intention to hold a referendum on the issue of "sovereignty/association" upon his election in 1976, and even before Clark's defeat Levesque had fired the opening salvo in his campaign to persuade the province to seek independence. He introduced a 118-page white paper that recited the long history of the sensitive relations between English and French Canada, and asserted that it was too late to strike up a new relationship within the existing framework. In

an emotional appeal to the province's electorate, Levesque declared that he expected "at the great crossroads of the referendum to choose the only road that can open the horizon and guarantee us a free, proud, and adult national existence." 57

Levesque, however, was careful to dispel the fears that a "yes" vote in the referendum would mean a sudden rupture in economic ties with the rest of Canada, for public opinion polls showed that Quebeckers did not want outright independence. 58 The PQ campaign slogans made no reference to separatism, but claimed instead that sovereignty/association meant that French and English Quebeckers would live as equals. Federalist opponents of the PQ, however, charged that a "yes" vote in the referendum would mean the breakup of Canada and would place Quebec in perilous waters. Quebec Liberal leader Claude Ryan and his supporters argued that the only way for Quebec to remain in close economic association with Canada was within the federal system, as one of Canada's ten provinces. Liberals accused the PQ of seeking to obscure the economic consequences that a breakup of Canada would entail. Polls immediately prior to the referendum indicated that 54 percent would vote "yes" to negotiate sovereignty/association," but almost the same percentage indicated that

58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
they would reject outright independence. 60

In the wake of the Trudeau victory, Levesque announced that the long-awaited independence referendum would be held on May 20, 1980. 61 Although he had not set a definite date for the referendum on independence when he was elected in 1976, the choice of this particular time reflected his belief that the pro-independence forces had gained a substantial advantage in the pre-referendum campaign. One reason for this was that the Canadian Supreme Court had declared parts of the law making French the sole official language in Quebec unconstitutional; and although the Court had confined itself to the relatively narrow issue of language used in the provincial legislature, the 9-0 decision called into question other parts of the law designed to give the French language primacy in all walks of life and business. Levesque immediately seized on the fact that Canada's high court also struck down a similar law in the western province of Manitoba, where English was declared the sole official language in 1890. "It took 90 years to challenge the Manitoba law, but only two years to overrule Quebec," Levesque said. 62

Levesque made the point all through the campaign that a "yes" vote in the referendum would bring about no abrupt

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60 Ibid.


changes. "We will negotiate and if need be hold another referendum or elections," he told a Montreal audience. Trudeau, however, accused Levesque of presenting Quebecers with an ambiguous choice. "If they had asked a clear question to the Quebecois, 'Do you want independence or not?' the Quebecois would have answered a resounding 'no,'" said Trudeau. In the closing days of the referendum campaign, Levesque said that there was a "surge of solidarity" across the province for a "yes" vote on the referendum, and he appealed to non-French groups to join the "mainstream of solidarity" so that they might share the victory he was confident of achieving. Public opinion polls in April showed that 48 percent of those questioned supported Levesque, 43 percent were opposed, with 9 percent undecided. 65

Many observers in both Canada and the United States anxiously awaited the referendum return. Pollsters said that the vote was either too close to call or gave the separatists a slight edge. But when the results were finally in, it was apparent that the PQ had suffered a stunning defeat. Liberal Claude Ryan, leader of the opposition to sovereignty/association, held a 54-42 percent lead over Levesque's forces. Quebecois had said "non" to Levesque. 66

65Ibid.
Prime Minister Trudeau, in a conciliatory gesture, proposed a new Canadian constitution in a move designed to reassure Quebec that the "deep aspirations" of its French-speaking majority would be secured in the new charter. But 3,000 embittered young nationalists, disgruntled by their defeat in the provincial referendum, marched on a predominantly English-speaking residential neighborhood in Montreal, breaking windows, throwing rocks, and clashing with riot police. At least eight people were seriously injured in the mêlée. Another group of 2,000 marched down St. Catherine Street in Montreal, burning Canadian flags and smashing shop windows. It was obvious that the separatists' dream of a "free Quebec" would not die easily.

Trudeau vowed that a brand new constitution would replace the British North America Act, and he announced that he would send Finance Minister Jean Chretin to begin exploratory talks with the premiers of all the provinces in an effort to seek common ground for a new constitution. Trudeau indicated that he was willing to give the provinces greater autonomy at the expense of the federal government. His only conditions were 1) that Canada remain a true

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68 Ibid.
federation, with the federal parliament retaining "real powers," and 2) the new charter include a bill of rights and freedoms including the provision securing French linguistic rights. "For us, everything else is negotiable," he said. Both Ryan and Trudeau challenged Levesque to accept the will of the majority and to participate in good faith and loyalty "in the development of a new federalism."

In the post-election debate, however, analysts noted that, despite the federalist victory over the separatists,

The prevailing view is that the victory of the federalist forces has, for the time being, checked the thrust of Quebec's secession. But the victory was purchased with large and vague promises from Trudeau, Ryan, and key English-speaking politicians. The redemption of these promises causes more concern for the winners than the losers, and many argue that there is a long distance between accepting the need for change and making specific changes acceptable to all the disparate provinces in this vast country.

As the influential Toronto Globe and Mail put it, "It should be recognized by Canadians outside Quebec that when we urge the people of Quebec to vote 'no' we are committing ourselves to the negotiation of change, real and possibly wrenching change, in the structure of the confederation as we know it."

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69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF QUEBEC NATIONALISM

The final word on Quebec's relationship with English-speaking Canada has, of course, yet to be written, and thus one cannot point to any clear act, policy or program that has remedied all of Quebec's complaints while satisfying at the same time English Canada's conception of federalism. Perhaps the only general conclusion that can be drawn is that, if history is any indication, the Quebec "problem" may not be resolved for decades or even centuries to come. As Marcel Rioux claims, "It is almost four centuries since Champlain founded Quebec. Why is there today more than ever a Quebec 'question.' ... a question asked for such a long time that it is flagrantly up to date."¹

If we accept the question posed by Rioux, then all of the issues raised in this thesis, federalism, nationalism, constitutional reform, separatist parties, and particularly the rise of the Parti Québécois, are really elements of a larger issue, namely, can Canada and will Canada be able to devise a solution to allow French and English-speaking Canadians to live in harmony? Or will these groups continue

¹Marcel Rioux, Quebec in Question, trans. James Boake (Toronto: James, Lewis and Samuel, 1971), p. 3.
to struggle in the coming years within an uneasy and unsatisfactory arrangement that suits neither side? One may legitimately ask, given the history of the tempestuous relationship between French and English-speaking Canada, whether there will be more Riels, Papineaus, Schoeters's and Levesques. The researcher of these questions senses that the answer may lie with those who are adept at using a crystal ball, rather than with those who rely on the empirical data and statistics of political science. Lacking such clairvoyance, I can only hope to draw some general conclusions from the information set forth in previous chapters.

It can be seen that there continues to be a strong sense of identity among French Canadians with respect to their language, customs, and homeland, Quebec. Nationalist sentiment, like the folkways of tribal cultures, is passed from generation to generation. The youthful French Canadians who supported the Parti Québécois in the elections of 1976, 1982, and the referendum campaign of 1981 have much in common with their ancestors who fought alongside Papineau and answered the call of the Saint Jean Baptiste Society. Is this nationalism strong because Quebeckers feel a natural sense of pride in their own language, heritage and institutions, or is French Canadian nationalism merely
a reaction to the presence of the "outside threat," the "oppressive foreigner," the English Canadian and the "Yankee" American? Will nationalism take the more peaceful forms of the Saint Jean Baptiste Society, or does the future hold the prospect that radical terrorist groups, like the FLQ, will again emerge to express French Canadian frustrations through bombings, kidnappings, and other forms of violence? Will Quebeckers be content to confine their nationalist aspirations to socialist or social democratic forms, or will fascist, communist or nihilist forms of nationalism take the place of the more moderate expression of French Canadian nationalism?

My conclusion is that Quebec nationalists will continue to use the ballot box as their primary means of expressing nationalist sentiment, especially now that they have a viable separatist party at their disposal that is clearly capable of winning elections. Moreover, the PQ shows ample evidence that it will remain on the political scene in Quebec for at least the immediate future. Thus, nationalists will use the electoral option unless English Canada shows a complete unwillingness to show appropriate sensitivity to Quebec's language and takes regressive steps to confine French Canadians to a subordinate position in the life of the nation.
As for how accommodation will be achieved between the two cultures, perhaps some answers lie in the new Canadian constitution. The patriation of the constitution in 1982 marked a milestone in Canadian political history. Certainly it may be said that, of the democratic governments of the twentieth century, Canada was an anomaly in that its constitution could only be changed by a foreign government. With the patriation of the constitution, Canada has now assumed both the form and substance of an independent nation, "a true national character for the first time."2

The new constitution's provisions that are of greatest concern to Quebec are, of course, those dealing with minority rights and the treatment of the French language. The question remains whether the entrenchment in the constitution of French Canadian language rights, to safeguard French Canada's mother tongue, will be any more effective than, say, the First and Fifteenth amendments of the U.S. Constitution have been in protecting the rights of blacks, hispanics, and other minorities in the United States? What is more, while minorities in the United States may, on occasion, offer convincing proof that their rights to fair housing, non-discriminatory employment and freedom from racial harrassment have been violated, the French Canadian cannot bring suit against a British Columbia innkeeper, an Alberta restauranteur, or an Ontario government official

simply because one, or all, of these individuals is unable to communicate with him in French, which he is accustomed to in Quebec.

What the constitution can guarantee is that the French Canadian will be able to carry on an active dialogue with his federal government in his own language; that his province, whether it be Quebec, Manitoba, Ontario, or any other province, will not abridge his right to maintain schools where his language may be taught, and where his religion and customs may be practiced. He must be certain that his institutions will not be abolished or persecuted simply because they are different from those of the majority in any province.

In chapter III on federalism, I discussed the consociational model of elite compromise and accommodation. It was demonstrated that the consociational model no longer effectively operates to diminish conflict, and this hypothesis appears to have gained additional support during the constitutional negotiations of 1980. Levesque obstructed constitutional proposals which would make illegal the parts of Quebec's language law (Bill 101) which declared French as the sole official language of Quebec. Federal-provincial discord escalated during the constitutional

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Ibid.
Perhaps, however, we may be seeing a new form of consociational democracy taking place, not involving the elites, but rather the direct accommodation of the electorate to reduce tensions. Levesque's leadership was rejected in Quebec when a proposal for sovereignty/association was voted down in the referendum of 1980. This may be an indication that, while one of Quebec's elite's—specifically the PQ—wishes to see cleavages exacerbated, the general population is doing what it can, through the ballot box, to reduce tensions between Quebec, its sister provinces and Ottawa.

The Future of Levesque and the Parti Quebecois

At the time of the PQ defeat in the referendum on sovereignty/association in 1981, many felt that the days of the PQ as a majority government were numbered. However, many federalists, and even other observers, were surprised when the PQ was re-elected by a comfortable margin in the 1981 provincial election. It garnered 80 of 122 seats in the Quebec National Assembly, as opposed to 42 for the Liberal party.8 This victory could do nothing but fuel sentiment for separatism, and Quebec's Education Minister, Camille Laurin, told a cheering election-victory crowd that "soon we will be making Quebec a country."9

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8 "Separatists Win Handily in Quebec Election," The Denver Post, April 14, 1981, p. 3.
9 Ibid.
In Ottawa, Prime Minister Trudeau and his Liberal government were obviously dismayed. The PQ victory gave Levesque what he felt was a mandate to take a tough position on the issue of the patriation of the constitution, which came before the federal parliament in late 1981. It is also certain that Levesque's victory gave him further encouragement to implement and enforce the province's strict language laws regarding the use of French.

In the later half of 1982 and the first months of 1983, however, Levesque's popularity appears to have suffered a steep downturn. A recent poll in 1983 showed that he had only a 25 percent approval rating, and even a longtime separatist and early supporter of Levesque, Pierre Bourgault, wrote that Levesque makes independence "look like the worst possible thing that could happen to Quebec." "Indeed," Bourgault claimed, "when he now says he doesn't have enough power within the confines of confederation, I can only say 'thank God he doesn't have more powers, what would he do then?'"

Many also claim that Levesque has badly mismanaged the province's economy. Currently, Quebec has the highest unemployment rate in Canada, 14 percent, which is two percentage points above the national average. In addition,

10 "Lessons of Language in French Quebec," Newsweek, 18 April, 1983, p. 16.
11 Ibid.
it is estimated that 160,000 people have left the province, the vast majority of them members of the English-speaking minority. Following the example of Sun-Life, the nation's largest insurance company, which moved its headquarters from Montreal to Toronto, the Bank of Montreal recently warned that it, too, may relocate outside the province.

There also appears to be growing dissatisfaction, even among French-speaking Québécois, concerning Levesque's language legislation. For example, a hotel owner near the Maine border was cited recently for displaying a sign that read "Bar Open," prompting one Quebec citizen to refer to the enforcers of the language legislation as "tongue troopers." Levesque, meanwhile, continues to insist that he will press forward with his original objectives for "sovereignty/association."

A comprehensive appraisal of Rene Levesque's career would be premature at this time, for he has not been in office long enough to be judged either a failure or success in the eyes of his only major constituency, the Québécois. What may be said with certainty in 1983 is that Levesque has succeeded in using French Canadian assertiveness in the areas of language and minority rights to his political advantage. While some ridiculed his

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12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
proposals in 1976, and were certain that he would be defeated in the next provincial election, they have been proven wrong, as the 1981 election shows.

In examining Levesque's political style, one is tempted to make comparisons between him and the Frenchman who shouted "vivre le Québec libre" from the balcony of the Montreal City Hall in 1967, Charles de Gaulle. Like de Gaulle, Levesque used the referendum on the sovereignty/association issue in 1980, and de Gaulle used the referendum on the question of the direct election of the president of France in 1962. Interestingly, de Gaulle himself proposed a "sovereignty/association" arrangement for Algeria in lieu of complete independence when his program for dealing with the Algerian crisis of the early 1960's failed to satisfy the FLN. 15

Other comparisons are also appropriate. For example, de Gaulle based his world-view on the primacy of the nation-state, and jealously guarded French sovereignty against encroachment by any regional organization that proposed European unity at the expense of French sovereignty. Similarly, Levesque views Quebec as a nation-state and is making every effort to see that the province's sovereignty is not compromised in a federal system. One could also hold

that both Levesque and de Gaulle used the "politics of 'no,'" or the veto. De Gaulle dramatically withdrew French forces from NATO and vetoed Britain's entry into the Common Market. Levesque has employed similar tactics at federal-provincial conferences. For example, he tried to veto Trudeau's move to patriate the constitution. De Gaulle also used the "politics of the empty chair" at conferences and negotiations, a gesture intended to detract from the legitimacy of the proceedings by dramatizing the absence of an important partner who could argue that he had not been consulted on the issue and that any agreement was not binding, therefore, on the French people. Rather than boycott an important conference, however, Levesque has chosen to be present—and vocal—in his denunciation of any policy with which he disagrees. It is only after he fails to obtain what he wants from federal or provincial leaders that he threatens to go his own way. History has shown, however, that Levesque's threats are more of a nuisance, to bog down proceedings, than an actual plan of action which he intends to carry out.

**Trudeau and French Canada**

As Trudeau's biographer, George Radwanski points out, "At the most simplistic level, it is possible to say that a separatist government is now in power in Quebec, the risk

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19 Kolodziej, p. 461-462.
of the breakup of the confederation is more immediate than in 1968, and therefore Trudeau has failed to achieve his principal objective. But that would reduce the exceedingly complex interplay of historical, social, and political forces to a mindless syllogism."

The careful observer, however, can be more generous than Radwanski, for the PQ has now been in power almost seven years and Quebec has not left the confederation. Trudeau's decision to run for Prime Minister in 1978, after having served longer than any other elected leader of the free world, is understandable in the context of his aspirations. Another leader, perhaps, would have been content to let someone else take the helm of the nation after having completed such a long, and often frustrating, tenure in office. But Trudeau wished to see at least some of his objectives come to fruition and refused to leave at a time when the confederation needed the presence of a French Canadian prime minister to deal with Quebec separatism and the constitutional issues that remained unresolved.

At 64, Trudeau will probably not remain Canada's leader much longer. But he may decide to stay in the game until Levesque is no longer in charge of the government of Quebec. Trudeau views Levesque as his nemesis; Levesque views Trudeau as his. The contest for Quebec may be determined by which of the two has the greatest political longevity.

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Obstacles to Independence-Present and Future

Despite the PQ's sweeping victory in 1981, there are a number of obstacles to achieving independence through the electoral process. The very nature of attempting to achieve independence through the electoral process creates problems for the PQ for, as the campaign for independence becomes immersed in the process of elections, other issues, of which the separatist cause is only one, come to the fore. While individuals may support separatism in opinion polls, in the context of elections they may find other issues more important, such as the state of the economy. Examples of this can be found in the substantial number of Francophones who declared themselves supporters of Quebec independence yet voted for the anti-separatist Liberal party in the elections of 1970 and 1973. Conversely, individuals who do not believe in separatism may see the separatist party as a vehicle for registering economic protest, or other kinds of dissatisfaction, as the 1976 election appears to demonstrate. Finally, separatist leaders may be tempted to water-down their commitment to separatism in order to maintain their anti-separatist electoral clientele. This appears to have been the case with the PQ's election strategy in 1976, and again in 1981.

In addition to the above-mentioned factors, which involve the general environment in which the PQ must operate, there are also a number of important issues which the party

must settle **internally** if it wishes to be successful in the future. The first of these is that the PQ faces the challenge of maintaining the support of a wide-ranging clientele which may share little more than a general commitment to independence, and which may have different and contradictory interests regarding other issues. With respect to this first point, Postgate and McRoberts point out,

> The most obvious conflict among Parti Québécois clientele is the conflict among economic groups. An interesting dilemma for the PQ is that, just as the "new middle class" and working class Francophones may be led by quite different grievances to support Quebec independence, so they may have quite contradictory expectations of what Quebec independence would accomplish: one group seeking to continue the technocratic, political modernization of the "Quiet Revolution" and the other seeking to bring the Quebec government firmly under working-class control.\(^{22}\)

These tensions were evident in 1971 when the PQ was asked to show its solidarity with Quebec's militant trade unions. Although the PQ has managed to avoid major conflict among groups which support it, this does not mean that it will continue to be successful. There continue to be radical elements among the PQ's supporters, such as Marxists and left-wing militants, who see a class struggle within the Francophone community and want an independence movement that is on the

\(^{22}\) *Ibid.*
side of the Francophone working class. The leftists are often dismayed by the readiness of the Parti Québécois to accept a continued role for private enterprise within any new Quebec state, and even to accept American investment. "For many left-wingers," Postgate and McRoberts point out, "it is not possible to 'civilize' American capital." In addition, division exists among adherents of the Quebec independence movement concerning the place that Anglophones should have within the new Quebec state. The PQ would allow English language schools to persist, but the total enrollment would be fixed according to the proportion of Anglophones within the new Quebec state at the time of the first census. New immigrants would be required to attend French schools. PQ conventions have witnessed intense struggles between "moderate" and "radical" factions over this issue. The authority of René Levesque has at times been necessary to maintain support for the "moderate" position.24

One may thus conclude that, in 1983, the Parti Québécois, despite some internal division, is strong as a political force in the province and that, at least for the immediate future, the PQ will continue to shape the province's political system. Indeed, the PQ has succeeded in transforming the

23 Ibid., p. 194.

24 Ibid.
province's party system from one dominated by the Liberals and the Union Nationale, to a two-party system dominated by the Liberals and the PQ. What makes the PQ different from past third party movements is that "the strong commitment of the Parti Québécois voters to the party's ideology differentiates it from the other 'successful' third party, the federal Social Credit party. Whereas the Social Credit party may be able to attribute some of its success to economic protest, the PQ's success has been based on a combination of economic protest and the presence of widespread support for the PQ's separatist ideology ... This helps to explain its success." Further, by Postgate and McRoberts' measure, "Purely economic dissatisfaction could have been contained within the existing Liberal-Union Nationale two-party system; without an ideologically based rejection of these parties, there would not have been as great a need to turn to a third party."  

The contest between separatists and federalists will undoubtedly continue, even after the passing of Levesque and Trudeau. Until such time as Quebeckers are supremely confident that they will be able to cope with the economic consequences of independence, a separate state of Quebec.

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25 Ibid., p. 192.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
will not materialize. But, until then, Quebecois will certainly use the separatist movement, and organizations like the Parti Quebecois, as bargaining chips to obtain concessions from Ottawa. In this respect, Quebec may have a tool at its disposal that is unique to any province in the world: a method to wring concessions from the central government by a continued threat to leave the confederation, to secede without actually having to secede. Such an arrangement may be described as blackmail, but at least it is a "crime" that can be committed without bloodshed, without civil war, something that neither federalists nor separatists wish to see. The relationship between French and English Canada was observed by a leading French Canadian politician shortly after confederation and is, perhaps, as accurate today as it was in 1867. He said, "English and French, we climb a double flight of stairs towards the destinies reserved for us on this continent, without knowing each other, without meeting each other, and without even seeing each other, except on the landing of politics."28

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