Democratic Political Development: A Methodological Inquiry
Focusing on Southern States

Sandra Kaye Burden
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd

Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-cenz-m803
DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: A METHODOLOGICAL INQUIRY FOCUSING ON SOUTHERN STATES

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of Government
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

By
Sandra Burden
1970
APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Author

Approved, May 1970

Donald J. Baxter, M.A.

George E. Grayson, Ph.D.

Roger Smith, M.A.
Political scientists are rightly occupied with problems of change and "modernization" in a world that is in desperate need of both. But why study these phenomena in other cultures and ignore the revolutionary changes that are occurring in America's own "underdeveloped area"? For some reason most political scientists seem willing to leave description and analysis of the South's political revolution to today's journalists and tomorrow's historians.

James Prothro and Donald Matthews, 1966
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FRONTISPICE</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. POLITICAL THEORY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART A: RESEARCH AND THEORY</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART B: THEORY AND CONCEPTUALIZATION</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: A NASCENT THEORY</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: AN EMPIRICAL MODEL</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. THE SOUTH: AMERICA'S OWN DEVELOPING AREA</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. SOUTHERN DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: AN EMPIRICAL MODEL</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. SOUTHERN DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII. CONCLUSION</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Southern and Non-Southern Attitudes Towards Government</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Data for First Time Segment, 1942-46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-A. Raw Data on Selected Variables</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-B. Standardized Scores for Model Variables</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-C. Matrix of Correlation Coefficients</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-D. Prediction Equations to Determine the Degree of Fit</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Data for Second Time Segment, 1948-52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-A. Raw Data on Selected Variables</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-B. Standardized Scores for Model Variables</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-C. Matrix of Correlation Coefficients</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-D. Prediction Equations to Determine the Degree of Fit</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-E. Computation of Path Coefficients</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Data for Third Time Segment, 1960-64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-A. Raw Data on Selected Variables</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-B. Standardized Scores for Model Variables</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-C. Matrix of Correlation Coefficients</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-D. Prediction Equations to Determine the Degree of Fit</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-E. Computation of Path Coefficients</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Additional Data for Third Time Segment, 1960-64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-A. Raw Data on Selected Variables</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-B. Standardized Scores for Selected Variables</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Probability ($R^2$) of Predicting State Welfare Effort from Selected Variables as Indicated by Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Hypothetical Scattergram Showing Cluster Units</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Communications Model of Democratic Political Development</td>
<td>53a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Direct and Indirect Paths in Communications Model</td>
<td>53a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to inquire into the diversity and complexity of political development processes. The conditions and consequences of democratic governance in eleven southern states are investigated in terms of a methodology which not only permits replication and validity checks but attempts to come to grips with the formidable problem of causality. Theory building techniques for transposing normative conceptual schemes into empirical models are stressed.

The American South is presented as an authentic "developing area" and, as such, a propitious source of high quality quantitative information needed to build empirical theories and models of democratic political development. The attempt to fit comparable data drawn from eleven southern states over three distinct time periods to a Communications Model of democratic political development which fitted data drawn from seventy-seven nations indicated that the process of democratic political development in the South differs, and differs significantly, from that postulated by the Communications Model.

The findings of this study suggest that regional or cluster comparisons which aggressively and imaginatively investigate the relationships linking man, his environment, and his government in distinct contexts, or in terms of precise typologies, are needed to enrich and render more didactic the growing body of literature focusing on democratic political development.
DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: A METHODOLOGICAL INQUIRY FOCUSING ON SOUTHERN STATES
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The ecology of modernization is a subject researched and studied by social scientists with increasing frequency and rigor. Salient disparities in levels of social, economic, and political development among contemporary societies dramatize the divergent nature and pace of modernization processes. Because the goals as well as the process of modernization differ from society to society, the social, economic, and political correlates of modernization are investigated from various perspectives.

Intellectual curiosity and an idealistic sense of pragmatism shape the double-edged rationale of social scientists studying modernization. In the interests of science, scholars delve to accumulate knowledge and generate systematic explanations of the complex factors involved in modernization. In the interests of humanity, scholars and laymen work to build knowledge of modernization which is relevant and practicable and, hence, can be applied to improve living conditions in the real world.

Knowledge in this context means empirical, not normative, statements which are scientifically derived and inter-linked.¹ "What is

modernization" and "What is the political function in the modernization process" easily become polemical questions which science cannot answer. Scientific study, however, can provide answers to questions about the relationship between selected characteristics of modernizing societies and polities. By stating a priori the desired end state of the modernization process, researchers can critically and systematically investigate the determinants and consequences of selected modernization goals.

In an age marked by unsurpassed technological and scientific achievements, the pervasiveness and tenacity of social and political problems appear anachronistic. "Our greatest challenge today," Arnold Toynbee asserts, "is the morality gap between our cumulative accelerating advance in science and technology and our appalling failure in our relationships with each other."¹ Social scientists are working to meet this challenge. Because political institutions and practices are by definition the instruments used to treat social problems, the work of political scientists who build knowledge about political development assumes particular significance.

Political Science and Political Development

Political development is the label frequently ascribed to the political dimension of modernization. Although both terms are ill-defined, modernization and political development are popularly used in reference to complex phenomena in changing societies. While the term political development may narrow the scope of modernization somewhat by referring primarily to the development of political institutions

¹Arnold Toynbee, as quoted in an interview in Saturday Review, April 5, 1969, p. 23.
and practices, the range of inquiry remains vast and often ambiguous. Consequently, imprecise definitions of both terms mark conceptualization as a most pernicious barrier to theoretical advancement.

Conceptualization poses a two-fold problem. Building knowledge of political development requires concepts which are at once theoretically significant and operational. To come to grips with the problem of conceptualization one must limit the broad intellectual space covered by amorphous terms, such as modernization and political development, without eliminating the concept's theoretical significance. An attempt to overcome such conceptual difficulties begins here by delimiting democratic political development as the subject of the present inquiry.

**Democratic Political Development**

Democracy, as a classic form of government and as a modern way of life, has been studied from many viewpoints. Western scholars, in particular, have studied the conditions which give rise to and the consequences which ensue from democratic governance. Moreover, those who value democracy highly, as does the present writer, see it as the desired end state of the process of political development. Hence, it seems appropriate to study democracy as one type of political development.

Learning about the conditions and consequences of democratic political development calls for careful study of different societies and their governments. What is involved in the process of democratic political development

... is an especially acute question in those parts of the world where democratic institutions are new, their social bases are weak, and governments are in the position of seeking social change while remaining able to control it. ... It is through the comparative analysis of democracies in widely differing conditions and through time that we can learn something about their potentialities
and ultimate compatibilities with drastic social change.¹
Empirical research drawn from many such societies "... should help to produce a genuine theory of democratic government—a theory having practical as well as ethical importance for our times."²

While various dimensions of democratic political development, such as integration, legitimacy, participation, competition, equalitarianism, and bureaucratization, have been recognized, the formidable task of devising adequate, operational definitions remains. To permit researching the relationships between democratic political development and selected modernization factors in the southern United States, the definition employed here is limited first to democracy and then to selected democratic characteristics.

Democratic political development may be defined as a dynamic process of diffusion between the society and polity characterized by rising levels of political participation and competition for authoritative decision-making positions. As defined by this researcher, the above concept is operationalized to investigate the conditions and consequences of democratic political development in eleven southern states.

A Study of Democratic Political Development in the South

Conceptualization, observation, and comparison are the hallmark of efforts to build scientific theories of political development. Conceptualization, involving a delimitation of scope and the careful defi—

²Ibid., p. 47.
nition of terms, is a first step in learning about political development. Concepts such as that offered above can then be investigated empirically, that is, ascribed quantitative meaning and observed in terms of discrete analytic units. Findings obtained in this manner can be compared and contrasted to discern patterns of similarity and dissimilarity. The employment of these procedures is one of the objectives in the following study of democratic political development in the South.

The purpose of this study is to attempt a modest step in the direction of understanding democratic political development. Employing eleven southern states as the units of comparative analysis, this endeavor begins with an effort to integrate ideas from several realms of political inquiry into a disciplined framework of study which can be applied to various groupings of analytic units. The initial focus on the theoretical and methodological aspects of studies in political development is subsequently concentrated on fitting a theoretical model of democratic political development to empirical data drawn from the once-Confederate southern states. The method used to test the fit between empirical theory and quantitative data has been previously applied by Donald McCrone and Charles Cnudde.

Using model construction and related theory building techniques, McCrone and Cnudde have reported a satisfactory fit between a "communications theory of democratic political development" and correlational data for seventy-seven nations. Furthermore, they have accepted a series of empirical propositions—which causally link urbanization, education, and communications with democratic political development—as the "beginnings of a parsimonious theory of democratic political development."¹

Any development theory is essentially a series of inter-linked, causal statements. Therefore, procedures for handling causality in developmental research are clearly needed. McCrone and Cnudde's procedures for transposing research findings into theoretical propositions represent a unique attempt to distinguish causal relationships from correlation data. Because even under the most ideal experimental conditions the treatment of causality poses troublesome problems, McCrone and Cnudde's method deserves close and critical study.

A Preview of the Text

The theoretical and methodological groundwork for the investigation of democratic political development in the South is laid in the following chapter. The utility of comparative analysis in studying the development process and theory building techniques in transposing research findings into theoretical schemes is discussed in the first part of Chapter II.

A variety of conceptual approaches to political development is considered in the second part of Chapter II. This discussion is aimed at developing a concept of political development which is at once relevant, in terms of theoretical significance, and rigorous, in terms of operational reliability and validity. A pluralist, multi-dimensional concept of political development is presented and is the basis from which an operational definition of democratic political development is drawn.

A nascent theory of democratic political development is reconstructed in Chapter III. This "communications theory" of democratic political development, as formularized by McCrone and Cnudde,
rests heavily on the works of S.M. Lipset, Daniel Lerner, and Phillips Outright. Inasmuch as the McCrone-Cnudde model is based on cross-national data, some of the problems of generalizing from cross-national, correlational studies in efforts to build theory are pointed out at the end of this chapter.

In Chapter IV the McCrone-Cnudde model is discussed in more detail, with particular attention focused on model construction as a potent theory building technique. The methodology and formulations of McCrone and Cnudde are critically reviewed, and the rationale for adopting their procedures for formulating causal propositions about the developmental process in the South is given. Simplification of the complex phenomena dynamically entangled in the development process is deemed the primary advantage of model construction.

The two chapters which follow focus on the South. The first, Chapter V, marks the South as an authentic developing area and, consequently, a propitious source of the quantitative data needed for empirical research. Several, perhaps peculiar, problems of democratic political development in the South are outlined and considered from both academic and practical points of view. There also the case is presented for employing distinct environmental settings, such as the South, as analytic units in comparative studies of political development. This argument rests on the belief that empirical theories of political development based on cross-national data, such as the "communications

---

theory" mentioned above, suggest a generic process of political development which is at once misleading and dubious. Constructing typologies of political development with empirical referents and phrased in terms of deviation from a general model is presented as a realistic and didactic goal which is facilitated by comparing environmental and political data drawn from discrete analytic clusters.

The major thrust of this thesis comes in Chapter VI. There environmental and political correlational data, similar to that used by McCrone and Cnudde but drawn from eleven southern states over a twenty year time period, is presented and analyzed. Causal inference and theory building techniques are used to test the validity of the "communications model of democratic political development" in the South. In efforts to add a longitudinal dimension, correlation data for the key variables—urbanization, education, communications, and democratic political development—are given for three separate time periods. The "communications model" is then tested to determine the fit of the southern data to the model for each time segment. Rather than accentuating the stages of development prescribed by the "communications theory," as anticipated, the findings of the investigations in this chapter suggest an "education model" of democratic political development for the South. Nonetheless, and this point should be underlined, the fit between the southern data and the several alternative models proposed by McCrone and Cnudde is not consistently satisfactory.

This realization leads to the conclusion that correlation data must meet at least certain statistical requirements before it can be fruitfully fitted to a model. Recounting the obvious fact that iden-
tification of associations among variables, i.e. the detection of plausible causes of a dependent variable through linear regression analysis, precedes formulations about causality, this researcher concludes that an attempt to construct a model of democratic political development for the South based on the data used in this study would, at best, be premature. In plain language, McCrone and Cnudde's sophisticated procedures for distinguishing causal relationships would appear to demand high quality data and considerably large zero-order and multiple correlation coefficients.

Closing the book on attempts to build a model of southern democratic political development, Chapter VII exploringly re-considers the preliminary task of identifying the crucial factors associated with democratic political development in the South. Wealth and racial balance are found to be highly correlated with the political development index. An alternative operationalization of democratic political development (which attempts to incorporate the "political institutionalization" dimension suggested by Samuel Huntington) is introduced, and its relationships with the environmental and political variables investigated previously are discussed.

The primary purpose of Chapter VII is to explore the possible consequences of democratic political development in the South through consideration of its relationship with welfare policy. Resting heavily on the pioneering works of Thomas Dye, an operational definition of State Welfare Effort is given to permit comparisons among the southern

---

states with regard to levels of welfare effort and levels of political and social development.\(^1\) While the findings of this exploratory research generally support those of similar studies comparing all the American states, i.e. welfare policy is more sensitive to environmental than political factors, the potential for predicting southern welfare effort from a combination of ecological and political data is found to be particularly high (\(R = .95\)).

Chapter VIII is devoted to summation and concluding remarks. Regarding the construction of democratic political development models, some criticisms of the McCrone-Cnudde study are set forth, and several implications for further research are spelled out. More importantly, the appropriateness of the South as a focus for scholars interested in political development is reiterated.

CHAPTER II

POLITICAL THEORY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

PART A: RESEARCH AND THEORY

Empirical statements and a logical basis from which to generalize are the cornerstones of Brechtian political theory. As discussed in this chapter, theorizing about political development necessitates both quantitative and comparative research. In studying political development comparatively, political scientists "... test the universalism of ideas in more and more particular contexts, using micro as well as macro units and quantitative data."\(^1\) Because comparative analysis yields generalizations about political life in developing societies, efforts to build theories of political development frequently employ comparative analytical frameworks.

An Overview of Comparative Politics

Students of comparative politics have assumed many faces over the past several decades. After years of concentration on foreign political institutions, the field of comparative politics "commenced to undergo radical transformation in the early 1950's."\(^2\) Factors both internal and external to Political Science have ushered in an apparent revolution in

\(^1\)Apter, Conceptual Approaches to Modernization, p. 4.

studying contemporary governments.

Within the discipline, the behavioral persuasion has gained influence and affected the perspective of those comparatively studying political phenomena. Concomitantly, growing numbers of newly independent states after World War II have dramatized the fact that "people can be organized in hundreds of ways unassociated with the modern state."¹ A redirection of interests and energies among students of comparative politics, so as to discern and illuminate the common dimensions of political life, has rejuvenated the entire discipline. A 1962 survey indicates that American political scientists view comparative politics as the field in which the most significant work is being done.²

Howard Scarrow has described the transformations of this subfield as (1) an expansion of geographical horizons; (2) a broadening intellectual focus; and, (3) a concentrated effort to render political study genuinely comparative.³ To these characteristics, a fourth can be added: an effort to identify, conceptualize, and inter-relate the major factors of social change and political development. "One of the most vital needs for further theoretical progress," Robert Ward corroborates, "is a deeper understanding of political change or development phrased in comparative terms."⁴


³Scarrow, Comparative Political Analysis, pp. 1-4.

The Focus on Development

Change, the volatility of societies, remains little understood. The political, economic, and sociological dimensions of change have been noted and variously labeled evolution or revolution, progress, and, more currently, modernization. Still, as John McKinney suggests, "Change as variously conceptualized in cycles, spirals, straight lines, ascendencies, discontinuous alterations, and dialectic ziggags leaves us with a sense of inadequacy and a low predictive ability. . . ."\(^1\)

The problem of social change is closely akin to and further complicated by that of continuity. Historians in particular have often seen the stabilizing elements which characterize continuity as but another side of change. So it is both sides, both change and continuity, which constitute the coin of development so highly valued on the world market today.

In efforts to comprehend more fully the dynamics of continuity and change, social scientists seek to discern and explain the common dimensions of development. Despite a lack of agreement on the precise nature of the various dimensions, it is generally assumed that environmental, behavioral, and institutional factors are intimately involved in the process of development.

Because development continually affects so many aspects of social life, "it has become a major preoccupation of social science in all of its branches."\(^2\)


The problem of the relationship between social order and change is persistent, and it is not only a problem of vast practical significance to any social system, but constitutes the highest level theoretical and empirical problem of the academic disciplines concerned with social life.  

The myriad problems of development raise tantalizing questions in the minds of scholars and laymen alike. These questions evolve around goals and process: they are questions of what and how.

An answer to the first question involves the setting of specific objectives toward which a society should move. What kind of economic system? What kind of political regime? What kind of social structures? These are basic questions confronting policy-makers in developing areas. Yet, the goals selected—the prescribed policy objectives—must be practicable. If any sort of development is to be achieved, policies must be known which, when properly implemented, will bring the social system closer to its chosen objectives.

While the question of what (prescribing development goals) may not be within the realm of political science scholarship, the question of how clearly belongs in that domain. For "... coping with the problems of continuity and change is dependent upon the ability to mobilize relevant knowledge." Coming to grips with the process of development necessitates the mobilization of relevant knowledge with which to anticipate and perhaps re-channel and mold the indigenous forces of change and continuity.

The political function in the development process—"to maintain

---

1 McKinney, *The South in Continuity and Change*, p. 3.

2 Ibid., p. 28.
stable controls over these rapid changes—is everywhere acknowledged, but nowhere understood. The role of political scientists, who attempt to delineate alternative responses and weigh the consequences of each policy choice, assumes particular significance.

Implications for Research and Theory

The relationship between goals and process is similar to that between ends and means. An understanding of this relationship has important consequences for both research and theory.

The question of the appropriateness of the means for achieving a given end is undoubtedly accessible to scientific analysis. Inasmuch as we are able to determine which means for the achievement of a proposed end are appropriate and inappropriate, we can in this way estimate the chances of attaining a certain end by certain available means. In this way we can indirectly criticize the setting of the end itself. . . .

The implications for empirical research and scientific theory should be clear: (1) The understanding of political development demands a method which enhances the accumulation of knowledge. This is the Scientific Method. (2) Only by specifying a priori the goals or ends can the appropriate means for achieving those ends be scientifically studied. (3) The setting of goals, in Weber's words, is "not a task which science can undertake."

Theory, the explanation of circumscribed phenomena, requires both specific knowledge and a logical basis from which to generalize.

Any restless area presents social research with an excellent oppor-

---


tunity to meet the need for a theoretically sound, empirically based exposition of the process called modernization. To be sure there are particularities in each situation. Particularities can be wedded to generalizations, however, if we focus social research in any area upon those aspects of the process which it shares with other regions of the world that are seeking to accompany rapid economic growth with social change.¹

Daniel Lerner's remarks above, regarding a communications theory of modernization, highlight the importance of genuinely comparative study.

Empirical research in comparative politics seeks "... to discover regularities and variations of political organizations by comparative analysis of historical and contemporary systems."² Particularities and generalities about political development, as indicated by research findings, are needed for systematic explanation and theoretical advancement. "Orderly comparison is one necessary step in the process of systematic explanation."³

**Building Theories of Political Development**

Comparative researches are providing a growing body of information about the relationships between political and environmental variables in diverse socio-economic contexts. Yet, scientific theories explaining aspects of political development have been few. Among all social scientists, political scientists have been most prone to view scientific theorizing with reserve and often with reluctance or misunderstanding. Confusion about the nature and function of political

¹Lerner, "Communications Theory of Modernization," p. 331.


theory has apparently tainted persisting apprehensions.

Political theory, in the lexicon of the empiricist, does not imply "iron laws of politics." It does mean systematic explanations of political life. Theories are analytical, intellectual constructions -- "ways of delimiting reality for various purposes and for ultimately acting upon it."¹

Because the integrity of a theory is often adjudged by its applicability, that is the number of real-life cases which fit and thus can be explained in terms of the theory, an emphasis on broad all-encompassing theories of social action and political and economic life continues.² A contrary tendency has been to focus on particular aspects of the political or social system. Relatively narrow studies have more recently provided quantitative information about limited aspects of political life. Yet, whether the focus has been broad or narrow, the relationship between political system characteristics and the nature and scope of the modernization process remains unclear; in part, at least, because of the failure to gather data under the constraint of a clearly conceived theory and, in part, because of the failure to develop and revise theories under the discipline of empirical investigation.

Scientific theories of development, creatively conceived and rigorously investigated, are prerequisite to understanding, explaining, and anticipating the forces of development. If the effort is to accumu-

¹Apter, Conceptual Approaches to Modernization, p. 5.

late and assemble knowledge which is relevant and applicable, energies must be directed at building theories which have immediate empirical relevance—not esoteric theoretical schemes. The quality of such theories depends on the quality of research designs and the continuing replication of similar researches employing varied analytic units.

Quantitative and qualitative research findings are providing a broad and solid foundation upon which scientific theories of political development can be constructed. Yet, transposing the findings of empirical research into theoretical formulations remains a major task in building theories of political development.

**Closing the Gap Between Research and Theory**

Recent social science research can truly be seen as the harbinger of sought-after theories of social change and political development. Yet, the volume and intensity of unrefined research in political science has had the inadvertent effect of making the inherent gap between research and theory more visible and tantalizing. The gap between the languages of research and theory, Hubert Blalock points out, "can never be bridged in a completely satisfactory way."

One thinks in terms of a theoretical language that contains notions such as causes, forces, systems, and properties. But one's tests are made in terms of covariations, operations, and pointer readings. Although a concept such as mass may be conceived theoretically or metaphysically as a property, it is only a pious opinion, in Eddington's words, that 'mass' as a property is equivalent to 'mass' as inferred from pointer readings.¹

Recognition of the differences between the languages of research and theory is fundamental to realizing that some methods of theory building

---

may be preferable to others.

In theorizing about political development, one inevitably makes judgements or causal inferences about the sequence of variable relationships. Yet, so long as the basis for making these judgements, that is the criteria and procedures applied in analyzing research data, differ among researchers or remain elusive and ambiguous, isolated research findings can never be consolidated into a didactic theoretical network. Clearly, the task of assembling cumulative knowledge about political development demands consistent applications of sound analytic methods to related researches.

While a scientific frame of reference is undoubtedly a formidable, indeed indispensable, weapon of aspiring theorists, there exists a variety of essentially scientific methods to choose from; some, perhaps, being more appropriate than others for the particular task at hand. For the political scientist interested in political development, the chosen analytic methods must not only permit disciplined replication of related researches but must also define appropriate procedures for making theoretical judgements about causality. One such method of transposing research data into theoretical formulations of the process of political develop-

---

1 Karl Pearson, The Grammar of Science, Second Edition, Part I (1911) provides this classic definition: "The classification of facts, the recognition of their sequence and relative significance is the function of science, and the habit of forming a judgement upon those facts unbiased by personal feeling is the characteristic of what may be termed the scientific frame of mind. The scientific method of examining facts is not peculiar to one class of phenomena and to one class of workers; it is applicable to social as well as physical problems. . . ." In a more pithy fashion, Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962), p. 218, marks scientific methodology as "a way of preventing me from deceiving myself in regard to my creatively formed subjective hunches. . . ."
ment involves the construction and testing of causal models.

In the process of theory building one begins with simple causal models, tests to see if they fit the data, modifies them until he is willing to commit himself (temporarily) to a given model, and then finally attempts to estimate standardized and unstandardized regression coefficients. At the same time he is aware that other models may also fit the data and that his measures of relative importance are appropriate to only a given model and a particular set of data. The interplay between theory and research takes on real meaning in the process.1

In this process of inferring causal relationships, the science of statistics provides needed analytic discipline. Thinking in terms of causal models, mathematical principles, rather than intuitive whims or fancies, are applied in altering or rejecting the model being tested.

While statistics provides no formula for proving that variable X causes variable Y, statistics does provide a number of applied mathematical principles and techniques for determining if, how, and to what extent X and Y are related. The Pearson correlation coefficient, for example, statistically defined as ranging from -1.0 to +1.0, is popularly employed by social scientists as a measure of the association between variables. Nonetheless, this relatively sophisticated statistic (which is framed by a set of assumptions such as linearity, random error distribution, and homoscedasticity that may or may not be appropriate for different data sets) measures only association—never causation.

Model construction techniques, based on similar statistical principles, are aimed at extending the findings of correlation analysis by distinguishing between spurious, indirect and direct relationships and thereby limiting the range of possible or probable causal linkages. In much the

same way as correlation analysis defines statistically significant associations and thus permits the researcher to objectively assess the relationship between variables, model construction techniques allow him to make unbiased causal inferences regarding the sequence and interactions of a set of variables through the comparison of actual and predicted measures of possible associations. In simple terms, the actual measures which derive directly from the data are compared with the predicted measures which obtain from the researcher's assumptions about the data. If, for example, one assumption is that characteristics X, Y and Z are isolated from external disturbing influences and another is that Y is the dependent variable, the prediction that Y and X are spuriously or indirectly related (r_{xy,z} = 0 or r_{xy} = r_{xz} r_{zy}) can be tested against the actual partials indicated by the data. Following these procedures for making judgements concerning the adequacy of alternative causal models, the researcher "can proceed by eliminating inadequate models that make predictions that are not consistent with the data."^2

Models which include only a few variables and thus limit the number of possible inter-relationships are easier to handle but offer less pay-off than more complex ones. This state of affairs creates a dilemma for the social scientist who needs to "... select models that are at the same time simple enough to permit him to think with the aid of a model but, also, sufficiently realistic that the simplifications required do not lead to predictions that are highly inaccurate." On the other hand, Blalock

---


continues, "The more complex the model, the more difficult it becomes to decide exactly which modifications to make and which new variables to introduce. Put simply, the basic dilemma faced by all sciences is that of how much to oversimplify reality."¹

It seems necessary to emphasize that model construction and testing, employing the techniques sketched above, is only one, but a highly valid, way of coming to grips with causality and methodically assessing the nature of variable relationships. It should be further noted that such procedures of causal inference can never "... establish any given model as the single correct one."² Because a number of models could conceivably fit any given set of data, the initial selection of models to be tested is a crucial aspect of theory building procedures. Guided by the perceptions and intuitions which frame his nascent theory, the researcher initially limits the number of alternative models by choosing only "a finite number of specified variables." In so doing, he admits "that had another set been selected, his model might have looked quite different."³

Conclusions about the process of development derived in this manner are refined empirical propositions. When utilized with precision and caution, model building techniques can be a powerful tool for analyzing political development. Thoughtfully and exactingly employed, this method offers the prospect of a "... parsimonious theory, rather than mere correlates of, the process of democratic political development. ... "⁴

¹Blalock, Causal Inferences, p. 8.
²Ibid., p. 20.
³Ibid., p. 15.
A first step in both research and theory is conceptualization, this is the definition of terms to be studied. Identifying and conceptualizing the major factors of the development process has been a great barrier to building theories of political development. The idea of political development itself has most generally been used as a catch-word rather than as an operational concept; and has thus confounded the already complex task of theory building.

At this point, agreement about a concept of political development appears limited to the meager assumption that political development is a "good thing," whatever that may mean. Lucian Pye has aptly identified the basis of the conceptual difficulty:

The difficulty with concepts of political modernization and development is that there are so many... A political system is expected to do more than merely solve problems; it must cope with insoluble issues, and it must provide people with a sense of identity and of fundamental membership in a large community. Clearly the multi-functional character of politics... means that no single scale can be used for measuring the degree of political development.¹

Lacking consensus on the concept, researchers have tended to study political development as (1) an integral link in the process of modernization or (2) the stability of specific and differentiated political institutions.

An alternative has been to conceptualize various characteristics which are assumed to be vital dimensions of political development and to study such characteristics as individual concepts. After a brief look at some of the problems of conceptualization, various conceptual approaches to political development will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter.

**The Relevance-Rigor Controversy**

One aspect of the problem of conceptualizing political development is the task of defining the relevant dimensions of the process both within and external to the political system. The importance of considering both internal and external factors has been documented by Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner.

In recent studies of political development, political scientists have tended to treat the political system as a dependent phenomena, influenced in its stable or changing configurations by ecological and other environment factors. From these studies we have come increasingly to understand that the structures of political institutions, their operation, and political behavior... are influenced in part by such broad phenomena as educational systems or communications network of a particular society.¹

In stating the case for clear and close relationships between the political system and the socio-economic milieu, the same authors warn against the "... danger of an unjustifiable implication, namely, that the political system is the outcome of environmental factors that may be stable or changing through time."² The complexity of these inter-relationships means that, in many cases, concepts of political development which appear most relevant, that is, come closest to defining phenomena in the real world, cannot be rigorously investigated.


²Ibid., p. 7
The low potential for operationalizing concepts such as "institutions of politics" or the "broader environment" has given rise to a proliferation of concepts which are at once more precise and more controversial. To render concepts both relevant and rigorous, John Crittenden points out, the "dominant characteristic of contemporary research on development is an emphasis on complex and speculative concepts based on a large number of empirical referents."¹

Coming to grips with the problem of conceptualization entails finding a middle ground between concepts which are accurate and relevant, on the one hand, and which lend themselves to precise operationalization on the other. As LaPalombara has later argued, "The best hope for the discipline's future growth lies in the application of rigorous methodologies to important problems conceptualized at the 'middle range' and involving partial segments of the polity."² In devising and investigating concepts of political development, compromise between the relevance demanded by theory and the rigor demanded by research seems inevitable.

**Political Development as Modernization**

Daniel Lerner is a scholar who has made a satisfactory compromise. He has maintained a high degree of relevance in providing a conceptual scheme of political development which has adequate operational potential. Much like Dankwart Rustow who considers "politics, economics, sociology and psychology" as "many different aspects of the same seamless web of


social reality,¹ Lerner sees the entire social system impinging upon and affected by political development. For Lerner, the social system and political system, with all their respective function and structures, are inextricably bound.

Lerner argues that "two main sets of problems confront the development process everywhere: mobility and stability."

By mobility we mean the problem of societal equilibrium. Mobility is the agent of social change. Only insofar as individual persons can change their place in the world, their positions in society, their own self-image does social change occur. . . . The political function in this process is to maintain stable controls over these rapid changes—i.e., to preside over a dynamic equilibrium.²

The hallmark of a modern, and thus politically developed, state is, in Lerner's words, an "expansive and adaptive self-system, ready to incorporate new roles and to identify personal values with public issues."³

From this now popular perspective, the goal of political development is, in many respects, identical to the aim of modernization. Linking political development and modernization in a similar fashion, Lucian Pye sees the problem of political development as "... one of cultural diffusion and of adapting, fusing, and adjusting old patterns to new life demands."⁴ Crystallizing as a rise in social mobilization and political participation, political development has an impact on the entire community.

³Lerner, Passing of Traditional Society, p. 51.
⁴Pye, Communications and Political Development, p. 19.
Political Development as Institutionalization

An able critic of the viewpoint presented above is Samuel Huntington. In efforts to extract the political dimension from the larger societal context, Huntington defines political development as "the institutionalization of political organizations and procedures." He argues that a "concept of political development should be reversible," that is, "define both political development and the circumstances under which political decay is encouraged." ¹

In the Weberian tradition, Huntington submits four ideal types of polities based upon his "theory" of political development and political decay. Conceived in terms of "high" or "low" ratings on the criteria social mobilization and political institutionalization, societies may be categorized as having a civic (high/high), contained (low/high), corrupt (high/low), or primitive (low/low) polity. India, for example, is depicted as a contained polity, "politically highly developed, with modern political institutions, while still very backward in terms of modernization." ²

Huntington identifies public interest with "whatever strengthens governmental institutions" and asserts that "the public interest is the interest of public institutions." He then concludes: "The existence of political institutions (such as the Presidency or Presidium) capable of giving substance to public interests distinguishes politically developed societies from undeveloped ones." ³ Because rapid social mobilization or increased political participation may cause demands which overload

¹Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," p. 393.
²Ibid., p. 409.
³Ibid., p. 415 (Italics mine.)
the political system, Huntington maintains that these phenomena often undermine and impede the process of political institutionalization and, hence, may lead to political decay.

Criticism and Synthesis

The institutional approach to political development, as presented by Huntington, fails completely in at least one crucial area: the problem of transforming a contained polity, such as India, into a civic polity is left unexplored. In stating a sound argument for stable political institutions in changing societies, Huntington provides little insight for a country such as India or a state like Mississippi where political institutions are "developed" yet where economic and social development is severely retarded. That extreme or overly-rigid institutionalization of political structures may actually preclude development in other societal sectors and, perhaps, constrain the functioning of political structures themselves are major aspects of the development problem which Huntington apparently ignores. Highly institutionalized polities, such as absolute monarchies, Communist regimes, and elitist state governments, appear to do little to enhance—and may often thwart—certain modernization goals.

The modernization approach to political development, as advanced by Lerner and many others, is equally unsatisfactory in at least one respect. The general tendency of those linking modernization and political development has been to equate one "good" (modernization) with another "good" (political development), while leaving the task of defining "good" to the reader's vivid imagination. Lerner, in marking empathy as the all important link between what may be inferred to be a democratic society and a democratic polity, comes closer than most. Nonetheless, even here, empathy is at best merely a crucial vehicle whose destination is never clearly
specified.

The point to be made here can be simply put: Even though a political scientist can never prove the "goodness" or "correctness" or intrinsic value of the goal or destination he researches, he nevertheless is obliged to define the goal as explicitly and forthrightly as possible. The tendency to define only intermediate or instrumental goals, such as social mobilization, political participation or political institutionalization, casts doubts about—if not totally obscures—what the researcher's notion of political development really is. Because non-scientific, essentially metaphysical value orientations mold the researcher's notion of political development, it would seem advantageous, seemingly crucial for interpretive purposes, to sketch the basic values molding non-operational notions.¹

Thus, the following statement of this researcher's value orientations to the problem of political development is not intended as sheer rhetoric; nor is it given to initiate polemic discourse. Rather, these statements represent the simplest beliefs which led this researcher to accept the pluralist concept of political development discussed in the next section. For the sake of brevity, they can be listed as follows:

(1) The individual is valued more highly than any group, organization, state, or nation.

(2) The security, freedom, and dignity of the individual is valued as the highest order "good."

(3) The goal of modernization and political development is to maximize

the security, freedom, and dignity of each and every individual.

(4) Political institutions and practices are not valued of themselves but only insofar as they are instrumental in realizing this goal.

(5) Democratic political institutions and practices, as classically defined, favor the realization of this goal more than non-democratic. Perhaps, then, in the light of these unproven, non-testable assertions, the relevance of the pluralist concept of political development can be seen for what it truly is: a ward against scientific yet essentially sterile investigations of political development. Based on an "... awareness of the experience of the human race in historical times and not just contemporary primitive and advanced western societies,"¹ the pluralist concept offers a somewhat transcendental approach to political development.

The Pluralist Approach to Political Development

William McCord has labeled the European experience of the 18th and 19th centuries as the "first springtime of freedom." He observes that liberal forces there "confronted challenges from the old aristocracies resembling those faced by progressive movements in contemporary developing states."² He outlines the following interpretations of why some states "leaped to freedom" in this period while others did not:

(1) Economic development - This school subscribes to the belief that economic abundance attenuates class differences and thus lays the foundations for functioning democracy. Pointing to the findings of Lipset, McCord argues that such correlations may more reasonably be read as indications that a "stable, liberal democracy creates more


doctors or telephones or literacy, rather than the reverse."

(2) **Ideology** - This school, led by Massimo Salvadori, contends that new and unique ideas borne of the Enlightenment and Age of Reason nurtured the blossoming of liberal democracy. McCord welcomes Salvadori's emphasis on ideological commitment as a needed antidote for the implacable economic forces thesis, but notes that "it smacks of Hegelianism to suggest that philosophies, abstractly floating above social reality, totally created a new society."

(3) **Homogeneity and Institutionalization** - A fully liberal polity, according to this school, stems from national homogeneity which permits the establishment of electoral and political structures compelling compromise and long practice in self-government. In criticizing this thesis, McCord cites many "examples of nations which lacked these advantages, but still managed to evolve a liberal political structure."

(4) **Pluralism** - This school incorporates several theses of political and social development. It maintains "that a liberal political structure grows only in a society characterized by multiple economic checks and balances; ... It distrusts a society in which a single group (whether a feudal aristocracy, a Brahmin caste, corporation executives, or the government) has unchallengable economic power, for in this environment political absolutism finds its natural habitat."

In prescribing certain goals for developing societies, McCord's pluralist concept of political development is clearly a normative one. This concept prizes a liberal, democratic polity and defines its evolution in terms of an open socio-economic milieu. The pluralist "... wishes to

---

1Ibid., pp. 249-54, passim.
abolish privilege, end economic serfdom, and extend equality of opportunity to all." Political development, then, "should be measured in terms of the degree to which it ends suffering, enhances individual dignity, and widens the possibility of free choice."\(^1\) Although no amount of research can yield empirical evidence supporting these goals in absolute terms, their relative merits, their conditions and consequences, and their implementation can be studied scientifically.

**A Concept of Democratic Political Development**

The several conceptual approaches to political development discussed above are marked by varying degrees of relevance and operational potential. Nonetheless, the contribution of such concepts to research and theory is mainly heuristic. All of them require more precise definition. None of them, as presented by various authors, are suited for rigorous operationalization. If the interest of Political Science is the building of knowledge about political phenomena, then the discipline must demand that speculation and intuition either be shaped into testable hypotheses or eschewed.

In efforts to render the pluralist concept operational, political development will be limited for this thesis to Democratic Political Development. By making the concept specific in this way, one may identify desired ends of the development process without making their ultimate value the subject of inquiry. Democratic Political Development, as discussed in the following chapters, is investigated as an empirical--not a normative--concept.

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 281.
Although various dimensions of democratic political development, such as legitimacy, participation, equalitarianism, consensus, and effective opposition to the "ins," are recognized, this research attempts to study the correlates of only selected dimensions. Democratic Political Development, as conceptualized here, describes a dynamic process of diffusion between the polity and society characterized by rising levels of political participation and competition for authoritative decision-making positions. Voter turnout and inter-party competition are the specific indicators used to investigate this concept.
CHAPTER III

DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: A NASCENT THEORY

As noted in the previous chapter, political scientists have hardly formed a united front in their efforts to build a theory of political development. In a way, this is a healthy sign; it recognizes, at least tacitly, that a theory could at best only superficially grasp the complex phenomena of political development. This realization has ushered in a growing interest in types of political development and an effort to build developmental theories of selected polity types.

Democratic Political Development

Westerners, in particular, as members of democratic polities have frequently studied the conditions which give birth to and nurture democracy. More often than not, however, the blatant assumption that political development and democracy are one and the same is applied as an unstated premise. The pitfalls of equating the two are confounded further by poor, inadequate conceptualizations of democracy.

In the interest of more rigorous research, it appears that students must be content to settle for something less than an all-encompassing concept of democratic political development. They must eschew the risks of explaining nothing in their attempts to explain everything. As noted in the previous chapter, the development, the conditions and consequences, of democratic governance has been variously studied. Indeed, the voluminous bulk of literature on the subject is so vast that one might justifi-
ably be appalled by the dearth of scientific knowledge about democracy.

The virtues of citizenship, perhaps the distinguishing feature of democracy, have been defended by Aristotle and Rousseau. These thinkers together with many others have argued that individuals should govern their own destinies. Contemporary scholars as well have tended to accept popular sovereignty and its host of democratic corollaries (such as majority rule, minority rights, political equality, limited government and so on) as desirable political goals; and have tried to explain what conditions enhance democracy and how this type of government affects man and society.

Whether the geographic focus has been a single nation or a cross-cultural comparison, diversity in both form and substance among allegedly democratic regimes has been noted. The plight of post-colonial regimes, in particular, has significantly illustrated that prescribed forms—revered democratic structures—may not actually function "democratically." This realization has, in large part, precipitated the current focus on environment and government as intimate factors of democratic political development.

**Lipset's Study of Democracy's Social Requisites**

Seymour Martin Lipset, a pioneer in the scientific study of democratic political development, has investigated the "existence and stability of democratic society. . . from a sociological and behavioral standpoint." In order to construct a theory of democratic political development, Lipset maintains, "One must be able to point to a set of conditions that have actually existed in a number of countries, and say:"

. . . democracy has emerged out of these conditions, and has become stabilized because of certain supporting institutions and values, as
well as because of its own internal self-maintaining processes.\(^1\) Democracy, as defined by Lipset, is "a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials," permitting ". . . the largest possible part of the population to influence [decision-making] through their ability to choose among alternative contenders for political office."\(^2\)

Operationalizing this concept, Lipset applies the criteria (1) uninterrupted continuance of political democracy since World War I, and (2) absence of major political movements opposed to democratic "rules of the game" (i.e., totalitarian factions received less than 20 per cent of the vote in any election over the past 25 years), to locate thirteen stable democracies and fifteen unstable democracies and dictatorships among European and English-speaking nations. Expertise opinions are used to locate seven democracies and unstable dictatorships and thirteen stable dictatorships among Latin American countries. Proceeding from these four classifications, Lipset's analysis of quantitative data and historical records leads him to conclude that economic development (wealth, industrialization, education, and urbanization) and legitimacy (effectiveness in maximizing constituency satisfaction and minimizing disruptive cleavages) are social requisites of democracy.

So far as operationalizing the social requisites is concerned, no attempt is made to quantify legitimacy. Regarding economic development, Lipset calculates the mean score and range of variation on each indicator of Wealth (Per capita income, population/doctors, population/motor vehicles, telephones/population, radios/population, and newspaper copies/population), Industrialization (Per cent males in agriculture and per capita energy consumption), Education (Per cent literate, primary education enrollment, post-primary education enrollment, and higher education enrollment/population),

\(^1\)Lipset, "Social Requisites of Democracy," p. 69. \(^2\)Ibid., p. 71.
and Urbanization (Per cent in cities over 20,000; 100,000; and in metropoli-
tan areas) for each of his four political classification. While the mean scores on each economic development indicator can be seen to favor the more democratic countries, the considerable overlap in the ranges of the scores among the four classifications makes conclusive interpretations difficult.

As a step toward scientific theorizing about political development, Lipset's study can be challenged on at least two grounds. First, democracy is operationalized as a dichotomous variable, making comparisons with the continuously scaled economic development variables difficult. Second, this key variable is operationalized largely on the basis of intuitive judgements, making valid replications difficult. Although an attempt is made to temper the subjectivity of categorization, Lipset's conclusions about democratic development are primarily based on speculative labels marking each regime as democratic or not.

Although a significant addition to democratic study, Lipset's work was most important for the subsequent work it inspired. In one such work, to be discussed below, Phillips Cutright has operationalized democratic political development as a continuous variable with empirical referents. Before turning to this study, however, it will be necessary to examine briefly some other foundations of Cutright's research.

Lerner's Theory of Political Modernization

In part, the theoretical groundwork for Cutright's cross-national study of "national political development" was laid by Daniel Lerner. His study of modernization in the Middle East stems from a survey of six countries (Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iran) conducted in 1950-51 to investigate the relationships between urbanization, literacy,
media consumption and production, and political participation. Although Lerner's admitted concern is political development, his actual concern—as may be inferred from his choice of voter turnout as the political indicator—is **democratic** political development. This he esteems as the "crowning institution of participant society."

Lerner highlights the importance of configurational analysis in stressing the unstabilizing impact of disproportionate changes in one or more of the variables listed above. Egypt, for example, which scores high on urbanization yet very low on literacy, is contrasted with Turkey where improvements in each variable describe a more even pace of change. In pointing to this finding as a possible explanation of Turkey's relatively more "democratic" regime, Lerner sets the stage for presenting a theory which directly and intimately relates democratic political development and modernization.

Empathy, "the general capacity to see oneself in the other fellow's situation," is considered by Lerner as a bridge juxtaposing traditional and modern, participant society.

Traditional society is non-participant—it deploys people by kinship into communities isolated from each other and from a center; it develops few needs of interdependence; lacking the bonds of interdependence, people's horizons are limited by locale and their decisions involve only other known people in known situations. Modern society is participant in that it functions by 'consensus'—individuals making personal decisions on public issues must concur often enough with other individuals they do not know to make possible a stable common governance.

Inasmuch as urbanization, education, and communications break down parochial barriers and thus enhance the individual's capacity to

---

1Lerner, *Passing of Traditional Society.*

2Ibid., p. 49.

3Ibid., p. 50
empathize, Lerner reasons, the foundations for consensus and participation in political decision-making are laid. Because modern society is characterized by empathy ("the inner mechanism which enables newly mobile persons to operate efficiently in a changing world"), it facilitates consensus and thus makes possible a "stable common governance," democracy that is.

Lerner does more, however, than merely observe this link between modernization and political development. He specifies the key variables and postulates the sequential stages of democratic political development.

The secular evolution of a participant society appears to involve a regular sequence of three phases. Urbanization . . . literacy and media growth. There is a close reciprocal relationship between these, for the literate develop the media which in turn spread literacy . . . . Out of this interaction develop those institutions of participation . . . which we find in all advanced modern societies.2

While addressing himself to the problems of political development and modernization in transitional societies of the Middle East, Lerner provides a theory of democratic political development which can be investigated scientifically. A number of testable hypotheses can be drawn from this theory, and they and their corollaries can be studied systematically in a variety of environmental settings. Such investigations may assume a broad cross-national focus, as did Cutright's, or a limited focus on a cluster of polities having similar characteristics, such as southern states.

Cutright's Study of Political Development

Phillips Cutright, in a cross-national study of the correlates of

1Ibid., p. 49.

2Ibid., p. 60.
political development, has constructed an index of political development which, he claims, is more removed "... from the world of ethnocentric judgments about the goodness or evil of political systems. ..."¹

Employing seventy-seven nations as the units of analysis, Cutright has investigated the environmental correlates of what he labels "national political development."

A basic criticism of Lipset which apparently guided Cutright's research deserves specific mention.

It makes little difference that in the verbal discussion of national political systems one talks about shades of democracy if, in the statistical assessment, one cannot distinguish among nations. ... One cannot distinguish among ... political systems without a scoring system that assigns values ... according to some stated criteria.²

Cutright's disciplined efforts to index political development as a continuous variable and, hence, permit statistical assessments of the political as well as the environmental aspects of development is no small contribution. Nonetheless, his critical remarks concerning heretofore inadequacies in conceptualizing the political variable--specifically referring to a "... value laden curiosity about democracies and dictatorships. ..."³—is somewhat ironic, if not hypocritical. In other words, although he does submit a non-value laden concept of political development, his operational definition appears to be a quite valid measure of democratic political development as defined by Lipset. "A careful examination of Cutright's political development scoring procedure indicates reliance on the same standards utilized by Lipset."⁴

²Ibid., p. 254.
³Ibid., p. 254.
⁴McCrone and Cnudde, "Causal Model of Democratic Political Development," p. 73.
Cutright notes that "the concept that guided construction of the index can be stated simply—a politically developed nation has more complex and specialized national political institutions than a less politically developed nation." Yet, his criteria for assigning the points that are accumulated to yield an index of political development for each country are clearly "value laden," as he himself would put it. The political development scores over the 21-year period 1940-1960 are attained by totalling the points assigned to each country each year as described below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Possible points</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(0 - 2)</td>
<td>&quot;Legislative Branch of Government&quot;: Existence of self-governing parliament wherein the lower or only chamber was represented by two or more parties and the non-major parties held at least 30 per cent of the seats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Same as above except &quot;30 per cent rule&quot; not applicable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Members not affiliated with political parties, or, Parliament is not self-governing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0 - 1)</td>
<td>&quot;Executive Branch of Government&quot;: Ruling chief executive selected by (a) direct vote in open election with competition, or (b) political party in multi-party parliament as defined by &quot;30 per cent rule.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ruling chief executive selected on non-hereditary basis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Hereditary ruler.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A nation may obtain 0 to 3 points per year or a maximum cumulative score of 63.

Cutright's inclusion of such notions as self-governing parliaments, major and minor parties, and direct and open elections as the basic criteria in constructing his political development index tends to rebuke his earlier criticism of value laden concepts. Unless, perhaps, he could justify value

2Ibid., p. 256.
laden operational definitions but not concepts. While Cutright's concept represents an attempt to detach values, such as a researcher's preference for democratic governance, from empirical investigation, his operational procedures tacitly indicate that developed political structures function more democratically than less developed political structures. In this light, Cutright's contribution to theory building can be seen not as a value-free measure but rather one which "... transforms Lipset's democratic attributes into a continuous variable."¹

Cutright's choice of indicators for urbanization, communications, education, and agricultural development are not dissimilar from those investigated by Lipset. A standardizing procedure, the T-scoring method,² is used to collapse the various measures into single, scaled indicators of Urbanization (Per cent in cities over 100,000), Education (literacy and higher education enrollment), Communications (newspaper readers, newsprint consumption, domestic mail volume, and telephones per capita), and Agricultural Development (Per cent economically active labor force in agriculture). Each of these scales is correlated with the political development scale. Cutright reports high zero-order correlation coefficients between political development and urbanization (.69), education (.74), and communications (.81).

¹McCrone and Cnudde, "Causal Model of Democratic Political Development," p. 73.

²This procedure, so labeled by Allen S. Edwards, Statistical Methods for the Behavioral Sciences (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1954), p. 160ff., is analogous to the z scoring procedures for standardization in general statistics, whereby the mean is set at zero and the standard deviation at one. By inflating the mean and accordingly adjusting the standard deviation, T-scoring eliminates minus scores and facilitates comparisons among different measures, such as dollars, per cent, median number of years, and so forth.
Commending Lipset's conceptualization and Cutright's operationalization, McCrone and Cnudde point out that neither study, however, provides "theoretical formulations of the process of democratic political development." To "...provide a basis for inferring causal relationships by distinguishing between spurious correlations and indirect and direct effects," McCrone and Cnudde turn to the theory offered by Lerner. To "...derive explanatory propositions concerning the process of democratic political development," they turn to the methodology offered by Blalock to formulate and test an empirical model.¹ Their model, a Communications Model of democratic political development, is discussed in Chapter IV. Before turning to this model, a few general comments about cross-national studies, correlation analysis, and theory development are in order.

Some Problems of Cross-National Studies

Granted that the construction of political development theories involves generalization, the inherent problems of generalizing from correlation studies, particularly those assuming a cross-national or cross-cultural focus, deserve mention. The basic problem stems from the tendency to ignore or underestimate the importance of cluster variations, that is variations which cannot be readily attributed to chance and which may, on the other hand, be a function of peculiar factors that are both discernable and measurable.

For example, if one selects a set of 100 observations, objectively scores each observation on three characteristics (X, Y, and Z), and then attempts to generalize about the inter-relationships of the characteristics

for his set of observations, he may begin by plotting a scattergram for characteristics $X$ and $Y$. A hypothetical scattergram for this example is depicted in Figure 1 below.

After fitting a regression line to his data, he may find that the correlation and regression coefficients are the same and equal .70. On the basis of this statistical assessment, he may then infer that, generally, as $X$ increases, $Y$ increases similarly. On the other hand, upon studying his scattergram more closely, he may observe the cluster of dots in the lower right-hand corner for which the effect of $Y$ on $X$ is noticably less, or perhaps non-existent. In efforts to satiate his intellectual curiosity, he decides to note the score on the $Z$ characteristic for each of the cluster dots. In finding that nearly all the cluster units have a very low score on $Z$, he may surmise that $Z$ has a peculiar influence on the association between $X$ and $Y$ for this particular cluster of units. To test his hunch, he may undertake further research to ascertain and attempt to explain the cluster unit's apparent uniqueness.
Cutright's attempt to discern problems of political development in terms of relative "over" or "under" development in environmental sectors illustrates the pitfalls of over-generalizing. The possibility—and I would argue probability—that the nature and sequence of political development may differ in varied environmental settings is only mentioned parenthetically by Cutright; and the analysis of cluster variations needed to make judgements is obscured by correlation analysis. After filling several pages with rhetoric about the relative importance of various environmental factors on political development, depicting the regression line as equilibrium points for the communications and political development relationship, and providing a lengthy table of residual error of prediction scores (i.e., each country's predicted political score subtracted from its actual score), Cutright notes for the careful reader:

... (one could have had several equilibrium points simply if different clusters of nations had different regression lines, a possibility to be explored in later research). ... \(^1\)

The error of prediction scores calculated by Cutright do in fact indicate that geographic location is at least one significant variable of political development. Asian and Eastern European countries in particular tend to scatter on the "under" politically developed side of Cutright's regression line. His scattergram reveals relatively high communications scores among Eastern European or communist countries, yet relatively low scores on the political development index. Less salient evidences of clustering, however, is obscured by the inherent limitations of applying correlation analysis to such a large and diverse universe of nations.

In summary, it can be noted that Cutright's residual error of

\(^1\)Cutright, "National Political Development," p. 258.
prediction technique is at most a statistical method for identifying units with an "over" or "under" political development problem. It must be stressed, however, that if one equates the regression line with a series of statistically determined equilibrium points, as Cutright does, such equilibrium points hold only for the one set of data which was fitted to the regression line. To maintain that this one regression line describes equilibrium points for each of the seventy-seven nations is tantamount to arguing that the process of political development is ubiquitous. Clearly, there may be peculiar factors operating in unique settings which pre-empt the anticipated relationship between communications and political development. The point here is not to degrade correlation analysis or to discard the deviant cases as hopeless cases. Rather, the limitations of applying correlation analysis to a diverse universe are pointed out to highlight the advantage of grouping deviant cases and defining clusters for more intensive study.

Choosing Appropriate Analytic Units

In discussing the broad outline of issues important to comparative research and developmental theory, the basic dilemma of choosing suitable analytic units has perhaps been obscured. This dilemma of whether to focus on a large number of diverse units or to limit oneself to smaller, more homogenous units dissimilar enough to make comparisons among them interesting is a peremptory concern.

One way to escape this dilemma is to utilize a standard, yet relatively flexible, framework in studying divergent areas. Through the application of disciplined methodologies, researchers could attach new and explanatory meaning to the significance of deviation from a model. Once it is
clear that democratic political development in certain states and configurations of societies does not proceed in the manner postulated by a general theory, typologies differentiating polities according to their peculiar ecological matrix and the manner in which they deviate from the theory can be constructed. Such typologies—with precise, empirical referents—should suggest new and revised theories and models specifying distinct sets of variables and variable inter-actions.

An integrated network of democratic political development theories, combining the orientations and procedures of research and theory building sketched above, is not a mere pipedream for the future. The pioneering works of Lerner, Lipset, Cutright, and McCrone and Cnudde mark a path of research and theory building endeavors which, if pursued cautiously, steadfastly, and imaginatively, can lead to a fuller and more accurate understanding of democratic political development.
Lerner's theory of democratic political development, in spite of Cutright's corroborative research findings, remains speculative. This state of affairs illustrates the gap between research and theory discussed in Chapter II. Transposing the empirical findings of research into theories is indeed a problem for which there are no simple formulas. Donald McCrone and Charles Cnudde, however, have raised one crucial problem of transposing research findings into theories of political development: causality.

The construction of an empirical theory of democratic political development is dependent on the formulation of causal propositions which are generalizations of the developmental process. . . . The next major task is the formulation and testing of empirical models of democratic political development which provide a basis for inferring causal relationships by distinguishing between spurious correlations and indirect and direct effects.¹ Yet, more than just recognizing this problem, they have attempted to apply methods designed to aid in formulating causal propositions. Theory building techniques, such as the Simon-Blalock technique of model construction and causal inference, provide needed assistance in coming to grips with the problem of causality.

Model Construction and Theory Building

Relying on two theory building techniques, Simon-Blalock causal model analysis and path coefficients, McCrone and Cnudde project a causal model which, in their words, "represents the beginnings of a parsimonious theory of democratic political development." Adopting Lerner's "conceptualization of political development as a developmental sequence" as the theoretical basis for formulating causal propositions and Lipset's focus on democracy as the dependent variable, they emphasize communications development as a prerequisite to a successfully functioning political democracy. "Both normative and empirical theory point to communications," they argue, as the crucial variable of democratic political development.¹

Urbanization and Education, together with Communications and Democratic Political Development, are the concepts investigated in this analysis. Using the correlation coefficients among these variables derived by Cutright, McCrone and Cnudde employ model construction and causal inference techniques to transpose correlation data into theoretical formulations of the process of democratic political development.

McCrone and Cnudde's Simplifying Assumptions

Before turning to the McCrone-Cnudde model of democratic political development and to the theoretical propositions derived therefrom, the fundamental assumptions upon which this model is based must be recounted.

...political development is assumed to be the dependent variable and urbanization is conceived not to be dependent on any other variable in the system. Second, relationships between the variables in the system are assumed to be additive and linear. Third, other causes of each of the four variables are assumed to be uncorrelated with the

¹Ibid., pp. 74-5, passim.
other variables in the system. And fourth, it is necessary to assume uni-directional causation.¹

The authors recognize uni-directional causation as the least desirable assumption. However, remembering Blalock's rule of thumb (Don't be afraid to over-simplify reality. It will always be possible to introduce complexities a few at a time),² this assumption should not alter unduly conclusions about the developmental sequence drawn from this type of analysis.

A less satisfactory assumption, which casts doubts on the theoretical basis of the model, is that Urbanization is not dependent on any other variable in the system. In other words, increases in the level of urbanization cannot be attributed to changes in the variables Education, Communications, or Democratic Political Development. The questionability of this assumption will be explored more fully in connection with southern political development in a subsequent chapter.

A Communications Model of Democratic Political Development

The Communications Model of democratic political development, as presented by McCrone and Cnudde, is depicted in Figure 2. Several alternative models were investigated and then rejected by McCrone and Cnudde, using the Simon-Blalock technique discussed earlier. This final model—linking Urbanization (U), Education (E), Communications (C), and Democratic Political Development (D) in a developmental sequence—was accepted after the analysis of path coefficients indicated that the indirect link (the

¹Ibid., p. 73.

²Blalock, Methodology in Social Research, p. 371.
causal path Urbanization-Education-Communications-Democratic Political Development) accounted for the direct relationship between Urbanization and Democratic Political Development. (See Figure 3.)

The following empirical propositions were derived from this causal model of democratic political development:

1. Democratic political development occurs when mass communications permeate society. Education affects democratic political development by contributing to the growth of mass communications, therefore:

2. Mass communications occur when literacy and educational levels rise in society. Urbanization affects democratic political development primarily by increasing educational levels, which then increase mass communications, therefore:

3. Education and literacy development occur in urbanizing societies. This causal model, in the authors' words, "is a series of inter-related causal propositions which link urbanization through a developmental sequence to democratic political development."^1

The Significance of This Model

McCrone and Cnudde do more than transpose Cutright's research into a causal model of political development. They do more, also, than deduce from Lipset's and Lerner's speculations the beginnings of an empirical theory of democratic political development. Most significantly, they apply methods of simplifying a tremendously complex process for analytical purposes. The utility of theory building techniques in narrowing the gap between research and theory is aptly demonstrated.

---

A variety of causal inference techniques involving the construction of simplifying models, similar to those applied by McCrone and Cnudde, are available. Such techniques would appear to be necessary tools for creating some theoretical order, however artificial for the moment, out of the now substantial body of correlational research. Because it only indicates association, never causation, correlation analysis can never be a high powered theoretical tool.

Techniques of causal inference, however, applied cautiously and imaginatively, can be used to refine the implications of correlational data by "... distinguishing between spurious correlations and indirect and direct effects." Although these techniques require initial simplification of developmental data, they can subsequently be used to build sophisticated models of development more in keeping with the complexities of the real world. Used together, correlation analysis and causal inference techniques can provide invaluable assistance in constructing more elaborate models of democratic political development.

As additional causal variables are identified and included, the model of democratic political development will begin to match the complexity of the phenomena which it seeks to explain. . . . A second form of elaboration is the introduction of new dependent variables. In this manner, we can gauge the effects of democratic political development. By the introduction of measures of welfare, education, and military expenditure into the model, we can measure the effects of both democratic political systems and the causal factors in development on public policy.2

Thus, provisions are made for introducing new variables which either affect or are affected by variables already included in the system.

1Ibid., p. 72.
2Ibid., p. 79.
Figure 2
Communications Model of Democratic Political Development

Figure 3
Direct and Indirect Causal Paths in Communications Model
Public Policy and the Consequences of Democratic Political Development

The McCrone-Cnudde model depicts in abbreviated terms three conditions--Urbanization, Education, and Communications--which give rise to democratic governance. As the authors stressed above, similar techniques can be used to elaborate or extend this model so as to include the consequences, as well as some additional conditions, of democratic political development.

Extending his empirical study of democracy's social requisites, Lipset argues that there are certain "consequences of an existent democratic system."\(^1\) Some of these consequences, such as an open class system, an equalitarian value system, and literacy, he maintains, function to sustain democracy; while others, such as political apathy, bureaucracy, and mass society, "may have the effect of undermining democracy." Lipset, however, and this point is to be stressed, offers no empirical evidence to substantiate his claims that democratic systems yield certain consequences.

Until recently, in fact, a general assumption of many researchers was that democratic political institutions produce certain desirable consequences. A growing body of public policy researches has at last cast considerable doubt on such assumptions. Comparative studies of political and ecological systems in the American states, in particular, have raised the questions: What, if any, independent effect do democratic political institutions--such as voter participation and inter-party competition--have on public policy? And, in turn, what effect

\(^1\)Lipset, "Social Requisites of Democracy," p. 105.
In casting doubts on much of Political Science's conventional wisdom, the conclusions of researchers comparatively studying the American states are quite relevant to studies of developing areas. The stress laid by students of development on the institutionalization of political structures which function to enhance levels of participation and competition and bureaucratic efficiency may be unwarranted and elusive if the findings from the American states, which indicate low intervening effects of political variables and the greater significance of socio-economic variables on public policy, are accepted.

... the message that emerges from these studies asserts the need for investigating the states' historical and socioeconomic environments in order to explain the levels and variations in policy patterns.¹

The remaining task for the student of comparative politics, Richard Hofferbert points out, whether his units of analysis are American states or non-western polities, is two-fold:

On the one hand, we must account for the 'why' of the relationship between social development and policy. ... But we must also attempt to account for the variance left unexplained by that particular mode of inquiry.²

Because in studying developing areas abroad the tendency has been to concentrate on the conditions which nurture democracy; and because the implications of recent researches regarding the consequences of selected democratic political institutions in the American states have been disparaging; it appears that both conditions and consequences warrant investigation by students of democratic political development--whatever the geographic field of inquiry.

The Utility of Models

The utility of models of democratic political development, such as McCrone and Cnudde's, in assisting students to grasp the fundamental relationships between democratic political structures and their conditions and consequences should be obvious. What may not be obvious is that, at the present time, causal propositions and hence theories of democratic political development derived from such models offer the most reliable method of integrating discrete research projects into sound, empirical theories of democratic political development. "In regards to the subject of theory building in political science, the cumulative nature of empirical model building needs to be stressed."¹

The careful and creative testing of models, such as the Communications Model of Democratic Political Development presented above, with varied analytic units can provide methodological grounds for circumscribing types of political systems, their conditions and consequences, and distinct levels and processes of political development. This approach recognizes, at least tacitly, that political development may not be a generic process and that the development of political system types may depend upon environmental configurations. The effects of environmental factors on the process of political development, and vice versa, may be discerned more accurately in terms of specific socio-economic or psycho-cultural settings. Such an approach could lead to more refined and precise typologies of political systems and the processes of their respective development.

An effort to document the utility of model construction and replication of studies testing similar models is made in Chapter VI. The investigation of Southern Democratic Political Development in terms of the Communications Model of Democratic Political Development is intended as a modest step in the direction of empirical theory building. The potential pay-off of such a study cannot be realized, however, until a number of similar research projects applying the same model to different analytic clusters have been explored. The advancement of empirical theories of democratic political development depends, in large part, upon the comparison, analysis, and categorization of findings obtained through disciplined research projects applying a singular method, preferably a simplifying model, and exploring a broad range of environmental settings.
CHAPTER V

THE SOUTH: AMERICA'S OWN DEVELOPING AREA

The American South, in spite of the influential role its people have played in shaping the most modern, most affluent, and most democratic nation in the world, remains an area little understood by political scientists.

The South is the closest approximation to a traditional society that we have in the United States today. It is America's own 'underdeveloped area,' bound by a reverence for history and custom and built on the basis of a near peasantry.¹

The availability of aggregate data and the accessibility of the region, together with the South's mysterious combination of diversity and homogeneity, are practical considerations which suggest researching the nature and scope of political development in this area. The extent to which the South is similar to other developing areas is the extent to which investigations of the South can enrich political development theories.

A Typology of Development

James Coleman's typology differentiating traditional, transitional, and modern societies has gained wide acceptance, as frequent allusions to these concepts in the literature indicate.² Yet, as often as the concepts are employed and as useful as they have been in denoting levels of deve-


opment, they remain imprecise.

Modern societies, as depicted by Dankwart Rustow, are characterized by a "... widening control over nature through closer co-operation among men."¹ "High individual aspirations, geographic and social mobility, and a faith in rationality rather than custom..."² are the marks of modern society. Traditional societies, on the other hand, are bound by "... a reverence for the past, a passive acceptance of the present, and a fatalism about the future."³

Between these two intellectual constructs rests an ill-defined, yet extensive, area labeled "transitional." Serving as something of a residual concept, transitional societies are characterized by both modernity and tradition. These dichotomous distinctions, then, are really "shorthand for continua: no real-world community is entirely one or the other. Thus, the distinction between a 'traditional' and a 'modern' society is admittedly gross, but it is an important one to make if we are to understand today's changing world."⁴

The South: A Transitional Society

Students of political development are primarily concerned with political communities falling mid-way along this continua. The eleven once-Confederate states of the South, as a sub-region of the United States, evidence together and severally characteristics of both modernity and tradi-

---

²Matthews and Prothro, New Southern Politics, p. 262
³Ibid., p. 262.
⁴Ibid., p. 261.
tion. The urban, industrial, and essentially modern areas around Atlanta, Miami, Dallas, New Orleans, the nation's capital and Richmond, to mention a few, stand out in sharp contrast to southern rural areas which in many ways typify the South:

The rural and small-town South is still, in quite a large degree, a 'traditional' society; one of 'status' rather than 'contract,' of 'Gemeinschaft' rather than 'Gesselschaft,' of 'ascription' rather than 'achievement,' of 'locals' rather than 'cosmopolitans.'

Not only does the South differ from the rest of the nation in levels of urbanization and industrialization, political participation and political competition, and educational attainment, but, also, and more importantly, in basic attitudes about the self, inter-personal relationships, and government. Some of the differences in political knowledge and practices and basic attitudes between southerners and non-southerners is illustrated in Table 1. This information, derived from a cross-national survey of political culture, suggests interesting disparities between the southern sample (drawn from Mississippi, Alabama, Kentucky and Tennessee) and the sample for the remainder of the United States. Southerners, for example, appear more likely not to understand political issues (Question 15) and less likely to try to keep informed (Question 11a). The propensity to attempt to influence political decisions (Question 24) is nearly three times higher in the remainder of the United States than in the South. That this apparently low sense of political efficacy among southerners applies to local as well as state and national affairs is suggested by the response to Question 23. Responses to Questions 35, 72f, 72h, and 82 may be inter-

---

1Ibid., p. 261.

preted as indications of a higher level of fatalism—about economic, social, as well as political life—among southerners.

The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from these data is that the South represents a distinct region or sub-culture of the United States. Further, the generally subjective orientations of southerners to political life suggest the existence of a southern political culture similar to that found in transitional democratic societies. Whereas the disparity between southern and modern, democratic attitudes has been documented, the low political efficacy and high level of fatalism among southerners remain unexplained. Questions of why some American states develop politically, socially, and economically and why some states have a "civic culture" while others do not suggest a gamut of researches needed to illuminate the processes of democratic political development in the American states. It is felt that the unique features of the South, as described in this chapter, mark this area as an appropriate starting point.

**Comparative Analysis and the Southern Mosaic**

In efforts to understand dissimilarities within the South and to define the nature of southern development in relation to other developing areas, the eleven, once-Confederate states are comparatively studied. In order to discern the more factual and less speculative elements which have variously shaped southern political development, it is necessary to disparage at the onset lingering notions of a southern monolith. In observing that "... the South is not of one piece in its reaction to the forces of change," Allan Sindler does just this.

Whether the focus be effectuation of law, economic development, the evolution of race relationships, or the shaping of new political pat-
terns, emphasis can properly be placed on the variations of response within the South, and on some of the important factors associated with such variations.¹

Realization of the South's growing diversity, however, should not be interpreted to mean the passing of the South as a unique region. Today, as much as ever, the reality of the South—tainted by nostalgia about the past, frustration about the present, and uncertainty about the future—persists.²

The intrinsic, sometimes imperceptible forces binding the South manifest themselves as an implacable sense of community—a pride of belonging among southerners. Although the precise basis of this cohesion and patriotic identification is not clear, it nonetheless persists. Whereas new influences continually confront old habits and the old South is ostensibly shifting its foundations, an abiding sense of southernity is yet sustained.

This southernity is like a changing mosaic, in which distinctive colors and shapes change while the essential unity remains the same. Both tenacious continuity and pervasive change are basic ingredients making the South an appropriate focus for studying democratic political development.

The Southern Political Milieu

Politics, throughout the South, has been perhaps the one aspect of social life reflecting the most diversity and complexity.

There are, as Ralph McGill loves to say, many Souths with many political faces. There is and is not likely to be any single and uniform

pattern and rate of political movements and organizations. The diversity
and complexity of the region prevent such development.¹

The enigma of southern politics—the seemingly inexplicable differences
among the states in levels of participation, party and faction competi-
tion, and the scope and direction of public policies—continues and in
many respects grows more rather than less perplexing.

The need to understand and act upon some of the characteristics
of southern political institutions is implied by Samuel Cook's obser-
vations regarding the strains between political development and moderni-
ization in the region.

Instead of serious and imaginative attempts to translate the inevit-
able consequences of vast technological, economic, legal, educational,
industrial and human innovation into realities of political life, Southern politicians sought desperately to isolate and freeze the
political process and to erect permanent bulwarks against the invading
tides of change. The consequence of the absence of a genuine confront-
ation of politics and revolutionary historic change has all the
brooding reality of Greek tragedy.²

Cook's tacit thesis that southern political institutions and practices
have functioned to restrain, rather than nurture, modernization represents
a significant departure from the general thesis that democratic structures
and social change are mutually re-inforcing.

Viewing political development and modernization as naturally con-
comitant processes through which the political, economic, and social sys-
tems inter-act to tame the tides of change, Alexander Heard describes the
role of the political system:

Economic and social systems possess great power...used to form and
influence the political system of the community. The political system
possesses power of its own through the control over the formal rules
that govern the community, and it can thereby alter economic and social

¹Samuel Cook, "Political Movements and Organizations," in Avery
Leiserson (ed.), The American South in the 1960's (New York: Praeger,
²Ibid., p. 131.
conditions. A dynamic interplay is created in which government is both the product of the economic and social conditions and an agency ... through which the community can preserve or change these conditions.¹

The dynamic interplay typical of southern political systems, however, appears somewhat anomalous.

Political systems in the South are typically "products" rather than "agents" of social and economic factors. Political offices often carry little generating power of their own; and authoritative decisions come largely from power concentrations immune to the democratic "rules of the game." Formal political institutions frequently neither share, curb, nor mitigate power and influence entrenched outside government.

In the South, the social and economic matrix that has perpetuated one-party politics is dominated by what Jasper Shannon calls the 'banker-merchant-farmer-lawyer-doctor-governing class.' This class has had its way in much of the South most of the time since Reconstruction, and the (nominally) political institution through which it has ruled is the one-party system. Once this system became established via political channels, it generated its own self-perpetuating forces. [This] governing class governed not at the expense of the Negro alone, but also at the expense of the other whites, the tenant farmers, mill hands, and persons of humble status generally.²

Inasmuch as formal democratic groundrules for decision-making are conveniently superceded by the demands of private interests, authoritative power in the South has a personal rather than political base. Financial statements and social registers are looked to more frequently than ballot boxes as legitimate sources of authority.

Southern Political Man: The Personal Style

Although formal democracy has been in short supply in the South, the tone and practice of southern politics has been democratic almost to the extreme—among the whites. Probably nowhere else in the country

²Ibid., p. 145.
have there been closer personal relationships between voters and representatives, at all levels of government.

The "extreme democracy," alluded to above by Leslie Dunbar, however, has been a "... democracy short on formal controls and efficient methods of obtaining popular consensus, putting a high value on informal means of effecting accountability."¹ These remarks present the South as the type of transitional society characterized by highly personal power relationships.

The visible results of personal politics in the South "... have been labeled 'bourbon,' 'readjuster,' 'redeemer,' 'oligarchy,' 'aristocracy,' and 'special interests,'"²

Whatever the label, there has been an awareness that political controls in most southern states rested in the hands of a relatively few willful men as leaders, together with a remarkable small minority of participating voters.²

The personal political style, whereby political leaders define the public interests in terms of the private interests of a socio-economic elite, has been used to resist social and political change in the South.

William Nicholls describes the conditions under which an effective system of economic and political oppression grew.

The South's political structure was based on a narrow electorate which gave disproportionate weight to the economic interests of large planters. ... The South's rural leadership ... promoted its self-interest in a cheap labor supply by diverting the attention of low-income whites, through numerous devices which at least clearly supported their claims of superiority over the Negro race. ... It rationalized a policy of inaction toward the improvement of schools and other public services, toward social and political reform, and


²Thomas Clark, "The South in Cultural Change," in Sindler, Change in the Contemporary South, p. 4.

³William Nicholls, "The South as a Developing Area," in Leiserson, p. 25.
toward the promotion of industrial-urban development. In such a static and stagnant environment, only by migration to other regions could most low-income people better their lot.¹

Finding themselves outside the ranks of social and economic acceptability, southern Negroes and many whites were without political recourse. Elitism had restricted access to political power as well as its rewards, social status and economic gain. The criteria for access to power became ascriptive and highly selective.

**Southern Apolitical Man: Victim of Oppression**

One familiar with Bernard Malamud's Pulitzer prize winning *The Fixer* cannot help but draw some poignant parallels between oppression in tsarist Russia and many parts of the contemporary South. The anti-semitic pogroms of the tsarist regime reflected, in a significant way, the social and economic power of the upper classes. The preservation of the status quo necessitated that growing dissatisfactions and frustrations among the lower classes be thwarted. Lower class bitterness toward their own way of life—the deplorable working and living conditions prescribed by an oligarchial, self-interested elite—was skillfully, if only temporarily, rechanneled by "public" leaders into an obsessive hatred of the Jews.

The race issue—the intense hatred of Negroes among lower members in the southern hierarchy—was used in much the same manner by southern political leaders to insulate and augment their personal powers—political, social and economic. Racism in the South, like anti-semitism in Russia, has been a potent decoy—an elusive sanctuary—shrewdly positioned by the better-fed, better-housed, better-paid, and better-educated segment of society to sustain their own stations.

¹William Nicholls, "The South as a Developing Area, in Leiserson, *The American South in the 1960's*, p. 25.
Whether one can accept or find meaning in this analogy is not, however, prerequisite to understanding a more basic point about racism and politics in the South. As the study by Matthews and Prothro aptly documents, the Negro and all that surrounds him and his ethno-logy is a crucial variable of southern political life. In looking to why this is so, however, the black color of his skin—the sole criteria differentiating him from so many low-income whites—is, realistically, a most arbitrary and dubious variable for political scientists to dwell upon. Why is skin color, rather than hair color or physique or shoe size (!), such a crucial factor in the South?

The plights of ethnic groups or minorities in Russia, Germany, Ireland, to mention a few prominent examples, and that of the southern Negro appear similar. Yet, the phenomena of discrimination or oppression or exploitation—as an integral part of a community's political culture—appear more generic than the stress on color or creed permits. Not blackness and its correlates, but the values and orientations imputed to blackness and the conditions which nurture and sustain discriminating attitudes are fundamental variables of political culture and, hence, democratic political development.

**Southern Political Culture**

Inasmuch as this study focuses on democratic political development, the factors affecting civic culture—the political culture of democracy—need investigation. A civic culture, as conceived by Almond and Verba, is characterized by high political efficacy and cognitive, openly partisan, and participant orientations toward government. The

---

southern environment is apparently not the most suitable breeding ground for this type of political culture. While this research does not include the attitudinal data needed for direct study of political culture, the analysis of aggregate environmental data does permit an indirect look at political culture in the South.

The beliefs, attitudes, and values which constitute the political culture of a society are an integral dimension of political development.

The phrase 'political culture' summarizes a complex and varied portion of social reality. Among other things, a nation's political culture includes political traditions and folk heroes, the spirit of public institutions, political passions of the citizenry, goals articulated by the political ideology, and both the formal and informal rules of the political game. It also includes other real, but elusive, factors, such as political stereotypes, political style, political moods, the tone of political exchanges, and finally, some sense of what is appropriately political and what is not.1

Verba defines political culture more succinctly as the "system of beliefs about patterns of political interactions and political institutions."2

Which ever concept one prefers, it should be clear that environmental as well as governmental factors mold political culture and affect the impact of political culture on democratic political development and modernization.

In the South where "much that never existed is remembered as the backbone of its culture," tradition is a key determinant of political culture. Daniel Elazar describes the conditions which nurtured a traditionalistic political culture in this region.

...those who settled the South sought opportunity in a plantation-centered agricultural system based on slavery and essentially anti-commercial in orientation. This system, as an extension of the landed gentry agrarianism of the Old World, provided a natural environment for the development of an American-style traditionalistic culture


in which the new landed gentry progressively assumed ever greater roles in the political process at the expense of the small landholders, while a major segment of the population, the slaves, were totally excluded from any political roles whatsoever. Elitism in this culture reached its apogee in Virginia and South Carolina; in North Carolina and Georgia a measure of equalitarianism was introduced by the arrival of significant numbers of migrants.

A matrix of factors link economic development and political culture, "... in the sense that abundance and growth are more likely to support a civic culture than poverty and immiseration."

As affluence increases, inter-personal trust increases, political partisanship takes on different meaning, class awareness relaxes and class voting diminishes in importance, the openness of the political system to participation by racial minorities is facilitated and political alienation declines.

Other environmental factors, such as education, communication, and urbanization, can be investigated as agents of political socialization which make the link between political culture and political development more visible.

---


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question Number</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Per Cent Agreeing in South</th>
<th>Non-South</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11a</td>
<td>Regularly follow politics and government affairs</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Don't understand national and international issues at all</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Impossible to change local regulation which you consider unjust or harmful</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Would not try to change such a regulation</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30a</td>
<td>Political party is most effective vehicle for changing governmental decision</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Your point of view would be seriously considered at government office</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72a</td>
<td>Agree that voting is the main thing that decides how things are run in this country</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72b</td>
<td>Agree that people will take advantage of you</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72e</td>
<td>Agree that human nature is co-operative</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72f</td>
<td>Agree that people like me don't have any say</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72h</td>
<td>Agree that no one cares about you</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>Economic situation of my family will go up in next ten years</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHAPTER VI

SOUTHERN DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT:
AN EMPIRICAL MODEL

The Communications Model of Democratic Political Development, proposed by McCrone and Cnudde and discussed in the previous chapters, is based on empirical data from seventy-seven nations. If, as the authors state, the propositions derived from this model represent the "beginnings of a parsimonious theory of democratic political development," one would expect the theory, or model, to be applicable to varied units of analysis. If similar data from the southern states can be fitted to this model, one might reasonably expect the empirical theory of democratic political development, which Lipset, Lerner, Cutright, and McCrone and Cnudde together build, to illuminate the process of democratic political development in the South.

To test the logic outlined above and to inquire into the diversity of development, comparable data from eleven southern states are fitted to the Communications Model for three distinct time periods: 1942-46, 1948-52, and 1960-64. The attempt to provide a more longitudinal look at development by considering different time periods did not have the anticipated effect of accentuating the successive stages of development prescribed by the theory. Moreover, because the fit of the data to the model varied over the time periods, several questions regarding the applicability of the model and the interpretation
of findings derived in this manner need to be raised. Before turning
to these questions, however, the methodology used to replicate the
McCrone-Cnudde study in the American South is discussed.

**Operationalizing the Concepts**

Urbanization (U), Education (E), Communications (C), and Demo­
cratic Political Development (DPD) are the major variables investi­
gated in this part of the analysis. The unavailability of consistent
indicators for all these concepts precluded the longitudinal perspec­
tive of the political development process which was desired. For only
two variables, Urbanization and Democratic Political Development, were
similar data found for all time segments.

The census definition of Urbanization--population living in
concentrations of 2500 or more-- is used throughout; as is the opera­
tional definition of Democratic Political Development which is given
below. The indicators for Education and Communications are outlined
below according to time period.

**Education:**

1942-46  Median years schools completed (1940)
         College students per 1000 population (1942)
1948-52  Median years school completed (1950)
         College students per 1000 population (1950)
         Per cent population aged 25 and older literate (1950)
1960-64  Median years school completed (1960)
         Per cent literate, i.e. Fifth grade education (1960)
         Per cent with high school education or above (1960)
         Per cent with college education or above (1960)
Communications:

1942-46 Telephones per 1000 population (1937)
1948-52 Daily newspaper circulation (1953) per 1000 population (1950)
1960-64 Per cent housing units with radio (1961)
Per cent housing units with telephone (1961)
Per cent housing units with television (1961)

From the discussion about conceptualizing political development in Chapter II, it is clear that the political variable can be conceived and operationalized in various ways. The desirability of researching selected dimensions of the political variable was pointed out there in connection with the adoption of a pluralist concept of democratic political development. In an effort to operationalize and study the development process, Democratic Political Development will be defined to include (but not necessarily limited to) political participation and inter-party competition.

Political participation will be measured for individual states, and voter turnout will be the basic measure. In order to operationalize State Political Participation (SPP), mean percentages of voter turnout in elections for Governor, U.S. Senator, and U.S. Representative are tabulated for each state over each time segment. Using standardizing procedures similar to the T-scoring method used by Cutright, an index of State Political Participation is constructed. The mean score for all southern states on this index is 500, with scores over 500 indicating higher levels of participation and scores under, lower participation.

^See note 2, p. 43 above.
The second dimension, State Party Competition (SPC), is similarly operationalized. The mean percentage of votes for Democratic candidates in the same elections as above is used as a measure of inter-party competition. (The choice of this indicator is based on the assumption that high percentages indicate Democratic Party hegemony and, hence, low inter-party competition.) Standardizing the scores in the manner described above, an index of State Party Competition is constructed. Scores over 500 reflect greater party competition, that is lower Democratic Party strength, and those under 500 reflect lower party competition in state elections, that is higher mean percentages of votes for Democratic Party candidates.

State-by-state averages of these two scores, State Political Participation and State Party Competition, constitute the empirical referrents for Democratic Political Development (DPD). Operationally defined in terms of participation and competition, Democratic Political Development scores are assigned to each state for each separate time segment to form an index of Democratic Political Development for the eleven states in each time period. The data for this study is presented in the tables which follow the discussion about model fitting for each time segment. Raw data is given in Part A and standardized scores are given in Part B of Tables 2, 3, and 4.

Similarities to Cutright's Research

Except for Urbanization for all years and Communications for years prior to 1960, the operationalization of concepts in this study is quite similar to Phillips Cutright's. Though unlike Cutright's data in several important respects, the data for the last time segment offer the best empirical referrents for testing the propositions
derived by McCrone and Cnudde.

In operationalizing Urbanization, population concentrations of 2500—rather than 100,000—are used because of data availability. It is contended, though by no means proven, that both definition measure the same phenomenon: urbanization. It can be argued that had the 100,000 density criterion been used, the results would have been significantly different. It is believed, however, that while states' scores on urbanization may have been different, the correlations with other variables in the system would not have differed drastically enough to alter the interpretations of this research.

While the operationalization of Urbanization differed from Cutright's mostly as a matter of convenience, the choice of different indicators for Communications and Democratic Political Development was deliberate. The concept Communications, as operationalized by Cutright, is heavily loaded with quasi-educational indicators, such as newspaper readers, newsprint consumption, and domestic mail volume. Daniel Lerner, in stressing the communications system in relation to the individual's capacity to empathize, would probably not corroborate Cutright's indistinct operationalization of Communications and Education. It would seem imperative that Communications be operationalized in terms of indicators functioning to enhance empathy and that indicators of literacy be consigned to the Education concept.

Although Cutright's conceptualization of political development in terms of the complexity and specificity of political institutions is acceptable, his method of measurement appears detached from his concept. Inasmuch as the pluralist concept of Democratic Political Development adopted earlier may appear equally detached from the
operational definition given above, it must be stressed that the Democratic Political Development index employed in this research does not portend to measure the concept en toto. Rather, and this is important, the operational definition is presented as a measure of selected, yet vital, dimensions of Democratic political Development: participation and competition.

Before presenting the southern data and testing the fit of the Communications Model, it seems appropriate to mention one of this research's major shortcomings. This is, of course, the small number of observations. A county-by-county or district-by-district survey of the eleven states would yield a more valid and reliable basis for interpreting these findings and generalizing from this study. Based on only eleven units, the findings of this research must be accepted in the same spirit as they are offered: cautiously and tentatively.

The First Time Segment: 1942-1946

The investigation of the process of democratic political development in the years 1942 through 1946 is based on the raw data and standardized scores which are presented in Table 2. Interactions among the key variable--Urbanization, Education, Communications, and Democratic Political Development--are indicated by the matrix of variable correlation coefficients constructed in Table 2-C. The model to be tested here, together with the inter-correlations between the variables in the system, is depicted in Figure 4.

Following the procedures outlined by McCrone and Cnudde, we investigate alternative models of causality in order to define the one model which best fits the data. Three variables together with their zero-order correlation coefficients are considered simultaneously,
and the actual relationship dictated by the data is compared with the predicted relationship based on the assumption of spurious or indirect association.

Prediction equations based on the correlation coefficients between variables are computed for each alternative model. Models that make prediction equations that are inconsistent with the actual relationships between the variables of the system are rejected. The difference between predicted and actual correlations reflect the degree of fit between the data and the model being tested. The series of prediction equations used for fitting alternative models to the southern data for the first time period are summarized in Table 2-D.

Turning to the first three variables in the system--Urbanization (U), Education (E), and Communications (C)--we test the fit between the actual correlations and models which alternately predict a spurious or indirect relationship between (E) and (C), (U) and (E), and (U) and (C). These alternative models are depicted in Figures 4.1a, 4.1b, and 4.1c, respectively, and the degree of fit is presented numerically in parentheses beneath each model. The model depicted in Figure 4.1b clearly reflects the best fit or least difference between actual and predicted scores. Acceptance of this model, indicating the causal linkage Urbanization-Communications-Education, means rejection of model 4.1c which fitted Cutright's data and was accepted by McCrone and Cnudde.

Introducing the political variable DPD, the causal relationship of this variable with Communications and Education (the last two variables of the sequence accepted above) is similarly investigated. The alternative models are given in Figures 4.2a, 4.2b, and the degree of fit is indicated below each model. Unlike McCrone and Cnudde who

---

accept model 4.2b at this point, we recognize that model 4.2a actually fits the southern data more closely. This model indicates stages of development in the following sequence: C---E---DPD.

Incorporating the two models accepted above, we must now test the fit of the data to the resulting model which postulates the developmental sequence Urbanization-Communications-Education-Democratic Political Development. Using prediction equations to test the paths connecting this sequence, as indicated by the solid lines in Figure 4.3, against the actual relationship between Urbanization and Democratic Political Development, indicated by the broken lines, we find the degree of fit to be .053. The closeness of this fit permits acceptance of the model depicted in Figure 4.4, while the slightly greater strength of the path relationship (U-C-E-DPD) over the direct relationship (U-DPD) suggests compounding influences within the system.

This model differs from the Communications Model in that the positions of Education and Communications in the developmental sequence are reversed. The implication is that Education, rather than Communications, is the crucial link to Democratic Political Development in the South.

The Second Time Segment: 1948-1952

With this revised model in mind, we now turn to testing the southern data for the second time period, 1948 through 1952. The raw and standardized scores, the matrix of correlations, and the prediction equations used for investigating this period are presented in Tables 3-A, 3-B, 3-C, and 3-D respectively. A diagrammatic representation of the variable relationships to be investigated is given in Figure 5.
Again considering the variables Urbanization, Education, and Communications first, we seek the best fit for the data among the alternative models represented in Figures 5.1a, 5.1b, and 5.1c. As was found for the first period, the data for the second period best fit the second model which postulates the developmental sequence Urbanization-Communications-Education.

Adding the political variable, the alternative models of possible relationships are depicted in Figure 5.2a and 5.2b. It is the first of these models, Figure 5.2a, causally linking Communications-Education-Democratic Political Development which best fits the southern data.

Turning to Figure 5.3, which represents the model relating all four variables, the direct and indirect paths linking Urbanization and Democratic Political Development are investigated. The solid lines represent the path relationship linking Urbanization and Democratic Political Development via Communications and Education, and the broken lines represent the direct relationship between the two. The degree of fit for this model (.238), as measured by the difference between the predicted (.342) and actual (.104) relationship between Urbanization and Democratic Political Development, is probably too large to attribute to measurement errors. Before rejecting this model, however, a more refined technique used by McCrone and Cnudde is employed here to measure the independent effect of Urbanization on Democratic Political Development.

1The standard for model acceptance used by McCrone and Cnudde is that the degree of fit, i.e. the difference between predicted and actual correlation values, should not exceed .100. Ideally, the degree of fit between a model and a data set would be equal to zero. Because both sampling and non-sampling errors which are inadvertently introduced by the researcher may distort the actual or real correlations between variables, however, allowances are made for slight deviations from a perfect degree of fit.
Path coefficients, measuring the "amount of change in the dependent variable produced by standardized changes in the independent variable,"¹ are computed in Table 3-E for each of the paths in the causal model depicted by Figure 5.3. The path coefficient for path d, which is .252, indicates the direct effect of urbanization on democratic political development. Both this analysis of path coefficients and that above yield predicted correlation values greater than the actual correlation coefficient for urbanization and democratic political development, which is .104. Because this may indicate that the relationship between the two variables is actually strengthened by the causal links with communications and education, this model is not rejected. Had the actual value been greater than the predicted value, and the difference also too large to attribute to error, this model would have been rejected as well.

In view of this situation and the very low correlation between urbanization and the political variable indicated by the data, it may be reasonably argued that Communications and Education tend to obscure a significantly stronger relationship between Urbanization and Democratic Political Development in the South. If this is the case, it lends support for accepting the developmental sequence described by Figure 5.4. This sequence--linking Urbanization, Communications, Education, and Democratic Political Development--is identical to the one supported by the data for the first time period. Although the fit of the data to this model is not completely satisfactory, it does indicate clearly that the stages of democratic

¹McCrone and Cnudde, "Causal Model of Democratic Political Development," p. 75. The primary advantage of using standardized path coefficients is to reduce the distortion caused by correlating variables with different variances.
political development in the South does not correspond to those derived from similar cross-national data and prescribed by McCrone and Cnudde.

**The Third Time Segment: 1960-1964**

The possible paths linking the four variables of the system and the correlation coefficients, as derived from the data presented in the tables below, for the last period to be investigated here are given in Figure 6. For the three variables in the first half of the system, the alternative models are represented in Figures 6.1a, 6.1b, and 6.1c with the degree of fit indicated below each model. Unlike the previous fittings for the first half of the model, the model in Figure 6.1a—linking Communications and Educations via Urbanization, offers the best fit to the data for this period.

Before accepting this model, which indicates a spurious association between Education and Communications, it should be pointed out that the Simon-Blalock technique used here only suggests the best paths connecting variables. It never suggests the direction of a path relationship. By indicating that the path relationship C-U-E is stronger than the direct relationship C-E, the model in Figure 6.1a casts doubt on McCrone and Cnudde's assumption that "urbanization is conceived not to be dependent on any other variable in the system." The alternative to this is that there are variables outside the system investigated here which affect the Communications-Education relationship. In view of the dubious variable relationships in the first part of the system, conclusions about the links connecting the first three variables will await investigation of the second half of the system.

The possible paths connecting Communications, Education, and Democratic Political Development are represented in Figures 6.2a, 6.2b
and 6.2c, with the degree of fit indicated below each model. The com-
parison of predicted and actual relationships indicates that the model
in Figure 6.2a offers a slightly better fit than the others. None of
these models, however, offers a very satisfactory fit to the data.

Because these findings are unsatisfactory and indeed suggest
no model adequately fitting the southern data for the last time segment,
the first half of the model is re-examined. The model which offered the
best fit and was tentatively accepted for the first half is depicted
in Figure 6.1d. This model is similar to the one in Figure 6.1a; the
only difference being that the direction of the arrows has been changed.
In re-directing the arrows in this manner, we now reject the assump-
tion that urbanization is not dependent on any other variable in the
system. The fit of the data to this model affirms the sequence
Communications-Urbanization-Education for the first half of the model.

The possible relationships for the second half of the model
are depicted in Figures 6.3a, 6.3b, and 6.3c. The model in Figure 6.3c,
depicting the causal links Urbanization-Education-Democratic Political
Development, clearly fits the data best. Joining this model with
that accepted for the first half, we construct the completed model
for all four variables which is presented in Figure 6.4. An invest-
igation of the path and direct relationships between Communications
and Democratic Political Development is needed to ascertain the
validity of this model.

The prediction equations calculated to determine the degree of
fit between the model in Figure 6.4 and the actual Communications-
Democratic Political Development relationship indicate a poor fit (.131).
As shown in Table 4-D, the predicted relationship is actually lower
than the actual relationship between Communications and Democratic
Political Development. In order to permit a more accurate assessment of the strength of the direct path linking Communications and Democratic Political Development versus that of the indirect path via Urbanization and Education, path coefficients are computed in Table 4-E to allow a more refined evaluation of this model. These calculations indicate that the indirect paths linking Communications and Democratic Political Development through Urbanization and Education cannot account for a sizable proportion of the association between Communications and Democratic Political Development. In the developmental sequence from C to U to E to DPD, the direct effect of C on DPD, as indicated by the path coefficient of .145 for path d, is too large to be termed negligible or to be attributed to error. Because the causal sequence C-U-E-DPD, depicted by solid lines in Figure 6.4, fails to account for the independent effect of Communications on Democratic Political Development, this model cannot be accepted.

Several alternative models postulating possible relationships among the four variables of the system proscribed by McCrone and Cnudde have been examined and rejected. Inasmuch as none of the models investigated satisfactorily fit the southern data for the last time period, the implications of this and earlier researches need to be reconsidered.

The McCrone-Cnudde study of seventy-seven nations over a twenty-one year time period confirmed the Communications Model of Democratic Political Development. They concluded that the "overwhelming important causal links in the process of democratic political development are contained in the developmental sequence from U to E to C to D."\(^1\)

\(^1\) McCrone and Cnudde, p. 78.
From the investigation here of southern data for two four-year
time periods, Education, rather than Communications, appears to be
the more crucial link to Democratic Political Development in the South.
Although no completed model of the developmental process can be ac­
cepted for the last time segment, the partial models depicted in
Figures 6.1d and 6.3c do closely fit the southern data and do point
to Education as the more crucial link to Democratic Political Devel­
opment.

The difficulties of fitting a model to the southern data for the
last time segment, above all else, suggest the presence of major vari­
ables--outside the system investigated here--impinging upon the devel­
opmental process in the South. Clearly, a satisfactory model of
Southern Democratic Political Development will include variables in
addition to or other than Urbanization, Education, and Communications.
TABLE 2
DATA FOR FIRST TIME SEGMENT, 1942-46

TABLE 2-A.--Raw Data on Selected Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% urban</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med.yrs.sch.</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coll.stud./10,000 pop.</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>92.2</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>79.6</td>
<td>107.9</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephones/1000 pop.</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Political Dev.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPP: % voting for</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Sen.</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Rep.</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC: % vote for Dem.cand.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov.</td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>99.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Sen.</td>
<td>94.2</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>98.2</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>92.1</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>88.7</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Rep.</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>96.8</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>96.0</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td>89.0</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE 2-B.--Standardized Scores for Model Variables, First Time Segment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Urbanization (U)</th>
<th>Education (E)</th>
<th>Communication (C)</th>
<th>Democratic Political Development (SPP)</th>
<th>(SPC)</th>
<th>(DPD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>466.9</td>
<td>440.7</td>
<td>411.9</td>
<td>469.4</td>
<td>468.7</td>
<td>469.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>391.4</td>
<td>430.1</td>
<td>422.5</td>
<td>536.7</td>
<td>476.7</td>
<td>506.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>701.6</td>
<td>514.9</td>
<td>678.4</td>
<td>578.6</td>
<td>545.5</td>
<td>562.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>506.4</td>
<td>468.6</td>
<td>483.0</td>
<td>452.6</td>
<td>406.9</td>
<td>429.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>573.3</td>
<td>474.6</td>
<td>536.2</td>
<td>502.8</td>
<td>412.4</td>
<td>457.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>368.8</td>
<td>416.4</td>
<td>387.0</td>
<td>378.4</td>
<td>409.8</td>
<td>394.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>439.5</td>
<td>535.6</td>
<td>440.3</td>
<td>733.0</td>
<td>654.3</td>
<td>693.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>413.1</td>
<td>458.5</td>
<td>394.1</td>
<td>392.7</td>
<td>414.5</td>
<td>403.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>513.9</td>
<td>533.5</td>
<td>539.7</td>
<td>484.4</td>
<td>659.8</td>
<td>572.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>610.1</td>
<td>674.0</td>
<td>635.7</td>
<td>472.9</td>
<td>463.6</td>
<td>468.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>514.9</td>
<td>549.4</td>
<td>571.7</td>
<td>498.6</td>
<td>588.0</td>
<td>543.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Mean          | 500.0            | 500.0         | 500.0             | 500.0                                  | 500.0 | 500.0 |
| Stan.dev.     | 100.0            | 73.5          | 100.0             | 96.1                                   | 96.9  | 88.1  |
TABLE 2-C.--Matrix of Correlation Coefficients, First Time Segment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>U</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>SPP</th>
<th>SPC</th>
<th>DPD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Political Participation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Political Competition</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Political Development</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 2-D.--Prediction Equations to Determine the Degree of Fit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models</th>
<th>Predictions</th>
<th>Degree of Fit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1a rUE rUC = rEC</td>
<td>(.588) (.941) = .553</td>
<td>.722 .169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1b rUC rCE = rUE</td>
<td>(.941) (.722) = .679</td>
<td>.588 .091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1c rUE rEC = rUC</td>
<td>(.588) (.722) = .425</td>
<td>.941 .518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2a rEC rED = rCD</td>
<td>(.722) (.375) = .271</td>
<td>.284 .013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2b rEC rCD = rED</td>
<td>(.722) (.284) = .205</td>
<td>.375 .170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 rUC rCE rED = rUD</td>
<td>(.941) (.722) (.375) = .255</td>
<td>.202 .053</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 4. Alternative Models for First Time Segment, 1942-46, possible causal paths including correlation coefficients.

Fig. A.1a

Fig. A.1b

Fig. A.1c

Fig. A.2a

Fig. A.2b

Fig. A.3

Fig. A.4
### TABLE 3

**DATA FOR SECOND TIME SEGMENT, 1948-52**

**TABLE 3-A.--Raw Data on Selected Variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urbanization</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% urban</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med.yrs.sch.</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coll.stud./10,000 pop.</td>
<td>118.5</td>
<td>110.4</td>
<td>135.6</td>
<td>131.4</td>
<td>142.6</td>
<td>101.8</td>
<td>115.4</td>
<td>114.7</td>
<td>144.5</td>
<td>188.5</td>
<td>114.7</td>
<td>128.9</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% literate</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>80.2</td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>78.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Communications</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper circ./1000 pop.</td>
<td>572.0</td>
<td>351.0</td>
<td>1095</td>
<td>809.0</td>
<td>700.0</td>
<td>110.6</td>
<td>231.9</td>
<td>198.4</td>
<td>298.3</td>
<td>333.3</td>
<td>227.2</td>
<td>242.3</td>
<td>78.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democratic Political Dev.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPP: % voting for</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov.</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Sen.</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Rep.</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC: % vote for Dem.cand.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov.</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Sen.</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>97.8</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Rep.</td>
<td>96.8</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>95.9</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>94.6</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Heard and Strong, *Southern Primaries and Elections; Heard, The Two-Party South*.
TABLE 3-B.--Standardized Scores for Model Variables, Second Time Segment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Urbanization (U)</th>
<th>Education (E)</th>
<th>Communication (C)</th>
<th>Democratic Political Development (SPP)</th>
<th>(SPC)</th>
<th>(DPD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>490.6</td>
<td>457.9</td>
<td>428.9</td>
<td>402.4</td>
<td>480.9</td>
<td>441.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>401.5</td>
<td>486.3</td>
<td>430.2</td>
<td>577.4</td>
<td>450.7</td>
<td>514.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>669.5</td>
<td>629.5</td>
<td>696.0</td>
<td>543.3</td>
<td>530.7</td>
<td>537.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>502.8</td>
<td>459.5</td>
<td>490.4</td>
<td>434.9</td>
<td>394.3</td>
<td>414.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>581.2</td>
<td>433.6</td>
<td>523.7</td>
<td>447.8</td>
<td>459.7</td>
<td>453.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>359.4</td>
<td>426.9</td>
<td>331.2</td>
<td>442.6</td>
<td>404.7</td>
<td>423.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>407.2</td>
<td>464.7</td>
<td>486.7</td>
<td>634.2</td>
<td>638.8</td>
<td>636.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>432.0</td>
<td>404.1</td>
<td>443.8</td>
<td>421.0</td>
<td>402.8</td>
<td>411.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>493.0</td>
<td>548.3</td>
<td>571.7</td>
<td>578.8</td>
<td>632.9</td>
<td>605.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>646.4</td>
<td>672.8</td>
<td>616.6</td>
<td>559.6</td>
<td>477.6</td>
<td>518.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>516.9</td>
<td>518.4</td>
<td>480.7</td>
<td>469.9</td>
<td>627.0</td>
<td>548.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>500.0</td>
<td>500.0</td>
<td>500.0</td>
<td>500.0</td>
<td>500.0</td>
<td>500.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stan.dev.</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>94.1</td>
<td>77.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 3-C. — Matrix of Correlation Coefficients, Second Time Segment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>U</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>SPP</th>
<th>SPC</th>
<th>DPD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.74</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.81</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Political Participation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Party Competition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Political Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 3-D. — Prediction Equations to Determine the Degree of Fit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictions</th>
<th>Equations</th>
<th>Degree of Fit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Actual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1a rUE rUC = rEC</td>
<td>(.742) (.876) = .650</td>
<td>.814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1b rUC rCE = rUE</td>
<td>(.876) (.814) = .713</td>
<td>.742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1c rUE rEC = rUC</td>
<td>(.742) (.814) = .604</td>
<td>.876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2a rEC rED = rCD</td>
<td>(.814) (.480) = .391</td>
<td>.449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2b rEC rCD = rED</td>
<td>(.814) (.449) = .365</td>
<td>.480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3 rUC rEC rED = rUD</td>
<td>(.876) (.814) (.480) = .342</td>
<td>.104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 3-E. — Computation of Path Coefficients using Simultaneous Equations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path</th>
<th>Equations</th>
<th>Path Coefficients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a (UC)</td>
<td>bUC + rUC = 0</td>
<td>.876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b (CE)</td>
<td>bCE + rEC = 0</td>
<td>.814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c (ED)</td>
<td>bED + rED = 0</td>
<td>.480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d (UD)</td>
<td>bUD + (bED · rUE) + rUD = 0</td>
<td>.224</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 5. Alternative Models for Second Time Segment, 1948-52, possible causal paths including correlation coefficients.
### TABLE 4

**DATA FOR THIRD TIME SEGMENT, 1960-64**

#### TABLE 4-A.—Raw Data on Selected Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urbanization</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% urban</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med. yrs. sch.</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% literate</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>78.7</td>
<td>81.2</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>86.9</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% with H.S. educ.</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% with coll. educ.</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Communications</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% housing units with telephones</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>television</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>82.6</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>radio</td>
<td>87.3</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>84.9</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democratic Political Dev.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPP: % voting for</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov.</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Sen.</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Rep.</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC: % vote for Dem. cand.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov.</td>
<td>96.3</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Sen.</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>97.3</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>64.7</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Rep.</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>91.6</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 4-B.—Standardized Scores for Model Variables, Third Time Segment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Urbanization (U)</th>
<th>Education (E)</th>
<th>Communication (C)</th>
<th>Democratic Political Development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>508.0</td>
<td>456.9</td>
<td>505.0</td>
<td>421.4 508.0 464.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>415.8</td>
<td>429.4</td>
<td>408.7</td>
<td>537.6 487.6 498.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>654.7</td>
<td>681.4</td>
<td>566.1</td>
<td>592.7 563.4 578.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>511.8</td>
<td>464.4</td>
<td>534.0</td>
<td>366.9 373.8 370.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>573.3</td>
<td>443.6</td>
<td>545.9</td>
<td>475.4 487.3 481.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>376.7</td>
<td>427.2</td>
<td>320.5</td>
<td>431.2 414.1 422.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>390.5</td>
<td>472.8</td>
<td>464.9</td>
<td>648.8 598.1 623.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>403.5</td>
<td>441.4</td>
<td>420.6</td>
<td>426.3 398.6 412.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>488.8</td>
<td>453.8</td>
<td>576.2</td>
<td>563.4 599.4 581.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>663.1</td>
<td>621.8</td>
<td>617.4</td>
<td>587.7 541.6 564.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>514.1</td>
<td>607.2</td>
<td>540.8</td>
<td>460.3 523.4 491.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>500.0</td>
<td>500.0</td>
<td>500.0</td>
<td>500.0 500.0 500.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stan.dev</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>90.6</td>
<td>87.8</td>
<td>89.6 77.3 80.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 4-C.—Matrix of Correlation Coefficients, Third Time Segment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>U</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>SPP</th>
<th>SPC</th>
<th>DPD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.756</td>
<td>.845</td>
<td>.219</td>
<td>.312</td>
<td>.272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.605</td>
<td>.401</td>
<td>.424</td>
<td>.427</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.295</td>
<td>.500</td>
<td>.404</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Political Participation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.851</td>
<td>.968</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Party Competition</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.956</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Political Development</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 4-D.—Prediction Equations to Determine the Degree of Fit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models</th>
<th>Equations</th>
<th>Degree of Fit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>Difference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1a rUE rUC = rEC</td>
<td>(.756) (.845) = .639</td>
<td>.605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1b rUC rCE = rUE</td>
<td>(.845) (.605) = .511</td>
<td>.756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.1c rUE rEC = rUC</td>
<td>(.756) (.605) = .457</td>
<td>.845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2a rEC rED = rCD</td>
<td>(.605) (.427) = .257</td>
<td>.404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2b rEC rCD = rED</td>
<td>(.605) (.404) = .244</td>
<td>.427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2c rED rCD = rEC</td>
<td>(.427) (.404) = .173</td>
<td>.605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3a rUD rED = rUE</td>
<td>(.272) (.427) = .116</td>
<td>.756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3b rEU rUD = rED</td>
<td>(.756) (.272) = .206</td>
<td>.427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3c rUE rED = rUD</td>
<td>(.756) (.427) = .323</td>
<td>.272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4 rCU rUE rED = rCD</td>
<td>(.845)(.756)(.427) = .273</td>
<td>.404</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 4-E.—Computation of Path Coefficients using Simultaneous Equations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Path</th>
<th>Equation</th>
<th>Path Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a (CU)</td>
<td>bCU + rCU = 0</td>
<td>.845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b (UE)</td>
<td>bUE + rUE = 0</td>
<td>.756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c (ED)</td>
<td>bED + rED = 0</td>
<td>.427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d (CD)</td>
<td>bCD + (bED x rCE) + rCD = 0</td>
<td>.146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 6
Alternative Models for Third Time Segment

(U, C, E, D)

Fig. 6.1a

Fig. 6.1b

Fig. 6.1c

Fig. 6.1d

Fig. 6.2a

Fig. 6.2b

Fig. 6.2c

Fig. 6.3a

Fig. 6.3b

Fig. 6.3c

Fig. 6.4
CHAPTER VII

SOUTHERN DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT:
IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

The problems of fitting the southern data to an acceptable model of democratic political development which were reported in the preceding chapter dramatize the need for further research. If the focus is the conditions of democratic governance, the effort to construct a theory or model of southern democratic political development will entail the introduction of additional causal variables, and, perhaps, the substitution of alternative operationalizations for Democratic Political Development. If, on the other hand, the effort is to construct a model of southern democratic political development which includes both conditions and consequences of selected political system characteristics, new dependent variables, such as public policy indicators, must also be introduced and investigated.

In this chapter some additional data regarding both the conditions and consequences of southern political development, as well as an alternative operationalization of the political system variable itself, are presented. This presentation is not aimed at postulating a precise model of Democratic Political Development for the South. Rather, it is intended merely to illustrate some possible directions for further investigations.

Because the most reliable data found for the South is also the
most recent, this discussion focuses on the time period 1960-1964. The new variables which are introduced here are Wealth, Racial Balance, State Legislative Composition, and State Welfare Effort. Both the raw data and the standardized scores on these variables for the several states are presented in Table 5. The correlation matrix in Table 6 summarizes the inter-actions of all the variables investigated by this research.

Some Additional Causal Variables

Wealth, as measured by per capita income, and Racial Balance, as measured by the percentage of Negro population in each state, are introduced as possible conditions of Democratic Political Development. The index for Wealth was standardized according to the procedures outlined in Chapter VI, so that the states with the highest per capita incomes have scores over 500. In similarly indexing the race variable, the basic measure was inversed on the presumption that states with a lower percentage of Negroes have greater racial balance and, perhaps, less racial tension; thus, states with a smaller proportion of Negroes were assigned scores over 500 on the Racial Balance index.

Both Wealth and Racial Balance are found to be more highly correlated with Democratic Political Development than the variables investigated in Chapter VI. (See Table 6.) The correlations between Wealth and the other environmental variables suggest considerable inter-action, with the correlation coefficient ranging from .743 to .902. In view of the high interacting effects demonstrated by this variable, Wealth does not appear to contribute significantly to illuminating further the process of Democratic Political Development in the South. Racial Balance, on the other hand, demonstrates strong association with each
political variable: State Party Competition ($r = .715$), State Political Participation ($r = .666$), and Democratic Political Development ($r = .715$).

From the investigations executed in Chapter VI, it is clear that no satisfactory model of Southern Democratic Political Development could be derived from McCrone and Cnudde's system of variables. One reason for the generally poor fit between the southern data and the alternative models investigated there may derive from the simple fact of low correlation coefficients between Democratic Political Development and Urbanization ($r = .273$), Education ($r = .429$), and Communications ($r = .405$). Using multiple regression analysis to determine the probability of predicting DPD from U, E, and C, we find that $R_{D,U,E,C}^2 = .567$. Because less than a third ($R_{D,U,E,C}^2 = .32$) of the political variable's variance can be explained by the best combination of information on Urbanization, Education, and Communications, we may safely conclude that a satisfactory model of Democratic Political Development for the South must include other variables. In order to discern which combination of the five environmental variables investigated here can best explain Democratic Political Development in the South, multiple regression coefficients were computed. These findings are tabulated below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Multiple Regression Coefficient ($R$)</th>
<th>Per Cent of Variance Explained ($R^2$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E, C, W</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E, C, U</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E, RB, W</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E, RB, U</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RB, C</td>
<td>.744</td>
<td>.554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RB, C, U</td>
<td>.746</td>
<td>.557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RB, C, U, W</td>
<td>.749</td>
<td>.561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RB, C, U, W, E</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.562</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Race, Communications, and Urbanization offer the best combination of three variables for predicting DPD. Nonetheless, even this markedly
good combination explains only a slight degree more of the variance
\( (R_{D,R_{CU}}^2 = .557) \) than does the Racial Balance indicator alone \( (r_{DR}^2 = .512) \).

The crucial questions posed by these findings can be simply put: What are the mechanisms through which Race so discernably affects Democratic Political Development in the South? And secondly, what are the other vital factors effecting Southern Democratic Political Development? The multiple regression coefficient for DPD which takes into account the effects of all five environmental variables is only .75 and, thus, can account for only about 56 per cent of the total variation in DPD.

An Alternative Measure of Political Development

The alternative operational definition of the political variable which is given here represents an attempt to incorporate the political institutionalization dimension suggested by Huntington. State Legislative Composition (SLC), as measured by the mean percentage of seats in the State Legislatures held by the major political party, is used to reflect the degree of political party institutionalization among the southern states. The raw data for this indicator, which is displayed in Table 5, illustrates the very high degree of Democratic Party hegemony in the South. Because the percentage of seats held by Democratic candidates in state legislatures typically exceeds the percentage of votes gained for those seats, it would appear that the Democratic Party has successfully used the formal "rules of the game" to institutionalize a one-party system. Easton's distinction between the "government" and the political "regime" has apparently been undermined by a highly institutionalized Democratic
Party machine in much of the South.¹

Insofar as the southern situation exemplifies the dysfunctions of overly institutionalized democratic political structures, the scores on the State Legislative Composition index are inversed and then combined with the State Political Participation and State Party Competition scores to form a second index of Democratic Political Development according to the following formula: \( DPD_2 = .80 \ DPD_1 + .20 \ SLC \). As shown in Table 6, none of the correlation coefficients between \( DPD_2 \) and the several environmental variables is interestingly high. Consequently, this alternative operationalization of the political variable adds little insight into the developmental process in the South. It can nonetheless be noted that even though the magnitude of association is small, State Legislative Composition is the only measure investigated by this research which is found to be negatively related to State Welfare Effort.

**State Welfare Policy**

The two measures which are combined to form an index of State Welfare Effort (SWE) for the southern states are (1) state public welfare expenditures per capita, and, (2) per cent of the total welfare expenditure funded by state and local governments. Standardizing the raw data for this index, we assign scores over 500 to states which demonstrate greater effort to treat welfare problems via monetary policy. It can be observed from Table 5 that only three southern states (Florida, Louisiana, and Texas) score above the mean of 500 on this index; and that the per capita public welfare expenditure in Louisiana ($17.58) is

almost three times that of the average for all southern states ($6.32). ¹

As indicated by the correlation matrix in Table 6, Urbanization demonstrates the strongest relationship with State Welfare Effort (.491), and Communications comes second (.381). The welfare policy indicator shows only weak relationships with the political variables SPP and SPC (.074 and .090, respectively) and a slightly inverse relationship with SLC (−.256). Thus, this preliminary analysis of zero-order correlation coefficients tends to discount the importance of the several variables investigated as determinants of southern State Welfare Effort.

Before rejecting this analysis as totally nugatory, however, it is necessary to point out the results of an attempt to predict State Welfare Effort from information on the other variables. The results of the stepwise multiple regression program employed for this are summarized in Table 7 according to the capacity of political system and environmental characteristics, both severally and together, to predict State Welfare Effort. The multiple regression program used for this analysis calls for the introduction of one variable at a time, simultaneously computes the partial correlations for each step, and thus makes "automatic" adjustments for the effects of variable inter-actions. For example, even though the zero-order correlation coefficient between SWE and C is second in magnitude to that between SWE and U, when U is partialled out as the first major variable, Education is "recognized" as the second major variable. One may infer from this that the interaction between U and C is considerable. This inference gains further acceptability when we recognize that the zero-order correlation coefficient between U and C (.846) is greater than that between U and E (.756)

¹Several studies of the Long dynasty and Louisiana politics mark the personality of Huey Long himself as the vital force behind welfare policies in this state.
for the southern data. Cutright's cross-national data (from which McCrone and Cnudde derived the propositions that (1) Education development occurs in urbanizing societies, and (2) Democratic political development occurs when mass communications permeate society) indicate a quite different picture; namely, that the association between U and C (.71) is less than that between U and E (.75). The least that can be summarized from this sketchy evidence is that Education, rather than Communications, appears to be a more crucial factor of both Democratic Political Development and State Welfare Effort in the South.

A second observation is the scant influence of the race variable on welfare policy (.026), as opposed to its striking affect on DPD (.715). The third, and perhaps most impressive, observation to be made from the findings of the multiple regression analysis concerns the high proportion of variation (about 81 per cent) in southern State Welfare Effort which can be explained in terms of Urbanization, Education, Wealth and Communications. Adding the democratic political variable SPC, the predictive potential is enhanced almost 10 per cent ($R^2 = .903$); and adding SPP, the correlation between actual SWE scores and those predicted from a five-stage regression equation would be .965—an almost incredible indication of predictive power, which may stem in part from the small number of observation units and the large number of variables considered.
### TABLE 5

**ADDITIONAL DATA FOR THIRD TIME SEGMENT, 1960-64**

**TABLE 5-A.--Raw Data on Selected Variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Wealth(^a) (1960)</th>
<th>Race(^a) (1960)</th>
<th>State Leg. Comp. (^b)</th>
<th>Pub. Welfare Expend. (^c) (1961)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>per capita income</td>
<td>per cent Negro</td>
<td>% seats held by Dem. cand. in Lower</td>
<td>State contr. % State per capita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>$1462</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>1338</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td>97.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1610</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>94.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>1608</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>1168</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>1562</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>85.8</td>
<td>96.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>1379</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>1539</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>79.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>1917</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>1852</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>92.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Mean          | 1582                  | 25.5             | 95.4                      | 6.32                              | 28.2          |
| Stan. dev.    | 249.7                 | 8.8              | 7.0                       | 3.95                              | 3.4           |


TABLE 5-B.—Standardized Scores for Additional Variables, Third Time Segment, 1960-64

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>452.0</td>
<td>449.4</td>
<td>446.3</td>
<td>461.0</td>
<td>470.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>402.3</td>
<td>542.2</td>
<td>440.6</td>
<td>498.2</td>
<td>488.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>654.2</td>
<td>587.5</td>
<td>499.4</td>
<td>562.7</td>
<td>539.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>511.2</td>
<td>466.4</td>
<td>489.4</td>
<td>394.2</td>
<td>487.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>510.4</td>
<td>427.9</td>
<td>440.4</td>
<td>473.1</td>
<td>744.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>334.2</td>
<td>313.5</td>
<td>433.4</td>
<td>424.8</td>
<td>415.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>492.0</td>
<td>511.7</td>
<td>558.3</td>
<td>610.4</td>
<td>488.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>418.7</td>
<td>395.0</td>
<td>433.4</td>
<td>416.7</td>
<td>439.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>482.8</td>
<td>602.3</td>
<td>770.7</td>
<td>619.3</td>
<td>429.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>634.2</td>
<td>648.7</td>
<td>447.8</td>
<td>541.3</td>
<td>504.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>608.1</td>
<td>555.8</td>
<td>541.0</td>
<td>501.7</td>
<td>494.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Mean          | 500.0      | 500.0              | 500.0                 | 500.0                 | 500.0                     |
| Stan.dev.     | 100.0      | 100.0              | 100.0                 | 76.2                  | 88.7                      |
TABLE 6.--Matrix of Correlation Coefficients for Selected Environmental, Political System, and Policy Variables: Third Time Segment, 1960-64

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>U</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>W</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>SPG</th>
<th>SPP</th>
<th>SLC</th>
<th>D1</th>
<th>D2</th>
<th>SWE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>.756</td>
<td>.846</td>
<td>.853</td>
<td>.596</td>
<td>.312</td>
<td>.219</td>
<td>-.027</td>
<td>.273</td>
<td>.223</td>
<td>.491</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td>.607</td>
<td>.902</td>
<td>.652</td>
<td>.425</td>
<td>.402</td>
<td>.031</td>
<td>.429</td>
<td>.369</td>
<td>.112</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.856</td>
<td>.754</td>
<td>.500</td>
<td>.295</td>
<td>.380</td>
<td>.405</td>
<td>.441</td>
<td>.381</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.743</td>
<td>.481</td>
<td>.395</td>
<td>.163</td>
<td>.452</td>
<td>.423</td>
<td>.352</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.715</td>
<td>.666</td>
<td>.471</td>
<td>.715</td>
<td>.725</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Party Competition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.851</td>
<td>.598</td>
<td>.956</td>
<td>.963</td>
<td>.090</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Political Participation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.379</td>
<td>.968</td>
<td>.915</td>
<td>.074</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Legislative Composition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.499</td>
<td>.683</td>
<td>-.256</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Political Development (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.974</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Political Development (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Welfare Effort</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 7.—Probability ($R^2$) of Predicting State Welfare Effort from Selected Variables as Indicated by Stepwise Multiple Regression Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step Number</th>
<th>Variable Entered</th>
<th>Multiple $R$</th>
<th>Multiple $R^2$</th>
<th>Increase in $R^2$</th>
<th>Number of Independent Variables Included</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environmental Alone</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>.492</td>
<td>.242</td>
<td>.2415</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>.632</td>
<td>.400</td>
<td>.1583</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>.682</td>
<td>.465</td>
<td>.0656</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>.903</td>
<td>.815</td>
<td>.3495</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>.903</td>
<td>.816</td>
<td>.0008</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Alone</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>SLC</td>
<td>.256</td>
<td>.066</td>
<td>.0655</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>.397</td>
<td>.157</td>
<td>.0919</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>D2</td>
<td>.418</td>
<td>.175</td>
<td>.0174</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>U</td>
<td>.492</td>
<td>.242</td>
<td>.2415</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>.632</td>
<td>.400</td>
<td>.1583</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>W</td>
<td>.682</td>
<td>.465</td>
<td>.0656</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>.903</td>
<td>.815</td>
<td>.3495</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>SPC</td>
<td>.950</td>
<td>.903</td>
<td>.0877</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>SPP</td>
<td>.965</td>
<td>.931</td>
<td>.0288</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>SLC</td>
<td>.969</td>
<td>.939</td>
<td>.0077</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>.969</td>
<td>.939</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

Prompted by an interest in comparative methodologies and attempts at theory building generated by scholars concerned with developing nations, this study has been addressed to one essential question: What are the conditions and consequences of democratic governance? The underlying thesis of this research, which identifies the South as an authentic developing area, has been lent credence by the growing literature in Political Science which deals comparatively with the political systems of the American states. The current interest in comparative state politics is, in many respects, a stepchild of the more pronounced concern among political scientists with the development of national political systems in transitional societies. Although the geographic areas of inquiry differ, both sub-fields within the discipline have experimented with comparative methodologies in efforts to fulfill a common purpose: to build theories of political change and development sensitive to the socio-economic milieu.

One of the more perplexing problems in comparative politics, which may derive from the employment of too extensive geographic parameters, has been the multiplicity and complexity of social and cultural variables involved in the developmental process. A primary advantage of comparing American states, Thomas Dye points out, stems from their institutional and cultural homogeneity which makes it
possible to isolate at least some of the major causal factors and thus simplify the complex task of theory building. This position is supported by Ira Sharkansky's extensive study of economic and public policy variables in the American states. Sharkansky "identified instances where regional phenomena make a significant contribution to the explanation of interstate differences in policy that is independent of economic characteristics of the region..."; and pointed to the "likelihood that historical experiences shared by neighboring states have had a lasting impact on public policies."^2

The incongruencies between the cross-national model of democratic political development proposed by McCrone and Cnudde and the southern data, which were reported in Chapter VI, lend further support for adopting a regional focus in comparatively studying political systems. The transitional societies of the eleven southern states have been presented as a frequently ignored source of information needed to build empirical theories of social and political change. This region is an appropriate analytic focus not only because of its historical, institutional, and cultural homogeneity but, also, because of the heterogeneity within the South. Clearly, there is ample evidence to disparage lingering notions of a "solid South." Yet, there are few explanations of how the southern solidarity of 1860 has become the southern diversity of 1960 and still fewer empirical theories which

^1 Thomas Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public, pp. 11-15.

postulate the course of democratic political development and modernization in the South. If political development in these states can be illuminated, the potential for generating more comprehensive and didactic theories of change in transitional societies, whether in the United States or abroad, would be improved.

While this research does not offer empirical propositions concerning the process of democratic political development in the South, it does challenge those offered by McCrone and Cnudde. In so doing, these findings support the thesis that several theories of democratic political development may obtain from regional comparisons. McCrone and Cnudde work to build a theory which explains democratic political development in terms of three variables—Urbanization, Education, and Communications—which are causally linked in the developmental process. Although the southern data for the first two time segments did fit a model similar to that proposed by McCrone and Cnudde, but emphasizing Education rather than Communications, no satisfactory model including the variables Urbanization, Education, and Communications fitted the southern data for the most recent time period.

The strong association between the racial variable and the several environmental and political variables investigated here suggests that an appropriate model of southern democratic political development must include additional causal variables. In addition to clarifying the mechanisms through which race so saliently affects democratic political development and to providing a sound theoretical foundation which explicitly acknowledges the racial factor in the developmental process, further researches of southern democratic political development need also to identify other causal factors if a satisfactory
model of political development is to be constructed for the South.

The immediate conclusion of this research is that the process of democratic political development in the South differs, and differs significantly, from that postulated by Lerner and reified by McCrone and Cnudde. The question now is whether the major variables and the sequence of variable relationships in the developmental process vary as a function of certain, definable factors peculiar to the southern case. For example, the South is presented here as an elitist political community wherein a highly personalized political style grew out of a plantation society. In this hierarchial, private-oriented political community, educational advancement appears to be a vital step to democratic political development. In another political community, characterized by high social mobility, an open opportunity structure for all citizens, and public-oriented policy makers, for example, mass media development may be the crucial requisite for functioning democracy.

Whether democratic political development or welfare policy has been the dependent variable, the findings of this research do not support many accepted notions about the determinants and consequences of democratic governance in the South. Rather, a challenge is raised to investigate and identify additional factors of democratic political development and to conceptualize more precisely the causal links which inter-relate environmental, political system, and public policy characteristics in the region. For only with the identification and thoughtful inclusion of additional causal factors will models of democratic political development begin to match the complexity of the phenomena which they seek to explain.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

General


The South


Comparative State Politics


VITA

Sandra Kaye Burden

Born in Aulander, North Carolina, April 10, 1945. Graduated from Aulander High School in 1963 and received B.A. in Political Science from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1967. Pursued graduate studies in the Department of Government at The College of William and Mary from June 1968 to June 1969.

Currently employed by The Carolina Population Center doing research in Population Dynamics under the direction of Dr. Abdel Omran, Associate Professor of Epidemiology, School of Public Health, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.