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Colonialism and the Organization of African Unity: The Effect of the Colonial Experience on African Attempts to Unite

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COLONIALISM AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY:

The Effect of the Colonial Experience
on African Attempts to Unite

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of Government
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

by

Adotei Akwei

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APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

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


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That's all folks!

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper was to determine the effects that colonisation had firstly, on nationalist sentiments of independence in Africa, secondly, on efforts toward achieving continental unity and thirdly, on the formation of the Organization of African Unity which was ultimately founded on the 25th of May, 1963, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

An examination was first made of the development of the concept of African Unity, from Pan-Africanist theory in the early 19th century, to nationalist organizations agitating for independence and unity, finally culminating in the Summit of Heads of States in Addis Ababa.

A review was also made of the period from to 1958-1963 when efforts towards achieving African unity were taken by important African countries and which was when deep divisions and discord emerged as the legacy of the colonial era. An analysis was then made of the nature and differences of the two major methods of colonial administration; the Direct Method used by the French and the Indirect Method adopted by the British, and their resultant effects on the development of the indigenous political leadership.

There is no doubt that the dynamics that developed out of the relationships between the colonial power and the colony had lasting influences on the political philosophy and outlook of Africa's leadership. In French Africa, where citizens of the colonies were theoretically accepted as citizens of France, the emphasis was on achieving rights they felt were being denied to them as French citizens. In British Africa, there was never any question that the ultimate goal was for total independence from Britain, as they were never considered British subjects.

As a result of these fundamental differences, the states were split in their attitudes towards African Unity. The Anglophone countries espoused total unity, and in some cases a single central government for the continent while the Francophone countries favored at best, a loose association of cooperation.

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INTRODUCTION

The study of political science, government and international relations, eventually leads to the question of whether actions in the international realm are enacted by systems of states, by states themselves or by the men who create these states. The debate as to which approach of analysis is correct has gone on for a long time and probably will continue on for even longer, because there are never any absolute truths, and even loose generalities are faced with numerous contradictions.

Nevertheless, a choice must be made as to how one will examine such a question; whether at the community level, the state level or the individual level. In most cases it is a combination of two or three of the above in varying degrees. This is the case when one looks at the political history of Africa, particularly when it comes to African Unity.

Two prevailing factors appear to be the colonial background and the charismatic personalities of individual leaders. The early history of independent post-colonial Africa, has been dominated by names like Kenyatta of Kenya, Nkrumah of Ghana, Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, Leopold Senghor of Senegal, Sekou Toure

of Guinea or Nasser of Egypt. More often than not, these men were not only larger than their governments, they were their governments, making key decisions unilaterally and particularly in foreign policy, determining which way their nations went..

The link between the perspectives of the individual leaders of Africa, and their colonial background, is primary; if these men were the actors, carrying out policy, the colonial experience was the backdrop against which these men were formed. It was the most influential of factors affecting the environment into which they would come after independence, and within which they would act.

An examination into this relationship would appear to be recovering well trodden ground, and thus at best be a reminder of certain theories, and at worst be redundant. However, when looking at the same relationship as an influential factor in the formation of nationalist sentiment within the international realm, it no longer seems quite as redundant.

The Concise Oxford dictionary defines nationalism as "patriotic feeling, or principles, or efforts; policy of national independence". This paper focuses on the latter half of that definition, i.e. the pursuit of policies of national independence. The significance of the relationship becomes quite important, when one

considers the role of nationalism in world affairs.

Since the end of World War II, the organisation and arranging of the international community has been influenced by two fundamental trends. Firstly, the consolidation of the nation state as the principle actor in international affairs, secondly, the efforts towards creating supranational organisations to create order and regulate the international community.

The fact that both these trends went on at the same time does not mean that they were conducive to each other. In fact the pursuit of one implies the compromising of the other. To some extent the peace and stability of the world depends on which trend is dominant; that is the question of who will actually keep world order; the restraint of individual nations, or some higher organisations.

The focus of this paper then, is on the influence that colonial backgrounds had on the development of nationalism in Africa. In particular, how it affected perceptions on, 1) Pan-African Unity, 2) Regional African Unity and 3) individual state independence, by looking at the Organisation of African Unity which was founded on May 25, 1963 in Addis Ababa.

While I accept the fact that there were other equally important factors affecting the founding of this body, I will confine myself to the relationship between

the colonial backgrounds, and the nationalism espoused by the elite group of African leadership at the time.

I will be concentrating mainly on the actual founding of the OAU rather than looking at its subsequent history which was to a large extent predetermined by the OAU's Charter, and the perception of its scope and authority.

I will also be looking at the history prior to the conference concerning African Unity, as well as looking back at the colonial systems and their effect on the subsequent leadership of Africa.

The ideas of freedom and self-determination in Africa have long been associated with the idea of Pan-Africanism and African Unity. Not only do the two ideas seem conducive to each other, and supportive, they developed along side each other and thoughts of the pursuit of freedom and self-determination are actually all embraced within the theory of Pan-Africanism. All were geared towards helping achieve eventual independence for Africa and equality for people of African descent with the rest of the world. Therefore, I propose to go through the history of both, together, because as will become evident, their history is very much intertwined.

CHAPTER ONE

Early Pan-Africanism

The seeds of Pan-Africanism and African unity, first sprouted in the Caribbean and the United States. A precise definition of Pan-Africanism does not and probably will never exist because it is a search for utopia at one extreme and for simple equality and dignity on the other, involving many different goals. Some major components and themes include the idea of:

"Africa as the homeland of Africans and persons of African origin, solidarity among people of African descent, belief in a distinct African personality, rehabilitation of Africa's past, pride in Africa's culture and the hope for a united glorious future for Africa"¹

Actions and undertakings with these ideals in mind are recorded as far back as the early 19th century, and the attempt to resettle American Negroes in the U. S. colony of Sierra Leone. There were movements to abolish slavery with many groups and activities aimed at trying to achieve equality. Without becoming too bogged down in detail, we can acknowledge the attempt to reorient people of African descent in the New World back to Africa not only physically but spiritually and mentally

as well. This coincided with the attempt to re-evaluate the Negroes as a race and reject the negative stereotypes attributed to them, the main one being the need for European rule to bring order and progress to Africa.

Aspects of nationalist actions also took place in Africa itself. National churches sprang up and split from the European churches, placing native chiefs at the head of these churches just as the English monarch was the head of the Church of England.

This occurred in the colonies of Nigeria, the Cameroun and Basutoland in the late 1880's and the early 1890's.²

All these activities were going on but had not been unified under an all embracing, overriding philosophy such as Pan Africanism. This however changed with the emergence of men who could articulate these various actions as all being aspects of the pursuit of a common goal, and who would encourage and inspire these actions to continue with this larger goal in mind.

Among these early Pan-African theorists were men like J. Africanus Horton, Rev. James Johnson and Edward Blyden. All were, apart from their successful careers as academicians, prolific and powerful writers who shaped the thinking of future black leaders. Horton's most famous work was entitled "West African Countries and Peoples, British and Native. With The Requirements

Necessary for Establishing that Self Government Recommended by the Committee of the House of Commons, 1865, and A Vindication of the African Race"³, both he and fellow Sierra Leonian, Rev. Johnson advocated the development of independent African states, and in Johnson's case, a separate African Church, in order to develop the latent talents and skills which the Negro race possessed as abundantly as any other, and which they had a right and a duty to use. Alongside these two men stands Edward Blyden, from Nigeria, whose real contribution was his ability to express ideas which encompassed Pan-Africanist sentiment and inspired many. His tracts such as "Hope for Africa", "The Negro in Ancient History" as well as his addresses on "Study and Race" were brilliant rejections of 19th century racist views by revelling in the glories of ancient Africa and in Africa's place in the future as a united power, for the benefit of African people. Blyden called for African states, saying, "So long as we live simply by their sufferance, we must expect to be subject to their caprices". It was Blyden's opinion that a strong, united Africa would also benefit Africans of the diaspora by helping them become citizens of the nations they lived in by giving them a focal point of pride and belonging.⁴

There are of course other names that should be

mentioned. Benito Sylvain of Haiti being just one of them. However, it is not the purpose of this chapter to present an exhaustive account of Pan-Africanist history, it is rather to present a general and basic background of the evolution of Pan-Africanist Thought, so that later analysis will not take place in a vacuum.

These men that I have mentioned were important in that they represented a period when ideas were being developed, discussed, and circulated resulting in a synthesis which was Pan-Africanist. This synthesis developed in stages, where not only was the body of thought first unified and made coherent, but more importantly the thinkers and articulators, came together and discussed unified action. This was done through a series of Pan-African Conferences.

The Pan African Conferences: Phase I

The first of these conferences took place in Chicago in 1893. Among those present were representatives from Egypt, Liberia and Sierra Leone, and of course, from the United States. Speeches were made Edward Blyden, Booker T. Washington and Rev. Johnson. There was also a conference in Georgia in 1895. In 1897, Henry Sylvester Williams, a barrister from Trinidad, launched the African Association.⁵ The common themes running through all these activities was the

rejection of the negative attributes imposed upon the Negro race, as well as a call to both Africans and the European powers that it was time for Africa to develop and take her place in the world of civilised men as equals and equally importantly a call to closer contact between fellow Africans in order to achieve these goals.⁶

The Second Pan-African Conference which took place in Westminster in 1900 crystallized the attempts to achieve these goals. There were representatives from the Caribbean, from the United States, most importantly, W. E. B. DuBois and from the colonies in Africa as well. The outcome of the conference resulted in the adoption of a Pan-African organisation which was to replace the African Association. It was based on five principles:

1. To secure civil and political rights for Africans and their descendents throughout the world.
2. To encourage friendly relations between the Caucasian and African races.
3. To encourage the African peoples everywhere in educational industrial and commercial enterprise.
4. To approach Governments and influence legislation over the black races, and
5. To ameliorate the condition of the oppressed Negroes in Africa, America, the British Empire and other parts of the world.

A secretariat was set up in London with various branches around the world to coordinate activities and

deal with local issues. Also the Association was to meet every two years.⁷

The next meeting which was held in the United States saw a preview of the later pre-eminence of W. E. B. DuBois in Pan-Africanist thought. In a paper he presented which was later adopted by the gathering, he stated that the problem of the twentieth century was the problem of the color line. Aside from the paper's rejection of racial slurs and stereotypes, the paper was important for its call for France and Britain to grant independence to their colonies, and for the United States to end the oppression of her Negroes.⁸

While the conference was historically significant and important to the later Pan-African movement, the achievements of the Association were limited due to the lack of funds and it faded into obscurity after 1902.

Garveyism

The next major development in the Pan-Africanist concept of African Unity and self-determination was the emergence of Marcus Garvey.

Born in Jamaica in 1887, he had a long and varied education, and an equally interesting career which began as a printer, before developing into an editor. Marcus Garvey would later mobilize large numbers of the Negro people in the United States, and temporarily place him-

self at the head of the movement to liberate the Negro people from their physical, mental and spiritual oppression.

Much of Garvey's fame came from the flamboyant and spectacular manner in which he went about rehabilitating the image of Africa and of the black race.

In 1916, Garvey came to Harlem to try and capitalise on the noble sounding principles and doctrines which were echoing around the United States, particularly Woodrow Wilson's Four Points which called for democracy and self-determination in a world where peace and cooperation were to be striven for. Garvey's fiery personality and ability to communicate and inspire crowds, combined with the right atmosphere led to the founding of the Universal Negro Improvement Association in New York, which led to the publication of the NEGRO WORLD a newspaper which lasted until 1953.

Garvey's messianic vision of a future African Empire spawned a wave of businesses, groups and publications all supporting his call for Africans to do for themselves; he himself launched the Black Star Shipping line, calling for Africans to ship goods for African people. While Garvey's actions were limited to the United States, the knowledge of his action and his name spread all over Africa, and his calls of "Back to Africa" and "Africa for Africans" were to become

rallying cries for the Pan-Africanists and for the nationalist movements as well.⁹

Garvey's success soon faltered, primarily due to lack of organisation, and also because of Garvey's clashes with other Negro leaders, who ridiculed his excessive pomp, pagentry and other eccentricities. Garvey's success was not so much in his intellectualization, or in his contribution to Pan-Africanist thought, but rather in his ability to gather and generate support among the masses of black people who were unmoved by reading brilliant speeches and papers. Garvey was first to demonstrate the possibility of taking positive action, with the as yet unmobilised black people. His fall from grace came rapidly. After investigations about mismanagement of funds for the Black Star Line, Garvey was deported back to Jamaica, and never regained the influence or potential for influence that he once had. His fall however, cannot overshadow his contribution to the creation of a feeling of solidarity among Africans and people of African descent.

At the same time, several organizations sprang up in his wake, capitalizing on the new burst of enthusiasm he had generated: the Union of Students of African Descent and the African Progress Union, both based in London, were two examples.¹⁰

The Pan African Congress: Phase II

Developing alongside Garveyism during the same period was the work of W. E. B. DuBois. DuBois was a leading spokesman and civil activist, as well as a brilliant scholar. His later career was devoted more to the international struggle for equal rights for people of African descent, leading to his becoming a pre-eminent Pan-African theorist.

DuBois convened a series of Pan-African meetings between 1919-1927, calling for progress for peoples of African descent and an end to discrimination and oppression not only in the United States but in colonial Africa as well. His London Pan-African conference of 1921 was more radical in tone than any of the previous Pan-African gatherings. The manifesto that was adopted by the conference criticised the colonial systems and the conditions of relations between the white and coloured races. It also pleaded for the respect of the sovereignty of Haiti, Abyssinia (now Ethiopia) and Liberia. The manifesto also challenged the rest of the world to participate in the building of a great new society where all would be equals.¹¹

There were of course other forces working towards the Pan-African ideals. In August of 1925 the West African Students Union was launched in London. In brief, its principles were "to establish a hostel for

the growing number of African students studying abroad, to foster the spirit of national consciousness and racial pride among all African people, to serve as a center for information on African history customs and institutions, to act as a center for research on all subjects pertaining to Africa and its development."¹²

The significance of this organisation was that it provided a recognized and accepted forum for discussion. It also became a meeting point for the ever increasing number of African activists. Its monthly publication, WASU was influential in helping spread ideas of nationalism and African Unity. The influence it would have later was reflected by its membership: Kwame Nkrumah of the Gold Coast, Jomo Keynatta of Kenya and Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria, all of whom were to become major players in the drama of nationalism and independence.

To review at this point what it is we have been dealing with is to give a sense of all the different organisations and personalities involved in the quest for the rehabilitation of the Negro race, both in and out of Africa. Rehabilitation, in terms of creating pride in ones colour, ones race and the source of that race, Africa. There were therefore many aspects of this movement; all with the hope that eventually Africa and her people would be treated as equal participants in

world affairs and as equals based on the potential of her people.

The question of independence and self-rule was inevitable and in the quest for a bright future for Africa, the need for solidarity amongst all people of African descent, developed into solidarity between future African states as well.

The Italian invasion of Abyssinia and the start of World War II were the final ingredients in the blossoming of the movements for independence and indirectly, African Unity. The ideals for which the World war was being fought included among many others, the right to freedom for all peoples. The obvious contradictions between what the allies were saying and what they were practicing, became more difficult to ignore. Especially in view of the fact that many African soldiers actually took part in the conflict, and realised that they too were making the same sacrifices as the the European troops. Even more basically, both crises' created focal points around which and against which the numerous African activists could unite.

The invasion of Abyssinia in October of 1935 resulted in countless committees and organisations to protest and force the League of Nations to take some action. As Abyssinia was one of the few black sovereign states, the emotional response was intense.¹³

The declaration of the Atlantic Charter in 1941 was another milestone in creating an atmosphere of nationalism. The statement that "all people had a right to choose the form of government under which they would live and determine their political destiny" was reinforced by Clement Attlee, then Churchill's deputy, who in response to a WASU demand for clarification, replied that the Charter was applicable to all and would be denied to no one. The fact the Churchill subsequently categorised the statement as applying only to Europe only fanned the flames and the determination of the voices calling for African independence.

In 1943, George Padmore, a leading Pan-African writer from the West Indies and Nancy Cunnard wrote an article entitled "The White Man's Duty: An Analysis of the Colonial Question in Light of the Atlantic Charter". The article illustrates the growing frustration and gathering radical desire for freedom. The article's proposed Charter for the Colonies, called for economic, social and political equality in Africa, particularly in South Africa, whose systematic oppression was the greatest source of anger. For the British West Indies, internal self-government was to be granted immediately. It would only be a matter of time before the same demand was issued for Africa.¹⁴

This did happen, in Manchester in 1945, at the

second official Pan-African Conference.

Pan-African Congress: Phase III

Prior to this in 1944, the Pan-African Federation was launched, in Manchester, which was to incorporate many of the existing Pan-African organisations, and while each of them was to remain autonomous, each was required to adhere to the basic framework of the P.A.F., which meant each was to promote unity and cooperation among people working towards the freedom and independence of Africa. It was the P.A.F. whose voice led the ever increasing pressure on the Attlee government to live up to its promises on the colonial issue and it was the P.A.F. which undertook the organising for the Manchester Conference inviting the aging W. E. B. DuBois to be the Chairman.¹⁵

The Manchester Conference was probably the most effective and influential in the development of Pan-Africanism. It also marked a branch point. In the former meetings, never before had all of Africa and the Caribbean been represented. There were student organisations as well as Trade Union representatives, and other officially accredited delegates representing nationalist movements in the colonies.

As with WASU, there were individuals brought into contact with each other who were to become important to

history themselves. The effect of having official delegates instead of having people attend in a private capacity meant that decisions and proposals now had effects beyond those who were present.

At the end of the conference the changing tone on self rule and independence was obvious: immediate independence for British and French West African colonies, the British Sudan, and French North African colonies, was demanded. Economic, social and political reform were urged for East and Central Africa, the West Indies and British Guyana.

Solidarity was declared with Egypt's demands that British forces be removed from her soil as well as with the struggle against oppression in South Africa and the United States.¹⁶ As if that was not enough, the declaration went on to call upon the workers and farmers of the colonies to unite and organise to fight imperialism, the use of strikes and boycotts was encouraged, following the example of India in her quest for independence. There was a new militancy in the movement, a radical step forward not only in method but also in scope, and application.

The Pan-African idea was developing into a strong substantive movement for nationalism, with mass support back in the colonies geared towards achieving independence. The self-determination aspect of Pan-Africanism

began to become paramount and receive more attention, the goal of solidarity followed close behind. Later it would lag farther and farther behind.

The period following the conference, can be described as one in which attempts were made to try and organise and control the growing swell of nationalist sentiment. The application of these militant strategies, including participating in strikes and boycotts led to increasing contact and cooperation between the Pan-Africanists in London and the nationalist movements in the various colonies.

There were numerous publications, articles and books geared towards this end, presenting ideas and opinions to the increasingly interested populations, and it was through these publications that reputations were made. Those who achieved such renown as thinkers, organisers and effective communicators found themselves being invited to return to their respective colonies and take a direct hand in the struggle for independence. In August of 1947, for example, Kwame Nkrumah left for the Gold Coast to become the secretary for the United Gold Coast Convention, the leading nationalist movement in that colony.¹⁷

The increasing predominance of the issue of nationalism and independence was facilitated by events in Africa itself.

In 1952, a military coup replaced the puppet monarchy of King Farouk with the nationalist Gamel Nasser at its head, supported by the Egyptian army. That same year saw the outbreak of the "Mau Mau" uprisings in Kenya, long thought safely and firmly secured in the British Empire. Two years later the Algerian revolution began. There was a growing atmosphere of tension and expectation.

In 1955 the Bandung Conference was held in Cairo, which re-affirmed Asian solidarity with Africa's quest for freedom, sending out another ripple into the already troubled waters.¹⁸

Pan African Congress: Phase IV

The last phase in the emergence of African Unity and the attainment of the goals of African nationalism was ushered in by the 1958 Conference of Independent African States, which was held in the newly independent nation of Ghana. Nkrumah's previous participation with the Pan-African organisations in London had made a deep and lasting impression on him, and led to his unflagging pursuit of African Unity. On the eve of independence, he told the world press that "Ghana's independence is meaningless unless it is linked with the total liberation of the continent of Africa."

Nkrumah was now in the uniquely powerful position

of being one of the leading theorists of Pan-African thought, and the Head of State of a nation. His close links with with DuBois and Padmore led to his inviting them to continue their work in Ghana, thus making it the new center for the quest for African Unity and occasionally even for African nationalism.¹⁹

Though the conference was attended by only eight nations; Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, Sudan, Liberia, Ethiopia and Ghana, the impact of the conference was inspirational to nationalist movements all over Africa. The conference was also significant because it raised the first hints of the tension between the drive for African Unity and the drive to consolidate independent nations.

Among the many resolutions and proposals called for, the delegates resolved to preserve unity of purpose and action in foreign policy. They stressed the need to avoid taking any individual action that might endanger their freedom of interest, while acknowledging the need for better communications and trade between African states and the need to invest their resources in achieving this. They agreed to do this so far as it did not compromise the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states.²⁰

The African nationalist had switched roles, from being leaders of movements opposing the administration

to actually being the administration. Their responsibilities changed from trying to undermine and change the existing structure and system of government, to now trying to create and preserve a new order. Whereas before, they could suggest radical ideas and solutions as one set of intellectuals to another, they now had too much to lose and with independence achieved, little to gain.

Unity was a tool to be utilized towards the freedom of the whole continent. Beyond that it was to be a step towards asserting African influence on international affairs. Of course there were other reasons for solidarity and in these, African unity does not differ from other supranational organisations such as the United Nations or the Organisation of American States or even the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. All of these bodies in one way or another, attempt to foster peace, economic development and cooperation. The area where the concept of African Unity goes farther is that its theory holds the ideal of a new political structure. In place of a group of separate sovereign states, a central Union government was to oversee a federation comparable to the United States. This also was not unique and has its parallel in the European Common Market, and the talk of a EuroGovernment.

The years following the 1958 conference saw the

majority of the African colonies achieve independence. Most of the new nations participated in the Pan-African meetings and organisations, there were differences in the interpretation, fervour and pursuit of a united Africa. This, combined with the internal differences between the different nations led to groupings and blocs based on regionalism and common colonial heritage, the French speaking nations coming together in their organisations and the English speaking organisations in theirs, with the odd country in each group.

Between 1960 and 1963 the numerous different blocs and groupings could all be said to represent the basic split in ideology between the militant radical Casablanca group, comprising Ghana, Egypt, Morocco, Guinea, the Algerian freedom movement (GPRM), Libya and Mali, and the more conservative governments of French speaking Africa, as well as Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya (which vacillated a lot) Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo and Tunisia, called the Monrovia group, both taking their name from respective conferences.²¹

The differences in ideology between the two major blocs represented the division that would plague the OAU in years to come and block any pursuit of a real and radical concept of African unity. There were other issues that would split Africa into different groupings and it would be an oversimplification to say that the

Casablanca group held the common view of African unity.

Their solidarity with each other was expressed in their activism for gaining independence for the rest of Africa, and a common stand against neo-colonialism. Nevertheless it was from this group that the calls for Union Government, for a United States of Africa and central government came, particularly from Ghana.

From the opposing view came the idea of solidarity between independent sovereign states. Leading this group were the Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Togo.²²

As the rifts between these nations worsened, and conferences were held ignoring some and for the purpose of condemning others, Emperor Haile Selassie finally called for a conference where all would have a chance to present their views in front of all the African nations, and an attempt to organise structures promoting African Unity would be attempted.

Pan African Congress: Phase V

The Addis Ababa Conference was held from May 23-25 in 1963. An unprecedented thirty heads of states met and agreed to form the Organisation of African Unity which would be the primary and principal body organising the relations between African nations themselves and African relations with the rest of the world. Beyond this point, the theory of African Unity would go no

farther in practice.

The principles and charter of the OAU represent a compromising of the more radical ideas of African Unity in its Pan-African trappings, and perhaps it was necessary: all supranational bodies represent compromises of individual national desires, they must also compromise in their purposes themselves so as to retain their appeal to as many different interest groups as possible. With the Addis meeting in particular, there was incredible pressure to come out of the very closely observed summit with something to show. Certain issues were therefore politely and temporarily forgotten, at the same time the most fervent proponent of the radical union of African states, Nkrumah of Ghana, had by this time antagonised and angered too many other heads of states with his self-proclaimed leadership of African nationalism and Pan-Africanism. There was in effect no single loud voice appealing for a truly united Africa. In such an atmosphere, it is not surprising that the more conservative ideas of consultation and functional co-operation finally won out. The newly acquired status of sovereign nationhood was too precious to be tampered with, and was to remain paramount. Regional groupings based on economic and cultural ties were allowed, but competing regional blocs would not be tolerated. The nature of the OAU was decided, the

question as to whether it was permanent, was now dependent on how much each individual nation would tolerate interference.

The OAU does not and can not represent the apex and conclusion of the Pan-African goal of African Unity. Not only is there strife and discord in Africa between member states, there is a growing sense of despondancy and frustration with the ineffectiveness of the body. This is not only limited to the cynicism that most have towards these supranational bodies, it is a questioning of the very purpose of the body. When it celebrated its twentieth anniversary in 1983, a cynical press stated that its greatest achievement was that it had survived at all, given the numerous crises that had forced several meetings to be cancelled, and had seen some countries refuse to attend.

With the demise of the original founders of the body as well as the old guard of men who participated in the Pan-African organisation in London, one has to wonder whether this temporary phase of African unity is not the final permanent one. At the same time the continuing political and economic crises' which the African nations have been in since independence has led to increasing pressures and tensions augmenting the already uneasy composition of populations within these states. There is therefore a rigid intolerance of

movements desiring to break away from the formal state, as this represents not only a decrease in power, and authority for the government, but also fosters doubt for the whole nation as well. The problem arises when an outside opinion favours the rebellions and this has been a problem facing the OAU. By championing the right for all Africans to have the right to self-determination, the OAU sets itself up in favour of rebel movements, or officially unrecognised organisations, which claim, legitimately, in some cases that they should not be ruled by the government of the state that was put in place in by the colonial power. The problem of arbitrary boundaries rises up again to haunt Africa. Ironically a solution to the problem is possible by the idea of federating, and creating a central government for all which would not be questioned. The nationalist urge to maintain the territorial integrity of the state however, stands in the way, and the O.A.U. has not found a way to deal with the problem.

CHAPTER TWOThe Harvest of Fragmentation

The period between 1958-1963, saw a great transformation on the African continent. The independence of Ghana, was but the first in a flood of former colonies to achieve independence. In most of the colonies, former leaders of the various national movements with their parties invariably came to head the administration, and the first native governments.

The efforts to consolidate the former colonies into solid nation-states was soon faced with the increasingly strident call for African Unity. After all, the theories of liberation had emphatically stated that a united African effort involving all of Africa would be the most successful method of achieving national liberation. At the same time, the very theory and essence of the liberation struggle in Africa was integrated with solidarity and unity among blacks both in Africa and outside the continent. The difference now though, was that the leaders of the liberation struggle had now moved from a position where Pan-Africanist theory had been another weapon aimed at achieving independence, (and where it was more rhetoric than action,) to the stage where the

theory waited to be interpreted, and put into practice. It was in this arena that the tensions arose; over the interpretation of African unity and African solidarity. Historical evidence documents the conflict over interpretation, showing the splits and eventual cleavages which so influenced the formation of the OAU and its charter. The history unfolds itself in the form of numerous conferences, movements and declarations.

The first of these conferences were the two held in Accra in 1958. The first, which consisted of the eight independent African nations at that time, Ghana, Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Sudan, Tunisia and Morocco, and the second, also in 1958 which was attended by most of the political parties and organisations in Africa, and was unofficially known as the All African Peoples Congress.

The Conference of Independent African States

Upon achieving independence for Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, soon showed his commitment to Pan Africanism. He first invited George Padmore to be his advisor on African affairs. Padmore, an eminent writer and theorist had been deeply involved in many of the organisations which had agitated for independence, and while in London, was one of the main organisers of the

Pan-African Congress in Manchester in 1945.

Accra soon became the center for propaganda and revolutionary material which spread to many parts of the continent. After consulting with the Heads of State of the independent nations, Nkrumah then convened a conference in Accra. While specific resolutions towards achieving a single African government, or a union of African states were not declared, there was a strong presentation of what was defined as 'an African personality', which was described in the following manner;

"We resolve to preserve the unity of purpose and action in the international affairs which we have forged amongst ourselves in this historic conference; to safeguard our hard won independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity; to preserve among ourselves a fundamental unity of outlook on foreign policy so that a distinct African Personality will play its part in co-operation with other peace loving nations to further the cause of peace".²³

The conference also laid the groundwork for the All Africa Peoples Conference, which occurred later that year. Out of this conference came a more militant rhetoric on the topic of the liberation of the rest of Africa, than had been the case with the preceding conference. Attendance at the conference bestowed great status on the various nationalist movements, throughout

Africa. The conference also raised the issue of interpreting exactly what African Unity would entail. Suggestions towards achieving a Union of African States were discussed, and regional groupings were suggested as a first phase. Among the resolutions declared were:

1. An endorsement of Pan-Africanism and the desire for unity among African people.
2. A declaration that the ultimate objective was the evolution of a Commonwealth of Free African States.
3. A call to the independent States of Africa to lead the peoples of Africa toward the attainment of this objective.
4. An expressed hope that the day would dawn when the first loyalty of African States would be to an African Commonwealth.²⁴

The language and intent of the resolutions was diplomatically vague and general, yet, there can be little doubt that a single African body, even such a loose one as a commonwealth was present in the minds of the participants of the conference. The conference went further and encouraged regional groupings.

The gathering endorsed the desire in various parts of Africa for regional groupings of states, and advocated that such groupings be based on three principles namely:

1. Only independent states and countries governed by Africans should come together, and
2. The establishment of groups should not be prejudiced to the ultimate objective of a Pan-African Commonwealth.

The Conference also went on to denounce the artificial boundaries drawn by the colonial powers and recommended their abolition or adjustment at an early date. A permanent Secretariat was set up to promote understanding and unity and among other things a feeling of one community among the people of Africa, with the objective of facilitating the emergence of a United States of Africa.

It was from this conference that the seeds of the Ghana, Guinea and later Mali, Union first germinated. One cannot ignore the fact that even though Nkrumah of Ghana, as a radical Pan Africanist, would probably have come to the aid of Guinea, upon her abrupt attainment of independence, (which shall be dealt with later), it was the conference however that produced the theory and framework, which enabled the union to come into being on the 1st of May 1959, in Conakry Guinea.

The fact that the Union was made up of only two states did not undermine its significance, or inhibit its goals and declarations. The union was seen, by its members as a nucleus of the eventual United States of Africa, and the bulk of its document reflected that

orientation.

Ghana and Guinea were already established radical states vis a vis Pan Africanism, and this union and the rhetoric that surrounded its founding only enhanced that reputation. Yet at the Sanaquille Conference held in Liberia that same year, the participants agreed to the principles of non-interference in the domestic affairs of others, and were also expected to maintain their individual structure.²⁵ The Sanaquille declarations were just the first of many such documents, where conservative formality took preventative action against the radical Pan-Africanist elements.

The second All African Peoples Conference, which was held in Tunis in January of 1960, also called for African Unity. Its objectives included the promotion of understanding and unity among African people; development of a feeling of one community, accelerating the liberation struggle, and mobilising support for the struggle and finally working for the emergence of a united states of Africa.²⁶

In trying to express the 'African Personality' the conference warned against neo-colonisation and balkanisation which were to be fought through economic cooperation among African states. To this end an effort was made to start an African Trade Union.

While there was unanimity on most of the resolution at the conference, the Trade Union issue caused the first crack in the facade of unity and concensus. The origins of the split came back down to the differences between the radical and conservative African Nationalists. The radicals wanted the new All Africa Trade Union Federation to be unaffiliated with any other, non African Union including the Communist International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICTFU) and the Western oriented World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). Their insistence on this position was one which had appeared earlier at an informal African Trade Union meeting held in Accra, which had also been geared towards starting an All African Trade Union. At the same time that this conference was being held, Kenyan nationalist and cofounder of KANU, the Kenyan Nationalist Party, Tom Mboya, called for a meeting of the ICTFU in Lagos. This action was not well received by the radical Ghanaian press, which accused the Lagos conference of being imperialist, and detrimental to the establishment of an African Personality. The clash was so severe that a decision could not be agreed upon in Tunis and it was decided to discuss the subject again at the conference of All African Trade unions to be held in Casablanca later than year.

In 1960, the proponents of continued links with the

ICTFU formed the African Regional Organisation of the ICTFU. When the African Trade Union Federation was set up in May of 1961 in Casablanca, members were given ten months within which to disaffiliate themselves from the ICTFU, yet at the founding of the OAU in Addis Ababa in 1963, nothing was agreed upon or put into writing about the Trade Union issue.

The Trade Union issue was just one of many points of conflict on which the leadership of Africa would come to decisions on, and decide where they stood vis a vis interpreting the meaning of African Unity. The other critical event which finally laid down the lines of demarcation, was the Congo incident which erupted in 1960.

The Congo Crisis - Historical Background

The roots of the Congo crisis lay primarily in the colonial legacy left behind by eighty years of Belgian rule. The manner in which the Congo was administered was more authoritarian and dictatorial than either the English or French systems.

From 1885 to 1908, the Congo was administered as the personal property of King Leopold of Belgium. The Belgian cabinet and parliament therefore had nothing to do with it. During this period, the major tribal powers were destroyed or scattered. World criticism at the

harshness of Leopold's rule soon forced the Belgian government to take over.

While the excesses of Leopold were stopped, the Belgians, anxious to keep the various tribes weak, increased the number of chiefs by an incredible amount. Between 1914 and 1919, the number grew from 3,653 to 6,095. The administration ignored traditional rights of succession and appointed whomever they wished. The result not only undermined traditional authority, but also laid the ground work for the fractured, rival-ridden frame work from which the Congo was to be built when it attained independence.

Compounding this shaky structure was the fact that Belgium devoted negligible time and resources to development in the Congo. Education and Health services and infrastructure were distant seconds in priority while mining profits for companies like Societies Generale, were first and foremost in the minds of the Colonial administration. Consequently, the local colonial administration made no effort to recruit the indigenous population for positions of responsibility, where administrative skills could be developed.

As late as 1955, an unofficial but much publicized report, suggested that Congolese independence could be fixed for 1985, and even that was considered a bit daring.²⁷ The development of nationalist movements

was obviously hampered; natives were barred from going abroad for education, except in a few non-Catholic cases. The late 1940's saw the introduction of a system of civic merit cards, that every Congolese over the age of 21 could show that he truly aspired to the higher civilisation, that of assimilation to Belgian culture and colonial values.²⁸ The Congolese were finally granted the right to form political parties in 1959. Prior to this, groups which were allowed were comprised mostly of old boys associations, and non-political clubs. Where there were political organisations, they were basically formed along tribal lines.²⁹ It was with this background that the Congo stumbled into independence.

The sudden shift in Belgian policy, regarding Congolese independence is still open to speculation, but there are two theories that stand out. One holds that the riots in Leopoldville which led to the police and the Force Publique killing forty-nine and wounding others, broke the genteel insulation which had muffled earlier Congolese protest, and caused disapproval at home in Belgium. The other, contends that Brussels thought that a rapid transfer of power to inexperienced men and conflicting interests would be the best way of prolonging the colonial system by forcing the Congolese to request the return of the Belgians. Consistent with

this argument is the action taken by the Belgians: immediate independence was offered. It took one year for the different political parties to agree upon a date for independence. However when it was agreed upon, the Belgians went one better, and pushed the date ahead by one year, and granted the Congo independence in June of 1960. The crisis started almost immediately.

The key factions acting out the drama were the Mouvement National led by Patrice Lumumba, who was appointed Prime Minister and the ABAKA movement led by Joseph Kasavubu, who was appointed President (and who only reconciled with Lumumba at the All African Conference in Accra in 1958). Under them was an administration of 9,801 Belgians, most of whom left immediately for Katanga province. Of the remaining 11,803 Africans, 11,000 were barely literate clerks in grade 5, 800 were in grade 4 and of the rest, none had reached the first grade.³⁰ There was literally no one to run the government. Added to this was the secession of the copper rich Katanga province, led by Moise Tshombe on July 1st and that of South Kasai, under Albert Kaondji on August 8th.

In desperation, Lumumba and Kasavubu asked for United Nations peace keeping forces to try and regain some stability. The force was made up mostly of troops from the independent African nations, some of whom,

Ghana, for example had already received direct calls for assistance from Lumumba. Among those that sent troops were Morocco, Guinea, Mali, Tunisia and Ghana.

The Congo crisis soon had larger implications for the rest of Africa, other than just the collapse of a newly formed state, if that were not important enough. Increasing the stakes, were the visible and perceived interests of Western Europe. What with all the fiery rhetoric about new-colonialism coming from the more radical Pan-African states for the past few months, the fact that the numerous companies stood to benefit by maintaining the existing working relationship they had with Katanga made it an issue of critical importance towards projecting an African personality. The fact that Belgium supported the Katanga secession, and helped train Tshombe's new army, and that it had also set up two NATO bases in Katanga, were a challenge that protagonists of African unity or even African nationalism, could not afford to ignore or respond to.

Lumumba called for a conference in August of 1960, hoping to be vindicated and have his cause championed. Attending states included Ethiopia, Ghana, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Togoland, Tanganyika, Tunisia, the UAR and the Algerian Provisional government. Here the signs of the cleavage in African unity, which the Congo crises would aggravate, began to emerge.

Firstly, although Nigera had attended the Addis Ababa conference in 1960 as an independent state (although not yet independent) she was not invited to Leopoldville for precisely that reason. At the same time, no concrete resolutions were reached either in condemning the UN for its lack of decisive action, or stating full support for Lumuumba. Only Guinea supported Lumuumba's call for the for the military overthrow of Tshombe's rebel government. In short nothing was suggested and the confusion continued, causing more damage as the factions moved farther apart.³¹

In December of 1960, a conference was held in Brazzaville, the capital of the French Congo. In attendance were the former members of French West Africa and Equatorial Africa. Like their Leopoldville counterparts, they came up with no suggestions other than that the Congo should become a loose federation. What did emerge from the conference was a moderate pro-French African bloc known as the Brazzaville group, which soon solidified and took its own position on Pan-African Affairs at later conferences.

As the situation in the Congo continued to fluctuate, the position of the other African states also began to become more confused. Lumuumba, having been let down by the lack of support from the Leopold

conference, turned to the Soviet Union for aid, without consulting Kasavubu. The rift between them reopened, each dismissing the other, thereby causing yet another issue on which Africa would be divided. Kasavubu was known to be a federalist, and more acceptable to the West, while Lumumba was a believer in a strong central government, and an ardent Pan-Africanist. The radical Pan-African states though, were still reluctant to oppose the UN and world opinion by supporting him. Efforts were made to force the UN to deal militarily with the rebels but these met without success. The situation was further complicated by the creation of a rival student-based government led by Colonel Mobutu, which promptly dismissed both Lumumba and Kasavubu. Eventually Mobutu joined up with Kasavubu, leaving Lumumba isolated. Prior to this the rest of Africa had already taken sides; the radical Casablanca bloc, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Egypt and Morocco, the supported Lumumba. After his death, they withdrew recognition of Kasavubu as Head of State, and gave moral support to Lumumba's deputy, Antoine Gizenga. Supporting Kasavubu were Liberia, Tunisia and the Brazzaville group. Even amongst the different sides however, there were rifts; one of them being Ghana's failure to withdraw her troops from the UN forces in order to form a joint African High command. The actions taken by the hardline Casablanca

states alienated future independent states, who joined the Brazzaville group in May of 1961, forming the Monrovia group.

The Congo crisis provides an interesting case study within which to compare the characteristics of the radical and conservative nation, as well as the so called middle roaders.

The Casablanca group which supported Lumumba believed in a strong central government, and regarded federalism as a way of perpetuating factionalism, which they saw as detrimental to African unity. They were suspicious of anything which seemed tainted with neo-colonialism, and saw federalists as playing into the hands of the imperialist cause. President Nasser's speech at the opening of the Third All African People's Conference in Cairo, in March of 1961, accused imperialist interests of using the UN to achieve their ends. He also went on to criticize African nations for the mistakes they had made and for not closing ranks and uniting as the colonialists had done.

Events in the Congo provided material around which the Casablanca group solidified into a block, just as had been the case for the Brazzaville group. This happened at the conference of Heads of States which was held in Casablanca in January of 1961. As this happened, the opposing view points from the other

nations of Africa also coalesced. For example, the Prime Minister of Nigeria, Abubakar Tafewa Balews, had already dismissed the idea of a United States of Africa, saying it would only create new problems: "Nigeria needs many decades to achieve the level of other countries. Our most pressing problems are here, and only here."³² This kind of sentiment was echoed by the Prime Minister of Sierra Leone, Sir Milton Margai, who said that upon attaining independence, Sierra Leone would not seek any close association with other African states.³³ This third viewpoint was championed by the so called Monrovia Group, which stated its purpose and its aims as follows:

"To bridge the gulf that had existed in Africa between what were called the 'Brazzaville Powers' and the 'Casablanca Powers'. The conveners of the Monrovia Conference, very much disturbed by this artificial and unendurable division of Africa into blocs or groups set out to arrange a conference of all Heads of African states, including Malagasy, irrespective of their political affiliations,.....The 'Casablanca Powers' which had been invited to Monrovia then decided to decline the invitation intensified the rift between them and what came to be known as the 'Monrovia' group of African states."³⁴

The resolution adopted at the conference was concrete evidence of their gradualist, more conservative

approach towards interstate relationships. First, there was to be absolute equality and sovereignty of African states. Second, each state had the right to exist and no state was to annex another. Third, voluntary union with another state was allowed. Fourth, non-interference in the affairs of sister states, including harbouring dissidents or initiating subversive action was to be allowed.

On two key issues, which the Casablanca powers pressed for, the recognition of the Algerian provisional government and the repeated nuclear tests being conducted by the French in the Sahara, nothing was said or done.

In contrast, the Casablanca powers, adopted an African Charter which called for a consultative assembly, with representatives from every African state, and which was to meet periodically. To facilitate this, political, economic and cultural committees were to be set up, as well as a joint High Command.

A final attempt at reconciliation was made at the Lagos conference in January of 1962. There were, after all, some points on which the two sides agreed. Like their Casablanca counter parts, the Monrovia group soon called for cooperation in economic, scientific, cultural, educational and technical fields, and suggested that committees be set up to facilitate this.

Still, the differences and the perception of these differences were too large to overcome. The Lagos conference again saw the Casablanca powers decline to attend, because firstly, they were not consulted in making arrangements for the conference, and therefore could not be properly prepared within the remaining time. Secondly, the failure to invite the Algerian Provisional Government, was too critical a point to be overlooked. The decision not to invite the Algerians, actually caused a rift between the states which attended the conference. Tunisia, Libya and the Sudan all declined to attend at the last minute, thus making the conference one composed mainly of states south of the Sahara.

The Lagos conference formalized many of the decisions made by the Monrovia group. A general secretariat was to be set up as well as a council of ministers, both geared towards working out areas of cooperation. The conference produced a charter which later became the charter for Inter-African and Malagasy States. The draft was sent to the various governments, and the final charter was written three months later.

The Charter stressed sovereignty for all African States, non-interference by African states in the internal affairs of another, and finally the non-acceptance of any supreme leadership.

The Lagos conference produced no different approaches, or viewpoints on dealing with the rifts which were splitting Africa. The most significant achievement that it produced was that the seeds for the Addis Ababa conference of 1963 were first laid down and that can mainly be credited to Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia who assumed the role of mediator and whose remarks at Lagos contained an appeal for all the factions to come together.

"To escape exploitation, and to overcome the political deficiencies which beset us, Ethiopia urges that while we press ahead with all urgency and speed in those economic areas in which rapid advance can be achieved, parallel steps would be simultaneously taken to explore the possibilities of achieving increased political unity among us. Ethiopia is committed to the principle of political unity among African states, indeed, we believe that we all are, and that we differ only in our assesment of the speed with which this most desirable of goals can be attained. The task is now to devise the means whereby this basic agreement may be most rapidly advanced...The furtherance of political unity this would be a fundemental objective of the Organisation of African States."³⁵

While the Emperor regretted the absence of the radical states, he warned "that no African can escape

his solemn duty of work with his fellow Africans for the cause of this great continent. And we pledge ourselves to labour unhesitatingly in the discharge of this obligation during the days ahead."

It was this kind of rhetoric with its apparently deep felt commitment to Africa as a whole rather than any one viewpoint, that made the Emperor's appeal and efforts at reconciliation successful. In the same speech, he continued:

"Ethiopia considers herself a member of one group only - the African group ... We contend accordingly that no wider and unbridgeable gap exists between the various groupings which have been created. It is our belief, to the contrary that a close and careful analysis of the policies adopted by the African nations today on a wider range of questions emphasize, not the differences among them but the large number of views which they share in common."³⁶

The most important element of the Emperor's speech was of course the lack of support for the radical Pan African policies which were espoused by the Casablanca group. At the same time, by upholding increased political unity as the eventual desired goal, he also avoided siding with the conservative Monrovia group. The emotional call that his speech sent out for participation at the Addis Ababa conference produced the

desired effect: both the Monrovia and Casablanca groups attended. However there was no direction the conference could take, and it did not take any, other than the road of compromise, and it was from this process that the O.A.U. was founded and its charter was written.

Addis Ababa May 1963

The charter produced in Addis Ababa made solid the nature of compromise needed to secure the support of the Heads of State present at the summit. Among its purposes and principles were the following:

Article II

1. The Organisation shall have the following purposes:
 - a) To promote unity and solidarity of African states
 - b) To coordinate and intensify their cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa.
 - c) To defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence.

Article III

Principles

1. The sovreign equality of all member states;
2. Non-interference in the internal affairs of a member state;
3. Respect for the sovreignty and territorial integrity of each member state, and for its inalienable right to independent existence.

There were admittedly other principles and goals declared but concerning African Unity, these were the main points agreed upon. The institution was to consist of an assembly of Heads of States, a council of Ministers, a general Secretariat, and a Commission for Mediation, Concilliation and Arbritration. All these bodies were geared toward coordination and harmonizing political, diplomatic, economic cooperation as well as in transport.

The nature of the organisation was finalised right from the start and its scope and authority were clearly defined and limited. The conference was itself hailed as a success. Both the Casablanca and Monrovia groups were disbanded and in their place was a single all African body. The more strident demands for unity made by the radical Casablanca group for a single independent labour union, an African High Command, and even for a single central government were withdrawn, and still the Casablanca powers did join the OAU. The nature of their

compromise became obvious. It is a little harder to discern the nature of the compromises made by the Monrovia group. More significantly, a close review of the speeches made by the various Heads of State reveals little sign of flexibility and compromise.

Of the thirty-five speeches given, four of them, those given by the Heads of State of Sudan, Liberia, Congo and Rwanda, do not deal with the issue of African unity at all and confine themselves to innocuous diplomatic congeniality. Added to this list of inapplicable speeches are the speeches of Haile Selassie, which must be put in a different category, and the rebuttal given by his Prime Minister to certain charges made by the President of Somalia. The Emperor's speeches laid out the specific details of the OAU, and did not deal too much with long range Pan-African policy other than counselling compromise and patience.

"But through all that has been said or written and done in these years runs a common theme. Unity is the accepted goal. We argue about technique and tactics. But when semantics are stripped away, there is little argument among us. We are determined to make a Union of Africans...It is our duty to rouse the slumbering giant of Africa, not to the nationalism of Europe's nineteenth century, not to regional consciousness, but

to the vision of a single African brotherhood bending its united efforts toward the achievement of a greater nobler goal...

We should therefore not be concerned that complete union is not attained from one day to the next. The union we seek can only come gradually, as the day-to-day progress which we achieve carries us slowly but inexorably along this course. We have before us the examples of the U.S.A. and the USSR. We must remember how long these required to achieve their union. When a solid foundation is laid, if the mason is able and his materials good, a strong house can be built."

The Emperor's speech astutely trod the fine line by endorsing eventual union, yet at the same time warning against hastiness and calling for a gradual development towards that union. The Emperor continued:

"Thus a period of transition is inevitable. Old relations and arrangements for a time linger. Regional organisations may fulfill legitimate functions and needs which cannot otherwise be satisfied. But the difference is in this: that we recognise these circumstances for what they are, temporary expedients designed to serve only until we have established conditions which will bring total African unity within our reach."

The Emperor then went on to press for concrete action in the form of the creation of the OAU, stating

that the conference could not be adjourned until a single African Charter was adopted and a single African organisation created. The stress then was on having tangible immediate results to show progress, even at the expense of the direction the body would take in the long term.

The other speeches also fell subject to the pressure of having to show results at the end of the summit, nevertheless, the viewpoints of the different heads of state did not change. Tunisia warned against rushing into immediate unity. President Leopold Senghor of Senegal elaborated in great detail, agencies which were to be set up in stages to increase cooperation between African states. He staunchly refused federation as did his colleagues President Ahidjo of Cameroun, President Youlou of the Congo, and the heads of state of Malagasy, Niger, Dahomey, Chad, the Central African Republic, Somalia, Mauretania, the Ivory Coast, Mali, Upper Volta, Tanzania and Nigeria.

Of these speeches it is perhaps the speech of President Ahidjo of Cameroun which strikes the most interesting note. On the topic of African unity, the President first warned the gathering to remember the diversity of the continent:

"But in actual fact how do we appear to the world? In spite of a strained will to unite, how different we really are! Differing cultures bequeathed by our former colonial rulers, each state differing in the way it obtained its freedom, differing in its economic structure, or in the institutional organisation of our nations.

Differing also in the various friendships we have made which could not help but influence our behaviour or our way of viewing things.

As is normally the case, we have different approaches to the fundamental problems of the hour, we have had an imperfect or incorrect vision of the internal situation of our neighbours. We have even had on occasion misunderstandings. We have also been impatient or too eager to help, for right or wrong."³⁷

The relevance of President Ahidjo's speech becomes more apparent when one looks back again at the breakdown of where each state stood on the topic of African unity. Rwanda, Sudan, Liberia and Ethiopia, Tunisia, Senegal and the Congo, Malagasy, Niger, Dahomey, the Central African Republic, Chad, Somalia, Mauretania, the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta and Mali all voted against any attempt beyond cooperation between sovereign nation states. Of these, all were French colonies, prior to independence, with the exception of Tanzania, and

Nigeria, which were British and Cameroun which was German.

Of the states which called for immediate Federation or anything more radical than simple cooperation were Egypt, Ghana and Uganda, all of which were formerly British, and Algeria and Guinea which were French. Here too, interesting similarities are visible, because in both Algeria and Guinea, the road to independence from France was far from smooth and congenial. Algeria had had to wage a bloody eighteen year war, before the French were finally forced to grant independence. Guinea, while not forced to wage a military struggle came to sudden independence without any aid or assistance from her former colonial master. When Charles de Gaulle offered France's colonies the choice of remaining a federation but with more autonomy, and the choice of being independent, only Guinea voted for complete independence. Within weeks, and even in less time in most cases, France pulled out of Guinea, going to the extent, some rumors have it, of pulling out telephones. In any case, Guinea was in dire straits, so much so that Ghana came to its aid, as has already been mentioned.

The colonial background of the African states can not be said to be solely responsible for the decisions made in Addis Ababa, because there were too many other

forces also at work. The reality was that despite the rhetoric of independence, most of Africa was still heavily dependent on their former colonial masters for assistance in almost all aspects of their economic and social development. One need only remember the example of Guinea and its bitter break with France. Still, among the myriad of factors affecting political outlook, the colonial heritage can not be ignored, because it is from this background, or rather against this backdrop, that the leadership of Africa was formed. It was against the colonial system that these leaders struggled and formed their own personal convictions which later guided their decision making. It would therefore be amiss, were one not to look at the colonial heritage and its effect on the leadership of independent Africa.

CHAPTER THREE

Colonialism

European Involvement

European involvement and interest in Africa took a radical turn in the late 19th century. Whereas prior to 1884 each power had had its trading interests and small spheres of influence scattered over Africa. The continent had not been divided up yet nor were these areas considered colonies i.e. with organised administrations and formal boundaries. The 1884 Berlin Treaty changed all of that, and led to the infamous 'Scramble for Africa' which led to the division of these spheres of influence into protectorates and eventually colonies.³⁸ The importance of these boundaries lies in the fact that these are basically the same boundaries that the emerging African nations came into independence with. The problem with the boundaries was that they were arbitrary, created by the colonial powers for their own reasons, and that they defined the groupings within those boundaries, and thus made up the future citizens of these nations rather haphazardly. In most cases the boundaries split tribal groups between two colonial powers and in some cases placed some groups completely in one colony when their whole historical and cultural

orientation was in a neighbouring colony. In effect the only uniting factor in these colonies was the presence of the colonial power, and the eventual desire to be rid of him, which began the movement for self-determination.³⁹

While much was made of the 'white man's burden' or Europe's civilising mission, the driving influence behind these colonial conquests was the economic and political competition between the colonising powers. As a result of this, individual colonial policy was never clearly established nor did they have a clear direction beyond attaining the colony, maintaining control and exploiting its wealth. Thus, the administration of these colonies was haphazard in its development and often contradicting in its outlook and goals.

French Africa for example, at the height of its power in the 1950's included North Africa; Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. In Black Africa it held French West Africa; Senegal, Sudan, Mauretania, Upper Volta, Niger, Guinea, the Ivory Coast and Dahomey, and French Equatorial Africa; Gabon, Middle Congo, Chad, and Oubangui-Chari Madagascar and later Cameroun. To the East there was French Somaliland, the Comoro Islands and Reunion. A look at the map shows the enormous distances over which these holdings lay, and emphasizes their lack of geographical and cultural similarity.

Completely ignorant of the difficulties that lay in the administration of such disparate holdings, France continued its campaign of acquiring new colonies.

The French are said to have followed the Direct System of ruling, with all power and decision making residing in Paris. All policy came in the form of Presidential decrees, prepared by the minister of Colonies and his staff.

After 1848, when France abolished slavery, all Africans theoretically became French citizens, but this became a reality only in the French West Indies and the four coastal communes of Senegal where citizens were allowed to form political parties, and could be appointed to government posts. This was the earliest possible outlet for native African political aspirations. In 1914 for example, Blaise Diagne became the first black African to be elected to the French Parliament. The fact that parliament did not legislate for the colonies was ignored.⁴⁰ The rest of French Africa was ruled under less democratic terms, and was actually governed by separate laws, among them the legitimacy of forced labour.

The Ministry of Colonies only made slight modifications in detail to the proposals sent by the Governors-General. Under the minister was the Conseil Superieur des Colonies, to which all colonies could send represen-

tatives, but which in fact was powerless. The delegates were white and represented colonial interests.

On the continent itself, the Governor was chosen from among senior officials of a special African corp of civil servants. He alone could make laws or correspond with the minister. Under him came the Secretary General and the Government Council of high officials and nominated leaders who acted in an advisory manner only. Only Senegal and Magasascar had assemblies, which also held no real power.

Under the Governor-General of French West and Equitorial Africa were the governors of the individual colonies themselves. (The long resistance to France in North Africa prohibited the development of a system which could delegate power.) Under these lieutenant-governors were the district officers or administrators. Hard as the French tried to centralise power and decision making with the governor-general, the distances from the colonial capitals of Dakar and Brazzaville for example, to the small village in say Guinea or the coast of Gabon, proved too great, thus leaving the maintenance of the empire in the hands of district officers and the network of village chiefs who were directly under their control. It was the district officer therefore who was responsible for administration, police, taxes, roads, buildings, development of the economy and social pro-

gress. The rare visit to the bush by a governor was as remarkable as a trip overseas by the minister of colonies.

The British system was little different, although it was described as being an Indirect System of Rule. The cogs in the colonial system were again the district officers. The two major differences between the two systems were, one, the governor of the individual British colony was equal in power and responsibility to the governor-general of the French colonial regions, rather than the lieutenant, governors. Despite the governor's greater theoretical independence from London, he himself ruled only through basic guidelines and principles, leaving the actual conduct of the colony in the hands of the district officer. The second and more significant difference was that the British Indirect System of rule, as propounded by its creator, Lord Lugard, sought to rule and develop by controlling and manipulating existing indigenous institutions, whereas the French, like their Belgian and Portuguese counterparts went out of their way to destroy native institutions and appoint whomever they wished into positions of authority. In short the British system sought to maintain at least the illusion of continuity and tradition, while the French did not even bother. Consider the words of Gordon Guggisberg, one time governor of the

Gold Coast.

"I have never concealed my conviction that it is on the native institutions of this country - with the exception of giving certain populous municipalities a voice - that the gradual development of the constitution must be founded. It was at the preservation of native institutions that I aimed when devising what is the outstanding feature of the new constitution - the provincial councils. These councils are really the breakwater defending our native institutions and customs against the disintegrating waves of Western civilisation."⁴¹

It is here that the critical difference lies, and becomes applicable to the analysis in this paper: that is in the intent, or intentions that influenced colonial administration. I limit myself to the French and British approaches because it was their former colonies that charted the course of Pan-Africanism. The Portuguese, Belgian, and even the East African holdings of France emerged to play their roles later, due to the later attainment of independence.

Guiggisberg's comments provide an insight into the intellectual thinking in Britain surrounding the colonial period. Like his French counterpart, the common man did not give much thought to the colonial empire, and when he did, it was as proud possessor of

multitudes of exotic lands and peoples, all adding to the glory of the empire. The English government, while supporting the civilising mission of colonisation, never thought to make her African natives, Englishmen, who had black skin. They wanted them to be civilised, loyal to the crown, but never Englishmen. Thus one can have governors like Lugard and Guggisberg of Nigeria and the Gold Coast, formulating guidelines and policy that aimed at achieving a civilised, western oriented democratic system, while remaining African.

The background around French colonialism, saw a French empire made of countless diverse peoples, all united under a superior French culture. This was the grand idea of 'assimilation' which thrived through the first and second republic, when the empire was just growing. It lasted until the early part of the 20th century, when the rise of the idea of 'association', where men of different culture were to be left alone, given good administration and some measure of autonomy, was debated.⁴² While the idea of association was never applied to Africa, it nevertheless joined the melting-pot of ideas and opinions on the nature of France and her citizens. It represented a refusal of assimilation and a desire to maintain the status quo of France as the mother country civilising her African children. One of the effects of such a philosophy would

have far reaching consequences:

"The practical effect of this vague, patriotic and humanitarian idealism were not negligible on the colonial servants, whose task is exalted and on the native elites who tended to think of themselves as French.⁴³

The visible effects of the contradiction in French colonial policy manifested themselves in numerous ways. The educational system lagged behind that of the British because of fears of creating an elite. For example in the late 1920's there were about 5,000 students attending Catholic or Protestant mission school in French West Africa, while in the British colony of the Gold Coast alone, there were over 20,000.⁴⁴ Inevitably, the French were forced to realise that more of the indigenous population would have to be trained in order to assist in the growing administration of the colonies, and while the missionary element was the large factor in the British colonies, it was the government which eventually took charge of the educational system in French Africa. It set up schools to train teachers, doctors, medical assistants, pharmacists, middle level administrators and lawyers. It was to this group, who were granted higher education, the so called 'evolues' that the theories of a republican France, including assimilation began to take a hold.

"Thus it was under the banner of French

Revolutionary ideas which were still alive among the teaching professionals, that political movements awakened. The evolues considered themselves French Africans and demanded French citizenship. But French officialdom made no effort to seize the opportunity; the 'France of a hundred million inhabitants' was no more. It was only later that the profound influence of the colonial period on the political evolution in French Africa could be measured".⁴⁵

One can trace its effect, however, in the growth and development of indigenous African political movements, simply by creating the possibilities. As was said earlier, all French Africans were theoretically French citizens. The Senegalese communities of Dakar, Goree, St. Louis and Rufisque actually held this citizenship and its rights and priviledges, and this implied that all French Black Africans could one day achieve the same status. It was to this end that French Black Africans devoted their efforts, to achieving the rights and priviledges that were being denied to them.

1914 saw Blaise Diagne elected to the French Parliament, a position he held until the late 1920's. He built the Republic Socialist party, from the small political associations formed by liberal evolues, like Lamine Gueye of Senegal and Ralaimongo of Madagascar,

who were both teachers. Ralaomongo founded the journal L'Opinion, which demanded that Madagascar become a department (more closely linked with metropolitan France) and that her people be given French citizenship. Guye founded the Socialist Party, which was affiliated with the Socialist party in Paris.

Diagne was responsible for the legislation of 1915-16 which confirmed French citizenship on the black natives in the four communes in Senegal, and was critical in achieving the same rights for the rest of French Black Africa, in 1946.

On the French side, the legislation of 1946, was influenced in a great manner by the end of World War II and the installation of DeGaulle's Free French administration as the legitimate French government. During the war, the governor of Chad, Felix Eboue, a black West Indian was the first to declare for DeGaulle, and later rally the other French governors to DeGaulles' standard in 1940. DeGaulle's Provisional government, feeling the need to legitimise its power created a Consultative assembly in 1943, in which French Resistance delegates sat alongside white delegates from the colonies. The Commissaire des Colonies, Rene Pleven, looked into a new policy that would take into account the Atlantic Charter, yet at the same time restore France and the union of its empire.⁴⁶ In December of 1943 he summoned a Mixed

Franco-Malagasy Commission in Tananarive, and later a conference in Brazzaville, which was inaugurated by DeGaulle himself.

The Brazzaville Conference, has assumed an historic place in the history of French Black African political development, but for precisely the opposite reasons its participants could have imagined. The conference which consisted of governors and some members of the Consultative Assembly, reached many contradictory decisions. Among them, the extension of gubernatorial powers, fiscal decentralization, consolidation of the powers possessed by chiefs, special status for evolues, and the employment of Africans in the administration. Politically France was to remain indivisible.

"The aims of France's civilising mission in her colonies preclude any thought of autonomy or any possibility of development outside the French empire. Self government must be rejected - even in the more distant future."⁴⁷

In spite of this, the conference endorsed the creation of general councils composed of Europeans and Africans from each colony. In addition, the colonies were to progress from administrative decentralization to political personality. The conference went on to suggest that the colonies be represented in the future Constituent Assembly which would be held in Paris

eventually in 1945.⁴⁸

On the part of the Africans, Diagne's path was followed by many whose names would later become famous; Houphouet-Boigny, Modibo Keita, Leopold Senghor, Sekou Toure, Dior Hamani, all of whom were also deputies, elected to the French Parliament, and participated in the Constituent Assembly of 1945, which laid down the preliminary groundwork for eventual French citizenship for all of Black French Africa. The African minority, though small, grew. That particular assembly had 23 African deputies, three of whom were elected by white colleges. In the parliamentary assembly, the Conseil de la Republique and the Assembly of the African Union, there were 114 Africans altogether. They managed to create an intra colonial party the Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA) headed by Houphouet, Senghor, Keita, Sekou Toure and Hamani. An interesting point is that while their numbers were few, they held as much power as metropolitan deputies; they represented the whole of France and thus exerted influence on the rise and fall of ministers. Each French government after 1946 had at least one African minister or secretary of state up until the 1960's.

French black African political parties and movements thus evolved under radically different conditions from those of their British counterparts.

They fought for rights which were theirs as citizens of France, while the British colonies, always subjects but never citizens of Britain, were determined to achieve self government and later independence.

French North Africa resembled the British situation more closely than it did the French. Morocco, for example, strongly resisted the French until 1934. Though late in the development of political parties, they never lost their determination to achieve independence once again.

Tunisia's first political party, the Young Tunisians formed in 1907, was initially in favour of French administration, and only agitated for France to fulfill her development projects. It was only after the founder of the Destour Party, a few years later and the idea of creating a new Tunisia, based on traditional legal and political systems, while rejecting those of France, that Tunisia's true political path began to appear. It was the Neo-Destour Party which led Tunisia to independence.

Algeria's indigenous political movements began to reassert themselves in 1912, when young, French educated Muslims founded the party of Young Algerians which demanded the law of Nature be abolished. In 1926, the more radical Etoile-Nort-Africane was founded by Ali Abd al Quadir. The party espoused socialism, and the

unification of the Maghreb (Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia). Later, in 1929 under Messali Hadj, the party became more nationally oriented. This was one of the few organisations at that time to be openly against the French. The majority of the parties, for example the Federation des Elus Musulman, founded by Ferhat Abbas, favoured assimilation and equality between Frenchmen and Muslims. The different political perspectives followed classlines, the older highly educated Algerians favouring assimilation while the younger generation of nationalists, who were not so well educated wanted an independent Muslim Algeria. Eventually the younger generation won out and by 1934 was already waging a bitter civil war with France that would last for nearly eighteen years.

The British Situation

The response to British colonialism, like the French, Africans in North Africa, went from strong support of the colonial mission of civilising Africa to polite requests and later strident demands for independence. The main difference lay in the effect of the large and relatively widespread system of education which the British built and which produced a larger more capable and ambitious elite class, than was the case in French West Africa.

The 1920's saw the colonies of West Africa first begin to feel the economic competition and discrimination of British rule as the percentage of Africans in the government increased slightly while that of the British nationals doubled.⁴⁹ There was also increased discrimination in the church, as there too, natives began to suffer blocks and impediments in their rise in the church hierarchy thus provoking African ministers to break away from the English church. In spite of this, the first political organisation of any significance, the National Congress of British West Africa, founded by Herbert Macaule was more influenced by the outbreak of World War I and its desire to champion the British cause, then by any desire for more autonomy. Its stated aim was to 'aid in the development of political institutions in British West Africa under the Union Jack'. They too wished to become a dominion of the imperial country.⁵⁰ By the end of the 1920's the Congress was already suffering attacks both externally and internally. While they wanted increased representation on the British colonial councils, they also wanted a federal union of self governing territories. The contradictions rendered the Congress impotent.

The next wave of nationalists, I.T.D. Wallace-Johnson of Sierra Leone, J. B. Danquah of the Gold Coast, and N. Azikiwe, were all a little less patient in the

manner and the language, although not really radical in the scope of their demands. They started organisations which soon began to raise more of a fuss for the British authorities. In 1938, the Nigerian Youth Movement issued a charter calling for the complete handover of government into native hands.

The final wave of British African nationalists emerged after World War II. In the Gold Coast, Danquah founded the United Gold Coast Convention, which began to agitate for British concessions and eventual self government. In 1947, the UGCC invited Kwame Nkrumah to be its Secretary, they thus unknowingly cast the control of the independence movement into the hands of the radicals, who demanded independence immediately.

In Nigeria, the final nationalist wave was fractured by the division of the colony into three regions which each held a tribal majority. In the North, the Northern Elements Progressive Union founded by Aminu Kanu, fought for control with the Northern Peoples Congress, founded by the reigning Emirs of the Muslim caliphates which were still politically powerful.

In the south, Azikiwe formed the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons in the Eastern region in 1944, while in the West, a Yoruba lawyer, Obafemi Awolowo, founded the Action Group in 1950.

Sierra Leone, which had evolved with almost two

separate colonies, within the same boundaries; the first the Westernized creoles and the second the indigenous natives who lived an almost perfectly insulated tribal existence, went two constitutions in 1947 and 1951. Finally the Creole led but Protectorate (interior) based Sierra Leone Peoples Party, under Sir Milton Margai, managed to create a coalition, and put effective pressure on the British authorities in 1953. Their demands were for independence.

In the Gambia, the political movements rose up around the capital, and from them came the Peoples Progressive Party under Dawda Jawara, which achieved internal self-government in 1963.

East Africa's transition from colonies to independent countries was complicated by the presence of white settlers, and the radically different manner in which the colonies were administered.

These factors led to the delays in achieving independence, and therefore reduced their influence and participation in the founding of the OAU. Kenya, for instance became independent in 1963, and Tanzania and Zambia became independent in 1964. They have therefore been left out of this review of the colonial backgrounds which shaped the majority of Africa's political elite.

This chapter has concentrated on the social and cultural influence that the colonial periods had on

British and French Africa. Colonisation represents the most critical factor affecting the development of the perception and perspective of African leadership. Its direct results can be seen in the speeches and writings which will be examined in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FOURThe Results of the Colonial Experience On African Leadership

The line connecting foreign policy and nationalism can always be fairly well discerned. It is a progression: ones foreign policy is based on ones national interests, and conducted accordingly. In the particular case of the African states, the link between their colonial past and the nationalism which they espoused upon achieveing independence, and their foreign policy are their leaders. These were the men who led the independence movements and invariably came to power, and controlled most aspects of governmental decision making. The connection therefore becomes all the more direct and yet more complicated, because it raises the individual factor, which is so susceptible to many other influences, to the center of our attention. These other forces can not be denied, and must be acknowledged in the shaping of personal philosophies and decisions. Nevertheless, the individual can be placed within his context, which includes the historical background, the interaction of culture and outside forces which met up within the individual. The historical background, was the colonial period.

In the case of French Africa, its effect on the political leadership was profound:

"The formation of a small Frenchified elite, even though it could not boast an education above the level of secondary schools, provided cadres for the political parties and afterwards for the republics. Their leaders were mindful of the inferior status which had made them wish for emancipation, but at the same time for identification with the French intellectual elite. This fact along with the established relations with the French and a long attachment with the metropolitan economy, partially explains the duration of the 'Union Francais' and the maintenance of close relations with France after independence".⁵¹

Consider this correspondence from Blaise Diagne to Marcus Garvey,

"We French nations wish to remain French, since France has given us every liberty and since she has unreservedly accepted us upon the same basis as her own European children. None of us aspires to see French Africa delivered exclusively to the Africans as is demanded, though without any authority, by the Ameircan negroes, at the head of whom you have placed yourself. No propaganda, no influence of the blacks, or of the whites will take from us the pure sentiment that France alone is capable of working generously for the advancement of the black race."⁵²

This was the initial French reaction to the growing swell of Pan-Africanist sentiment. Diagne's pro-French sentiment, eventually alienated him from his own people, nevertheless, the attachment to France would continue and is clear in the speeches of Houphoet-Boigny, of the Ivory Coast, who was the leading spokesman for the conservative Pan-Africanist philosophy. On France, he said,

"We would be unfair if we wanted to deny the works accomplished by France in Africa. Internal slave trade was making the people suffer. The coming of France was looked forward to with great hope. France came in the name of Liberty".

On the subject of independence, he spoke ardently against the idea of absolute independence. He viewed the world as becoming more and more organised into larger political and economic units, but for him, that larger unit of which the Ivory Coast was to belong to would be a French one.

"On the morrow of the last war, France conceived a beautiful and grand design; to free and emancipate her former colonies scattered over the five continents of the world and to associate them with her destiny... She undertook, by the very act of setting up the French Union, to lead the peoples for whom she was responsible towards

freedom to administer their own affairs democratically... France renounced dominance... believing that that which endures is based on equality and brotherhood. She wants to create a new community based on friendship and confidence.

We were warned. Our response was the conscientious and responsible men of French Black Africa, those who have fought colonisation the hardest and are still fighting colonialism in all its forms, want, while remaining vigilant to do away with the paralyzing distrust, to rise above all feelings of bitterness, even the most legitimate and grasp the brotherly hand that is held out to them.

In West Africa and Equatorial Africa, over 60 million Africans... were divided, by the accident of colonisation in the last century into two groups of different cultures: English and French.

The first group, English speaking is moving towards independence within the framework of the commonwealth, with ties that are more economic than political.

The second is moving toward self-government within a federal community which remains to be defined judicially, but whose ties within the community are of sentimental, economic and political in nature."⁵³

Leopold Senghor, the other pivotal leader of French West Africa echoed similar sentiments, although there

was the difference of Senghor's philosophy of 'Negritude'. His attempt to form the Mali Federation out of the former French colonies of West Africa, placed him slightly farther away from Paris and from Houphouet. Senghor wished for a community which would have a strong African identity. "We must have an African community, before we can have a Franco-African Community". Senghor's 'Negritude' was developed as a rejection of the 'assimilationist' assumption that African culture was essentially inferior to French culture. The differences between Senghor and Houphouet were, therefore, slight, in theory but they did have repercussions, in the political activities which the two took part in. Senghor was thus the middle ground between Houphouet and their more radical comrade, Sekou Toure of Guinea, for example.

"And yet in the interest of Black Africa and of France, our aim must be to unite, within the Mali federation, all the old states of the old A.O.F. and to sign in the meantime, economic and cultural pacts with the other states, including the republic of Guinea. By doing so, we shall only be following France's example."

Perhaps the most interesting point is the constant concern over the well being of France.

"The reconstruction of the old federation is finally in the interest of the French Community. As I have often said: the association of the earthenware pot and the iron pot is contrary to nature. Based on unequal strength, it causes trouble, engenders weakness. However, the strength of each of the partners is moral as well as material, political as well as economic. The French community will be solid only to the extent that the States - I mean their populations - feel that they are morally equal partners and have a real share in the decisions of the Executive council. How could this be achieved if they came disunited, while metropolitan ministers of the community always formed a cohesive bloc? How could this be achieved if they get the discouraging impression that their progress depends not on their united organisational effort, but rather on the pleasure of metropolitan France?"⁵⁴

The warm friendly relations between France and her former colonies had one exception, Guinea, and Sekou Toure's solitary vote against the 'Loi Cadre'. DeGaulle's great referendum, where one chose either to be a part of France or against her, culminated the development of one of Africa's truly revolutionary socialist leaders. Like his elder comrades, Houphouet

and Senghor, Toure was a former French deputy, elected to the French Parliament and also a founding member of the RDA. His rise to political leadership, was through the trade unions, of French West Africa whom he represented at a conference in Paris, where he was introduced to the far left of French politics. Alongside his strong commitment to trade unions, was his commitment to Africaness, which made him hostile to pressure from the metropolitan affiliations which the French African trade unions were subject to. In 1957 he became president of the first independent black trade union the UGTAN, which planned to "unite and organize the workers of black Africa, to coordinate their trade union activities in the struggle against the colonial regime and other forms of exploitation."

Sekou Toure's break with Paris started in 1957 when the RDA was split between supporters of a federal community linked to France, led by Sekou Toure and Senghor and supporters of individual sovereignty with each territory linked to France separately and directly, held by Houphouet Boigny. When the issue was shunted aside, and France later offered autonomy within the French Community or complete independence, Sekou Toure voted for independence and subsequent relations sank to an extremely low point. Prior to this, Sekou Toure was a confirmed radical, an Africanist, but as the leader of

an independent Guinea, he became the leading proponent of Pan-Africanism, after Nkrumah.

"Thus the independent states of Africa were totally justified in the exercise of their sovereignty, to concentrate their interests on the prospects of a free and united Africa. They will not under any pretext ignore the fundamental problem: that of the national independence of colonized peoples "who are trying to elude the colonial powers by more or less fortunate and just transformation of the legal ties which those powers have imposed upon their victims... The determination of Guinea to see the realization of unity in the independence of Africa, is notably, as regards the means of development, the determination to see Africa itself participate in the development of its own wealth in the primordial interests of its populations...Having affirmed during the referendum organized by France that Guinea prefers liberty in poverty to opulence in slavery, we consider it another duty to declare before the representatives of the United Nations that, in the perspectives of a swift and democratic evolution of Africa, we, the national leaders of the republic of Guinea, would prefer to be the last in a united Africa, rather than the first in a divided Africa."⁵⁵

France's colonies to the north were also split in their relationships with France after independence due to their colonial experience. In Algeria, Ferhat Abbas,

who was to be its first president had once said on the eve of the Algerian war, "We prefer to be ten million corpses, rather than ten million slaves." He was replaced by Youssef Ben Khedda, who had been a key organiser in the independence movement even before it left the suburbs of the capital, and was a radical nationalist, anti-French. When he came to power in 1961, the government communique reflected its socialist outlook, and its neutralist stance, in international affairs. The same middle ground that the radical Pan-Africanists, who had supported their cause against the French, were saying a united Africa would become. The difference in the political outlook of the Algerians on one hand and Morocco and Tunisia on the other, was due to a number of reasons aside from the civil war which left the Algerians and the French bitter with each other, but at the bottom of everyone of them was the colonial relationship which aggravated Franco-Algerian relations.

"Throughout this period, but especially in the critical early 1950's, Cairo provided a sympathetic base for the nationalist of the Maghreb, and also gave them a little material support. These faced the Paris-settler in its full rigor. But the duality worked in Tunisia and Morocco differently from in Algeria. Partly, this was by reason of the variable between settler-population sizes: around 1945 there

were about 250,000 Europeans in Tunisia, perhaps 300,000 in Morocco but much more than a million in Algeria. Partly the variable derived from the fact that Tunisia and Morocco were recognised as protectorates, with some eventual claim to a life of their own, while Algeria north of the Sahara had long been governed as an integral segment of France, and so, in practice entirely in the interests of local Europeans."⁵⁶

Tunisia's growing demands for independence were met by a France that was already losing a war and clashing with an increasingly violent radical movement in Algeria and Morocco. When the first signs of similarity began to appear in Tunisia, in 1954, when 70,000 French troops were tied down fighting in the countryside, the French began to try other methods. Destour Party leader Habib Bourgiba was freed from jail and allowed to regain his influence and control thus preventing the party from going into a hard line anti-French mentality. When Tunisia was granted independence, it was Bourgiba who came to power, and while there were no thoughts of compromising on independence, his relationship with France was far from hostile.

Moroccan foreign policy as an extension of her colonial experience, stands inbetween Algeria and Tunisia. Like Egypt, Morocco's royal family had ruled

with the permission of Paris since 1912. In 1927, Mohammed V mounted the throne, the French believing him to be 'manageable'. But the regency ended three years later, as the young sultan proved himself very able, intelligent and profoundly attached to Islam, although open to new ideas. Mohammed V came to symbolise Moroccan nationalism, submitting unwillingly to Vichy rule, but welcoming the American forces. The Independence Party, Istiqlal, first demanded complete independence. Mohammed V soon came to support their cause openly and was exiled in 1953. Public outrage however, and the deterioration of the rest of French north Africa, forced Paris to negotiate with the Sultan, and he returned in 1955 and in 1960, took direct control of the government. His commitment and position, on African unity, were reflected in his hosting of the famous Casablanca conference, at which the radical Casablanca group solidified.

As one moved farther east, there was Nasser's Egypt which had become independent in 1952, when a military coup toppled King Farouk. While Egypt had been independent on paper since 1942, the country had remained as much a subject of Britain as it had ever been. Added to this were the undeniable facts that the government and court of Farouk were as corrupt as they were seemingly indifferent to the economic chaos and loss of national

dignity. All this combined to make the coup a wave of purifying nationalism. Nasser's radical Pan-African stance solidified with the Suez Canal crisis, and the realization that European economic interests still threatened to try and circumscribe the newly won independence of Africa and Egypt. At the same time, Nasser's efforts at promoting pan-Arab unity fell through in 1961 with the attempted union with Syria, and then later that same year with Yemen. The arena left to him lay on the African continent.

The last of the African Heads of State to make the issue of African Unity a prominent one in their foreign policy was Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. His commitment and perspective on African Unity has already been well documented, by the mere retelling of Pan-African history, of which he is an integral part. His numerous books and speeches on African Unity, all elaborate on his ideas, and were presented in a nutshell in a speech he made in 1960.

"Fellow Africans, you all know that foreign domination in Africa effectively disintegrated the personality of the African people. For centuries during which colonialism held sway over our beloved continent, colonialism imposed on the mind of Africans the idea that their own kith and kin in other parts of Africa were aliens and had little, if anything in common with Africans elsewhere. It was in the interest of the colonial and

settler rulers to perpetuate the subjection of use, the indigenous people, by pursuing a policy not only of 'divide and rule', but also of artificial territorial division of Africa. It played upon our tribalistic instincts. It sowed seeds of dissension in order to promote disunity among us.

It is therefore with great pride and happiness that we note how resurgent Africa is witnessing today what is by no means a humble beginning of a process of re-integration of the African personality and the forging of closer and stronger bonds of unity which are bound to bring us to our ultimate goal: the attainment of a Union of African States and Republics which, to my mind is the only solution to the problems facing Africa today."⁵⁷

The fact that only Nkrumah emerges as a radical from British West Africa, could be seen as a negation of the thesis of this paper, but a concluding analysis, will put his radicalism, and the lack of it in the other leaders of British West Africa, into their proper perspective, and give hopefully the whole picture.

Finally there was Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, who played a most crucial yet enigmatic role in the formation of the OAU. There is no question that it was due to his prestige and position as the leader of Africa's oldest independent nation that his voice carried great weight with all of Africa's other heads of

state. Nor can one ignore the diplomacy with which he managed to bring together the different factions at one conference. Perhaps it was precisely because of the fact that he had to remain accessible to all sides that prevented him from taking a clear stance on African Unity. An example of this ambiguity is demonstrated in his opening address to the Summit where he stated that eventual African Unity was unquestionable while in the same speech advocated a gradual journey towards that goal with no specific timetable.

In the case of the Emperor, one must remember that he alone of Africa's leaders had experienced the loss of authority in his country and had been exiled from 1936 to 1941. At the same time the nature of the Ethiopian government was still as rigidly traditional as it was autocratic. However strong the Emperor's commitment to African Unity, it was no doubt tempered by an understanding of the dynamics of power and authority. Haile Selassie then, stood at a pivotal role in what was to be the final step towards African Unity. But, one will never know just how much further the Emperor would have gone.

CONCLUSION

Colonialism has been used as an explanation for numerous events, perspectives and actions of the African Heads of States. Its effects on their nations, the development of their political processes, have been analysed countless times. At the same time, the nationalist movements of Africa can not be analysed without reference to Pan-Africanism. Modern African nationalism evolved out of Pan-Africanism, and its theories, are a founding pillar on which it was built. It was also Pan-Africanism that managed to bridge twentieth century intellectual thought and organisation with the indigenous aspirations of once again regaining liberty. It did this by providing leadership; men capable and determined to win independence for the people.

The analysis therefore tends to overlap at certain points, colonialism and the development of nationalism on the one hand, and Nationalism and Pan-Africanism on the other. The purpose of this paper has been to look at one aspect of that overlap, foreign policy specifically concerning African Unity, and trace the line of connection. The connection is that the colonial experience, has been a major factor in deciding whether

a country was radically supportive of African Unity or whether it was conservative.

Colonialism's single uniting factor, that is the fact that all these countries had a colonial history, is negated by the great difference in the effects that colonisation had on the different colonies. This was due to the differences in the colonizing countries themselves. However, a basic and primary factor of colonisation was the diffusion of the colonizing country. Albert Memi wrote on the grand task of 'civilising' Africa: "This was the justification for the conquest and exploitation of colonialism, and despite governmental concentration on the acquisitorial side of colonialism, the diffusion of cultures and values took place, and its clearest manifestation is in the political leadership that led Africa to independence."

The connection in the case of the French colonies is quite clear. The critical factor was not the actual colonial process but the diffusion of the ideas of Republican France, its desire for an empire of 'a hundred million' diverse in background, but all nevertheless French. Thus members of her colonies were made French citizens on paper, though not in practice. When the nationalist movements began to agitate, unlike their British African counterparts, they were not

fighting for independence, but for rights which were theirs but were being denied to them. The case is similar to the Civil Rights Movement here in the United States. The compromises made by Paris were therefore undeniable as they were legally correct.

Thus, the last fifteen years of French rule in Africa had black Africans representing their colonies in the French parliament and different administrations. French Africa's political elite were thus left with the job of fighting for increased representation rather than fighting for actual independence. And when independence came, the intimacy of the relationship with Paris, was unchanged.

There were only three exceptions to this rule, Algeria, Guinea and Morocco, who for reasons already elaborated on came to independence with cooler and less favorable relations and impressions of France. Their other similarity was that they were also all radical Pan-African states.

The British case seems a little less clear, while all of British Africa was united on the issue of achieving total independence, only Nkrumah of Ghana emerged as a proponent of radical Pan-Africanism. The connection therefore appears to be broken, but in fact it is not.

Sierra Leone and Nigeria came to independence as

unstable amalgamations of different tribal groupings. The uneasy alliance between the Western-educated coastal tribes and the creoles of the hinterland in Sierra Leone mirrored the deep mistrust between the three regions of Nigeria. At the same time it was the NPC, controlled by the Saruana of Sokoto, and Premier Tafewa Balewa, who came to power, not Azikiwe, who had worked alongside Nkrumah, at the Manchester Pan-African Congress in 1945. In both countries, the concentration was therefore internal, the politics of nationalism superceded the politics of foreign policy. Especially any ideas would reduce their already tenuous control of their countries. In the case of the Gambia, which is the smallest country in West Africa, there must have been apprehension at the fate of Togolese President Olympius Sylvauius, who was overthrown, by a coup, which was rumoured to be supported by Nkrumah, with whom he had clashed.

The ambitiousness of Nkrumah's vision was matched only by his intolerance of imperialism, and the 'stooges' of imperialism. This attitude alienated many of the leaders of West Africa from him, both French and English, who were wary of a self appointed leader.

In the final analysis, it was the concentration of radicalism in one man, and the inheritance of tribal divisions from the colonial period which resulted in the patchy appearance of radicalism in British West Africa. On the French side it was the lack of republican egalitarianism, in the colonies of Guinea, Algeria and Morocco which fostered that same radicalism.

FOOTNOTES

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