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**The Scourge of "Discovery": A Case Study of the Genocide of Native Americans in English North America**

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THE SCOURGE OF "DISCOVERY":
A CASE STUDY OF THE GENOCIDE OF NATIVE AMERICANS
IN ENGLISH NORTH AMERICA

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of History
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

by
Jayma Ann Abdoo
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PREFACE

Any history of the relations between Native Americans and European colonists written by a White historian is fraught with the potential of being what Calvin Martin has called "historiographic colonialism." Since this is a study of the genocide of Native Americans, it necessarily focuses on the indigenous people as victims; however, I have tried to portray something of the lives of the native peoples during this period of colonization as they were never merely "acted upon" by the European settlers but also acted in ways which were important to the outcome. In so doing, I fully accept Michael Dorris's statement that "whoever attempts to write Native American history must admit in advance to fallibility."2

Another problem in writing about Native Americans is more basic: What is the proper term to use to identify the indigenous inhabitants of the Americas erroneously labelled "Indians" almost five hundred years ago? I believe that a people should be able to choose its own name, and, at present, both "Indian" and "Native American" seem to be equally acceptable to the descendants of the original native peoples of the United States. I have chosen to follow the example of

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1 Martin, "The Metaphysics of Writing Indian-White History," 33.

2 Dorris, "Indians on the Shelf," 104.
Robert Berkhofer, who in *The White Man's Indian* opted to use "Native American" when referring "to the actual peoples designated by the term Indian" and "Indians" when referring to the "White image of these persons." In addition, Berkhofer followed the policy of *The Handbook of North American Indians* in capitalizing the first letter of racial groups (White, Black, and Red); I have done likewise.3 In a matter of style, I have modernized the spelling in the quotations taken from colonial sources.

Choosing Virginia as the case study is not meant to imply that Virginia's treatment of Native Americans was unique; on the contrary, it was probably typical. Further studies on the other colonies must be done, however, to prove or disprove this claim.

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ABSTRACT

This study explores the issue of genocide as it pertains to the drastic demographic decline suffered by the indigenous peoples of English North America during the process of colonization. Seventeenth-century Virginia is used as a case study.

Genocide is a relatively new word, invented in 1944 by Raphael Lemkin. In 1948, the United Nations passed a Convention on Genocide, and since that time several scholars have studied the phenomenon and developed their own definitions and typologies. In Chapter 2 there is a detailed analysis of the views of these scholars which leads to the following definition of genocide: Genocide is the destruction of a group of human beings who are defined as a group by the perpetrator, who acts with purpose and in an organized manner, and who also determines that the group is alien to the perpetrator’s society.

Chapter 3 shows how the Europeans involved in the colonization of the Americas considered the native peoples to be alien and inhuman. This view made it easier for the colonizers to destroy the natives when they seemed to interfere with the colonizers’ goals to obtain the natives land and resources.

Chapter 4 provides a chronological account of the colonization of Virginia from 1607 to 1676, which shows how the colonists greed for land and their debased image of the native peoples caused the destruction of the natives—physically, culturally, and spiritually.
THE SCOURGE OF "DISCOVERY":
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INTRODUCTION

The word "genocide" is less than fifty years old; however, the practice of genocide spans human history.\(^1\) As the sociologist Jack Nusan Porter has stated, the term has defied conclusive definition by scholars. "Genocide is not a value-free term," Porter writes. "It is loaded with political and emotional bias."\(^2\) Denoting the intentional infliction of mass destruction on a people, genocide is perhaps the ultimate crime against humanity. The terrible implications of the word "genocide" make its use susceptible to two opposing tendencies, both of which make difficult the rational study of the phenomenon. One of these tendencies is that overuse of the word, particularly in political rhetoric, can trivialize the concept.\(^3\) The second tendency is that denial or justification of genocide is the standard response to the crime, which serves to prolong the suffering of the victim group, renders the achievement of individual and social justice impossible, and makes more likely the recurrence of genocide is the future. As two prominent scholars of genocide, historian Frank Chalk and sociologist Kurt

\(^1\) Kuper, Genocide, 11; Porter, Genocide and Human Rights, 4.

\(^2\) Porter, Genocide and Human Rights, iii, 3; Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide, 27.

\(^3\) Porter, Genocide and Human Rights, 3, 9.
Jonassohn, have pointed out, "Throughout most of recorded time, it was the victors who wrote the history of the conquests," thus facilitating the perversion of truth by the denial of genocide.\(^4\)

Considering the role of genocide in the demise of the indigenous inhabitants of English North America in the wake of colonization illustrates well the problems with the definition and application of the term. The European settlers and their descendants have remained in power in this land since their initial victorious confrontations with the indigenous peoples. Not only have the Euro-Americans controlled the nation's politics and economics through the centuries, but they have controlled as well the telling of all history, not only of the conquests. To compound the problems of finding reliable history, until very recently, Chalk and Jonassohn have written, "only the rulers made news." Fortunately, some historians have now turned their attention to the role of the people who never held the reins of power.\(^5\)

When these people are given voice, the result often challenges the heretofore accepted views of the majority, thus exciting controversy. To charge that Euro-Americans carried out genocide in the process of settling what is now the United States is to dispute some of the most basic beliefs underpinning the nation--the ideals of personal liberty,

\(^4\) Chalk and Jonassohn, *The History and Sociology of Genocide*, 7.

\(^5\) Ibid., 8.
individual rights, progress, and democracy. In this case, as in every case, the charge of genocide demands careful substantiation, not only because of the seriousness of the accusation but also to avoid dismissal of the charge as mere political rhetoric. While the injudicious use of the term serves in the long run to undermine its impact, the public recognition of genocide when it has occurred is fundamental to the hope of building a more humane world. Past genocides must be understood and condemned if future genocides are to be prevented.6 "If previous examples of genocide are consigned to oblivion," Roger Smith, professor of government, writes, "the problem of prevention . . . will lack urgency."7

There is no question that the indigenous peoples of all the Americas suffered a demographic disaster in the wake of the European discovery of their homelands. Russell Thornton, an expert in the demographic history of Native Americans, estimates that more than five million native inhabitants lived in what is now the United States in 1492; by 1800, the number had declined to 600,000; and by the last decade of the nineteenth century, the nadir of population loss, the number had dwindled to 250,000.8 There is also no question that the drastic decline in numbers occurred because of contact with European settlers and that these settlers acted destructively

6 Smith, "Genocide and Denial," 3.
7 Ibid., 24.
8 Thornton, American Indian Holocaust and Survival, 43.
towards the native peoples. Whether genocide was a factor in the precipitous loss of native life is important to determine. As Christopher Vecsey, professor of religion and Native American studies, has written:

"A moral examination of our American policies is anything but outdated. On the contrary, vigilance is essential. . . . [W]e historians must not cease to tell the stories, no matter how lurid, of our American-Indian relations. . . . Cynicism and sophistication must not cause our moral outrage to falter. The stories of Indian-White contact reveal to us the stain on our national wealth, spirit, and character, and helps us as well to envision ourselves darkly, and thus more fully."9

This paper is an exploration of the crime of genocide and its applicability to the tragic loss of life among Native Americans which occurred as Europeans invaded their lands. In recent years, several scholars from various disciplines have expanded on both the work of the originator of the term "genocide" and the United Nations, which passed the Convention on Genocide in 1948. They have proposed several definitions and typologies for what has proved to be a difficult and complex concept. Since it is necessary to establish a thorough understanding of what constitutes genocide before passing judgment on the colonizers of North America, Chapter II of this paper will present a lengthy review of these definitions. A synthesis of these definitions will show that genocide was a decided factor in the policy and practices of European settlers towards Native Americans. Chapter III will demonstrate how the European image of the native inhabitants

contributed to the practice of genocide. In order to explore more fully how genocide occurred, Chapter IV will present a case study of the relations between the native peoples and the settlers in the first English colony in North America, Virginia, from 1607 to 1677. The Conclusion will summarize how the events in Virginia constituted a genocidal process and will discuss the impact in the contemporary United States of the denial of the genocide of Native Americans.
CHAPTER II
THEORIES OF GENOCIDE

Definitions and Controversies

Despite the efforts of scholars and others, "genocide" continues to elude precise definition. One reason that scholars have found it so difficult to agree on a definition is the history of the word itself. Raphael Lemkin, a Polish jurist, invented the word "genocide" in 1944, before worldwide knowledge of the full horror of the Nazi genocides. Although he said that he wanted to define "an old practice in its modern development," his description of the word derived in large measure from what he knew at the time was going on in Nazi Germany. When the full dimensions of the Nazi genocides confronted the world, the tendency developed to associate "genocide" with their immensity, calculated cruelty, totality, and sinister bureaucratization and technology of killing. This Nazi standard can impede the historian's ability to assess possible genocides in the past when humankind lacked the modern world's capabilities to exact quick death on huge numbers of people. Yet historians must not allow the Nazi genocides to overwhelm other cases in which a smaller number

1 Lemkin, Axis Rule In Occupied Europe, 79.
of deaths took place in less spectacular ways.

Although the word "genocide" is now most frequently associated with the Nazis' destruction of the Jews, Lemkin actually gave the word broad definition. Combining the Greek word for "race" or "tribe," genos, with the Latin suffix for killing," -cide, Lemkin formed the word "genocide" and wrote that "by genocide, we mean the destruction of a nation or an ethnic group" by an "oppressor nation." Furthermore, "genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national group." Significantly, Lemkin explicitly stated that mass killing is not the only form of genocide. In fact, genocide does not necessarily entail "the immediate destruction" of the nation or ethnic group, rather it can be a systematic plan of action carried out to destroy "essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves."2

Lemkin delineated the following ways in which the perpetrator's plan of action can consist of coordinated attacks on "different aspects of life" of the victim group:

1. The perpetrator can destroy the political life of the victim group by taking over its government or by relegating it to colonial status.

2. The perpetrator can destroy the social life of the

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2 Ibid., 79, 80.
victim group by undermining the ties which unify the group’s society and by imprisoning or murdering those group members who provide moral leadership.

3. The perpetrator can destroy the cultural life of the victim group by preventing its cultural practices, by destroying its cultural institutions, and by controlling its educational system.

4. The perpetrator can destroy the economic life of the victim group by expropriating its natural resources and other sources of wealth and by controlling trade and employment.

5. The perpetrator can destroy the religious life of the victim group by forbidding religious practices.

6. The perpetrator can destroy the moral life of the victim group by promoting activities, such as excessive alcohol consumption and pornography.

7. The perpetrator can use biological means to destroy the victim group by enforced birth control and sterilization.

8. The perpetrator can directly destroy the physical existence of the victim group by mass murder or enforced starvation.\(^3\)

The result of these attacks would be the end of the ethnic or national group’s existence as an entity even if individuals within the group survive. As Israel Charny, psychologist and Executive Director of the Institute of the

\(^3\) Ibid., xi-xii, 82-85.
International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide in Jerusalem, has pointed out, Lemkin "emphasized the elimination of the continuity of a people even more than the fact of mass murder itself." Thus, in its original use, genocide did not necessarily imply mass death. Lemkin specifically recognized the destruction of a group's culture without the physical annihilation of the group's members as a form of genocide. After World War II, the term "ethnocide" came into being to cover this concept.\(^4\)

While allowing for a broad range of ways which can result in a group's demise, Lemkin narrowly defined the perpetrators and the victims of genocide. The perpetrator had to be a nation and the victims had to be a national or ethnic group. In addition, Lemkin stipulated the necessity for the perpetrator to have the intention to destroy the victim group. Scholars and diplomats who have pursued the study of genocide have reevaluated each of the factors in Lemkin's definition with varying results.

Reacting to the horror of the Holocaust, the United Nations confronted the issue of genocide during the first years of its operation. The ensuing debates did more to demonstrate the political controversies the term can incite than to illuminate concrete ways the United Nations could act to prevent genocide in the future. On December 11, 1946, the General Assembly declared that genocide is a crime under

\(^4\) Charny, "The Study of Genocide," 2; Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide, 9.
international law to be condemned by the civilized world and mandated the United Nation's Economic and Social Council to develop a full resolution on the subject. The Council attempted to construct a working definition of genocide, a plan for appropriate international action when genocide occurs, and a possible course of prevention. This proved to be no easy task as the various political concerns of member nations dominated the debate over proposed resolutions. Particularly contentious was a proposal in the original draft submitted by a committee of the Economic and Social Council which included "political groups" in the list of potential victims of genocide. Also provocative in this draft was the inclusion of "cultural genocide," defined as a "deliberate act committed with the intent of destroying the language, religion or culture of a national, racial, or religious group." Both of these provisions were deleted by vote of the General Assembly.

Finally, on December 9, 1948, the General Assembly approved a compromise "Convention on Genocide." This Convention states that "at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity" and "in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international cooperation is required." The Convention proceeds to define genocide as

follows:

Any act committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

In addition, the Convention provides that national rulers, other public officials, and private individuals who are responsible for acts of genocide are liable for punishment. Unlike Lemkin, the United Nations did not specify that the perpetrator had to be a nation state.  

The major deficiency in the United Nations definition is the limit on the kinds of groups which can be victims. Groups based on political affiliation, sexual preference, and economic status are all omitted, which means, for instance, that if a state systematically eliminated all homosexuals, all Communists, or all beggars, the United Nations could not consider it genocide. Including the necessity for the perpetrator to have "the intent to destroy" the victim group poses problems of proof. Rarely does a perpetrator admit to the intention to destroy a group even when the end result of its actions is precisely that. Furthermore, the Convention rules out liability in cases where a perpetrator group, in pursuing another goal, causes the elimination of the victim group in the process. These limitations proved that while

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8 Ibid., 959.
expediency required the members of the United Nations to condemn the Nazi genocides, self-interest motivated them to preserve their own "rights" to maintain internal order without facing a charge of genocide themselves.

In the years since the United Nations Convention, scholars have grappled with its weakness, and most have argued for broadening the scope of its definition of genocide. Most of the scholars agree that, in its essence, genocide is the organized destruction of a group as a group. The debate hinges on what other criteria should apply, with five major factors in dispute: the constitution of victim groups, the nature of the perpetrator, the intention of the perpetrator, the methodology of destruction, and the permissible conduct of the victim group. What follows is an analysis of how several scholars have defined genocide and addressed these five factors.

Sociologist Leo Kuper has decided to use the United Nations definition in his writings about genocide despite his disagreement with part of it. He has done so because he believes that the internationally-recognized United Nations Convention provides the most practical means to devise effective preventive measures. Believing that "political and economic groups" should be included in the categorization of victims, Kuper calls these cases "related atrocities." Kuper also has developed a new classification called "genocidal

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massacres" which he defines as "the annihilation of a section of a group—men, women and children, as for example in the wiping out of whole villages."\textsuperscript{10} The use of these terms, however, can obfuscate the issue of what constitutes genocide. By conceding one of the key issues—the limitation of possible victim groups, Kuper reinforces the idea that political and economic groups are less worthy of protection. The term "genocidal massacres" is confusing because it uses the word "genocide," yet assigns a new meaning to it and raises the question of whether debates on what constitutes genocide will wrongly hinge on the number of victims rather than on what is done to them. Focus on the number of victims can also hinder the historian's analysis of past events when the number of victims may have been relatively small solely due to technological reasons.

In identifying types of genocide, Kuper sets forth two major categories: (1) domestic genocides, which result from "internal divisions within a society" and (2) genocides which occur during international war. He then delineates four subgroups of domestic genocides: (1) genocides against indigenous peoples; (2) genocides against hostage groups, such as the Nazi genocides; (3) genocides following upon decolonization, where two or more heretofore dominated groups emerge in their own power struggle; and (4) genocides which occur as the result of a struggle between ethnic, racial, or

\textsuperscript{10} Kuper, \textit{Genocide}, 39, 10.
religious groups. In these types of genocide, the perpetrator need not be a nation-state nor even the dominant group in a society.\textsuperscript{11} Particularly in his discussion of genocides following decolonization and genocides arising out of animosity between racial, ethnic, and religious groups, Kuper raises the specter of minority and oppressed groups retaliating by committing genocide themselves.\textsuperscript{12}

While rejecting Jean Paul Sartre's charge that genocide of indigenous peoples is endemic to colonization, Kuper has accepted that "the course of colonization has been marked too often by genocide," including in North and South America. Throughout history, "hunting and gathering peoples have often been the victims of genocidal attacks." Whether during colonization or a nation's expansion, the advancing state deems that these hunters and gatherers stand in the way of economic development and the progress of civilization, and therein lies the rationale to eliminate them. Should the perpetrator group need to rely on the indigenous people for labor, however, then such a need serves as a "functional restraint" against genocide.\textsuperscript{13}

In discussing the reasons indigenous peoples are frequently subjected to genocidal attacks, Kuper faces the problem of making the perpetrator's intent to destroy the

\textsuperscript{11} Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide, 17.

\textsuperscript{12} Kuper, Genocide, 57-83 passim.

\textsuperscript{13} Kuper, Genocide, 15, 40, 50, 46.
victims a prerequisite of genocide. Typically, the nation-state which eliminates indigenous peoples in the process of territorial expansion or economic development excuses its actions by claiming that it never intended the deaths of the natives but only sought control of the resources where they lived. Without specifically resolving the question of intent, Kuper has conceded that "material interests are an important factor in genocide. Their role is most marked in the genocides of colonization, in the sacrifice of indigenous groups to economic development."\(^{14}\)

Israel W. Charny has proposed what he calls a "humanistic definition of genocide" which is unique in that it resolves the question of intent by removing it as a criterion. He also expands the categories of possible target groups. Genocide, according to Charny, is "the wanton murder of human beings on the basis of any identify whatsoever that they share--national, ethnic, racial, religious, political, geographical, ideological" (emphasis added).\(^{15}\) By substituting "wanton" for deliberate intention, he correctly allows for situations in which the perpetrators act without regard for the ultimate consequences so that the deaths of the victims occur even though it is not the stated objective. Charny's definition is strict enough to prevent genocide from being used too loosely, while at the same time, it demands


adherence to a basic respect for human rights. As historian Richard G. Hovannisian has pointed out, the world is "dominated by so-called national interests" which determine state action more so than the desire for truth and justice."16 It is necessary to place parameters on acceptable conduct in order to prevent human destruction as an "unintended" corollary of another plan. Using Charny's criterion, a state could be charged with genocide if it destroyed indigenous peoples not for the sake of destroying them but in order to obtain their land or otherwise advance its economic development. Charny does not establish any criterion for the nature of the perpetrator. He does, however, restrict the genocidal acts to murder, apparently rejecting the broader range of destructive actions set forth by Lemkin and the United Nations.

The historical sociologist Helen Fein emphasizes that the way a perpetrator group perceives its victims is a critical factor in genocide. In all genocides, the perpetrator considers the victim group to be "outsiders," whose very existence is "alien" and anathema to the ruling society.17 The victim group becomes the "other," and in stark terms Fein has declared that "genocide is the annihilation of the other." Taking into account all the factors which contribute to genocide, Fein first defined the term as:


17 Fein, Accounting for Genocide, 6.
the calculated murder of a segment or all of a group defined outside of the universe of obligation of the perpetrator by a government, elite, staff or crowd representing the perpetrator in response to a crisis or opportunity perceived to be caused or impeded by the victim. The universe of obligation is the range of people to whom the common conscience extends.

She later expanded this definition by recognizing, as stated in the United Nations Convention, that interference with a group's ability to reproduce and raise its children can also constitute genocide.  

Fein has concluded that:

Genocide is sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity directly or indirectly, through interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of group members, sustained regardless of the surrender or lack of threat offered by the victim.

Like Kuper, Fein does not choose to alter the United Nations Convention; she believes as he does that it provides the best chance for worldwide efforts to stop genocide. Since she believes that the United Nations' omission of political groups from the list of possible victims is wrong, however, Fein has adopted another term, "ideological slaughters," to apply to state-authorized mass killings of a group identified by its political beliefs. This approach raises the same problems as Kuper's adoption of "related atrocities" in that a separate term implies that the elimination of a political group is less significant than the elimination of a religious

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18 Fein, "Scenarios of Genocide," 5, 4; Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide, 16.


20 Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide, 16.
one. Fein believes that despite agreement by most scholars that genocide is "primarily a crime of state," certain genocides can occur without state authorization, especially in situations involving colonization, decolonization, and civil wars.\textsuperscript{21}

Fein's analysis of situations which can lead to genocide results in her four-part typology. The first type is developmental genocide which is rooted in the desire of the perpetrator for economic gain. Fein subdivides developmental genocides into two kinds: (1) "utilitarian" genocides occur when the perpetrator eliminates people who "[stand] in the way of economic exploitation of resources"; and (2) "latent" genocides take place when the victim group is decimated by diseases brought by invading settlers. Fein believes that the fate of indigenous peoples who have faced colonization or national expansion by European settlers in the Americas, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa may be the archetype of developmental genocides.\textsuperscript{22}

The concept of latent genocide raises the issue of intention as a criterion for genocide. As Fein defines the term, latent genocides would not usually be considered intentional because the invading settlers did not plan to kill the native people by exposing them to new diseases. Fein, however, imposes into the debate a different understanding of

\textsuperscript{21} Fein, "Genocide: A Sociological Perspective," 12.

\textsuperscript{22} Fein, "Scenarios of Genocide," 8.
the term "intent" by juxtaposing it with the idea of "motive." Intent, Fein states, is "purposeful action" and someone can be said to act intentionally if "there are foreseeable ends or consequences" which may be different from the motive for the act. Fein cites the work of two men who have studied the Cambodian genocide in the 1970s, David Hawk and Hurst Hannum, who have argued that the United Nations Convention's requirement of intent "requires only that the various destructive acts—killings, causing mental and physical harm... have a purposeful or deliberate character as opposed to an accidental or unintentional character."²³

The adoption of this definition of "intent" serves the cause of justice far better than the more traditional notion because it does not allow for the absolution of a group from the crime of genocide on the notion that the actions which resulted in the annihilation of many people were carried out for another purpose. The problem raised by the intent of the nation-state in determining whether or not it carried out genocide against indigenous people during colonization or national expansion is thus resolved: The determining factor is not whether the nation-state's purpose was to kill the natives but whether its actions were "deliberate" or "purposeful" rather than "accidental." For instance, if the agents of the nation-state deliberately seized the land and took over natural resources which belonged to the native

peoples and the result was the inability of the natives to sustain themselves, then the nation-state can be guilty of genocide even if its motive was solely to obtain these resources.

Fein's three other types of genocide are based on political or ideological concerns, as follows: (1) despotic genocide takes place in a polarized society when one of the groups decides to eliminate another group which it perceives as its opposition; (2) retributive genocide takes place when a ruling class determines to eliminate a subject class which has threatened its authority; and (3) ideological genocide takes place when the state creates a mythical image of an "outsider" or "enemy" group which it must destroy.24

In writing about the Armenian genocide, Fein has addressed the issue of violent actions by the victims carried out in an attempt to repel the perpetrators of genocide. She believes that such actions do not negate the genocide but can make it easier for the perpetrators to justify the genocide by claiming it was necessary to meet the threat posed by the victims' acts.25

Jack Nusan Porter argues against giving genocide too broad a meaning because he fears this will lead to a weakening of the concept. He does believe, however, that the victim


25 Fein, Accounting for Genocide, 12, 15, 17; Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide, 16.
groups designated in the United Nations Convention are too restrictive. Unlike Fein and Kuper who establish new terms to cover other groups, Porter expands the list within his definition of genocide and thus avoids the pitfall of making the targeting of these other groups seem less significant. As he has defined it: "Genocide is the deliberate destruction, in whole or in part, by a government or its agents, of a racial, sexual, religious, tribal, ethnic, or political minority." Porter also recognizes that genocide can encompass more than the direct mass killing of the group by concluding that "[genocide] can involve not only mass murder, but also starvation, forced deportation, and political, economic, and biological subjugation."26

Two of the three "major components" of genocide which Porter identifies—technology and bureaucracy/organization—apply only to genocides of the twentieth century and beyond as they concern the modern technological capability to inflict mass death and the bureaucracy necessary to organize such actions. The third component—ideology—is relevant to the study of genocides throughout history, including the consideration of genocides against indigenous peoples. It is ideology which always has made the victim group "the other," placing the persons within the group "outside the pale of human existence," and giving legitimacy to the perpetrators desire to eradicate them. Porter has written that "words such

as 'savages' are commonly used, especially during war or colonization, to reduce the victims to the level of non-humans, thus making it easier to annihilate them."

Porter identifies three situations in which genocides have historically occurred: (1) during a war or in the aftermath of a defeat in war; (2) during internal and external colonization; and (3) during inter-tribal conflicts. During wartime, civilian populations can become military targets. War can also "provide both the pretext and the opportunity to commit genocide" by creating an atmosphere in which state propaganda can flourish against a targeted group deemed alien to state interests. During internal colonization and imperialism (or "external colonization"), "genocide can become a military and political tool in subjugating the land and its people." Porter believes that this kind of genocide can occur either directly, when the colonizers carry out mass killings of native peoples, or indirectly, when the colonizers transfer diseases to natives who succumb because they lack immunization. This latter case is similar to Helen Fein's concept of "latent" genocides, which removes the typical requirement of "intent" from the definition of genocide. In Porter's case, however, he implies that the transfer of disease would amount to genocide only if immunizations existed but were not made available to the native population.

\[27\] Ibid., 12.

\[28\] Ibid., 15-16.
Porter acknowledges that whether "intent" should be requisite to genocide is a controversial issue, but in using the phrase "deliberate destruction" in his own definition, he indicates his belief that it is. Since Porter does not discuss the meaning of intent as Fein has done, he probably has the more traditional view that the perpetrator must actually have wanted the destruction. Porter has concluded that "numerous Indian tribes have disappeared or are in the process of disappearing because of conquest and colonization," and he has labelled as genocide the killing of Native Americans in the United States. By failing to specify whether he is applying the term generally or in particular instances and by offering no specific analysis of this genocide, Porter weakens his case.29

Irving Louis Horowitz, another sociologist, has put forward a relatively brief definition of genocide which eliminates some of the strictures that others have placed on the concept. According to Horowitz, genocide is "a structural and systematic destruction of innocent people by a state bureaucratic apparatus." While Horowitz specifies that the perpetrator of genocide must be a state, he uses only the word "people" in defining the victim, thus ignoring altogether the restrictions placed on the victim groups in the United Nations Convention. It is not the type of people selected as victims which determines genocide but rather that the state gives them

29 Ibid., 11, 12, 16.
as identity, almost always labelling them as "alien" or "enemy." Under Horowitz's terms, all people are treated as equally worthy of life; and a perpetrator group would be guilty of genocide if they tried to destroy all Communists, homosexuals, or poor people, just as they would be guilty under the United Nations Convention for exterminating Chinese, Hindus, or people of mixed race.30

Horowitz's one caveat—that the victims be "innocent"—raises some troubling issues, particularly since he does not elaborate on what he means. As Helen Fein argues, a people should be able to resist, even by violent means, attempts by the perpetrator to destroy them, and such resistance should not mitigate the crime of genocide. Furthermore, a group may engage in activities which have harmful effects on the perpetrator but which certainly do not justify a genocide. Still another problem is that Horowitz does not say who determines whether the victims are "innocent" and on what basis can this determination be made. A perpetrator will always be able to find its victims guilty of something which justifies their destruction. Horowitz leaves open the method of destruction, which seemingly can incorporate a wide range of means, particularly since he has stated that "genocide represents a systematic effort over time to liquidate" the target group (emphasis added). While he does not directly make intent to destroy a requirement for genocide, it is

implied in the words "systematic destruction," although this could be the "purposeful action" definition of intent as advocated by Fein.31

Although Horowitz directs most of his attention to twentieth-century genocides and has geared his definition to the modern age, he has determined that "the conduct of classic colonialism was invariably linked with genocide. It is the hypocritical heritage of European nations that they proclaimed concepts of democracy and liberty for their own populations while systematically destroying others." He does not provide specific historical examples of colonial genocides, leaving unresolved what specific conduct he regards as genocidal and why. Horowitz does point out, however, that the irony of colonization is that Europeans, who were the true outsiders in the colonized land, quickly determined that it was the native peoples who were the aliens.32

Yehuda Bauer, a professor of Holocaust studies, confronts directly the issue of the uniqueness of the Nazi genocide of European Jews in the context of other genocides. Reflecting the concerns of many people that applying the term "genocide" to all the kinds of group destruction formulated by Lemkin and others weakens the impact of the Holocaust, Bauer has determined that there is a dichotomy in their definition.

31 Ibid., 17, 18-19; Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide, 16; Fein, Accounting for Genocide, 12, 15, 17; Fein, "Genocide: A Sociological Perspective," 10, 15-20.

He proposes that "Holocaust" should be used to mean the state-sponsored, total physical extermination of a victim group, while the term "genocide" should apply to the other kinds of destructive actions propounded by Lemkin and others. Bauer defines genocide specifically as:

the planned destruction . . . of a racial, national, or ethnic group as such, by the following means: (a) selective mass murder of elites or parts of the population; (b) elimination of national (racial, ethnic) culture and religious life with the intent of 'denationalization'; (c) enslavement, with the same intent; (d) destruction of national (racial, ethnic) economic life, with the same intent; and (e) biological decimation through the kidnapping of children or the prevention of normal family life, with the same intent.

Thus, the goal of genocide is the destruction of the victim group as a group and does not necessarily involve the planned killing of all of its members. Nor does Bauer specify that the perpetrator of genocide must be a state. In contrast, a Holocaust, Bauer says, is the "state-sponsored and planned, physical annihilation, for ideological or pseudo-religious reasons, of all the members of a national, ethnic, or racial group." To date, Bauer believes only the Nazi genocide of the Jews can qualify as a Holocaust.  

Unlike most scholars of genocide, Bauer believes that there are only four categories of victim groups: racial, tribal, national, or ethnic. He does not support adding political groups to the possible types of victims, and he wants

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33 Bauer, "The Place of the Holocaust In Contemporary History," 204-05, 213, 206, 214; Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide, 20; Bauer, "The Place of the Holocaust in Contemporary History," 205.
to limit the United Nations Convention by removing religious
groups from its list. His rationale—that membership in these
kinds of groups is voluntary—is specious. To claim that it
would not be genocide for a state to single out for extinction
Catholics or Communists, for example, because the people
within these groups could disassociate is both cruel and
unrealistic.\textsuperscript{34} Without elaborating, Bauer has stated that
"the policies of American settlers towards many Native
American tribes" resulted in genocide, and he believes that
"the fate of the Ache Indians in Paraguay or of the Pierce-Nez
Indians in the American Northwest at the end of the last
century" came close to the Holocaust.\textsuperscript{35}

Although he does not address the issue of intent and
motivation as Fein does, Bauer's views fit her argument. He
believes that "what made the Holocaust unique is . . . the
motivation of the murderers" and the motivation was to
annihilate all Jews solely for ideological reasons. In
genocides, Bauer sees political motivations which result in
the destruction of people: For example, in the Armenian case,
Bauer believes, the Turks were motivated by the desire to
establish a Pan-Turkish empire and not by a desire to
eliminate the Armenians, but they believed that the Armenians
might stand in their way. While Bauer does not do so, this

\textsuperscript{34} Bauer, "The Place of the Holocaust in Contemporary
History," 212.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 213; Bauer, "Essay: On the Place of the
Holocaust in History," 217.
idea of political motivation can readily be extended to the destruction of native peoples who stood in the way of colonization or national expansion. In distinguishing the Holocaust from genocide in this way, however, Bauer appears to make the peculiar judgment that it is worse to destroy people for ideological reasons than it is for political or any other reasons. To the contrary, all rationales for genocide can be equally pernicious. The desire for economic gain which fueled many of the genocides of colonization and national expansion is certainly more coldly calculating than ideological beliefs which can inflame genocidal situations.36

Political scientist Robert Melson has focussed on the historical processes that have led to genocide rather than on a definition of the term. By studying the Armenian and Jewish examples, he has developed a theory of genocide which he suggests may be applicable to other state-sponsored, domestic genocides, past and future. Melson believes that in these cases, the victim group is a minority within the state which the majority has tolerated but also scorned. In spite of its demeaned status, the victim group achieves some success, economically, culturally, politically, or socially, but this success leads to increased tensions with the majority society which feels threatened by minority accomplishments. The majority then determine that the minority group has links, which may be real or imagined, to an outside enemy. When the

state experiences serious military defeats and/or political misfortunes, it determines that the minority group is to blame and therefore must be eliminated. As Melson writes, "Once the state has become convinced that a minority is alien and that it is a deadly threat to its existence, by administrative fiat or by legalistic means it geographically segregates the targeted group and disintegrates it from the social structure." Like Porter, Melson believes that a state of general war makes it easier for genocide to take place. Melson also believes that a simpler genocidal process is possible when the perpetrator has always regarded the victim group as outsiders. Such situations have occurred whenever "a settler regime confronts a technologically less advanced or 'primitive' people, where from the first, the targeted groups are seen as existing outside the social and moral order of the perpetrators." In such cases, the genocidal process is short-circuited because the state does not need the intervening steps to justify its decision to destroy the victim group. 37

In Melson's scenarios, the perpetrator must be the state and the victims are any minority group which the state identifies as outsiders. In cases of settler regimes targeting indigenous peoples, the state may not necessarily have numerical superiority over the minority group. Melson indicates that the state does make a deliberate decision to eliminate the minority and therefore seems to believe that

37 Melson, "Provocation or Nationalism," 79-81.
both motive and intent are present in a genocide. Melson's study of process is limited, however, and he does not rule out the possibility of other kinds of genocide. The delineation of process is useful to the historian and to those concerned with the prevention of future genocides as it provides guideposts by which to determine if a genocide took place in the past or if one may be in the making.

According to sociologist Vahakn N. Dadrian:

Genocide is the successful attempt by a dominant group, vested with formal authority and/or with preponderant access to the overall resources of power, to reduce by coercion or lethal violence the number of a minority group whose ultimate extermination is held desirable and useful and whose respective vulnerability is a major factor contributing to the decision of genocide.

Diverging from the United Nations Convention, Dadrian places no restrictions on who can constitute the victim group except that it be a minority. The perpetrator does not necessarily have to be the state but must be the dominant group in the society. He identifies the following three factors as essential to determining whether genocide has occurred: (1) the intent of the perpetrator; (2) the methodology used against the victims; and (3) the number of resulting casualties in the victim group. While he allows a range of possibilities within the first two factors, intent and methodology, Dadrian considers that the third factor, the number of casualties, may be "the most critical in terms of determining whether a particular act . . . has a genocidal character." Counting the number of victims is a dangerous
standard, however, because it allows the definition of genocide to focus on "how many deaths" rather than on the act of destruction. It also does not recognize that historical events may have been genocide even if the numbers of dead were much less than in modern genocides because the technology to inflict mass death quickly did not exist. He also considers that the response of the victim group to the acts of the perpetrator can affect the type and scope of the genocide.38

In his typology of genocide, summarized below, Dadrian identifies five categories which show a broad application of his definition and a wide range of methods—from assimilation to murder—by which a perpetrator can cause a group's demise.

1) Cultural genocide can occur when the perpetrator does not feel immediately threatened by the victim group and can see a benefit to assimilating the group rather than eliminating it. Through threats of violence, the perpetrator forces the victim to assimilate. When the victim yields without a struggle, a "non-violent" genocide occurs. In some instances, the perpetrator can resort to occasional massacres to intimidate the victim group into compliance. The result of cultural genocide is the disappearance of the group as a group. This recognition that seemingly non-violent assimilation can be genocide because the perpetrator succeeds only by using the threat of violence to force the victim group to comply with the measures that destroy it adds a powerful

38 Dadrian, "A Typology of Genocide," 201, 203, 204.
argument to the necessity to incorporate these acts into any definition of genocide. The perpetrator would surely have to rely on threatened force to carry out the removal of children, servitude, cultural decimation, and all such means of group destruction and would likely resort to mass killings if these means did not successfully terminate a group’s existence. To exclude such cases from genocide would punish the victim group for trying to save the lives of the individuals within it.\textsuperscript{39}

2) Latent genocide occurs when the "unintended consequence" of certain acts of the perpetrator is the destruction of the victim group. For instance, the perpetrator may intend to remove a group from its land, but the resulting "dislocation" of the group may cause its demise. In order for the dominant group to be guilty of genocide in this kind of case, Dadrian believes it must persist in the activity and "refrain from obviating the adverse, unintended consequences." Thus, while direct intent to eliminate the victim does not exist, the perpetrator knowingly persists in actions which destroy the victim anyway. This is similar to Fein’s qualification of intent as opposed to motive. The action which causes the victims’ demise is purposeful, although the underlying motive for the action is something other than the elimination of the group.\textsuperscript{40}

3) Retributive genocide takes place when massacres are

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 205.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 206.
carried out against only a segment of the minority group for the purpose of intimidation or to extinguish suspected "trouble spots." This kind of genocide may also be a way for the dominant group to "test" the feasibility of carrying out a more complete genocide.\(^4\)

4) Utilitarian genocide, like retributive genocide, is limited in terms of targeted victims and objectives. It occurs when the perpetrator massacres a minority group in order to gain something, such as economic resources.\(^4\)

5) Optimal genocide, which is what was carried out against the Armenians and the Jews, is a sustained, destructive process in which the goal of the perpetrator is "the total obliteration of the victim group."\(^4\)

Dadrian believes that in several instances the indigenous peoples of North America were victims of genocide at the hands of White settlers. As a prime example of latent genocide, Dadrian cites "the depredations of removal, reservations, allotment, and ultimate detribalization" which the dominant White society inflicted on Native Americans. Pointing to the Cherokee removal from Georgia as representative of utilitarian genocide, he has written that this action was "symbolic of the pattern of perpetration inflicted upon the American Indian by Whites in North

\(^4\) Ibid., 207.
\(^4\) Ibid., 209.
\(^4\) Ibid., 210.
America." According to Dadrian, however, optimal genocide, as he defines it, did not occur. In making this judgment, however, Dadrian seemingly overlooks two points of historical significance: First, modern technology makes possible the quick and relatively easy infliction of mass death on a scale unprecedented in earlier times. Societies which engaged in genocidal practices in prior eras should be held accountable not by the standards of modern technology but by what they had the capability to carry out in their times. Second, the perpetrator may find that a "sustained, destructive process" of any of Dadrian's other types of genocide—latent, utilitarian, cultural, and retributive—may be optimally successful in "the total obliteration of the victim group" and easier to carry out than conducting large scale and sustained mass murders. Upon analysis, Dadrian's typology is actually in four parts, each of which can be optimal in its results. In studying the genocide of Native Americans, Dadrian should consider their near-total obliteration and how each type of genocide contributed to it before concluding that no optimal genocide took place. Furthermore, Dadrian compounds his error by stating his belief that in the United States the dominant society's creed of democratic pluralism and human rights and its desire to see itself as a "melting pot" made assimilation rather than physical annihilation the goal. Thus, according to Dadrian, the United States' Native American policy adhered more to coercion, removal, and "assimilative disintegration" than to deadly violence. Rather, the United States disposed
of Native Americans as it saw fit in order to achieve its goals of national expansion and the establishment of White, western culture.44

Roger Smith, a political scientist, has delved into the issue of intent in considering the meaning of genocide, which he has defined as "almost always a premeditated act calculated to achieve the ends of its perpetrators through mass murder." In some instances, however, the perpetrator may carry out actions which have "genocidal consequences" even though there is no "conscious decision" to exterminate the victims. If the perpetrator becomes aware of the actual fatal consequences of its acts yet continues the activities anyway, then the unintended outcome changes to a knowing and willful result. "The distinction," Smith has written, "between premeditated and unpremeditated genocide is not decisive, for sooner or later the genocidal is transformed into genocide." Genocidal consequences frequently occurred during colonization when "violence, disease, and relentless pressure" served to eliminate native peoples.45

Based on the premise that "genocide is a rational instrument to achieve an end," Smith has constructed a typology based on the motivation for the genocide--motivations which he believes have varied "to a large extent by historical

44 Ibid., 201, 206, 209; Dadrian, "The Victimization of the American Indian," 528, 535.

45 Smith, "Human Destructiveness and Politics," 23.
period." His five categories are as follows:

1) Retributive genocides rarely occur without additional motivations. Their purpose is to punish a victim group whom the perpetrator has dehumanized and made a scapegoat. 47

2) Institutional genocides, most prevalent in ancient and medieval times, occur when mass murder is a by-product of military conquest. 48

3) Utilitarian genocides, based on the perpetrator group's desire for economic gain, figure prominently in periods of "colonial domination and exploitation" of the native inhabitants and periods of intra-national expansion into the territory of indigenous peoples. In sharp terms, Smith has concluded that the "basic proposition contained in utilitarian genocide is that some persons must die so that others can live well." In expropriating the land and resources for itself, the perpetrator group, motivated by "ethnocentrism and simple greed," destroys the indigenous peoples which stand in its way. 49

4) Monopolistic genocides, the most common domestic genocides of the twentieth century, usually take place in plural societies. The perpetrator group eliminates the victim

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46 Ibid., 24.
48 Ibid., 24.
49 Ibid., 25.
group out of a desire to monopolize power.\textsuperscript{50}

5) Ideological genocides, which also have primarily occurred in the twentieth century, are usually total. The perpetrator group seeks to impose its own view of a pure society by eliminating any group which is alien to this ideal.\textsuperscript{51}

Smith does not accede to the restrictions imposed on the definition of victim groups in the United Nations Convention. Rather, he points out that the reasons victims have been selected for genocide have changed through the ages. By so doing, he underscores the problem with judging genocide only by twentieth-century standards. Not only have the \textit{modi operandi} of genocide changed, but the rationales for targeting victims for genocide have changed as well. According to Smith, prior to modern history, most people who fell victim to genocides did so because of \textit{where} they were, not because of \textit{who} they were. They were killed because they happened to be "on a conqueror's line of march" and so were victims of institutional genocides. When the era of colonial domination began in the fifteenth century, those who became victims of utilitarian genocides did so because of both who they were and what they had. Demeaning and dehumanizing the native inhabitants who were of a different race and usually less technologically advanced gave the colonizers "justification"

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 25-26.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 26; Chalk and Jonassohn, \textit{The History and Sociology of Genocide}, 22.
for the seizure of land and resources and for the elimination of those indigenous peoples who stood in their way. It is in the twentieth century that victims of genocide have been singled out solely on the basis of who they are. These historical distinctions of victims do not mitigate any of the acts of genocide: It is equally serious for a perpetrator to destroy a group because it wants what the group possesses as it is for the perpetrator to destroy a group solely on the basis of its identity.

In their joint work, Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn have developed a restrictive definition of genocide, although they provide a new perspective on the constitution of victim groups. According to these two scholars: "Genocide is a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator." Allowing the perpetrator of genocide, which Chalk and Jonassohn stipulate must be the state or other authority, to select its victim group based on its own perceptions of that group realistically acknowledges that perpetrators of genocide frequently assign mythical characteristics to its targeted victims. No matter what real or imagined parameters establish the victim groups, the perpetrators always dehumanize them and place them "outside the web of mutual obligations." This open-ended method of describing the possible victims of genocide is noteworthy.

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52 Smith, "Human Destructiveness and Politics," 31; Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide, 22.
because it treats as equally serious the destruction of any grouping of people.\footnote{Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide, 23, 10, 28.}

In contrast to Lemkin who believed that genocide could include methods other than outright killing, Chalk and Jonassohn limit the application of the term "genocide" to those cases in which mass killing is the method of extermination. Given the many other effective methods to destroy a group, this limitation to mass killing is short-sighted. Chalk and Jonassohn specifically reject the idea of cultural genocide preferring the term "ethnocide" to cover the destruction of a group's culture.\footnote{Ibid., 23.}

Another limiting factor which Chalk and Jonassohn impose on the definition of genocide is the requirement that the killing be "one-sided." They have done so to indicate that the victims can have no reciprocal intention to eliminate the perpetrator and cannot possess any "organized military machinery that might be opposed to . . . the perpetrators." Furthermore, one-sidedness excludes from genocide both military and civilian casualties of war. Chalk and Jonassohn, however, do not completely preclude resistance to the genocide on the part of the victim group. They allow that a genocide can occur even if "an objectively powerless group resists" because "the very hopelessness of the resistance "underscores
the one-sidedness of these mass killings.\textsuperscript{55} Chalk and Jonassohn err in making one-sidedness a criterion for genocide. To say that genocide cannot occur if the victim group effectively resists or rebels is unfair to the victims because it implies that passivity is the only acceptable response. Furthermore, it undermines efforts to prevent genocide by seeming to caution against one of the means to stop its occurrence. As James Morris has stated in an essay on the Tasmanians, the group which carries out genocide often uses as an excuse any acts of rebellion by the targeted victim.\textsuperscript{56} According to Chalk and Jonassohn, the perpetrator in these cases could be cleared of the crime of genocide even if they resort to mass killings to prevent the alleged rebellion. Genocides can also occur in wartime if one or both sides determine to eliminate the total society of the other and pursue civilian as well as military targets. In a more far-reaching approach, Helen Fein eliminates the criterion of one-sidedness altogether and allows for the rebellion of victim groups and for "bilateral genocidal killing arising during a civil war."\textsuperscript{57}

Chalk and Jonassohn insist that the intent to annihilate the victim group is a necessary component of genocide. Cases in which mass deaths result from the actions

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 23-24, 16.

\textsuperscript{56} Morris, "The Final Solution, Down Under," 213.

\textsuperscript{57} Chalk and Jonassohn, \textit{The History and Sociology of Genocide}, 16; See also note 24, above.
of a state or other authority which does not intend to destroy the entire victim group, such as limited massacres and the unplanned spread of disease, may be terrible, but, according to Chalk and Jonassohn, they are not equal to genocide. They apparently have struggled with this issue, and they engage in a somewhat convoluted discussion of the problem of requiring intent. They concede that intent is difficult to determine since it is rarely acknowledged by the perpetrator, and they allow for some leeway in deciding whether intent exists. For instance, they believe that it is possible to discern intent from the perpetrator’s ideology or "by analyzing the inherent logic of the situation and the processes occurring in this environment." Furthermore, Chalk and Jonassohn believe that intent "is not always explicit in the awareness of the actors." They admittedly are troubled by those cases in which the means which an authority group uses to reach a goal which in itself is not genocide inevitably lead to the mass extermination of the victim group anyway. In trying to come to terms with these situations, they have tentatively concluded that "an action is 'intended' even when it is carried out for different purposes but the perpetrator is likely to know that genocide is the inevitable or probable by-product of a planned action."58 This is similar to Fein's definition of intention as "purposeful action."

To cover the variety of cases which meet some but not

all the requirements of their definition of genocide, Chalk and Jonassohn adopt the term "genocidal massacres," which include mass killings without the intention of total group extinction, the deliberate destruction of a group through means other than mass killings, and the use of killings to terrorize a group into submitting to ethnocide. Genocidal massacres also cover acts in which the result of colonial expansion, although unintended by the colonizers, was the deliberate extermination of the indigenous people.59 Using this term to cover so many possibilities is confusing. Furthermore, in this last instance "deliberate" and "unintended" appear to be contradictory unless Chalk and Jonassohn are using "intent" in the way that Fein uses "motive." If this is so, it is not clear why Chalk and Jonassohn have assigned the term "genocidal massacres" rather than "genocide." The deliberate extermination of indigenous peoples in the wake of colonial expansion fits well Chalk and Jonassohn's category of genocide described earlier in which the perpetrator's actions may be motivated by something other than the demise of the victims but it is obvious that the actions will result in victims' destruction.

Chalk and Jonassohn have devised a typology, based on the motives of the perpetrator, under which genocides are carried out for one or more of the following four reasons: "(1) to eliminate a real or potential threat; (2) to spread

59 Ibid., 26; Chalk and Jonassohn, "The History and Sociology of Genocidal Killings," 40.
terror among real or potential enemies; (3) to acquire economic wealth; and (4) to implement a belief, a theory, or an ideology." The first three reasons underlay the genocides that were committed by states seeking to build and maintain empires. In particular, the third reason, "to acquire and keep economic wealth, usually in the form of land," drove the Europeans who colonized the New World to exterminate the native inhabitants.60

Among all these scholars, two central concerns dominate their examinations of the nature of genocide. One is a desire to define the term in such a way that it can apply to a variety of situations where groups are destroyed as a result of organized action by a perpetrator. The other related concern is the belief that it is necessary to assign the term—albeit carefully—to applicable cases wherever and whenever they occur. Recognizing, as Chalk and Jonassohn phrase it, that until recently "collective denial" of genocides, past and present, has been the rule, these scholars understand that allowing genocides to go unrecognized and unacknowledged is, in effect, to reward the perpetrators. Non-recognition of genocide also continues the injustice for the victims and their survivors and leads to public indifference, which, in turn, undermines the effort to prevent future genocides.61

60 Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide, 29, 30, 36.

61 Ibid., 27; Smith, "Genocide and Denial," 2, 24.
Proposed Resolution

Before proposing a definition of genocide which synthesizes the above analysis of the viewpoints of Lemkin, the United Nations, and the various scholars, the five disputed factors require resolution:

1) With regard to the nature of the perpetrator, many of the scholars see the necessity for the state to sanction in some way the genocidal actions. Fein correctly cautions against making this a requisite part of genocide. Genocides can occur among groups acting outside of state control: for instance, in cases which arise out of ethnic divisiveness. The more important requirement is that the actions which result in the genocide are organized rather than random.

2) As to the nature of the victim, with the exception of Yehuda Bauer, each scholar who addressed legitimate identifying characteristics of victim groups believes that the United Nations Convention, specifying that these groups be defined by nationality, ethnicity, race, or religion, is too restrictive. To place any limitations on the nature of a group which can be the victim of genocide is wrongly judgmental, both because it seemingly makes certain human beings worthier than others and because it ignores the ability of a perpetrator to target victims based on irrational ideology. What is important as a component of genocide is that the victims are targeted for destruction not as individuals but because of their membership in a group. The individuals, as Charny states, can be any human beings, and
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the group of which they are allegedly a part, as Chalk and Jonassohn declare, is defined by the perpetrator based on any criteria it chooses. As all scholars of genocide agree, the one overriding characteristic of the victim group which allows the genocide to take place is that, to the perpetrator, the victims are "aliens," existing outside the ethos of the perpetrator's society.

3) As to the question of whether the perpetrator must have the intention to destroy the victim group, the majority opinion is that this is a necessary criterion for genocide, although there are varying ways of defining intent. Fein's adoption of "purposeful action" as the meaning of intent and her separation of "intent" from "motive" resolves the many problems associated with making the intention of the perpetrator a part of the determination of genocide. To avoid confusion, however, the term "purposeful action" should be substituted for the word "intent." The criterion for genocide should be whether the action which results in the genocide was deliberate rather than accidental, whether or not the underlying motive for the action was the destruction of the victim.

4) To determine what methodology of destruction is necessary for genocide to occur, the question centers on whether genocide should be limited to cases of mass killing or should it encompass the destruction of a group's existence through a variety of other actions. Since in genocide a group and not individuals are the targets of destruction and that
there are many ways to terminate a group's existence, it is logical to recognize that genocide should include the deliberate infliction of mass death and all other actions which are carried out by the direct or implied threat of force and which result in a group's demise.

5) As to the last point of controversy--whether a genocide must be one-sided--it is wrong to require passivity on the part of the victim, and wrong to say that genocides cannot occur during war. One-sidedness should be removed as a criterion.

The resolution of these disputed factors leads to the following definition of genocide: Genocide is the destruction of a group of human beings who are defined as a group by the perpetrator, who acts with purpose and in an organized manner, and who also determines that the group is alien to the perpetrator's society. To elaborate, the perpetrator targets the group as a group, rather than the individuals within it. Furthermore, it is the group which is destroyed, not necessarily the persons within it, and the destruction may be carried out by force or the threat of force. The perpetrator may carry out a plan of action for the deliberate purpose of eliminating the group. Genocide can also occur, however, when the perpetrator may be motivated by some other goal but acts in a way which obviously will result in the destruction of the group or which shows a reckless disregard of the consequences. Resistance or rebellion against the genocide and the perpetrators on the part of the victim group does not mitigate
the actions of the perpetrator. The identity of the perpetrator is not a factor in genocide, although it is frequently a nation state.

The Genocide of Native Americans

Applying this concept of genocide to what happened generally to the Native Americans in the wake of European "discovery" and settlement, the issue necessarily moves beyond whether Columbus was an Adolf Eichmann, as New York Times' writer Karl Meyer facetiously phrased it. Russell Thornton has written:

For [Native Americans] the arrival of the Europeans marked the beginning of a long holocaust, although it came not in ovens, as it did for the Jew. The fires that consumed North American Indians were the fevers brought on by newly encountered diseases, the flashes of settlers' and soldiers' guns, the ravages of "firewater," the flames of villages and fields burned by the scorched-earth policy of vengeful Euro-Americans. The effects of this holocaust of North American Indians, like that of the Jews, was millions of deaths. In fact, the holocaust of the North American tribes was, in a way, even more destructive than that of the Jews, since many American Indian peoples became extinct."

Thornton has identified four causes of the "demographic collapse" of the Native Americans: "disease, including alcoholism; warfare and genocide; geographical removal and relocation; and the destruction of ways of life." Of these, Thornton believes that European diseases caused the greatest number of deaths, while genocide was "probably ... somewhere

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in the middle to lower part of the ranking of the causes of Indian depopulation." He does not elaborate on what he considers genocidal acts, although he infers that they were massacres carried out against men, women, and children. For certain tribes, including the Powhatans, Thornton has found that the effects of war and genocide were devastating. As an example, Thornton writes that after the 1622 uprising of the Powhatan tribes, the English colonists conducted a campaign of "deliberate and systematic destruction" of the Powhatans.63

Using the broader definition of genocide given above leads to a reconfiguration of Thornton’s four causes because, under certain conditions, geographic removal and relocation and the destruction of ways of life can constitute genocide. For instance, Thornton writes that relocation and removal frequently resulted in increased mortality because of accompanying military actions, a greater susceptibility to disease, starvation, and poor conditions. Sometimes the destruction of the ways of life of the tribal group led to a rise in the death rate within the group.64 Death by starvation when caused by White settlers or soldiers who intentionally prevented access to food supplies qualifies as genocide. If the Euro-American authorities and their agents or settlers forced the relocation of a group of native people under conditions which were so poor as to be likely to cause

63 Thornton, American Indian Holocaust and Survival, xvi, 44, 47, 48, 49, 69-70.

64 Ibid., 50-51.
sickness and death and this is what happened, then here too a genocide occurred. While the strictly inadvertent spread of disease correctly belongs outside the realm of genocide, failure to take known preventive measures to halt the spread of disease, fostering alcoholism, and permitting conditions in which diseases flourish, as well as the willful infliction of disease, all support the charge of genocide. Genocide, therefore, can be present in each of Thornton's causes, and was a more significant factor in the demise of Native Americans than he has allowed.

In general, two crucial factors underlay the policies and practices of the English colonists and the United States government towards Native Americans: the Euro-Americans' greed for land and other economic resources and their belief in White supremacy and its counterpart, the dehumanization of the people they called "Indians." As Roger Smith has phrased it, Native Americans were victimized based on what they had as well as who they were. These factors led to a range of actions which can sustain a charge of genocide. At times, there were mass killings specifically aimed at annihilation of native people. More often, there were actions carried out ostensibly for other purposes but in such a way as to show a reckless disregard of the suffering and death which were bound to occur. At other times, programs to assimilate the Native Americans, such as religious conversion and the removal of

children from their tribes to be reared and educated by White people, meant the intentional destruction of the natives' way of life. When these programs were carried out by force or the implied or direct threat of force, a charge of genocide is possible. In some instances, native life dwindled both physically and culturally, succumbing to the relentless pressure of Euro-Americans who did not care that native life was destroyed.

All these actions which resulted in the demise of Native Americans occurred because Euro-Americans always placed the native peoples, in Helen Fein's words, "outside of the universe of obligation." Thus, Euro-Americans considered Native Americans undeserving of any rights and readily discardable. When Euro-Americans attempted to assimilate Native Americans, they believed that they had to first strip the natives of "Indianness." As General Richard Henry Pratt (1840 to 1924), a leading advocate of assimilation through education, declared, his cause was based on the dictum: "Kill the Indian and save the man." Only the "functional restraints," which Leo Kuper wrote about, could interrupt the programs of destruction. These functional restraints were mainly of three types: (1) the need for native labor, an economically-based restraint; (2) the desire for native trade


67 Dadrian, "The Victimization of the American Indian," 530.

68 Kuper, Genocide, 46.
or tribute, also economically-based; and (3) the attempt to use certain tribes as protection from others or to carry out warfare against "enemy" tribes, based on the need for security. When these restraints were removed, either because their intended purpose failed, as when the native inhabitants proved unworkable as a labor supply, or because other concerns became paramount, such as when fear caused all natives, "friendly" and "enemy," to be seen as one, then destructive practices became unbridled. In writing about the Tasmanians, James Morris described "the classic settler-native syndrome," which is applicable also to what happened between settlers and native peoples in what is now the United States. As Morris stated, English settlers in Tasmania concluded "that life in Tasmania would be much happier if there were no Tasmanians," just as English settlers in North America decided that their life in North America would be better if there were no "Indians." 69 In the eyes of Euro-Americans, Native Americans were at best an expendable people to be used when possible and discarded if not.

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CHAPTER III
IMAGE AND EXPECTATIONS

Recurrent in theories of genocide is the finding that, preceding the destruction, a group which carries out a genocide always identifies its victims as aliens existing outside the realm of the common ethos. In Helen Fein’s succinct phrasing, "genocide is the annihilation of the other."\(^1\) To review the historical relationship between Whites and the native peoples of the Americas is to find that a fundamental cornerstone of that relationship has been the White view of the Native Americans’ "otherness." As the Native American writer Michael Dorris has written, there has been a "long-standing tendency of European or Euro-American thinkers to regard Indians as so ‘Other,’ so fundamentally and profoundly different, that they fail to extend to native peoples certain traits commonly regarded as human."\(^2\)

Not only did the White people view the native peoples as aliens, but they also saw them as deficient. Whites, therefore, subjugated the "Indians" as they saw fit, appropriating their land, labor, and souls.\(^3\) Expanding the

\(^1\) Fein, "Scenarios of Genocide," 5.

\(^2\) Dorris, "Indians on the Shelf," 101.

\(^3\) Berkhof, The White Man's Indian, 113.
implications of the Euro-Americans' image of native peoples, historian Richard Drinnon has written that White behavior towards the native peoples has been premised on the principle of the "negation of the other." Accordingly, the "Indians" had no inherent rights to their existence. Whites would allow them to survive only if they would forego their "Indianness" and adopt White ways.

Image and intentions are closely intertwined: each can influence the other. The need to justify motivations and intentions can serve to perpetuate a faulty image, even in the face of empirical evidence to the contrary. As historian Gary Nash has written:

Understanding the English image of the Indian . . . gives meaning to English relations with the Indian and to English policies directed at controlling, "civilizing" and exterminating him. Images of the Indian were indicators of attitudes towards him. Attitudes, in turn, were closely linked to intentions and desire. . . . Thus, images of the Indians in colonial America are of both explanatory and causative importance.

Seeing the Native Americans as deficient others gave rise in Euro-Americans to the belief that they had the right to do what they wished with the natives' land and resources and with the native peoples themselves. At the same time, the motivation of the colonizers to make good in the New World by

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5 Berkhofer, The White Man's Indian, 119.
6 Ibid., 118.
planting and trading, which required the expropriation of the natives' resources and labor, was made easier to carry out by this image, thus giving the image its own raison d'être.

The label of "Indian" itself underscores the bias of the European colonizers. First, it is a misnomer based on the mistaken assumption by Columbus and his followers that they had landed in the Indies rather than the Caribbean. Second, the Europeans subsumed under this one name a large number of diverse peoples living in separate national or tribal groupings. The native peoples of the Americas never saw themselves as one; rather, the Europeans imposed an arbitrary and false unity,8 seeing all "Indians" as a "separate and single other."9 Refusing to acknowledge diversity and individuality, the Europeans persisted in using "Indian" even after they realized that they were not in the Indies after all. This aggregation of many peoples into one "they" who stand diametrically opposed to the "we" is a common attribute of prejudice. It is convenient to view an enemy as a single alien group rather than as many individuals with distinguishing qualities.10

From accounts of explorers and colonizers from Columbus to Thomas Hariot, the English colonists who embarked for

8 Berkhofer, The White Man's Indian, 3; Dadrian, "The Victimization of the American Indian," 517.

9 Berkhofer, The White Man's Indian, xv.

10 Berkhofer, The White Man's Indian, xv; Dadrian, "The Victimization of the American Indian," 517.
Jamestown in 1607 had ample opportunity to learn about the native peoples they would encounter. Both the novelty of a new "land" and the desire to promote colonization gave rise to a considerable literature. Before setting foot in Virginia, the English colonists had formed in their minds and image of Native Americans which would influence their behavior toward them.

The image, however, was not a clear one. Rather, as Nash says, the English had developed a "split image" of America's natives.11 Several representations by explorers depicted the natives as savages, beasts, an inhuman species who engaged in outrageous acts of cruelty and brutality such as cannibalism. For instance, reports from the expeditions of Martin Frobisher in the 1570s described the natives as brutal, sly, and only half-human.12 Other reports portrayed the natives as more childlike in their primitiveness, and docile, friendly, and helpful to the foreigners who arrived on their shores. Columbus himself wrote of the generosity and naïveté of the natives in San Salvador.13

Looming large in the English perception of the natives was their knowledge of the Spanish experience in conquering the natives of Latin America. Influenced by the writings of the priest Bartholomé de las Casas, which had been translated

12 Ibid., 200.
13 Ibid., 201.
into English in 1583 and which castigated the Spanish for their cruelty to the natives, the English, too, were critical of Spanish ruthlessness. Portraying the Spanish in this light was useful propaganda for the English in their geopolitical and religious rivalry with Spain and was a tool for English entrepreneurs who pushed for colonization on the grounds that England needed to save the New World from Spanish domination. The younger Richard Hakluyt, who together with his uncle was a prime promoter of colonization in the Americas, seized on the vilification of the Spanish to support his cause. In his "Discourse of Western Planting," written in 1584, Hakluyt accused the Spanish colonizers of barbarously slaughtering millions of "peaceable, lowly, mild, and gentle" natives, including women, children, and the elderly.14

The failure of the Roanoke colony in the 1580s, partially caused by the friction between the native peoples and the settlers, did nothing to enhance the image of the natives as childlike and friendly. Instead, the English became more inclined to the image of brutal savages.15 To make matters worse, well before arriving in Jamestown, the English received a warning that at least some of the native inhabitants would not welcome them there. On an exploratory voyage from Roanoke to the James River in 1585-86, Captain

14 Taylor, The Original Writings and Correspondence of the Two Richard Hakluys, 257-260.

Ralph Lane received a warning from a tribe that was enemies of the Powhatans about a powerful king in the area who "would be loathe to suffer any strangers to enter into his country, and . . . able to make a great many of men into the field, which . . . would fight very well."16 Thus, as they set sail for Virginia, the English could not have expected that smooth relationships with the indigenous peoples lay ahead. Maintaining a dual image of the natives helped to encourage colonization by holding out hope that the natives would willingly submit to the colonizers' superior ways while at the same time laying the groundwork to justify the use of force. An English minister, Robert Gray, writing a sermon in 1609 to encourage colonization, expressed well this dual image:

The report goeth that in Virginia the people are savage and incredibly rude, they worship the devil, offer their young children in sacrifice unto him, wander up and down like beasts, and in manners and conditions differ very little from beasts . . . yet by nature loving and gentle, and desirous to embrace a better condition.17

Wanting the Native Americans to provide land, labor, and trade, the English devised theories to achieve these ends, whether or not the natives wanted to embrace English ways. Acquiring land was of primary importance to the colonists, who failed—or refused—to understand the native inhabitants' conceptions of land ownership. What the English saw were huge tracts of unoccupied, or at most under-used,

17 Gray, A Good Speed to Virginia, unpaged text.
territory, and they believed they had the right to seize or at least share it with the natives.18 If the natives did not seem inclined to accept the intrusion, the English determined that because they were barbarians, the natives had no rights to the land. In his 1609 sermon, the Reverend Robert Gray asked rhetorically: "By what right or warrant we can enter into the land of these savages, take away their rightful inheritance from them, and plant ourselves in their places, being unwronged and unprovoked by them?" He then answered that "a Christian king may lawfully make war upon barbarous and savage people . . . and may make a conquest of them."19 In the age of its burgeoning empire, England never recognized the sovereign rights of native peoples to their land. If the English afforded the natives any land rights at all, it was only to use the land at the discretion of the colonial power.20

Equally important as land in the minds of the colonizers was the problem of finding an adequate labor force to work it. Here again, the European image of the "Indians" augured well for a solution. The idea of the heathen, yet simple-minded, malleable natives, encouraged the Europeans to believe that, given the opportunity, the natives would flock

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19 Gray, A Good Speed to Virginia, unpaged text.

to work for them, receiving in return the benefits of European civilization.\textsuperscript{21} Awareness of the Spanish colonists' experience in the New World and their success in utilizing native labor spurred the English to think that they could do likewise.\textsuperscript{22} When the natives proved recalcitrant to become the English people's laborers, the image of the "savage Indians" provided the justification for the colonists to force the natives to work and to enslave them if necessary. The Europeans considered the natives' refusal to exploit their land and its resources and their practice to use only what was necessary for survival a sure sign of indolence, which was viewed as sinful. Therefore, with self-serving logic, the Europeans concluded that they could enslave the natives in order to save them from the devil.\textsuperscript{23} While the English castigated the Spanish for their cruelty to the indigenous people, historian Edmund Morgan maintains that they certainly undertook their own colonization efforts buoyed by the "Spanish experience" which "had shown that Europeans could thrive in the New World without undue effort by exploiting the natives."\textsuperscript{24} The colonists' profitable use of native labor, whether through slavery or other means, served as a functional restraint upon the colonizers' use of more destructive methods.

\textsuperscript{21} Morgan, \textit{American Slavery, American Freedom}, 22-24.
\textsuperscript{22} Morgan, "The Labor Problem At Jamestown," 597-99.
\textsuperscript{23} Morgan, \textit{American Slavery, American Freedom}, 24.
\textsuperscript{24} Morgan, "The Labor Problem at Jamestown," 598-99.
to overcome any obstacles the indigenous peoples might pose to English domination. In the North American colonies, the English found that the natives would not solve the colony’s labor needs. The functional restraint was then lifted, and the English turned to other, more lethal means to win control.

The desire for trade provided another important impetus for the colonization of the Americas. Professing a belief in the inherent right of "civilized" nations to establish trade with the "uncivilized," the English concluded that trade would not only be profitable for the colonizers but would also be beneficial for the natives. Seeing the "Indians" as tractable savages who would be willing to embrace English ways, the English saw trade as a way to establish friendly relations. Once again, however, the English were ready with alternative plans in case the native peoples proved unwilling partners. In his "Pamphlet for the Virginia Enterprise," written in 1585, the elder Richard Hakluyt posed four essential dilemmas which the English faced in their attempt to set up trade with the New World natives. The first problem would arise if the natives felt content as they were and did not desire any of the goods the English had to offer. In that case, he proposed that their "nature" may need to be "altered, as by conquest and other good means." The second problem, to which he offered no solution, was that trade could be precluded if the native peoples desired the commodities England had to offer but produced these things themselves. Yet a third problem would occur if the natives wanted English goods but had
nothing themselves to trade. Here a solution was readily available, according to Hakluyt: the colonizers should conquer the new land and use it to produce goods desired by the mother country. Uncooperative natives might cause the fourth problem. "If they [the natives] will not suffer us to have any commodities of theirs without conquest," Hakluyt wrote, then the English, being the "lords of navigation" could defend themselves and "annoy" the natives "in many places." Proposing that the English could take advantage of intertribal fighting as a way to obtain revenge against the natives, Hakluyt concluded that the English would then be able to "conquer, fortify, and plant. . . . And in the end to bring them all [the Native Americans] to subjugation or civility."25 Whenever the natives did prove to be profitable trading partners, this served as another functional restraint on the colonists' killing of the native people.

In all three objectives which the English hoped to achieve in colonizing the Americas—land, labor, and trade—the dual image of the indigenous peoples served the colonizers well. The "innocent savages" beckoned the English to come by promising to share willingly their land and to become toilers for English planters and traders for English goods. If the "savages" proved "brutal" instead, therein lay the justification for the English to force them into submission.

When the natives proved unwilling or unable to contribute to the colonies' profitability, the English could also feel free to exert control by deadly means. As historian Robert Berkhofer has explained, "If the primitivistic version of Indian goodness promised easy fulfillment of European desires, the image of the bad Indian proved the absolute necessity ... of forcing the Native Americans from 'savage' to European ways through the exploitation of their physical bodies, spiritual souls, and tribal lands."²⁶

Another rationale for colonization figured prominently in the writings of Europeans in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and that was the duty to "Christianize" the native inhabitants. The Spanish and the French, Roman Catholics, took the duty seriously, and members of the religious orders worked assiduously to bring the "heathen savages" to the one true God. Curiously, the Protestant English, while emphasizing in their writings the necessity of converting the natives, never expended much effort in actually doing so.²⁷ Even in their writings, converting the natives to the Church of England seemed to be less a matter of saving souls as a part of the larger scheme to convert them to the English way of life, and thus to secure their cooperation with the colonizers' endeavors. In his instructions to the first Virginia colonists, King James ordered them to treat the

²⁶ Berkhofer, The White Man's Indian, 119.
²⁷ Chalk and Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide, 175.
natives well "whereby they may be the sooner drawn to the true knowledge of God, and the obedience of us" (emphasis added). The Virginia Company echoed these sentiments in its 1609 instructions to the Jamestown settlers. Claiming that converting the natives to Christianity was "the most pious and noble end of this plantation," the Company emphasized that the only hope was with the younger generation and told the colonists that if they "entreat well and educate those which are younger . . . in your manners and religion, their people will easily obey you and become in time civil and Christian." Berkhofer refers to this use of religious conversion to achieve the more profitable goals of colonization as the "fusion of secular and religious ends" which "can be viewed not only as bringing the Indian more fully under White law and jurisdiction but also making them more amendable to White economic exploitation." Perhaps the fact that English-Native American relationships soured early explains the dearth of concerted effort to proselytize the Christian faith among the native inhabitants. Native resistance to English goals quickly obliterated the image of the "amiable savages" in the English mind, with the result that the image of the "brutal barbarians" became dominant. Once this happened, the English felt justified in resorting to

30 Berkhofer, *The White Man's Indian*, 133.
force rather than conversion to achieve what they wanted.

The image of native peoples as "alien others" which persisted in the European mind is an important requirement in the determination of whether the Europeans carried out genocide. Understanding how that image contributed to the pursuit of English goals demonstrates how seeing people as savage rather than human enables a genocidal process to begin. In the case of the English colonists in North America, this discussion of image and expectations also reveals the presence of two important factors in the study of genocide: motive/intent and the knowledge of wrong-doing. In 1585, the elder Richard Hakluyt clearly spelled out the goals of the voyages to Virginia: "(1) to plant Christian religion; (2) to traffic; (3) to conquer; or to do all three." He then acknowledged: "To plant Christian religion without conquest will be hard. Traffic easily follows conquest: conquest is not easy. Traffic without conquest seems possible, and not uneasy." After considering "what is to be done," Hakluyt expressed his belief that peaceful means would be the best course for all concerned. Nevertheless, he concluded that should the natives offer any resistance, then the colonists could justly use force to conquer them.31 This is the common theme of English colonization. From the beginning, the English colonists went to Virginia, where they knew that the native inhabitants might not welcome them, with the motivation

31 Taylor, The Original Writings and Correspondence of the Two Richard Hakluyts, 329-334.
to settle and to trade no matter what the natives' response would be. If the natives chose to cooperate with the settlers and to adopt English ways, then all would be peaceful. If the natives did not cooperate, however, the English fully intended to use force to obtain compliance no matter what the human cost would be. Furthermore, the English knew about and condemned the Spanish for their treatment of the native peoples of New Spain. Yet, they admitted before they had arrived in their first colony that they too might be driven to force the natives into submission. They were thus ready and willing to do what they had already professed was wrong and cruel.

For the Native Americans, the result of colonization—whether accomplished through their coerced compliance with English ways or through the English use of force against them—was the same: a staggering death toll and survivors who lost their traditional way of life. In the establishment of their colonial domain, the English denied the natives the right to exist—spiritually, culturally, economically, and frequently even physically.32

CHAPTER IV
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY VIRGINIA: A CASE STUDY

The Native Peoples of Virginia
At the Time of Contact With the English

In the beginning of the seventeenth century, one of the largest, most intricately organized, and powerful Native American societies in North America occupied the land that is now Virginia. A short time before the English arrival, Wahunsonacock (called Powhatan by the English), the strong and ambitious weroance (chief) of the Pamunkeys, had consolidated about thirty Algonquian-speaking tribes under his dominion. These tribes lived in an estimated 161 villages spread over approximately six thousand square miles of Virginia’s coastal plain, from the Potomac River on the north to the Great Dismal Swamp on the south and from the Atlantic Ocean on the east to the fall line on the west. In the late sixteenth century, Wahunsonacoock had begun expanding his rule when he inherited six tribes. By 1608, he subjugated the other tribes through conquest or intimidation. The majority of the Virginia tribes were Algonquians, and Wahunsonacoock now ruled all those living on the coastal plain except the Chickahominies.¹

The degree of Wahunsonacoock's control varied, however, with those tribes living farthest from him enjoying the

¹ Rountree, Pocahontas's People, 10.
greatest freedom. The English referred to this grouping of thirty tribes as the Powhatans. Although historians have commonly called the Powhatans a "confederacy" and occasionally an "empire," ethnohistorian Helen Rountree persuasively argues that both are misnomers. The tribes on the fringe were too loosely connected to be a confederacy and Wahunsonacock did not exert enough "coercive force" over his tribes to equal a "monarchical state." Rountree adopts the name "paramount chiefdom" as the most accurate term to refer to the thirty-tribe grouping, the Powhatans.2 When the English invaded Virginia in 1607, Wahunsonacock was still in the process of consolidating power in his attempt to forge a new ethnic group out of the various Algonquian tribes.3

West of the fall line, in the piedmont region of Virginia, lived two allied Siouan-speaking tribal groupings, the Monacans and the Manahuacs, who were the Powhatan's worst enemies. Two Iroquoian-speaking tribes occupied territory on the coastal plain south of the James River. Estimates of the total number of Native Americans living in Virginia in 1607 vary. The most recent figures indicate that the total native population was approximately 20,000 to 25,000. Of these, approximately 14,000 were Algonquians of which about 12,000 to

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2 The term "paramount chiefdom" is used in this paper as the most accurate descriptive label for the thirty tribes linked by Wahunsonacock's rule. The name Powhatan is also used to refer to this thirty-tribe grouping.

3 Rountree, Pocahontas's People, 11, 12-13.
13,000 were in the Powhatan paramount chiefdom. Quite possibly, the population had already declined precipitously due to the advent of European diseases fifty to one-hundred years earlier.\(^5\)

Anthropologists and historians have not been able to conclusively determine the extent to which European diseases had struck the Powhatan tribes prior to 1607 largely because no archaeological evidence of plagues has as yet been unearthed. Knowledge of the broad sweep of European diseases through the continents of North and South America beginning with the advent of native-European contact, coupled with an albeit sparse historical record, lends credence to the theory that the Powhatans had suffered considerable loss of life from these diseases in the late sixteenth to early seventeenth centuries.\(^6\) A leading authority on New World epidemics, Alfred Crosby, has shown how fast and far diseases spread by documenting the first outbreak of smallpox in the Spanish colonies in 1518, which rapidly spread from the Caribbean to Mexico and then through Central and South America.\(^7\) Accounts of Hernando DeSoto’s expedition in 1539 to 1543 through territory which is now the southeastern United States indicate

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\(^4\) Thornton, *American Indian Holocaust*, 68; Rountree, *Pocahontas’s People*, 3; Fitzhugh, "Commentary," 188.

\(^5\) Rountree, *Pocahontas’s People*, 3.


that epidemic diseases had already struck the native peoples in the area, perhaps ignited by contact with an earlier group of explorers under Ponce de León who reached Florida in 1513. Sir Francis Drake's landing in St. Augustine, Florida, in 1585 apparently was the source of another epidemic, probably of typhus, which struck the area. In his account of the colony of Roanoke which existed briefly in the 1580s, Thomas Hariot graphically depicted how European diseases devastated the native inhabitants physically and spiritually:

[W]ithin a few days after our departure from every such town, the people began to die very fast, and many in short space; in some towns about twenty, in some forty, in some sixty, and more six score, which in truth was very many in respect of their numbers....The disease also was so strange, that they neither knew what it was, nor how to cure it....[T]hey were persuaded that it was the work of our God through our means, and that we by him might kill and slay whom we could without weapons and not come near them.

This marvelous accident in all the country wrought so strange opinions of us, that some people could not tell whether to think us gods or men, and the rather because that all the space of their sickness, there was no man of ours known to die....

Accounts of the Spanish Jesuit mission in Virginia in 1570 to 1571 indicate that the Powhatans had suffered many years of "famine and death," which could indicate the presence of epidemic diseases. In 1608, John Smith had two

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8 Smith, M., Archaeology of Aboriginal Culture Change, 55.

9 Crosby, Columbian Exchange, 40; Smith, M., Archaeology of Aboriginal Culture Change, 56.

10 Quinn, The Roanoke Voyages, 1584-1590, 378-79.

11 Dobyns, Their Number Became Thinned, 276.
experiences which also could be evidence of earlier epidemics among the Powhatans. On a trip to the Eastern Shore, a local weroance told him about the deaths of two children which precipitated "a great part of his people" dying. Later Wahunsonacock told Smith that he had "seen the death of all my people thrice," although it is not clear from this remark whether the deaths resulted from warfare or disease. Concrete evidence exists that native people contracted European diseases wherever they experienced initial contact with Europeans and that these diseases spread rapidly from intra-native contact. The fact that the Powhatans had an early encounter with the Spanish missionaries and were also in relative proximity to areas where plagues occurred points to a conclusion that the Powhatans had themselves suffered from epidemics prior to 1607.

The tribes within the Powhatan chiefdom lived, as historian Wesley Frank Craven has described, in a "highly organized communal enterprise." Primarily a sedentary people, they resided for most of the year in their villages. Each village was small, composed of a maximum of one-hundred homes, and was always built near water. Some of the villages were palisaded completely, but in some of the larger villages, a palisade surrounded only the more important buildings. The people were farmers, growing corn, peas, pumpkins, beans,


13 Craven, White, Red, and Black, 49.
sunflowers, gourds, and tobacco. Lacking fertilizer, the Powhatans used the slash and burn technique of agriculture, in which they left fields fallow after a few years to replenish while they moved on to new ground. This style of farming required that free land be always available. The Native Americans' concept of land ownership was based on community and thus differed from the European idea of individual ownership. While the paramount chief was the holder of the lands in his domain, he may have been more of a "steward" than a landowner in the European sense. The paramount chief granted tracts of land to the separate tribes who paid him tribute in return, and then the local weroances parcelled out tracts of land to individual families within the tribe in exchange for their tribute. Ownership of fields was based on usufruct, and any uncultivated land was considered communal property.14

Hunting, fishing, and gathering provided food as well. The native people ate fish, deer, bear, wild turkey, and other game and wild fruits such as berries. Hunting and fishing were the job of the Powhatan men, who also cleared the fields in preparation for planting. The women did all the rest of the farming and prepared the food for eating. This division of labor in the procurement of food baffled the English. While in reality, the role of women as farmers enhanced their

14 Rountree, Pocahontas's People, 5-6; Rountree, The Powhatan Indians of Virginia, 40, 46, 57, 114-15, 124; Wright, the Only Land They Knew, 18.
status in the tribe, the English could not comprehend a society whose women ranked higher and had more control over their lives than did English women. Instead, Englishmen dismissed the native men as lazy, and this notion furthered the image of the natives as "alien others."\(^{15}\) Another promoter of colonization, Samuel Purchas, in a diatribe against the native peoples, castigated them for "having little of humanity but shape" and for being "wild and unmanly . . . captivated to Satan's tyranny in . . . wicked idleness."\(^{16}\)

Powhatan society was matrilineal: tribal chiefs inherited their power through the mother's side of the family. Each of the thirty tribes in this confederacy was ruled by a weroance (male) or weroansqua (female), who was responsible to Wahunsonacock either directly or through another, intermediate weroance. Chiefs wielded considerable power over tribal members and administered harsh and swift punishments for wrongdoing, including disobedience. Chief Wahunsonacock was the strong ruler over all the people in the paramount chiefdom, but he was still trying to consolidate his hold over the fringe tribes when the English arrived. Each weroance/weroansqua required tribute payments from their tribes' people, and Wahunsonacock collected tribute in corn, animal skins, copper, beads, pearls, turkeys, deer, and other wild animals from each of his subject tribes. Although

\(^{15}\) Rountree, *Pocahontas's People*, 5, 8.

religion evidently played an important role in Powhatan life, a variety of gods and religious beliefs existed. The people believed that priests had special abilities, such as healing the sick and foretelling the future. They exerted a powerful influence in secular affairs because of these skills and their religious authority. Thus, the colonists were particularly alarmed when the priests became virulent opponents of English settlement.\(^{17}\) Powhatan men were fierce warriors, and inter-tribal warfare was common. Although they sometimes fought in open areas en masse, more often warriors engaged in small-scale, surprise attacks carried out from undercover. Weaponry consisted of bows and arrows and clubs.

Wahunsonacock and some of the Powhatan tribes may have had their first contact with Europeans in the years between 1559 and 1561 when the Spanish sent an exploratory party through their territory. In 1570, led by a native captive whose Christian name was Don Luis de Velasco, Spanish Jesuits set up a short-lived mission on the York River. Less than six months after their arrival, Don Luis, who had since returned to his tribe, and a group of warriors killed the eight Jesuits and captured a novice. In 1572 the Spanish sent a force to retaliate and retrieve the novice; they killed twenty natives in combat and hanged another fourteen. According to later accounts about this incident which the Chickahominies gave the English, the natives felt an indelible hatred for the

\(^{17}\) Rountree, *Pocahontas's People*, 11.
Spaniards for this ruthless revenge.\textsuperscript{18}

In the 1570s and 1580s, English and Spanish expeditions to the Chesapeake resulted in more contact between Europeans and the indigenous peoples, including the tribes of the Powhatan. It is not known, however, whether the Powhatans knew of the experience of the native peoples with the Roanoke settlers. By 1607, the sum total of their knowledge of Europeans surely made the native peoples at best apprehensive about future contacts. As two ethnohistorians, Helen Rountree and J. Frederick Fausz have concluded, the threat of European invasion probably gave impetus to Wahunsonacock's efforts to build his paramount chiefdom, hoping that by consolidating power, the tribes would best be able to hold firm. Rountree sees two other factors contributing to Wahunsonacock's drive to power: the increasing threat of war from enemy tribes and the "social disruption" caused by the epidemics of European diseases.\textsuperscript{19} Threats from within and without to the Powhatans' social order likely did impel Wahunsonacock's campaign for unification as the best means to hold firm against disaster.

When the English arrived in Virginia and began to build a settlement, Wahunsonacock must have realized that his domain was at a critical juncture. Disease may already have ravaged his people, and they now faced not only known enemies (the

\textsuperscript{18} Rountree, Pocahontas's People, 15-18; Fitzhugh, "Commentary," 189; Fausz, "Patterns of Anglo-Indian Aggression," 236.

\textsuperscript{19} Rountree, Pocahontas's People, 10; Fausz, "Patterns of Anglo-Indian Aggression," 236.
Monacans and the Manahuacs) from the west, but a new, potential enemy from the east. Having been unable to subjugate totally the fringe tribes of his chiefdom, he may have feared that they might break away and form dangerous alliances with the enemy tribes or the colonists. Although he was quick to exterminate the Chesapeake tribe, who he believed threatened his rule around the same time as the English arrival, Wahunsonacocock chose not to order a massive attack to drive out the new settlers despite having overwhelming numerical superiority. Instead, Wahunsonacocock decided to try to use the English to his advantage, apparently hoping that he could form an alliance with them and obtain weapons which would help him strengthen his hold on the tribes in his chiefdom and protect it from enemies. Anthropologist Nancy O. Lurie believes that, although suspicious of the English from the outset, the Powhatans in 1607 believed themselves strong enough to handle any possible threat from the English colonizers. Similarly, J. Frederick Fausz maintains that the Powhatans were overconfident about their military capabilities. This may have been the case. It is also possible, however, that Wahunsonacocock acted out of a perceived position of weakness, rather than strength. Plagues of

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22 Lurie, "Indian Cultural Adjustment," 37-38; Fausz, "The Invasion of Virginia," 145.
European diseases probably had already ravaged and demoralized his people. Furthermore, he was well-aware that Europeans could act treacherously and that their firearms were superior to his people's weaponry. Within days of the English arrival, some Powhatans attacked the colonists but were repulsed by musket fire.\textsuperscript{23} With tribal enemies to the west and a potentially more lethal enemy to the east, Wahunsonacock may have felt unable to mount a defense, let alone an offense, on two fronts. He opted for a political gamble: an attempt to use, rather than fight, the English. It was a gamble that failed.

**The Seizure of Virginia**

The English experience in Virginia in the seventeenth century illustrates well how colonization can set in motion a genocidal process for which ultimate responsibility must lie with the officials of the colonizing nation-state. While genocide does not require state involvement, in the genocides of indigenous peoples which occurred during European colonization, a key element is the role of the nation-state, which provided the underlying motive, the authority, and frequently the means to carry out the genocides and, therefore, must bear the responsibility for what occurred.

Although the Virginia Company of London, which organized the Virginia venture, was a private corporation, it received its charter from the Crown, which therefore held the

\textsuperscript{23} Fausz, "Patterns of Anglo-Indian Aggression," 237.
final authority. From 1607 to 1609, the king imposed direct royal control of the colony's government, but from 1609 to 1624, he granted the Virginia Company greater autonomy. In 1624, however, the King revoked the Virginia Company's charter and turned Virginia into a royal colony. The governing body within the colony evolved during these years. Initially, the Virginia Company appointed a council and president, but in 1609 it established the position of a strong governor who would work with the council. In 1619 the colony initiated its first elected legislature, the House of Burgesses, which sat with the governor and council in the Grand Assembly. After 1624, the king appointed the governor and council. Among its responsibilities, the Grand Assembly determined the colony's policy with the native peoples.²⁴

The colonists who arrived in Virginia on April 16, 1607 had several expectations, first and foremost of which was that they anticipated finding the means to enrich themselves and the Company. The second was that they did not plan to do the menial work required to sustain a colony. As stated earlier, they expected to find the "Indians," and with the experience of Roanoke behind them, plus an overt warning, they surely did not anticipate that these "Indians" would welcome them. This was no deterrent, however, for the English believed in their own inherent right to the land and in their rights to force

²⁴ Robinson, Southern Colonial Frontier, 1, 7; Robinson, Virginia Treaties, xxii-xxiii; Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 79.
trade and expropriate native labor. Knowing that the Spanish had built a successful and wealth-producing colony on the backs of native peoples, the English could have expected no less for themselves.\textsuperscript{25} If converting the natives to Christianity figured prominently in the plans written for the colony in London, conversion did not seem to loom large in the minds of the settlers. The colonists, however, did not arrive with the intention of annihilating the native peoples but rather of using them in the furtherance of English gain and glory.

From the beginning, a mutual wariness existed between the colonists and the native peoples. For the first two months, Wahunsonacock apparently decided to allow the individual tribes of his chiefdom to act as they pleased towards the newcomers. Helen Rountree believes this was a way for Wahunsonacock to test the English. If this is so, he might not have decided on his plan to try to ally with these Europeans and was trying instead to determine whether he could successfully expel them from his land. The first encounter between natives and the English did not bode well for either side: Native warriors attacked the first arrivals at Cape Henry, proving to the colonists that they were not welcome, and the English turned their guns on the warriors, proving to the natives the superiority of English firearms. Initially, the English tired to convince the natives that they were only

\textsuperscript{25} Morgan, "The Labor Problem at Jamestown," generally; Morgan, \textit{American Slavery, American Freedom}, 83-88.
visiting; however, their construction of a fort at Jamestown belied their words and convinced the Powhatans that they planned to stay. From April to June, the relationship between natives and English teetered back and forth between welcoming gestures on the part of the natives and violent skirmishes in which natives frequently fell victim to English gunfire. Although the Powhatans had great numerical superiority over the colonists at this point, their experiences facing English firearms apparently daunted them to such an extent that they could not take advantage of their numbers. Repeatedly, Englishmen writing of their experiences in the colony tell of the terror which the use of their firearms induced in the native people. Although the view of the natives as inferior beings could well have influenced these accounts, it is reasonable to believe that the sight and sound of firearms and the dreadful injuries they could inflict would arouse such fear in people who fell victim to them for the first time. Firearms offered the English not only a technological advantage but a psychological edge as well. Perhaps it was this direct experience with the power of English weapons which convinced Wahunsonacock that he might not succeed in war against them, but that he could benefit from an alliance with them. On June 15, 1607, he ordered his tribes to cease hostilities\(^\text{26}\).

For the remainder of the year, an uneasy truce prevailed. The first group of 105 settlers was preoccupied with trying to stay alive. Quickly exhausting the provisions they had brought with them, they contracted typhoid, dysentery, and salt poisoning from drinking the water of the James River. To make the situation worse, the natives’ corn ripened later than usual, which deprived the English, as well as the natives, of a food source. Watching the weakened settlers, who were either too ignorant or too lazy to take the steps necessary for survival, may have increased Wahunsonacocock’s confidence that he would be able to deal with them on his own terms. When the natives did harvest their corn in September, they brought gifts of food to Jamestown, but the colonists remained unable to recognize the humanity in their saviors. As George Percy, one of the settlers wrote:

If it had not please[d] God to have put a terror in the savages’ hearts, we had all perished by these wild and cruel pagans. . . . It pleased God, after awhile, to send those people which were our mortal enemies to relieve us with victuals, as bread, corn, fish, and flesh in great plenty, which was the setting up of our feeble men, otherwise we had all perished. Also we were frequented by diverse kings in the country, bringing us store of provision to our great comfort.27

The redoubtable John Smith ascended quickly to a position of power in Jamestown. Brash and arrogant, Smith viewed the native peoples as nothing more than treacherous savages whom the English could quickly conquer and force into

27 Rountree, Pocahontas’s People, 34-35; Robinson, The Southern Colonial Frontier, 8-9.
servitude. Seizing the initiative in the failing colony, Smith decided in the autumn of 1607 to embark on a campaign to obtain food from the natives by any means necessary. Gary Nash maintains that from this point on, "it was John Smith who, more than any other figure, wrought the most significant change in English attitudes and policy toward Powhatan." It was also Smith who did more than anyone else to keep alive the Jamestown settlers, who remained peculiarly unwilling to work. The colonists were thus completely dependent on whatever corn Smith could cajole or force from the natives, who because of the poor harvest, had little surplus available for trade. For a short while, trade went well for Smith, especially with the Chickahominies, but the dwindling corn supply, coupled with Smith's insatiable desire for it, soon soured his relationship with the tribe. In December, the natives attacked a group of Smith's men who were on a trading mission on the Chickahominy River and took Smith hostage. Helen Rountree maintains that Smith was not mistreated during his captivity and that Chief Wahunsonacock believed that he had made Smith an ally by the time he was released a few weeks later. Afterwards Smith wrote that he had falsely promised Wahunsonacock that the English would make themselves subservient to the paramount weroance in return for his care.

28 Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 77.
30 Rountree, Pocahontas's People, 36, 38-39.
For the next ten months, the Powhatans continued to supply the Jamestown settlers with food, but the relationship between the English and the native peoples remained tense. Since distrust underlay the English attempts at diplomacy, their actions inevitably sparked distrust in the natives as well. Violent flare-ups caused by both sides were the result.

One of the seminal events in the early relationship between the English colonists and the native peoples came in the fall of 1609. Captain Christopher Newport, recently returned to the colony from England, set out to stage a coronation of Wahunsonacock, which in English eyes would mean that Wahunsonacock had placed himself under the domain of the English king. According to this scheme, the colonists believed that once the Powhatans had "accepted" English rule, they would certainly be more willing to trade. If Wahunsonacock had acquiesced as the English had anticipated, colonization could have proceeded mainly by ethnocide, with the remaking of the natives into appropriate royal subjects who would supply the needs of the colony for labor and food. Wahunsonacock proved unwilling to go along with the plan, however. Sensing that his idea of relating to the English as allies was not shared by the English, Wahunsonacock balked at their attempt to make him subservient. Asserting that he himself was a king and the English were on his land, he rejected a summons to a meeting with Newport and made Newport come to him instead. Then he refused to kneel and accept the crown. As John Smith, a witness to the incident, retold it:
"But a foul trouble there was to make him kneel to receive his crown. . . . At last, by leaning hard on his shoulders, he a little stooped, and Newport put the Crown on his head."

Although the English tried to claim that, once crowned, Wahunsonacock "had acknowledged King James' dominion over Virginia," his recalcitrance surely made them recognize that the natives were not going to succumb readily to English control. At his point, Wahunsonacock probably realized that he would have to resist actively to save his people from ruin. A few months later, in January 1609, Wahunsonacock told Smith that he now believed that the English intended "to invade my people and possess my country."31

The tactic Wahunsonacock adopted was to refuse more trade with the colonists, who from the time of the so-called "coronation" of Wahunsonacock through the summer of 1610 were literally starving to death. Relationships between the natives and the settlers disintegrated rapidly once the functional restraint which trade with the natives provided was gone. The English resorted to the force of arms to obtain the Powhatans' corn. John Smith set out in late December 1608 to capture Wahunsonacock and seize his people's corn; after a violent encounter, Smith failed and Wahunsonacock decided to move his headquarters farther away from the English colony. Only by holding a gun to the chest of Opechancanough,

31 Robinson, Virginia Treaties, 5; Rountree, Pocahontas's People, 47; Fausz, "An 'Abundance of Blood Shed on Both Sides,'" 19.
Wahunsonacock's half-brother and powerful weroance of the Pamunkeys, was Smith able to obtain any corn at all. This incident, which humiliated Opechancanough in front of his people, demonstrated not only Smith's disdain for the powerful weroance but also the way in which the English effectively used their firearms to overcome native resistance through the terror which their weapons evoked. Smith later wrote how he "led the trembling king (near dead with fear)." After the summer of 1609 brought another poor harvest, Smith decided to move some of the colonists out of Jamestown. The Nansemonds, Arrohatecks, and the Powhatans living near the falls of the James River met this expansion into their homelands with immediate violent resistance.3²

In October 1609, John Smith severely injured himself in an accident and returned to England, and the ensuing winter in the colony was the nadir of its "starving time." The natives continued to resist trade. Wahunsonacock executed the leader of a trading party, and another trading group of Englishmen obtained corn only after using "some harsh and cruel dealing[s] by cutting off two of the savages' heads and other extremities." This corn did not go far to alleviate the hunger in Jamestown, and the settlers were reduced "to do those things which seem incredible as to dig up dead corpses out of graves and to eat them and some have licked up the

3² Rountree, Pocahontas's People, 48-52; Barbour, Complete Works of Captain John Smith, 252.
probably believing that the settlement was finally about to collapse and that they would soon be rid of the colonists, the natives kept the pressure on by refusing relief and by frequently ambushing stragglers who left the fortress to forage for food.

By May 1610, more than half the settlers in the colony had died, but the situation changed for the English and the Native Americans when Sir Thomas Gates and Lord De la Warr arrived from England, not only with long-awaited provisions but with some three hundred new settlers. Having heard reports of the colony's troubles, the Virginia Company in London had decided that a more authoritarian form of government was necessary and had received a new charter from the king which allowed them to tighten controls. The company's first appointed governor was Lord De la Warr and his deputy was Gates. These men were determined to rule the colonists with an iron fist and to subjugate the native people ruthlessly. They brought with them express instructions from the Virginia Council in London which detailed how the colony should deal with the natives and which were, in effect, an aggressive plan for ethnocide. After proclaiming that "your enemies can be but of two kinds--strangers and natives" and that the colonists could in "no way trust" Wahunsonacock, the Council reasserted its claim that "the most pious and

33 Percy, "'A Trewe Relacyon,'" 266, 267.

34 Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 79-81.
noble end of this plantation" was to convert the natives to Christianity. To do so, the Council authorized the settlers to "procure . . . some convenient number of [native] children to be brought up in your language and manner." Removing young people from their homes and educating them in the ways of English people were the only hope the colony had to bring the Native Americans under its control. The Council went on to recommend that the settlers imprison and, if necessary, kill the native priests since they exercised great power over the people.35

The Council then put forward two new tenets of policy. The first was to declare that if the colonists did not take Wahunsonacock prisoner, they must make him and all the weroances their tributaries. This usurpation of the natives' economic structure is another common element of genocidal practices. Tributary status for the Powhatan tribes would benefit the colony in many ways. It would force the weroances to "acknowledge no other Lord but King James" and allow the colony to enrich itself without much effort since the tribes would supply it with corn, furs, other desirable goods, and a continual supply of laborers. Furthermore, the company believed that by weakening Wahunsonacock's hold on his tribes and by making the tribes dependent on the colony for protection, tributary status would make the natives accept the colony's control. Only through forcing the functional

35 Robinson, Virginia Treaties, 6-8.
restraints of labor and trade upon the native peoples would they be allowed to "enjoy their houses" and other "blessings" which the colonists might choose to bestow. The second new policy was a reversal of what the company had originally set out to do. No longer considering it viable to ally with the tribes closest to them against their enemy tribes, the company declared that now the colonists must "make enemies unto those among whom you dwell" and if "friendship" was to be made at all, it should be done with "those that are farthest from you."\(^36\) Apparently the company believed that alliances with the tribes farthest away would help to keep the tributary tribes in subjugation by means of intimidation. The threatened use of force against the Powhatans was thus implicit in the colonists' actions and is another element of the genocidal process.

By the time these instructions arrived in Virginia, however, the colonists had determined for themselves that violence was the only means to subdue the Native Americans. As Edmund Morgan has explained, the failure of the colonists to sustain themselves while they not only watched the native people thrive but were forced to rely on them, their inferiors, for food, presented a "challenge" to their "image of themselves, to their self-esteem, to their conviction of their own superiority over foreigners, and especially over barbarous foreigners." As frequently occurs in cases of

\(^{36}\) Ibid., 6-8.
genocide, when the perpetrator group believes that its well-being is threatened by a group it believes is alien, the colonists answered this challenge by deciding to torture and kill native people and burn their villages and cornfields. De la Warr and Gates adapted the company’s instructions to accommodate the violent zeal of the colonists. Nothing less than a series of genocidal massacres ensued.

Gates went with a party of men to Kecoughtan to take revenge on the natives there who he heard had killed some English traders. Luring the natives to them by music and dance, Gates and his men then attacked, killing many. Once the remaining natives had fled, Gates claimed possession of their town. In July 1610, when Wahunsonacocock refused Lord De la Warr’s command to return some captives and stolen arms, De la Warr cut off the hand of a native captive and sent the man back to Wahunsonacocock with the message to comply or face the destruction of all the Powhatan villages in the vicinity. When Wahunsonacocock still did not yield, De la Warr sent George Percy with a group of over seventy men "to take revenge" upon the Paspaheghs, a Powhatan tribe. Coming upon a village, Percy and his men "put some fifteen or sixteen to the sword and almost all the rest to flight," and then burnt the houses and destroyed the corn. Angry that four prisoners had been taken alive, Percy beheaded one of them, leaving only the tribal queen and her children as survivors. On the way back

to Jamestown, the Englishmen threw the children overboard and shot out their brains. The queen was executed upon arrival at the settlement. This brutal attack wreaked such havoc on the Paspaheghs that they never recovered, and the genocide of this tribe was soon completed. After the English killed their chief in another fight in February 1611, the tribe disappeared, its survivors apparently joining other tribes.\textsuperscript{38}

The Native Americans resisted the English onslaught, but they were no match for the colonists who possessed superior weaponry. By the end of 1611, the English had gained control of the James River and declared that Wahunsonacock was no longer a threat. The Powhatans found themselves ravaged not only by the bloodshed but by a spiritual and cultural crisis brought on by the realization that their gods, priests, and weroanes could not protect them from the new diseases and firepower of the colonists. Still the Powhatans refused to capitulate; the English continued the fight, and in April 1613 boldly captured Wahunsonacock's favorite daughter, Pocahontas. With the Powhatans nearing the end of their ability to resist, the English delivered the last punishing blow against the once strong Pamunkeys, destroying their villages near what is now West Point, Virginia.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{38} Percy, "'A Trewe Relacyon,'" 270; Rountree, Pocahontas's People, 54-5; Percy, "'A Trewe Relacyon,'" 271-73.

The April 1614 marriage of Pocahontas to the Englishman John Rolfe brought with it a peace agreement between the colonists and the Powhatan tribes, which were now effectively reduced to tributary status. The Chickahominies, recognizing the superior force of the English, quickly followed the tribes of the Powhatan in making peace with the colonists. To do so, the Chickahominies had at least to appear to agree to their own ethnocide by giving up their tribal identity and being called Englishmen and women. They also consented to be subjects of the Crown and to submit to the authority of the colonists in return for which the English allowed them to maintain their own laws and government. In addition, the Chickahominies had to agree to send three hundred warriors whenever the English needed help against their enemies. Lastly, every bowman had to pay tribute at harvest time of two bushels of corn, in return for which they would receive two hatchets.40

J. Frederick Fausz characterizes the hostilities between the Powhatans and the English between 1609 and 1614 as the "First Anglo-Powhatan War." While in doing so he fulfills his apparent and worthy goal of reinvigorating the role of the Native Americans in their own history, the characterization proves faulty. An Anglo-Powhatan war implies a more balanced equation, at least in terms of responsibility for the fighting and perhaps even in fighting capabilities; furthermore, in

war, military casualties are the permissible and inevitable result. The Powhatans did resist, sometimes violently, the incursions of the English, but such acts do not constitute war. The English were well able to overcome the natives' numerical superiority with their firearms and their tactics. Even Fausz describes the English actions as "unprovoked" and "ruthless," and indicts them for the "use of deception, ambush, and surprise, the random slaughter of both sexes and all ages, the calculated murder of innocent captives, and destruction of entire villages." He makes no like case—nor can one be made—against the Native Americans. This was no Anglo-Powhatan War but an officially-sanctioned series of genocidal massacres aimed at subjugating or destroying, if necessary, the Native Americans of coastal Virginia. To use the term "Anglo-Powhatan War" is to fall into the trap which the Native American writer Michael Dorris warns against. Emphasizing the natives' combativeness, Dorris says, "reinforce[s] the myth of Indian aggressiveness and bellicosity and further suggests that they got what they deserved." This is not to suggest that the native peoples were the helpless victims of English aggressiveness. Rather a combination of factors constrained the Powhatans' ability to effectively defend themselves. First, European diseases had already reduced their numbers—and thus their fighting force—and probably created a spiritual crisis as well which would

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also have undermined their strength. Second, the natives' weaponry was no match for English firearms. In addition, when the English first arrived, Wahunsonacock made a strategic choice which in hindsight proved to be wrong. By not taking immediate and decisive action to drive the English away (which might have succeeded), the Powhatans allowed the English to establish themselves and take advantage of the divisions among the native tribes. Furthermore, to conclude that native peoples did become the victims of a colonial power's genocide does not denigrate them. The fault for genocide, as with any crime, lies with the perpetrator and not the victim.

In the aftermath of the 1614 peace accord, the colonists' violence against the natives subsided. Weakened by age and defeat, Wahunsonacock's hold on his tribes declined, and by 1616 his half-brother Opechancanough had emerged as the dominant weroance. When Wahunsonacock died in 1618, his title officially passed to another brother, Opitchapam. In a short time, Opitchapam proved ineffective, and Opechancanough took over.42 He apparently used his deep feelings of resentment and animosity toward the English to build up his power among the Powhatan tribes. His success indicates that the Native Americans were struggling to revive and still committed to resist the colonists' encroachments on their land and way of life. In trying to build up their capabilities to defend themselves, the native people faced another debilitating

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42 Rountree, Pocahontas's People, 62, 66.
obstacle over which they had no control: European diseases continued to devastate them, with virulent epidemics striking at least twice, in 1617 and 1619.43

These years of relative peace did not mean that the English had come to trust the native peoples, but rather that they felt that they had succeeded in putting the natives in their place. Any sign that the native people were stepping out of that place was met by English force. In 1616, when the Chickahominies refused to pay their tribute, George Yeardley, then deputy governor, took "one hundred of his best shot" to deal with them. In the ensuing encounter, Yeardley ordered his men to open fire, which they did, killing twelve members of the tribe and wounding more. Twelve of the surviving natives were taken prisoner. In this way, the colonists obtained their corn, for the Chickahominies brought them one hundred bushels as ransom for the prisoners. Several members of the tribe were not released, however, and were held in servitude to Yeardley and some of the other men on the expedition. The colonists applauded this retaliatory strike, believing that it had so frightened the native peoples that they would not cause any trouble again. In reality, however, the Chickahominies agreed to join forces with Opechancanough.44


Two years later, a group of Chickahominies killed some traders and some English children. Seeking to prevent a retaliatory attack, Opechancanough sent word to Governor Argall promising to capture those responsible, which he apparently failed to do. Although Opechancanough declared that he would not break the peace, such a promise did not assuage the governor, who issued a proclamation forbidding trade and "familiarity" with the "perfidious savages" "lest they discover our weakness."\(^{45}\) Whether in response to the same incident or another one, the Council of Virginia issued a letter to Governor Yeardley in June 1619 ordering that the colonists take "sharp revenge" on the Chickahominies for the "outrage" by "not only . . . the personal destruction of the murderers, but the removing that people further off from our territories."\(^{46}\)

In 1617 another event of far-reaching importance occurred in the colony. The first cargo of John Rolfe's improved tobacco plant was shipped to England where it netted a good price. Suddenly, the colonists found the source of riches they had been looking for during the last ten years, and they began to cultivate it in earnest.\(^{47}\) This produced two interrelated results, neither of which boded well for the


native peoples. The first was that settlers wanted more and more land on which to grow tobacco, a land-hungry crop which depletes the soil and requires planters to move continually to fresh fields. The second was a large increase in the number of English people arriving in the colony, producing even greater pressure for more land. In the spring of 1618, about four hundred settlers lived in the colony; in the next four years, more than ten times that number arrived. The mortality rate from disease remained high, however, so that only 1,240 colonists were alive in the colony in 1622.48

As an incentive to promote colonization, the Virginia Company in 1618 established a headright system, awarding fifty acres of land to anyone who paid his own way to Virginia or paid for the passage of someone else. By 1622, Virginia Company officials in London ruled that "no other but the Company here and that in a Quarter Court . . . had power to dispose of land" in the colony. Furthermore, these officials held that "to compound" for the land with Opechancanough was "dishonorable and prejudicial to the company" as it would falsely imply "a sovereignty in that heathen infidel" and infringe on the Company's tithes.49 The threefold growth in the number of colonists was enough to cause a significant loss of land to the natives, land which they needed for their crops


and for foraging. Another result of the growth of the colony was a decrease in the supply of game which the natives hunted. Able to produce less food for themselves, the natives faced an added burden, since the colonists continued to expect the natives to supply them with corn. Intent on profiting from tobacco, the settlers neglected to grow their own corn, despite laws to do so.\textsuperscript{50} This continual and growing squeeze on the natives' livelihood, which obviously would lead to their demise, resulted from the deliberate actions of the colonists, who were motivated by their desire to control and profit from Virginia's land and resources. Thus, the colonists must bear responsibility for the results of their actions: the near-extinction of Native Americans.

At the same time that the colonists were seeking the means to wealth through tobacco, the Virginia Company in London renewed its efforts to anglicize the natives and thus accomplish ethnocide by taking their children into colonists' homes where they would be educated and converted to Christianity. Not yet relinquishing their belief that the natives should do the colony's labor, the settlers considered that native children would be their servants while learning English ways.\textsuperscript{51} A new charter in 1618 set aside ten thousand acres at Henrico "for the building and planting of a college for the training of the children of those infidels in true

\textsuperscript{50} Morgan, "First American Boom," 181.

religion, moral virtue, and civility and for other godly uses." Both efforts—to bring native children into the colony and to build a school for them—floundered. The colonists were chagrined when they found that, as Governor Yeardley wrote, "the Indians [were] very loathe upon any terms to part with their children." Yeardley promised to do his best "to purchase some children," and he suggested that perhaps he could convince Opechancanough to send entire families to the colony as a way to give the colonists "the opportunity to instruct their children." In 1620, the Virginia Company appointed George Thorpe to take charge of the college effort. Thorpe was a sincere advocate of the non-violent assimilation of the natives, whom he believed were "of a peaceable and virtuous disposition." He thought he had established a good relationship with Opechancanough, for whom he built an English-style house. Given that Opechancanough was plotting native resistance, it is most probable he realized that the conversion-assimilation attempts were as much a threat to the survival of his people as the colonists' land-grabbing and guns.

Over the years, the settlers came to feel that the native peoples no longer posed any real threat to the security of the colony. They had found themselves well able to put

52 Craven, *The Southern Colonies*, 132.
54 Ibid., 446.
down occasional flare-ups, and they refused to comprehend that their impingement on the natives' land and culture would produce deepening resentment. The English people's beliefs in their own superiority and the inferior "otherness" of the natives contributed to their attitude of invincibility; but they also needed these beliefs if their plans were to succeed. While the colonists wanted the natives' land, they also relied on the natives to produce food for the colony, and they still had hopes to use native labor. As long as the English felt they had the natives under control, their best plan was to take over the land they needed but to keep the natives alive as a food and labor source.

During these same years, however, indignation over the domination of the colonists was growing among the Native Americans. It is not known for how long Opechancanough was planning a rebellion, but given how well coordinated it was, it surely had been in the making for some time. Apparently harboring a desire for revenge, Opechancanough managed to deceive the colonists by an outward show of obeisance. Even the week prior to the rebellion, Opechancanough assured Governor Francis Wyatt that he wanted to keep the peace despite the recent killing by the colonists of a prominent warrior.

On Good Friday, March 22, 1622, the rebellion began. Led by Opechancanough, the Native Americans rose up with fury in a series of surprise raids on individual homes which were dispersed throughout the colony. Caught off-guard, the
settlers were slow to organize any defense. Although they did not destroy the colony, the native warriors avenged themselves with a terrifying vindictiveness, sparing no one. A unique feature of the attack was that the natives veered from their usual practice of not killing women and children. Altogether 347 settlers died, a number which is more significant in relative terms: almost one-third of the colonists were wiped out. Undoubtedly, casualties would have been greater had not two Christianized natives alerted Jamestown and a few other settlements to the impending attack in time for them to repulse it. Given how well-planned and thorough the Powhatans were in carrying out their uprising and the fact that they abandoned their usual restraints against killing women and children, it is possible that Opechancanough and his people had themselves attempted to carry out a genocide of the English colonists. If this is so, the rebellion illustrates another danger wrought by the injustices of colonialism: the oppressed themselves may attempt genocide against those who try to destroy them as a last resort to save themselves from extinction.

Initially, the colonists were too shocked by the rebellion to plan either a defense or offense. It took over twenty days for the survivors to pull themselves together into fewer and more centralized settlements in which they were better able to protect themselves from further attack. Finding they only had 180 able-bodied men to mount a counter-attack, a number deemed insufficient for the task, they
abandoned any plans to strike back. To compound their predicament, the settlers found themselves faced with the possibility of starvation because they were too terrified to go out to the fields to plant corn.

The rebellion of March 22nd destroyed once and for all any beliefs which the English settlers had that they could tame the "savages." Once over the initial shock, the colonists and the Virginia Company in England adopted a policy to pursue the outright extinction of all the native peoples. Edward Waterhouse, a secretary to the Virginia Company in London, wrote a lengthy account of the uprising and recommended the action the colonists needed to take. Calling the natives "savages," "beasts," "miscreants," "more foul than lions and dragons," and "wicked infidels," Waterhouse declared that they could never be trusted. He coldly determined, however, that the "massacre" would actually benefit the colony because now it could justifiably conquer the natives by any means necessary:

[O]ur hands which before were tied . . . are now set at liberty . . . so that we . . . may now by right of war, and laws of nations, invade the country, and destroy them who sought to destroy us: whereby we shall enjoy their cultivated places. . . . Now their cleared grounds in all their villages shall be inhabited by us.

Advocating total warfare, Waterhouse concluded:

[T]he way of conquering them is much more easy than of civilizing them by fair means. . . . [V]ictory of them may be gained many ways; by force, by surprise, by famine in burning their corn, by destroying and burning their boats, canoes, and houses, by breaking their fishing weares, by assailing them in their huntings, whereby they get the greatest part of their
sustenance in winter, by pursuing and chasing them with our horses, and blood-hounds to draw after them, and mastives to tear them, which take this naked, tanned, deformed savages for no other than wild beasts.\textsuperscript{55}

In what was effectively an official declaration of war against the Native Americans, the Virginia Company in London sent a letter to the governor and Council of Virginia in August 1622, in which it directed the course of action the colonists should pursue against the natives:

\textit{We must advise you to root out [the natives] from being any longer a people, so cursed a nation, ungrateful to all benefits, and uncappable of all goodness: at least to the removal of them so far from you, as you may not only be out of danger, but out of fear of them, of whose faith and good meaning you can never be secure: Wherefore as they have merited let them have a perpetual war without peace or truce. }\ldots\textit{ And because there is a necessity not only in the thing itself, but in the speediness of effecting it, we think it fit that besides that certain way of famishing (whereunto we doubt not but you have ere this given a good beginning by the burning of their corn, or the reaping it to your own benefit) you add and put in execution all other ways and means of their destruction.} (emphasis added)

These "ways and means" included provoking the natives to fight each other by offering rewards for "the bringing in of their heads" and always maintaining groups of colonists "that may from time to time . . . pursue and follow [the natives] surprising them in their habitations, intercepting them in their hunting, burning their towns, demolishing their temples, destroying their canoes, plucking up their weares, carrying away their corn, and depriving them of whatsoever may yield

\textsuperscript{55}Kingsbury,\textit{ Records of the Virginia Company}, Vol. 3, 556-58, 541-64, passim.
them succor or relief." The company’s instructions also contained two provisions for obtaining native servants and slaves. One was the advice to the colonists to spare the young people, "whose bodies may, by labor and service, become profitable" and who could be anglicized in the process. These young servants were to be given to the colony’s soldiers as a reward. Second, the company proposed that the sale of native slaves could help finance the colony’s defense. In addition to setting forth the conduct of the war, in the same set of instructions, the Virginia Company in London also made clear that the colony’s mission to Christianize the native peoples was over. The need for revenge necessitated "the condemnation of their [the natives’] bodies," rather than any continued effort to save their souls. Demonstrating that company members had no intention of trying to resolve the underlying tension with the native peoples caused by the expansion of the colony unto more and more of the natives’ lands, the company announced plans to send many hundreds more settlers to Virginia.

The warfare decreed by the company meets every criteria of genocide: it was deliberate, total, and targeted all Native Americans on the basis that they were "Indians," all of whom the English perceived to be enemies and aliens. The tactics prescribed resulted in the deaths of women, children, and

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56 Robinson, *Virginia Treaties*, 43-44.

57 Ibid., 41, 43.
elderly men as well as warriors, and the colonizers' express purpose was to terminate the natives existence as a people. Although the company claimed that removal could sufficiently protect the colony, it is clear from their mandated means to prosecute the war that mass destruction of the native peoples would result. If any natives survived, they could be placed on land too far from the colony to pose any threat, but saving them was not the company's goal. Rather, revenge and security for the colony were the ends to be achieved by any means.

For the next decade, the colonists followed the company's orders for war. Even when the company lost control of the colony to the Crown in 1624, warfare continued unabated and unrestricted by any royal decrees. Shortly after receiving the August instructions, the Council in Virginia sent a letter back to London, reporting on the progress of the war. "We have anticipated your desires by setting upon the Indians in all places," the Council stated, and "by computation and confession of the Indians themselves we have slain more of them this year than hath been slain before since the beginning of the colony." Although the natives proved difficult to destroy "with the sword by reason of their swiftness of foot," the Council promised to "constantly pursue their extirpation" "by the way of starving and all other means that we can possibly devise."^58

After this first year had passed, the colony settled

^58 Ibid., 46.
into a pattern of officially declared campaigns conducted two or three times a year. The General Assembly levied taxes to pay for these campaigns and provided that any colonists wounded or disabled would be cared for at the public’s expense. For the colonists, combining the tactics of force of arms with starvation served a dual purpose: They obliterated their enemy and seized the natives’ corn to satisfy their own hunger. Consistently, the governor and Council issued orders which show not only how alien the native peoples had become in their own land, but also how important it was for the authorities to maintain the enmity between the individual colonists and the native people. In May 1623, Governor Wyatt issued a "Proclamation to be careful of the savages’ treachery" in which he outlawed any private "parley" between settler and native and authorized commanders to "shoot or kill by any means" any native who shall "stand out." Five years later, in January 1628, the governor and Council, fearing that the colonists had become too lax in their defense, nullified a five-month old peace treaty with the Native Americans and ordered that a state of "enmity and wars with all the Indians" be maintained. They then reiterated the prohibition against conversing with any native and decreed that the colonists should kill all natives on sight. In 1631 an act of the Grand Assembly declared the "Indians" to be the "irreconcilable
While expressing fear of the natives' "treachery," the colonists did not hesitate to act treacherously themselves. In April 1623, the Council ostensibly accepted a peace accord offered by a group of natives who promised to return English prisoners in exchange for peace so they could plant some badly needed corn. In a letter to London, however, the Council declared that it had no intention of honoring the peace. Rather, it saw the accord as a chance to learn where the natives planted their corn so that once the natives had grown "secure upon the treaty, we shall have the better advantage both to surprise them, and to cut down their corn." Again in 1628, the Council agreed to make another false peace accord in order to obtain the release of prisoners.

The colonists considered no tactic too ruthless to utilize in their campaign of extermination. On May 12, 1623, Captain William Tucker, acting under authority of the governor, met with a group of Pamunkeys supposedly to "conclude a peace." When the tribe agreed to a treaty, Tucker passed around deliberately poisoned wine and two hundred native people dropped dead. On the return trip, Tucker and his men killed another fifty natives, including two kings, this time with weapons, and "brought home part of their


60 Robinson, *Virginia Treaties*, 48, 54.
heads." An incident which demonstrates the extent to which the colonists placed all "Indians" outside the "universe of obligation" occurred in October 1627 when a Captain Sampson arrived in Virginia with a group of natives from the Caribbean Islands. Perhaps planning to sell them into slavery, Sampson found himself faced with a colony which wanted no more "Indians" in its midst. He then turned them over to the Court "to dispose of them as [it] shall please." Reporting that members had heard rumors that these Caribbean natives were running away and attempting to join the Virginia tribes and that some of them had stolen goods and "attempted to kill some of our people," the Court expressed fear that they "may hereafter be a means to overthrow the whole colony." To solve the dilemma, the Court ordered that these Caribbean natives be seized immediately and "hanged til they be dead." 61

The colonists extended their loathing and mistrust to all Native Americans, no matter what their tribal affiliation. While occasionally they appeared to form an alliance with some of the fringe tribes of the Powhatan group, this was a tactic to attempt to use inter-tribal tensions to the colony's advantage by joining forces with the fringe to fight the core. For instance, in 1625, the colonists heard that the Patawomecks were resisting Opechancanough's rule and tried to get them to fight on the English side. Although the Patawomecks and a force from the colony joined to fight a

61 Fein, "Scenarios of Genocide," 4; Robinson, Virginia Treaties, 50; McIlwaine, Minutes of the Council, 155.
northern tribe to obtain corn, the Patawomecks insisted on remaining neutral towards Opechancanough. Finally, colonial forces turned on the Patawomecks, killing some of them and taking as prisoners the weroance, his son, and some others. The only exception the colonists made to their policy to "wholly extirpate" the native population was to accept into the colony any individual native who "desired[d] our friendship and protection, the first step to their conversion." These were natives who, at least in English eyes, were essentially abandoning their "Indianness" and could be brought into English ways, thus effecting a cultural genocide. The "Indians" would disappear as a people even though individuals would live on, "remade" into English men and women. How many natives actually entered the colony in this way is not known; however, those who did probably became servants while they were being "anglicized."  

Despite the waging of war, the colony was experiencing economic success with a tobacco boom which was at its height between 1623 and 1630. The potential for wealth sparked greed and a credo among the successful planters, who generally held political as well as economic power in the colony, that allowed for the exploitation of servants to a degree which would have been intolerable in England.  

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62 Rountree, Pocahontas's People, 75-6; Robinson, Virginia Treaties, 53, xxii.

63 Morgan, "First American Boom," 177, 193; Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 123, 127, 129.
Claiburn approached colonial officials with an "invention" which would be "an assured way and means . . . for safekeeping of any Indians, which he shall undertake to keep for guides always ready to be employed." Claiburn added that he hoped "to make them [the natives] serviceable for many other services for the good of the whole colony." The officials awarded him exclusive rights to his invention plus a native man with whom to begin.\textsuperscript{64}

Surviving records provide no details on the nature of his "invention" or its success, but apparently the hope of forcing the native population to work had waned by this time, and the records do show that the colony's primary labor source in this decade were poor whites who came as indentured servants. While the need for native labor had served at times as a functional restraint on the colonists' desire to physically eliminate the native people, this restraint disappeared at the same time as economic success spurred the colonists' drive for more land and resources, encouraging them to take what they wanted from the natives no matter what the human cost. Furthermore, the promise of wealth and the need for laborers continued to bring more English into Virginia, putting an additional squeeze on the natives. By 1625, the colony had recouped its losses from the Powhatan rebellion, having reached a population of 1,300. Just four years later, the population had doubled to about 2,600, and in 1632 the

\textsuperscript{64} McIlwaine, \textit{Minutes of the Council}, 111.
The colony numbered about 3,200 settlers. In a portent of a problem that would continue to plague the colony for the next fifty years and only find solution in the institution of Black slavery which replaced the need for White indentured servants, the governor and Council, meeting in January 1626, discussed how to handle the many servants and tenants who would be freed during the year, expecting to have their own land to settle. The Council decided to give these former servants and tenants leases for plots of the "common lands as yet untaken up by any adventurers or planters."

For the big planters, the tobacco boom produced an insatiable need for more land—for themselves and for their servants whom they would eventually have to set free. These men knew that without land to promise, it would be much harder to acquire the laborers they needed and that, furthermore, if these servants became the landless poor after serving their indenture, the colony could face turmoil. Economic success and the colony's security depended on the acquisition of native land. Thus, the tobacco boom helped to fuel the war of extermination against the native peoples. As the colony looked to produce enough to make itself self-sustaining and as the White poor from England filled the need for laborers after

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the natives had been found wanting, the colonists had no reason to want the natives alive and every reason to exterminate those who stood in their way. Once rid of the Native Americans, land and security would be theirs. As Governor Wyatt pronounced, it was "infinitely better to have no heathen among us, who at best were as thorns in our sides, than to be at peace or league with them."68

In 1629, the Assembly finally authorized action on a plan which had been discussed for at least five years to clear the native people out of the lower peninsula. Fifty acres of land was provided for any many who would settle at a point on the York River known as Cheskiack. In 1632, the offer was extended to land about halfway up the peninsula at a point called Middle Plantation (later the site of Williamsburg). The Assembly took the last step to secure the area by an act passed in 1633 which established a labor levy of one man in every forty living on the peninsula below Middle Plantation in order to build the necessary fortifications. By 1634, the English had succeeded in driving the native peoples out of the area and so claimed an additional 300,000 acres as their own. Twelve years later they seized the rest of the peninsula as well.69 The forced appropriation of land without payment occurred frequently in colonial Virginia, although land


purchases also took place.  

The Powhatan tribes tried forcefully to resist the colonists, but their fighting strength diminished quickly, and they waged few offensive forays after 1624. Success in war and in the acquisition of the lower peninsula made the Virginia colonists feel more secure. Finally, in September 1632, the colony agreed to a peace treaty with the Pamunkeys and Chickahominies, which brought an end to the decade of warfare. The Virginia authorities continued to warn the settlers, however, not to trust the natives.

In the ten years from the rebellion in 1622 until the peace accord in 1632, the Native Americans had suffered great losses in life and land at the hands of the colonists. There is no record of the exact death toll, but the indigenous population was continually in drastic decline due to the colonists' attacks and destruction of crops and the spread of European diseases. The psychological stress of the English invasion which the natives had experienced in the earlier years must have intensified, wrought by physical and spiritual crises as unknown diseases and superior firepower cut down their people and their gods and priests seemed unable to protect them. The relentless advance of the colonists meant that the native peoples could no longer pursue their

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71 Rountree, *Pocahontas's People*, 80.

traditional way of farming, hunting, and gathering on their homelands, causing not only a loss of livelihood but a cultural decline as well. Psychological, spiritual, and cultural strain probably contributed to the natives' inability to fight against the English advance.\(^7\)  

As was true of the peace of 1614, the peace of 1632 did not reduce the enmity between Native Americans and the English colonists. In the records of the Council and the General Court, the colonists still referred to the natives as "our irreconcilable enemies." In 1635, some of the colony's most powerful men revolted against Governor John Harvey, partly out of their anger that he had made a "dangerous peace" with the native tribes against the advice of Council. They accused Harvey of ulterior motives for making the peace, claiming that he and some "Marylanders" had a monopoly on the profitable corn trade.\(^4\)

Frederick Fausz has incorrectly assessed the 1622 to 1632 war and its aftermath. He believes that the English never intended to annihilate the Native Americans during the war but sought to contain the tribes which threatened them while building advantageous relationships with others. He then maintains that the postwar period ushered in a "pragmatic era of intercultural relations." Supporting his arguments by

\(^{73}\) Crosby, The Columbian Exchange, 45, 56.  

\(^{74}\) McIlwaine, Minutes of the Council, 484; Robinson, Virginia Treaties, 60; Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 145.
citing the fur trade and the colonists' attempts to take advantage of the enmity between certain native tribes, Fausz fails to understand that these instances are examples of functional restraints on genocidal practices rather than any indication of practical, intercultural relationships. Without acknowledging that he is contradicting himself, Fausz accepts that the English eventually decided to eliminate the native tribes who lived closest to them, yet he implies that the fact that certain colonists were profiting from the fur trade with other native tribes shows some sort of intercultural respect. In doing so, he ignores the pattern of the colonists to use the natives whenever it was profitable and to destroy them when it was not.\footnote{Fausz, "Patterns of Anglo-Indian Aggression," 246-7, 226, 249, 252.}

For the next twelve years, the colony continued to grow in population and in territory. It was during these years that the number of White settlers surpassed the number of native people. In 1634, there were approximately 5,200 colonists, and by 1640 there were about 8,100. In the meantime, it is estimated that the native population had declined to fewer than 5,000.\footnote{Rountree, Pocahontas's People, 78-9.} The combination of increasing numbers and the ongoing requirement of fresh land for tobacco drove the expansion of the colony, which proceeded to take control of the rest of the James River area and then pushed north. By 1643, planters had claimed land as far north as the
Potomac River, although most did not actually begin settlement of the Rappahannock-Potomac area until a few years later. The Eastern Shore also began to fall rapidly into English hands. Colonial officials encouraged the spread of settlements by granting tracts of land for which the owners would pay quitrents. The fact that they were giving away the homelands of the indigenous people did not matter to the English as they refused to recognize the natives' sovereign right to the land; they offered compensation to the natives for only some of the land they took. Envisioning the need for even greater expansion, in 1643 the Assembly authorized exploration of land southwest of the Appomattox River.

An aging Opechancanough watched in dismay the colonists' advance, which had already resulted in the disappearance of several of the Powhatan tribes. Once again while appearing to acquiesce, the last great weroance of the Powhatans was actually refusing to surrender. Among the surviving tribes of the Powhatan, Opechancanough found simmering resentment and a will to resist, which he used to organize a final mass rebellion. On April 18, 1644, the Native Americans rose up with fury for a second time. Although few records about the rebellion exist, it appears to have been short in duration but extensive in casualties.

77 Ibid., 81-3.

78 Robinson, Southern Colonial Frontier, 55.

79 Lurie, "Indian Cultural Adjustment," 51.
Native warriors killed approximately four hundred colonists and seized many prisoners. For whatever reason, however, they did not sustain their revolt. It is not clear whether Opechancanough intended genocide in this attack or whether he hoped to use a massacre to terrorize the English into leaving or at least stemming their advance. Although the number of English casualties was higher in actual number than in 1622, they were less proportionately, and a stronger colony was better able to withstand the attack.

Unlike 1622, this time the colony responded quickly. On June 1, 1644, the General Assembly issued a declaration of war, stating that the colony would "forever abandon all forms of peace and familiarity with the whole Nation and will to the utmost of our power pursue and root out those which have anyway had their hands in the shedding of our blood and massacring of our people." Adopting starvation as a tactic, the Assembly ordered that "we use our utmost endeavors to cut down the Indians corn generally this summer in all places subject to Opechancanough." Demonstrating again that all native people were the enemy, the order added that, in addition to the Powhatan, the war "be persecuted as far as our abilities and ammunition shall enable us thereunto." Furthermore, the decision to starve the native peoples meant that the colonists were not engaged in traditional warfare.

80 Rountree, Pocahontas's People, 84; Robinson, Virginia Treaties, 30.

81 Robinson, Virginia Treaties, 63.
which is limited to combatants. Rather, starvation was a sure means to annihilate an entire people—men, women, and children.

By late summer, the colonists' offensive was in full force with a march against the Pamunkeys and Chickahominies. Assaults on other tribes followed. Also that summer the Assembly dispatched Governor William Berkeley to England to seek assistance for the prosecution of the war. In the winter of 1645, the Assembly initiated a program of building along the frontier. Since the colony lacked the finances to sustain these forts, the Assembly granted the forts and adjoining lands to individuals who agreed to operate them and maintain ready fighting forces. The forts made it easier to carry out the many-faceted assault against the native peoples, as indicated by the Act calling for the erection of Fort Henry at the falls of the Appomattox. The presence of this fort, the Assembly said, would prevent "the great relief and subsistence to the savages by fishing" and also make possible "the cutting down their corn or performing any other service upon them."

Since England was preoccupied with problems at home, Governor Berkeley returned to the colony in June 1645 without the assistance he had sought. Shortly thereafter, Opecheanocanough sent word to the governor and Council that he desired

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82 Rountree, Pocahontas's People, 84-85.
83 Robinson, Southern Colonial Frontier, 49; Neill, Virginia Carolorum, 187.
84 Hening, The Statutes at Large, Vol. 1, 315.
to negotiate a peace. Although the Council reported that it accepted the offer, apparently no peace conference took place. Instead, Governor Berkeley took command of an expedition against the natives "with considerable success, taking many prisoners; all of whom, over eleven years of age, it was decided . . . to send, in Sir William's ship to the Western Island." Other expeditions against the natives followed. In March 1646, the Grand Assembly determined that since the natives were now "dispersed and driven from their towns and habitations, lurking up and down the woods in small numbers" so that "further revenge" was "almost" impossible, it would be to the best interests of the colony to make peace with Opechancanough. They armed and sent out a group of sixty men led by Governor Berkeley to carry out "any occasional war" for the purpose of bringing Opechancanough to a peace conference. Apparently believing that their campaign to destroy the Native Americans was successful, the House of Burgesses concluded that "the savage king . . . is so abandoned by his people, and they so routed and dispersed, that they are no longer a nation, and we now suffer only from robbery of a few starved outlaws whom by God's assistance, we doubt not to root out in another year" (emphasis added).

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Unyielding to the end, Opechancanough refused to accept the governor's plan, and so Berkeley took him prisoner. Old and physically weak, Opechancanough must have realized that his people were defeated and the once-powerful Powhatan paramount chiefdom was destroyed, but he would not capitulate. While imprisoned in Jamestown, Opechancanough was killed by a vengeful English guard.

The colonists concluded a peace treaty in October 1646 with Opechancanough's successor, Necotowance. This treaty was a milestone in Native-White relations in English North America as it established several important precedents. The Powhatan paramount chiefdom was broken, and the individual tribes reduced to tributary status. The natives agreed to give allegiance to the English king and to allow the appointment of their future chiefs by the Virginia governor. In return for yearly tribute of twenty beaver skins, the colonists agreed to provide protection for the natives. With this provision, the colony decided to forego its earlier plan to make alliances with the tribes farthest away. The treaty, furthermore, established a boundary line demarcating land for the Native Americans from the colonists' territory, a system which set the stage for the later development of reservations and recognized the natives' right to use the land, although not to own it. The Native Americans were to reside north of the York River, but the governor and Council could authorize English settlements in part of that area as long as they notified Necotowance in advance. No native was permitted to enter the
land between the York and James Rivers, from the falls to Kequotan, and it was lawful "for any person to kill" any "Indians" who "do repair to or make any abode upon the said tract of land." If it was necessary for a native messenger to travel through that territory, he would have to wear a striped coat which he could acquire at one of the forts. Necotowance agreed to return all English prisoners, "negroes and guns," and all native servants who ran away to their tribes. The colonists once again provided for any native child under the age of twelve to come to live with them, but mandated the death penalty for any English person who "entertained" or "concealed" any other natives. The English paid no compensation to the native tribes for the land they acquired.89

The treaty of 1646 marked the end of the union of tribes in the Powhatan paramount chiefdom. As Helen Rountree writes, "The Powhatans were soon isolated on ever-shrinking islands of tribal territory, their supratribal organization all but extinct." In the following years, loss of independence broke several individual tribes as well.90 By bringing the natives increasingly under colonial domination, the treaty worked insidiously to undermine their ability to resist the usurpation of their resources and the decimation of their way of life. Beholden to colonial officials for their

89 Robinson, *Virginia Treaties*, 68-70.

90 Rountree, *Pocahontas' People*, 89.
positions of leadership, tribal chiefs had to act within the bounds of conduct proscribed by the English or risk removal. Even if a weroance/weroansqua could work within the English system to gain something for his or her people, over time such strategies would result only in greater dependence on the colonizers. Historian Steve Stern's analysis of what happened to the natives of Peru under Spanish colonial rule is applicable also to what happened to the natives in Virginia. As Stern writes:

A strategy of defense which depended upon colonial institutions to resist exploitation tied the natives more effectively than ever to Hispanic power. . . . Indians who won limited but important victories by securing the favor of colonials and their institutions held a certain interest in avoiding wholesale challenges of authority which invited punishment or revocation of their achievements.

[T]o the extent that reliance on a juridical system becomes a dominant strategy of protection for an oppressed class or social group, it may undermine the possibility of organizing a more ambitious assault aimed at toppling the exploitative structure itself. When this happens, a functioning system of justice contributes to the hegemony of a ruling class.91

Ten years after the treaty, Cockacoeske became the weroansqua of the Pamunkeys, and she tried assiduously to re-establish the Powhatan tribal union by working within the colonial legal establishment. Although historian Martha McCartney may be right that Cockacoeske was a leader of "considerable influence and political acumen," there is no evidence to support McCartney's contention that this weroansqua succeeded in "turn[ing] the English political system to her own people's

91 Stern, Peru's Indian Peoples, 135, 137.
advantage." Rather the native people continued to decline, and no tribal union took place. Working within the colonial system doomed Cockacoeske's intentions from the start because by so doing she was implicitly legitimizing English rule and because the system would never tolerate the renewal of native strength. Such was the stranglehold of the treaty, however, that should Cockacoeske have chosen to resist the English, she probably would have wrought her own doom.

For almost the next two decades, the colonists manifested their confidence that they had succeeded in subjugating at least the Native Americans in and near the occupied territory by passing several legislative acts which contained provisions ostensibly to protect the natives and to entice them to adopt English ways. As at other times when they did not feel physically threatened by the Native Americans, the colonists relaxed their efforts to physically annihilate the natives and turned more to anglicization as a non-lethal means to terminate the natives' existence as a people.

At the same time, despite mandating a boundary line between the land the natives could live on and the land for English settlement, the treaty in reality became a license for the unbridled expansion of the colony. In this way, it set the pattern of treaty abrogation by Whites which continued for

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93 Craven, The Southern Colonies, 364-69.
the next several centuries. The great irony of the treaty was that while it purported to reserve land for use by the native inhabitants it instead resulted in the near end of native homelands in Virginia. As Wesley Frank Craven stated, "The peace of 1646 had been made on the eve of one of the most important periods of expansion in Virginia's history." 94

The treaty's prohibition of settlement by the English on the north side of the York River was doomed to be short-lived. Ever hungry for more land on which to grow tobacco, settlers soon pushed into the area between the Rappahannock and the Potomac Rivers, winning the approval of the House of Burgesses and governor, who in 1648 repealed the restrictions on settlement in the area and established Northumberland County. Soon the House of Burgesses and Governor Berkeley bowed to the demands for an end to the York River restriction as well by formally revoking the boundary line on September 1, 1649. 95 Within three years, so many English had established themselves in the area that the colony formed three new counties: Gloucester, Lancaster, and Westmoreland. 96 By 1653, the colony's White population was about 14,300, and the rate of growth was accelerating. In 1699, fewer than fifty years later, the White population had more than quadrupled to

94 Rountree, Pocahontas's People, 88; Craven, The Southern Colonies, 363.

95 Hening, The Statutes at Large, Vol. 1, 352-54.

96 Craven, The Southern Colonies, 364.
The steady northward advance of settlement and the continuing decline of the native population in the area caused a shift in the locus of the fur trade from the upper Chesapeake to the western and southern frontiers of the colony. In 1650, Abraham Wood, a major figure in the fur trade, led an expedition from Fort Henry, on the site of present-day Petersburg, southwest to the falls of the Roanoke River. The fur trade thrived in areas beyond settlements, so the Englishmen involved in it relied on Native Americans who were not yet in the way of the land-hungry planters. Since the traders needed the Native Americans who supplied the furs and since some of the traders were powerful men in the colony, the tribes involved in the trade received some protection from abuse. Trade provided another functional restraint on the colonists' drive to physically destroy the native peoples. As long as they felt that the colony's security would not be threatened, the English were ready to profit from the natives when they could. When economic tensions destabilized the colonial society later in the century, however, this functional restraint, and the concomitant protections for the natives involved in the trade, disappeared.98

In general, between 1646 and 1663, official policy in the colony offered protection from flagrant violence and

97 Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 404.

98 Robinson, Southern Colonial Frontier, 55; Craven, The Southern Colonies, 362, 369.
unfair practices to all Native Americans in the colony, not just those involved in the fur trade. Laws passed by the Grand Assembly reflected the colonists' confidence that the Native Americans no longer were able to threaten their well-being and advancement and their belief that a policy of pacification and anglicization was the best means to assure the colony's continued security. These were tactical decisions, as underlying English attitudes towards the native people had not changed: The colonists continued to refer to them as "the common enemy." 99

During the legislative session which lasted from March 1655 to December 1656, the Grand Assembly passed several acts concerning Native Americans which set the stage for a series of similar enactments over the next eight years. The Assembly prefaced many of these acts with an acknowledgement that the settlers' constant pressure on the natives, "taking away their land and forcing them into such narrow straights and places that they cannot subsist either by planting or hunting," had provoked some of the natives to violence and threatened the peace and prosperity of the colony. The first act in this series, passed in March 1656, set forth a plan which would put the natives to work for the benefit of the colony, while providing them with the means to adopt an English way of life. Every time a native brought in eight wolves' heads, the English agreed to give his chief a cow, "a step to civilizing

them and making them Christians."100

In this same act, the legislators tried to induce Native American parents to turn their children over to the English to be brought up "in Christianity, civility and the knowledge of necessary trades" by allowing the parents to choose the English person to whom they would entrust their children and by mandating that the children not be used as slaves. A short time later another act stipulated that native children given over to the English would be servants "for such a term as shall be agreed on by the said parent and master." In the legislative session two years later, the Assembly established that native children serving in English households should be set free at age twenty-five years.101

As still another means to make the natives adopt English ways, the Assembly sitting in 1657-58 mandated that the Native Americans be granted land in a manner similar to the English settlers: the colony was to give each bowman fifty acres of land in a pattern which would form "towns" of Native Americans.102 The paradox of this act, by which the colonists were "giving" the natives land which was theirs to begin with, was apparently lost on the English, but for native peoples it marked the loss of their independence. Deepening the crisis

100 Hening, The Statutes at Large, Vol. 1, 467-68, 393-94.


of survival of the native people was the problem that private ownership of tracts of land was a foreign idea to them and corrupted their tribal way of life.

At the same time that the colony was passing laws to coerce the natives into the English mode, it authorized the killing of any native who took part in any "mischief" on land claimed by the colonists. Thus, the colonists preserved their right to physically eliminate any native who appeared unwilling to accept the way the English wanted him or her to be. Within a year, however, settlers had killed so many natives "though never so innocent" that the Assembly believed the colony faced the threat of native rebellions, "whereby we may probably be involved in a war for us and our posterity."

The Assembly repealed the law and enacted a new one which permitted the killing of native people only when they were found by the testimony of two sworn witnesses to have committed a felony. In another act a year later, the Grand Assembly prohibited settlers from kidnapping Native Americans for the purpose of selling them into servitude. Native American servitude itself was never prohibited, although in the legislative session of 1661-62, the Assembly limited the length of time that a native could be held in service to the same number of years that an English person served.¹⁰³

In other legislative acts, the Assembly authorized measures ostensibly to protect the lands of the native peoples

from further encroachment by settlers. First, the Assembly prohibited Native Americans from selling their land to individual colonists without the assent of the Assembly and later ruled that Native Americans could only sell land at quarter courts. In 1657-58 the Assembly stated that "all the Indians of this colony shall and may hold and keep those seats of land which they now have," adding a proviso, however, which allowed for English settlement on the natives' land if approved by the governor and Council or the commissioners. A few years later, in the legislative session of 1661-62, the Assembly passed another act which reiterated these laws regarding native lands because the English settlers had been ignoring them.\textsuperscript{104} While on the surface these laws appear to be for the benefit of the Native Americans, the Assembly was motivated more by the desire to consolidate its power in the colony and to maximize its profits from land grants. All the laws did was to place in the government the sole authority to obtain land from the natives and to redistribute this land to English settlers. By so doing, the government assured that it could collect quitrents on the land which it could not do on land which settlers had purchased directly from the native inhabitants.\textsuperscript{105} The way Lancaster County officials carried out a 1653 act which had set aside land for the native inhabitants indicates that the legislature was not motivated


\textsuperscript{105} Rountree, Pocahontas's People, 82.
by concern for the welfare of the native peoples. The Lancaster County Court ordered a force of men, "well and sufficiently armed with a formidable gun, powder, and shot, with either a sword or a pistol," to "settle" the natives into their allotted space.\textsuperscript{106} Despite the appearance of the laws, the colonists continued to use violence to push the Native Americans onto tracts of land to which they were unwilling to go. In other legislation based on the desire to control wealth, centralize power, and maintain security, the Assembly acted in 1660-61 to restrict the fur trade to those traders who received a commission from the governor. Stating that the act was necessary because unscrupulous Englishmen were illegally trading firearms for furs, the Assembly took control of the lucrative trade, giving the governor personal control over an important source of wealth in the colony. In still another way, the Grand Assembly asserted its control over native-White relations by forbidding contact between individual settlers and native people without permission from the proper authorities.\textsuperscript{107} The existence of this provision, which specifically forbade settlers from "entertaining" and "harboring" any natives, suggests that such activity was going on within the colony and that the Assembly felt the need to preempt it in order to maintain enmity between the two groups.

\textsuperscript{106} Robinson, \textit{Virginia Treaties}, 71; Stanard, "Extracts From the County Records," 173-74.

\textsuperscript{107} Hening, \textit{The Statutes at Large}, Vol.2, 20; Vol. 1, 410; Vol. 2, 143.
The Assembly must have feared what might happen if the natives became human in English eyes or if a sense of unity developed between the two peoples, realizing that it is easier to abuse or destroy a people viewed as an enemy "other" rather than as fellow human beings.

In other ways as well colonial officials ensured that the Native Americans would continue to be aliens in their own country. As part of the same act which forbade killing natives on sight for "trespass or harm," the Grand Assembly decreed that any native who ventured into the area of the colonists' plantations must carry a ticket obtainable from a designated settler. The "Act Concerning Indians" passed by the Grand Assembly in 1661-62 required native people to obtain a license from two county justices in order to "oyster or gather wild fruit," food necessary for their subsistence during much of the year. In this same act, the Assembly sought to prevent "free intercourse" between the English and the natives which they feared would occur due to the proximity of English and native settlements. Using fear as a tactic to keep the two peoples apart, the Assembly asserted that such "free intercourse" would inevitably result in "the Indians coming and pilfering." Supposedly to prevent this potential problem, the Assembly decreed that silver and copper plated badges "with the name of the town engraved upon them, be given to all the adjacent kings" and that any native who came "within the English bounds" must wear one of the badges or be with someone else who wore one. In 1662, the Crown authorized
the establishment of special courts to hear the cases of Black slaves and Native Americans accused of capital crimes. These courts of oyer and terminer, which also heard all cases of treason and piracy, conducted trials in the counties rather than in the colonial capital and thus operated more quickly and cheaply. Since the colonists believed that any crimes by natives or slaves threatened the security of the colony, they wanted speedy resolution of these cases.\textsuperscript{108}

The colonists realized a distinct advantage for themselves in keeping alive the tributary natives and enacted legislation to enforce it. A provision in the "Act Concerning Indians" of 1661-62 ordered the tributary tribes to act as intelligence agents for the colony by demanding the kings to notify the colony's militia whenever they had "the least notice of any march by any strange Indians near our quarters." The Assembly also reasoned that by offering military assistance to the tribes to move against these "strange Indians," the tributary tribes and the colony would establish "an equal interest in each others preservation" for the better security of the colony.\textsuperscript{109} When the colonists believed they would benefit from using some of the Native Americans against others, they did so; thus, at times security also acted as a functional restraint on their genocidal practices.

Despite these laws establishing parameters for Native


\textsuperscript{109} Hening, \textit{The Statutes at Large}, Vol. 2, 142-43.
American-White relations in Virginia in a time of relative peace, the colonists were quick to put down any sign of possible trouble from the native peoples. As the growth of the colony pushed the native peoples away from the rivers and land which provided them with food, the Rappahannocks in Lancaster, Northumberland, and Westmoreland counties apparently resisted. In 1654 the Assembly ordered a force of 170 armed men to march against this tribe to obtain retribution and stipulated that the governor should then determine whether to declare war. In 1656 the Assembly, hearing reports that six-to-seven hundred "western and inland Indians" had settled near the falls of the James River, feared that "great danger might ensue to this colony." The Assembly resolved immediately to remove, by force if necessary, "these newcomer Indians" who must not be "suffered to seat themselves there, or any place near us, it having cost so much blood to expel and extirpate these perfidious andtreacherous Indians which were there formerly." The Assembly authorized Edward Hill to lead a force of at least one-hundred Englishmen and ordered the tributary tribes to assist him in expelling the newcomers. Although the instructions said that Hill should first attempt to remove the natives "without making war," a bloody battle took place in which many of the tributary natives were killed, including the chief. Although the Assembly criticized Hill for his handling of the situation, it allowed him to stay in command. Finally, in April 1657, the colonial militia succeeded in ousting the natives. As another
way to maintain control and force submission of the native people, the colony also severely punished individual natives for alleged transgressions. In 1660 the Assembly ordered that if some natives failed to compensate a settler for "wrongs done to him," these natives should be sold into slavery in a foreign country, with the profits of the sale going to the settler.110

In 1662 the Assembly acted to counter a perceived threat to the security and economy of the Virginia colony from the "Susquehannock and other northern Indians." Problems with these northern tribes were leading to an end to the relatively peaceful interlude in Native American-White relations. At this point, however, the Assembly tried to prevent any "dangerous consequence" and interference with the colony's trade with its "neighboring and tributary Indians" by prohibiting "all Marylanders, English and Indians" and "all other Indians to the northward of Maryland from trucking, trading, bartering, or dealing with any English or Indians to the southward of that place." By September 1663, the tensions between the colonists and the northern Native Americans had not only increased but spread to the Patawomecks, a tributary tribe and one-time member of the former Powhatan paramount chiefdom. Claiming that the Patawomecks and other northern tribes had given some "cause of jealousy to the English," the

Assembly demanded that the tribes "deliver such hostages of their children or others as shall be required." If the tribes refused to turn over these hostages, the colony would declare them enemies and treat them accordingly.\footnote{Hening, The Statutes at Large, Vol. 2, 153, 193.}

In the same act, the Assembly mandated that in the event of any injury or death to an English person at the hands of a native from one of the northern tribes, the tribe nearest the site of the crime would be held responsible for turning over the "criminal," and if it did not, the colony would hold the entire tribe responsible. This notion that all Native Americans could be held responsible for the alleged transgression of one individual served two purposes: one was to continue the colonists' view of Native Americans as a group rather than as individuals, and the second was to help the colonists control the natives through threats of retaliation and the fostering of disunity and mistrust among the native people. Furthermore, the Assembly instigated dissension among the native inhabitants by ordering these tribes to pursue aggressively any "strange Indians" who might enter their land and specifically instructing the Patawomacks and other tribes to track down the Doegs, who had confessed to killing some settlers, and turn them over to the English. These acts apparently did nothing to stop the problems along the frontiers of the colony, and may have spurred the natives to increasingly resist, as the Assembly recorded in September
1664 that natives had committed several murders of settlers on the frontier plantations. In response, a new act required that four able-bodied and armed settlers would be necessary to plant any new frontier settlement.\textsuperscript{112}

Economic woes in the colony which began in the 1660s and were brought on by lower tobacco prices and stricter trade laws increased the unease and tension among the settlers. As societies often do during times of decline, the colonists sought a scapegoat for their troubles. Since the downturn coincided with more frequent incursions into the colony by "foreign" native tribes, which added to the colonists' sense of insecurity, the Native Americans easily became this scapegoat. Focusing their anger first at the "foreign" tribes, the colonists gradually targeted all Native Americans—friendly and foreign—for revenge.\textsuperscript{113}

By 1665, the growing hostility of the English settlers manifested itself in a stringent "Act Concerning Indians." In this legislation, the Assembly extended to all Native Americans its 1663 law holding that among the northern tribes the nearest Native American tribe was responsible for any crimes of violence committed against an English person. Furthermore, the act now specifically stated that "if any Englishman is murdered, the next town shall be answerable for it with their lives or liberties to the use of the public."

\textsuperscript{112} Hening, \textit{The Statutes at Large}, Vol. 2, 193-94, 209.

\textsuperscript{113} Rountree, \textit{Pocahontas's People}, 94-96.
The Assembly then took away the right of the native tribes to select their own weroances, mandating instead that the colony's governor "shall constitute and authorize such person in whose fidelity [he] may find greatest cause to repose a confidence to be the commander of the respective towns." Chastising the settlers for their carelessness in going unarmed into "churches, courts, and other public meeting," the Assembly authorized the militia "to take care to prevent the same." Lastly, the Assembly reiterated the ban on harboring, entertaining, or employing any native person.114

By 1666, the English once again began to express the desire to exterminate the Native Americans. A key development in the deteriorating relations between Native Americans and Whites occurred that year when Governor Berkeley, in a letter to General Robert Smith, wrote:

I think it is necessary to destroy all these Northern Indians—for they must needs be conscious of the coming of these other Indians. Twill be a great terror and example and instruction to all other Indians. If you the Council near you and the Council of war be of this opinion it may be done without charge for the women and children will defray it.115

Although it is not clear from the records, Berkeley was probably targeting the "northern Indians" referred to in the 1665 laws, which included tributary and heretofore "friendly" tribes such as the Patawomecks, in order to prevent their


115 Sweeney, "Some References to Indians," 591; Rountree, Pocahontas's People, 95; McIlwaine, Minutes of the Council, 510, 488-89.
alliance with the troublesome Doegs. Regardless of the specific tribes which were the subject of the governor's letter, it contains three critical points: (1) a call by the highest colonial official to annihilate a group of Native Americans; (2) a plan to use this annihilation to terrorize other natives into submission; and (3) a proposition to sell native women and children into slavery to finance the military campaign. Berkeley received an enthusiastic response to his letter. The justices of Rappahannock County stated that the Doegs and other northern tribes in conjunction with "our neighbor Indians above" were responsible for various "execrable murders" and that the county now planned "to destroy and eradicate [these tribes] without further encouragement than the spoils of our enemies." A month later in July 1666, the governor and his Council declared "a war of extermination" against several of the northern tribes to revenge several killings of settlers and to prevent "future mischiefs." The Council targeted the towns of the Nansemonds and Portobaccos and the "whole nation" of the Doegs and Patawomecks for "utter destruction if possible" and called for the native women and children "to be disposed of" according to the governor's instructions. Quite possibly, the colonists succeeded in obliterating the Patawomecks as they disappeared from the historical record after that date.116

116 Sweeney, "Some References to Indians," 591; Rountree, Pocahontas's People, 95; McIlwaine, Minutes of the Council, 510, 488-89.
A few months later, in October 1666, the Assembly admitted that its prior act holding native towns responsible for murders committed near them was "too full of severity" to carry out without at least some basis for guilt, but declared that other measures were necessary to prevent "like insolencies and murders." It then resurrected the old proviso of the 1646 treaty permitting any settler to kill on the spot any native caught in territory claimed by the colony who was not serving as a messenger or in some other form of public employment permitted by the governor. This act authorized such killings in the frontier county of Henrico but stipulated that, if successful, the Assembly could extend the law to other places. Furthermore, the act called for the governor to forcibly "reduce" to a "conformable obedience" any "refractory" natives.\textsuperscript{117}

By the late 1660s, the colony's repressive measures had effectively reduced Native American incursions into English settlements.\textsuperscript{118} In 1671 the Assembly felt secure enough to repeal the act of 1666 which had authorized the killing of natives caught "trespassing" in Henrico County, and in 1674, passed another act designed to protect the lands assigned to Native Americans from further encroachments by English settlers. This act not only reiterated the prohibition against natives selling their land to individual settlers, but

\textsuperscript{117} Hening, \textit{The Statutes at Large}, Vol. 2, 237-38.

\textsuperscript{118} Rountree, \textit{Pocahontas's People}, 96.
also specifically barred colonists from leasing land from the native inhabitants. Yet during this brief reprieve in the war of extermination, the Assembly, in October 1670, approved a statute which underscored the ongoing relegation of the Native Americans to alien and inferior status. Although in practice Native Americans had already been forced into slavery, for the first time, the law of the colony established that non-Christian native people "imported into this colony by shipping shall be slaves for their lives" (emphasis added). Other natives who came to the colony by land could be held in servitude until thirty years of age, if obtained as children, and for a limit of twelve years, if obtained as adults.119

During the years since the 1646 treaty, the Native American population had continued its precipitous decline; by 1669 there were an estimated 2,900 people left in the tribes which had once formed the Powhatan paramount chiefdom. Violent attacks by the English and continuing epidemics of European diseases contributed to the decline. Since even the records left by the English testify to the fact that the native population had lost significant sources of food due to their shrinking territory and the ecological impact of colonial plantations, it is probable that starvation also increased the death rate.120 As had happened in the earlier


120 Hening, The Statutes at Large, Vol. 1, 467.
years of colonization, the ceaseless assault on the natives' way of life, carried out by the colonists' deliberate actions, continued to weaken the natives' morale and their will to survive, which hastened their decline.\textsuperscript{121}

Although active resistance by Native Americans had abated by the late 1660s and they no longer had the numbers or the strength to pose a threat to Virginia's security, the economic and political woes of the colony intensified. Tobacco prices were still depressed, which caused particular hardship for the small planter. To preserve the mercantile interests of the mother country, England fought two wars with the Dutch, in 1664-67 and 1672-74, to prevent them from trading with the colonists, thus depriving Virginia of one of its markets. During these same years, weather frequently ravaged the tobacco and food crops, and in 1673 disease destroyed many of the settlers' cattle. To add to their economic hardships, the colonists faced an increasing tax burden. In the midst of this downturn in the colonists' fortunes, their careless acquisition and ruthless exploitation of cheap White laborers came back to haunt them. These laborers were mostly men who in England were impoverished and unemployed, and some were convicted criminals. They had been shipped to Virginia, often against their wills, to serve the upper class of planters who were interested only in maximizing their profits. The conditions of servitude were extremely

\textsuperscript{121} Rountree, \textit{Pocahontas's People}, 96. Thornton, \textit{American Indian Holocaust and Survival}, 69.
harsh, further hardening an already tough group. Increasingly, when the time of freedom came, these servants found themselves without the means to obtain land for themselves. By the late 1660s, a growing class of landless poor so threatened the colony's security that in 1670 the Assembly voted to disenfranchise them in a wrongheaded attempt to weaken their impact.122

While the English in Virginia were contending with their own internal pressures, inter-tribal hostilities among the Native Americans of Virginia and Maryland were creating problems which would soon reverberate in the English settlements. Maryland betrayed its allies the Susquehannocks by making peace with their long-standing enemy, the Senecas. The Senecas proceeded to push the Susquehannocks back to the Potomac River where their numbers, added to other Native American tribes in the area, created a food shortage. Trying to avoid starvation, some of the natives in the area began raiding nearby English plantations.123 This renewed raiding along the frontier rattled the nerves of an already tense colony, but more significantly, provided the colonists with an outside target to bear the brunt of their internal frustrations. Writing less than thirty years after these events, Robert Beverley accurately portrayed what happened. "Vent[ing] all their resentment against the poor Indians," he

122 Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 236-47.

123 Craven, The Southern Colonies, 373.
wrote, made the settlers feel that they had an easy way out of all their problems. Once again the Native Americans became the scapegoats for the colony. Already perceived as "alien others" by the English, the native peoples were ready targets on whom colonists could vent their anger during this time of economic insecurity and political unrest. In this way, Bacon's rebellion represents a chilling precursor to some of the most flagrant genocides of the twentieth century, those carried out by the Nazis and by the Turks against the Armenians, in which the victims became the scapegoats for a country's woes.

The trouble which shortly would lead to Bacon's Rebellion erupted in July 1675, in the Potomac River Valley. Claiming that a wealthy planter had reneged on a debt, some members of the Doeg tribe tried to steal some of his hogs as compensation, which set off a chain reaction of escalating violence. First, the planters in the area retaliated by killing several of the alleged thieves, and then the Doegs, seeking their own revenge, killed a herdsman on one of the plantations. Spurred to action by fury and fear, a thirty-man militia pursued the Doegs into Maryland. Coming


125 Melson, "Provocation or Nationalism," 80-81.

upon a cabin of Doegs, one group of the militia lured the chief out under the pretext that it wanted to parley. Although the chief denied that these Doegs had anything to do with the recent killings, the militia shot him anyway. During the fight which followed, the militia killed ten more Doegs and captured the chief’s son. Meanwhile, another group of militia encountered a group of friendly Susquehannocks. Mistaking them for Doegs, the militia killed fourteen of them before realizing their error. Although Maryland officials complained to Governor Berkeley about the botched incursion into their colony, Berkeley and the Grand Assembly did nothing to censure the militia for the murder of the innocent Susquehannocks, nor did they offer any compensation to the "friendly" tribe for the wrong done to it. The Native Americans in the Potomac Valley were left to seek their own justice for the killing of their men, and over the next month, they conducted several raids on English settlements in both Virginia and Maryland.

On August 31, Berkeley ordered Colonel John Washington and Major Isaac Allerton to go with other militia officers to investigate the source of the raids and to demand satisfaction from the Native Americans found to be responsible. If no satisfaction were forthcoming, the militia officers could organize an attack. Washington and Allerton ignored the specifics of Berkeley’s instructions and summoned a militia force of one thousand, which included 150 men from Maryland, now aggravated enough by the Native Americans’ attacks to act
to repress them. Foregoing the "investigation" part of their mission, and thus indicating that they regarded all Native Americans as one enemy group, the militia surrounded a fort of about one hundred Susquehannock men, women, and children on September 26th. The five chiefs who responded to the summons to parley attested to their friendship with the English and denied responsibility for any of the raids. Once again, claims of innocence fell on deaf ears, and the militia executed the five chiefs. Although Maryland authorities reprimanded the commander of its militia for this action, the Virginia authorities took no action against Washington and Allerton. Indeed, the militia continued to lay siege to the fort, pushing the Susquehannocks to the point of starvation until the natives were able to carry out a clever escape during which they killed ten militia guardsmen.

Outraged by the injustices done to them by the same English who had promised them friendship and protection, the Susquehannocks raided English settlements along Virginia's northern frontier, killing thirty-six settlers during January 1676. Agitated and distraught, colonists all over Virginia, but particularly those along the frontiers, pressed their leaders to squash the native peoples and to restore the colony's security. Governor Berkeley responded by ordering Sir Henry Chicheley to lead a force to overcome the natives. For reasons that are subject only to conjecture, the governor rescinded this order before the expedition began. Berkeley was now an old man, who had asked to be retired as he no
longer felt strong enough for the job. He may have feared
that the English militia would not be able to find the
Susquehannocks, who were adept in conducting their raids as
they roved in small bands through wooded areas. Dire reports
about King Philip's War, which was currently raging in New
England, may also have convinced Berkeley that a raid by
Chicheley would provoke the tributary natives to join forces
with the "enemies," setting off a general war in Virginia that
could ruin the colony.

Certainly Berkeley did not call off the expedition
because he wanted to better relations with the Native
Americans because at about the same time as he recalled
Chicheley, Berkeley refused an appeal from the Susquehannocks
to negotiate a peace. Rejecting both peace and a strong
offense, Berkeley had apparently decided that the best way to
put down the rebellious natives and preserve the colony was to
build and man more forts along the frontier, which would make
it easier to carry out attacks against the "foreign" native
tribes. At the same time, Berkeley wanted the aid of the
tributary natives to provide intelligence. In this way,
Berkeley believed the colony could make good use of the
tributary tribes, who alone posed no threat to the colony, and
prevent them from joining forces with the "enemy" tribes,
which he feared could prove fatal to the colony.

In March 1676, the Grand Assembly adopted Berkeley's
plan and declared war against the Native Americans involved in
the "murders, rapins, and depredations" against the English
and any others who refused to deliver "hostages or other security for their fidelity and good affection to the English as shall be required" or who "shall refuse to be aiding and assisting us in discovering, pursuing, and destroying those our enemies." In this act, the Assembly ordered the erection of several forts along the frontiers and the formation of a force of five hundred men to patrol them. Appointed commissioners were "to use Indians in the war and require and receive hostages from them." As an incentive for these tributary natives to serve the colony's interests, the Assembly established that natives who brought in prisoners or the heads of any natives they killed would receive an award of matchcoats. In order to ensure that the tributary natives could pose no threat, the Assembly authorized the death penalty for any English persons caught supplying any firearms to them. As a further measure to control trade, the Assembly decided to limit the number of traders to no more than five per county to be appointed by the county courts.\textsuperscript{127} In order to pay for the garrisons and the forces, additional taxes were imposed on the colonists, whose ongoing financial problems were now exacerbated by bad weather which ruined much of the year's tobacco crop.

The burden of additional taxes to pay for a campaign against the Native Americans which most Virginians considered inadequate spurred greater unrest in the colony. Seizing on

\textsuperscript{127} Hening, \textit{The Statutes at Large}, Vol. 2, 326.
Berkeley's own profitable involvement in the fur trade, many in the colony began to charge that he was disregarding the safety of the English colonists in order to protect those Native Americans who were the source of his furs. The Assembly's limits imposed on the traders gave credence to these charges against the governor by appearing to be a way for him to monopolize the trade.

Within a month of the Assembly's declaration of war, a rumor (which later proved unfounded) that a massive force of Native Americans, some from hundreds of miles away, was poised for an attack on the colony, provoked the settlers in the outlying areas to take matters into their own hands. These colonists believed that the only sure way to achieve security was to annihilate all Native Americans without distinction. As a royal commission later wrote, to these colonists, "it matters not whether they be friends or foes so they be Indians." Writing about the rebellion, ethnohistorian Wilcomb Washburn has explained:

In their excited condition, the planters turned their eyes to the most convenient targets for their wrath: the several villages of subject Indians within the colony. Here were ideal sacrificial victims: the color of their skin exactly matched that of the frontier marauders, they fitted nicely into the role of "traitors in our midst" if not by overt acts, by secret intentions, and there were few of them.\textsuperscript{128}

Furthermore, in turning on the native peoples who were most easily within their reach even though they were not the tribes

\textsuperscript{128} Craven, \textit{The Southern Colonies}, 381; Andrews, \textit{Narratives of the Insurrections}, 123; Washburn, \textit{Governor and the Rebel}, 33-34.
involved in any raids or the feared mass attack, the settlers were following the example of prior colonial legislation which had authorized the colony to hold whole tribes responsible for crimes committed near them, even if these crimes had been committed by others.¹²⁹

The residents of Charles City decided to move against the Native Americans supposedly grouping on the upper James and asked Governor Berkeley for permission to raise a volunteer force and to choose their own officers to lead it. When Berkeley rejected their appeal and instructed them to wait for the regular militia which was on its way, these men decided to carry out their plans anyway. They found their leader in Nathaniel Bacon, a wealthy planter and member of the Council who had just been cut out of the fur trade by the Assembly's act. Most importantly, Bacon hated all Native Americans and saw no way and no reason to distinguish "friend" and "foe" among them. Bacon was not troubled by an dichotomy of images of Native Americans--to him they were all savages whom the colony must destroy. By choosing Bacon as their leader, the settlers made clear that they wanted the extermination of all the native inhabitants.

Bacon first sought authorization from Berkeley to assume command, promising that he would follow the Assembly's orders to spare the tributary tribes. Whether Bacon would have adhered to this promise is doubtful since his "appeal of

the volunteers to all well-minded and charitable people" stated the need to wipe out the "friendly" natives as well as the enemies. No matter what Bacon would have done with a commission, when the governor refused it, the rebellion was on, and Bacon and his volunteer troops became self-appointed crusaders carrying out what Fausz has called a "true race war." They turned immediately on the Pamunkeys, the tributary tribe whose weroansqua, Cockacoeske, was trying to abide by English laws. Terrorized by the rebels, the Pamunkeys fled the area.130

What followed was basically a power struggle coupled with a dispute over tactics between the governor and the rebels, led by Nathaniel Bacon. The debate was never over fairness to the Native Americans, but whether the colony could best be saved from further trouble by exterminating all of them or by using the tributary tribes to assist the colonists in the war. Berkeley, in fact, declared his willingness to destroy the tributary tribes if they caused any trouble. In mid-May, hearing reports (later proved false) that some of the tributary natives had engaged in hostile acts, he instructed Colonel Thomas Goodrich "to spare none that has the name of an Indian for they are now all our enemies."131 Governor Berkeley and his supporters were determined, however, to

130 Washburn, Governor and the Rebel, 36; Fausz, "An 'Abundance of Blood Shed on Both Sides,'" 52; McCartney, "Cockacoeske," generally.

131 Washburn, Governor and the Rebel, 42, 47.
maintain control over policy and over the colony’s militia. Bacon and his followers, all men who lived or owned land on the frontier, believed that the governor’s greedy interests in the fur trade dictated his policies to the detriment of their own security, and so they determined to take it upon themselves to eliminate all Native Americans once and for all.

As it turned out, Bacon and his men succeeded only in two vicious attacks on friendly tribes. The first occurred in May 1676 after the Occaneechees warned Bacon of a planned attack by the Susquehannocks and then, on Bacon’s behalf, carried out a raid on this tribe. When the Occaneechees refused to turn over the captive Susquehannocks to Bacon, who wanted them as slaves, and also refused to give Bacon beaver skins, the rebels launched a savage and indiscriminate attack on the entire tribe, including women and children. The ferocity of the assault is best stated in the words of one of Bacon’s men, who claimed that in the stand-off one of the Occaneechees fired first, and then:

We quickly repaid them, firing in at all their men, ports holes, and other places so thick that the groans of men, women, and children were so loud. . . . Immediately we fell upon the men, women, and children without . . . and destroyed them all, and the king’s forts where all his treasure, his wife and children and ammunition, with a strong guard of men, women, and children were, stook [sic] close to the portholes, fired and destroyed them, a great number of men, women, and children, whose groans were heard, but they all burnt, except three or four men, who, hoping to escape, broke out, and had a welcome by a liberal volley of shot, from our men . . . few or none of them escaped, but were shot behind trees as they stood.

The rebels killed the king of the Occaneechees and took his
daughter prisoner. The narrator concluded that they "could have brought more [prisoners], but in the heat of the fight we regarded not the advantage of the prisoners, nor any plunder, but burnt and destroyed all." Bacon, reiterating that all Native Americans were the enemy, praised the fight: "We destroyed about one hundred men and two of their kings, besides women and children. This victory was the greatest."\textsuperscript{132}

Proving his disregard for the welfare of the friendly tribes, Berkeley promised to forgive the rebels for their actions if they would agree to stop their rebellion against his authority. Making good on this promise in early June, Berkeley pardoned Bacon, restored him to the Council, and promised him a legal commission to continue his fight against the Native Americans. For the rest of the month, the power struggle between Berkeley and Bacon see-sawed. When Bacon demanded to be made general not only of the volunteers but of all the forces in Virginia, Berkeley apparently felt this would be yielding too much to the rebellious Bacon, and so he reneged on his promise. Bacon went home where he aroused his supporters to follow him back to Jamestown and to clamor for the commission. When Bacon threatened to have his soldiers shoot the members of the House of Burgesses, the Assembly succumbed and persuaded Berkeley to give Bacon the commission he wanted. In ensuing legislation, the Assembly also

\textsuperscript{132} "Bacon's Rebellion," 1-9.
appointed Bacon commander-in-chief of all the forces raised to fight the Native Americans.

In the meantime, the Grand Assembly had again declared war "against the barbarous Indians," now defined to include not only the "enemy" tribes but also any among the tributary and friendly tribes who:

have, or hereafter shall forsake their usual and accustomed dwelling towns without license obtained . . . as also all such Indians as shall refuse upon demand to deliver up into the hands of the English all such arms and ammunition of what kind or nature soever (bows and arrows only excepted) and also to deliver such hostages as shall from time to time be required of them . . . or that refuse or neglect to send such of their Indians with the English as shall be required of them . . . all such Indians as at present are our reputed friends who shall receive and entertain into their towns, cabins, or forts, any Indian or Indians our present enemies, or Indians that shall hereafter become our enemies, or any strange Indian who do not properly belong to their said towns, and shall not immediately upon their said coming in amongst them seize the said Indians, and deliver them up to the English, or kill or destroy them . . . and also all such Indians who shall be known directly or indirectly to hold commerce or conversation with out known enemies . . . and the Indians of any town who shall refuse to give an account, or that shall not give a true and just account by name and number . . . shall be held and prosecuted as enemies as aforesaid.

To fight the war, the Assembly called for the formation of a force of one thousand men, apportioned by county. To help defray the costs of the war, the Assembly seized all the land which had been granted the native tribes at the time of the 1646 treaty but which was not presently occupied in order that it could sell it. In a measure which demonstrated how this war against "Indians" was different from wars among White Europeans, the Assembly ordered that all Native Americans
taken prisoner during the war "be held and accounted slaves during life." As Edmund Morgan has pointed out:

Englishmen did not think of enslaving prisoners in European wars. And it is inconceivable that a raid, say by the Dutch, would have resulted in authorization to seize a suitable number of Dutch men, women, or children for sale into slavery. There was something different about the Indians. Whatever the particular nation or tribe or group they belonged to, they were not civil, not Christian, perhaps not quite human in the way that white Christian Europeans were. 133

On June 26, a triumphant Bacon led his forces out of Jamestown to fight the Native Americans. For reasons that are not altogether clear, Governor Berkeley, within a few weeks of Bacon's departure, decided to revoke Bacon's commission and to declare him once again a rebel. Perhaps complaints he received from Gloucester County about the conduct of Bacon's troops gave the governor pause to consider that he may have ceded too much power to Bacon. Berkeley tried to regain his authority by going to Gloucester to raise his own forces to lead against the natives. He was unsuccessful, however, because too many men favored Bacon and were thus unwilling to fight with the governor. At this point, the majority of the colonists supported Bacon's cause for a confluence of reasons centered around their desire to squelch the "Indian problem" which had become the focus of their anxieties. Furthermore, Bacon rallied supporters by turning a tactical dispute into charges that Berkeley cared more about protecting his profits in the fur trade than he did about protecting the colonists.

Bacon's July 30th "Declaration of the People" is an indictment of Berkeley for "assuming the monopoly of the beaver trade" and "having in that unjust gain bartered and sold his majesty's country and the lives of his loyal subjects to the barbarous heathen." In his "Manifesto," Bacon proclaimed his own tactical priorities by stating "our open and manifest aversion to all, not only the foreign but the protected and darling Indians" and by declaring his intent "to ruin and extirpate all Indians in general."\textsuperscript{134}

During the first week of August, Bacon led his second, and last, campaign against Native Americans, once more choosing to target a friendly, tributary tribe, the Pamunkeys. When his troops confronted a Pamunkey encampment, Cockacoeske's instructions to her people not to resist were to no avail, as Bacon ordered an attack anyway, killing eight and capturing forty-five members of the tribe. After this, Bacon's energies were diverted from his vow to exterminate all Native Americans to his power struggle with the governor. The result was that the English were fighting each other rather than the native tribes. Whether Bacon would have had the tenacity to continue his pursuit of native peoples and attack those tribes which were not on "friendly" terms with the colony is not clear. He may have been the kind of leader who builds his/her political career by pandering to the worst instincts of people, and thus Bacon may have believed that he

\textsuperscript{134} "Proclamations of Nathaniel Bacon," 58, 57.
was assuring himself success and popularity by attacking those tribes least likely to fight back. What is clear is that the disagreement between Bacon and his rebels and the governor hinged on questions of authority and tactics, rather than on the goal of removing any possible threat to the security and economic expansion of the colony which the native people might pose. Both governor and rebels would not shirk from the extermination of all natives if they felt it would benefit the colony.

After Bacon’s death of natural causes in October, the rebellion sputtered, and Governor Berkeley, acting decisively and ruthlessly, reasserted his control over the colony. The Crown sent a commission to Virginia to investigate the rebellion and appointed a new governor who took over from Berkeley in May 1677. The royal commissioners acknowledged that the rebels had shamefully mistreated the friendly native tribes, and on May 29, 1677, the colonists, under their new governor Herbert Jeffries, concluded another peace treaty with what was left of the tributary tribes.

In this treaty, the natives once again acknowledged that they would "have their immediate dependency on, and own all subjection to the Great King of England" and agreed to yearly payments of tribute to the governor. In return, the treaty renewed old pledges to protect the natives' lands from further encroachments by settlers and outlawed the further sale of native people as slaves, limiting terms of servitude to the same number of years as English servants. The natives
could obtain certificates from public magistrates to enter into colonial territory in order to fish and forage as long as they limited themselves to things "not useful to the English." As further service to the colony, the Native Americans were to continue to supply intelligence about the movements of any "strange Indians" and to provide military assistance to the English "upon any march against the enemy." While the treaty recognized Cockacoeske as having authority over several tribes and some of the treaty's provisions could appear to assert friendship and fair treatment, the reality is that the tributary tribes were now so reduced in numbers and strength and so totally subjugated to the English that the colonists could afford the terms of the treaty. They knew that these natives could never again threaten the colony's security or the colony's continued growth.\textsuperscript{135}

Six years before the outbreak of Bacon's rebellion, the population of the tributary tribes had declined to an estimated 2,900. Although there are no records indicating the population in 1677, by 1697, a survey by the Virginia governor estimated that the number had plummeted by another fifty percent to 1,450. In that year, there were only nineteen tributary tribes left in the colony, and some of them were not from the original Powhatan union. More than twenty of the Powhatan tribes had become extinct. By 1700, the total number of all Native Americans in Virginia, tributary and non-

\textsuperscript{135} Robinson, \textit{Virginia Treaties}, 82-87.
tributary, was about two thousand. Furthermore, since the founding of Jamestown, the colonists had never hesitated to abrogate the terms of any agreement they had made with the native peoples and now, with the tribes in such weakened condition, it would be easier to do so. The treaty of 1677 would prove to be as full of empty promises as had all the others. With its demeaning terms of subjugation and tribute and its requirements for the natives to obtain certificates in order to search for food, this treaty emphasized once again that the Native Americans had been made aliens in their own country. For as Edmund Morgan has indicated, the English believed that "it was no good trying to give [the natives] a stake in society--they stood outside society." As "outsiders," the Native Americans would always be targets for English greed and vengeance.

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136 Robinson, "Tributary Indians," 57, 59; Rountree, Pocahontas's People, 104; Thornton, American Indian Holocaust and Survival, 70.

137 Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 233.
CONCLUSION

From 1607 to 1677 a genocidal process took place in Virginia during which the English colonists decimated the indigenous peoples, reducing them in number by at least ninety percent, eliminating many tribes altogether, and causing profound cultural and spiritual changes. As in other genocides which occurred during colonization, this one was fueled by the colonizers' debased image of their victim group and by their desire for economic growth, two factors which became inextricably intertwined.

In the seventy years covered herein, the English colonists acted in ways which fulfilled all the criteria for genocide. First, the actions of the colonists were purposeful and organized. Second, the victims (Native Americans) were a group which was defined—albeit wrongly—by the perpetrator of the genocide. European colonizers incorporated under one name, "Indians," a wide range of ethnic and cultural groups in which race was the unifying factor. Believing these "Indians" to be inferior to themselves, "savages," and not quite human, the English pushed them outside their own moral universe and targeted them as this group of "Indians" rather than as individuals. Third, destruction of the group, the Native Americans, took place and occurred in many ways, from mass
killings to ethnocide.

In the case of the English in Virginia, the genocidal actions of the colonists were often carried out for the direct purpose of destruction and at other times were carried out for another stated objective but with reckless disregard of the consequences. While the motive for continually pushing the native people into more remote and smaller tracts of land was to expand the colony's territory, the colonists did so purposely, without regard for the drastic consequences to the natives which were obvious outcomes. One of the most significant outcomes was the reduction in the natives' food supply, since they lost land on which to grow crops and on which to forage and hunt. In addition, the increasing English population and number of settlements drove the game the natives hunted out of the area. The effects of an inadequate diet is difficult to measure from this distance of time; however, it quite possibly weakened the natives enough to make them more susceptible to the devastating plagues of European diseases and could also have interfered with their ability to reproduce. Although there is no evidence that the English in Virginia deliberately spread their diseases among the native peoples, if hunger, a direct result of English policies, made the natives less resistant to the diseases, then the English must bear some of the blame for the deaths which occurred. Furthermore, the colonists continued their land-grabbing policies even after they knew that the result was insufficient food for the native population.
The principal underlying motivations for colonization have always been economics and power, and colonization has often resulted in genocide because the colonizers want for themselves the economic resources which the native peoples possess. In the case of Virginia, the primary resource was land, and the English were determined not to allow the indigenous people to prevent them from taking it. Although the English often declared that they acted to secure the colony from the natives' assaults, this was a specious rationale, because it was the English who were the interlopers and the natives who needed to secure their lives and land from encroachment. Neither should history absolve the English by any claim that they did not believe they were doing anything wrong. As the writings of the Richard Hakluyts show, the English were highly critical of the mistreatment of the indigenous peoples by the Spanish in the New World, yet they went on to act in similar ways in their own colonies.

Colonization turns genocidal because the indigenous peoples become expendable in the view of the colonizers, and this is what happened in Virginia. When the English felt that they could make advantageous use of the native people, they did not conduct wars of extermination against them. At various times, the English desire for native labor, their need to have the natives produce the colony's food or obtain furs for trade, and their plans to use the tributary tribes to help maintain the colony's defenses served as functional restraints on the genocide. However, when these plans went awry or when
the colonists' desire for more land became paramount, the English readily adopted policies to annihilate the tribes which stood in the way of the colony's "progress." Neither did the colonists care if Native American deaths resulted from any other policy they pursued. As expendable people, the Native Americans were to be used or eliminated, depending on which best served the needs of the colonizer.

Colonization has not always resulted in genocide, and no attempt is made here to definitively analyze the history of colonization and genocide. Nevertheless, the story of seventeenth-century Virginia illustrates why colonization always has the potential to turn genocidal. The paramount drive of colonizers for power and wealth has propelled them to do whatever has been necessary to achieve these ends. When indigenous peoples can play a role which benefits the colony, for example, as traders, laborers, or food suppliers, the colonizers have tolerated their presence. When indigenous peoples have seemed to be an obstacle, however, the colonizers' image of them as alien "others" has served to remove any compunction to destroy them. What took place in Virginia also demonstrates another genocidal potential of colonization: In a desperate struggle for survival, the victim group can themselves turn genocidal against its oppressor, as was seen in the Powhatan uprising of 1622. Although not a factor in Virginia, what has become chillingly clear in the twentieth century is that colonization can have long-term genocidal consequences years after the colonial
power has abdicated, by setting in motion internal conflicts among the different colonized groups.

The genocide of Native Americans in English North America contains another element common to genocides, which is that the perpetrators—and, in this case, their descendants—deny that genocide took place. Roger Smith has written that "denial is usually the last stage of genocide," as the common response of the perpetrator is "denial of the facts, of responsibility, of the applicability of the concept of genocide to the crimes in question." For both the victims and society at large, denial has profound implications. Writing about the Armenians, Smith has probed the impact of denial in ways which can be applied to the case of Native Americans as well. "Denial has deeply entangled psychological and political dimensions," Smith states. "On a moral and cultural level, denial continues the genocide, suggesting as it were, that [the victims] deserved their fate." He goes on to recount how evidence indicates that "faced with a world that no longer remembered or cared, Armenians internalized their rage along with a sense of defeat. Frustration, a sense of helplessness, and, not uncommonly, depression set it." Robert Jay Lifton provides additional evidence of the effects of denial from his study of the survivors of genocide. Survivors can experience "sustained psychic numbing," Lifton writes. They need acknowledgement of the genocide and punishment of the perpetrators "in order to reestablish at least the semblance of a moral universe." Although not backed by
research, certainly the proposal can be made that Native Americans from colonial days to the present have exhibited the same kinds of malaise, the "psychic numbing" that Smith and Lifton write about. High rates of alcoholism and suicide continue to plague reservations. In another interesting parallel, the acts of terrorism carried out by some Armenian extremists succeeded in publicizing their case and spurred a resurgence of Armenian activism and cultural cohesion. The defiant acts of Native American activists during the 1960s and 1970s produced similar results, forcing the United States public to face its shameful treatment of native peoples and giving many Native Americans a renewed interest in the regeneration of their cultural and spiritual life.¹

If society at large allows the denial or forgetting of genocides, it is "in effect, rewarding those who have managed successfully to use genocide as an instrument of state policy." Condoning genocide makes it more likely that genocides will occur again. Furthermore, by allowing the state to deny or forget genocide, society joins in the perpetration of the crime, impedes fundamental justice for the victims, and prohibits a healing process--for the victims and the community--from beginning. Again addressing the Armenian case, Smith makes another point applicable to the case of Native Americans: "Finding a way, through or around the . . .

¹ Smith, "Genocide and Denial," 5, 10, 2, 26; Lifton, "Witnessing Survival," 263, 266; Smith, "Genocide and Denial," 27.
denial of genocide . . . has deep significance for those concerned with the dangers inherent in the manipulation of history by government, and for those who seek to understand better the crime of genocide and, through understanding, prevent new acts of mass slaughter." This concern is echoed by historian Richard G. Hovannisian, who has written about the problems posed by nation-states which deny genocide in the pursuit of self-interest at the expense of truth and justice.2

In the case of Native Americans, historians must not allow the United States, in Christopher Vecsey's words, to "forget the grisly truth about ourselves and our past." The genocide of Native Americans must be acknowledged and steps taken, however belatedly, to achieve truth, healing, and justice. Vecsey sees hope, if this can be accomplished:

Our national pride must be tempered with critical self-knowledge. Our faith in ourselves must incorporate doubt into itself if it is to be a lasting, effective faith. The study of our contact with Indians, the envisioning of our dark American selves, can instill such a strengthening doubt.3

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