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Community Power and Urban Renewal Success: A Replication

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COMMUNITY POWER AND URBAN RENEWAL SUCCESS: A REPLICATION

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

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ABSTRACT

Amos Hawley's study, "Community Power and Urban Renewal Success", is replicated, using all cities in the United States of 15,000 population and over and urban renewal status as of the end of 1969. Hawley's measure of the concentration of community power -- the ratio of all managers, proprietors, and officials to the total employed labor force -- is found to be consistently and significantly associated with the urban renewal statuses, even with controls employed.

The control variables appeared to be highly associated with both the MPO ratio and urban renewal status; and, Hawley's study is extended by employing these variables and others as independent variables with MPO ratio and urban renewal status as the dependent variables.

The nature of the association of MPO ratio and urban renewal status with these variables indicates, in the light of the findings of other studies, that Hawley probably misinterpreted the meaning of lower MPO ratio. Reasons are given for interpreting lower MPO ratio as a measure of decentralized power structure, the opposite interpretation to that given by Hawley. Urban renewal success, then, is interpreted as associated with decentralized community power structures.

COMMUNITY POWER AND URBAN RENEWAL: A REPLICATION

INTRODUCTION

A first question: How does one measure community power structure; especially how does one measure the power structure of numerous communities for comparative purposes? A second question: What factors are correlated highly with urban renewal participation and success? Amos Hawley, in his study, "Community Power and Urban Renewal Success," addressed himself to both questions. He argued from a theoretical position that the ratio of managers, proprietors, and officials to the total employed labor force (hereafter referred to as the MPO ratio) is a measure of community power structure. The lower the MPO ratio, the more centralized the power structure. He hypothesized that communities with more centralized power structures would be able to mobilize more successfully for community action projects. He "tested" his presumption about MPO ratio measuring power concentration and his hypothesis about centralized community power structure yielding better community action results by measuring the association of MPO ratios and the urban renewal status of all cities 50,000 population and over in the United States. He found a significant and consistent relationship between the two variables. Thus Hawley has presented: an attractive measure of community power structure, apparently useful for comparative purposes; a "tested" hypothesis about the relationship of power structure and urban renewal endeavors, with the implication that this relationship might be generalizable to other types of community endeavors; and an answer to the question about factors related to urban renewal participation and success.

Hawley's study, published in 1963, was a creative and unique approach to the questions of community power structure and urban renewal participation.

In a sense the study of community power structure had its start and came into its own with the work of Floyd Hunter. Hunter's findings, and especially his methodology, were enthusiastically accepted at first.[1] In time, however, they were to set off a debate that for some years consumed the energies of writers and provided a part of the motivation for numerous studies.

Many scholars have found community power structures to be relatively "elitist." Usually using some form of the reputational approach, they found influence-power to be concentrated in a relatively few persons, whose interests were cohesive, and who predominantly were of the business field. Examples are: Pellegrin and Coates (1956), who concentrated on the influence of executives of absentee-owned corporations; Fanelli (1956), who gave a typology of leadership and emphasized their inaction; Agger (1956), who, nevertheless, took a point from Hunter and emphasized it more, that is, on different issues, one finds somewhat different influentials; Barth and Abu Laban (1959); D. C. Miller (1955, 1958), who distinguished between key and top influentials, and found American community power structures more business dominated than English; Vidich and Bensman (1958), whose methodological approach was similar to the earlier work of Robert and Helen Lynd, presented a community with shared values where an elite dominated by reflecting and reinforcing these values.

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[1]See the book reviews of Community Power Structure: London, 1955; Mills, 1953; Strong, 1954. The lone dissenting reaction at the time was by Kaufman and Jones, 1954.

Then came the "pluralist" reaction. Many scholars became critical of the findings (or at least their interpretations of the findings) and the methodological approach of "the elitists." First, there were articles of criticism that only pointed to what might be alternative approaches.[2] Then studies appeared that found community power structures to be relatively "pluralistic." Usually making use of some form of the decision-event approach, they found that influence-power was more widely dispersed, that the decision-makers were from different fields and different classes (where applicable to the study), that the structures change with issues and time, and that they were open to change of program and personnel. Examples are: Scoble (1956), who early found specialized leadership; Schulze (1961), who, in contrast to Pellegrin and Coates, found a "bification" of power with executives of absentee-owned corporations rarely becoming involved in controversial local issues; Dahl (1961), who found that New Haven had evolved from oligarchy to pluralism in the last 150 years, and presented evidence that today most groups have some power and that economic and status elites are not necessarily the "power elites"; Burgess (1962) showed that Negroes could be influential in community decision-making in a southern city; Wildovsky (1964), studying the smaller town of Oberlin, refined the techniques and considered more issues than Dahl did in New Haven.

Rossi, in 1960, reviewed the studies done and found four different types of community power structure. He conceded that the types were related to the methods of the researchers, but went on to say, ". . . in much larger part, the differences among reseachers are functions of 'reality', representing major ways in which communities do in fact

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[2]See Kaufman and Jones, 1954; Dahl, 1958.

differ" (Rossi, 1960:398). His thesis was that the differences are functions of differences among communities in their "political structures." However, Rossi was ahead of his time. Most writers concentrated on the biases and inadequacies of the methodological approaches of their "opponents."

The journals are full with critiques of the reputational approach. Kaufman and Jones (1954) early expressed their "amazement" at the findings and turned to criticism of the method that uncovered "reputation" not power. Dahl (1958) held that the "ruling elite model" assumes the existence of important characteristics of the community without empirical backing, and offered a test of the theory (in effect, an event-decision analysis). Polsby (1959a, 1959b), picked up Kaufman and Jones' point about reputation for power and not "real" power and argued that the approach deals with general power and neglects issue areas, and that it presents a false idea of the unity of elite power. Wolfinger (1960) gave the points made by others and added a few of his own, such as: the use of "knowledgeables" in order to reveal those with reputation assumes that appearance and reality are the same, the researchers and respondents were using ambiguous terms; they were confusing status and power, and finally, the method is just a matter of bias. Greer (1962) called the approach a "documented myth" and held that the problem of the metropolitan areas is not a business elite but the inability of any and all elites to get needed decisions made.

There have been critiques also of the event-decision approach. Bachrach and Baratz (1962) accepted the criticisms of the elite model, but pointed out that the event-decision approach did not recognize the "two faces of power" (that power may be exercised in preventing issues

from arising) and that the approach had not sufficiently established criteria for judging the relative importance of issues. Anton (1963) surveyed the major works in the field, and then critically examined the assumptions about the nature of "community" and "power" made by Dahl and others, concluding with the judgment that political science is not a science at all. Burgess (1962) responded to Wolfinger's critique by saying that Wolfinger operates with two doubtful premises: one, that power in the community can or should be equated with political power; and, two, that power will always vary from issue to issue. She offered that in the light of her research both premises are very much open to question.

Hawley was aware of the debate. He referred to it and cited members of each "side" in his footnotes. He offered that both approaches discover that managerial and proprietary personnel, with occasional exceptions, constitute the power figures (Hawley, 1963:422). Perhaps he is inaccurate in this assessment, particularly in regard to the pluralists who were beginning to publish in volumes at that time. Also, it may be that his assessment of the findings of the other studies is an indication of where he stood in regard to the debate. (We will pursue this further in the critique section of the thesis) In any event, Hawley's criticism of both approaches, both of which he characterizes as being "social-psychological", was that they are applicable only in a case study; they offered no facility for quantitative and comparative studies of the phenomenon (Hawley, 1963:422).

This is not completely accurate. Comparative studies, with quantitative aspects, have been and are being done, using social-psychological methods.

Peter Rossi (1957) issued an early call for comparative studies.

In that article he emphasized "gaps" in research in the field. In a later article (1960) he cited the need for a conceptual scheme to aid such studies.

There has been development in the comparative studies of community power structure. This development somewhat corresponds with the passing of years. Beginning in the late fifties there were studies by one scholar comparing two or three studies of individual communities which were reported by different researchers (one of whom perhaps was the scholar doing the comparing). Examples are D. C. Miller (1955, 1958), M. Kent Jennings (1964), and Clelland and Form (1964).

Next there were studies by one scholar or a team who, both investigated and compared two or more communities. Examples are: Rhyne (1958), Agger and others (1964), Presthus (1964), and D'Antonio and Form (1965). Gamson (1966) investigated and compared 18 communities on 54 issues.

Then there have been studies by one or more scholars who quantitatively compared a relatively large number of studies which were conducted by many different researchers. Examples here are: Walton (1966a, 1966b); Gilbert (1968); and Clark and others (1968). Rogers (1962) very early criticized this particular approach to the field. Polsby (1969) recently reiterated this criticism, arguing that because of differences in the methodological approaches of the various studies the findings of the comparative study are suspect.

The most recent work (which has the advantages of that which precedes it and attempts to surmount its disadvantages) is the quantitative study of large numbers of communities, collecting identical data, using directly comparable methods. Clark gives a report of some of

these comparative studies in the last chapter of his book, Community Structure and Decision-Making: Comparative Analysis. Conscious that many studies of some scope were being undertaken and hopeful of deriving comparable data, some meetings were held of directors of projects, and a Committee for Comparability in Community Research has been created. The most impressive success growing out of the committee's work has been the coordination of three very large projects: the International Studies of Values in Politics program, the National Opinion Research Center's studies based on Permanent Community Sample, and a series of studies conducted in five Mediterranean countries by the Programme Meditarraneen of the Centre de Sociologie Europeene. Clark's latest article (1968) is an expression of this correlated community study. Fifty-one cities ranging in population size from 50,000 to 750,000 were studied concerning the relationship of community structural characteristics to decision-making patterns and to budget and urban renewal expenditures. Directly comparable methods were used. A "ersatz decision-event method" was employed to identify decision-making patterns. Numerous structural variables (such as, industrial activity, educational level, economic diversification) were employed.

Nevertheless, Hawley's quantitative and comparative study is different. First, he took an exclusively systemic position. He began with the notion that power resides in the system and subsystems and not in individuals. His was not a "social-psychological" position. His concern was not even secondarily with individual leaders and followers. Second, consistent with his theoretical position, his methodology was different. He used Census-type data exclusively. He engaged in no interview or questionnaire-type case studies. Third, his work was one of the early studies to emphasize the importance of community structures.

Fourth, his was one of the early studies to emphasize the "outputs" of community power structures.

Other researchers have followed him in these pursuits. Crain and Rosenthal (1967), taking a systemic position, studied the relationship of community socio-economic level to community action in eight issue areas--including urban renewal programs. Socio-economic level was measured by education and income, especially education. They wrote, "The data strongly suggest that the community is a good deal more than the sum of its parts" (Crain and Rosenthal, 1967:983). They were impressed with the inability to predict group action from the generally known relationships between individuals' characteristics and behavior. They used Census-type data, information about community decisions secured from mailed questionnaires, and data from other studies. Yet, they were not concerned with community structure, except for figures about education and income. Their emphasis was on the "outputs" of different socio-economic levels--finding that the lowest and very highest s.e.s. communities had centralized power structures with records of mobilization in community programs.

Clair Gilbert (1968) in her extensive survey of other community studies, was very much concerned with community structures and their relationship to the structure of decision-making. She abstracted from the studies she surveyed, and measured the correlation of seven clusters of structural variables with the power structures presented in the studies. However, she did not share Hawley's emphasis on "outputs"; her concern was with the shape of the power structure, conflict, and governmental forms.

John Walton's (1966a, 1966b, 1968) approach and concerns have been

very similar to Gilbert's. His work has been that of surveys of studies by other researchers. Yet, in his latest article he took a systemic position. He theorized that communities have decentralized power structures or not according to the degree of their interdependence with the "larger society." The more interdependence, the more decentralized the power structure. Like Gilbert and Hawley, he emphasized community structures. In his recent theoretical work, he sought to interpret the meaning of the cluster of demographic and political variables found positively associated with types of structure. However, his concern has been with structures and not the "outputs."

Paulson, Butler, and Pope (1969) made reference to Hawley and intentionally assumed his systemic position. They used Census-type data and information secured from questionnaires concerning welfare programs in the counties of North Carolina. They employed Hawley's MFO ratio (though limited to male MPO's). They used numerous factors of community structure, both as control variables (like Hawley) and as independent variables. The dependent variables were two measures of participation in welfare programs and one measure of participation in the poverty program. They found that higher MPO ratios are positively associated with participation in these programs.

Clark, whom we mentioned earlier, does not take an exclusive systemic approach. He still seeks to uncover the power structure of communities by the case-study-type, decision-event method. Further, he concludes his article by calling for more case studies to help clarify his findings. He used Census-type data rather extensively, though not as the measure of power structure. In a sense he emphasized community structures more than did Hawley. He sought what community structures

are correlated with power structure and did not use the structures only as control variables concerning the relationship of an assumed measure of power structure with urban renewal status. He emphasized "outputs", but in a different way from Hawley. They are not used as a "test" of the presumed measure of power structure. He was the first to find that "decentralized power structure" was positively and significantly associated with urban renewal and general budgetary expenditures.

Alford and Aiken (1969) did not explicitly argue for a strict systemic position; yet, their concept of mobilization and all of their operational variables are community actions and characteristics. As did Hawley, they used Census-type data exclusively, but as a more indirect measure of community power structure. The purpose of their study was to seek "structural properties of communities linked to their capacity to obtain Federal money for different type programs" (Alford and Aiken, 1969: 2). They emphasized community structures even more than Hawley--using them both as independent and control variables. They emphasized "outputs". Urban renewal participation was used as a "test" of presumed measures of power structure. Their interpretation of their data was that more numerous centers of power with more numerous exchange relationships between them characterize the communities that are successful in urban renewal.

There are numerous books and articles about urban renewal. "Urban renewal programs have been the most frequently studied aspect of public policy making in American cities in recent years" (Alford and Aiken, 1969:1). In the scholarly literature, the aspects studied have been diverse, including whether a program reached different statuses in a given city (Hawley, 1963; and Crain and Rosenthal, 1967), urban renewal expenditures (Clark, 1968b), the number of years a city took to enter the

program (Straits, 1965; and Alford and Aiken, 1969). The factors related to urban renewal have been numerous, including community power structure measured in numerous ways, the political ethos of the city (Wolfinger and Field, 1968), and the ability of political leaders to elicit support (Dahl, 1961). There have been case studies of the endeavors of various communities (Kaplan, 1963; and Rossi and Dentler, 1961), and participant observation studies of the response of and effect on the residents involved (Gans, 1965). Rothenberg (1967) gives an economic evaluation of urban renewal, especially the residential redevelopment aspect. Greer (1965) offers an over-view of the system after extensive interviews and study of documents. Willmann (1967) traces the origin, evaluation, and present organization of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Wilson's "Reader" (1966) has numerous articles addressed, sometimes polemically, to the many faceted phenomenon of urban renewal.

Still, Clark is accurate in his observation:

> Until quite recently, neither theoretical nor empirical work on community decision-making has been concerned with systematically relating decision-making patterns to policy outputs (Clark, 1968:587).

This is especially true when one limits the community power structure outputs to urban renewal experience.

Again, Hawley's work was innovative and unique. Different aspects of his study have been used by other researchers since 1963. His MPO ratio measure and his findings have been referred to in numerous works.[3]

Hawley's study holds great promise. Willis Hawley and Frederick Wirt have written:

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[3]In addition to the works cited in this section, see: Hawley and Wirt, 1968:297; and Wilson, 1968:4.

> Amos Hawley's article is an almost unique example of . . . aggregate data analysis, which classify large numbers of communities by variables that might affect the structure of community power . . . Hawley skips entirely the laborious study of the interpersonal milieu of power and examines the structural community characteristics and associated community policies. If this methodology could be validated generally, it would open the way to analysis of a large number of cities and to broadly applicable conclusions now impossible because of the slow and difficult process of constructing case studies (Hawley and Wirt, 1968:297).

There has been one attempt at replication of Hawley's study. Bruce Straits (1965) in the "Commentary and Debates" section of The American Journal of Sociology argued that the observed correlation between MPO ratio and urban renewal success may not be a matter of differences in power structure but a matter of spurious correlations with other factors such as socio-economic status and age of a city. Using the worksheets and IBM decks from Hawley and other researchers, he worked with data on all 15,000 population and over cities from the states that had legally approved the program by 1960. Three of the controls were changed. Instead of measuring metropolitan status by a central city/suburb dichotomy, the employment-residence ratio was used. The percentage of families with income between $3,000 and $10,000 was substituted for the median income variable. Eight categories of region were used rather than the four in Hawley's study. Most importantly the operational definition of the dependent variable was changed. This variable became the number of years that a community had been in the urban renewal program since 1951.

The MPO ratio and the variables that Hawley had used as controls (with modification for three of them) were run as independent variables against "urban renewal success." Straits found the simple correlation

of MPO ratio with urban renewal success was -.21 (1965:81). This is in the direction that Hawley predicted. With all "control" variables held constant simultaneously, the partial correlation of MPO ratio with urban renewal success was -.07. Two of the variables--log city size and age of housing--were found to be better predictors of success than was the MPO ratio. Straits felt that these statistical manipulations and others indicated that MPO ratio may be spurious, and concluded with a call for more inquiry.

Hawley was very critical in his response to the article. In addition to criticisms of other points, he said that Straits' dependent variable was "more than slightly different from his" (Hawley, 1965:83). He observed that Straits was ambiguous by what he meant by "being in the program." It can mean: one, years since entering the planning stage; two, years since entering the execution stage; or three, years spent in either stage but terminated by withdrawal from participation. Further, Hawley was critical of Straits' assumption that the variable could be a continuous one--wondering how Straits' assigned his scale values, given the differences in the cities and the nature of their participation. Hawley concluded:

> Mr. Straits seems to deal with the association of MPO ratio with years spent in the program, whereas my problem was the association of MPO ratio with a measure of urban renewal success. The problems are different; the results, therefore, are not comparable (Hawley, 1965:84).

Hawley said in effect that Straits' study was not a replication. The thesis turns now to what hopefully is a more faithful attempt. Part I is a presentation of my replication. In Chapter 1, Hawley's thought and procedure are summarized. In Chapter 2, his study is replicated where possible.

PART I

HAWLEY REPLICATED

CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM REVIEWED

This chapter is a review of the theoretical position, the hypotheses, and the procedures of Hawley's study.

Hawley's Theoretical Position

Power is defined by Hawley as ". . . the capacity to produce results" (Hawley, 1963:423). It is assumed to be an attribute of a social system and not a personal attribute that distinguishes leaders from followers. Hawley argued strongly for this starting point:

> Perhaps enough has been said to indicate that power is a product of a system having developed, that it is lodged only in a system, and that it is most appropriately treated, therefore, as a system property. Whatever power an individual might appear to possess is in effect attached to the office he occupies in a system. He acquires power by attaining to an office and he loses it when he is separated from the office. But the acquiring and losing of power is illusory; the property belongs rather with the office or, better still, to the system in which the office is a specialized function (1963:423).

More specifically Hawley assumed that a community may be viewed as a power system, with functional subsystems of power:

> As a system of relationships among functionally differentiated units, the community constitutes a mobilization of power . . . for dealing with the environment, whether physical or social. Each unit or subsystem-family, church, store, industry--is also an organization of power for the conduct of a function. Both the system and its subsystems tend to approximate a single organizational model.

> Moreover, since the performance of its function by any one part affects in greater or lesser degree the conditions under which other parts carry out their functions, the parent system and each subsystem is an arena in which a more or less continuous interplay of influences occurs. Power, then, is expressed in two ways: (1) as functional power--that required to execute a function; and (2) as derivative power--that which spills over into external relationships and regulates the interaction between parts (1963:423).

The distribution of power in a community (derivative power), according to this systemic position, is the result of the scale to which a function has developed and, more importantly, is the result of the position of a function in the system.

> Those subsystems that are most instrumental in relating the system to the environment doubtlessly exert a greater derivative effect than do subsystems one or more steps removed from the key position (Hawley, 1963:423).

A community normally exercised its power through established and accepted channels. But when "crises" occur for the whole or much of the community in unattended areas and/or non-routine issues, the established and accepted channels are "tested." The community may or may not be effective in dealing with the exceptional circumstances. Hawley said that

> Whether or not it is effective would appear to be contingent on the way in which the derivative power is distributed in the system. Where it is highly concentrated the community should be able to act as a unit in almost any emergency. On the other hand, where power is widely distributed a community may be able to act coherently only with great difficulty, if at all, when confronted with a novel problem (1963: 423).

The question then becomes, "How is power distributed in a particular community?" (In any given community, power concentration may be in a small sector, or it may be distributed more or less throughout the subsystems.) In order to answer this question about the distribution of

power, Hawley "infers" from his thought about the community being a power system that power is exercised through the "managerial functions" of the subsystems of communities. He wrote:

> Proceeding from the notion that system power resides in the subsystems or functional units of a community, we can infer that it must be exercised through the managerial functions of the subsystems. For it is those functions that co-ordinate the systems and articulate the latter with the larger system (1963:424).

Granted this, his line of reasoning becomes: discover the number of managerial positions relative to the total number of positions or functions in a given community and one will discover the degree of its power concentration.

Hypotheses

Hawley has designed and executed a study that is consistent with his theoretical position, and which, he believes, makes convincing that position. His hypothesis on a nominal level is: ". . . the greater the concentration of power in a community the greater the probability of success in any collective action affecting the welfare of the whole" (1963:424). This hypothesis is conditional. He recognized that a concentration of power does not assure success in a community action. Various factors, including concentration of power, might intervene to defeat a collective project.

He operationalized his hypothesis by using the ratio of managers, proprietors, and officials to the total employed labor force as his measure of the concentration of power. He wrote:

> In the absence of data on the number of managerial functions, I shall use the number of managerial personnel, that is, the number of people who reported occupations as manager, proprietor, or official in the Population Census, to measure concentration of power. Personnel, it should be stressed, is used only as a substitute for,

> and as an index of, functions. Since the significance of the number of functions varies with the number of all other functions (i.e., the size of the employed labor force), it should be expressed as a ratio to the latter. Hence the lower the ratio of managers, proprietors, and officials to the employed labor force, the greater is the concentration of power (1963:424).

Hawley further operationalized the hypothesis by using arrival at the execution stage of the urban renewal program as his measure of success in collective action. He pointed out that urban renewal has a standard procedure to which all participating communities must submit. Participation in the program involves passage through a series of stages, differentiated by the extent to which the local community has conformed to and fulfilled given federal requirements. The stages of the program are planning, execution, and completion. Hawley wrote:

> Arrival at the completion stage is unquestionably the best measure of success. Unfortunately only eighteen cities ... had by the end of 1959 advanced so far .... The next best indication of success in urban renewal is arrival at the execution stage. At that stage a city has completed its planning and has satisfied all administrative requirements for the receipt of a capital grant . . . . The city is then either at the point of, or has embarked upon, the acquisition of land, the relocation of current occupants, and clearing and improving the land. At the end of 1959, ninety five cities with populations of 50,000 or more (in 1950) had advanced to the execution stage (1963:424-425).

For control purposes two other classes of cities were used as the second and third categories of his dependent variable. One class is composed of cities that entered the program but then abandoned their efforts. They are called "dropouts". The other class is composed of all cities (cities of the required size and located in states where urban renewal was permitted by state law) which for one reason or another have not attempted urban renewal at any time. They are called "never-in-program" cities. A sizeable group of cities that were in the planning stage of

participation in urban renewal were not included in Hawley's study.

The operational hypothesis, then, is: MPO ratios are lowest in urban renewal cities that have reached the execution stage and highest in cities that have never attempted urban renewal. Dropout cities are expected to occupy an intermediate position between the other two classes (1963:425).

Procedure

The hypothesis was tested primarily in reference to incorporated cities of 50,000 population or more. The 1950 Census data available to Hawley that allowed him, in the last part of the study, to make some refinements in the MPO ratio were limited to these 50,000 population plus cities.

Nevertheless, as a preliminary test of the representativeness of cities of 50,000 population plus, their MPO ratios for each of the three urban renewal statuses were compared with the MPO ratios of cities of 15,000-50,000 population. The series of ratios were found to be "very similar", and in all cases conformed to the hypothesis.

Hawley, then, concentrated on the 50,000 population plus cities. The association of MPO ratios with urban renewal status was measured by a quintile distribution of cities according to MPO ratios by the three urban renewal statuses. The MPO ratios were significantly lower in cities that had reached the execution stage. The probability that the association found was by chance was less than .01.

He next employed ten further control variables: age of housing, extent of dilapidation, planning budget size, metropolitan status (Central city or suburban city), form of government, type of industry, size

of manufacturing plant, median income, educational level, and region.[1] The hypothesized association of the size of mean MPO ratios with urban renewal status held true with each of the ten controls applied successively; though in nine out of twenty-three cases the dropout cities failed to hold an intermediate position between execution stage and never-in-program cities.

Hawley next employed rank correlation analysis. He used Kendall's tau-c, to assess the closeness of the association of the size of the MPO ratios with the urban renewal statuses, successively applying the ten control variables. He found a positive and significant association under all controls with the exceptions of: mayor-council government, service industry, low educational level, and the northeast and the west regions.

Observing that the classification of all managers, proprietors, and officials is quite heterogeneous, Hawley next distinguished between the different industry classes of MPO's. He distinguished between and treated as separate classes, the following groups: salaried manufacturing MPO's, self-employed manufacturing MPO's, retail and wholesale trade MPO's, banking and finance MPO's, and public administration MPO's. He employed rank correlation analysis, using Kendall's tau-c, to assess the closeness of the association of the size of the MPO ratios with the urban renewal statuses, by the different industry classes of MPO's, with the ten control variables applied. He found that the association was significant for all of the industrial classes of MPO's except public administration, which not only fell short of significance, but was also

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[1]Definitions and sources of the variables according to Hawley and the present writer are to be found in Appendix A. Since the reader might wish to consult them at different points in the paper, it was thought best to include them in an appendix.

negative. Hawley recognized that this striking exception posed an "interesting problem", but said that he could not pursue the question in his study.

Hawley concluded his article:

> While the findings reported in this paper should be regarded as exploratory, they clearly support the hypothesis that the lower the MPO ratio the greater the chance of success in an action program such as urban renewal. They also demonstrate the facility and the economy in research of a conception of power as a system property. Much remains to be done, however, to develop knowledge about that property . . . . (1963:431).

CHAPTER II

THE REPLICATION

This chapter presents the conditions, the definition of variables, the findings, and the summary of the replication.

Conditions

For the purpose of replication, in this chapter, Hawley's theoretical position and hypothesis are accepted and used. His procedure where possible is followed.

Preliminary investigation of the importance of city size revealed the value of gathering data and making calculations in most instances on all incorporated cities 15,000 population and more, rather than limiting the data and calculations to 50,000 population and over cities. The universe of incorporated cities of 15,000 population and over was found to be 1122 communities.

For reasons that will become apparent, in this chapter, it was not possible to follow Hawley's procedure concerning the tau-c measurements of association. Further, as will be explained in Chapter 3, data was not available in the 1960 Census concerning the different industry groups of managers, proprietors, and officials. Therefore, it was not possible to follow Hawley's procedure of distinguishing between the industry groups.

Brief Definition of Variables

Most of my variables are identical to Hawley's, except that they come from the 1960 rather than 1950 Census documents and related sources, and except that in most cases they are calculated on the basis of all cities 15,000 population and over and not just 50,000 population plus cities.[1]

The MPO ratios are the ratios of all managers, proprietors, and officials, except farm, to the total employed civilian labor force. This is identical with the variable that Hawley used; though he did not acknowledge in his article that he dealt only with "civilian" labor force, and though he evidently intended to employ only "managers, proprietors, and officials not elsewhere classified" (Hawley: 1963:424). A check of his code sheets indicates that he used civilian labor force and the broader classification of MPO's.

As indicated above, Hawley used the execution stage of urban renewal participation and the two control statuses of dropout and never-in-program for the three categories of his dependent variable. The present writer has six categories for this variable: completion stage, execution stage, planning stage, dropout status, never-in-program status, and other type projects status. These six categories are mutually exclusive, and, together are all-inclusive of the 1122 cities.

By the end of 1969 enough cities had reached completion stage in the urban renewal program to use that category. Hawley's categories of execution stage, dropout, and never-in-program statuses were used, as well as the planning stage status which he omitted. The sixth category

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[1]Again, the reader is referred to Appendix A for the full definitions and the sources of the variables.

of the dependent variable is composed of those few cities that participate in the urban renewal program, but do so only in the newer and different type projects that were not a part of the program during the 1950's, the time period for Hawley's study. All of these "other-type-projects" omit either the planning or the execution stage, requiring only two and not three steps of participation, and thus are not comparable with the older type projects. Again, Hawley did not use them. Therefore, because they are not compatible with any of the other categories, this category was used as a separate one.

Where appropriate, the three categories of execution stage, dropout, and never-in-program status have been "separated out" for comparison with Hawley's tables.

The control variables and their computations are similar to Hawley's, except that they have been brought up to date and increased in number. Age of housing is based on the percentage of residential units built 1939 or before. Extent of dilapidation is computed on the basis of percentage of reported dilapidation of residential units. Planning budget size is determined by the percentage of the total operating budget of a city devoted to planning. Service or manufacturing industry is computed from the ratio of manufacturing payroll to wholesale, retail, and service payrolls. Size of manufacturing plant is arrived at by dividing the number of plants into the number of manufacturing employees. Income is the reported median income per family. Education is based on the percentage of persons with four or more years of college. In each case these percentages and ratios were dichotomized at the median.

Metropolitan status is based on the location of cities with respect to Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas. Central cities are

the largest cities of SMSA's, usually having a population of 50,000 or more. Suburban cities, in this study, are all other incorporated urban places over 15,000 population located within a SMSA. Independent cities are all incorporated urban places 15,000 population and over that are located outside the SMSA's.

The form of government classification includes commission, city manager, and mayor-council forms.

Hawley used the four regional classifications of the Census Bureau. The Bureau further divides these into nine areas. Because preliminary work with the data indicated that states differ in regards to urban renewal status, the larger number of categories were used in this study.

In addition to dichotomizing at the median, it was thought that it might be helpful with some of the variables to get more numerous categories. As in Hawley's study, a quintile distribution of the MPO ratios was developed. Additionally, quintile distributions of city size, age of housing, extent of dilapidation, planning budget size, type of industry, size of manufacturing plant, median income, and educational level were developed. Further, in addition to Hawley's size classes of 15,000-50,000 population cities and 50,000 population and over cities, this study uses four size classes: 15,000-30,000 population, 30,000-50,000 population, 50,000-100,000 population, and 100,000 and over population size.

Two new variables were added: economic functional classification and dormitory function. A city is classified as serving a dormitory function when the aggregate employment is less than 67 percent of the resident labor force.

The economic functional categories are based on data on employment in manufacturing, retailing, wholesaling, and selected service establishments on a place-of-work basis. They are computed by the relative percentages of the aggregate employment in manufacturing and retailing.

Findings

With similar variables and procedures, most of Hawley's study was replicated; and it was found that the data, as of the end of 1969, support his operational hypothesis and earlier findings. There is a significant and consistent association between MPO ratio and urban renewal status, and this association is in the direction predicted. However, other variables that are significantly and consistently associated with both urban renewal status and MPO ratio were found.

This study began, as did Hawley's, with a preliminary test of the representativeness of cities 50,000 population and over, concerning the distribution of MPO ratios in the three urban renewal classes. See Table 1, where Hawley's findings are in parentheses for comparative purposes.

Hawley could observe, ". . . the two series of ratios are very similar. Thus it seems possible that findings for large cities might apply to all cities . . ." (1963:425). He also wrote: "It is also to be noted . . . that the ratios conform to the hypothesis" (1963:426).

My data, like Hawley's, show that the MPO ratios conform to the hypothesis, though the ratios for the smaller cities in execution and dropout stages are identical. The two series of ratios in my study are somewhat similar; though it could be disputed that they are "very similar".

TABLE 1

NUMBER AND MEAN MPO RATIOS, CITIES BY TWO SIZE CLASSES, AND BY THREE URBAN RENEWAL STATUSES (HAWLEY'S FIGURES IN PARENTHESES)

URBAN RENEWAL STATUS	All Cities of 15,000 Population And Over		Cities of 15,000 - 50,000 Population		Cities of 50,000 Population And Over	
	Number	MPO Ratio	Number	MPO Ratio	Number	MPO Ratio
Execution Stage	247 (136)	8.5 (9.0)	150 (41)	8.7 (9.1)	97 (95)	8.2 (9.0)
Dropout	49 (79)	8.9 (10.0)	39 (41)	8.7 (9.8)	10 (38)	9.3 (10.1)
Never In Program	520 (402)	10.6 (11.0)	455 (341)	10.6 (11.1)	65 (61)	10.9 (10.8)
TOTAL	816 (617)	9.9 (10.4)	644 (423)	10.0 (10.7)	172 (194)	9.3 (9.5)

There is need for a more precise comparison of the series of ratios according to size class.

The identical MPO ratios of the small cities in the execution and dropout statuses disrupt somewhat the similarity of the two ratio series. The range of MPO ratios between execution stage and never-in-program status differs in the two size classes also. Hawley's data reveal that the small cities had a range of 2.1 and the large cities a range of 1.8. My data also reveal a difference, but greater in the large cities than in the small cities (2.7 and 1.9 respectively).

Hawley's data and mine reveal that large cities have lower MPO ratios in execution stage than do small cities, though my data reveal a greater difference. The data from both studies show that large cities have higher ratios in the dropout status, though, again, my data show a greater difference. However, in the never-in-program status, Hawley's data show that large cities have lower MPO ratios than small cities, and my data reveal an equal amount of difference, but in the opposite direction. During the time between Hawley's study and mine the ratio that has changed least is that of large cities that have never entered the program. On the other hand small cities, even with lower MPO ratios, have increasingly not entered the program.

Both studies show a difference in the total MPO ratio figure between the size classes. Hawley's data reveal even a greater difference than do mine.

These finding in both Hawley's and my data suggest that the series of ratios in the two class sizes are <u>not</u> "very similar" in any full sense of the term. And the findings, along with the differences in percentages of cases in the three statuses according to size class, point to the need of investigating further the importance of city size.

Before leaving Table 1, we might note three things. First, in every case except one my MPO ratios are lower than Hawley's. Why there should be proportionately fewer managers, proprietors, and officials, at least in these urban renewal statuses, according to the 1960 as against the 1950 Census, the present writer cannot explain. Because of the popular literature on the increasing "bureaucratization" of our country, one might have expected that my MPO ratios would be larger than Hawley's; yet he shows a total ratio of 10.4 for all cities in his study, and the total in my study is 9.9 Dr. Ito of the College of William and Mary has offered the explanation that apparently these cities do not comprise an exact mixture of the U.S. population as a whole. The Census for 1960 does show a larger proportion in the MPO category than for 1950. Second, my ratios are especially lower than Hawley's in the dropout cities. Perhaps this indicates that with the passage of time from Hawley's study to mine, the same forces involved in MPO ratio levels that are associated with urban renewal success are now, more than formerly, associated with dropping out of the program. This seems to be more true of small than of large cities. Third, the widest range of MPO ratios from execution stage to never-in-program status in the two studies is to be found among the large cities in my study. This would seem to suggest that MPO ratio (and whatever it is that it represents) is more determinative of urban renewal status in large than in small cities and in the 1960's rather than the 1950 period.

Table 2 again gives the frequencies and mean MPO ratios for cities, controlled by Hawley's two size classes, but gives all six urban renewal statuses. This allows further comparisons according to size.

TABLE 2

NUMBER AND MEAN MPO RATIOS, CITIES BY HAWLEY'S CLASS SIZE AND BY SIX URBAN RENEWAL STATUSES

URBAN RENEWAL STATUS	All Cities of 15,000 Population And Over		Cities of 15,000 - 50,000 Population		Cities of 50,000 Population And Over	
	Number	MPO Ratio	Number	MPO Ratio	Number	MPO Ratio
Completion Stage	192	7.6	83	7.8	109	7.5
Execution Stage	247	8.5	150	8.7	97	8.2
Planning Stage	58	9.3	51	9.1	7	10.8
Dropout	49	8.9	39	8.7	10	9.3
Never In Program	520	10.6	455	10.6	65	10.9
Other Type Projects	56	8.8	34	8.3	22	9.5
TOTAL	1,122	9.4	812	9.7	310	8.7

Regarding frequency, only 10.2 percent of the small cities reached completion, whereas 35.1 percent of the large cities did so. There were 4.3 percent dropouts among small cities, and 3.2 percent among large communities. Over a half of the small cities never got into the program, whereas about a fifth of the large cities never entered.

Regarding ratios, the total MPO ratio was higher for small than for large cities. The difference between the total MPO ratios is greater than, say, the difference between completion and execution stages in each of the size classes. The range of ratios from completion stage to never-in-program status is greater in large cities; again suggesting that MPO ratio (and what it measures) has more to do with the community actions of large cities. The MPO ratio is lower for large cities than for small communities at the completion and execution statuses, but higher at the planning, dropout, never-in-program, and other type projects statuses. This, along with the greater range for large cities, indicates that large cities are more heterogeneous regarding MPO ratios, and that the ones with lower MPO ratios tend to enter the urban renewal program and quickly move on to execution and completion without dropping out as often. It also indicates that small cities which have lower ratios tend not to participate as readily and as successfully as do large cities with lower ratios.

Table 2, with its greater number of cities and urban renewal statuses, again shows the importance of city size.

Before leaving this table we might observe two further things. First, though the dropout cities do continue to hold an intermediate position between Hawley's polar statuses of execution stage and never-in-program cities, they do not fit into a larger scale of completion,

execution, planning, dropout, never-in-program cities. For small cities the MPO ratio of dropouts is the same as for cities of execution stage. Among large cities the MPO ratio for dropouts falls between the ratios for the execution and planning stages. Second, the other-type-project cities vary between the size classes in percentage of frequency and in mean MPO ratios. Indeed, except for planning stage this status has the greatest difference in ratios. These findings about dropout and other-type-project cities will be further explored in connection with Table 3.

In Table 3, there are four size classes. In the smallest cities only 7.4 percent reached completion stage against 50 percent of the largest cities. The "dropout" and "never-in-program" percentages progressively get smaller as the size classes get larger. A striking 61.5 percent of the smallest cities never entered the program, whereas only 9.2 percent of the largest cities failed to enter the program.

The total MPO ratios differ, with the smallest cities having the highest mean ratio (9.8, 9.3, 9.0, 8.3). The range of MPO ratios from completion stage to never-in-program status for the two classes of small cities is less than the range in the two classes of large cities (just as was shown in Table 2); but note that it is the "smallest" cities and the "largest" cities that emphasize this difference in range. For the two classes of large cities the difference between the MPO ratios of completion and execution stages on the one hand and planning stage on the other hand is striking. This further indicates that large cities with lower MPO ratios quickly move beyond the planning stage. Among the smallest cities the difference in MPO ratio between planning and execution is minimal. The fairly small cities hold an intermediate position on this difference.

TABLE 3

NUMBER AND MEAN MPO RATIOS, CITIES BY FOUR SIZE CLASSES AND BY SIX URBAN RENEWAL STATUSES

URBAN RENEWAL STATUS	Cities of 15,000-30,000 Population		Cities of 30,000-50,000 Population		Cities of 50,000-100,000 Population		Cities of 100,000 Population And Over	
	Number	MPO Ratio	Number	MPO Ratio	Number	MPO Ratio	Number	MPO Ratio
Completion Stage	41	8.1	42	7.6	44	7.6	65	7.4
Execution Stage	97	8.8	53	8.6	60	8.2	37	8.2
Planning Stage	31	9.0	20	9.3	4	11.2	3	10.2
Dropout	28	9.1	11	7.8	7	9.2	3	9.6
Never In Program	344	10.6	111	10.6	53	11.0	12	10.7
Other Type Projects	18	8.2	16	8.4	12	9.1	10	9.9
TOTAL	559	9.8	253	9.3	180	9.0	130	8.3

The pattern noted earlier of the two classes of large cities having lower MPO ratios for the completion and execution stages and higher ratios for the other statuses has become more complex with the introduction of the four classes of size. Now it can be seen that the smallest and largest size cities emphasize the difference concerning completion stage. Concerning the planning stage, both of the classes of the large cities make the difference, but this is extreme because of the MPO ratios of the "fairly large" size cities.[2] Concerning the MPO ratios for the dropout status, one sees that it is the "fairly small" cities that emphasize the difference. The two classes of larger cities have higher ratios in the never-in-program status mainly because of the "fairly large" cities. Both of the two classes of large cities have significantly higher ratios concerning the other-type-projects status, but this is emphasized by the largest cities.

Tables 1 through 3 show that city size is an important variable in regard to the frequency of participation at different urban renewal statuses and in regard to the size of the MPO ratios at different statuses. The relationship of MPO ratio to urban renewal status, controlled by city size, is not unmixed; but it generally holds that the larger the size class of a city the lower the MPO ratio in advanced stages of urban renewal and the higher the ratio in planning, dropout, and never-in-program statuses.

Before leaving Table 3, note two further things. First, the MPO ratios of the dropout cities continue to hold an intermediate position

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[2]The small number of cities should be noted in these cells, though the MPO ratios are generally in line with the trend indicated by the two classes of smaller cities concerning planning status.

between the ratios of execution and never-in-program status, except in the class of "fairly small" cities. However, the position of the drop-out ratios fluctuates in relation to the ratios of the other statuses, controlled by city size; and this makes impossible any attempt to put it in a larger scale. For the smallest cities the MPO ratio for dropouts is in the "right" place if there was a scale. For the class of fairly small cities, however, the ratio falls between those of completion stage and execution stage. For the two classes of large cities, the dropout ratio falls between the execution and planning stages.

Because of this phenomenon, at this point, a procedural decision was made not to "separate out" parts of the data in order to have an ordinal scale for the dependent variable. This would have entailed a "sacrifice" of some data and would have blurred the reality of the urban renewal status of the cities. However, this decision meant that the writer could not follow Hawley's procedure, later in the study, concerning tau-c measurements of association between MPO ratios and urban renewal status.

The final thing to be noted about Table 3 concerns the other-type-projects cities. City size does make some difference in frequency. Progressively, the larger the size class of the city the more likely it will participate in one of these type projects. Concerning MPO ratios there is a range of 1.7 between the smallest and largest cities, the greatest range between these two size classes of all the different urban renewal statuses. The distribution of the ratios for this status, according to city size, indicates that larger cities enter these types of projects without having relatively low MPO ratios. If the statuses of urban renewal were a scale, the MPO ratios for other-type-projects status would fall

between completion stage and execution stage for the two classes of smaller cities, and would fall between execution and planning stage for the two classes of large cities. These other-types-of-urban-renewal-projects, then, seem to be more readily entered into by larger cities than by smaller ones, with larger cities being able to enter into such projects with higher than average MPO ratios. (The average MPO ratio for all cities is 9.4). Given the nature of these projects and the characteristics of the larger cities, the higher percentage of participation is to be expected. The relatively high MPO ratios might indicate that some large cities with high MPO ratios enter these type projects as an alternative to the older type programs.

Hawley's next table was a quintile distribution, according to MPO ratios, of 50,000 population and over cities, by his three urban renewal statuses. The identical procedure has been followed in this study; and the figures are given in Table 4, with Hawley's data shown in parentheses for the purpose of comparison. The distribution of my data is somewhat similar to Hawley's. The most striking difference over the time period between the two studies is the fewer number of cities in all quintiles that have dropped out. Whether or not this is peculiar to large cities, the writer does not know. Comparable data for small cities for the earlier period are not available. My total number of large cities in these statuses is smaller than Hawley's. The difference in the number of cities in the dropout status, plus the fact that large cities of all MPO quintiles have moved on to completion stage, explain this smaller number. Still, the overall pattern of the two sets of data are similar.

TABLE 4

QUINTILE DISTRIBUTION OF 50,000 POPULATION AND OVER CITIES (MPO RATIOS), BY THREE URBAN RENEWAL STATUSES (HAWLEY'S FIGURES IN PARENTHESES)

URBAN RENEWAL STATUS	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th
	Under 6.8 (Under 7.8)	6.8-8.2 (7.8-8.9)	8.3-9.8 (9.0-9.9)	9.9-11.7 (10.0-11.7)	11.8 & Over (11.8 & Over)
Execution Stage	28 (27)	21 (22)	27 (21)	13 (17)	7 (9)
Dropout	1 (3)	3 (9)	2 (8)	2 (8)	2 (7)
Never in Program	5 (9)	10 (9)	5 (8)	20 (13)	25 (22)

The chi square measure of Hawley's data in Table 4 was 23.516; the contingency coefficient was .330; the probability that the distribution was due to chance was less than .01. These measures could not be calculated on my data because of the numerous cells with less than five theoretical cases. In order to compensate for this and to have a comparable measure, the dropout and never-in-program categories of the dependent variable were collapsed into one category, called "outside the program." This was done both for Hawley's and my data. The results are shown in Table 5. The procedure met with limited success--Hawley's data lost some of its value with the reduction of categories. However, the table does reveal that over the period of time between the two studies, MPO ratio is even more associated with urban renewal status in the direction that Hawley predicted.

Concerning his data Hawley observed:

> That the concentration of power, as represented by the ratio of all MPO's to the employed labor force is significantly greater in cities that have reached the execution stage in urban renewal than in the other classes of cities is apparent. (1963:426).

The distributions of my data in Tables 4 and 5 go beyond his in supporting his observation.

Concerning the quintile distributions, it might be noted that Hawley's study and mine found different extreme scores and distributions. My range for large cities was from 3.6 to 22.2 (for small cities this range was from 2.5 to 35.5). Hawley's code sheets reveal that his lowest was 4.0 and the highest was 30.8. Hawley found a wider range of ratios in the first and fifth quintiles. In the second through the fourth quintiles I found a greater range.

TABLE 5

QUINTILE DISTRIBUTION OF 50,000 POPULATION AND OVER CITIES (MPO RATIOS), BY TWO URBAN RENEWAL STATUSES* (FIGURES FROM HAWLEY'S DATA IN PARENTHESES)

URBAN RENEWAL STATUS	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th
	Under 6.8 (Under 7.8)	6.8-8.2 (7.8-8.9)	8.3-9.8 (9.0-9.9)	9.9-11.7 (10.0-11.7)	11.8 & Over (11.8 & Over)
In the Program	28 (27)	21 (22)	27 (21)	13 (17)	7 (9)
Outside the Program	6 (12)	13 (18)	7 (16)	22 (21)	27 (29)

*X^2 = 39.67, C = .434, P < .001
(X^2 = 17.78), (C = .292), (P < .01)

In retrospect one might observe that in Table 1 (where larger cities were controlled, the three statuses of urban renewal were used, and the mean MPO ratios from both studies were presented), Hawley's mean MPO ratios stood a better chance than mine of being very high because of the nature of the MPO ratio distributions. This was the case in all cells of Table 1 except the "never-in-program" status, where my mean MPO ratio was slightly larger than his. This is additional evidence that MPO ratio (and what it measures) is determinative of the participation and non-participation of large cities.

Table 6 gives the quintile distribution of MPO ratios for all cities 15,000 population and over, by the six urban renewal statuses. Note that the relationship, with the newer data even in this expanded form, remains significant. The probability that the association shown there is due to chance is less than .001.

Still, as Hawley observed concerning his data given in Table 4, the quintile distribution of cities shown in Table 6 reveals a sizeable spread over the ratio range in each urban renewal status class. Hawley wrote, "That raises a question of how some cities manage to get to the execution stage without a concentration of power" (1963:426). He did not answer this question in his article. A preliminary answer, at this point in the present study, is that other variables in addition to MPO ratios significantly determine urban renewal success. Hawley also wrote:

> The complementary question of how other cities with marked concentrations of power escape urban renewal may be given a tentative a priori answer: that is, they are susceptible and may yet enter the program (1963:426).

TABLE 6

QUINTILE DISTRIBUTION OF ALL CITIES (MPO RATIOS)
BY THE SIX URBAN RENEWAL STATUSES*
(PERCENTS BY COLUMNS IN PARENTHESES)

URBAN RENEWAL STATUS	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th
	Under 6.7	6.7-8.2	8.3-9.6	9.7-11.6	11.7 and Over
Completion Stage	71 (31.1)	52 (22.0)	32 (14.9)	29 (13.4)	8 (3.5)
Execution Stage	63 (27.6)	59 (25.0)	55 (25.6)	44 (20.3)	26 (11.5)
Planning Stage	9 (3.9)	13 (5.5)	9 (4.2)	16 (7.4)	11 (4.9)
Dropout	10 (4.4)	13 (5.5)	9 (4.2)	9 (4.1)	8 (3.5)
Never in Program	65 (28.5)	87 (36.9)	94 (43.7)	107 (49.3)	167 (73.9)
Other Type Projects	10 (4.4)	12 (5.1)	16 (7.4)	12 (5.5)	6 (2.7)

* $X^2 = 141.011$, $C = .334$, $P < .001$.

His answer can be checked. The comparable data in Table 4 indicate that with the passage of time one finds a higher percentage of cities (50,000 population and over) with lowest MPO ratios in the execution stage. This supports Hawley's answer. However, there remain about 15 percent of the lowest MPO ratio cities (considering just these three statuses) that have never entered the program. There is still reason to believe, then, that there are things other than time that keep the lowest MPO ratio cities out of the program.

Before leaving Table 6, note several other things. First, it was said earlier that larger cities with lower MPO ratios tend more readily to enter the program and rapidly advance to completion. The part about lower MPO ratios is supported by these data. Note the difference in percentages in the first quintile (lowest MPO ratios) between the planning and execution stages. Note also the difference in percentage between even the first and second quintile at completion stage. The cities with the lowest MPO ratios are significantly the most successful. Second, earlier it was said that large cities tended more readily to enter the other-type-projects of the urban renewal program. Here, the data indicate that cities with medium size MPO ratios tend to enter the program in this way. There are but few cases, yet the evidence is that cities with the highest MPO ratios are least likely to enter into these other-type-projects. Possibly this low percentage is the result of the vast majority of such cities refusing to enter <u>any</u> type of urban renewal endeavor. The percentages by row, however, indicate that this is not the case completely. (The row percentages, in order of MPO quintile, are: 17.9, 21.4, 28.6, 21.4, 10.7.) Third, earlier it was said that it was the "fairly large" cities that tended more readily to drop out of the program.

The data here indicate that cities of the second quintile of MPO ratios also tend to do so. Fourth, note the great difference in percentages between the fourth and fifth quintiles of MPO ratio in the never-in-program status. (The row percentages are 20.6 for the fourth quintile and 32.1 for the fifth.)

Still, the newer data and the expanded form of my study support Hawley's findings that there is a significant association between MPO ratio and urban renewal status. And the distribution of the frequencies indicate that MPO ratio is a fairly good predictor of urban renewal status.

Hawley, at this point in his study, recognized that other variables are related to urban renewal status. He wrote:

> It is doubtlessly true that factors other than the distribution of power operate on urban renewal experience or the lack of it (1963:426).

He employed these "factors" as control variables. His data and mine are given in Table 7. It should be remembered that his figures are for 50,000 population and over cities, and mine are for all cities 15,000 population and over.

Hawley observed concerning his data that in no instance did the introduction of a control vitiate the association of lower MPO ratio with urban renewal success (as measured by arrival at execution stage). My data reveal two exceptions to his findings: the west south central and mountain regions do vitiate the association of lower MPO ratio with urban renewal success. However, these two exceptions are very possibly the result of the small number of cities in each instance.

Hawley further noted concerning his data that in a number of instances the dropout cities failed to hold an intermediate position

TABLE 7

MEAN MPO RATIOS IN CITIES[1] BY THE THREE URBAN RENEWAL STATUSES, WITH SELECTED VARIABLES CONTROLLED (HAWLEY'S FIGURES IN PARENTHESES)

CONTROL VARIABLE	URBAN RENEWAL STATUS					
	Execution Stage		Dropout		Never In Program	
Age of Housing:						
Young	9.6	(10.1)	8.9	(10.7)	11.2	(12.2)
Old	8.0	(8.2)	8.8	(9.5)	9.4	(9.5)
Extent of Dilapidation:						
Low	8.7	(9.1)	8.5	(9.2)	10.9	(11.0)
High	8.3	(9.1)	9.2	(10.9)	10.1	(10.2)
Planning Budget:						
Small	8.2	(8.8)	9.5	(9.3)	11.4	(11.0)
Large	9.1	(9.6)	8.5+	(11.3)	11.2	(11.6)
Metropolitan Status:						
Central City	8.3	(9.0)	10.0+	(10.8)	10.9	(10.1)
Independent City	9.2	(8.9)	9.4	(8.5)	10.0	(11.9)
Suburban City	8.1		8.0		10.9	
Government:						
Manager	9.2	(9.5)	9.2	(9.7)	11.4	(12.3)
Mayor-Council	7.9	(8.8)	8.5	(9.4)	9.6	(9.7)
Commission	8.1	(8.7)	11.0*	(12.1)	10.2	(10.2)+
Industry:						
Service	9.8	(10.0)	11.6+	(10.9)	12.3	(12.6)
Manufacturing	7.3	(8.1)	8.3	(9.2)	8.6	(9.7)
Size of Mfg. Plant:						
Small	9.8	(9.5)	11.6+	(11.0)	12.0	(12.0)
Large	7.4	(8.1)	8.4	(8.8)	8.8	(9.5)
Median Income:						
Low	8.3	(8.8)	9.7	(10.7)	10.0	(9.6)
High	8.7	(9.2)	8.2	(9.7)	11.0	(11.4)
Education:						
Low	7.4	(8.2)	7.6	(9.8)	8.2	(8.6)
High	10.0	(9.8)	10.4	(10.5)	12.3	(12.4)

TABLE 7--Continued

CONTROL VARIABLE	URBAN RENEWAL STATUS		
	Execution Stage	Dropout	Never In Program
Region:			
New England	7.0	7.7+	7.5
Middle Atlantic	7.9 (8.5)	9.7* (8.1)	10.8 (9.8)
South Atlantic	9.0	9.8*	10.8
East South Central	8.0 (8.5)	10.2* (10.6)	10.5 (10.4)
West South Central	11.1	14.4*	10.8
East North Central	7.4 (9.4)	7.6 (11.0)	10.5 (12.2+)
West North Central	10.2	10.3*	11.1
Mountain	11.7+ (11.9+)	11.8* (12.8*)	10.8 (12.6)
Pacific	9.8	7.9*	10.7

* N is 5 or less.
\+ N is less than 10.

[1]MPO ratios for the current study are based on cities 15,000 and over population; Hawley's are based on cities 50,000 and over.

between the polar statuses. The same number of instances of this phenomenon are found in my data even though the number of categories have been increased. Thus, my newer data, which includes more and smaller cities, support Hawley's findings concerning the association when controls are employed.

A further test of the association is to be found in Table 8 where the six urban renewal statuses are presented and three additional controls are employed. There are seven exceptions to the expected association of lower MPO ratios with urban renewal success (here measured by arrival at completion stage). However, all but two of these exceptions very well may be due to the small number of cities in each case. The remaining two exceptions--south Atlantic region and smallest quintile of size--are very slight, both involving only a .1 ratio difference from the "expected" ratio value.

It is interesting to note that <u>if</u> one were to construct a scale of completion stage, execution stage, planning stage, and never-in-program status, the series of ratios along such a scale consistently becomes progressively larger, except where there is either a small number of cities in each case or where the difference is slight as mentioned above or where there are the controls of low education and medium size quintile. These exceptions may seem rather numerous, but the conditions are much more strenuous--requiring a sequence of four "proper" ratio scores.

In any event, the association between lower MPO ratios and the more stringent urban renewal success criterion of completion stage has been shown to hold, even with the employment of additional control variables, except for the slight exceptions noted above.

TABLE 8

MEAN MPO RATIOS IN CITIES BY THE SIX URBAN RENEWAL STATUSES, WITH SELECTED VARIABLES CONTROLLED

CONTROL VARIABLE	URBAN RENEWAL STATUS					
	Completion Stage	Execution Stage	Planning Stage	Dropout	Never In Program	Other Type Projects
Age of Housing:						
Young	8.9	9.6	10.2	8.9	11.2	9.5
Old	7.2	8.0	8.8	8.8	9.4	8.0
Extent Dilapidation:						
Low	7.2	8.7	8.9	8.5	10.9	8.7
High	7.8	8.3	9.6	9.2	10.1	8.8
Planning Budget:						
Small	7.3	8.2	9.7	9.5	11.4	8.6
Large	8.6	9.1	9.4+	8.5+	11.2	9.6
Metropolitan Status:						
Central City	7.7	8.3	9.8	10.0+	10.9	9.4
Suburban City	6.3	8.1	8.5	8.0	10.9	7.5
Independent City	8.7	9.2	9.6	9.4	10.0	9.3
Government:						
Commission	7.4	8.1	10.5+	11.0*	10.2	9.3*
Manager	8.4	9.2	9.6	9.2	11.4	9.5
Mayor-Council	7.0	7.9	8.9	8.5	9.6	7.6
Industry:						
Service	8.7	9.8	10.6	11.6+	12.3	10.1
Manufacturing	6.5	7.3	8.5	8.3	8.6	7.7
Size Mfg. Plant:						
Small	8.4	9.8	10.1	11.6+	12.0	9.6
Large	7.2	7.4	8.8	8.4	8.8	7.9
Median Income:						
Low	7.7	8.3	9.2	9.7	10.0	9.2
High	7.6	8.7	9.5	8.2	11.0	8.2

TABLE 8--Continued

CONTROL VARIABLE	URBAN RENEWAL STATUS					
	Completion Stage	Execution Stage	Planning Stage	Dropout	Never In Program	Other Type Projects
Education:						
Low	6.7	7.4	8.5	7.6	8.2	7.5
High	9.2	10.0	10.3	10.4	12.3	10.0
Regions:						
New England	6.4	7.0	8.4+	7.7+	7.5	7.0+
Middle Atlantic	6.7	7.9	8.4+	9.7*	10.8	7.6+
South Atlantic	9.1	9.0	9.7+	9.8*	10.8	9.9
East South Central	8.7	8.0+	10.3+	10.2*	10.5	8.3*
West South Central	9.3+	11.1	10.8*	14.4*	10.8	10.1+
East North Central	6.8	7.4	8.0+	7.6	10.5	6.9+
West North Central	8.9	10.2	9.6+	10.3*	11.1	8.4*
Mountain	No Cases	11.7+	12.5*	11.8*	10.8	10.4*
Pacific	8.8	9.8	6.6*	7.9*	10.7	9.5*
Economic Function:						
Manufacturing	6.4	7.1	7.5	7.4	8.4	6.7
Industrial	8.8*	8.7+	8.2*	8.7*	8.0	8.2*
Diversified Mfg.	8.5	8.6	10.7+	9.7+	9.9	9.4+
Diversified Retailing	9.2	9.6	10.1	9.5+	11.1	9.9
Retailing	8.8	11.6	11.4+	11.0*	12.9	11.2+
Dormitory Function:						
Yes	5.9	9.5	9.5*	9.2+	11.7	8.2*
No	7.8	8.4	9.3	8.8	10.2	8.8
Size Quintile:						
First (Smallest)	8.1	8.0	9.0	8.5+	10.4	8.1*
Second	7.8	8.7	9.1	8.1	10.4	9.0+
Third	7.5	9.7	8.8	10.4+	11.1	8.3
Fourth	7.7	8.2	9.8+	8.7	11.0	7.9
Fifth (Largest)	7.5	8.1	11.4*	9.3*	9.9	9.8

* N is 5 or less.
\+ N is 10 or less.

However, before leaving Tables 7 and 8, note two very important things. First, in Table 7 observe that my more extensive categorization of the variables of metropolitan status and region reveal differences in mean MPO ratios that Hawley missed. The independent and suburban cities have very different MPO ratios relative to the three urban renewal statuses. Also the further divisions of the regions reveal striking differences; and this holds whether or not a small number of cities are involved. Second, and most importantly, observe that the control variables, in a number of instances, make a sizeable difference in MPO ratios. Especially note the variance between the categories of each of the following: type of government, economic function, industry, size of manufacturing plant, education, and region. These differences are present whether or not there are a small number of cities involved. Examples are the 4.5 difference in execution stage controlled by economic function, and the 4.1 difference in never-in-program status controlled by education. These are greater ranges of ratios than found between completion stage and never-in-program status for most categories.

Let us look briefly at the association of at least a few of these control variables with urban renewal status and MPO ratio using "the controls" now as independent variables. See Table 9.[3] Subtable A

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[3]In Tables 9 and 10, for the sake of brevity, some of the categories of the variables have been collapsed. The six urban renewal categories were collapsed into three--leaving completion stage separate, including the execution and planning stages in the "in progress" category, and the dropout, never-in-program, and other-type-project statuses in the "not in program" category. This new categorization of the other-type-project status is open to question; yet the figures are presented in Table 9 (and Table 10) only for illustrative purposes. The figures are to be found in full in Part II of the paper. MPO ratios are trichotomized by using the first quintile separately, the second and third quintile as "medium", the fourth and fifth quintile as "high" MPO ratio. City size,

TABLE 9

SELECTED VARIABLES, BY URBAN RENEWAL STATUS

A. MPO RATIOS

URBAN RENEWAL STATUS	Lowest	Medium	High
Completion	71	84	37
In Progress	72	136	97
Not In Program	85	231	309

B. CITY SIZE

URBAN RENEWAL STATUS	Largest	Medium	Small
Completion	95	66	31
In Progress	75	131	97
Not In Program	58	253	318

C. AGE OF HOUSING

URBAN RENEWAL STATUS	Oldest	Medium	Young
Completion	78	71	42
In Progress	88	140	67
Not In Program	61	226	338

D. METROPOLITAN STATUS

URBAN RENEWAL STATUS	Central City	Independent City	Suburban City
Completion	101	46	44
In Progress	97	110	98
Not In Program	76	211	336

E. EXTENT OF DILAPIDATION

URBAN RENEWAL STATUS	Highest	Medium	Low
Completion	49	97	45
In Progress	73	151	81
Not In Program	105	191	329

F. MEDIAN INCOME

URBAN RENEWAL STATUS	Lowest	Medium	High
Completion	47	106	39
In Progress	61	148	96
Not In Program	115	194	316

is presented for comparative purposes. Note the similarity of the pattern of frequencies in the six tables. Further, observe that the first cell of completion status for city size, age of housing, and metropolitan status have higher frequencies than is the case for MPO ratio. All of the subtables have higher frequencies in the third cell of the not-in-program status than does MPO ratio.

These variables that Hawley used as control factors vary in a rather consistent way with urban renewal status. There are indications that their degree of association is relatively high. The extreme categories of these variables would seem to be excellent-to-fair predictors of the completion and not-in-program statuses.

MPO ratio has been found to be consistently and significantly associated with urban renewal status. It appears that at least some of these other variables are similarly associated. What is the relationship of these variables to MPO ratio? Tables 7 and 8 revealed that MPO ratio varies as these variables are used as controls. Table 10 gives a concise and conservative presentation of the association. Note the over-all similarity of the pattern. Observe also that each subtable reveals something of a unique relationship between the particular variable and MPO ratio.

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age of housing, extent of dilapidation, median income, and education quintiles are similarly trichotomized. Economic functional classification was trichotomized by treating manufacturing separately, and including the industrial and diversified manufacturing in the second category, and diversified retailing and retailing in the third category. This method of collapsing the categories of urban renewal status and the quintiles is biased against the first column in each table, especially the top cell of the first column. The writer considers this a conservative presentation of the data.

TABLE 10

SELECTED VARIABLES, BY MPO RATIOS

A. EDUCATIONAL LEVEL

MPO RATIO	Lowest	Medium	High
Lowest	138	72	18
Medium	73	229	149
High	12	149	292

B. ECONOMIC FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION

MPO RATIO	Manufacturing	Diversified Industrial	Retailing
Lowest	154	28	34
Medium	182	122	114
High	55	76	277

C. AGE OF HOUSING

MPO RATIO	Oldest	Medium	Young
Lowest	94	74	59
Medium	109	201	141
High	24	172	247

D. MEDIAN INCOME

MPO RATIO	Lowest	Medium	High
Lowest	21	117	90
Medium	81	203	167
High	121	128	194

E. TYPE OF GOVERNMENT

MPO RATIO	Mayor	Commission	Manager
Lowest	133	26	66
Medium	192	46	213
High	130	45	267

F. SELECTED REGIONS

MPO RATIO	Northeast	North Central	West
Lowest	110	80	18
Medium	111	167	67
High	51	114	116

Summary

The newer and expanded data consistently support Hawley's operational hypothesis and earlier findings with only a very few minor exceptions. However, Hawley neglected to pursue some of the implications of his own data. In his single-minded attention on the association of MPO ratio and urban renewal status, he failed to note and explore the association of his control variables with both MPO ratios and urban renewal status.

These associations have been explored in the present study, though the exploration is limited by the variables that are available. The findings of this further work are to be found in Part II, Chapters 3 and 4.

PART II

HAWLEY EXTENDED

CHAPTER III

THE MPO RATIO AND COMMUNITY POWER

It is not possible within the scope of this study to give a definitive answer to the broad question of the meaning of MPO ratio, with special emphasis on whether or not it is a measure of community power.

The variables on which the writer has data are not sufficient for such a task. Data would be needed on each, or at least some, of the other categories of the labor force besides the category of managers, proprietors, and officials. My data are on a city basis. One would not be justified in assuming that these other groups (for example, professionals) vary from city to city in a constant way as MPO ratios vary. One should at least control for these other groups if he wished to pursue causal relationships between MPO ratio and certain other variables.

A breakdown of the different industry groups (manufacturing, retailing and wholesaling trade, banking and finance, and public administration) would be necessary. Hawley, in a letter to the writer, described the category as "crude" and in need of refinement. He demonstrated in his study that public administration MPOs, in just the opposite fashion from the other industry groups were in greater numbers where there was urban renewal success. He concluded his article with a call for further study of the internal diversity of the category. Unfortunately the 1960

Census does not give the necessary data. The 1950 Census of Population, which Hawley used, gave the total employed labor force for each of the industry groups for all the cities and the number of MPOs in each of the industry groups for cities of 50,000 population and over. The 1960 Census of Population, on the other hand, gives the total employed labor force for each of the industry groups for all the cities, but gives the number of MPOs in each of the various industry groups only for SMSA's of 100,000 population and over.[1]

Then there are other variables that would be necessary or helpful in determining the broad meaning of MPO ratio: data on other issue areas, data on voting, data found relevant in other studies, etc.

Three things are possible within the scope of the present study. First, one can demonstrate that cities tend to have certain characteristics when they have low MPO ratios and other characteristics when they have high MPO ratios. (This is merely a demonstration of correlations, not an argument for causal relationships.) Second, one can cite the data and interpretations of other studies about power structures and community characteristics. Third, one can assume that MPO ratio is a measure of community power structure, and seek to determine whether or not low MPO ratio is a measure of greater power concentration, as Hawley argued it was. One can test Hawley's answer by using the found characteristics of the cities in conjunction with the results of other studies.

We turn now to these pursuits. First, what characteristics of cities are associated with what size MPO ratios?

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[1] A letter received from the Census Bureau indicates that the data are not in published form, and that the Bureau would not be interested in providing the data even at payment of cost for preparation.

Findings

Table 11 presents measures of the association of cities with selected variables and MPO ratios.[2] Educational level and the functional classifications are strongly correlated with the ratio. Age of housing and region are moderately associated with it. Type of government and planning budget are associated with it enough to be noteworthy.

In addition, some of the categories of the lower ranked variables are highly correlated with some of the categories of MPO ratio in cities; for example: 65.2 percent of the cities with the highest median income have high MPO ratios, and 56.9 percent of the cities with the least dilapidated housing also have high ratios.

Particular Variables and MPO Ratios

Tables 12 through 22 present the column percentages and frequencies of cities according to the eleven variables and MPO ratios. Table 12 reveals, as one might have supposed, that educational level is positively associated with MPO ratios. What might be surprising is the degree of the association. Note the extreme "scores" in the lowest and highest educational levels. Observe the "skip" from 24.2 percent to 61.9 percent in the lowest educational level and the "skip" from 18.3 percent to 52.4 percent in the highest educational level, which contribute to the extreme scores.

Table 13 presents a very similar overall pattern, though the percentages are not quite as extreme in most cases of functional classifications and MPO ratio. Again, note the "skip" between the high and

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[2]Chi square, contingency coefficient, and tau-c are presented as they were in Hawley's study. Gamma and theta measures, where appropriate, are presented here, though they are not calculated for all relationships used in this chapter.

TABLE 11

MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION OF SELECTED VARIABLES AND MPO RATIO (RANKED ACCORDING TO THE STRENGTH OF GAMMA AND THETA MEASURES)

VARIABLES ASSOCIATED WITH MPO RATIO QUINTILE	X^2	Adjusted Contingency Coefficient	Tau-c	Gamma	Theta
Education Quintile	552.854	.643	.498	.604	
Functional Classification	421.988	.601	.458	.575	
Age Housing Quintile	221.048	.454	-.296	-.365	
Region	280.105	.474			.291
Type Government	79.332	.287			.261
Planning Budget	25.904	.258	.197	.243	
Dormitory Function	25.329	.167	.073	.165	
Metropolitan Status	101.403	.322			.120
City Size Quintile	40.230	.208	-.081	-.101	
Median Income Quintile	248.419	.477	.048	.059	
Dilapidation Quintile	148.732	.383	-.033	-.041	

TABLE 12

COLUMN PERCENTAGES OF EDUCATION BY MPO RATIO
(NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

MPO RATIO QUINTILE	EDUCATIONAL LEVELS				
	Lowest	Low	Medium	High	Highest
Lowest	61.9 (138)	21.7 (50)	10.0 (22)	2.3 (5)	5.7 (13)
Low	24.2 (54)	31.3 (72)	25.9 (57)	14.5 (32)	9.2 (21)
Medium	8.5 (19)	21.3 (49)	23.2 (51)	28.6 (63)	14.4 (33)
High	4.9 (11)	18.7 (43)	26.8 (59)	28.2 (62)	18.3 (42)
Highest	0.4 (1)	7.0 (16)	14.1 (31)	26.4 (58)	52.4 (120)

X^2 = 552.854, C = .575, tau-c = .498, gamma = .604.

TABLE 13

COLUMN PERCENTAGES OF FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION BY MPO RATIO (NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

MPO RATIO QUINTILE	FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION				
	Manufacturing	Industrial	Diversified Manufacturing	Diversified Retailing	Retailing
Lowest	39.4 (154)	11.8 (4)	12.5 (24)	8.0 (18)	8.0 (16)
Low	31.2 (122)	52.9 (18)	17.7 (34)	13.7 (31)	7.5 (15)
Medium	15.3 (60)	17.9 (6)	33.3 (64)	20.8 (47)	10.6 (21)
High	8.4 (33)	11.8 (4)	28.1 (54)	31.9 (72)	20.6 (41)
Highest	5.6 (22)	5.9 (2)	8.3 (16)	25.7 (58)	53.3 (106)

X^2 = 421.988, C = .537, tau-c = .458, gamma = .575.

highest MPO ratios for retailing cities, and between the medium and low for manufacturing cities. Not surprisingly manufacturing cities are strongly associated with low and lowest MPO ratios, whereas retail cities are highly correlated with high and highest MPO ratios.

The consistency of this pattern is striking when one realizes that MPO ratio is computed on the basis of place of residence and functional classification on the basis of place of work. A very similar pattern was found when using Hawley's categories of manufacturing and service industry in association with MPO ratio. (Both manufacturing-and-service industry and MPO ratio are computed on a place of residence basis.)

A comparison of Tables 12 and 13 reveals that lowest level of education of residents is a better indicator than manufacturing classification of work force that a city will be in the lowest quintile of MPO ratio. On the other hand, knowing that a city is classified as retailing will give one a slight advantage over knowing that a city has the highest educational level in "predicting" whether or not it will be in the highest MPO ratio quintile.

In Table 14 one sees that age of housing presents a somewhat less consistent pattern in relationship with MPO ratio. The "youngest" housing cities have an erratic association with the quintile of MPO ratio. Note that as many as 17.9 percent of the cities with youngest housing are in the lowest quintile of MPO ratios. However, the young to oldest housing cities are related to MPO ratio in the pattern that one might expect. Cities with the oldest housing are strongly associated with low and lowest MPO ratios.

Table 15 reveals that the nine regions differ from each other in their association with MPO ratio. Each is unique, though the Middle

TABLE 14

COLUMN PERCENTAGES OF AGE OF HOUSING BY MPO RATIO
(NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

MPO RATIO QUINTILE	AGE OF HOUSING QUINTILE				
	Youngest	Young	Medium	Old	Oldest
Lowest	17.9 (40)	8.5 (19)	14.7 (33)	18.4 (41)	41.4 (94)
Low	12.9 (29)	13.5 (30)	18.3 (41)	29.6 (66)	30.8 (70)
Medium	18.3 (41)	18.4 (41)	18.3 (41)	23.8 (53)	17.2 (39)
High	15.6 (35)	30.0 (67)	28.1 (63)	16.1 (36)	7.0 (16)
Highest	35.3 (79)	29.6 (66)	20.5 (46)	12.1 (27)	3.5 (8)

X^2 = 221.048, C = .406, tau-c = -.296, gamma = -.365.

TABLE 15

COLUMN PERCENTAGES OF REGIONS BY MPO RATIO
(NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

MPO RATIO QUINTILE	REGIONS								
	New England	Middle Atlantic	South Atlantic	East South Central	West South Central	East North Central	West North Central	Mountain	Pacific
Lowest	49.4 (41)	38.5 (69)	7.8 (10)	15.0 (9)	0.9 (1)	26.5 (70)	10.3 (10)	2.0 (1)	11.3 (17)
Low	27.7 (23)	24.6 (44)	20.9 (27)	16.7 (10)	11.9 (13)	29.2 (77)	15.5 (15)	8.0 (14)	15.2 (23)
Medium	12.0 (10)	13.4 (24)	25.6 (33)	20.0 (12)	19.3 (21)	19.3 (51)	24.7 (24)	14.0 (7)	21.9 (33)
High	7.2 (6)	8.4 (15)	27.1 (35)	41.7 (25)	37.6 (41)	9.5 (25)	22.7 (22)	36.0 (18)	19.9 (30)
Highest	3.6 (3)	15.1 (27)	18.6 (24)	6.7 (4)	30.3 (33)	15.5 (41)	26.8 (26)	40.0 (20)	31.8 (48)

X^2 = 280.105, C = .447, theta = .291.

Atlantic and east north central are somewhat similar, as are the west north central and the Pacific. New England and the mountain region present opposite patterns. The tendency of cities in the west south and west north central regions to have higher MPO ratios than in the east south and east north central regions is interesting. The lower MPO ratios are found in New England especially, and in the East in general. The higher MPO ratios are in the mountain states especially, and in the West and South in general, with the Pacific region somewhat tending toward higher MPO ratios.

There is indication in Table 16 that by using commission type of government as the middle category one would have a scale of types of government in relation to MPO ratio. The commission form of city government is evenly balanced between higher and lower MPO ratios. The city manager form tends toward higher MPO ratios, and mayor-council government towards lower. This is noteworthy because Hawley used these categories with the thought that commission form of government represented the most decentralized power structure, city manager form of government represented the most centralized, with mayor-council form holding an intermediary position.

Table 17 shows that low planning budget cities tend to be lower MPO ratio cities and high planning budget is associated with higher MPO ratios. The distribution is such, however, that at the highest MPO ratio quintile the two types of cities are very similar.

Does a city being classifiable as a dormitory city reveal a difference from other cities relative to MPO ratios? It makes some difference, but not much. Since only 186 cities are classified as dormitory, the all-other cities tend to arrange themselves in a normal distribution

TABLE 16

COLUMN PERCENTAGES OF TYPE GOVERNMENT BY MPO RATIO (NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

MPO RATIO QUINTILE	TYPE OF GOVERNMENT		
	Commission	City Manager	Mayor-Council
Lowest	22.2 (26)	12.1 (66)	29.2 (133)
Low	17.9 (21)	19.0 (104)	24.4 (111)
Medium	21.4 (25)	20.0 (109)	17.8 (81)
High	26.5 (31)	21.2 (116)	15.4 (70)
Highest	12.0 (14)	27.7 (151)	13.2 (60)

X^2 = 79.332, C = .257, theta = .261.

TABLE 17

COLUMN PERCENTAGES OF PLANNING BUDGET BY MPO RATIO (NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

MPO RATIO QUINTILE	PLANNING BUDGET	
	Low	High
Lowest	26.1 (61)	10.2 (23)
Low	22.2 (52)	21.2 (48)
Medium	19.2 (45)	22.1 (50)
High	12.8 (30)	25.2 (57)
Highest	19.7 (46)	21.2 (48)

X^2 = 25.904, C = .231, tau-c = -.145, gamma = .243.

for MPO ratio quintile. Dormitory cities do tend toward the "highest" MPO ratio; however, note that nearly the "normal" percent (that is, 20 percent) are in the lowest MPO quintile.

This variable of dormitory function is important and should be a better measure of the "flight to the suburbs" by managers, proprietors, and officials than the measure Hawley used. Hawley employed the central city/all other cities dichotomy. As will be seen shortly this dichotomy is misleading. Still, some measure is needed. Since MPO ratio is computed on the basis of place of residence, one might argue that central cities and manufacturing cities, etc., tend to have lower MPO because the managers, proprietors, and officials, who work there, reside (and therefore are counted) elsewhere. The cities classified as fulfilling the dormitory function support this argument somewhat, but not as strongly as might be expected. Also, as noted above, the functional classification of cities, which is computed on a place of work basis, is strongly associated with MPO ratio. And the industry group variable, which is computed on the place of residence basis, is highly correlated with functional classification. Together, the association of these variables of dormitory function, economic functional classification, industry, and MPO ratio indicate that the relative size of the MPO ratios is dependent on much more than the fact that it is computed on the basis of place of residence. (See Table 18.)

Table 19 gives the relationship of central, independent, and suburban cities to the MPO ratio quintile. Like the regions, each metropolitan status displays a unique relationship with MPO ratio. Central cities tend somewhat to have lower MPO ratios. Independent cities tend to have more medium-size MPO ratios. Suburban cities show

TABLE 18

COLUMN PERCENTAGES OF DORMITORY FUNCTION BY MPO RATIO (NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

MPO RATIO QUINTILE	DORMITORY FUNCTION	
	No	Yes
Lowest	20.5 (192)	19.4 (36)
Low	21.8 (204)	17.2 (32)
Medium	20.0 (187)	15.1 (28)
High	20.2 (189)	15.1 (28)
Highest	17.4 (163)	33.3 (62)

X^2 = 25.329, C = .149, tau-c = .073, gamma = .165.

TABLE 19

COLUMN PERCENTAGES OF METROPOLITAN STATUS BY MPO RATIO (NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

MPO RATIO QUINTILE	METROPOLITAN STATUS		
	Central City	Independent City	Suburban City
Lowest	22.3 (61)	8.7 (32)	28.2 (135)
Low	24.8 (68)	20.2 (74)	19.7 (94)
Medium	17.9 (49)	25.1 (92)	15.5 (74)
High	23.0 (63)	27.5 (101)	10.9 (52)
Highest	12.0 (33)	18.5 (68)	25.7 (123)

X^2 = 101.403, C = .288, theta = .120.

a striking U distribution. The variance among suburban cities and the strength of the two extremes of lowest and highest MPO ratios is surprising.

Observe that suburban and independent cities have opposite distributions. When Hawley combined these in his "non-central city" category he canceled out these unique distributions. His results showed that "non-central cities" had similar MPO ratios as central cities. The data show, however, that the different kinds of non-central cities differ from one another and from central cities in their association with MPO ratio.

Though Chapter 2 indicated that city size, like MPO ratio, is strongly associated with urban renewal success, city size is only weakly correlated with MPO ratio. See Table 20, where the approximate population size of the quintile are: first quintile, 15,000 to 18,000; second quintile, 18,000 to 25,000; third quintile, 25,000 to 35,000; fourth quintile, 35,000 to 70,000; fifth quintile, 70,000 to 7,000,000 population. The small cities (first three quintiles) have a slight tendency toward higher MPO ratios. The medium size cities (fourth quintile) have a slight tendency toward lower MPO ratios. The large cities (fifth quintile) have a little more tendency toward lower ratios and a definite shift away from "highest" MPO ratios. (An examination of 100,000 population and over cities shows a similar shift, with only 6.2 percent of these larger cities in the "highest" MPO ratio category.)

Income and educational level often are similarly associated with other variables. This is not the case in their relationship with MPO ratio. Whereas educational level in cities is highly correlated with MPO ratio, median income in the cities presents a very mixed pattern. Table 21 reveals that the lowest quintile of income, in an opposite

TABLE 20

COLUMN PERCENTAGES OF CITY SIZE QUINTILE BY MPO RATIO
(NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

MPO RATIO QUINTILE	CITY SIZE QUINTILE				
	1st (Smallest)	2nd	3rd	4th	5th (Largest)
Lowest	19.5 (43)	17.3 (39)	17.8 (40)	21.8 (49)	25.1 (57)
Low	19.1 (42)	17.8 (40)	18.7 (42)	25.8 (58)	23.8 (54)
Medium	23.2 (51)	18.2 (41)	18.7 (42)	14.7 (33)	21.1 (48)
High	16.4 (36)	23.1 (52)	20.4 (46)	15.1 (34)	21.6 (49)
Highest	21.8 (48)	23.6 (53)	24.4 (55)	22.7 (51)	8.4 (19)

X^2 = 40.230, C = .186, tau-c = -.081, gamma = -.101

TABLE 21

COLUMN PERCENTAGES OF MEDIAN INCOME BY MPO RATIO
(NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

MPO RATIO QUINTILE	MEDIAN INCOME QUINTILE				
	Lowest	Low	Medium	High	Highest
Lowest	9.4 (21)	24.6 (55)	27.7 (62)	31.7 (71)	8.4 (19)
Low	17.5 (39)	21.0 (47)	29.5 (66)	25.4 (57)	11.9 (27)
Medium	18.8 (79)	23.2 (52)	17.0 (38)	22.3 (50)	14.5 (33)
High	35.4 (79)	20.1 (45)	16.5 (37)	8.9 (20)	15.9 (36)
Highest	18.8 (42)	11.2 (25)	9.4 (21)	11.6 (26)	49.3 (112)

X^2 = 248.419, C = .426, tau-c = .048, gamma = .059

fashion from "lowest" education, tends toward higher MPO ratio. The highest quintile of income does have a strong tendency toward the highest MPO ratio, as did the highest quintile of education. However, note that the fourth quintile ("high") income is inversely related with higher MPO ratio. There is a reverse pattern between cities in these last two quintiles of income. The percentages by row reveal that cities with the highest income quintile (49.6 percent as against 18.6 percent in the lowest income quintile). Cities with the lowest MPO ratios are in the second, third, and fourth (especially the fourth) quintiles of income.

Table 22 presents the weak and negative association of extent of dilapidation and MPO ratio. Though one might have anticipated otherwise, it is very different from the distribution of age of housing and MPO ratio.

TABLE 22

COLUMN PERCENTAGES OF EXTENT OF DILAPIDATION BY MPO RATIO
(NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

MPO RATIO QUINTILE	EXTENT OF DILAPIDATED HOUSING				
	Lowest	Low	Medium	High	Highest
Lowest	15.7 (36)	30.2 (68)	25.4 (57)	17.7 (38)	12.3 (28)
Low	12.6 (29)	22.2 (50)	23.7 (53)	27.9 (60)	19.4 (44)
Medium	14.8 (34)	21.8 (49)	18.8 (42)	20.5 (44)	20.3 (46)
High	14.3 (33)	10.7 (24)	17.0 (38)	22.3 (48)	32.6 (74)
Highest	42.6 (98)	15.1 (34)	15.2 (34)	11.6 (25)	15.4 (35)

$X^2 = 148.732$, C = .342, tau-c = -.033, gamma = -.041

Cities with the lowest extent of dilapidated housing do tend to be the cities with the highest quintile of MPO ratio. Note the percentage "skip" from high to highest MPO ratio for lowest extent of dilapidation. However, only 31.7 percent of the cities with the highest extents of dilapidation are in the two lower quintiles of MPO ratio. The percentages by row reveal that cities with the lowest MPO ratios tend to be in the second and third quintiles (low and medium) extent of dilapidated housing. Seemingly, MPO ratio (and what it measures) is not merely a simple response to "need" as represented by dilapidated housing.

Thus Tables 12 through 22 reveal that low MPO ratio cities tend also to be cities that have low educational levels, are classifiable as manufacturing, have old housing, are in the New England region especially and the eastern part of the country in general, have mayor-council form of government, have low planning budgets, are not dormitory cities, are central cities and one kind of suburban cities, are larger cities, with middle range income, and middle range extent of dilapidated housing. High MPO ratio cities, on the other hand, tend to be cities with high educational levels, are classifiable as retailing cities, with young housing, in the mountain region especially and the southern and western parts of the country in general, have city-manager form of government, have high planning budgets, serve a dormitory function, are independent and suburban cities, are smaller, with "highest" and "lowest" income, and "lowest" and "highest" extent of dilapidated housing.

The Association With Controls

Do these associations vary, and if so, in what way, when controls are employed? Tables 23 through 30 present the column percentages and frequencies of cities according to the first four variables, by MPO ratio,

first, for all cities and then with selected variables controlled. Many interesting relationships are to be seen in these tables, but comment will be made on only a few.[3]

Table 23 presents the effects of other variables on the relationship of cities with various educational levels and low MPO ratio. The series of percentages of cities according to educational levels (from highest percentages in the lowest educational level to the lowest in the highest educational level) remains remarkably similar with virtually all of the employed controls. The exceptions are either where there are a small number of cases or in cities of the first quintile of size where the exception is only a slight difference in percentage points. Educational levels, then, have a very consistent relationship with low MPO ratio in cities, even when the controls are employed.

However, it is evident from the data that each and all of the categories of the control variables have unique and modifying effects on the relationship of cities concerning educational level and low MPO ratio. The percentage of all lowest educational cities which have low MPO ratios is 86.1. When cities, in addition to having lowest educational levels, are in the following categories, their percentages are increased as shown:[4]

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[3]Tables 23 through 30 are given in Appendix B. These tables present the column percentages and frequencies of cities according to the educational level, functional classification, age of housing, and region, by MPO ratio and controlled by selected variables. The MPO ratio quintile is presented by using the lower two quintiles as "low" MPO ratio and the upper two quintiles as "high" MPO ratio. The third quintile ("medium") is not presented. The "all cities" classification is the percentages and frequencies of the association when no controls are employed, and is given for comparative purposes.

[4]Only increases in percentages are shown in the text. Also reference is made only to those instances that have ten or more cases. The writer realizes that this omits reference to some strong influences. The reader is referred to the tables in Appendix B.

Lowest education and highest income =
100.0 with low MPO ratio (13 cases)

Lowest education and New England region =
96.9 with low MPO ratio (32 cases)

Lowest education and high income =
95.6 with low MPO ratio (44 cases)

Lowest education and Pacific region =
95.5 with low MPO ratio (21 cases)

Lowest education and fifth quintile size of city =
95.2 with low MPO ratio (39 cases)

Lowest education and fourth quintile size of city =
94.7 with low MPO ratio (54 cases)

Lowest education and medium income =
94.7 with low MPO ratio (53 cases)

Lowest education and manufacturing =
93.8 with low MPO ratio (121 cases)

Lowest education and Middle Atlantic region =
92.2 with low MPO ratio (59 cases)

Lowest education and suburban cities =
92.0 with low MPO ratio (116 cases)

Lowest education and central cities =
91.8 with low MPO ratio (45 cases)

Lowest education and third quintile size of city =
91.7 with low MPO ratio (33 cases)

Lowest education and low income =
91.5 with low MPO ratio (57 cases)

Thus, these categories (and some others) make significant, positive contributions toward a city having a low MPO ratio, in conjunction with, and perhaps in addition to, its lowest educational level.

Table 24 shows the effects of the variables on the relationship of cities with various educational levels and high MPO ratios. There are seven instances of vitiation of the series of percentages according to educational levels that cannot be explained-away by appeal to small number of cases. These occur at the categories of young and medium age housing,

west south central and mountain regions, independent cities, the smallest size cities, and medium income level cities. In these cases educational level in the cities does not have a consistent relationship with high MPO ratio.

All of the control variables, again, have unique and modifying effects on the relationship of cities concerning educational level and high MPO ratio. The percentage of all highest educational cities which have high MPO ratios is 70.7. When cities, in addition to having highest educational levels, are in the following categories, their percentages are increased as shown:

Highest education and retailing =
93.1 with high MPO ratio (68 cases)

Highest education and highest income =
89.0 with high MPO ratio (113 cases)

Highest education and Middle Atlantic region =
86.2 with high MPO ratio (25 cases)

Highest education and mountain region =
83.4 with high MPO ratio (20 cases)

Highest education and fourth quintile of city size =
81.4 with high MPO ratio (35 cases)

Highest education and suburban cities =
81.0 with high MPO ratio (115 cases)

Highest education and youngest age housing =
80.3 with high MPO ratio (61 cases)

It is evident that these categories (and some others) make positive contributions toward a community's having a high MPO ratio in conjunction with, or in addition to, its highest educational level.

Table 25 presents the effects of the variables on the relationship of cities with various functional classifications and <u>low</u> MPO ratios. There are three cases of vitiation of the series of percentages (from highest in

manufacturing to lowest in retailing) according to functional classification, that cannot be explained-away as due to the small number of cases. These occur at the categories of suburban cities, medium income cities, and high educational level cities. (For educational levels as controls see Table 23.) Otherwise, functional classification reveals a consistent relationship with low MPO ratio in the cities.

All of the categories of the controls reveal unique, modifying influence on the relationship. The percentage of all manufacturing cities which have low MPO ratios is 70.6. When cities, in addition to being manufacturing, are in the following categories, their percentages are increased as shown:

Manufacturing and lowest education =
93.8 with low MPO ratios (121 cases)

Manufacturing and oldest housing =
90.1 with low MPO ratios (109 cases)

Manufacturing and Middle Atlantic region =
85.7 with low MPO ratios (78 cases)

Manufacturing and central cities =
84.6 with low MPO ratios (88 cases)

Manufacturing and New England region =
84.2 with low MPO ratios (48 cases)

Manufacturing and medium income =
82.1 with low MPO ratios (85 cases)

Manufacturing and largest city size =
82.0 with low MPO ratios (73 cases)

Manufacturing and high income =
80.4 with low MPO ratios (78 cases)

Manufacturing and low dilapidation =
79.6 with low MPO ratios (78 cases)

Manufacturing and medium dilapidation =
79.3 with low MPO ratios (73 cases)

Thus these categories (and some others) make significant, positive contributions toward a city's having a low MPO ratio, in conjunction with, or additional to, its manufacturing status.

The relationship of cities with various functional classifications and high MPO ratios, with controls, is given in Table 26. In five instances the series of percentages according to functional classification are vitiated where sufficiently large numbers of cases are involved. Two of these five instances, however, involve only slight differences in percentage points. The remaining three instances occur at medium age housing, west south central region, and highest extent of dilapidated housing. Besides these, functional classification has a consistent relationship with high MPO ratio.

Again the categories of the control variables make a difference. The percentage of all retailing cities which have high MPO ratios is 73.9. When cities, in addition to being retailing, are in the following categories, their percentages are increased as shown:

Retailing and highest education =
93.1 with high MPO ratios (68 cases)

Retailing and high dilapidation =
88.9 with high MPO ratios (16 cases)

Retailing and South Atlantic region =
86.3 with high MPO ratios (19 cases)

Retailing and West North Central region =
85.7 with high MPO ratios (18 cases)

Retailing and medium age housing =
85.3 with high MPO ratios (29 cases)

Retailing and not dormitory function =
84.6 with high MPO ratios (93 cases)

Retailing and Mountain region =
83.3 with high MPO ratios (20 cases)

Retailing and largest size cities =
83.3 with high MPO ratios (15 cases)

Retailing and highest income =
81.8 with high MPO ratios (63 cases)

Retailing and medium dilapidation =
81.8 with high MPO ratios (27 cases)

Retailing and central cities =
81.0 with high MPO ratios (30 cases)

Retailing and Middle Atlantic region =
80.0 with high MPO ratios (16 cases)

These categories (and what they measure) make significant, positive contributions toward a city's having a high MPO ratio, in conjunction with and perhaps in addition to its retailing status.

The relationship of cities of various age housing and low MPO ratios, with controls, is shown in Table 27. In four instances the series of percentages according to age of housing are vitiated where sufficiently large numbers of cases are involved. One of these, however, involves only a slight difference in percentage points. The other instances are manufacturing cities, East North Central region, and suburban cities. Otherwise, age of housing reveals a consistent relationship with low MPO ratio.

The controls make a difference. One hundred and sixty-four, or 72.2 percent, of all oldest housing cities have low MPO ratios. When cities, in addition to being oldest housing cities, are in the following categories, their percentages are increased as shown:

Oldest housing and manufacturing =
90.1 with low MPO ratios (109 cases)

Oldest housing and lowest education =
88.0 with low MPO ratios (88 cases)

Oldest housing and central cities =
86.7 with low MPO ratios (63 cases)

Oldest housing and fourth quintile city size =
85.2 with low MPO ratio (46 cases)

Oldest housing and medium income =
84.8 with low MPO ratios (46 cases)

Oldest housing and fifth quintile city size =
84.2 with low MPO ratios (53 cases)

Oldest housing and New England region =
82.6 with low MPO ratios (38 cases)

Oldest housing and Middle Atlantic region =
81.7 with low MPO ratios (80 cases)

Oldest housing and high income =
80.0 with low MPO ratios (20 cases)

Thus these categories (and what they measure) make positive contributions toward a city's having a low MPO ratio, in conjunction with, and perhaps in addition to, the city's oldest housing status.

Table 28 presents among cities the relationship of age of housing and high MPO ratio with the other variables employed as controls. (For education and functional classification as controls see Tables 24 and 26.) In thirteen instances the series of percentages according to age of housing are vitiated where sufficiently large numbers of cases are involved. These instances are highest and high education cities, retailing and diversified retailing, South Atlantic, East South Central, and Pacific regions, cities of all three metropolitan statuses, first and second quintiles of city size, and lowest income. Only in other instances is age of housing in a consistent relationship with high MPO ratio in the cities.

Again, the controls make a difference. We cite only the increases in percentage of cities. The percentage of all young age housing cities which have high MPO ratios is 59.6. When cities, in addition to being young age housing cities, are in the following categories, their percentages are increased as shown:

Young housing and Mountain region =
83.3 with high MPO ratios (10 cases)

Young housing and retailing =
78.6 with high MPO ratios (44 cases)

Young housing and fourth quintile of city size =
78.1 with high MPO ratios (32 cases)

Young housing and diversified retailing =
74.3 with high MPO ratios (52 cases)

Young housing and West South Central region =
74.1 with high MPO ratios (40 cases)

Young housing and central cities =
71.7 with high MPO ratios (48 cases)

Young housing and highest education =
71.4 with high MPO ratios (45 cases)

Young housing and highest income =
71.4 with high MPO ratios (30 cases)

Young housing and medium education =
70.6 with high MPO ratios (24 cases)

Young housing and low income =
68.8 with high MPO ratios (22 cases)

Young housing and independent cities =
68.1 with high MPO ratios (47 cases)

Young housing and lowest income =
65.7 with high MPO ratios (48 cases)

Young housing and high education =
65.4 with high MPO ratios (46 cases)

These categories (and what they measure) make positive contributions toward a city's having a high MPO ratio in conjunction with, and perhaps in addition to, the city's young housing status.

The relationship among cities of various regions and various MPO ratios is given, with controls, in Table 29. In numerous instances it is difficult to determine whether or not the series of percentages in cities according to regions are consistent because of the few cases

involved. However, there are at least four instances where there are a sufficient number of cases and the pattern is disrupted. These points of disruption are central cities, largest size cities, and low and medium income cities.

Sixty-five, or 77.1 percent, of all New England cities have low MPO ratios. (Since this region has the highest percent of low ratios we will use it for demonstrative purposes, though each region "behaves" somewhat differently with the controls employed.) When cities, in addition to being located in New England, are in the following categories, their percentages are increased as shown:

New England and lowest education =
96.9 with low MPO ratios (32 cases)

New England and fourth quintile of city size =
95.2 with low MPO ratios (20 cases)

New England and medium income =
90.6 with low MPO ratios (29 cases)

New England and low education =
86.4 with low MPO ratios (19 cases)

New England and manufacturing =
84.2 with low MPO ratios (48 cases)

New England and central cities =
83.9 with low MPO ratios (26 cases)

New England and high income =
83.3 with low MPO ratios (15 cases)

New England and oldest housing =
82.6 with low MPO ratios (38 cases)

New England and suburban cities =
81.4 with low MPO ratios (22 cases)

These categories and other categories (and what they measure) make positive contributions toward a city's having a low MPO ratio.

Increases in percentages of cities in other regions, with the

employment of controls, that have ten or more cases and are worthy of special notice, are the following:

Central cities in the Middle Atlantic region
increase the percentage by 30.1 percent. (31 cases)

Lowest education cities in the Middle Atlantic region
increase the percentage by 29.1 percent. (59 cases)

Medium income cities in the Middle Atlantic region
increase the percentage by 28.3 percent. (32 cases)

Manufacturing cities in the Middle Atlantic region
increase the percentage by 22.6 percent. (78 cases)

Oldest housing cities in the Middle Atlantic region
increase the percentage by 18.6 percent. (80 cases)

Manufacturing cities in the South Atlantic region
increase the percentage by 33.9 percent. (20 cases)

Smallest size cities in the South Atlantic region
increase the percentage by 17.7 percent. (13 cases)

Lowest education cities in the East North Central region
increase the percentage by 34.9 percent. (60 cases)

Central cities in the East North Central region
increase the percentage by 27.3 (41 cases).

Largest cities in the East North Central region
increase the percentage by 23.5 (36 cases).

Manufacturing cities in the East North Central region
increase the percentage by 19.2 percent. (99 cases)

High income cities in the West North Central region
increase the percentage by 32.1 percent. (11 cases)

Lowest education cities in the Pacific region
increase the percentage by 69.0 percent. (21 cases)

Manufacturing cities in the Pacific region
increase the percentage by 18.3 percent. (13 cases)

High income cities in the Pacific region
increase the percentage by 9.6 percent. (22 cases)

The tables reveal that all of the variables employed have influence on the relationship of cities concerning region and low MPO ratio. The categories of the variables used that are most influential are: lower educational level, various levels of income, manufacturing status, central and suburban cities, and various size classes (in that order).

Table 30 presents the relationship of cities concerning regions and high MPO ratios with the several variables employed as controls. There are too few cases in most cells to determine whether or not the series of percentages of cities according to region is consistent. However, there is some indication that the pattern is at least somewhat consistent.

Noteworthy increases in percentages of cities in the different regions with high MPO ratios are:

Highest education cities in Middle Atlantic region increase the percentages by 63.7 percent. (25 cases)

Retailing cities in Middle Atlantic region increase the percentages by 56.5 percent. (16 cases)

Highest income cities in Middle Atlantic region increase the percentages by 52.4 percent. (35 cases)

Retailing cities in South Atlantic region increase the percentages by 40.6 percent. (19 cases)

Youngest housing cities in South Atlantic region increase the percentages by 24.9 percent. (12 cases)

High education cities in South Atlantic region increase the percentages by 21.9 percent. (23 cases)

Third quintile size cities in East South Central region increase the percentages by 20.1 percent. (13 cases)

Diversified retailing cities in the West South Central region increase percentages by 18.9 percent. (33 cases)

Largest cities in the West South Central region increase percentages by 13.9 percent. (18 cases)

Highest education cities in the East North Central region increase percentages by 51.0 percent. (41 cases)

Retailing cities in the East North Central region increase percentages by 41.7 percent. (26 cases)

Highest income cities in the East North Central region increase percentages by 32.7 percent. (49 cases)

Young housing cities in the East North Central region increase percentages by 29.5 percent. (12 cases)

Retailing cities in the West North Central region increase percentages by 36.2 percent. (18 cases)

Fourth quintile size cities in the West North Central region increase percentages by 19.3 percent. (11 cases)

Medium-age housing cities in the Pacific region increase percentages by 29.3 percent. (17 cases)

Highest education cities in the Pacific region increase percentages by 25.6 percent. (34 cases)

Independent cities in the Pacific region increase percentages by 23.3 percent. (18 cases)

All of the control variables have some effect on the relationship among the cities of different regions and high MPO ratio. Medium to highest educational levels, the extremes of income, types of retailing cities, various age of housing statuses, and various city sizes (in that order) seem to exert the most positive influence on the relationship among cities of different regions and high MPO ratio.

Interpretation

On the whole the use of the controls produces few surprises, given the distribution in the cities of educational levels, income, age of housing, etc. Some of the instances where more than one level of income are associated with greater increases in the percentage of cities having higher or lower MPO ratios are surprising, though these may be attributable to the small number of cases and the peculiar association of

income levels and ratio levels in the cities. That cities with highest educational levels, or classified as retailing, or in the South and West, or with young housing could be controlled by fourth and fifth quintile size and still increase the percentage (however not frequency) of high MPO ratio is somewhat surprising. For some reason(s) these variables are "stronger" than the opposite tendency in larger city size to be associated with low MPO ratios.

Also the use of the controls does not produce much information about the broad meaning of MPO ratio. The overall "impression" that one gets is that the educational levels of the cities are more than moderately dependent on the relative number of MPO's, with many of the managers, proprietors, and officials being college graduates. The relative number of MPO's in a community, in turn, are dependent upon whether the city is primarily a manufacturing or a retailing center. The more retailing, the greater the number of MPO's relative to the labor force. However, the MPO ratio is not dependent merely on functional classification. For example, the cities of the East North Central region constitute 34.3 percent of the manufacturing cities of the country as against New England having 14.6 percent of the manufacturing cities; nevertheless 77.1 percent of all the cities in New England have low MPO ratios against 54.7 percent of all the cities in the East North Central region, and 84.2 percent of the manufacturing cities in New England have low MPO ratios against 73.9 percent of the manufacturing cities in the East North Central region.

All of the variables seem to be interrelated, and some appear to be very complex relationships. But this is neither the sole nor the most decisive limitation in getting beyond "impressions" and getting to convincing answers about the broad meaning of the MPO ratio. Again, the

most decisive limitation is that there are too many unknown factors: the size of the other categories of professional and work groups in each community, the relative number of the different occupational groups within the MPO category, etc.

Nevertheless, the study has presented solid data about some of the characteristics of cities that have low MPO ratios and some of the characteristics of cities that have high ratios. We move now to the second and third phases of inquiry concerning MPO ratio and community power structure.

At this point, for the sake of argument, the assumption is made that MPO ratio is a measure of community power concentration. The question becomes: Is low MPO ratio a measure of greater concentration of power and high MPO ratio a measure of lesser concentration?

Hawley argued that low MPO ratio is a measure of greater concentration of power. The study has demonstrated that low MPO ratios are to be found in cities that tend to have certain characteristics. Therefore, Hawley is led to say that communities of greater concentration of power are communities that have these certain characteristics.

Hawley logically must say that cities with greater concentration of community power are cities that tend to be: low in educational level, classifiable as manufacturing cities, with old housing, in the New England region especially, the eastern part of the country in general, cities with mayor-council form of government, low in planning budgets, not-dormitory cities, central cities and larger, more industrialized suburban cities, larger cities in general, with middle range income, and middle range extent of dilapidated housing. Cities having the first four characteristics in some kind of mutual combination or in combination with

the other listed characteristics or in combination with a number of the income levels are even more likely to be cities that also have centralized power structures.

The other side of Hawley's argument, that he did not hesitate to make explicit, is that high MPO ratio is a measure of lesser concentration of power. Therefore, Hawley logically must say that cities with lesser concentrations of community power are cities that also tend to be: high in educational level, classifiable as retailing, cities with young housing, in the Mountain region especially and the southern and western parts of the country in general, cities with city manager form of government, with high planning budgets, that are more likely than low MPO cities to serve the dormitory function, independent cities and smaller, more retail-centered suburban cities, are smaller in general, with "highest" and "lowest" income, and "lowest" and "highest" extents of dilapidated housing. Cities having the first four characteristics in some kind of mutual combination, or in combination with the other listed characteristics, are even more likely to be cities that also have decentralized power structures. Also, in combination with the first four "variable-characteristics" the cities may be larger and also be cities with decentralized power structures. Three of the four "variable-characteristics" have unique associations: high education and retailing cities in the Middle Atlantic region, retailing and young housing cities that are central cities, and retailing cities with medium dilapidation and not-dormitory status also tend to be cities with decentralized power structures.

Is Hawley's argument made more convincing or less so when one sees the kinds of cities he is led to say are associated with centralized

power structures on the one hand and decentralized power structures on the other hand?

In the introductory section of the thesis it was noted that other researchers have been concerned with the association of community power structure and other community structures or characteristics. Claire Gilbert (1968) did an extensive survey of community studies of other researchers who dealt with power structure in any way. Her survey revealed that city type is a better predictor of type of power structure than is either population size or economic base. If it is granted, with Hawley, that MPO ratio is a measure of type of power structure, then Gilbert's finding is in agreement with Hawley concerning population size and is in conflict with him concerning economic base or functional classification. Gilbert found that central cities strongly tend to be pluralistic in power structure, that residential suburbs have factional structures with a ruling group, that industrial suburbs have multi-pyramidal structures with aggregates of leaders who do not form a group, and that independent cities are less pluralistic than other cities. Hawley's interpretation of MPO ratio is in conflict with these findings in every case. Gilbert's survey revealed that large cities tend to be pluralistic. Hawley's interpretation leads him to say that large cities are more concentrated power structures. Gilbert found that southern cities are less pluralistic than cities in the Northeast, North Central, and West. Hawley's interpretation of the data is that southern and western cities tend to have more pluralistic (less concentrated) power structures and the northern and eastern ones have the most concentrated. In conclusion Gilbert writes, "There is a trend in the United States away from centralized forms of power structures in local communities and toward more

pluralistic structures" (1968:155). In Chapter 2 it was demonstrated that among the cities that could be compared (50,000 population and over cities) there has been a definite lowering of the MPO ratio between 1950 and 1960. In conflict with Gilbert's findings, Hawley's interpretation would have to be that in the past decade there has been a movement toward centralized forms of power structure.

John Walton (1966a, 1966b, 1968) also surveyed the studies of other researchers, but limited himself to the works of social scientists who dealt primarily with community power structure. In his later article he sought to offer a unifying theory concerning his findings. From the survey he found that competitive or decentralized power structures are associated with absentee ownership of companies, adequate economic resources including a prosperous business community and low rates of poverty, satellite status, and political party competition. The only possible measure we have of absentee ownership is large manufacturing plant. (This assumes that absentee owned companies tend to be larger.) Cities with large manufacturing plants strongly tend to have low MPO ratios which Hawley would interpret as greater concentrated power structures. Our only possible measure of prosperous business community and low rates of poverty are degree of retailing and median income. As noted earlier, median income presents a mixed picture. Nevertheless, the data, as interpreted by Hawley, show that it is the poorer cities (high rates of poverty) that have decentralized power structures and that the next to the most prosperous quintile of cities have centralized structures. This is in conflict with Walton's findings. However, the data, as interpreted by Hawley's thought, also reveal that the <u>most</u> prosperous cities and the retailing cities are the most decentralized. In fact, 82 percent of the

cities that have this combination of characteristics have high MPO ratios. This is in agreement with Walton. Satellite status as measured by suburban cities presents that unique distribution of extremes of both greater and lesser power concentration. We do not have variables on political party competition except possibly the indirect measures of mayor-council government and large city size. Both of these characteristics are associated with low MPO ratios, i.e., greater concentrated power structures and not decentralized structures..

Walton's survey also found that the following variables are not significantly associated with community power structure: region, population size, industrialization, economic diversification, and type of government. If MPO ratio is a measure of community power structure, our findings are in conflict with Walton's because all five variables have been found to be significantly associated with MPO ratio.

Walton's explanatory theory is that interdependence of a community with the "larger society" leads to decentralized power structure. If high MPO ratio is interpreted to measure decentralized power structure, then my findings would not tend to support his theory. For example, I would be hard pressed to argue that the Mountain region, as against the New England or the East North Central regions, is more interdependent with the larger society.

Hawley's use and interpretation of MPO ratio is at odds with most of the findings from these two surveys of past case studies. Let us consider particular studies.

Maurice Pinard (1963), in the same year that Hawley published his study, reported that "highly integrated communities" are successful in the fluoridation issue. His measures of highly integrated communities were:

small size, low unemployment, natural growth rather than rapid growth or declining communities, small proportion of men in the labor force who are managers and professionals. Hawley's concept of greater power concentration and Pinard's thought about highly integrated communities are somewhat similar. As far as the writer can determine, neither researcher was aware of the similarity of their measures concerning proportion of managers to the labor force. However, there might be a conflict. Our data show that small size is not positively associated with low MPO ratio and, therefore, with greater power concentration. This may represent a difference in "centralization" and "integration," however, and not be a real conflict between the studies.

Crain and Rosenthal (1967), dealing with eight issues areas which included urban renewal and fluoridation, found that populations with medium to high educational levels have less mobilization in all of these areas than do cities with low and the very highest educational levels. Their interpretation of this was that increase in educational level leads to participation, decentralized structures, controversy, and immobilization. The exception of the very highest educational level was interpreted as "crossing a threshold" where one has an educated elite and centralization of power, resulting in mobilization.

According to Hawley's interpretation of our data, medium to high educational levels are associated with decentralized power structures in cities. This is in agreement with Crain and Rosenthal. However, the reverse in the highest level of education that Crain and Rosenthal found is not indicated in our data. In contrast to Crain and Rosenthal, Hawley would be led to say highest educational level cities are the most inclined to be cities with decentralized power structures. Nevertheless, note that

the overall interpretation of the data of centralized structures resulting in mobilization and decentralized ones leading to immobilization is similar in Hawley and Crain and Rosenthal.

Paulson, Butler, and Pope (1969) made reference to both Pinard and Hawley's work in their study of power structure and public welfare in North Carolina counties. They used the MPO ratio as a measure of power structure, though counting only the males among the MPO's and in the labor force. Their dependent variables were OEO appropriations per family, welfare cases per one thousand population, and welfare obligations per capita. Their findings were opposite to those of Hawley. They found that high MPO ratio was significantly and consistently associated with these measures of public welfare. As a footnote they say that they subsequently used urban renewal expenditures as a dependent variable; and though the association was not statistically significant, it was in the direction of high MPO ratio and greater urban renewal expenditures. They interpreted their difference with Hawley by reference to size of community, i.e., they were studying counties where there were very few cities with population over 10,000. They concluded that in small communities decentralized power structures get things done.

Unless there is a "threshold point," size does not adequately explain the difference in findings. Small size communities as a whole have higher MPO ratios than larger cities; but among the smallest cities, 15,000 to 18,000 population, our data show that lower MPO ratios are associated with urban renewal success.[5] Perhaps the opposite results were

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[5]As will be noted shortly, Alford and Aiken have shown that urban renewal status and urban renewal expenditures (the measure used by Paulson and others) are highly correlated.

caused by either the first or a combination of the first and second things: Paulson and the others used counties rather than cities and primarily used a different issue area (even though urban renewal expenditures were subsequently tested). The data reveal that the difference is not caused by a regional or state peculiarity. The South Atlantic region and North Carolina in particular reveal the pattern among small cities of low MPO ratio equals success.

Terry Clark (1968), using zero-order correlations, found that larger population cities and economically diversified cities tend to have decentralized power structures, whereas cities with city managers and highly educated populations tend to be centralized structures. He measured economic diversification by a dichotomous classification of communities ranked by Nelson as diversified or financial, and all other communities. Educational level was measured simply by the median years of public education completed by the residents of a community. Our data as interpreted by Hawley give opposite results from Clark's findings concerning three-out-of-the-four community characteristics. Concerning the fourth, economic diversification, Clark was working with a dichotomous classification that combines, and, therefore, cancels out, our two opposite extremes of manufacturing and retailing. Our data as interpreted by Hawley reveal that diversified communities tend to be in the middle of the centralization-decentralization spectrum.

In Clark's study of the 51 cities that ranged in population size from 50,000 to 750,000, decision-making was investigated through interviews of a standard panel of eleven informants in each community. A "score of decentralized decision-making structure" was computed for each city by getting the number of major actors in each of five decisional

stages (initiation, support, opposition, etc.) of four standard issue areas (urban renewal, election of mayor, etc.). This gives a 20-cell matrix for each community concerning participation and overlap. Clark's example may clarify the procedure. Imagine a community where the mayor initiated action on a decision, was supported by the downtown businessmen, and opposed by the labor unions and the newspapers. The mayor was the major negotiator between the various groups. And the mayor-businessmen coalition prevailed. In this situation, the total number of actors in the issue would be four: mayor, businessmen, labor unions, and newspaper. If these same four actors, again playing the same roles, were the only ones involved in the other three issues, there would still be only a total of four actors in all issue areas, which, divided by the number of issue areas, yields a final score of one for the community. This "centralized community" would rank near the bottom of Clark's scale of decentralization (Clark, 1968:580).

The present writer secured a list of the 51 cities with their index scores from Clark. These were ranked and collapsed into a three-part scale of centralized, medium, and decentralized cities.

As mentioned above, John Walton (1966) summarized 33 case studies dealing with 55 communities. From the studies, which range in time from 1953 through 1964, Walton classified the communities as: pyramidal, factional, coalitional, or amorphous. Pyramidal structure is monolithic, monopolistic, or a single concentrated leadership group. Factional structure has at least two durable factions. "Coalitional" refers to fluid coalitions of interest usually varying with issues. "Amorphous" refers to the absence of any persistent pattern of leadership (Walton, 1966:431-432).

Walton sent the present writer a list of the actual names of the communities with their classifications. Some of these were counties, some were cities with less than 15,000 population. Twenty-seven of the cities could be used and are included in Table 31, and may be compared with Clark's findings and a classification based on MPO ratio.

The MPO category in Table 31 is computed by ranking the 74 MPO ratios and, similar to Clark's scores, collapsing them into a three-part scale of centralized, medium, and decentralized cities. This, of course, assumes with Hawley that the lower the MPO ratio the more centralized the power structure of a city.

The findings of the different studies, using different methods, are highly contradictory. Taking Clark's measure of centralization of power in the 51 communities and relating it to the MPO ratio for these cities, Alford and Aiken found a correlation coefficient of -.49 (1969: 68).[6] Thus communities that Clark classified as having centralized power structures had high MPO ratios, which Hawley argued were more decentralized. The contradictions are to be found not just between Clark's and Hawley's studies. Note the studies that Walton surveyed. Of the four cities (Atlanta, Battle Creek, Seattle, and Syracuse) that were the subjects of duplicate case studies, only one had the second study concurring with the first.

Robert Alford and Michael Aiken (1969) have argued against the centralization and integration models of community power structure. They offered a model that "starts with the assumption that communities are

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[6] The present writer found Alford and Aiken's statistical measure of the data of Hawley and Clark after the procedure of comparing the two studies had been decided upon.

TABLE 31

COMPARISON OF POWER CONCENTRATION OF SELECTED CITIES

CITIES	CLARK	MPO RATIO	WALTON
Akron, Ohio	Medium	Centralized	
Albany, Ga.		Decentralized	Factional
Albany, N.Y.	Medium	Medium	
Amarillo, Texas	Centralized	Decentralized	Pyramidal
Atlanta, Ga.	Medium	Medium	Pyramidal & Coalitional
Baton Rouge, La.		Decentralized	Amorphous
Battle Creek, Mich.		Medium	Pyramidal & Factional
Berkeley, Calif.	Centralized	Medium	
Birmingham, Ala.	Centralized	Medium	
Bloomington, Ind.		Centralized	Coalitional
Bloomington, Minn.	Centralized	Decentralized	
Boston, Mass.	Medium	Centralized	
Bountiful, Utah		Decentralized	Pyramidal
Buffalo, N.Y.	Decentralized	Centralized	
Burlington, N.C.		Medium	Pyramidal
Cambridge, Mass.	Decentralized	Centralized	
Charlotte, N.C.	Centralized	Decentralized	
Clifton, N.J.	Centralized	Medium	
Corpus Christi, Texas		Decentralized	Pyramidal
Dallas, Texas		Decentralized	Pyramidal
Duluth, Minn.	Centralized	Decentralized	
Durham, N.C.		Medium	Coalitional
El Paso, Texas		Decentralized	Coalitional
Euclid, Ohio	Medium	Medium	
Fort Worth, Texas	Medium	Medium	
Fullerton, Calif.	Medium	Decentralized	
Gary, Ind.	Medium	Centralized	
Greenville, S.C.		Decentralized	Factional
Hamilton, Ohio	Centralized	Centralized	
Hammond, Ind.	Decentralized	Centralized	
Indianapolis, Ind.	Decentralized	Centralized	
Irvington, N.J.	Decentralized	Medium	
Jacksonville, Fla.	Centralized	Medium	
Lansing, Mich.		Medium	Factional
Long Beach, Calif.	Centralized	Decentralized	
Loraine, Ohio		Centralized	Factional
Malden, Mass.	Decentralized	Centralized	
Manchester, N.H.	Centralized	Medium	
Memphis, Tenn.	Medium	Medium	
Miami, Fla.		Medium	Amorphous
Milwaukee, Wis.	Decentralized	Centralized	
Minneapolis, Minn.	Decentralized	Centralized	
Mount Clemens, Mich.	Decentralized	Decentralized	Amorphous
Newark, N.J.	Decentralized	Centralized	

TABLE 31--Continued

CITIES	CLARK	MPO RATIO	WALTON
Newburg, N.Y.		Centralized	Amorphous
New Haven, Conn.		Centralized	Coalitional
Palo Alto, Calif.	Medium	Decentralized	
Pasadena, Calif.	Centralized	Decentralized	
Phoenix, Ariz.	Decentralized	Decentralized	
Pittsburgh, Penn.	Decentralized	Centralized	
Saint Louis, Mo.	Decentralized	Centralized	
Saint Paul, Minn.	Decentralized	Medium	
Saint Petersburg, Fla.	Medium	Decentralized	
Salt Lake City, Utah	Medium	Decentralized	
San Francisco, Calif.	Decentralized	Medium	
San Jose, Calif.	Centralized	Medium	
Santa Ana, Calif.	Medium	Decentralized	
Santa Monica, Calif.	Centralized	Medium	
Schenectady, N.Y.	Centralized	Centralized	
Seattle, Wash.	Medium	Decentralized	Pyramidal & Coalitional
Shreveport, La.		Decentralized	Pyramidal
South Bend, Ind.	Medium	Medium	
Springfield, Ore.		Centralized	Coalitional
Syracuse, N.Y.		Decentralized	Coalitional & Coalitional
Tampa, Fla.	Decentralized	Decentralized	
Tuscaloosa, Ala.		Decentralized	Coalitional
Tyler, Texas	Decentralized	Decentralized	
Utica, N.Y.	Decentralized	Medium	
Waco, Texas	Centralized	Decentralized	Pyramidal
Warren, Mich.	Centralized	Centralized	
Waterbury, Conn.	Decentralized	Centralized	
Waukegan, Ill.	Decentralized	Centralized	
Winston-Salem, N.C.		Medium	Pyramidal
Ypsilanti, Mich.		Centralized	Factional

composed of loosely integrated and relatively uncoordinated centers of power (1969:4). Their basic hypothesis is that communities with more centers of power and numerically more and qualitatively more extensive exchange relationships among them will be better able to mobilize for collective action than will communities with fewer centers of power and fewer interfaces (exchange relationships), even when the factors of community need are held constant.

Alford and Aiken used a variety of indirect indicators and measures of the number of centers of power and interfaces in a community. One cluster concerns social heterogeneity and includes: percentages of persons of foreign stock, of non-white persons, and of persons in private schools. A second category is bureaucratization of the local government and is measured by the proportion of city employees per thousand population. (They state that this measure is highly correlated with other measures of government bureaucratization.) A third cluster of variables concern political structure of a city and includes: mayor-council form of government, partisan and ward elections, and a relatively larger number of councilmen. The other indicators and measures are age and size of the city.[7] They argue that these diverse indicators are themselves correlated.

These indicators and measures were employed as independent variables against the dependent variables of four measures of urban renewal participation and success. The four measures are: one, urban renewal status (completion stage through never-in-the-program, including the other-type-projects in the appropriate stages); two, log number of

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[7]Alford and Aiken found a .72 correlation between age of housing and age of city in their study of 582 cities.

urban renewal dollars reserved per capita; three, number of years after 1951 it took the city to enter the program; and four, number of years it took after state enabling legislation was present. These four measures were found to be highly correlated with each other (Alford and Aiken, 1969:24). However, they mainly used the fourth measure.

The independent variables were shown to explain 42.99 percent of the variance in the years possible measure. By far the best "explainers" were population size, age of city, and percent of population that is non-white. Large, older cities with high percent of non-white population are better able to mobilize for community action and are more decentralized according to Alford and Aiken.

They did not use MPO ratio as an independent variable. However, in the light of Clark's findings and their recognition in Hawley's study of the importance of some of the control variables, they commented that low MPO ratio appears to be a measure of decentralized power structure rather than a measure of centralized structure (1969:54).

What has been the logical form of our argument through this process of comparing Hawley's interpretation of the data with the findings of other studies and using community characteristics? The form of the argument has been: if low MPO ratio is a measure of greater power concentration, then cities with greater power concentration are cities that also have certain community characteristics. We have used other studies to "show" that in most cases centralized power structures are not associated with these community structures. Therefore, there are reasons to believe that low MPO ratio is not a measure of centralized power structure. This is a weak argument. It has the logical forms of arguing from the negative and affirming (though the negative was used) the consequence. In

addition the argument rests upon other studies which are questionable in their own right. Nevertheless, some reasons to question Hawley's assumption and argument that low MPO ratio is a measure of centralized power structure have been found; and, indeed, one might wonder if MPO ratio is a measure of any kind of power structure.

The argument can be carried further. One may "test" Alford and Aiken's suggestion that low MPO ratio is a measure of decentralization. A stronger logical form of argumentation can be used in this case. Again, the assumption is made that MPO ratio is a measure of power structure. The form of the argument is: if low MPO ratios are found in cities with certain community characteristics, then low MPO ratios are measures of decentralized power structure. We will see whether or not we are able to affirm the "if proposition" and therefore be able to deduce the "then proposition".

The studies "show" that the community structures and characteristics that are associated with decentralized power structures are: larger cities, older cities, with a higher proportion of non-whites, cities with economic diversity, adequate economic resources, with absentee ownership, central cities and industrial suburban cities, satellite cities, with higher (though not the very highest) educational levels, with political party competition, in the North and East, and cities that in general are more interdependent with the larger society. Are low MPO ratios found in such cities? According to my data, low MPO ratios are found to be associated with most of the above characteristics in cities. As noted before, my study does not have data or comparable data on: proportion of non-whites and economic diversity. We have only indirect measures of: adequate economic resources, absentee ownership, age of cities, and political party competition. In three of the cases the indirect measures

indicate low MPO ratios, which interpreted by Alford and Aiken, mean decentralized power structures. In the case of adequate economic resources, our indirect measures present something of a mixed picture, though tending toward high MPO ratios. Satellite cities may be either residential or industrial suburban cities, the former having high MPO ratios, the latter having low MPO ratios. Higher educational levels have high MPO ratios. Alford and Aiken's interpretation of low MPO ratio (low MPO ratio indicating decentralized power structure) in all cases "fits" Walton's theory about interdependence with the greater society, though lowest educational level and interdependence are somewhat difficult to reconcile.

The results of our "test" of Alford and Aiken's interpretation of low MPO ratio as indicating decentralized power structure are not decisive. There are three possible exceptions and one definite conflict. This one results from Crain and Rosenthal's interpretation of their data. Their findings are that communities with medium to high levels of education are not successful in mobilizing for community action in eight issue areas. Their interpretation is that medium to high levels of education leads to participation, decentralization, and conflict with blockage. However, Alford and Aiken have pointed out in another regard that the association may be interpreted differently. High education means lack of need, which in turn means lack of participation, which means centralized power structure and lack of mobilization (Alford and Aiken, 1969:53).

In summary of the "tests" of the two interpretations, it appears that Alford and Aiken's interpretation of low MPO ratio fares more favorably than does Hawley's. Yet our tests are limited by the logical

form of the argument in the case of Hawley's interpretation, by the number of variables with which this study has to work, and by the other studies used as standards, some of which are not consistent in findings even among themselves.

If MPO ratio is a measure of power concentration, it is not the best conceivable measure. It has problems. It lumps together very diverse occupations, some of which could hardly be significant for community power structure. It excludes some occupational groups that would seem to be very important in considerations of power structure (See Appendix C). It does not get at important dimensions of power structure and community decision-making; for example, issue areas, and power used in blocking community actions. In Chapter 5 more will be said in criticism.

At this point, note just one more inadequacy; that is, MPO ratio is not the best predictor of urban renewal success. We now turn our attention to Chapter 4 and to the factors that are correlated with urban renewal status and success.

CHAPTER IV

URBAN RENEWAL "SUCCESS" AND COMMUNITY POWER

At the conclusion of the replication chapter, in Table 9, other variables were shown to be associated with urban renewal status in a pattern very similar to that of MPO ratio and urban renewal status. In the present chapter these associations will be more fully presented.

In Chapter 3, concerning MPO ratio as a measure of power concentration, other studies were presented that dealt with various variables associated with urban renewal participation and success. The researchers offered various interpretations of their findings. In the present chapter these interpretations will be reconsidered.

Findings

Table 32 presents various measures of the associations of selected variables and urban renewal status.[1] Age of housing and city size quintiles are moderately associated with the urban renewal statuses. MPO ratio, functional classification, and extent of dilapidation quintile are associated with the statuses enough to be noteworthy.

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[1]Chi square and contingency coefficients are used as in Hawley's study. Theta and lambda measures, where appropriate, are employed in this table, but were not calculated for all associations presented in the present chapter. Since contingency coefficients do not have a maximum score of 1.0, varying according to number of rows and columns, the coefficients have been adjusted in the most conservative way by standardizing them according to the larger number of rows or columns.

TABLE 32

MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION OF SELECTED VARIABLES AND URBAN RENEWAL STATUS (RANKED ACCORDING TO THE STRENGTH OF THETA AND LAMBDA MEASURES)

VARIABLE ASSOCIATED WITH URBAN RENEWAL STATUS	X^2	Adjusted Contingency Coefficient	Theta	Lambda
Age Housing Quintile	231.980	.453	.342	
City Size Quintile	234.806	.456	.338	
MPO Ratio Quintile	141.011	.366	.270	
Functional Classification	104.807	.331	.220	
Dilapidation Quintile	167.243	.394	.216	
Median Income Quintile	136.540	.360	.192	
Dormitory Function	74.870	.274	.192	
Education Quintile	62.358	.251	.175	
Metropolitan Status	207.129	.433		.114
Region	214.876	.425		.045
Type Government	34.032	.188		.009

In addition, some of the categories of the lower ranked variables are highly correlated with some of the urban renewal statuses in cities; for example: 40 percent of the cities in the east south central region have reached completion stage, and 77.1 percent of the highest income cities have never been in the program.

Particular Variables and Urban Renewal

Tables 33 through 42 present column percentages and frequencies of all cities according to ten of the variables by the six urban renewal statuses. Table 6 in Chapter 2 presents the association of MPO ratio and the urban renewal statuses.

The age of housing quintile by the urban renewal statuses is shown in Table 33. Older housing cities tend to be in the program and to push on to execution and completion stages. Younger housing cities tend not to be in the program. The medium and old housing cities have more tendency to drop out of the program. The young housing cities have greater tendency to be in the other-type-projects.

The city size quintile by the urban renewal statuses is given in Table 34. The pattern of the distribution is very similar to that of the four class sizes presented in Chapter 2. The larger cities tend strongly to be in the program and to successfully complete their programs. The fourth quintile cities, 35,000 to 70,000 population, have the greatest tendency to drop out; and the largest cities have the least tendency to do so. The larger cities are more inclined to enter the other-type-projects; but this may be because they are more inclined to enter the whole urban renewal program.

TABLE 33

QUINTILE DISTRIBUTION OF ALL CITIES (AGE OF HOUSING) BY URBAN RENEWAL STATUS *(PERCENTAGES BY COLUMNS, NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

URBAN RENEWAL STATUS	AGE OF HOUSING				
	Youngest	Young	Medium	Old	Oldest
Completion Stage	5.4 (12)	13.5 (30)	12.1 (27)	19.7 (44)	34.4 (78)
Execution Stage	6.7 (15)	17.5 (39)	25.0 (56)	26.5 (59)	34.4 (78)
Planning Stage	2.7 (6)	3.1 (7)	8.9 (20)	6.7 (15)	4.4 (10)
Dropout	3.6 (8)	2.2 (5)	6.3 (14)	6.3 (14)	3.5 (8)
Never in Program	79.0 (177)	55.6 (124)	42.9 (96)	35.9 (80)	18.9 (43)
Other Type Projects	2.7 (6)	8.1 (18)	4.9 (11)	4.9 (11)	4.4 (10)

* X^2 = 231.980, C = .414, theta = .342

TABLE 34

QUINTILE DISTRIBUTION OF ALL CITIES (SIZE QUINTILE - SMALL TO LARGE) BY THE SIX URBAN RENEWAL STATUSES *(PERCENTAGES BY COLUMN, NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

URBAN RENEWAL STATUS	SIZE QUINTILE				
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th
Completion Stage	5.9 (13)	8.0 (18)	12.0 (27)	17.3 (39)	41.9 (95)
Execution Stage	14.1 (31)	19.1 (43)	20.4 (46)	25.8 (58)	30.4 (69)
Planning Stage	8.2 (18)	3.6 (8)	6.7 (15)	5.3 (12)	2.2 (5)
Dropout	4.5 (10)	4.9 (11)	4.0 (9)	6.7 (15)	1.8 (4)
Never in Program	65.0 (143)	61.3 (138)	52.4 (118)	38.2 (86)	15.4 (35)
Other Type Projects	2.3 (5)	3.1 (7)	4.4 (10)	6.7 (15)	8.4 (19)

*X^2 = 234.806, C = .416, theta = .338

Tables 33 and 34 reveal very similar patterns, except not as great a percentage of cities with youngest and oldest housing are in completion stage as are smallest and largest cities; and a greater percentage of the youngest and oldest housing cities have never been in the program.

In Chapter 2, Table 6, we saw that cities with lower MPO ratios tend to participate successfully in the program. Higher MPO ratio cities tend strongly not to enter the program. Cities with second quintile MPO ratios (next to lowest) have the greatest tendency to drop out. Cities with medium size ratios are the most likely to enter into the other-type-projects.

Manufacturing and diversified manufacturing cities are the more likely of the functional classes to enter the program and push on to execution and completion. See Table 35. Retailing cities display a strong tendency not to enter the program. Industrial cities, differing from the other types of predominantly manufacturing cities, have the greatest tendency both to drop out and to participate in other-type-projects.

Cities with higher extents of dilapidation tend to participate with success in the program, as is seen in Table 36. Note that the fourth quintile is even more likely to do so than the cities with the highest quintile. Communities with the lowest extent of dilapidation are very unlikely to enter the program. The cities with high dilapidation (fourth quintile) have greater tendencies both to drop out and to enter other-type-projects.

Age of housing, city size, MPO ratio, functional classification, and dilapidation display similar patterns in their association with urban

TABLE 35

ALL CITIES OF DIFFERENT FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATIONS, BY URBAN RENEWAL STATUS *(PERCENTAGES BY COLUMNS, NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

URBAN RENEWAL STATUS	ECONOMIC FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION				
	Manufacturing	Industrial	Diversified Manufacturing	Diversified Retailing	Retailing
Completion Stage	23.5 (92)	8.8 (.3)	26.0 (50)	12.4 (28)	7.0 (14)
Execution Stage	24.3 (95)	29.4 (10)	28.6 (55)	23.5 (53)	10.6 (21)
Planning Stage	5.4 (21)	2.9 (1)	5.2 (10)	5.3 (12)	4.0 (8)
Dropout	5.1 (20)	8.8 (3)	4.2 (8)	4.4 (10)	1.5 (3)
Never in Program	37.1 (145)	41.2 (14)	31.3 (60)	49.1 (111)	72.4 (144)
Other Type Projects	4.6 (18)	8.8 (3)	4.7 (9)	5.3 (12)	4.5 (9)

* X^2 = 104.807, C = .302, theta = .220

TABLE 36

QUINTILE DISTRIBUTION OF ALL CITIES (EXTENT OF DILAPIDATION) BY URBAN RENEWAL STATUS *(PERCENTAGES BY COLUMN, NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

URBAN RENEWAL STATUS	EXTENT OF DILAPIDATION				
	Lowest	Low	Medium	High	Highest
Completion Stage	4.3 (10)	15.6 (35)	22.3 (50)	21.9 (47)	21.6 (49)
Execution Stage	7.0 (16)	21.3 (48)	29.9 (67)	30.2 (65)	22.5 (51)
Planning Stage	1.3 (3)	6.2 (14)	4.5 (10)	4.2 (9)	9.7 (22)
Dropout	3.0 (7)	4.9 (11)	5.4 (12)	6.0 (13)	2.6 (6)
Never in Program	80.0 (184)	46.7 (105)	33.9 (76)	31.6 (68)	38.3 (87)
Other Type Projects	4.3 (10)	5.3 (12)	4.0 (9)	6.0 (13)	5.3 (12)

* X^2 = 167.243, C = .360, theta = .216

renewal status. Age of housing reveals greater ranges in percentages from completion to never-in-program statuses. MPO ratio has a shorter range especially in the first quintile; likewise manufacturing, functional classification and highest extent of dilapidation are not as discriminating between completion and never-in-program.

Table 37 reveals that the quintiles of median income are less discriminating among the cities in the program. The low and medium income cities have greater tendencies to be in the program than the lowest quintile. The highest income cities have a strong tendency not to enter. Cities with medium and high incomes have greater tendencies to drop out. Lowest income cities are the most likely to enter other-type-projects.

Cities that are classifiable as dormitory cities have a very strong tendency to never enter the program. See Table 38. In contrast, non-dormitory cities are more likely to enter the program, to drop out, and to enter other-type-projects.

Table 39 shows that educational levels are even less discriminating among the cities than are income quintiles. Still, cities with least education are inclined to participate and push on in the program. Cities at the highest educational level tend to never enter. Low education cities are more inclined to drop out. High education cities have the greatest tendency to enter other-type projects.

Metropolitan status by urban renewal status is presented in Table 40. Central cities have a strong tendency to be in the program at execution and completion levels. Both suburban and independent cities have tendencies in the opposite direction; suburban cities especially tend to never enter the program. Independent cities have more of a tendency than the other two kinds to drop out of the program. Central cities are more likely to enter the other-type projects.

TABLE 37

QUINTILE DISTRIBUTION OF ALL CITIES (MEDIAN INCOME) BY URBAN RENEWAL STATUS *(PERCENTAGES BY COLUMNS, NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

URBAN RENEWAL STATUS	MEDIAN INCOME				
	Lowest	Low	Medium	High	Highest
Completion Stage	21.1 (47)	24.1 (54)	23.2 (52)	13.4 (30)	4.0 (9)
Execution Stage	21.1 (47)	29.9 (67)	24.1 (54)	24.6 (55)	10.6 (24)
Planning Stage	6.3 (14)	7.6 (17)	4.5 (10)	4.9 (11)	2.6 (6)
Dropout	3.6 (8)	4.0 (9)	5.4 (12)	5.8 (13)	3.1 (7)
Never in Program	41.7 (93)	29.5 (66)	37.5 (84)	45.5 (102)	77.1 (175)
Other Type Projects	6.3 (14)	4.9 (11)	5.4 (12)	5.8 (13)	2.6 (6)

* X^2 = 136.540, C = .329, theta = .192

TABLE 38

ALL CITIES ACCORDING TO DORMITORY FUNCTION, BY URBAN RENEWAL STATUS *(PERCENTAGES BY COLUMNS, NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

URBAN RENEWAL STATUS	DORMITORY FUNCTION	
	No	Yes
Completion Stage	19.0 (178)	7.5 (14)
Execution Stage	24.3 (227)	10.8 (20)
Planning Stage	6.0 (56)	1.1 (2)
Dropout	4.5 (42)	3.8 (7)
Never in Program	40.6 (380)	74.7 (139)
Other Type Projects	5.6 (52)	2.2 (4)

* X^2 = 74.87, C = .250, theta = .192

TABLE 39

QUINTILE DISTRIBUTION OF ALL CITIES (EDUCATION), BY URBAN RENEWAL STATUS *(PERCENTAGES BY COLUMNS, NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

URBAN RENEWAL STATUS	EDUCATIONAL LEVEL				
	Least	Low	Medium	High	Highest
Completion Stage	24.2 (54)	20.0 (46)	17.7 (39)	14.1 (31)	9.6 (22)
Execution Stage	27.8 (62)	23.0 (53)	23.2 (51)	20.9 (46)	15.3 (35)
Planning Stage	4.0 (9)	8.7 (20)	3.6 (8)	2.3 (5)	7.0 (16)
Dropout	4.0 (9)	5.7 (13)	5.0 (11)	4.1 (9)	3.1 (7)
Never in Program	35.0 (78)	39.1 (90)	44.5 (98)	52.3 (115)	60.7 (139)
Other Type Projects	4.9 (11)	3.5 (8)	5.9 (13)	6.4 (14)	4.4 (10)

* X^2 = 62.358, C = .229, theta = .175

TABLE 40

ALL CITIES OF DIFFERENT METROPOLITAN STATUSES, BY URBAN RENEWAL STATUS *(PERCENTAGES BY COLUMNS, NUMER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

URBAN RENEWAL STATUS	METROPOLITAN STATUS		
	Central Cities	Suburban Cities	Independent Cities
Completion Stage	36.9 (101)	9.2 (44)	12.5 (46)
Execution Stage	32.5 (89)	16.5 (79)	21.5 (70)
Planning Stage	2.9 (8)	3.6 (17)	9.1 (33)
Dropout	2.9 (8)	4.6 (22)	5.2 (19)
Never in Program	16.8 (46)	62.3 (298)	47.4 (174)
Other Type Projects	8.0 (22)	3.8 (18)	4.4 (16)

* X^2 = 207.129, C = .395, lambda = .114

Cities in the various regions present an interesting pattern in relation to the urban renewal statuses. See Table 41. Surprisingly, a higher percentage of cities in the east south central region have reached completion stage than cities in any other region. When completion, execution, and planning statuses are collapsed, however, one sees that New England has the highest percentage of cities in the program. The middle Atlantic region is a close third behind the east south central region with percentage of cities in the program. That the south Atlantic and east south central regions have higher percentages of cities in the program than the west north central and east north central regions is interesting. Regions west of the Mississippi have high percentages of cities that have never entered the program. Surprisingly high are the 70.6 percent in the west south central region and the 66.9 percent in the Pacific region. Surprising also is the industrialized east north central region with its low percentage in completion stage and high percentage in never-in-program status. Cities in the New England, the east north central, and Mountain regions have a greater tendency to drop out. Cities of the south Atlantic, west south central, and Mountain regions have greater tendency to enter the other-type-projects.

Table 42 reveals that the only type of government with over one-half of its cities in the program is the commission type. Mayor-council type has a higher percentage than city manager type in the program. City manager cities have greater tendencies never to enter the program and to enter other-type-projects. Mayor-council cities are more inclined than the others to drop out.

Thus Tables 33 through 42 reveal that older housing cities, larger cities, with lower MPO ratios, classifiable as manufacturing or diversified

TABLE 41

ALL CITIES OF DIFFERENT REGIONS, BY URBAN RENEWAL STATUS
*(PERCENTAGES BY COLUMNS, NUMBER
OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

URBAN RENEWAL STATUS	CENSUS REGIONS								
	New England	Middle Atlantic	South Atlantic	East South Central	West South Central	East North Central	West North Central	Mountain	Pacific
Completion Stage	26.5 (22)	29.6 (53)	20.9 (27)	40.0 (24)	6.4 (7)	13.3 (35)	13.4 (13)	0.0 (0)	7.3 (11)
Execution Stage	38.6 (32)	31.8 (57)	24.0 (31)	16.7 (10)	11.9 (13)	18.9 (50)	17.5 (17)	18.0 (9)	18.5 (28)
Planning Stage	7.2 (6)	5.0 (9)	7.8 (10)	10.0 (6)	1.8 (2)	3.4 (9)	9.3 (9)	10.0 (5)	1.3 (2)
Dropout	7.2 (6)	2.8 (5)	3.9 (5)	5.0 (3)	0.9 (1)	6.8 (18)	3.1 (3)	8.0 (4)	2.6 (4)
Never in Program	13.3 (11)	27.4 (49)	34.9 (45)	25.0 (15)	70.6 (77)	54.2 (143)	53.6 (52)	54.0 (27)	66.9 (101)
Other Type Projects	7.2 (6)	3.4 (6)	8.5 (11)	3.3 (2)	8.3 (9)	3.4 (9)	3.1 (3)	10.0 (5)	3.3 (5)

* X^2 = 214.876, C = .401, lambda = .045

TABLE 42

ALL CITIES OF DIFFERENT TYPE GOVERNMENT, BY URBAN RENEWAL STATUS *(PERCENTAGES BY COLUMNS, NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

URBAN RENEWAL STATUS	TYPE OF GOVERNMENT		
	Commission	City Manager	Mayor-Council
Completion Stage	32.5 (38)	13.7 (75)	17.1 (78)
Execution Stage	19.7 (23)	20.9 (114)	24.0 (109)
Planning Stage	6.0 (7)	4.8 (26)	5.3 (24)
Dropout	2.6 (3)	3.5 (19)	5.9 (27)
Never in Program	35.9 (42)	51.5 (281)	43.1 (196)
Other Type Projects	3.4 (4)	5.7 (31)	4.6 (21)

* $X^2 = 34.032$, C = .172, lambda = .009

manufacturing, with higher extents of dilapidation, low-to-medium income levels, classifiable as not-dormitory, with lower levels of education, that are central cities, on the Atlantic seaboard and in the South East, with commission form of government have greater tendencies to enter the program and push on to execution and completion stages. Younger housing, smaller cities, with higher MPO ratios, classifiable as retailing, with lowest extents of dilapidated housing, highest income, classifiable as dormitory, with highest levels of education, that are suburban cities, in the west south central region especially and the West in general, with city manager form of government are more likely never to enter the program. The types of cities that have the greatest tendency to drop out are: medium-to-old housing, 35,000 to 70,000 population cities, with low but not lowest MPO ratios, classifiable as industrial, with high but not highest extent of dilapidation, medium to high income, classifiable as not-dormitory, with low but not lowest educational levels, independent cities, in New England, the east north central, and the Mountain regions, with mayor-council form of government. Cities that have a greater tendency to enter the other-type-projects are: young, but not youngest, housing cities, larger cities, with medium size MPO ratios, classifiable as industrial or diversified retailing, with high but not highest dilapidation, lowest income, classifiable as not-dormitory, with high but not highest education, that are central cities, in the south Atlantic, west south central, and Mountain regions, with city manager form of government.

The Associations With Controls

Since the main concern of the thesis is with urban renewal success and the variables associated with it, the employment of controls has been limited to the association of the variables with completion stage of the

urban renewal program. Tables 43 through 51 present the column percentages and frequencies of cities according to nine of the variables, by completion stage, first for all cities and then with selected variables controlled. Again, many interesting relationships are to be seen in these tables, but comment will be made on only a few.[2]

Table 43 presents the effects of other variables on the relationship of cities with the quintiles of age of housing and completion stage. The series of percentages of cities according to age of housing remains remarkably consistent in pattern with all of the controls employed. The only exceptions are where there are a small number of cases (ten or under) involved.

However, it is evident from the data that all of the categories of the control variables have unique and modifying effects on the relationship of the cities concerning age of housing and completion stage.[3] Youngest through oldest housing cities that also are the largest size cities are much more likely than the "average" (the quintiles of age of housing by completion stage without controls) to reach completion stage. This is true when controlled by central cities also. Young housing cities that also are in the east south central region, or have the highest

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[2]Tables 43 through 51 are given in Appendix D. These tables present the column percentages and frequencies of cities according to age of housing, city size, MPO ratio, functional classification, dilapidation, income, education, metropolitan status, region, and type of government, by completion stage of urban renewal and controlled by selected variables. The "all cities" classification is the percentages and frequencies of the association when no controls are employed, and is given for comparative purposes.

[3]Increases and decreases are cited in the text where there are instances of 10 or more cases. The writer recognizes that this omits reference to some control categories that have strong influence on the associations. Again, the reader is referred to the tables in Appendix D.

dilapidation, or high MPO ratios, or classifiable as diversified manufacturing greatly increase in percentage over the average of cities that reach completion stage. Old housing cities that also are classified as lowest MPO ratio or diversified manufacturing cities greatly increase the percentage that reach success. Oldest housing cities that also are in the middle Atlantic region, or have medium dilapidation, or lowest MPO ratios, or medium income, or commission form of government greatly increase in percentage reaching completion stage. Oldest housing cities significantly decrease in percentage reaching completion when they also are independent cities, or suburban cities, or in the east north central region, or mayor-council cities.

The effects of other variables on the relationship of cities of various sizes and completion stage are presented in Table 44. The series of percentages of cities according to city size remains consistent in pattern with virtually all of the employed controls, except at the category of cities with lowest education.

Still, it is evident that all of the categories of the control variables have modifying effects on the association of cities concerning size and completion stage. The "medium" through the "largest" size cities that also are oldest housing cities are much more likely than the average to reach completion stage.[4] Fourth quintile size cities that also are in the middle Atlantic region, or have lowest MPO ratios, or low income, or commission government greatly increase in percentage over the average of cities that reach completion stage. Largest cities that also are in the New England, middle Atlantic, or south Atlantic regions, or that have lower MPO ratios, or are classifiable as manufacturing, or

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[4]See Table 43 where size may be interpreted as a control variable.

have commission government greatly increase in percentage (not frequency) reaching completion stage. Largest cities significantly decrease in percentage reaching completion stage when they also are suburban cities, low dilapidation cities, have medium MPO ratios, or high income level.

Table 45 and the two preceding tables present the effects of other variables on the relationship of cities of various MPO ratios and completion stage. The series of percentages of cities according to MPO ratios is vitiated at three categories where the number of cases is sufficiently large. These instances are: old housing, larger size, and cities with city manager form of government.

All of the categories of the control variables have some degree of influence on the association. The lowest through medium MPO ratio cities that also are in the middle Atlantic region are much more likely than the average cities to reach completion. This is true of those cities that are controlled by central city status, also. Lowest MPO ratio cities that also are largest size, or have old housing, or highest dilapidation, or lower income, or commission forms of government greatly increase in percentage reaching completion. Low and medium MPO ratio cities when also classifiable as diversified manufacturing cities have a greater tendency to be among the cities that find success. Decrease in the percentage of cities that reach completion are noteable when low MPO ratio cities are also in fourth quintile of size, have old housing, city manager government, or independent city status.

The effects of the other variables on the association of cities of various functional classifications and completion status are given in Table 46 and the three preceding tables. There are six disruptions of the pattern of the series of percentages according to functional

classification. These instances are: oldest housing, largest size, commission government, low income, central city status, and middle Atlantic region.

Noteworthy modifications of the associations are made by many categories of the control variables. Manufacturing, diversified manufacturing, and diversified retailing cities when controlled by largest size and central city status are more likely to reach completion stage. Manufacturing and diversified manufacturing cities that also have commission form of government, or medium dilapidation, or medium income are more likely to reach completion. Having lowest MPO ratios, or oldest housing or low income or being in the middle Atlantic region increase the chances that manufacturing cities will be successful in the program. Low MPO ratios and the south Atlantic region are associated with increases in the tendency of diversified manufacturing cities to reach completion.

Table 47 and the preceding tables present control variables with the association of extent of dilapidation and completion stage. There are eight vitiations of the series of percentages according to dilapidation. One is a matter of a very slight percentage. The other seven are: largest size, oldest housing, low income, medium education, lowest MPO ratio, city manager and mayor council government.

Cities that have low through highest extent of dilapidated housing are much more inclined to reach completion stage if they also are largest size cities, or central cities, or cities with lowest MPO ratios. Old housing, or manufacturing, or lowest education, or being in the middle Atlantic region increases greatly the percentage of cities with low and medium dilapidated housing which reach completion. High dilapidated housing cities are much more inclined to be successful in the program if

they are also low income, diversified manufacturing, or South Atlantic region cities. Oldest housing, or diversified manufacturing, or commission form of government, or east south Central region contribute to the percentage of highest dilapidated housing cities that reach completion. Independent city status is associated with a decrease in the percentage, of high and highest dilapidated cities that are successful.

The association of median income and completion stage, with controls, is given in Table 48 and the preceding tables. Instances of vitiation of the series of percentages according to income are: largest size, oldest housing, diversified manufacturing function, mayor-council government, and middle Atlantic region.

All of the categories have modifying effects on the association. Cities at all levels of income are much more likely to reach completion stage if they are also largest size cities. Cities with oldest housing or diversified manufacturing status among the cities from lowest through medium income are much more inclined than other cities from lowest through medium income to reach completion stage. Central cities and manufacturing cities among the lowest through high income level cities give greater promise of success. Lowest and low income cities that also have commission government have greater tendency to succeed, as do low through medium income cities that also are in the middle Atlantic region. Lowest income cities are much less likely to reach completion if they are also independent cities or in the south Atlantic region.

Table 49 and the earlier tables reveal the effects of the control variables on the association of educational levels, and completion stage. There are four instances, where there are sufficient number of cases, where control categories vitiate the series of percentages according to educational

levels. These are oldest cities, with mayor-council government, high dilapidation, and medium income.

All of the categories modify somewhat the association. Again, city size and central city status greatly increase the percentages for all educational levels. Oldest housing cities increase the percentage for lowest through medium educational levels. Low education cities that also have low income levels are much more likely than the average low education city to reach completion. Medium education cities that also have old housing, or medium income, or are in the middle Atlantic region are much more likely to succeed. The highest dilapidated cities among the high education cities have a greater tendency to push on to completion.

The preceding tables and Table 50 present the effects of controls on the association of metropolitan status and completion stage. In five instances the independent and suburban cities switch from the pattern of the series of percentages. These instances are: oldest housing, highest dilapidation, low and medium income, and commission form of government. All of the categories of the control variables modify to some extent the association. Lowest MPO ratio cities, or commission type cities, or cities in the east south Central regions increase significantly the percentages for all three metropolitan statuses. Central cities and independent cities in the middle Atlantic region are much more likely than "the average" city of these statuses to reach completion stage. Cities that are manufacturing, or largest, or with old and oldest housing, or lowest educational level significantly raise the likelihood of urban renewal success for both central cities and suburban cities. Central cities' likelihood of reaching completion stage are decreased when they are also cities with high MPO ratios or diversified retailing status.

Table 51, with the preceding tables, presents the association, with controls, of the regions and completion stage. In most instances there are too few cases to determine with confidence the consistency of the pattern of percentages according to regions. However, where there are sufficient number of cases, or nearly so, the pattern appears to be remarkably consistent.

Again, because of the scarcity of the cases in each matrix, we are limited in comments on increases and decreases of percentages. Central cities or largest cities in the following regions are much more likely to reach completion stage than are the "average" cities: in the New England, the middle Atlantic, south Atlantic, east south central, west south central, east north central, and the west north central regions. Cities in the middle Atlantic and east north central regions which also are oldest housing cities have greater tendencies to reach completion stage.

The employment of controls produces only a few surprises, given the distribution of the cities according to completion stage by age of housing, size, MPO ratio, etc. The five categories of the variables that are the most highly correlated with completion stage are: largest size cities (41.9 percent of them reach completion), east south central region (40.0 percent), central cities (36.9 percent), oldest age housing (34.4 percent), and commission government (32.5 percent). These are the categories that repeatedly combined with one another and with the other categories to give increases in percentages. It is somewhat surprising that high MPO ratio combined with young housing produces a sizeable increase in percent of cities that reached completion. Both of these categories taken separately do not lead in that direction. Also, it is somewhat

surprising that oldest housing when combined with mayor-council government meant a significant decrease in percentage reaching completion stage. Why there should be more of a decrease than when oldest housing is combined with city manager government, the writer does not know. This points to one of the two most unexpected findings: cities with commission-type government are much more likely to reach completion stage than are cities with either city manager or mayor-council governments. Because of the other variables associated with success (larger cities, central cities, manufacturing cities, etc.) one might have anticipated that mayor-council type of government would be most highly associated with completion stage. The strength of commission government for success cannot be explained just on a regional basis. Though it is found in greater numbers in the middle Atlantic and east south central regions, it is present throughout the country. And commission cities tend to reach completion irregardless of region.

The other most unexpected finding is the very high percentage of cities in the east south central region that reach completion stage. This holds regardless of controls. The contrast between this region and the west south central one is remarkable. It is like two different worlds. The contrast remains with all controls employed. Yet, interestingly enough, it is the south Atlantic region more than the east south central one that most often makes the greatest increase in percentages when combined with other variables.

Interpretation

How do my data compare with the data and interpretations of other researchers?

George Duggar (1961), in an early study of the characteristics of cities participating in the urban renewal program, concluded that once having entered the program cities with different forms of government displayed no significant difference in tendency to arrive at execution stage, nor in tendency to drop out of the program (Duggar, 1961: 56). Our newer data, especially using completion stage, conflicts with this earlier finding. All three types of government differ in their participation and success in the program and differ in their tendencies at dropping out (See Table 42).

Crain and Rosenthal (1967), as noted above, interpreted their data saying that cities with middle-to-highly-educated populations are not successful in urban renewal programs because education leads to increased participation and decentralization, which lead to controversy and conflict, with the results of immobilization. They found that cities with the very highest education levels, however, were able to mobilize for community action. Our data does not reveal this reversal at the very highest educational level. The series of percentages are consistent from lowest through the highest educational level. (See Table 39.) It was noted in Chapter 3 that Crain and Rosenthal's interpretation of high educational level leading to conflict and immobilization is open to question. Medium to high education may be interpreted as lack of need with the consequence of <u>lack</u> of participation, which in turn results in immobilization. The vital points in determining which interpretation is more accurate are the participation or lack of participation of educated populations and the kinds of structures in which educated populations do and do not participate. Studies probably could be cited that would lend support to both interpretations on these vital points.

Paulson, Butler and Pope (1969), in the counties of North Carolina, found that high MPO ratios were positively associated with success in welfare programs, and in a lesser degree were positively associated with larger urban renewal expenditures. They accepted Hawley's interpretation of high MPO ratios meaning decentralized community power, and concluded that in small communities decentralized power makes for success in community programs. Though my data is on the basis of cities and not counties, my data consistently reveal that all-size cities, including the smallest, tend to have low MPO ratios associated with urban renewal success. Earlier the difference between counties and cities was offered as a possible expalnation of the difference in size of MPO ratio in Paulson and the others' study on the one hand and Hawley's and my studies on the other hand. At this point it might be added that my data reveal that small poorer communities are much more likely than other income levels of small cities to enter the program and push on to execution and completion. However, I have no controls for MPO ratio on this association.

Alford and Aiken (1969) have argued that decentralized power structures are more likely to mobilize for federally funded community action programs such as urban renewal. They argue that the more centers of power and the more extensive interfaces between them in a community, the more decentralized its power structure and the more readily and successfully it can mobilize. Their data are very similar to that of the present study. Their data, as they interpret them, are not inconsistent with their hypothesis. However they have only the most indirect measures of centers of power and interfaces. These measures are age and size of city, percent non-whites, etc. They are forced to make

numerous assumptions in order to fill-in the causal links between their nominal and operational definitions of community power structure.

Terry Clark (1968b) found that decentralized power structure is positively correlated with urban renewal expenditures, even though he began his study with the hypothesis that centralized structures would be so correlated. His references indicate that he was dependent upon Hawley's study for this earlier expectation. Clark did not question Hawley's interpretation of low MPO ratio. Rather he sought to explain the difference by reference to "fragility", that is, the urban renewal program has become a less fragile community program with the passing of years (Clark, 1968b:587). Insofar as this explanation implies that with the passing of years cities will enter the program with higher MPO ratios, my data conflict with this explanation. The comparison between MPO ratios in 1950 and 1960 reveals that the ratios of cities in the program have become smaller not larger. Clark's operational definition of decentralization is the relative number of different actors in different roles in different, selected community issues. That the index scores of decentralization are based in part on selected community issues is a point of possible criticism of Clark's study. Nevertheless, the method and measure are open to replication that could be extended to different kinds of issues. The biggest drawback of the method and measure are that they are geared to case studies. This is what Hawley and Alford and Aiken were attempting to get beyond.

Hawley argued that greater concentration of community power leads to successful urban renewal participation. Alford and Aiken and Clark have argued just the opposite. Do my data support Hawley or the others?

My data reveal that certain community structures and characteristics are associated with cities that reach urban renewal success. These are: older housing, larger cities, with lower MPO ratios, classifiable as manufacturing or diversified manufacturing, with higher extents of dilapidation, low-to-medium income levels, classifiable as not-dormitory, with lower levels of education, central cities, on the Atlantic seaboard and in the south east region, with commission form of government. Such structures and characteristics tend to fit best with the structures and characteristics "found" to be associated with decentralized power structures (rather than with the structures and characteristics found to be associated with centralized power structures) by most other studies in the field. As in Chapter 3, there are exceptions; but our conclusion is that the data are more easily integrated into a decentralization interpretation.

The logical form of our argument in this case is strong. Our conclusion is weak, however, because the fit of data and interpretation is a matter of degree and because of our reliance on other studies which are open to question in their own right.

Nevertheless, this chapter is mutually supportive with the preceding one. If MPO ratio is a measure of community power concentration (even though it may not be the best conceivable one) and low MPO ratio indicates decentralization of community power, then in this chapter we have demonstrated that decentralized community power as measured by MPO ratio and by other measures employed by other researchers are correlated with urban renewal participation and success. Likewise this "test" in this issue area, adds another variable (urban renewal success) to the list of those characteristics that are associated both with decentralization and with low MPO ratio.

In Chapter Three it was shown that Hawley's interpretation of low MPO ratio is questionable. The same, of course, is true of his interpretation of high MPO ratio. Further, it was shown that Alford and Aiken's suggestion (that low MPO ratio might better be considered a measure of decentralized power structure) was more consistent with the data and findings of other studies. In the present chapter, we have questioned Hawley's interpretation that urban renewal success is associated with centralized power structures. It has been shown that urban renewal success is more likely to be associated with decentralized power structures.

Such reversals of Hawley's interpretations require further examination and explanation. Part III of the thesis is one such attempt. We return to Hawley's published study. Chapter five is a critical examination of the more theoretical aspects of his study.

PART III

HAWLEY CRITIQUED

CHAPTER V

THEORETICAL PROBLEMS

This chapter deals with Hawley's assumptions, and his use of language and logic in his published study. If it can be shown that Hawley's interpretation of the data is based on questionable and faulty reasons and reasoning, then the reader has further grounds for rejecting it.

Assumptions

Hawley assumed that greater concentration of power leads to greater probability of success in any community collective activity. He put his assumption in the form of a hypothesis and sought to test it in his study. He believed that his test supported the assumption. However, Hawley also assumed and presumed other things in his test. These assumptions and presumptions may not be valid. If they are important for the test, then the test may not be valid. If the test is not valid, then Hawley is back where he started with an "untested" assumption.

What are some of these other assumptions and presumptions? One, Hawley presumed that MPO ratio measures concentration of community power. MPO ratio became his operational measure of concentration of power. One may question the adequacy and appropriateness of his operational measure. Our earlier findings concerning the community characteristics associated with low and high MPO ratio, when compared with other studies, are grounds

for questioning this movement from nominal to operational definitions. Low and high MPO ratios were seen as somewhat inconsistently associated with the community characteristics that other studies had found to be associated with centralized and decentralized concentrations of power. (Further, it was seen that low MPO ratios are associated with the characteristics that most other studies found associated with decentralized power structure.) Other grounds for questioning the adequacy of his operational measure will be given below. At this point we simply note that Hawley made this presumption, that it is somewhat questionable, and that it is an all-important part of his test.

Two, Hawley presumed that low MPO ratio measures greater concentration of community power. Hawley argued for this presumption on a theoretical level and made it sound convincing. Below we will see that under critical examination his argument is not as convincing as it first appears. But note that it is a presumption. A leap of faith from the operational measure to the nominal concept is always required, and we are questioning this particular leap of faith. What his data and mine actually show is that low MPO ratio is consistently and significantly associated with urban renewal success. The data do not show directly that greater concentration of community power is consistently and significantly associated with urban renewal success. The data reveal the latter only if one is willing to presume with Hawley that low MPO ratio measures greater concentration of community power.

One can take the same data and presume that low MPO ratio measures less concentrated or decentralized community power. This is what was done by Alford and Aiken. In Chapter Three their presumption was tested. Comparison with other studies of the community characteristics associated

with decentralized power structure showed that this latter presumption is more consistent with the findings of the majority of these other studies. What would seem to be required of this latter presumption about low MPO ratio measuring decentralized power structure is a convincing theoretical framework. An indication of such a theoretical framework will be given in the concluding section of the thesis.

Three, Hawley assumed that urban renewal success was a good test of his first assumption. Two things should be noted about this. First, Hawley assumed that the urban renewal program is a good measure of community collective endeavors. This may be questioned. In some cities it may be the concern of only a few persons. The data merely show that low MPO ratio is positively associated with arrival at execution and completion stages of urban renewal. An assumption is necessary to say that low MPO ratios are positively associated with community collective endeavors. Second, Hawley assumed that this one issue-area (urban renewal) is adequately representative of all issue-areas. This may be questioned. The positive association of low MPO ratio with urban renewal success does not assure the positive association of low MPO ratio with welfare programs, for example (Paulson and others, 1969). One might look more closely at this particular issue-area of urban renewal and might see that "success" in this area requires different community characteristics -- possibly including a somewhat different power structure -- from the requirements for "success" in pollution control or "success" in school integration, etc. Except for the Paulson study (1969) there have been no investigations of the relationship of MPO ratio and other issue-areas. That study, as will be remembered, dealt with counties and not cities.

Four, Hawley assumed that the resources of power and exchange relationships of power were fixed. The MPO's had the derivative power; and when they were relatively small in number, they could exercise it "successfully." This assumption is questionable at three points. First, it neglects the possible divisions and differences within the MPO category, irregardless of how few MPO's there might be. Second, it neglects consideration of the relative power of other categories of the labor force. Third, it neglects serious consideration of the possible uniqueness of communities because of historical antecedents, personalities, and the other factors the present study considered.

All four of the above assumptions or presumptions are important for Hawley's test of his first assumption. It has been shown that all four are very questionable, if not invalid. If so, Hawley's test is not convincing. He is left with what he began with, an assumption that greater concentration of community power leads to greater probability of success in any community collective activity.

Linguistic Problems

Hawley's theoretical argument, at the beginning of his articles, is convincing at first reading. Closer examination, however, reveals that part of the convincing force of the argument is dependent upon his using words with more than one referent.

"Concentration", perhaps the most vital word in his article, has at least two referents in his study. It refers both to small number and to unity and potency. Hawley says that lower MPO ratio is a measure of greater concentration of power. This sounds reasonable to the reader because lower MPO ratio means smaller number of MPO's relative to the total labor force. But does lower MPO ratio also mean greater unity

and potency for the MPO's? Not necessarily. There very well may be internal differences and divisions among the MPO's regardless of the size of the group. And certainly the argument is possible that as this category of persons becomes smaller other categories increase in potency or strength in regards to community power. Hawley's movement from nominal to operational definitions and thus his whole argument is made more convincing because of the combining of these separable referents of the word "concentration".

Two, Hawley says that power "must be exercised through the managerial functions of the subsystems (1963:424). Given the systemtic framework, the reader is not inclined to disagree. However, this may be because "managerial functions" has several referents. For example, fathers and mothers could be thought of as performing the managerial function in the family, ministers in the churches, lawyers in legal matters, etc. Hawley, however, limits the "managerial functions" to the personnel classified as MPO's. Further, Hawley is ambivalent about the meaning of "subsystems" at this point. The one place where he gives examples, he lists: "family, church, store, industry" (1963:423). Yet, his MPO category which is exhaustive of those who fulfill the managerial functions according to him, does not include the managers of families as such (parents) and the managers of churches (ministers).

Three, Hawley writes that it is the managerial functions that "co-ordinate" the several other functions in their respective subsystems and "articulate" the latter with the larger system (Hawley, 1963:424). This is ambivalent at numerous points. First, managerial functions may refer to what parents, lawyers, and others do or it may refer only to what MPO's do. The latter is the interpretation that Hawley gave later

in the article. Second, do "co-ordinate" and "articulate" mean that MPO's are the influentials and decision-makers? Bruce Straits understood Hawley to be saying,

> We have a power pyramid with policy makers at the apex, followed by the managerial functions which are active in implementing policy decisions, and with the number of managerial personnel as measured by the MPO ratio forming the base (1965:78).

Hawley responded that the MPO's are the policy makers. Nevertheless, there is ambivalence in the published study at this point. Third, are all the MPO's policy makers? Surely some are very inconsequential as community influentials and decision-makers.

Four, the word "system", as used by Hawley, is both vague and extreme. On the one hand it is extreme. The system is the only location of power. It is completely separable from an individual. It is like a separate thing, even a separate super-person. Hawley writes such phrases as "the system exercises its power" (1963:423). On the other hand, it is vague because "the system" is not just a community, it is a model that Hawley is using. It is vague, too, in the sense that when he speaks of the subsystems he is ambivalent.

Five, Hawley writes of "crises" and "emergencies" occuring for the community (1963:423). His argument is that where derivative power is highly concentrated the community is able to act as a unit in an emergency. The design of the study is that urban renewal presents such an emergency situation. "Crises" and "emergencies" have many referents. One cluster of meanings is sudden and unanticipated occurances. It seems reasonable to the reader that such crises would best be met by a few ready men. But, is urban renewal such a crisis? Is it not a crisis or emergency only in the weakest sense of those words? Does it then

require the quick response of a few ready men?

Hawley's use of these words is ambivalent; and this ambivalence is to his advantage. It enables his argument to appear more convincing than it is under closer scrutiny.

Logical Problem

The logical form of the over-all argument of Hawley's study is weak. The argument is: if greater concentration of community power leads to success in community collective activity, then lower MPO ratios should lead to urban renewal success; lower MPO ratios lead to urban renewal success; therefore, greater concentration of community power leads to success in community collective activity. This has the weakness of affirming the consequence. The conclusion does not follow necessarily from the propositions that precede it.

An argument in this form is not without pragmatic, as distinct from logical, force, however. When used in conjunction with stronger logical arguments, as was done in Chapter Three of the present study, it is additional ground for acceptance of an over-all argument or position.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Amos Hawley's study was replicated where possible. The newer, expanded data support, with a very few exceptions, his operational hypothesis. It was found that lower MPO ratio continues to be consistently and significantly associated with urban renewal success. However, Hawley's data and the data of this study indicated that Hawley's control variables might also be positively associated with MPO ratio and the urban renewal statuses.

These associations were measured and it was found that educational level and the functional classifications are strongly correlated with MPO ratio. Age of housing and region are moderately associated with the ratio. Type of government and planning budget are associated with it enough to be noteworthy. It also was shown that age of housing and city size quintile are moderately associated with the urban renewal statuses. MPO ratio, functional classification, and extent of dilapidation quintile are associated with the urban renewal statuses enough to be noteworthy.

More particularly it was found that low MPO ratio cities tend also to be cities that have low educational levels, are classifiable as manufacturing, have old housing, are in the New England region especially and the eastern part of the country in general, have mayor-council form of government, have low planning budgets, are not dormitory cities, are central cities and one kind of suburban cities, are larger cities, with

middle range income, and middle range extent of dilapidated housing. On the other hand, high MPO cities tend to be cities with high educational levels, are classifiable as retailing cities, with young housing, in the mountain region especially and the southern and western parts of the country in general, have city-manager form of government, have high planning budgets, serve a dormitory function, are independent and one type of suburban cities, are smaller, with the extremes of income, and the extremes of extent of dilapidated housing.

It was then shown that the community structures and characteristics associated with low MPO ratio cities are, according to most other studies, associated more with decentralized power structures. The found characteristics of high MPO ratio cities, according to most other studies are associated more with centralized power structures. This is just the opposite of Hawley's interpretations of low and high MPO ratio. Further, it was shown that two of the most recent studies, which are extensive investigations, conclude that decentralized power structures are positively associated with measures of urban renewal success.

The data concerning urban renewal revealed that older housing cities, large cities, with lower MPO ratios, classifiable as manufacturing or diversified manufacturing, with higher extents of dilapidation, low-to-medium income levels, classifiable as not-dormitory, with lower levels of education, that are central cities, on the Atlantic seaboard and in the south east region, with commission form of government have greater tendencies to enter the program and to push on to execution and completion stages.

Younger housing, smaller cities, with higher MPO ratios, classifiable as retailing, with lowest extents of dilapidated housing, highest income, classifiable as dormitory, with highest levels of education,

that are suburban cities, in the west south central region especially and the west in general, with city manager form of government are more likely to never enter the program. The types of cities that have the greatest tendency to drop out are: medium-to-old housing cities, 35,000 to 70,000 population cities, with low but not lowest MPO ratios, classifiable as industrial, with high but not highest extent of dilapidation, medium to high income, classifiable as not-dormitory, with low but not lowest educational levels, independent cities, in New England, the east north central, and the mountain regions, with mayor-council form of government. Cities that have a greater tendency to enter the other-type-projects are: young, but not youngest, housing cities, larger cities, with medium size MPO ratios, classifiable as industrial or diversified retailing, with high but not highest dilapidation, lowest income, classifiable as not-dormitory, with high but not highest education, that are central cities, in the south Atlantic, west south central, and mountain regions, with city manager form of government.

It was shown that the community structures and characteristics that are associated with cities that reach urban renewal success tend to best fit with the structures and characteristics found to be associated with decentralized power structures by most other studies in the field. Again, this is the opposite of Hawley's interpretation of the kind of power structure that leads urban renewal success.

Hawley's published study was critically analyzed at the points of assumptions, and use of language and logic. It was argued that Hawley's interpretation of the data was based on questionable and faulty reasons and reasoning.

The thesis began with two big questions. How does one measure community power structure; especially how does one measure the power structure of numerous communities for comparative purposes? And, what factors are correlated highly with urban renewal participation and success? Hawley addressed himself to these questions and gave an answer: greater concentration of community power, as measured by low MPO ratio, leads to collective community action, as measured by urban renewal success. The present study extends and supports Hawley's data; however, it seriously questions his interpretation of the data.

Is MPO ratio a measure of concentration of community power? The writer does not have the variables (whatever they are) and the techniques of analysis that would be sufficient to give an unqualified, convincing answer. The writer can offer only the belief that MPO ratio probably is a measure of power concentration. It is not the best conceivable measure. It is a crude one -- including some occupations that should not be considered and excluding others that are important in considerations of community power. However, there are two grounds for the belief that MPO ratio is a measure of power concentration. First, in <u>all</u> the studies of community power structure one or more of the groups (managers, proprietors, and/or officials) are citied as influentials and decision-makers. It seems reasonable then to believe that the number of these persons relative to the labor force would be some kind of numerical measure of the power distribution in a community. This does not involve thinking in terms of their unity and potency. This does not involve interpreting <u>low</u> MPO ratio as measuring <u>greater</u> concentration of power. Second, MPO ratio has been shown to be consistently and significantly associated with urban renewal statuses and with welfare programs. Granted that in the two issue-areas

low MPO ratio was associated with success in the one setting and high MPO ratio was thusly associated in the other setting, still within each setting the relationships have been consistent. As noted above, this is a weak logical argument. Still, it does have pragmatic force. Until one has more firm grounds for thinking that MPO ratio does not measure concentration of community power this consistent association may be taken as offering some evidence that MPO ratio does measure concentration of power.

Is low MPO ratio a measure of greater concentration of power? Again, the writer does not have the variables and statistical techniques to give a firm and convincing answer. Any kind of answer at this point rests on comparisons with other studies which are not critically examined in their own right and rests on degrees of compatibility of the findings of the present study and the other studies. The writer, therefore, can only tentatively suggest that low MPO ratio may best be understood as a crude measure of lesser concentration of power (decentralized power structure). The grounds for this belief are: first, the better fit of the community characteristics associated both with low MPO ratio and decentralized power structures; second, the association of low MPO ratio with urban renewal success, which, in turn, is associated with decentralized power structure; third, a negative reason, Hawley's alternate interpretation is highly questionable when compared with other studies and when examined critically in its own right. The arguments involved here have their weaknesses. The answer is not fully convincing. Nevertheless, this answer seems to make more sense out of the data than the alternatives known to the writer at the present time.

What kind of theoretical framework would be consistent with the interpretation that low MPO ratios measure decentralized power structure? Alford and Aiken's model of greater numbers of centers of power with more extensive exchange relationships between them is not inconsistent with this interpretation. Lower MPO ratio means smaller number of MPO's relative to other groups. This could mean that the MPO's become one center of power among many others, or that the MPO's become a number of even smaller centers of power among numerous other centers. Hawley's finding that public administrators differ from the other groups of MPO's in relation to urban renewal is an indicator of the possibility of further divisions of the category into small centers of power.

How does the small number of MPO's fit with the thought of more numerous and extensive interfaces? Only the most indirect measures of exchange relationships have been developed. Nevertheless, those that are used in Alford and Aiken's study for which the present study has identical or parallel measures are consistent with the interpretation of low MPO ratio cities having more numerous and extensive interfaces. A smaller number of MPO's might mean that the MPO's will be more likely to go outside of their own category for many kinds of associations with other groups and thus more relationships will be established between centers of power. This interpretation is given in another setting by Pinard (1963:517). How is one to understand that a large number of MPO's (high MPO ratio) indicates centralization of power? Perhaps it is the case that as a group they dominate the community and within the category there is a tendency for only a few really top leaders to emerge.

Success in urban renewal is associated with what kind of community power structure? Probably success tends to be associated with decentralized power structure. This is affirmed very hesitantly. The present study, Alford and Aiken's study, and Clark's study could find only variables that merely have a moderate association with urban renewal success. Nevertheless, there are grounds for the belief: first, the findings, though weak, of other studies; second, the positive association in Hawley's and the present study reinterpreted MPO ratio with success; and, third, the association of particular variables, such as, commission type of government, with urban renewal success.

One could say that there are two phases to the participation of communities in urban renewal: initial involvement and persistence to completion. Both phases do not necessarily involve a great number of persons. The do involve at least one center of power that is able to establish and continue exchange relationships with other important centers. The responsibility, however, may shift from one center to another. For example, the responsibility may shift from the downtown businessmen, who might be responsible for the initial interest in the program, to the professional staff of the local Urban Renewal Board.

This is an indication that in many cases the type of power structure for the over-all community may not be the decisive determinant of success or non-success in urban renewal. Different centers of power may be involved, a small number of centers and of persons may be all that is necessary, and the community's participation may be left to "the professionals". Another way of saying this is that much of the power structure of some communities may consider urban renewal a non-issue.

The dropout cities are very interesting. They have what is necessary to enter the program but not what is necessary to persist. The dominant characteristic of these cities is their "almost" character. Concerning most of the variables, they are "low but not the lowest" or "high but not the highest". Other distinguishing characteristics are their tendency for medium to high income, while being independent cities, with relatively great extent of "need". The phenomenon of the leaders of these cities trying to keep-up with the advances of other larger, etc. cities, but not being able to do so, might be an explanation of the cities entering and then dropping out. On the other hand, it may be such a simple matter as these cities not having competent professional personnel.

Cities that tend to enter other-type-projects have a combination of the characteristics of the cities that succeed, dropout, and never enter the program. The distinguishing characteristics are: younger housing, high education, high dilapidation, and lowest income. One might argue that such cities, having some needs and not others, turn to the newer, quicker, and generally less extensive projects.

Finally, what evaluation is appropriate for the approach that Hawley brought to the study of community power structure? There is a sense in which the success of the systemic approach is highly desirable. It allows one to work with large numbers of cities for comparative purposes in a relatively short time. The findings of the approach give general standards by which individual communities may be compared.

On the other hand, it does not deal with the unique characteristics of the communities. It neglects what Alford (1967), in an earlier article, called the "short-run" factors, the situational rather than the

cultural, environmental, structural factors. James Q. Wilson cites Hawley and Pinard as examples and writes:

> This demographic approach has relied for the most part on readily available (perhaps too readily available) census materials concerning the composition of local populations to obtain factors which might be thought of as causes of policy differences . . . . There are two difficulties with this emphasis. The first is that it directs attention away from local government arrangements, political history and culture, party activities, and the political attitudes of key participants . . . . The second difficulty: in what sense have we "explained" a public policy by observing its association with certain population characteristics? . . . I suspect that human curiosity is not so easily satisfied and most of us would still want to understand the political linkages between demography (or attitudes) and policy (Wilson, 1968:4-5).

At the present time in the field of community power structure, there is a criticism of, and appreciation for, both the systemic and case study approaches. Nevertheless, there seems to be a general willingness to "trust" the case study approach most. Perhaps this is because this approach is "closer to the object of study". With Clark (1968b) one finds a sophisticated combination of approaches, though depending on case studies concerning power structure. This thesis has used as its standards, in a sense, the case studies surveyed by Gilbert (1968) and Walton (1966a, 1966b, 1968), and especially the study by Clark (1968b).

Still, the writer believes that the systemic approach should be pursued. There is need to get beyond Hawley and Alford and Aiken. Hawley gave a somewhat confused and probably erroneous interpretation of the data. Alford and Aiken's study is marred by vagueness and indefiniteness because of the great distance between their nominal concepts and operational measures. This great distance between measure and concept allows the assumptions and biases of the researcher to enter into his interpretation. The writer believes that this probably has been the case with both Hawley

and Alford and Aiken. The difference between their interpretations in large part may be seen as the old difference between the elitist (Hawley) and the pluralists (Alford and Aiken).

Using the systemic approach one will never attain the "concreteness" of the case study. Nevertheless, one can seek to find more self-evident and direct measures and seek to find variables that help explain the causal links.

APPENDIX A

THE VARIABLES

Hawley was not as explicit about the variables and their sources as he might have been.

Definitions and Sources of Variables

This appendix gives the full operational definitions and sources of the variables used in Hawley's study and the present one.

MPO Ratio

The MPO ratios are the ratios of all managers, proprietors, and officials, except farm, to the total employed civilian labor force. This is the variable that Hawley used; though he did not acknowledge that he dealt only with "civilian" labor force, and though he evidently intended to use only "managers, proprietors, and officials not elsewhere classified." His code sheets indicate that he used civilian labor force and the broader classification of MPO's. This has been confirmed in a letter received from Anne Hudson who is a former student of Hawley's. The source of my data for MPO ratios is the 1960 Census of Population, Volume I, Table 74.

Urban Renewal Status

By 1965 the last three states--Utah, Wyoming, and Idaho--passed enabling legislation for urban renewal participation. A check of the participation and success of cities in these states reveals that they are very similar to those of other states in their region. Therefore,

it was decided that it was appropriate to include cities from all fifty states in this study.

Although the urban renewal program does not require a community to be incorporated in order to participate, only incorporated cities have been included in this study because this is what Hawley did and is a standard control procedure (Sogg and Wertheimer, 1966:131).

Hawley used three categories of cities in relation to urban renewal. I have employed six categories for this variable: completion, execution, planning, dropout, never-in-program, and other-type-projects statuses.

By the end of 1969 enough cities had reached completion stage in the urban renewal program to use that category. I used Hawley's categories of execution stage, dropout, and never-in-program statuses, as well as the planning stage status which he omitted.

The sixth category of the dependent variable is composed of those few cities that participate in the urban renewal program, but do so only in the newer and different type projects that were not a part of the program during the 1950's, the time period for Hawley's study. Cities that participate in both the older type projects and the newer projects are counted only in the older type project for the purpose of this study. The newer type projects are: neighborhood development program, demonstration program, code enforcement project, general neighborhood renewal plan, interim assistance program, demolition project, community renewal program, and feasibility survey. All of these omit either the planning or the execution stage, only requiring

two and not three steps of participation, and thus are not comparable with the older type projects. Again, Hawley did not use them. Therefore, because they are not compatible with any of the other categories, this category was used as a separate one.

The sources of my data for urban renewal status are: "The Annual Reports of the Housing and Home Finance Agency," 1951-1960, and the "Monthly Reports of Urban Renewal Operations," Department of Housing and Urban Development Renewal Assistance Administration, 1961-1969. The annual and monthly reports list all cities according to completion, execution, and planning stage, and the monthly report notes the type projects in which each city is participating. The dropout category is secured by comparing each issue of the reports with the previous issue. The never-in-program cities are all those of 15,000 population and over which are not included in the above five categories. For the completion, execution, and planning stages, I used the most advanced stage that a city had achieved. Most cities had a number of projects which were in different stages. Also, I used the status and stage of cities as of December 31, 1969, as the final standard.

Age of Housing

Age of housing is arrived at by securing the percentage of residential units built by a certain time. Hawley used "1919 or before." I used 1939 because data on "1929 or before" were not available. The cities were then distinguished as "old" or "young" housing cities

relative to the median for all cities. Hawley's median was 65 percent; mine is 58 percent. The source of my data is the Housing Census, 1960, Volume I, Parts 2-8, Tables 14, 20, 23.

Extent of Dilapidation

Extent of dilapidation is computed by getting the percentage of reported dilapidated residential units in the cities and distinguishing "low" and "high" dilapidated cities relative to the median. Hawley's median was 4.7 percent. Mine is 2.8 percent. My source is the Housing Census, 1960, Volume I, Parts 2-8, Tables 12, 18, 22.

Planning Budget Size

Planning budget size is secured by determining the percentage of the total operating budget of a city devoted to planning and, again, dichotomizing the cities at the median. Hawley's median was .4 percent; mine, .6 percent. The sources of information are: The Municipal Yearbook, 1965, pp. 318ff., and The Municipal Yearbook, 1967, pp. 212ff. Data was available for 460 cities in 1965 (Hawley used 1955) limited to those that have 25,000 population or more and those that replied to questionnaires.

Metropolitan Status

Metropolitan status is based on the location of cities with respect to Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas. Central cities are the largest cities of SMSA's, usually having a population of 50,000 or more. Unlike Hawley, I did not group all non-central cities together; rather, I distinguished between those that are Suburban and Independent. Suburban cities, in my study, are all other incorporated urban places over 15,000 population located within a SMSA. Independent cities are all

incorporated urban places 15,000 population and over that are located outside the SMSA's. The source of the classification is The Municipal Yearbook, 1967, pp. 49ff.

Industry

Service or manufacturing industry is computed from the ratio of manufacturing payroll to the combined wholesale, retail, and service payrolls, and dichotomized at the median. Hawley's median was a 1.5 ratio. Mine was 1.2. Those under the median are "service cities," those over are "manufacturing cities." This category had 585 cases and was limited to cities of 25,000 population and more cities. The source is The County and City Data Book, 1962, Table 6.

Size of Manufacturing Plant

Size of manufacturing plant was arrived at by dividing the number of plants into the number of manufacturing employees and dichotomizing the cities at the median of 70 average employees for Hawley's and 51.9 employees for my study. There were 664 cases, again limited to 25,000 population plus cities. The source is The County and City Data Book, 1962, Table 6.

Median Income

Median Income is dichotomized at the overall median of $3,450 in Hawley's study and $6,044 in mine. The source is The Census of Population, 1960, Volume I, Table 33.

Educational Level

Educational level is measured by the percentage of the population, twenty-five years and older, who have completed four or more years of

college. This is dichotomized at the median of 6 percent in Hawley's study and 7.7 percent in mine. The source is Table 73 of The Census of Population, 1960, Volume I.

Regions

Hawley used the four regional classifications of the Census Bureau. The Bureau further divides these into nine areas. Because preliminary work with the data indicated that states differ in regards to urban renewal status, I employed the larger number of categories.

Variables with Quintile Distributions

In addition to dichotomizing at the median, I thought that it might be helpful with some of the variables to get more numerous categories. Like Hawley, I developed a quintile distribution of the MPO ratios. Additionally, I developed quintile distributions of city size, age of housing, extent of dilapidation, planning budget size, type of industry, size of manufacturing plant, median income, and educational level.

Four Size Classes

In addition to Hawley's size classes of 15,000 - 50,000 population cities and 50,000 population and over cities, I used four size classes: 15,000-30,000 population, 30,000-50,000 population, 50,000-100,000 population, and 100,000 and over population sizes.

Dormitory Function

Cities are classified as serving a dormitory function when the 1963 aggregate employment in manufacturing, retail, and wholesale trade, and selective services is less than 67 percent of the 1960 resident labor force engaged in manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, and business,

repair, entertainment, recreation, and personal services (other than private households). The 1960 labor force data have been adjusted by assuming that they changed by 1963 in direct proportion to estimated population change between 1960 and January 1, 1964 (utilizing 1964 estimates prepared by Rand McNally and Company). The source is The Municipal Yearbook, 1967, pp. 49ff.

Economic Functional Classification

The economic functional categories are based on data on employment in manufacturing, retailing, wholesaling, and selected service establishments as reported in the 1963 Censuses of Manufactures and Business on a place-of-work basis. Manufacturing cities are those which have 50 percent or more of aggregate employment in manufacturing, and less than 30 percent in retail trade. Industrial cities have 50 percent or more of aggregate employment in manufacturing, and over 30 percent in retail trade. In diversified-manufacturing cities employment in manufacturing is greater than retail employment, but less than 50 percent of aggregate employment. In diversified-retailing cities there is more employment in retailing than in manufacturing, but manufacturing is at least 20 percent of aggregate employment. In retailing cities retail employment is greater than manufacturing or any other component of aggregate employment, and manufacturing is less than 20 percent of aggregate employment. The source is The Municipal Yearbook, 1967, pp. 49ff.

APPENDIX B

TABLE 23

PERCENTAGES[1] AND NUMBER OF CITIES CONCERNING EDUCATION BY LOW MPO RATIO, WITH SELECTED VARIABLES CONTROLLED (NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

LOWER TWO QUINTILES OF MPO RATIO WITH CONTROL VARIABLES	EDUCATIONAL LEVELS				
	Lowest	Low	Medium	High	Highest
All Cities:	86.1 (192)	53.0 (122)	35.9 (79)	16.8 (37)	14.9 (34)
Functional Class.:					
Manufacturing	93.8 (121)	75.5 (86)	62.8 (44)	36.6 (15)	27.0 (5)
Industrial	88.9 (8)	70.0 (7)	49.0 (4)	60.0 (3)	0
Diversified Mfg.	64.7 (22)	30.4 (14)	27.4 (14)	20.5 (8)	0
Diversified Retail.	80.8 (21)	24.3 (8)	22.0 (11)	10.6 (7)	3.9 (2)
Retailing	85.0 (17)	30.0 (6)	7.2 (2)	5.2 (3)	4.1 (3)
Age of Housing:					
Youngest	88.2 (30)	52.2 (12)	31.0 (13)	10.2 (5)	11.9 (9)
Young	78.3 (18)	39.4 (13)	14.7 (5)	10.0 (7)	9.5 (6)
Medium	84.4 (27)	41.3 (19)	24.5 (12)	12.2 (5)	19.7 (11)
Old	85.3 (29)	55.7 (39)	45.9 (28)	15.1 (5)	24.0 (6)
Oldest	88.0 (88)	67.3 (39)	60.6 (20)	55.5 (15)	22.2 (2)
Region:					
New England	96.9 (32)	86.4 (19)	43.8 (7)	84.7 (6)	16.7 (1)
Middle Atlantic	92.2 (59)	84.4 (27)	57.7 (15)	32.2 (9)	10.3 (3)
South Atlantic	71.5 (5)	41.3 (12)	22.2 (7)	17.6 (6)	26.9 (7)
East South Central	70.0 (7)	31.3 (5)	23.5 (4)	10.0 (1)	28.6 (2)
West South Central	27.3 (3)	15.4 (4)	9.6 (2)	11.1 (4)	6.7 (1)
East North Central	89.6 (60)	62.9 (39)	59.6 (31)	24.1 (7)	17.5 (10)
West North Central	55.5 (5)	35.0 (7)	33.3 (7)	8.7 (2)	16.6 (4)
Mountain	100.0 (1)	0	22.2 (2)	0	8.3 (2)
Pacific	95.5 (21)	47.4 (9)	16.0 (4)	4.9 (2)	9.1 (4)
Metro. Status:					
Central Cities	91.8 (45)	65.6 (42)	42.4 (25)	15.9 (11)	18.2 (6)
Independent Cities	64.6 (31)	37.2 (39)	27.4 (15)	11.7 (9)	23.5 (12)
Suburban	92.0 (116)	67.2 (41)	52.0 (39)	23.0 (17)	11.2 (16)
City Size Quintile:					
First (Smallest)	72.1 (31)	40.0 (22)	41.1 (14)	19.5 (8)	21.3 (10)
Second	76.1 (35)	51.2 (21)	30.4 (14)	6.8 (3)	12.5 (6)
Third	91.7 (33)	44.2 (19)	25.0 (12)	20.5 (8)	17.0 (10)
Fourth	94.7 (54)	55.8 (24)	46.3 (19)	29.5 (8)	4.7 (2)
Fifth (Largest)	95.2 (39)	75.0 (36)	39.2 (20)	18.2 (10)	18.7 (6)

TABLE 23--Continued

LOWER TWO QUINTILES OF MPO RATIO WITH CONTROL VARIABLES	EDUCATIONAL LEVELS				
	Lowest	Low	Medium	High	Highest
Median Income:					
Lowest	65.8 (25)	28.4 (19)	10.9 (6)	17.3 (8)	11.8 (2)
Low	91.5 (57)	48.0 (23)	23.8 (10)	9.3 (4)	38.1 (8)
Medium	94.7 (53)	62.9 (34)	52.8 (28)	15.0 (6)	33.3 (7)
High	95.6 (44)	84.7 (39)	52.4 (22)	29.8 (14)	21.0 (9)
Highest	100.0 (13)	46.7 (7)	46.4 (13)	11.4 (5)	6.3 (8)

[1]The percentages are of the cities in each educational level (column percentages) that are within the lower two quintiles rather than the other quintiles of MPO ratio, controlled by the selected variables.

TABLE 24

PERCENTAGES[1] AND NUMBER OF CITIES CONCERNING EDUCATION BY HIGH MPO RATIO, WITH SELECTED VARIABLES CONTROLLED (NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

HIGHER TWO QUINTILES OF MPO RATIO WITH CONTROL VARIABLES	EDUCATIONAL LEVELS				
	Lowest	Low	Medium	High	Highest
All Cities:	5.3 (12)	25.7 (59)	40.9 (90)	54.6 (120)	70.7 (162)
Functional Class.:					
Manufacturing	2.3 (3)	9.7 (11)	15.8 (11)	25.4 (10)	54.0 (20)
Industrial	11.1 (1)	10.0 (1)	25.0 (2)	0	100.0 (2)
Diversified Mfg.	8.8 (3)	34.7 (16)	37.2 (19)	41.1 (16)	72.8 (16)
Diversified Retail.	15.3 (4)	51.6 (17)	58.0 (29)	63.6 (42)	74.5 (38)
Retailing	5.0 (1)	50.0 (10)	78.6 (22)	79.3 (46)	93.1 (68)
Age of Housing:					
Youngest	5.9 (2)	8.3 (2)	50.0 (21)	57.2 (28)	80.3 (61)
Young	8.6 (2)	48.5 (16)	70.6 (24)	65.4 (46)	71.4 (45)
Medium	6.3 (2)	43.4 (20)	55.1 (27)	68.2 (28)	57.1 (32)
Old	8.8 (3)	20.0 (14)	21.4 (13)	48.5 (16)	68.0 (17)
Oldest	3.0 (3)	12.0 (7)	15.2 (5)	7.4 (2)	77.8 (7)
Regions:					
New England	0	4.5 (1)	31.3 (5)	0	50.0 (3)
Middle Atlantic	0	9.4 (3)	19.2 (5)	32.2 (9)	86.2 (25)
South Atlantic	0	31.0 (9)	51.5 (17)	67.6 (23)	37.4 (10)
East South Central	20.0 (2)	56.3 (9)	58.9 (10)	50.0 (5)	42.9 (3)
West South Central	36.4 (4)	69.2 (18)	81.0 (17)	69.3 (25)	66.6 (10)
East North Central	6.0 (4)	8.0 (5)	17.3 (9)	24.1 (7)	76.0 (41)
West North Central	22.2 (2)	40.0 (8)	47.6 (10)	52.2 (12)	66.6 (16)
Mountain	0	50.0 (2)	55.5 (5)	91.7 (11)	83.4 (20)
Pacific	0	21.1 (4)	48.0 (12)	68.3 (28)	77.3 (34)
Metro. Status:					
Central City	4.1 (2)	14.1 (9)	35.6 (21)	63.7 (44)	60.7 (20)
Independent City	14.6 (7)	41.0 (43)	57.0 (49)	59.8 (46)	47.1 (24)
Suburban City	2.4 (3)	11.5 (7)	26.7 (20)	40.6 (30)	81.0 (115)
City Size Quintile:					
First (Smallest)	7.0 (3)	40.0 (22)	35.3 (12)	36.6 (15)	68.1 (32)
Second	13.1 (6)	31.7 (13)	42.2 (24)	63.6 (28)	70.9 (34)
Third	2.8 (3)	32.6 (21)	50.0 (26)	53.8 (21)	69.5 (17)
Fourth	3.5 (2)	16.3 (7)	36.6 (15)	53.4 (26)	81.4 (35)
Fifth (Largest)	0	6.3 (3)	29.4 (15)	54.6 (30)	62.6 (20)

TABLE 24--Continued

HIGHER TWO QUINTILES OF MPO RATIO WITH CONTROL VARIABLES	EDUCATIONAL LEVELS				
	Lowest	Low	Medium	High	Highest
Median Income:					
Lowest	21.0 (8)	45.2 (37)	69.1 (38)	67.4 (31)	41.2 (7)
Low	2.9 (2)	29.1 (14)	45.3 (19)	60.4 (26)	42.9 (9)
Medium	1.8 (1)	11.2 (6)	30.2 (16)	70.0 (24)	52.4 (11)
High	2.2 (1)	2.2 (1)	11.9 (5)	36.2 (17)	51.2 (22)
Highest	0	6.7 (1)	42.8 (12)	50.0 (22)	89.0 (113)

[1]The percentages are of the cities in each educational level (column percentages) that are within the higher two quintiles rather than the other quintiles of MPO ratio, controlled by the selected variables.

TABLE 25

PERCENTAGES[1] AND NUMBER OF CITIES CONCERNING FUNCTION CLASSIFICATION BY LOW MPO RATIO, WITH SELECTED VARIABLES CONTROLLED (NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

LOWER TWO QUINTILES OF MPO RATIO WITH CONTROL VARIABLES	FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION				
	Manufacturing	Industrial	Diversified Mfg.	Diversified Retail.	Retailing
All Cities	70.6 (276)	64.7 (22)	30.2 (58)	21.7 (49)	15.5 (31)
Age of Housing:					
Youngest	41.5 (22)	33.3 (1)	42.8 (6)	32.7 (14)	18.9 (17)
Young	62.5 (20)	60.0 (3)	16.6 (6)	10.0 (7)	12.5 (7)
Medium	62.9 (49)	66.7 (4)	10.5 (4)	17.6 (9)	5.8 (2)
Old	71.1 (76)	72.7 (8)	24.5 (11)	16.2 (6)	18.8 (3)
Oldest	90.1 (109)	66.7 (6)	52.5 (31)	50.0 (12)	37.5 (3)
Region:					
New England	84.2 (48)	50.0 (2)	66.7 (10)	40.0 (2)	100.0 (1)
Middle Atlantic	85.7 (78)	80.0 (4)	50.0 (18)	38.1 (8)	10.0 (2)
South Atlantic	62.6 (20)	75.0 (3)	11.5 (3)	18.9 (7)	13.6 (3)
East South Central	35.3 (6)	100.0 (1)	30.4 (7)	15.4 (2)	50.0 (2)
West South Central	27.3 (3)	100.0 (2)	5.6 (1)	5.3 (2)	10.0 (3)
East North Central	73.9 (99)	70.0 (7)	34.5 (10)	36.9 (14)	23.0 (9)
West North Central	45.0 (9)	20.0 (1)	20.0 (4)	21.7 (5)	4.8 (1)
Mountain	0	0	0	11.1 (1)	0
Pacific	44.8 (13)	66.7 (2)	20.8 (5)	19.0 (8)	26.4 (10)
Type of Government:					
Commission	69.6 (32)	60.0 (3)	15.3 (4)	15.8 (3)	18.8 (3)
City Manager	60.7 (82)	76.9 (10)	22.0 (18)	19.7 (27)	11.4 (14)
Mayor-Council	76.9 (160)	56.3 (9)	42.9 (36)	27.1 (19)	22.1 (13)
Dormitory Function:					
No	71.0 (269)	67.7 (21)	27.0 (49)	15.1 (26)	7.2 (8)
Yes	58.4 (7)	33.3 (1)	81.9 (9)	42.6 (23)	25.8 (23)
Metro. Status:					
Central City	84.6 (88)	100.0 (3)	34.9 (22)	17.9 (10)	5.4 (2)
Independent City	57.2 (72)	50.0 (7)	11.2 (8)	8.0 (6)	4.0 (2)
Suburban City	72.4 (116)	75.1 (12)	48.3 (28)	34.7 (33)	24.1 (27)
City Size Quintile:					
First (Smallest)	62.1 (46)	77.8 (7)	20.0 (5)	31.1 (14)	11.3 (5)
Second	64.8 (46)	0	25.7 (9)	21.6 (11)	16.7 (8)
Third	63.0 (46)	71.4 (5)	22.9 (8)	13.2 (5)	16.4 (8)
Fourth	77.4 (65)	66.6 (8)	40.0 (14)	25.0 (10)	20.0 (8)
Fifth (Largest)	82.0 (73)	66.7 (2)	35.4 (22)	17.3 (9)	11.1 (2)

TABLE 25--Continued

LOWER TWO QUINTILES OF MPO RATIO WITH CONTROL VARIABLES	FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION				
	Manufacturing	Industrial	Diversified Mfg.	Diversified Retail.	Retailing
Median Income:					
Lowest	61.7 (29)	80.0 (4)	15.4 (8)	13.2 (9)	14.3 (5)
Low	73.0 (65)	57.2 (4)	34.6 (18)	20.0 (7)	3.7 (1)
Medium	82.1 (83)	77.8 (7)	44.1 (15)	23.7 (9)	28.6 (8)
High	80.4 (78)	60.0 (6)	41.9 (13)	43.6 (17)	28.2 (9)
Highest	36.8 (21)	33.3 (1)	17.3 (4)	15.2 (7)	10.4 (8)
Dilapidation:					
Lowest	46.7 (29)	50.0 (2)	35.0 (7)	20.0 (9)	13.2 (10)
Low	79.6 (78)	28.6 (2)	38.7 (12)	22.2 (8)	29.7 (11)
Medium	79.3 (73)	90.0 (9)	30.2 (13)	26.4 (9)	12.2 (4)
High	73.5 (61)	75.0 (3)	30.6 (15)	27.3 (12)	5.6 (1)
Highest	62.5 (35)	66.6 (6)	22.4 (11)	15.1 (10)	14.3 (5)

[1]The percentages are of the cities in each functional classification (column percentages) that are within the lower two quintiles rather than the other quintiles of MPO ratio, controlled by selected variables.

TABLE 26

PERCENTAGES[1] AND NUMBER OF CITIES CONCERNING FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION BY HIGH MPO RATIO, WITH SELECTED VARIABLES CONTROLLED (NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

HIGHER TWO QUINTILES OF MPO RATIO WITH CONTROL VARIABLES	FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION				
	Manufacturing	Industrial	Diversified Mfg.	Diversified Retail.	Retailing
All Cities	14.0 (55)	17.7 (6)	36.4 (70)	57.6 (130)	73.9 (147)
Age of Housing:					
Youngest	37.7 (20)	0	21.4 (3)	51.1 (22)	68.3 (58)
Young	12.5 (4)	40.0 (2)	47.2 (17)	74.3 (52)	78.6 (44)
Medium	23.1 (18)	16.7 (1)	63.2 (24)	62.7 (32)	85.3 (29)
Old	8.4 (9)	18.2 (2)	40.0 (18)	51.3 (19)	75.1 (12)
Oldest	3.3 (4)	11.1 (1)	13.6 (8)	20.8 (5)	50.0 (4)
Region:					
New England	8.8 (5)	25.0 (1)	13.4 (2)	20.0 (1)	0
Middle Atlantic	6.6 (6)	20.0 (1)	25.0 (9)	38.1 (8)	80.0 (16)
South Atlantic	12.5 (4)	25.0 (1)	34.6 (9)	56.7 (21)	86.3 (19)
East South Central	35.3 (6)	0	52.2 (12)	61.5 (8)	50.0 (2)
West South Central	36.4 (4)	0	66.7 (12)	86.8 (33)	70.0 (21)
East North Central	10.4 (14)	20.0 (2)	24.1 (7)	34.2 (13)	66.7 (26)
West North Central	30.0 (6)	20.0 (1)	55.0 (11)	47.8 (11)	85.7 (18)
Mountain	0	0	100.0 (1)	77.8 (7)	83.3 (20)
Pacific	34.4 (10)	0	29.1 (7)	66.7 (28)	65.8 (25)
Type of Government:					
Commission	17.4 (8)	40.0 (2)	42.3 (11)	52.6 (10)	75.0 (12)
City Manager	20.0 (27)	7.7 (1)	42.7 (35)	61.4 (84)	77.2 (95)
Mayor-Council	9.6 (20)	18.8 (3)	28.5 (24)	51.5 (36)	67.8 (40)
Dormitory Function:					
No	13.2 (50)	16.2 (5)	38.1 (69)	62.2 (107)	84.6 (93)
Yes	41.7 (5)	33.3 (1)	9.1 (1)	42.6 (23)	60.7 (54)
Metropolitan Status					
Central City	5.8 (6)	0	30.2 (19)	62.5 (35)	81.0 (30)
Independent City	15.9 (20)	28.5 (4)	50.7 (36)	69.3 (52)	68.0 (44)
Suburban City	17.5 (28)	6.3 (1)	25.8 (15)	45.3 (43)	65.2 (73)
City Size Quintile:					
First (Smallest)	16.3 (12)	22.2 (2)	36.0 (9)	44.4 (20)	72.7 (32)
Second	23.9 (17)	33.3 (1)	40.0 (14)	62.8 (32)	70.8 (34)
Third	16.5 (12)	14.3 (1)	48.6 (17)	63.2 (24)	73.5 (36)
Fourth	10.7 (9)	16.6 (2)	31.4 (11)	62.5 (25)	75.0 (30)
Fifth (Largest)	5.6 (5)	0	30.6 (19)	55.8 (29)	83.3 (15)

TABLE 26--Continued

HIGHER TWO QUINTILES OF MPO RATIO WITH CONTROL VARIABLES	FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION				
	Manufacturing	Industrial	Diversified Mfg.	Diversified Retail.	Retailing
Median Income:					
Lowest	23.4 (11)	20.0 (1)	50.0 (26)	72.1 (49)	77.2 (27)
Low	10.1 (9)	28.6 (2)	32.7 (17)	48.6 (17)	77.7 (21)
Medium	4.0 (4)	11.1 (1)	26.5 (9)	52.6 (20)	67.8 (19)
High	5.2 (5)	10.0 (1)	9.7 (3)	35.9 (14)	53.2 (17)
Highest	45.6 (26)	33.3 (1)	65.2 (15)	65.2 (30)	81.8 (63)
Dilapidation:					
Lowest	38.7 (24)	0	45.0 (9)	62.2 (28)	79.0 (60)
Low	7.1 (7)	42.9 (3)	22.6 (7)	44.5 (16)	56.7 (21)
Medium	8.7 (8)	0	32.6 (14)	50.0 (17)	81.8 (27)
High	6.0 (5)	25.0 (1)	36.8 (18)	52.3 (23)	88.9 (16)
Highest	19.7 (11)	22.2 (2)	44.9 (22)	69.7 (46)	65.7 (23)

[1]The percentages are of the cities in each functional classification (column percentages) that are within the higher two quintiles rather than the other quintiles of MPO ratios, controlled by selected variables.

TABLE 27

PERCENTAGES[1] AND NUMBER OF CITIES CONCERNING AGE OF HOUSING BY LOW MPO RATIO, WITH SELECTED VARIABLES CONTROLLED (NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

LOWER TWO QUINTILES OF MPO RATIO WITH CONTROL VARIABLES	AGE OF HOUSING				
	Youngest	Young	Medium	Old	Oldest
All Cities	30.8 (69)	22.0 (49)	33.0 (74)	48.0 (107)	72.2 (164)
Region:					
New England	0	0	58.3 (7)	79.2 (19)	82.6 (38)
Middle Atlantic	27.3 (3)	46.2 (6)	33.3 (6)	46.2 (18)	81.7 (80)
South Atlantic	11.8 (2)	22.2 (10)	38.4 (15)	30.0 (6)	50.0 (4)
East South Central	20.0 (1)	25.0 (5)	20.8 (5)	66.6 (6)	100.0 (2)
West South Central	21.7 (5)	9.3 (5)	13.0 (3)	0	50.0 (1)
East North Central	42.3 (25)	31.8 (7)	68.8 (31)	60.8 (51)	61.1 (33)
West North Central	23.5 (4)	36.4 (4)	18.5 (5)	18.5 (5)	42.9 (6)
Mountain	15.8 (3)	16.7 (2)	0	0	0
Pacific	35.6 (26)	22.2 (10)	9.5 (2)	20.0 (2)	0
Metro. Status:					
Central City	5.6 (1)	9.0 (6)	36.5 (19)	61.3 (38)	86.7 (63)
Independent City	11.8 (2)	14.5 (10)	20.4 (22)	30.1 (28)	55.0 (44)
Suburban City	35.3 (66)	37.9 (33)	52.3 (33)	60.3 (41)	76.4 (55)
City Size Quintile:					
First (Smallest)	41.2 (21)	33.4 (13)	33.3 (15)	34.9 (15)	50.0 (21)
Second	30.8 (16)	27.2 (15)	24.5 (11)	40.5 (15)	60.0 (21)
Third	25.5 (14)	19.0 (8)	37.8 (20)	40.4 (17)	69.7 (23)
Fourth	28.5 (12)	17.1 (7)	32.6 (14)	62.3 (28)	85.2 (46)
Fifth (Largest)	25.0 (6)	13.1 (6)	36.9 (14)	57.1 (32)	84.2 (53)
Median Income:					
Lowest	14.3 (2)	15.1 (11)	24.3 (19)	25.9 (7)	67.8 (21)
Low	21.4 (3)	15.6 (5)	21.3 (7)	44.0 (22)	68.5 (65)
Medium	42.8 (9)	25.0 (7)	37.8 (14)	57.7 (41)	84.8 (56)
High	51.8 (29)	43.7 (21)	58.2 (25)	63.4 (33)	80.0 (20)
Highest	21.9 (26)	11.9 (5)	27.3 (9)	17.4 (4)	20.0 (2)

[1]The percentages are of cities in each category of the age of housing (column percentages) that are within the lower two quintiles rather than the other quintiles of MPO ratio, controlled by selected variables.

TABLE 28

PERCENTAGES[1] AND NUMBER OF CITIES CONCERNING AGE OF HOUSING BY HIGH MPO RATIO, WITH SELECTED VARIABLES CONTROLLED (NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

HIGHER TWO QUINTILES OF MPO RATIO WITH CONTROL VARIABLES	AGE OF HOUSING				
	Youngest	Young	Medium	Old	Oldest
All Cities	50.9 (114)	59.6 (133)	48.6 (109)	28.2 (63)	10.5 (24)
Region:					
New England	0	0	16.6 (2)	12.5 (3)	8.7 (4)
Middle Atlantic	63.6 (7)	46.2 (6)	50.0 (9)	35.9 (14)	6.1 (6)
South Atlantic	70.6 (12)	55.5 (25)	33.3 (13)	45.0 (9)	0
East South Central	40.0 (2)	55.0 (11)	58.4 (14)	22.2 (2)	0
West South Central	47.8 (11)	74.1 (40)	73.9 (17)	85.8 (6)	0
East North Central	47.5 (28)	54.5 (12)	15.6 (7)	9.6 (8)	20.4 (11)
West North Central	53.0 (9)	45.5 (5)	62.9 (17)	55.5 (15)	14.3 (2)
Mountain	68.4 (13)	83.2 (10)	86.6 (13)	66.6 (2)	0
Pacific	43.9 (32)	53.4 (24)	81.0 (17)	40.0 (4)	50.0 (1)
Metro. Status:					
Central City	77.8 (14)	71.7 (48)	42.3 (22)	12.9 (8)	5.3 (4)
Independent City	76.4 (13)	68.1 (47)	57.4 (62)	38.8 (36)	13.7 (11)
Suburban City	45.5 (85)	43.6 (38)	38.1 (24)	27.9 (19)	12.5 (9)
City Size Quintile:					
First (Smallest)	39.3 (20)	43.5 (17)	46.6 (21)	41.9 (18)	19.0 (8)
Second	59.7 (31)	54.5 (30)	55.6 (25)	37.8 (14)	14.3 (5)
Third	56.3 (31)	61.9 (26)	49.0 (26)	33.3 (14)	12.2 (4)
Fourth	45.2 (19)	78.1 (32)	48.8 (2)	15.6 (7)	11.2 (6)
Fifth (Largest)	54.2 (13)	60.8 (28)	42.1 (16)	17.9 (10)	1.6 (1)
Median Income:					
Lowest	78.6 (11)	65.7 (48)	55.1 (43)	55.5 (15)	12.9 (4)
Low	42.9 (6)	68.8 (22)	48.5 (16)	34.0 (17)	9.5 (9)
Medium	42.9 (9)	64.3 (18)	48.6 (18)	12.7 (9)	6.1 (4)
High	25.0 (14)	31.2 (15)	27.9 (12)	9.6 (5)	0
Highest	62.2 (74)	71.4 (30)	60.6 (20)	73.9 (17)	70.0 (7)

[1]The percentages are of cities in each category of the age of housing (column percentages) that are within the higher two quintiles rather than the other quintiles of MPO ratio, controlled by selected variables.

TABLE 29

PERCENTAGES[1] AND NUMBER OF CITIES CONCERNING REGION BY LOW MPO RATIO, WITH SELECTED VARIABLES CONTROLLED (NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

LOWER TWO QUINTILES OF MPO RATIO WITH CONTROL VARIABLES	REGIONS								
	New England	Middle Atlantic	South Atlantic	East South Central	West South Central	East North Central	West North Central	Mountain	Pacific
All Cities	77.1 (65)	63.1 (113)	28.7 (37)	21.7 (19)	12.8 (14)	54.7 (147)	25.8 (25)	10.0 (5)	26.5 (40)
Metro. Status:									
Central City	83.9 (26)	93.9 (31)	31.8 (13)	42.9 (6)	4.9 (2)	82.0 (41)	30.0 (6)	6.7 (1)	10.3 (3)
Independent City	64.0 (16)	61.5 (24)	25.9 (16)	14.3 (5)	8.9 (4)	44.1 (30)	17.7 (8)	4.2 (1)	8.4 (2)
Suburban City	81.4 (22)	54.2 (58)	30.8 (8)	72.7 (8)	34.7 (8)	52.1 (76)	36.6 (11)	27.3 (3)	36.1 (35)
City Size Quintile:									
First (Smallest)	42.9 (3)	55.8 (24)	46.4 (13)	45.5 (5)	15.8 (3)	40.0 (24)	23.8 (5)	18.2 (2)	30.0 (6)
Second	75.0 (9)	52.4 (22)	16.0 (4)	20.0 (2)	11.1 (3)	43.7 (21)	27.3 (6)	12.5 (1)	35.5 (11)
Third	75.1 (12)	60.6 (20)	12.0 (3)	21.1 (4)	30.0 (6)	53.3 (24)	19.0 (4)	14.3 (2)	21.9 (7)
Fourth	95.2 (20)	72.4 (21)	33.4 (7)	33.3 (3)	4.8 (1)	64.6 (42)	25.0 (4)	0	26.5 (9)
Fifth (Largest)	74.1 (20)	81.2 (26)	33.3 (10)	45.5 (5)	4.5 (1)	78.2 (36)	35.3 (6)	0	20.6 (7)
Median Income:									
Lowest	100.0 (6)	83.3 (10)	24.1 (19)	33.3 (15)	8.3 (5)	28.6 (2)	10.0 (1)	50.0 (1)	50.0 (1)
Low	59.0 (13)	75.4 (40)	32.2 (9)	33.3 (3)	12.0 (3)	55.8 (24)	28.0 (7)	8.3 (1)	28.6 (2)
Medium	90.6 (29)	91.4 (32)	45.5 (5)	0	23.1 (3)	69.8 (44)	16.6 (4)	16.7 (3)	29.6 (8)
High	83.3 (15)	78.8 (26)	25.0 (1)	0	37.5 (3)	75.8 (50)	57.9 (11)	0	36.1 (22)
Highest	20.0 (1)	10.8 (5)	42.9 (3)	50.0 (1)	0	31.7 (27)	10.6 (2)	0	13.0 (7)

[1]The percentages are of cities in each region (column percentages) that are within the lower two quintiles rather than the other quintiles of MPO ratio, controlled by selected variables.

TABLE 30

PERCENTAGES[1] AND NUMBER OF CITIES CONCERNING REGION BY HIGH MPO RATIO, WITH SELECTED VARIABLES CONTROLLED (NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

HIGHER TWO QUINTILES OF MPO RATIO WITH CONTROL VARIABLES	REGIONS								
	New England	Middle Atlantic	South Atlantic	East South Central	West South Central	East North Central	West North Central	Mountain	Pacific
All Cities	10.8 (9)	23.5 (42)	45.7 (59)	48.4 (29)	67.9 (74)	25.0 (66)	49.5 (48)	76.0 (38)	51.7 (78)
Metro. Status:									
Central City	6.5 (2)	0	46.4 (19)	35.7 (5)	80.4 (33)	4.0 (2)	35.0 (7)	73.3 (11)	58.6 (17)
Independent City	16.0 (4)	12.8 (5)	46.8 (29)	60.0 (21)	75.6 (34)	17.6 (12)	55.6 (25)	87.5 (21)	75.0 (18)
Suburban City	11.1 (3)	34.5 (37)	42.3 (11)	27.3 (3)	30.4 (7)	35.6 (52)	46.7 (14)	54.6 (6)	43.3 (42)
City Size Quintile:									
First (Smallest)	28.6 (2)	25.6 (11)	42.9 (12)	27.3 (3)	52.6 (10)	31.6 (19)	47.6 (10)	34.6 (6)	55.0 (11)
Second	16.7 (2)	33.3 (14)	52.0 (13)	60.0 (6)	74.0 (20)	35.4 (17)	36.3 (8)	87.5 (7)	58.1 (18)
Third	6.3 (1)	27.3 (9)	48.0 (12)	68.5 (13)	45.0 (9)	33.4 (15)	66.6 (14)	71.5 (10)	56.3 (18)
Fourth	4.8 (1)	20.7 (6)	42.8 (9)	44.4 (4)	81.0 (17)	20.0 (13)	68.8 (11)	100.0 (9)	44.1 (15)
Fifth (Largest)	11.1 (3)	6.2 (2)	43.3 (13)	27.3 (3)	81.8 (18)	4.4 (2)	29.4 (5)	75.0 (6)	47.1 (16)
Median Income:									
Lowest	0	8.3 (1)	53.1 (42)	48.8 (22)	73.3 (44)	28.6 (2)	80.0 (8)	50.0 (1)	50.0 (1)
Low	22.7 (5)	7.5 (4)	35.7 (10)	44.4 (4)	68.0 (17)	16.3 (7)	48.0 (12)	58.3 (7)	57.2 (4)
Medium	0	0	36.4 (4)	0	69.3 (9)	7.9 (5)	50.0 (12)	72.2 (13)	55.5 (15)
High	5.6 (1)	6.1 (2)	50.0 (2)	66.6 (2)	12.5 (1)	4.5 (3)	10.6 (2)	91.6 (11)	36.1 (22)
Highest	60.0 (3)	76.1 (35)	14.3 (1)	50.0 (1)	100.0 (3)	57.7 (49)	73.7 (14)	100.0 (6)	66.7 (36)

[1]The percentages are of cities in each region (column percentages) that are within the higher two quintiles rather than the other quintiles of MPO ratio, controlled by selected variables.

APPENDIX C

OCCUPATIONS IN MPO

The information on occupations included and excluded from the Census category of "managers, proprietors, and officials, excluding farming" is found in The Census of Population, 1960, Volume I, Parts 2-51, Table 121.

The MPO category does not include professional and technical workers, like: authors, clergymen, college administrators and professors, editors and reporters, lawyers and judges, social and natural scientists, personnel and labor relations workers, physicians, social and welfare workers, and teachers.

The category includes: buyers, department heads, floormen, and floor managers of stores; buyers and shippers of farm products; other purchasing agents and buyers; credit men; managers and superintendents of buildings, officials of lodges, societies, and unions; officials, administrators, and inspectors in public administration on the federal, state, and local levels; postmasters; railroad conductors; officers, pilots, pursers, and engineers of ships; other salaried and self-employed managers, proprietors, and officials in construction, manufacturing, transportation, communications, utilities and sanitary services, wholesale trade, retail trade, banking and other finance, insurance and real estate, business services, automobile repair services and garages, other repair services, personal services, and all other industries.

APPENDIX D

TABLE 43

PERCENTAGES[1] AND NUMBER OF CITIES ACCORDING TO AGE OF HOUSING BY COMPLETION STAGE OF URBAN RENEWAL, WITH SELECTED VARIABLES CONTROLLED (NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

COMPLETION STAGE WITH CONTROL VARIABLES	AGE OF HOUSING				
	Youngest	Young	Medium	Old	Oldest
All Cities	5.4 (12)	13.5 (30)	12.1 (27)	19.7 (44)	34.4 (78)
Metro Status:					
Central City	5.6 (1)	23.9 (16)	23.1 (12)	43.5 (27)	60.0 (45)
Independent	5.9 (1)	13.0 (9)	11.1 (12)	9.7 (9)	18.8 (15)
Suburban	5.3 (10)	5.7 (5)	3.2 (2)	11.8 (8)	25.0 (18)
Regions:					
New England	0	0	16.7 (2)	25.0 (6)	30.4 (14)
Mdl. Atlantic	0	0	0	25.6 (10)	43.9 (43)
S. Atlantic	5.9 (1)	20.0 (9)	17.9 (7)	40.0 (8)	25.0 (2)
E. S. Central	20.0 (1)	60.0 (12)	29.2 (7)	33.3 (3)	50.0 (1)
W. S. Central	4.3 (1)	5.6 (3)	13.0 (3)	0	0
E. N. Central	6.8 (4)	9.1 (2)	8.9 (4)	14.3 (12)	24.1 (13)
W. N. Central	0	0	11.1 (3)	14.8 (4)	35.7 (5)
Mountain	0	0	0	0	0
Pacific	6.8 (5)	8.9 (4)	4.8 (1)	10.0 (1)	0
Dilapidation:					
Lowest	3.3 (4)	2.6 (1)	3.6 (1)	4.2 (1)	17.6 (3)
Low	8.3 (4)	5.4 (2)	4.2 (2)	21.2 (11)	40.0 (16)
Medium	4.5 (1)	7.9 (3)	7.1 (3)	25.9 (14)	42.6 (29)
High	12.5 (2)	21.1 (8)	21.9 (7)	17.2 (10)	28.2 (20)
Highest	6.7 (1)	22.2 (16)	18.9 (14)	22.9 (8)	32.3 (10)
MPO Ratio:					
Lowest	15.0 (6)	10.5 (2)	9.1 (2)	36.6 (15)	46.8 (44)
Low	10.3 (3)	20.0 (6)	19.5 (8)	16.7 (11)	34.3 (24)
Medium	4.9 (2)	12.2 (5)	19.5 (8)	18.9 (10)	17.9 (7)
High	0	22.4 (15)	7.9 (5)	16.7 (6)	18.8 (3)
Highest	1.3 (1)	3.0 (2)	6.5 (3)	7.4 (2)	0
Median Income:					
Lowest	7.1 (1)	20.5 (15)	19.2 (15)	18.5 (5)	35.5 (11)
Low	7.1 (1)	18.8 (6)	18.2 (6)	20.0 (10)	32.6 (31)
Medium	4.8 (1)	14.3 (4)	8.1 (3)	19.7 (14)	43.9 (29)
High	7.1 (4)	8.3 (4)	4.7 (2)	25.0 (13)	28.0 (7)
Highest	4.2 (5)	2.4 (1)	3.0 (1)	8.7 (2)	0

TABLE 43--Continued

COMPLETION STAGE WITH CONTROL VARIABLE	AGE OF HOUSING				
	Youngest	Young	Medium	Old	Oldest
Funct. Classif.:					
Manufacturing	7.5 (4)	12.5 (4)	10.3 (8)	23.4 (25)	42.1 (51)
Industrial	0	0	33.3 (2)	9.1 (1)	0
Div. Manufac.	7.1 (1)	27.8 (10)	18.4 (7)	31.1 (14)	30.5 (18)
Div. Retail.	4.7 (2)	14.3 (10)	11.8 (6)	8.1 (3)	25.0 (6)
Retailing	5.9 (5)	8.9 (5)	5.9 (2)	0	25.0 (2)
Dormitory Func.:					
No	4.7 (6)	14.8 (27)	12.7 (26)	21.0 (44)	36.1 (75)
Yes	6.4 (6)	7.5 (3)	5.3 (1)	0	15.8 (3)
Education:					
Lowest	14.7 (5)	8.7 (2)	6.3 (2)	14.7 (5)	40.0 (40)
Low	8.7 (2)	15.2 (5)	15.2 (7)	20.0 (14)	31.0 (18)
Medium	0	14.7 (5)	8.2 (4)	26.2 (16)	39.4 (13)
High	2.0 (1)	15.7 (11)	12.2 (5)	24.2 (8)	22.2 (6)
Highest	5.3 (4)	11.1 (7)	16.1 (9)	4.0 (1)	11.1 (1)
Type Government:					
Commission	0	34.8 (8)	13.0 (3)	3.4 (1)	68.4 (26)
City Manager	5.6 (9)	12.1 (17)	11.4 (12)	21.8 (17)	33.3 (20)
Mayor-Council	5.3 (3)	8.5 (5)	12.5 (12)	22.6 (26)	24.4 (31)
City Size:					
1st Quintile (Smallest)	3.9 (1)	5.1 (2)	2.2 (1)	7.0 (3)	14.3 (6)
2nd Quintile	0	9.1 (5)	8.9 (4)	5.4 (2)	11.4 (4)
3rd Quintile	5.5 (1)	11.9 (5)	9.4 (5)	14.3 (6)	30.3 (10)
4th Quintile	14.3 (4)	4.9 (2)	11.6 (5)	20.0 (9)	35.2 (19)
5th Quintile (Largest)	16.7 (4)	34.8 (16)	31.6 (12)	42.9 (24)	61.9 (39)

[1]The percentages are of cities in each category of age of housing (column percentages) that also are in completion stage rather than the other statuses of urban renewal, controlled by the selected variables.

TABLE 44

PERCENTAGES[1] AND NUMBER OF CITIES ACCORDING TO CITY SIZE BY COMPLETION STAGE OF URBAN RENEWAL, WITH SELECTED VARIABLES CONTROLLED (NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

COMPLETION STAGE WITH CONTROL VARIABLES	CITY SIZE QUINTILES				
	1st (Smallest)	2nd	3rd	4th	5th (Largest)
All Cities	5.9 (13)	8.0 (18)	12.0 (27)	17.3 (39)	41.9 (95)
Metro. Status:					
Central City	25.0 (1)	16.7 (1)	17.6 (3)	20.3 (14)	46.1 (82)
Independent	7.1 (7)	10.4 (11)	14.0 (14)	20.3 (12)	66.7 (2)
Suburban	4.3 (5)	5.4 (6)	9.3 (10)	12.6 (12)	23.9 (11)
Regions:					
New England	0	16.7 (2)	18.8 (3)	14.3 (3)	51.9 (14)
Mdl. Atlantic	14.0 (6)	7.1 (3)	27.3 (9)	48.3 (14)	65.6 (21)
S. Atlantic	3.6 (1)	4.0 (1)	4.0 (1)	23.8 (5)	63.3 (19)
E. S. Central	18.2 (2)	40.0 (4)	47.4 (9)	11.1 (1)	72.7 (8)
W. S. Central	5.3 (1)	7.4 (2)	5.0 (1)	0	13.6 (3)
E. N. Central	1.7 (1)	2.1 (1)	8.9 (4)	13.8 (9)	43.5 (20)
W. N. Central	9.5 (2)	4.5 (1)	0	25.0 (4)	35.3 (6)
Mountain	0	0	0	0	0
Pacific	0	12.9 (4)	0	8.8 (3)	11.8 (4)
Dilapidation:					
Lowest	0	0	4.1 (2)	3.7 (2)	25.0 (6)
Low	4.0 (2)	10.3 (4)	14.0 (7)	22.0 (9)	28.9 (13)
Medium	8.6 (3)	8.8 (3)	9.8 (4)	12.8 (5)	46.7 (35)
High	7.7 (3)	2.4 (1)	19.4 (7)	24.0 (12)	49.0 (24)
Highest	10.2 (5)	16.7 (9)	14.3 (7)	26.8 (11)	50.0 (17)
MPO Ratio:					
Lowest	9.3 (4)	17.9 (7)	30.0 (12)	34.7 (17)	54.4 (31)
Low	4.8 (2)	10.0 (4)	9.5 (4)	17.2 (10)	59.3 (32)
Medium	7.8 (4)	9.8 (4)	11.9 (5)	15.2 (5)	29.2 (14)
High	5.6 (2)	3.8 (2)	13.0 (6)	5.9 (2)	34.7 (17)
Highest	2.1 (1)	1.9 (1)	0	9.8 (5)	5.3 (1)
Median Income:					
Lowest	7.8 (4)	14.8 (8)	20.9 (9)	20.0 (8)	51.4 (18)
Low	15.7 (8)	4.8 (2)	21.4 (9)	26.3 (10)	49.0 (25)
Medium	0	15.0 (6)	7.4 (4)	30.0 (12)	49.2 (30)
High	2.6 (1)	5.9 (2)	14.3 (5)	8.3 (5)	29.8 (17)
Highest	0	0	0	8.5 (4)	21.7 (5)

TABLE 44—Continued

COMPLETION STAGE WITH CONTROL VARIABLES	CITY SIZE QUINTILES				
	1st (Smallest)	2nd	3rd	4th	5th (Largest)
Funct. Classif:					
Manufacturing	6.8 (5)	9.9 (7)	19.2 (14)	22.6 (19)	52.8 (47)
Industrial	0	0	14.3 (1)	16.7 (2)	0
Div. Manufac.	12.0 (3)	8.6 (3)	22.9 (8)	22.9 (8)	45.2 (28)
Div. Retail.	4.4 (2)	5.9 (3)	7.9 (3)	7.5 (3)	32.7 (17)
Retailing	2.3 (1)	8.3 (4)	2.0 (1)	15.0 (6)	11.1 (2)
Education:					
Lowest	4.7 (2)	10.9 (5)	33.3 (12)	26.3 (15)	48.8 (20)
Low	7.3 (4)	9.8 (4)	16.3 (7)	16.3 (7)	50.0 (24)
Medium	5.9 (2)	8.7 (4)	8.3 (4)	12.2 (5)	47.1 (24)
High	9.8 (4)	6.8 (3)	7.7 (3)	9.8 (4)	30.9 (17)
Highest	2.1 (1)	4.2 (2)	1.7 (1)	18.6 (8)	31.3 (10)
Type Government:					
Commission	20.7 (6)	7.7 (1)	29.6 (8)	40.7 (11)	57.1 (12)
City Manager	3.0 (3)	7.5 (8)	9.9 (12)	14.2 (16)	34.3 (36)
Mayor-Council	4.4 (4)	8.7 (9)	9.2 (7)	13.1 (11)	46.5 (47)

[1]The percentages are of cities in each quintile of city size (column percentages) that also are in completion stage rather than other statuses of urban renewal, controlled by the selected variables.

TABLE 45

PERCENTAGES[1] AND NUMBER OF CITIES ACCORDING TO MPO RATIO BY COMPLETION STAGE OF URBAN RENEWAL, WITH SELECTED VARIABLES CONTROLLED (NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

COMPLETION STAGE WITH CONTROL VARIABLES	MPO RATIO QUINTILES				
	Lowest	Low	Medium	High	Highest
All Cities	31.1 (71)	22.0 (52)	14.9 (32)	13.4 (29)	3.5 (8)
Funct. Classif.:					
Manufacturing	34.4 (53)	23.0 (28)	15.0 (9)	6.1 (2)	0
Industrial	50.0 (2)	0	0	0	50.0 (1)
Div. Manufac.	37.5 (9)	35.3 (12)	21.9 (14)	24.1 (13)	12.5 (2)
Div. Retail.	11.1 (2)	22.6 (7)	12.8 (6)	15.3 (11)	3.4 (2)
Retailing	31.3 (5)	13.3 (2)	9.5 (2)	4.9 (2)	2.8 (3)
Dilapidation:					
Lowest	11.1 (4)	13.8 (4)	5.9 (2)	0	0
Low	29.4 (20)	14.0 (7)	14.3 (7)	0	2.9 (1)
Medium	38.6 (22)	28.3 (15)	14.3 (6)	15.8 (6)	2.9 (1)
High	31.6 (12)	25.0 (15)	15.9 (7)	22.9 (11)	8.0 (2)
Highest	42.9 (12)	25.0 (11)	21.7 (10)	16.2 (12)	11.4 (4)
Median Income:					
Low	42.6 (46)	28.6 (34)	20.4 (23)	15.1 (22)	6.7 (5)
High	20.8 (25)	15.4 (18)	8.8 (9)	9.9 (7)	2.0 (3)
Dormitory Func.:					
No	31.8 (61)	23.5 (48)	17.1 (32)	15.3 (29)	4.9 (8)
Yes	27.8 (10)	12.5 (4)	0	0	0
Education:					
Low	33.3 (67)	20.4 (32)	13.3 (13)	11.2 (9)	4.0 (1)
High	14.8 (4)	25.3 (20)	16.2 (19)	14.6 (20)	3.5 (7)
Metro. Status:					
Central City	52.5 (32)	50.0 (34)	32.7 (16)	27.0 (17)	6.1 (2)
Independent	25.0 (8)	16.2 (12)	14.1 (13)	7.9 (8)	7.4 (5)
Suburban	23.0 (31)	6.4 (6)	4.1 (3)	7.7 (4)	0

TABLE 45—Continued

COMPLETION STAGE WITH CONTROL VARIABLES	MPO RATIO QUINTILES				
	Lowest	Low	Medium	High	Highest
Region:					
New England	34.1 (14)	21.7 (5)	20.0 (2)	16.7 (1)	0
Mdl. Atlantic	43.5 (30)	29.5 (13)	29.2 (7)	20.0 (3)	0
S. Atlantic	10.0 (1)	25.9 (7)	24.2 (8)	28.6 (10)	4.2 (1)
E. S. Central	55.6 (5)	50.0 (5)	41.7 (5)	36.0 (9)	0
W. S. Central	0	15.4 (2)	9.5 (2)	4.9 (2)	3.0 (1)
E. N. Central	21.4 (15)	16.9 (13)	11.8 (6)	4.0 (1)	0
W. N. Central	30.0 (3)	33.3 (5)	0	9.1 (2)	11.5 (3)
Mountain	0	0	0	0	0
Pacific	17.6 (3)	8.7 (2)	6.1 (2)	3.3 (1)	6.3 (3)
Type Government:					
Commission	69.2 (18)	33.3 (7)	24.0 (6)	19.4 (6)	7.1 (1)
City Manager	18.2 (12)	25.0 (26)	24.8 (17)	22.4 (14)	10.6 (6)
Mayor-Council	30.1 (40)	17.1 (19)	11.1 (9)	12.9 (9)	1.7 (1)

[1]The percentages are of cities in each quintile of MPO ratio (column percentages) that also are in completion stage rather than other statuses of urban renewal, controlled by selected variables.

TABLE 46

PERCENTAGES[1] AND NUMBER OF CITIES ACCORDING TO FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION BY COMPLETION STAGE OF URBAN RENEWAL, WITH SELECTED VARIABLES CONTROLLED (NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

COMPLETION STAGE WITH CONTROL VARIABLES	FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION				
	Manufac-turing	Industrial	Diversif. Manufac.	Diversif. Retail.	Retailing
All Cities	23.5 (92)	8.8 (3)	26.0 (50)	12.4 (28)	7.9 (14)
Education:					
Lowest	29.5 (38)	11.1 (1)	20.6 (7)	3.8 (1)	30.0 (6)
Low	24.6 (28)	0	30.4 (14)	9.1 (3)	5.0 (1)
Medium	22.9 (16)	12.5 (1)	31.4 (16)	12.0 (6)	0
High	12.2 (5)	0	20.5 (8)	19.7 (13)	6.9 (4)
Highest	13.5 (5)	50.0 (1)	22.7 (5)	9.8 (5)	4.1 (3)
Dormitory Func.:					
No	24.0 (91)	9.7 (3)	26.0 (47)	14.0 (24)	7.3 (8)
Yes	8.3 (1)	0	27.3 (3)	7.4 (4)	6.7 (6)
Type Government:					
Commission	43.5 (20)	40.0 (2)	38.5 (10)	15.8 (3)	12.5 (2)
City Manager	20.0 (27)	0	25.6 (21)	11.7 (16)	7.3 (9)
Mayor-Council	21.6 (45)	6.3 (1)	22.6 (19)	12.9 (9)	3.4 (2)
Dilapidation:					
Lowest	4.8 (3)	0	0	8.9 (4)	3.9 (3)
Low	23.5 (23)	28.6 (2)	16.1 (5)	5.6 (2)	5.4 (2)
Medium	32.6 (30)	0	34.9 (15)	11.8 (4)	0
High	28.9 (24)	0	30.6 (15)	11.4 (5)	11.1 (2)
Highest	21.4 (12)	11.1 (1)	30.6 (15)	18.2 (12)	20.0 (7)
Median Income:					
Lowest	21.3 (10)	20.0 (1)	32.7 (17)	17.6 (12)	14.3 (5)
Low	32.6 (29)	0	30.8 (16)	11.4 (4)	11.1 (3)
Medium	30.7 (31)	11.1 (1)	35.3 (12)	15.8 (6)	3.6 (1)
High	19.6 (19)	10.0 (1)	9.7 (3)	12.8 (5)	6.3 (2)
Highest	5.3 (3)	0	8.7 (2)	2.2 (1)	3.9 (3)
Metro. Status:					
Central City	48.1 (50)	33.3 (1)	46.0 (29)	28.6 (16)	10.8 (4)
Independent	15.1 (19)	0	19.7 (14)	9.3 (7)	6.0 (3)
Suburban	14.4 (23)	6.3 (1)	12.1 (7)	5.3 (5)	6.3 (7)

TABLE 46—Continued

COMPLETION STAGE WITH CONTROL VARIABLES	FUNCTIONAL CLASSIFICATION				
	Manufac-turing	Industrial	Diversif. Manufact.	Diversif. Retail.	Retailing
Region:					
New England	24.6 (14)	0	26.7 (4)	60.0 (3)	100.0 (1)
Mdl. Atlantic	39.6 (36)	20.0 (1)	30.6 (11)	14.3 (3)	5.0 (1)
S. Atlantic	12.5 (4)	0	38.5 (10)	29.7 (11)	9.1 (2)
E. S. Central	29.4 (5)	100.0 (1)	56.5 (13)	23.1 (3)	25.0 (1)
W. S. Central	0	0	16.7 (3)	5.3 (2)	6.7 (2)
E. N. Central	19.4 (26)	0	13.8 (4)	5.3 (2)	7.7 (3)
W. N. Central	20.0 (4)	20.0 (1)	20.0 (4)	4.3 (1)	4.8 (1)
Mountain	0	0	0	0	0
Pacific	10.3 (3)	0	4.2 (1)	7.1 (3)	7.9 (3)

[1]The percentages are of cities in each functional classification (column percentages) that also are in completion stage rather than other statuses of urban renewal, controlled by the selected variables.

TABLE 47

PERCENTAGES[1] AND NUMBER OF CITIES ACCORDING TO DILAPIDATION BY COMPLETION STAGE OF URBAN RENEWAL, WITH SELECTED VARIABLES CONTROLLED (NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

COMPLETION STAGE WITH CONTROL VARIABLES	EXTENT OF DILAPIDATION				
	Lowest	Low	Medium	High	Highest
All Cities	4.3 (10)	15.6 (35)	22.3 (50)	21.9 (47)	21.6 (49)
Median Income:					
Lowest	0	33.3 (4)	9.1 (2)	17.1 (6)	23.0 (35)
Low	0	20.6 (7)	24.6 (14)	32.0 (24)	17.6 (9)
Medium	20.0 (2)	19.1 (9)	34.2 (25)	17.3 (13)	11.1 (2)
High	10.0 (5)	15.7 (13)	10.0 (6)	14.8 (4)	50.0 (2)
Highest	1.9 (3)	4.1 (2)	25.0 (3)	0	50.0 (1)
Education:					
Lowest	13.3 (4)	27.3 (15)	33.3 (15)	22.0 (11)	20.9 (9)
Low	4.8 (1)	23.1 (9)	25.0 (13)	20.8 (11)	18.5 (12)
Medium	6.5 (2)	11.4 (5)	23.3 (10)	26.9 (14)	14.3 (7)
High	4.8 (2)	4.5 (2)	14.3 (7)	17.9 (7)	28.3 (13)
Highest	0.9 (1)	9.3 (4)	14.3 (5)	19.0 (4)	33.3 (8)
Metro. Status:					
Central City	22.2 (2)	29.8 (14)	38.9 (35)	40.3 (27)	37.7 (23)
Independent	0	12.7 (7)	9.5 (7)	14.7 (15)	13.4 (17)
Suburban	3.8 (8)	10.7 (3)	13.3 (8)	10.9 (5)	23.1 (9)
Dormitory Func.:					
No	4.2 (5)	17.8 (32)	23.1 (49)	22.1 (46)	21.3 (46)
Yes	4.5 (5)	6.7 (3)	8.3 (1)	14.3 (1)	27.3 (3)
Type of Govern.:					
Commission	14.3 (1)	39.1 (9)	36.4 (8)	25.0 (8)	36.4 (12)
City Manager	2.9 (4)	14.6 (12)	18.3 (19)	22.2 (22)	14.9 (18)
Mayor-Council	6.1 (5)	11.7 (14)	23.5 (23)	20.5 (17)	25.4 (18)

TABLE 47--Continued

COMPLETION STAGE WITH CONTROL VARIABLES	EXTENT OF DILAPIDATION				
	Lowest	Low	Medium	High	Highest
Region:					
New England	16.7 (1)	14.3 (4)	37.5 (12)	28.6 (4)	33.3 (1)
Mdl. Atlantic	4.7 (2)	35.6 (16)	42.9 (18)	28.1 (9)	47.1 (8)
S. Atlantic	0	7.7 (1)	11.1 (2)	35.7 (10)	21.5 (14)
E. S. Central	0	0	0	53.8 (7)	41.5 (17)
W. S. Central	0	0	10.0 (1)	8.3 (2)	6.3 (4)
E. N. Central	7.0 (6)	15.3 (9)	20.0 (9)	19.3 (11)	0
W. N. Central	0	4.3 (1)	19.2 (5)	22.2 (4)	20.0 (2)
Mountain	0	0	0	0	0
Pacific	1.7 (1)	10.0 (4)	9.7 (3)	0	75.0 (3)

[1]The percentages are of cities in each category of extent of dilapidation (column percentages) that also are in completion stage rather than other statuses of urban renewal, controlled by selected variables.

TABLE 48

PERCENTAGES[1] AND NUMBER OF CITIES ACCORDING TO INCOME BY COMPLETION STAGE OF URBAN RENEWAL, WITH SELECTED VARIABLES CONTROLLED (NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

COMPLETION STAGE WITH CONTROL VARIABLES	MEDIAN INCOME				
	Lowest	Low	Medium	High	Highest
All Cities	21.1 (47)	24.1 (54)	23.2 (52)	13.4 (30)	4.0 (9)
Education:					
Lowest	26.3 (10)	30.0 (21)	28.6 (16)	13.0 (6)	7.7 (1)
Low	22.4 (15)	22.9 (11)	20.4 (11)	19.6 (9)	0
Medium	14.5 (8)	21.4 (9)	30.2 (16)	14.3 (6)	0
High	19.6 (9)	23.3 (10)	10.0 (4)	10.6 (5)	6.8 (3)
Highest	29.4 (5)	14.3 (3)	23.8 (5)	9.3 (4)	3.9 (5)
Type Government:					
Commission	39.5 (15)	43.8 (14)	29.2 (7)	12.5 (2)	0
City Manager	12.8 (16)	21.7 (20)	22.3 (21)	12.1 (13)	3.9 (5)
Mayor-Council	26.7 (16)	20.2 (20)	22.1 (23)	14.9 (15)	4.4 (4)
Metro. Status:					
Central City	40.0 (26)	41.8 (28)	40.3 (31)	26.8 (15)	11.1 (1)
Independent	12.7 (17)	13.6 (15)	11.8 (10)	9.1 (3)	20.0 (1)
Suburban	16.7 (4)	23.4 (11)	17.7 (11)	8.2 (11)	3.3 (7)
Region:					
New England	16.7 (1)	27.3 (6)	31.3 (10)	22.2 (4)	20.0 (1)
Mdl. Atlantic	75.0 (9)	37.7 (20)	51.4 (18)	12.1 (4)	4.3 (2)
S. Atlantic	15.2 (12)	35.7 (10)	27.3 (3)	25.0 (1)	14.3 (1)
E. S. Central	42.2 (19)	44.4 (4)	0	33.3 (1)	0
W. S. Central	6.7 (4)	8.0 (2)	7.7 (1)	0	0
E. N. Central	0	11.6 (5)	22.2 (14)	19.7 (13)	3.5 (3)
W. N. Central	10.0 (1)	24.0 (6)	12.5 (3)	15.8 (3)	0
Mountain	0	0	0	0	0
Pacific	50.0 (1)	14.3 (1)	11.1 (3)	6.6 (4)	3.7 (2)

[1]The percentages are of cities in each category of income (column percentages) that also are in completion stage rather than other statuses of urban renewal, controlled by selected variables.

TABLE 49

PERCENTAGES[1] AND NUMBER OF CITIES ACCORDING TO EDUCATION BY COMPLETION STAGE OF URBAN RENEWAL, WITH SELECTED VARIABLES CONTROLLED (NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

COMPLETION STAGE WITH CONTROL VARIABLES	EDUCATIONAL LEVELS				
	Lowest	Low	Medium	High	Highest
All Cities	24.2 (54)	20.0 (46)	17.7 (39)	14.1 (31)	9.6 (22)
Metro. Status:					
Central City	46.9 (23)	40.6 (26)	42.4 (25)	26.1 (18)	27.3 (9)
Independent	18.8 (9)	14.3 (15)	7.0 (6)	11.7 (9)	13.7 (7)
Suburban	17.5 (22)	8.2 (5)	10.7 (8)	5.4 (4)	3.5 (5)
Region:					
New England	31.3 (10)	27.3 (6)	25.0 (4)	0	33.3 (2)
Mdl. Atlantic	42.2 (2)	28.1 (9)	46.2 (12)	14.3 (4)	3.4 (1)
S. Atlantic	0	17.2 (5)	21.2 (7)	20.6 (7)	30.8 (8)
E. S. Central	30.0 (3)	50.0 (8)	29.4 (5)	50.0 (5)	42.9 (3)
W. S. Central	0	7.7 (2)	0	11.1 (4)	6.7 (1)
E. N. Central	13.4 (9)	21.0 (13)	13.5 (7)	17.2 (5)	1.9 (1)
W. N. Central	22.2 (2)	10.0 (2)	14.3 (3)	17.4 (4)	8.3 (2)
Mountain	0	0	0	0	0
Pacific	13.6 (3)	5.3 (1)	4.0 (1)	4.9 (2)	9.1 (4)
Type Government:					
Commission	54.3 (19)	32.1 (9)	10.5 (2)	22.7 (5)	23.1 (3)
City Manager	14.8 (9)	19.2 (19)	17.5 (20)	11.4 (14)	8.7 (13)
Mayor-Council	20.2 (25)	17.5 (18)	19.5 (17)	16.0 (12)	9.1 (6)

[1]The percentages are of cities in each educational level (column percentages) that also are in completion stage rather than other statuses of urban renewal, controlled by the selected variables.

TABLE 50

PERCENTAGES[1] AND NUMBER OF CITIES ACCORDING TO METROPOLITAN STATUS BY COMPLETION STAGE OF URBAN RENEWAL, WITH SELECTED VARIABLES CONTROLLED (NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

COMPLETION STAGE WITH CONTROL VARIABLES	METROPOLITAN STATUS		
	Central City	Independent City	Suburban City
All Cities	36.9 (101)	12.5 (46)	9.2 (44)
Regions:			
New England	38.7 (12)	24.0 (6)	14.8 (4)
Middle Atlantic	81.8 (27)	30.8 (12)	13.1 (14)
South Atlantic	48.8 (20)	8.1 (5)	7.7 (2)
East South Central	64.3 (9)	31.4 (11)	36.4 (4)
West South Central	12.2 (5)	2.2 (1)	4.3 (1)
East North Central	40.0 (20)	5.9 (4)	7.5 (11)
West North Central	25.0 (5)	8.9 (4)	10.0 (3)
Mountain	0	0	0
Pacific	10.3 (3)	12.5 (3)	5.2 (5)
Type Government:			
Commission	47.1 (16)	22.9 (11)	29.4 (10)
City Manager	28.9 (37)	11.4 (20)	7.5 (18)
Mayor-Council	42.9 (48)	10.6 (15)	7.5 (15)

[1]The percentages are of cities in each metorpolitan status (column percentages) that also are in completion stage rather than the other statuses of urban renewal, controlled by the selected variables.

TABLE 51

PERCENTAGES[1] AND NUMBER OF CITIES ACCORDING TO REGIONS BY COMPLETION STAGE OF URBAN RENEWAL, WITH SELECTED VARIABLES CONTROLLED (NUMBER OF CITIES IN PARENTHESES)

COMPLETION STAGE WITH CONTROL VARIABLES	REGIONS								
	New England	Middle Atlantic	South Atlantic	East South Central	West South Central	East North Central	West North Central	Mountain	Pacific
All Cities	26.5 (22)	29.6 (53)	20.9 (27)	40.0 (24)	6.4 (7)	13.3 (35)	13.4 (13)	0	7.3 (11)
MPO Ratio:									
Lowest	34.1 (14)	43.5 (30)	10.0 (1)	55.6 (5)	0	21.4 (15)	30.0 (3)	0	17.6 (3)
Low	21.7 (5)	29.5 (13)	25.9 (7)	50.0 (5)	15.4 (2)	16.9 (13)	33.3 (5)	0	8.7 (2)
Medium	20.0 (2)	29.2 (7)	24.2 (8)	41.7 (5)	9.5 (2)	11.8 (6)	0	0	6.1 (2)
High	16.7 (1)	20.0 (3)	28.6 (10)	36.0 (9)	4.9 (2)	4.0 (1)	9.1 (2)	0	3.3 (1)
Highest	0	0	4.2 (1)	0	3.0 (1)	0	11.5 (3)	0	6.3 (3)
Type Government:									
Commission	100.0 (1)	57.9 (22)	0	37.5 (9)	7.1 (1)	7.7 (1)	26.7 (4)	0	0
City Manager	40.0 (8)	25.0 (8)	18.0 (18)	37.5 (6)	8.3 (6)	16.3 (16)	7.9 (3)	0	7.5 (10)
Mayor-Council	20.0 (12)	21.3 (23)	33.3 (9)	45.0 (9)	0	11.8 (18)	13.6 (6)	0	9.1 (1)

[1]Percentages are of cities in each region (column percentages) that also are in completion stage rather than the other statuses of urban renewal, controlled by selected variables.

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