"Six Nations of Ignorant Savages": Benjamin Franklin and the Iroquois League of Nations

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"SIX NATIONS OF IGNORANT SAVAGES": 
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN AND THE IROQUOIS LEAGUE OF NATIONS

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of History
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

by
Nancy Dieter Egloff
1987
APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Nancy Dieter Egloff

Approved, May 1987

James Axtell

James Whittenburg

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DEDICATION

To my parents and Martha for their gentle prodding and constant encouragement, and to Keith for his endless and patient support.
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This is the study of an American myth. This case essentially analyzes the role of the League of the Iroquois in the founding of American government. The study narrowly focuses on the Iroquois influence on one individual, Benjamin Franklin, who played a role in the drafting of the Albany Plan of Union of 1754. But the question of Iroquois League influence can be taken a step further. In this year celebrating the Bicentennial of the adoption of the United States Constitution, the question to be more generally addressed is that of the influence of the League on the authors of that document, portions of which are similar to the earlier Albany Plan.

This myth has evolved like many others—as a way for Americans to express pride in the democratic tendencies which they believe have always been a part of the fabric of this country, perhaps stemming from native traditions. Because of the narrow focus of this study, it is limited to analyzing any influences of the Iroquois on one colonist, Franklin. It studies Franklin's knowledge of the League and whether that knowledge may have influenced his involvement in the drafting of an early plan of union for the British colonies—the Albany Plan of 1754.

The method used in this study involved several components. In order to study the League's structure, the thoughts and writings of anthropologists and ethnographers throughout the last two centuries were used. Unfortunately, sources detailing the League's structure
contemporaneous with Franklin are very limited. Most are nineteenth and twentieth-century written descriptions evolving from an oral tradition.

In contrast, greater numbers of sources exist to study Franklin and the drafting of the Albany Plan. Franklin left many of his thoughts in his Papers and Writings. These include his thoughts on the Iroquois and his involvement in the formation of the Albany Plan. The writings of Franklin's contemporaries as well as the New York colonial documents help to elucidate Franklin's involvement in the Albany Congress. These documents were used in drawing comparisons/contrasts with the Iroquois League structure.

The study of the Iroquois' influence on the beginnings of the United States has been like solving one big puzzle. The sources, which are weak, contrived, or sometimes nonexistent, have led the researcher to a great deal of pondering and judicial reasoning. The trip has opened her eyes to some of the frustrations and joys of dealing with a historical myth.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to identify the influence, if any, of the League of the Iroquois Indians of New York on the 1754 Albany Plan of Union, the authorship of which has been attributed to Benjamin Franklin. The study addresses a twentieth-century myth stating that Franklin used the Iroquois League as his model for the plan, and hinting that it was the model used for the establishment of the government of the fledgling United States, through the Constitution.

The study is divided into four components -- a review of the Iroquois League structure, an examination of Franklin's possible knowledge of the League of the Iroquois, a review of the formation of the Albany Plan, and a comparison of the League and the Plan. Franklin's writings, the writings of his contemporaries, the official New York colonial records documenting the Albany Congress of 1754, and studies of the League by historians and anthropologists were examined.

The results of the study suggest little documentable influence of the Iroquois League on the author of the Albany Plan. Benjamin Franklin had limited contacts with the Iroquois. Further, the research indicates doubts as to the actual author of the plan. Finally, the study concludes that it is impossible for twentieth-century historians and anthropologists to fully understand the workings of a native American political organization such as the Iroquois League. Because Franklin may not have been the sole author of the Albany Plan, because he did not know enough about the League, because the League itself had an oral rather than a written tradition, and because anthropologists do not fully understand the League's structure, a twentieth-century myth, based on a simplistic notion, should not continue to be propagated.
"SIX NATIONS OF IGNORANT SAVAGES":

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN AND THE IROQUOIS LEAGUE OF NATIONS
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, French and British statesmen and soldiers struggled for the control of the eastern part of North America. These opponents vied with each other for the allegiance of the native Americans on the continent in a tug-of-war that created constant unrest on the frontier. In an attempt to ensure the loyalty of the Iroquois Indians in particular, the British Board of Trade called for a conference to be held at Albany, New York, in 1754. There the British hoped to form a treaty with the Iroquois, just one of several that had been sealed over previous years.

Along with representatives from a majority of the colonies, Benjamin Franklin attended the Albany Congress as a delegate from Pennsylvania. Franklin, like members of the Board of Trade, realized the necessity of cooperation between the English colonies. To achieve this cooperation, he brought along his ideas for a plan of union for the colonies. The Albany Congress's delegates, in addition to forming a treaty with the Iroquois, accepted Franklin's plan and sent it to the separate colonial assemblies and to the Board of Trade for approval. But the Board and all the assemblies rejected it. Franklin was disappointed because he realized that the French threat, the control of Indian affairs, and the need for a union of the British colonies were intertwined. He felt that the plan constituted a solution for the hard-pressed English colonies.

Studies of the Albany Congress have led historians to search out Franklin's motives and the sources of his ideas. Certain twentieth-
century historians and students of the Congress have suggested that Franklin could have used the Iroquois confederation as a model for his plan. This League of Six Nations, a political union of six tribes, including the Mohawks, Senecas, Onondagas, Oneidas, Cayugas, and Tuscaroras, developed within the latter-day New York. Whether or not Franklin used the Iroquois as his model for a plan of union becomes a valid subject for intensive study. Historians try to be as objective as possible in studying and interpreting the past, but they are sometimes guilty of stretching the truth and often may perpetuate distorted stories. Mythmaking occurs when unclear events are misinterpreted.
In the Franklin-Iroquois case, those historians who believe that Franklin had an Iroquois model enjoy quoting Franklin's words. In a letter dated March 20, 1751, Franklin wrote James Parker, printer and postmaster of New York, expressing his ideas for a union of all mainland British colonies. The letter included this statement:

> It would be a very strange Thing, if Six Nations of ignorant Savages should be capable of forming a Scheme for such an Union, and be able to execute it in such a Manner, as that it has subsisted Ages, and appears indissoluble; and yet that a like Union should be impracticable for ten or a Dozen English Colonies, to whom it is more necessary, and must be more advantageous; and who cannot be supposed to want an equal Understanding of their Interests.

The danger occurs when it is inferred from this statement that Franklin respected the Iroquois to such an extent that he used their League as a direct model for his own thoughts. To take the point further, a danger is involved when anyone stretches historical fact, possibly to twist and distort it to his or her advantage. Thomas A. Bailey, studying myths in the 1960s, believed that most of the "pretty little stories of history are in some degree false, if pursued to their smallest details." He defined a historical myth as "an account or belief that is demonstrably untrue, in whole or substantial part." Bailey discouraged the use of myths as a way to teach American values. An objective historian needs to try to find the needle of truth in the haystack of distortion.
A few twentieth-century historians and history texts have stated their beliefs that Franklin used the Iroquois League as his union model. One early example appeared in Felix Cohen's 1952 article, "Americanizing the White Man." Citing Franklin's "Six Nations" statement, Cohen implied that Franklin greatly admired the Iroquois confederacy and had the League in mind when he created his plan for uniting the British colonies. According to Cohen, Franklin incorporated in his plan the advice given by the Iroquois chief Canasatego, who spoke to the British representatives negotiating a treaty at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, in 1744. Although Franklin was not present, he did have the opportunity to read Canasatego's words as they were recorded at the council: "We are a powerful Confederacy; and by your observing the same methods, our Wise Forefathers have taken, you will acquire such strength and power. Therefore whatever befalls you, never fall out with one another."

Several suggestions of a possible influence from the Iroquois League appeared in textbooks and monographs in the 1970s. Wilbur Jacobs dealt with the question in Dispossessing the American Indian. Jacobs specifically looked at the ideas formulated by the authors of the Constitution and concluded that "the case for the Iroquois is not so farfetched as one might think." Franklin, "an admirer of the Iroquois league," had good reason to know its virtues, said Jacobs, for the printer from Philadelphia also served as a commissioner to a 1752 Indian conference in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Jacobs went on to describe how later, at the Albany Conference of 1754, Franklin and his fellow delegates got a scolding from Hendrick, a sachem of the Mohawk tribe. Hendrick praised the League and told the British that their
"disorganized, womanlike method of defense against the French was to be deplored." When Jacobs concluded with the statement, "It is known that other framers of the Constitution had knowledge of Indian confederation systems and the ideals of Indian democracy," he seemed to imply that Franklin, as well as other colonists, was very familiar with the League.

High school students who have used The American Adventure: The Early Years--20,000 B.C.-A.D. 1763 have confronted a blatant example of the formation of a myth. This textbook incorporated the following statement into a discussion of the way of life of the Iroquois Indians: "Benjamin Franklin used the example of the League of the Iroquois in drawing up a plan of union for the 13 British colonies in 1754." Here is the danger that Thomas Bailey foresaw. The writers of this text simplified a complicated and even ambiguous event, full of discrepancies; the intent of their "story" was to extol the virtues of the Iroquois, but in so doing, they possibly distorted historical facts.

Perhaps the greatest distortions appear when writers feel personal connections to their subjects. Donald Grinde, who claims Yamasee Indian descent, wanted the readers of The Iroquois and the Founding of the American Nation to understand the importance of the Iroquois to America. Grinde's writing supported his bias, as he intended to "cast off the arrogance of Western civilization in order to eliminate the idea of a superior culture," and to "chronicle the role of the Iroquois in forming a part of the political basis for the new American nation."

In order to do that, he gave numerous examples of the Iroquois' influence, including the part that he felt they played in the thoughts of Benjamin Franklin. He mentioned, without proof, an Iroquois suggestion
to the colonists that the latter would do well to follow the Iroquois principles of confederation. At Albany, Grinde continued, Franklin met with the conference delegates and the Iroquois, and "hammered out a plan which he acknowledged to be similar to the Iroquois Confederacy." But Grinde did not specifically indicate where and when Franklin "acknowledged" this fact. Discussing Hendrick's criticisms of the British, cited by Jacobs, Grinde thought Hendrick "hinted [that] the Iroquois would not ally themselves with the 'thirteen fires' until a suitable form of unity was established among them." Grinde confessed that Franklin only grudgingly recognized any Iroquois influence, yet Franklin's "Six Nations" statement "demonstrates the debt that he and other colonists owed the Indians in framing the Albany Plan of Union." Although the sources indicate that Franklin made his statement in 1751, not in 1754, Grinde implied that Franklin presented it at the Albany Congress. Finally, when Grinde printed the Albany Plan in an appendix, he omitted four paragraphs which, in his mind, may not have supported his premise that the Iroquois League was the role model for the democratic tendencies of the colonists.

In a recent publication, Forgotten Founders: Benjamin Franklin, the Iroquois and the Rationale for the American Revolution, Bruce Johansen reviewed what was written on American Indians and particularly on the Iroquois to date, including Grinde's work. Johansen studied the place of the Iroquois in American history, focusing on the eighteenth century, and concluded with remarks on the role of the Iroquois in the communication of democratic ideas. He felt that similar ideas even affected nineteenth-century thinkers like Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.
Johansen perceived a "plausible argument that the Iroquois had indeed played a key role in the ideological birth of the United States, especially through Franklin's advocacy of federal Union." Johansen tried to prove his objectivity and sincerity. He believed that "the argument around which this book is centered is only one part of a broader effort not to rewrite history, but to expand it, to broaden our knowledge beyond the intellectual straight-jacket of ethnocentrism that tells us that we teach, but we do not learn from, peoples and cultures markedly different from our own." Further, "the Iroquois were not the only American Indians to develop notions of federalism, political liberty, and democracy long before they heard of the Greeks or the Magna Charta. Benjamin Franklin was not the only Euro-American to combine his own heritage with what he found in his new homeland."

All of these authors credit the Iroquois with political organization and unity, a unity that quite conceivably was admired by the colonists, especially those with mandates for running colonial governments. However, the strength and unity of the Iroquois Confederacy waxed and waned a number of times in the centuries following its founding. Various colonists, who observed the League in different decades of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, described what impressed them most about the Iroquois' "Tree of the Great Peace," possibly leaving out or not perceiving some of the important features of the League structure. Improper understanding of the "Great Peace" led to "pretty little stories" in the twentieth century.
"THE TREE OF THE GREAT PEACE"

The League of the Iroquois originally consisted of five member nations—the Mohawks, Senecas, Onondagas, Oneidas and Cayugas. In the Iroquois legend of the founding of the League, which traditionally took place around 1600, the heroes Dekanawidah and Hiawatha brought the message of peace to these nations who were squabbling over internal problems. Dekanawidah accomplished this by planting the "Tree of the Great Peace," establishing an oral constitution to guide the newly formed League. Although his main intent was to establish peace among the bickering nations, he also wanted them to unite to acquire numerical strength. In 1780, David Zeisberger commented that the Iroquois called themselves the "united people, having united for the purpose of always reminding each other that their safety and power consist in a mutual and strict adherence to their alliance." Dekanawidah's unwritten constitution or "Great Peace" provided a way for this united people to work together for their mutual advantage.

Symbolism played an important role in the League's tradition. The best-known symbol for the Iroquois League is the longhouse, the typical dwelling of these Eastern Woodlands Indians. Jesuit Father Joseph Lafitau admired the Five Nations: "In spite of different reasons for jealousy, [they] have always kept united, and to indicate their union they say that they form a single house which we call the Iroquois Longhouse." According to John Heckewelder, a Moravian missionary who
described the Onondagas as the head of the League and the others as "brothers and sons," the nations united as brothers in a "family compact" within this longhouse. The Iroquois considered the Mohawks and Senecas to be the Elder Brothers, while the Oneidas and Cayugas were thought of as the Younger Brothers; the Onondagas acted as arbiters in the system. When they were seated in the longhouse of the confederacy, the Iroquois thought of the Mohawks as the Keepers of the Eastern Door of the Lodge and the Senecas as the Keepers of the Western Door, while the Onondagas sat in the middle geographically and figuratively as the Firekeepers and Wampum Keepers. Dekanawidah symbolized the unity of the Longhouse League with a bundle of arrows, one from each nation, which, "when it is made and completely tied together, no one can bend or break."

At the heart of the social structure of the League lay kinship structure; clan as well as village, the lowest denominators, formed the backbone of the League. Dekanawidah based the League on the matrilineal kinship system, decreeing that "women shall be considered the progenitors of the Nation," and they were to control the land, at least up to the wood's edge. The longhouse family included the siblings of a wife's mother, the wife's siblings, the wife's children, and her daughter's children. A clan was comprised of two or more maternal families who behaved as if the members of each generation were siblings. Originally, fifteen clans made up Iroquois society. They were distributed throughout the Five Nations, and members of one clan recognized every other member of that clan as a relative, no matter from which Nation he or she hailed. Members of the same clan could not marry. According to Lewis Henry Morgan, one of the earliest Iroquois anthropolo-
gists, the system divided the clans among the nations so that "the whole race was interwoven into one great family." Clans had great influence in government, according to Sara Henry Stites, whose 1904 doctoral dissertation discussed the "Economics of the Iroquois." She maintained that the clans held the actual sovereignty in the League: "The government of the Iroquois was a government for and by the clans, acting in an assembly composed either of representatives or of all the members of a clan." Clans were so powerful in government, Stites felt, because they controlled economic activities; although each tribal unit occupied its own territory and owned the supply sources in its region, within the tribal boundary the clans controlled the access to those sources. Economy directed the structure and actions of the confederacy, and the clans were at the heart of the economic system.

Further, two or more clans composed a moiety, and each tribe was divided into two moieties. Clan members of moieties acted as if they were brothers and sisters. The two moieties that formed a tribe served ceremonial functions, condoling each other's dead and performing other rituals. The duality of the tribal moieties was applied to the five tribes, which were divided into two moieties, the Elder Brothers and the Younger Brothers.

In order to maintain a system of duality and reciprocity, Iroquois kinship and social structure extended to its political structure. The League depended on individual villages and nations for its existence and its stability. This "league of ragged villagers," as Benjamin Franklin named it, survived because the roots of the "Tree of the Great Peace" grew deep into the heart of Iroquois village and family life.
Although unity theoretically formed the basis of the League, the Iroquois wanted to maintain the independence of the individual nations and the villages that made up the nations. Lafitau confirmed the independence of the village government when he wrote that "all the villages govern themselves in the same way, by themselves, and as if they were independent of each other." Each village had its own village council chief or chiefs, who were chosen from smaller residential units, sometimes even from a single household. In this matrilineal society, clan matrons chose the men on the village council. The village council was comprised of ranking clan chiefs and elders chosen by clan matrons. The same applied to the League Council; it too was attended by clan or tribal chiefs whose titles were hereditary, but also by other chiefs whose titles died with them.

Clans were represented among the sachems. The senior woman of a clan chose the successor of a deceased "federal" chief from her own lineage. Both the Mohawks and Oneidas had only three clans and nine League chiefs each. The Onondagas had nine clans and the Cayugas and Senecas approximately eight, but the number of chiefs differed among all three. The Onondagas had fourteen chiefs—including the most important, Thadodaho—who were distributed unequally among the nine clans. The Cayugas held ten chieftainships, which were distributed unequally among the clans; to make matters even more confusing, the Cayugas had more than one Bear, Turtle, and Snipe clan. The Senecas had only eight chiefs and eight clans, but the chieftainships were not distributed equally among their clans either.

Fifty sachems or federal chiefs from the tribal councils made up
the League Council. Each chief dropped his own name when installed and adopted the hereditary name of one of the original founding sachems. A sachem's power extended throughout the confederacy. A Mohawk sachem could expect the same obedience from any other nation that he would from the Mohawks, and according to Morgan, "herein we discover an element of Union, or rather a tendency to merge the national governments into one strong central government." 

Hereditary sachems cemented their authority by creating a special category of chiefs which served an intermediate function between the hereditary sachems and the people. These Pine Tree Chiefs were elected by the Council according to merit. Both the office and title died with the holder since neither was hereditary. The Pine Tree chiefs had a voice but no vote in Council proceedings. Their office allowed for a certain amount of popular participation in League affairs, and provided opportunity for the more ambitious and talented among them to have a voice. By creating the office of Pine Tree chief, the League created a system of checks and balances for itself.

In the Council each nation had only one vote in decisions, but certain tribes claimed special prerogatives. Since the Mohawks were regarded as the Eldest Brothers, they had to be present for a Council to be legal. Mohawks also had the right to exact tribute from surrounding dependent nations. The Onondagas kept the wampum and held the veto power in the Council. Finally, the "Great Peace" gave the Senecas the privilege of having the only two permanent war chiefs of the League because their nation lay closest to the unfriendly tribes in the west. These two war chiefs helped to settle disagreements and to organize warfare.
Councils sent representatives from the villages to tribal or national councils, through which individual nations were free to make a separate war, or a separate peace, with a foreign nation, or any part of it. In addition, each nation had its own war chief, chosen by the women, who not only led the particular nation to war, if necessary, but also had the privilege of bringing any of the peoples' complaints to the League Council, although they were not actual members of the Council. Members of the Council could not fight in wars because they acted as peace officers. If a sachem wanted to fight, he had to put aside his symbol of office—his horns—and fight as a common warrior. Therefore, the "Great Peace" allowed for individualized warfare, but also made certain that there were leaders who could act for the League in an emergency.

At the individual level, Dekanawidah hoped to place equal power and authority in the hands of the sachems. He told the original "lords" that they were "all of equal standing and of equal power," and that if they disagreed, "the consequences [would] be most serious and this disagreement [would] cause [them] to disregard each other." The talents and oratorical style of certain sachems created degrees of inequality among them as they vied for influence in Council debates. One sachem, Thadodaho of the Onondagas, inherited the special right to preside over the Council, but he had no particular executive powers.

Internally, the League Council functioned in all aspects of government. "The sachems," wrote Morgan, "formed the Council of the League, the ruling body, in which resided the executive, legislative and judicial authority." The Council performed a variety of duties. It
settled quarrels between its member nations, "since it is hardly possible that among peoples where license reigns with all impunity . . . there should not happen some event capable of causing a rupture." The League Council controlled the confederation treasury, which was filled by exacting tribute from dependent peoples and by receiving gifts from the Iroquois nations themselves. It also invested sachems with their office through a condolence ceremony. In this ritual, the Iroquois of one moiety reciprocally condoled with the living of the deceased sachem's moiety, in honor of the deceased sachem, and installed the successor, whom the women chose from the clan of the deceased. This method of selection, because it was based on the stable clan structure of the League, ensured an orderly transfer of power.

Externally, the League Council carried on essential diplomatic duties. It declared war for the League and made peace, since either an individual nation or the entire League could go to war. It sent and received ambassadors and entered into alliances with other tribes. In conducting a treaty of peace or alliance, the Council held a special meeting in which it exchanged wampum belts with the other nation or nations. For the Iroquois, an agreement was not considered valid unless wampum had been exchanged. These belts were mnemonic devices to help the Indians remember what the parties agreed upon at the treaty session. At the treaty, wampum also served to organize and regulate the flow of the treaty council's business, since wampum was exchanged regularly throughout the meeting. The Iroquois placed as high a value on wampum as the British would have placed on a written contract or agreement.

Another external power enabled the League to regulate the affairs
of subjugated nations. League members considered themselves to be at war with any tribes not allied with their confederacy. The Iroquois sometimes coerced tribes to enter their "pax Iroquoia" or "Great Peace." In fact, Dekanawidah's constitution provided for the conquest of nations who refused the Iroquois peace. If a foreign tribe would not accept peace after three offers from the Iroquois, the League could declare war. If the Iroquois won the war, they would automatically admit the nation to their peace. The Iroquois then supported the subjugated nation militarily and "after [the Iroquois] have satiated their Revenge by some cruel Examples, they adopt the rest of their Captives; who, if they behave well, become equally esteemed with their own People." 46

If a foreign nation wished to be admitted to the "pax Iroquoia," the Iroquois would follow the procedures stipulated by the legendary constitution. A prospective tribe applied for membership through one of the Five Nations, and the membership could be rescinded by the Council at any time. The nation retained freedom in running its own internal affairs, but had no voice in the Council. If it had something to say, it spoke through its sponsor. The Tuscaroras best exemplified such a willing nation. When their enemies forced them out of North Carolina in 1714 they headed north to join the League. 47 Lewis Henry Morgan described the League as a "progressive confederacy," since it continuously attempted to accumulate power by absorbing foreigners into its confederation. The fact that the League could maintain its population by so doing made it strong against Europeans, while other native groups became weaker. 48

Meetings of the Council took place each year at Onondaga. John Bartram, who traveled there, described Onondaga in 1743 as the "town
that serves the five nations as Baden does the thirteen cantons of Switzerland, with this difference, that Onondaga is at the same time the capital of a canton." Generally, the Onondaga nation called the meeting, but each nation had the power to do so if it wished and to prescribe the time and place. Those attending a Council meeting included the required sachems, Pine Tree and war chiefs, and women and children who came to listen. The meetings included ceremonial practices such as singing and praying, but the importance of a meeting lay in speech-making and debate. Actually, the debate consisted of a series of speeches made in turn by the sachems. The Iroquois art of oratory impressed Benjamin Franklin and other colonists, as indicated in their writings.

The Iroquois Council placed great emphasis on unanimous decisions. To try to arrive at one on a particular matter, the sachems of each nation first had to decide unanimously among themselves, for each nation had only one vote. Then the Elder Brothers and Younger Brothers respectively met and arrived at decisions within each phratry, or set of brothers. The phratries then took their decisions to the Council where the nations, with the Onondagas as arbiters, tried to arrive at a final unanimous vote. The Onondagas could use their veto power when indecision occurred, but the veto could be overridden by the phratries. In the case of a stalemate, the members dropped the matter from discussion.

As with any established confederation of government, the League had its positive and negative aspects. Theoretically, it allowed for the indirect participation of the people in their government. Specifically, it preserved the right of every person to express his own thoughts by permitting public councils to be held at the local level. These councils
acted as a check on the activities of the federal Council. Women and warriors also met in local councils periodically and could voice their opinions to the League Council through representatives. Arthur Parker, an anthropologist of Seneca descent, described the extraordinary political power of Iroquois women in contrast to the minimal rights granted to women at the turn of the twentieth century. He remarked that "women thus had great power for not only could they nominate their rulers but also depose them. Here, then, we find the right of popular nomination, the right of recall and of woman suffrage, all flourishing in the old America of the Red Man and centuries before it became the clamour of the new America of the white invader." Another positive aspect of the League was its preservation of local autonomy and "the perfect independence and individuality of the national sovereignties." The Iroquois tried to avoid a strong central government and the concentration of power in only a few hands.

Although the League's unity has been praised by anthropologists and some historians, it may not have exhibited as much cohesiveness as has been thought. The interests and objectives of the Mohawks and the Senecas frequently clashed, especially in the seventeenth century, and the individual nations often dealt differently with foreign nations, whether European or Indian. Because individual nations had the freedom of the "Great Peace," they went to war more frequently on their own than they did under the "wings" of the confederacy. Further, because the original founders of the League feared the usurpation of political power by the federal Council, the constitution provided no machinery for executing Council decisions. Usually, individual tribes carried out deci-
sions; if not, the Council appointed special agents.\textsuperscript{55}

The League also faced problems because of the inequality among nations and individuals. Since the Iroquois saw themselves as superior to all other nations, they did not admit new nations on a basis of equality. This led to friction and ineffectiveness in controlling dependent nations. Because only a few men met as representatives of the separate nations and excluded dependent nations from the Council, the League had more oligarchic than democratic elements. Morgan felt that an oligarchy had its advantages. Specifically, the power was distributed equally among an unchangeable number of rulers, which contributed to stability. Member nations were not ruled by a tyrannical body of sachems. Perhaps the Six Nations made their League as democratic as they realized it could be. But the extent of democracy has been difficult for anthropologists to determine.\textsuperscript{56}

The League played a major role in European-Indian relationships of the eighteenth century. Even with the individual freedoms taken by member tribes, the Iroquois nations stuck together in a loose confederation that was more efficient than any other Indian alliance of the time. The threat of English and French expansion produced a stronger League after 1701, when the Treaty of Ryswick, ending King William's War, brought among the Iroquois League and the two European powers a stance of neutrality that allowed the Iroquois to regain their strength.\textsuperscript{57} Both colonial powers tried to use the Iroquois as pawns in their struggle for empire. By the mid-eighteenth century, however, the Iroquois had decided to ally with the British. England offered several advantages. She did not penetrate into the Indian lands as far as France did, and she
offered certain desirable British goods such as woolens of a better quality and cheaper cost than comparable French goods. The Iroquois seemingly had a more equal, sibling relationship with the British, whom the Indians called "Brethren"; in councils the Indians referred to French officials as "Father" indicating a more distant relationship. The members of the League formed covenant chains of friendship with the British, as they did in 1754 at the Albany Congress. These councils were one way for colonists, especially British subjects such as Benjamin Franklin, to learn about the Iroquois "Tree of the Great Peace," formed and functioning for the Iroquois by the early seventeenth century.
"SIX NATIONS OF IGNORANT SAVAGES"

Certain British colonists such as Benjamin Franklin periodically discussed this somewhat powerful "league of ragged villagers" in their writings. Whether Franklin understood how the unwritten Iroquois constitution of the "Great Peace" worked is questionable. He certainly was not an ignorant eighteenth-century colonist. He knew what was happening in the colonies and in England, and had a cosmopolitan rather than a provincial outlook.

Much of Franklin's knowledge of the Iroquois came through his primary occupation as a Philadelphia printer. From 1736 to 1762, he copied and printed thirteen treaties made between various tribes and several of the colonies. Prior to 1754, six of these treaties dealt specifically with the Six Nations of the Iroquois. Five were drafted in Pennsylvania; the sixth conference took place in Albany. Because a printer was familiar with what he was copying, Franklin probably learned the procedures followed by the Iroquois nations when they met in a conference to draft a treaty.

One such treaty negotiation was that held at Newtown, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, in June 1744. At that meeting, Canasatego, an Iroquois chief, advised the colonial ambassadors that the Iroquois were "a powerful Confederacy; and by your observing the same Methods, our Wise Forefathers have taken, you will acquire such Strength and power. Therefore whatever befalls you, never fall out with one another."
Franklin probably learned more than procedures from printing Indian treaties; he also could become familiar with Iroquois thought and philosophy through the speeches of orators such as Canasatego.

When Pennsylvania Governor James Hamilton appointed Franklin to a conference at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, in September 1753, Hamilton presented the printer and assemblyman with his first opportunity to experience an Indian council first-hand. Along with Isaac Norris and Richard Peters, members of the assembly and the governor's council respectively, Franklin met with "Chiefs of the Ohio Indians," which included representatives of the Six Nations, Delawares, Shawnees, Miamis, and Wyandots.61

This conference began with a condolence ceremony to honor dead warriors of the Delawares and Miamis and to sympathize with the survivors and successors. Sympathy included more than mere words, however. The British brought gifts for these grieving tribes, who had lost chiefs and warriors to French soldiers. In these treaties, belts and strings of wampum took on a diplomatic purpose; although they were meant for condolence, they also stood for peace and unity among all nations present. The commissioners also heard speeches from the Indians. Scarouady, an Oneida representative of the Six Nations, spoke for all members of the League when he chastised the colonists for expanding their trade too far into Indian territory—they crossed the mountains—and for selling rum to the Indians. The Iroquois' oratory style was one of their strengths, and Scarouady showed the power of persuasion to reduce British trade: "The French look on the great Number of your Traders at Ohio with Envy; they fear they shall lose their Trade. You have more Traders than
are necessary." The Indians requested that only three sets of traders remain on Indian lands.

Despite Scarouady's plea to the colonists to stop the sale of rum, the commissioners promised the Indians alcohol after they completed the treaty. When the representatives concluded the treaty the Indians got their rum, and Franklin remarked that they "form'd a Scene the most resembling our Ideas of Hell that could well be imagin'd." He referred to the Indians at Carlisle as "Savages," a general term used by colonists from the time of first contact in the late sixteenth century. At Carlisle the expression possibly took on more meaning for Franklin. Despite the impression left by the inebriated Indians, Franklin believed that "the Treaty was conducted very orderly, and concluded to mutual Satisfaction," possibly implying that the "Savages" had the capability to be worthy diplomats. References in the treaty to a "single Heart" among the Indians present and also to the "Six Nations Council" probably contributed to the colonists' realization of the need for unity among themselves.

Aside from these few personal contacts with the Iroquois, Franklin learned about their behavior and political structure through talking and corresponding with acquaintances who dealt with the Indians more frequently. His friend Conrad Weiser, the chief Indian interpreter for the colony of Pennsylvania, contributed to Franklin's knowledge. For the first sixteen years of Weiser's life, his family lived among the Mohawks, who adopted him as a brother. When he moved to Tulpehocken, Pennsylvania, in 1729, his earlier experiences led to his involvement in Indian affairs in the colony. He worked with Shickellamy, an Oneida
chief who lived at Shamokin at the forks of the Susquehanna River. Shickellamy acted as the League's representative in that area. The League entrusted him with observing the actions of the Pennsylvania Indians. 66

Weiser, because of his position as "province interpreter," took an active part in most of the Indian treaties of the 1730s-1750s. He acted as interpreter at Lancaster in 1744, where he held a conversation with Canasatego; Franklin commented upon this conversation forty years later. In addition to the treaties in which Weiser had a role, Franklin also printed in pamphlet form a 1744 letter from Weiser to Thomas Lee, acting governor of Virginia, in which the interpreter gave his observations of the nature and culture of the Six Nations. Weiser's comments do not include his own opinion about the Indians, however. 67

Weiser had a deep respect for the Iroquois and other Indian nations with whom he had contact, and the respect was mutual. At the 1744 Lancaster treaty, an eyewitness, Witham Marshe, reported in detail. He realized that "Mr. Weiser, the interpreter," was "highly esteemed by the Indians, and is one of their council of state (though a German by birth)." Weiser understood the Indians and asked that observers of the treaty be sensitive to cultural differences. Marshe noted how "our interpreter, Mr. Weiser, desired us, whilst we were here, not to talk much of the Indians, nor to laugh at their dress, or make any remarks on their behavior." 68 At the conclusion of the Lancaster conference, representatives present signed the treaty. Because of their admiration for him, Weiser was asked by the Six Nations to sign his new name, Tarachiawagon, as a representative of the Mohawks, who were absent.
Tarachiawagon was the name of the Holder of the Heavens, the ancient founder and protector of the Iroquois Confederacy.69

Later, at the Albany Congress of 1754, Weiser worked to reestablish the covenant chain between the Six Nations and the British. He deeply resented an attack made on his integrity as an interpreter in 1754. In a pamphlet regarding a land sale "from the Six Nations to the Proprietors" of Pennsylvania, Charles Thomson, a Philadelphia teacher, accused Weiser of implementing a sale that had not been made in accordance with the procedures of the Confederation Council. Weiser vehemently replied to the "notorious Lye"; he found it unbelievable "that the Person [himself] known to have a considerable Influence among the Indians, made the Indians Sign a Release contrary to the Established Costum [sic], and Usage of the Six Nations." He continued by condemning Thomson as a "Scoundrel & an Ignorant fellow in Indian Affairs."70

Franklin worked with Weiser at the Albany Congress and knew of his activities at Lancaster, but Franklin's contacts with Weiser extended to more than Indian affairs. Weiser had an account with Franklin's printing office in Philadelphia, where the former bought books. Their families had contact as well; the printer's son William accompanied Weiser on a journey to the land of the Ohio Indians in 1748 to make the treaty of Logstown, during which time William kept a journal.71

Another Indian agent, Sir William Johnson, who lived at Mount Johnson, New York, could have provided Franklin with excellent knowledge of the Iroquois League. Johnson lived and worked in Iroquoia as the Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Six Nations, appointed by Governor George Clinton of New York in 1743. In this position, Johnson
had regular contact with the Iroquois. Although Johnson was most influential among the Mohawks, all of the Iroquois sachems seemed to respect him. In 1751, at a Council at Albany held on July 2, Hendrick, the Mohawk spokesman, informed the governor of the province of New York that Johnson "has large Ears and heareth a great deal, and what he hears he tells to us; he also has Large Eyes and sees a great way, and conceals nothing from us." All of the nations were angry when Johnson resigned his position over a conflict with the provincial government and because the British crown failed to subsidize his work. Hendrick lamented for all of the nations that "his Excellency will be pleased to reinstate Coll. Johnson or else we expect to be ruined." In 1756 the crown finally gave the Indians what they wanted and conferred on Johnson the position of sole superintendent of Indian affairs for the northern British colonies.

Johnson and Franklin did not correspond until 1755, but it seems possible that Franklin would have been familiar with Johnson's work and knowledge. Perhaps Franklin learned about Johnson through Weiser, since the two agents occasionally corresponded.

Whereas Weiser and Johnson dealt directly with the Indians through councils and treaties, two others who may have influenced Franklin were merely observers of the Iroquois lifestyle. One, John Bartram, a Philadelphia botanist, accompanied Weiser on his trip to the country of the Six Nations in 1743. In addition to noticing plant life in New York, Bartram also noted the behavior of the Iroquois and their procedures in council meetings. He characterized the Six Nations as a "subtile, prudent, and judicious people in their councils, indefatigable,
crafty, and revengeful in their wars, the men lazy and indolent at home."
They also appeared to be "grave, solid, and still in their recreations,
as well as in their council." Bartram felt that the sachems were the
kind of men one could trust to keep their promises, as long as they were
given presents. He seemed to be impressed with their "perfect union" by
which "their forefathers had conquered their enemies, were respected by
their allies, and honoured by all the world." If Franklin read that
statement and believed it, it is no wonder that he would desire to form
another such union between the British colonies.

Franklin probably read Bartram's Observations. They lived near
each other, and both were original members of the American Philosophical
Society, founded in Philadelphia in 1744; Franklin served as secretary of
the Society. According to Carolus Linnaeus, a Swedish botanist, Bartram
was the greatest "natural botanist" in the world. Bartram visited
Cadwallader Colden, one of Franklin's New York acquaintances, in
September 1753, and Colden described Bartram in a letter to Franklin in
1754 as "our friend Bartram." Before Franklin published his
"Observations concerning the Increase of Mankind, Peopling of Countries,
etc.," he sent copies to Bartram and Colden for their opinions. Since
both men knew each other as early as 1744, it seems likely that Franklin
may have learned something about the Iroquois from Bartram, particularly
after the latter's trip north.

In 1743 Franklin met Cadwallader Colden, a member of the New York
Council and surveyor-general of New York. Colden lived in the Catskill
Mountains of New York adjacent to Iroquois lands, and south of Mount
Johnson, the home of Sir William. In March 1749 Colden's son John went
to Albany to take office as clerk, and Colden trusted to Johnson's "friendship in giving advice on any emergency that may happen[.]. The present circumstances of affairs makes me think it improper to recommend him [John] to any other of my acquaintances at this time." That May Colden wrote to Johnson asking for assistance for an acquaintance, Professor Peter Kalm, who was traveling north. Kalm wanted to know the safest route to Canada, where he hoped to study botany and astronomy. Colden realized that Johnson knew the northern areas better than Colden did.

A man of many talents and interests, Colden studied science, agriculture, and physics. In 1727 he wrote a History of the Five Indian Nations, which he filled with descriptions of the Iroquois, their councils, and the League in general. Colden respected the Iroquois and their "Genius in the Arts of negotiating." He found it intriguing that "a barbarous People, without any of the Arts and Sciences in which we value our selves," could "manage their Interest with the most learned, most polite, and artificial Nation in Europe."

Colden wrote about the League of Five Nations, disregarding the sixth, the Tuscaroras. He described the League as "many Tribes or Nations, joined together by a League or Confederacy . . . and without any Superiority of the one over the other. This Union has continued so long, that the Christians know nothing of the original of it." He further explained how each nation was an "absolute Republick by itself," but how "Matters of Consequence, which concern all the Nations, [were] transacted in a general Meeting of the Sachems of each Nation." He admired the Five Nations because they "have such absolute notions of Liberty, that
they allow of no Kind of Superiority of one over another, and banish all Servitude from their Territories." According to Colden, theirs was a "perfect Republican Government." This idea also could have been in Franklin's mind when he formed his ideas for the Albany Plan.

Franklin and Colden corresponded frequently, and Colden's letters appear in Franklin's writings. The printer apparently respected Colden's opinion; he showed his plans for union to Colden and two other New York acquaintances on his way to the Albany Congress. Colden, who also favored a union of the colonies but did not attend the Albany Congress, commented on the plans and made his own suggestions. Franklin regretted Colden's absence from the Congress, writing, "We could have had your Presence and Assistance both in the Treaty [with the Iroquois] and in forming the Plan." Just as Franklin had friends and acquaintances who devoted much of their time to the Indians, he and other colonists understandably shared similar attitudes toward the native Americans. The "noble savage" concept of the French philosophers and the theory of natural rights prevailed in many minds during the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, and balanced any racism evident as well. As early as the first contact with the American natives, Europeans referred to those they met and heard about as "savages" and "barbarians." John Smith, for example, repeatedly wrote about the "Salvages" as early as 1607, and William Strachey called them such in 1612. In 1648 the directors of the Dutch West India Company used "savages" in reference to the natives near New Netherland. According to Francis Jennings, a twentieth-century historian, "savages" was an English translation for the Dutch "wilden", a
term intended for the natives of a country who possessed laws and religion, and differed from heathen or Negroes; the Europeans sometimes called the natives "Wilde Indians." Franklin came from a long line of Europeans whose terms for the Indians probably connoted more favorable meanings than they did for Europeans and Euro-Americans of later centuries. Franklin's biographer, Carl Van Doren, has described the printer's perspective on the Indian as neither anthropological nor romantic. Franklin had a definite curiosity about the "Savages," and he enjoyed commenting on their behavior. Before he printed the Newtown Treaty of 1744, he wrote to William Strahan, an English friend, promising that he would "send . . . an account of it when printed, as the method of doing business with these barbarians may perhaps afford you some amusement."  

As early as 1747 Franklin noted the strength of the Six Nations in "Plain Truth: or Serious Considerations on the Present State of the City of Philadelphia, and Province of Pennsylvania." He jealously explained how the French knew "the Power and Importance of the Six Nations," and spared "no Artifice, Pains or Expence, to gain them to their Interest." With this firm observation of the importance of the Iroquois in the colonial system, Benjamin Franklin directly hinted that the British had better take a lesson from the French. The Six Nations' confederation must have seemed quite impressive to merit such attention.  

Although he referred to the native Americans with the common term "Savages," Franklin seemed to admire their way of life and to respect their accomplishments. He wrote one of his best-known comments to James Parker on March 20, 1751:
It would be a very strange Thing, if Six Nations of ignorant Savages should be capable of forming a Scheme for such an Union, and be able to execute it in such a Manner, as that it has subsisted Ages, and appears indissoluble: and yet that a like Union should be impracticable for ten or a Dozen English Colonies, to whom it is more necessary, and must be more advantageous; and who cannot be supposed to want an equal Understanding of their Interests.

Three years later Franklin formed a plan of union for the "ten or a Dozen English Colonies." Although he did not refer to this statement at the Albany Congress in 1754, he still may have felt that if the "ignorant Savages" could firmly establish such a successful union, so could he and the colonists.

Two years after the letter to Parker, Franklin again expressed his admiration for the Iroquois in a letter to Peter Collinson, a London merchant, dated May 9, 1753. Franklin described how the Indians who preferred a life of freedom and ease had resisted attempts to civilize them. Although the native Americans were "not deficient in natural understanding," and visited "civilized" societies frequently to see their advantages, they still showed no "inclination to change their manner of life for ours, or to learn any of our arts." Franklin told Collinson how white captives of the Indians who were rescued from their captivity often became "disgusted with our manner of life" and escaped back into the woods.

In 1784 Franklin commented on a conversation between the Iroquois chief Canasatego and Conrad Weiser held at the Lancaster conference in 1744. Franklin admired the way that both conducted themselves at the conference and added some of his ideas about Indian behavior. His writing again showed his admiration for Iroquois government, which was run "by Counsel of the Sages." He marveled that "there is no Force,
there are no Prisons, no Officers to compel Obedience, or inflict Punishment." He sincerely respected the Indians' councils and felt that they had "acquired great Order and Decency in conducting them." An astute observer with an eye for the unusual or extraordinary, Franklin singled out the record-keeping duties of the women and the oratorical style of the men when in council. Indian hospitality impressed him as well, and he concluded that "if we could examine the manners of different nations with impartiality we should find no people so rude as to be without any rules of politeness, nor any so polite as not to have some remains of rudeness." Even later, in 1797, Franklin set down his "Remarks Concerning the Savages of North America," ideas acquired over many years. He complimented the Indians on their polite conversation and "Civility," and even felt that their politeness in conversation was "carried to Excess, since it does not permit them to contradict or deny the Truth of what is asserted in their Presence. By this means they indeed avoid Disputes; but then it becomes difficult to know their Minds, or what Impression you made upon them." Franklin may have thought some Indian actions to be barbarous, but he admired the Indians' life of freedom and some of their political and social accomplishments.

Along with most colonial officials of the time, Franklin saw the need for the British to support the Indians in order to receive their support in return. On December 6, 1753, in a comment similar to that in "Plain Truth," he wrote to Cadwallader Colden emphasizing the British need to undersell the French by furnishing the Indians with cheap goods, thereby attaching "the Indians more firmly to the British interest."
Immediately after the Albany Congress he wrote to Peter Collinson that "no Assistance is to be expected from [the Six Nations] in any Dispute with the French, 'till by a compleat Union among our selves we are enabled to support them in case they should be attacked." 98

Through his few experiences and by his many acquaintances, Franklin acquired some knowledge of the Six Nations. He apparently knew about their political dealings with other tribes. At least William Clarke, a Boston physician and political writer, thought so, or he would not have asked for Franklin's advice in a letter of March 18, 1754. Clarke wrote to inquire "What Tribes of Indians are in Alliance with the Six Nations, what Number they are computed at, the Number of the Six Nations themselves, [and] whether all the Tribes of Indians in alliance with the Six Nations are likewise in Alliance with the English." 99 Clarke referred to John Patten, an Indian trader who worked on the Ohio River and seemed fairly experienced in the Ohio country. Surely Clarke inflated Franklin's ego when he compared the printer with the trader and told Franklin that "I beleive [sic] you know the state of most of these Facts better your self, than he can." 100 Clarke probably did not know the degree of knowledge and understanding that Franklin held of the inner workings of the League's structure. Certain colonists like Franklin tried to understand and deal with the Indians, while others would try to use the Indians to further their goals of wealth and power in North America.
"ONE DIRECTION, ONE COUNCIL, ONE PURSE"--THE ALBANY CONGRESS

Major political events prior to 1754 centered around the growing conflict between the British and the French over westward expansion. The object of both rivals was to seize new territory, maintain their trade routes, and influence the Indian tribes to extend trade relations and to make treaties of alliance. 101 The Ohio Company, formed by certain enterprising individuals in the colony of Virginia in 1747, allowed the Ohio Valley to be opened to settlers. The British government hoped that this private company would serve to extend royal Virginia beyond the Alleghenies. 102 The rival colonies expanded in different ways. Whereas the British advanced slowly and steadily and tended to maintain a distinct line of settlements, the French moved more rapidly, following the rivers and lake systems of the St. Lawrence and Mississippi and establishing a chain of trading posts connecting Canada with Louisiana. 103 Whereas the British pushed the Indians ahead or aside as the colonists established settlements, the French allowed the Indians to dwell among them.

While moving into new lands, both European powers intensified their efforts to maintain and extend their Indian alliances. The Six Nations were central to this tug-of-war, for they controlled some of the tribes that lay north of the Ohio River, the prime region for colonial expansion. A meeting between the British and the Twightwee or Miami Indians at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, in 1748 resulted in an agreement to
work together against the French. Later in that year, in a treaty at Logstown in the Ohio region, the Ohio tribes lent their support to the British. The British held further meetings with the Indians in the following years to strengthen their position in the northern and western lands. They controlled more of the Indian trade than did the French. Because British occupied the coast and established settlements, they developed trade centers; they generally furnished a better lot of goods and at times undersold the French.

The French political and social fabric initially appeared to be weak. According to William Clarke, who wrote to Franklin in May 1754, "the French Forts are of no Consequence, but as it gives them the Advantage of gaining the Indians . . . their building Forts at such distances from the places from whence they must draw their supplies . . . must . . . rather weaken them." The Iroquois, however, realized the growing strength of the French, who "are Men, they are fortifying everywhere--but, we are ashamed to say it, you [British] are all like women bare and open without fortifications." As French influence grew, the British government naturally became concerned. But British colonial governments could not unite easily for matters of offense or defense because they had no method for joint action, and the particularism and narrow-mindedness that characterized the individual colonial assemblies made the situation less than desirable.

By mid-century certain colonists and British officials began to consider seriously the need for some type of union. One colonist in particular, Archibald Kennedy, developed a plan in 1751 that dealt mainly with Indian affairs. Kennedy, the King's Receiver General and a member
of the governor's council in New York, wrote a pamphlet in which he urged the British government to adopt a unified policy toward the Indians in order to keep them from aligning with the French. A year earlier, he expressed a similar concern in Observations on the Importance of the Northern Colonies under Proper Regulations: "The French know their Interest, and will pursue it. That we ever should be able to recover our Indians, is much to be doubted; and if ever the French become absolute Masters of the Indians, adieu to our English Settlements." In both of these pamphlets, Kennedy urged the need for union in order to conduct colonial defense. He realized the inadequacies of the colonial assemblies and their stinginess with their treasuries. So he stressed that "nothing, therefore, but a British Parliament, can put this Affair upon a proper Footing." 

By 1754 French threats alarmed the colonies and underlined the need for a plan of action. Governor Robert Dinwiddie of Virginia ordered the building of a fort at the forks of the Ohio River in 1753. In New York, British ineptness at defense irritated the Mohawks, and worried officials in the mother country. Realizing the problems mounting in America, the Board of Trade, the body in England that administered the colonies, called a meeting to be held at Albany, New York, in June 1754. They chose this site because of its proximity to the major Indian lands in question.

The British government also realized that a union of the colonists was necessary. On July 5, 1754, the Board of Trade wrote to Governor James DeLancey of New York that "it seem's to be the opinion and is the language of almost every colony that a general Union of strength
and interest is become absolutely necessary [...] nothing could have facilitated such a measure more than a general Congress of Commissioners from each Colony at Albany.”

Earlier in the year, the Lords recommended that then-New York governor, Danvers Osborne, call a conference with the Six Nations and send invitations to the governors of the colonies from New Hampshire to Virginia. At the death of Osborne, Lieutenant Governor James DeLancey sent the letters to the governors, asking them to choose delegates who were particularly acquainted with Indian affairs. The Virginia and New Jersey assemblies were preoccupied with other matters and did not want to get involved at the time; Rhode Island and Connecticut delegates came, having received a late invitation. In Pennsylvania, Governor James Hamilton appointed John Penn, Richard Peters, Isaac Norris, and Benjamin Franklin, all government officials, and the Assembly approved them and their expenses on April 12, 1754. Governor Shirley of Massachusetts encouraged other governors to send delegates.

The instructions requested the twenty-four delegates from seven colonies to gather in Albany on June 14. A number of governors and assemblies sent instructions with their commissioners, describing what they hoped would be accomplished at Albany. The conference goals summarily included a renewal of the general alliance between the British colonies and the Indian tribes south of the Great Lakes; the construction of forts to halt French intrusions on Indian lands and to encourage the British Indian trade; and ultimately the execution of these measures by a loose confederation formed by the colonies, rather than by the British Parliament, contrary to Archibald Kennedy's suggestion.
Because the Indians arrived five days late, the Albany Congress commenced on June 19, with James DeLancey, acting governor, presiding. At the first session, the Congress immediately plunged into the Indian business by reading the minutes of previous meetings with the Indians at Albany. Prior to the conference, the Commissioners of Indian Affairs met and concluded "that the most effectual method to retain and secure the Six Nations to the British Interest, will be to build two Forts, one on the Onondaga, the other in the Seneca Country."  

Through the duration of the Congress the delegates and the Indians exchanged gifts and presented speeches; Conrad Weiser served as interpreter. The Indians proved honest in their criticisms of both the French and the British. Hendrick, the Indian spokesman, replied that the "Covenant Chain" that bound the Indians with the British government had to be renewed. But he angrily told the delegates that the British had neglected the Iroquois for three years: "You have thus thrown us behind your back," he said, "and disregarded us, whereas the French are a subtle and vigilant people, ever using their utmost endeavors to seduce and bring our people over to them." He also complained about the British practice of making "paths through our Country to Trade and [building] houses without acquainting us with it." The Lords of Trade seemed to agree. In a letter they also criticized the way in which New York had dealt with the Iroquois. Hendrick reminded the commissioners of the "Ancient glory of the Five Nations," and DeLancey expressed the hope that the colonies would become "as powerful and famous" as the Iroquois "were of old."

The outcome of the talks, which lasted through July 9, was a
general treaty, one like those that preceded it. The Indians renewed the "Covenant Chain" with the British, giving a belt of wampum "to clear away, all Clouds that we may all live in bright sunshine, and keep together in strict union and friendship; then we shall become strong and nothing can hurt us." According to Robert Newbold, a student of the Albany Congress, one lasting result of the meeting was the emphasis on placing Indian affairs under British authority. In 1756 the Lords appointed William Johnson sole superintendent of northern Indian affairs.

Besides the general, treaty renewal and the British commitment to construct fortifications, the conference decided no specific Indian issues.

While the talks with the Indians progressed, the Congress formed two committees for different purposes. One committee's job was to draft a "representation of the present state of the colonies." This "Representation" would confirm the British territorial claims in North America made at the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, following Queen Anne's War. The purpose of the "Representation" was to indicate the encroachments of the French since the treaty was made. The resulting report, finished by Thomas Hutchinson, indicated many of the same problems evident in the debates with the Iroquois--the defenseless condition of the British colonies, their neglect of the Iroquois, the fraudulent land grants, and the ill effects of rum on the Indians. The report then proposed to deal with these evils, to establish forts on the frontier, to limit the existing boundaries of the British colonies at the Appalachian Mountains, to gain control over the Great Lakes, and to form a union, so that the combined resources of the British colonies could be used "against their common
enemy." To form a plan of union, the Congress established a second committee comprised of Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Hutchinson, Theodore Atkinson, who kept a detailed "Memo Book" at the conference, and four others. At the conference ten days earlier, a "motion was made, that the commiss'rs deliver their opinion, whether a Union of all the colonies is not at present absolutely necessary for their security and defence." The vote passed unanimously for the formation of such a plan, and each colony chose one of its delegates to serve on the committee to review suggestions. The "representation" document served to support the committee's goals in forming a plan of union.

Most of the delegates did not bring explicit instructions to form a union of the colonies; only Governor Shirley of Massachusetts had instructed his delegates to do so. Therefore, when the commissioners decided to form a plan of union, almost all of them exceeded their delegated powers. Some of the commissioners proposed that the colonies be divided into two or three separate unions. In the final plan, however, the committee decided against such a proposal. They felt that the "strength of the whole was necessary to be used against the enemy" and the colonies could support each other if they were in the fight together. The committee also set down in its final draft the "Reasons and Motives on which the Plan of Union was formed," concluding "that an union of the colonies is absolutely necessary for their preservation."

Certain delegates played key roles in the plan's formation. One was Benjamin Franklin, who developed the idea for a union of the colonies
several years before the British government called the Albany Congress. In 1751 he wrote to James Parker in reaction to Archibald Kennedy's pamphlet, The Importance of Gaining and Preserving the Friendship of the Indians. Franklin felt that a union was necessary to conduct Indian affairs, but that a union could not be established by royal governors because they did not always see "eye to eye" with the assemblies. Instead, it should be formed by a select group of men who would be furnished with instructions from the assemblies; the men would be sent to the various colonies to promote the scheme. In that way,

such an union might thereby be made and established. . . .
A voluntary union entered into by the colonies themselves, I think, would be preferable to one imposed by Parliament; for it would be perhaps not much more difficult to procure, and more easy to alter and improve as circumstances should require and experience direct."

This 1751 letter included Franklin's celebrated "Six Nations" remark; his plan called for an intercolonial council for Indian affairs and defense, with a governor at its head. Money would be raised by an excise tax on strong liquors, and the number of delegates for each colony would depend on the amount it paid into the general treasury.

No other mention of a plan of union appeared in Franklin's writings until 1754. On May 9, Franklin printed a cartoon in his Philadelphia newspaper, the Pennsylvania Gazette. The cartoon was of a snake, cut up into eight pieces, each marked for a colonial area—New England, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina. The caption read "Join, or Die." With his cartoon, Franklin responded to the French capture of the Virginia fort at the forks of the Ohio. He commented that "the confidence of the French in this undertaking seems well-grounded in the present disunited state of
the British colonies, and the extreme difficulty of bringing so many different governments and assemblies to agree to any speedy and effectual measures for our common defence and security; while our enemies have the great advantage of being under one direction, with one council, and one purse."  

On his way to Albany to attend the conference, the printer had drafted a plan which he showed to a few acquaintances—James Alexander, a member of the New York council, Cadwallader Colden, surveyor general of New York, and Archibald Kennedy. Franklin's "Short Hints towards a Scheme for Uniting the Northern Colonies" was not much different from his 1751 scheme. However, by 1754 he had come to realize that the involvement of Parliament was necessary. The scheme, "being first well considered and improved by the Commissioners at Albany," was "to be sent home, and an Act of Parliament obtain'd for establishing it."  

When Franklin arrived at Albany, the Pennsylvania delegation chose him as its member on the committee to form the plan of union. He presented his "Short Hints" to the committee, and "it then appear'd that several of the Commissioners had form'd Plans of the same kind." The committee met and debated the ideas for a plan of union at the same time that the councils with the Iroquois occurred. Unfortunately, the planning committee left no records of its sessions. All that survives is the draft of its "Short Hints towards a Scheme for a General Union of the British Colonies on the Continent," which closely resembles Franklin's "Short Hints." Franklin wrote the final draft of the Plan of Union from this committee document. On July 14, 1754, he wrote to Colden: "The Commissioners agreed on a Plan of Union of 11 Colonies
... the same with that of which I sent you the Hints, some few Particulars excepted." However, Franklin's "scheme" was not the only one presented to the committee. He indicated that other commissioners had formed plans similar to his, but no record indicates whether these plans were written or oral, or whose ideas they represented.

Another plan could have been brought by the Reverend Richard Peters, a delegate from Pennsylvania. His "A Plan for a General Union of the British Colonies of North America," dated only "1754", was almost entirely military in organization. The continental colonies, excluding the distant region of Nova Scotia, would be organized into four geographical divisions, each of which would provide a contingent for a "union regiment." The plan was never adopted and probably had little influence on the resulting document at Albany.

Thomas Hutchinson, another member of the committee, also had a role in the formation of the Albany Plan. When the Congress ended, Hutchinson wrote that "the plan for a general union was projected by Benjamin Franklin." But in 1769 he wrote to Governor Francis Bernard of Massachusetts that "at the congress at Albany in 1754 I was in favor of an Union of the govs for certain Purposes & I drew the Plan which was then accepted." This was the only time Hutchinson claimed to have authored the final plan, but in three other instances he named Franklin as the author, indicating that Franklin probably played the major role. Hutchinson's biographer, Bernard Bailyn, seemed to be convinced that at the Albany Congress, the Massachusetts representative "had shared with Franklin the leadership in planning a union of American colonies under British control." Years later, Hutchinson wrote in his Diary:
The same famous Dr. Franklin was one of the Commissioners from Pensilvania. He with Mr. Hutchinson, were the Committee who drew up the plan of Union, and the representation of the state of the Colonies. The former was the projection of Dr. F., and prepared in part before he had any consultation with Mr. H., probably brought with him from Philadelphia; the latter [i.e., "The Representation"] was the draught of Mr. H. 141 Conceivably, Hutchinson did contribute oral plans to the work of the committee, based on his own personal feelings and on the political climate in Massachusetts. Hutchinson wanted to keep Great Britain and her colonies together; some power must have control of the colonies, he felt, and that power should be British. 142 Also, Massachusetts Bay was the only colony in which the governor had instructed his delegates to "enter into articles of union and confederation for the general defence of his Majesty's subjects and interests in North America." 143 Governor Shirley described his ideas in letters to the other governors. His plan included the control of Indian affairs, the building of forts, and the taxation of the colonies by Parliament, issues similar to those in other plans. 144 If Hutchinson brought Shirley's views to the committee, Franklin might have integrated them into the Albany Plan.

This is what historian Lawrence Henry Gipson believed happened. Gipson cited evidence for the existence of two other plans in his article "Thomas Hutchinson and the Framing of the Albany Plan of Union, 1754." Both plans, from the Connecticut Historical Society Collections, limited a union to the northern colonies; one seems to have been largely an amended form of the other. Gipson argued that the final copy of the Albany Plan more closely resembled both of these plans in content, as well as in language and style, than it did Franklin's "Short Hints". Franklin admitted that his plan was not adopted in whole in a letter to
Peter Collinson on December 29, 1754: "For tho' I projected the Plan and drew it, I was oblig'd to alter some Things contrary to my Judgment or should never have been able to carry it through." And later, in his *Autobiography* in 1788, he wrote about his contribution: "A Committee was then appointed . to consider the several plans and report. Mine happen'd to be preferr'd, and, with a few Amendments, was accordingly reported." It appears, then, that a portion of the resulting Albany Plan of Union was not the product of Franklin, but of Hutchinson or someone from Massachusetts.

Nevertheless, Franklin reported his final draft on July 10 as he was instructed. The Congress debated it and resolved, with some opposition, "that the Commissioners from the several Governments be desired to lay the same before their respective constituents for their consideration." The secretary was to forward copies to those governors who were absent.

In essence, and in Franklin's words, the Albany Plan "was to be administered by a president-general, appointed and supported by the crown, and a grand council was to be chosen by the representatives of the people of the several colonies, met in their respective assemblies."

The Plan covered such topics as Indian trade, land purchases from Indians, new settlements, peace and war preparations, the method for raising soldiers, the manner of forming legislation, and the appointment of officers (see Appendix I).

Franklin's thoughts on the Albany Plan of Union reveal his firm belief that the colonies needed to work together. In his July 14, 1754, letter to Cadwallader Colden, Franklin expressed his wish that "the Union
may be approv'd of by the Assemblies of the several Colonies, and confirmed by the King and Parliament." Again, in his letter of July 29 to Peter Collinson, a London merchant, Franklin expressed his concern that

in my Opinion no Assistance is to be expected from [the Indians of the Six Nations] in any Dispute with the French, 'till by a compleat Union among our selves we are enabled support them in case they should be attacked.

After the representatives approved of the Plan of Union, they took it home with them to be considered in their assemblies. In Pennsylvania, Governor Hamilton expressed his approval of the document and recommended it to the Assembly. But when they took up the plan, in Franklin's absence, they "reprobated it without paying any attention to it at all, to my no small mortification." Ironically, some of those men who had supported it at the Congress failed to approve it at home. None of the other assemblies approved the plan either. In December, Franklin resigned himself to the fact that the plan would not be accepted by the colonial assemblies. In his December letter to Collinson, he wrote: "Every Body cries, a Union is absolutely necessary; but when they come to the Manner and Form of the Union, their weak Noddles are presently distracted." As early as May 1754, Doctor William Clarke, Franklin's Boston friend, had written of the necessity of union and of the present discord:

This union is hardly to be expected to be brought about by a confederacy or voluntary agreement, among ourselves. The jealousies the colonies have of each other . . . will effectually hinder any thing of this kind from taking place.
The assemblies rejected the Plan for a number of reasons, all of which seemed to indicate narrowmindedness and a lack of cooperation on their parts. They did not want the taxing power to be in the hands of a federation. Certain colonies such as Pennsylvania and Virginia were in competition with each other over lands in the Ohio Valley. Rhode Island and Connecticut opposed the plan because it would have infringed on the privileges which their strong charter governments gave to them. And New Jersey, one colony that did not send commissioners, responded that while a union was necessary, a place should be made in the federal legislature for the contribution of colonial councils.

In defense of his plan, Franklin wrote to Governor Shirley on December 18, 1754, lamenting that "the powers proposed by the Albany Plan of Union, . are not so great as those the colonies of Rhode Island and Connecticut are entrusted with by their charters, and have never abused." In another letter to Shirley four days later, Franklin indicated that the union probably would be acceptable to the colonial assemblies if they could have representatives in Parliament. In that way the people of Great Britain and the people of the colonies "would learn to consider themselves, as not belonging to a different community with different interests, but to one community with one interest."

Some colonies waited to decide against the plan until they learned how it was received in England. In the meantime, on June 14, 1754, King George II asked the Board of Trade to prepare a plan of its own for the common defense of the colonies. The Board reported its "Plan of General Concert" to the king on August 9. This plan included a method for maintaining forts and raising troops if necessary, and an appointment
of a commander-in-chief to control Indian affairs and defense. With a
note of sarcasm, Franklin wrote to Cadwallader Colden on August 30: "Our
Assembly [Pennsylvania] were not inclined to show any approbation of the
[Albany] plan of union; yet I suppose they will take no steps to oppose
[the Board's] being established by the government at home." The Board
of Trade did not even recommend the Albany Plan to the king. Franklin
wrote: "The Assemblies . . . all thought there was too much prerogative
in it, and in England it was judged to have too much of the
democratic." However, the Lords of Trade did express regret in a July
5 letter to Lieutenant Governor DeLancey:

We cannot however but express our surprise and concern
that after the proper arguments which you made use of to
induce the neighboring Colonies to concur in the treaty
with the Six Nations any of these Colonies should at this
conjuncture have declined joining in a measure so
apparently for the general interest and security of the
whole.

Franklin feared the Board's alteration of the Albany Plan. He
felt that royal intervention would lead the colonists to suspect the
royal governors and councils, and to believe that their representatives
in the assemblies would have no influence; confusion and animosity would
result. He had acquiesced, however, when he wrote to Peter Collinson
in December that "if ever there be an Union, it must be formed at home by
the Ministry and Parliament. I doubt not but they will make a good one,
and I wish it may be done this Winter." The Board's plan did not go
into effect that winter. In fact, war broke out in 1754, with the defeat
of George Washington's troops at Fort Necessity, and the plan never was
executed. The Board adopted only one feature--they agreed to appoint a
commander-in-chief and two commissioners of Indian affairs.
In writing his Autobiography two decades later, Franklin summed up the positive aspects of his plan and its far-reaching implications. He knew that it "was really the true medium," and he was still of opinion it would have been happy for both sides the water if it had been adopted. The colonies, so united, would have been sufficiently strong to have defended themselves; there would have been no need of troops from England; of course, the subsequent pretence for taxing America, and the bloody contest it occasioned, would have been avoided. But such mistakes are not new; history is full of the errors of states and princes."
"THE ERRORS OF STATES AND PRINCES"

Errors are not exclusive to states and princes; historians are also susceptible. Thomas Bailey defined a historical myth as "an account or belief that is demonstrably untrue, in whole or substantial part." Bailey's definition appears sound. The important point remains that Franklin never stated that the Iroquois League was his model for the Albany Plan of Union.

Historians and textbook writers cited earlier seemed to want to imply more. Felix Cohen hinted that Franklin was aware of the League model and considered its strengths when he wrote the Albany Plan. Wilbur Jacobs thought along similar lines. Perhaps Cohen and Jacobs saved themselves, however; neither one ever directly stated that Franklin based his plan on the "Great Peace." The textbook published by the Educational Research Council of America stated that Franklin used the example of the League in drawing up his plan. In Bailey's definition, this is a belief that is untrue, at least in substantial part, because Franklin did not say that he used it, nor did any of his contemporaries.

Other twentieth-century writers such as Franklin's principal biographer, Carl Van Doren, trod more carefully in discussing the matter of the influence of the Iroquois League. Van Doren wrote that Franklin "plainly had it in mind in his earliest discussion of the need of union among the colonies." And Franklin apparently did have it in mind in 1751, when he conceived of his earliest plan. Bruce Johansen, who sought
connections wherever he could, admitted that "the Iroquois were not the only American Indians to develop notions of federalism and democracy," and "Benjamin Franklin was not the only Euro-American to combine his own heritage with what he found in his new homeland." Unfortunately, Donald Grinde failed to take into account any other possible sources for Franklin's influence. So enamored was he with his Indian subject that he failed to see the truth in his sources. He based all of his implications and even his statements of "fact" on Franklin's remark of 1751. Franklin never made a similar statement in 1754; at least, none was published in any of his extant writings.

Besides the fact that Franklin never admitted to using the League as a model, a number of other reasons exist that show that the plan did not, and could not, directly follow the League in structure. These include the general dissimilarities in the two plans and in the Indian and English cultures, the inadequacies in Benjamin Franklin's understanding of the Iroquois people and their way of life, and the introduction of the ideas of others into the Albany Plan, creating doubts and suspicions as to the Plan's authorship.

The Albany Plan exhibits certain similarities with the Iroquois League, but crucial differences are obvious as well. The League's constitution myth evolved by 1600, while the Albany Plan became a part of history in July 1754. Still, their creators produced both for the same general purposes—defense and the creation of strength in numbers. In Franklin's "Reasons and Motives on which the Plan of Union was formed," he resolved "That an union of the colonies is absolutely necessary for their preservation." He recognized the disputes and quarrels between
the colonies and even between the assemblies and councils within the individual colonies, and he knew that the French were encouraged to invade British North America because of the colonies' disunion. Similarly, Dekanawidah wanted to stop the quarreling between the Iroquois nations and to form a union for strength against enemies.

However, the organization of and decision-making processes in the two plans present more contrasts than similarities. Both tried to guarantee the independence of their members. The Albany Plan allowed "each colony [to] retain its present constitution,"^{170} except in certain cases where the plan changed the situation; the plan had the potential to place requirements on its member colonies, which the League did not. Both plans signified a place for meetings—Onondaga for the Iroquois and Philadelphia for the British. Also, both made provisions for the transfer of power from one representative to the next, and provided for the choice of a new representative if one should die or become incapacitated.

However, the Albany Plan provided for a Grand Council to be chosen every three years by representatives of the people in their assemblies, and for a President-General to be appointed by the crown. The Council members of the "Great Peace" were not elected, but were selected from specific clans by clan matrons, who consulted popular opinion. The "Great Peace" actually described in detail the types of men suited for "lordship" and the restrictions placed upon them.^{171} In the League structure, the Thadodaho came closest to the English office of President-General. But the Thadodaho held an honorary office; although he had to be present for a decision to be reached, his "de jure" powers did not
approach those of the President-General. He could not dissolve or prorogue the League Council without its consent, a check on the powers of this office.

In the financial sphere, the Albany Plan placed greater emphasis on money matters. Both plans provided for a general treasury. The funds in the treasuries came from member nations/colonies and, in the case of the Iroquois, from dependent tribes. Whereas the League treasury derived from gifts, the Albany Plan gave its Council the power to levy taxes on the colonies "as shall appear most equal and just . . . and such as may be collected with the least inconvenience to the people." The plan's Grand Council would appoint a general treasurer, an office apparently not deemed necessary in the League; in Iroquoia, one of the Onondaga chiefs kept the League's wampum. Wampum, however, was not spent like the colonists' coins. Instead, as mentioned earlier, it became the League's archives, and according to Iroquois scholar Elisabeth Tooker, "it was not regarded as money by the Indians, except that being something valuable it could be used for economic exchange and for gifts." The Albany Plan's provisions granted an allowance of ten shillings a day and travel expenses to the Council members. Finally, the Albany Plan allocated a colony's number of representatives "according to the proportion it contributed to the general treasury," although each could not have more than seven nor less than two representatives. The Iroquois knew no such concept of saving funds and compensating representatives financially, although the host of a condolence council was expected to provide drink and a feast.

In the sphere of defense and warfare, both plans reflected the
ways in which the societies desired to handle war. Although the "Great Peace" laid down procedures for League warfare, it freed the individual nations to fight their own wars. The Albany Plan provided that the colonies be able to defend themselves too, so it mandated the Grand Council to help pay a colony's individual war expenses, if the expenses were deemed "just and reasonable." Franklin in his "Reasons and Motives" felt that it was "necessary to encourage colonies to defend themselves, as the expence would be light when borne by the whole." According to the plan, the President-General would nominate military officers, subject to the approval of the Council. In this way, the people of the colonies should feel as if they had a voice through their representatives in the selection of officers. By contrast, the women of the Iroquois chose war chiefs, "selected from the eligible sons of the female families holding the head Lordship titles." In the Albany Plan the Grand Council also had the powers of raising soldiers, building forts, and equipping vessels for defense purposes; none of these powers was given to the sachems in the League Council.

In order for the Grand Council to function, the Albany Plan granted it the power to make laws, subject to the approval of Parliament and the Crown. This Council could pass laws only in certain areas--for governing newly-formed settlements on the frontier, raising and regulating soldiers, regulating the Indian trade, and laying duties on member colonies. The Council could not interfere with the laws or taxes of individual colonies, however. Therefore, most of the laws which the Council could pass dealt with external affairs. The League's "Great Peace" made no specific stipulations about law-making, except to describe
the method for making decisions in the League's Council.

Similarities appeared in the conduct of external affairs. Both plans stipulated how treaties with foreign nations were to be made. Franklin realized that the "power of making peace or war with Indian nations is at present supposed to be in every colony," but because "one colony might make peace with a nation that another was justly engaged in war with . . . it was thought better to have all treaties of a general nature under a general direction . . . so the good of the whole may be consulted and provided for." The Iroquois, too, provided for conferring with nations who wished to enter the "Great Peace." When the Iroquois encountered the Europeans, the Indians revised their forms of treaty-making because they could not bring the European nations into the "Great Peace." To function, they formed "covenant chains" with the Europeans such as those formed at various conferences with the British.

Understandably Indian affairs would present the Grand Council with special situations addressed by the Albany Plan. It stipulated that the Council should handle Indian trade because "many quarrels and wars have arisen between the colonies and Indian nations, through the bad conduct of traders; who cheat the Indians after making them drunk, &c. to the great expence of the colonies." Possibly Franklin wrote this section of the Albany Plan, remembering a drunken scene at the Carlisle conference of 1753. Franklin knew that particular colonies, whose interests in the trade were more intense than others, would balk at being regulated, but again he felt it would "be best for the whole." The plan allowed the Council to make all purchases of Indian lands which did not lie within colony boundaries. Apparently, one purchaser seemed better
than many, and the best purchaser had to be the crown, or the union in the name of the crown. On the surface this seemed more equitable to all concerned than purchases by individuals. Unlike the plan, the League had no special provisions for dealing with Europeans until the "covenant chain" developed after contact with settlers.

A final external function of the Grand Council and President-General was to form new settlements on the lands purchased from the Indians. The Grand Council would grant the land to settlers in small tracts and would charge a quit-rent which could be placed in a fund for the general treasury to use. Through the establishment of new settlements, Franklin hoped that British colonies might be formed in the west, for "the power of settling new colonies is . . . thought a valuable part of the plan."  

Ultimately the greatest difference between the plan and League structures was created by Great Britain. The British colonies held very little of the freedom that the Six Nations supposedly enjoyed in decision-making. British authority overrode everything the Grand Council did; laws passed had to be sent to England for the approval of the King, sitting in the Privy Council, and were, "if not disapproved within Three years after Presentation to remain in Force." Franklin, in his defense of the plan, thought British approval was necessary "to preserve the connection of the parts of the British empire with the whole, of the members with the head, and to induce greater care and circumspection in making of the laws, that they be good in themselves and for the general benefit." Twenty years later there would be a different tone in the colonies, but in 1754 the colonists were British, and Franklin felt proud
of the empire.

Finally, the social foundations of two distinct societies contributed to differences in the plans. The Albany Plan made no mention of religion or ceremony; political necessity formed its core. The "Great Peace," however, depended on ceremony; even the song of war mentioned the "Almighty Creator," and the Dekanawidah myth of creation noted the "Great Creator from whom we are all descended." The Iroquois constitution protected religious rites and festivals; symbolism formed the basis for the League structure. The Iroquois could not separate politics from religious ceremony in their daily lives, whereas the English tradition eventually led to a separation of the two realms.

Unfortunately, truly comparing the League's "Great Peace" with the Albany Plan depends on understanding fully the League structure. Understanding fully the League structure depends on faithful documentation, particularly from the eighteenth century, the period when Benjamin Franklin knew of the League. However, since no documentation from that century exists, ethnographers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries wrote down the League's traditional myth as best as they could, based on what they learned from the oral tradition of their native informants.

Several differing versions exist of the Iroquois creation myth, each author feeling his to be the most accurate. Lewis Henry Morgan, one of the earliest ethnographers, wrote in 1845 of "the people whose sachems had no cities—whose religion had no temple—whose government had no record." He believed that Iroquois tradition, "with its laws, rulers, and mode of administration, [had] come down to them through many generations with scarcely a change." In 1851, Morgan wrote his classic
League of the Ho-de-no-sau-nee, Iroquois, for which he has been called the founder of American anthropology. In this work, Morgan acknowledged the assistance of Ely S. Parker, a Seneca engineer and later a Union general, whose "intelligence and accurate knowledge of the institutions of his forefathers, have made his friendly services a peculiar privilege."

The next major work, Horatio Hale's Iroquois Book of Rites, appeared in 1883. Hale received similar versions of the myth from two native informants, Chief John Johnson, a Canienga (or Mohawk) and John Buck, the Onondaga wampum keeper at the time. The author believed that the version supplied by Johnson was written down in 1757 by a Canienga chief named "David." Hale combined the two versions into what William Fenton considered to be the first scholarly account of the League's creation myth.

In 1892, J. N. B. Hewitt, a staff member of the Bureau of American Ethnology at the Smithsonian Institution and of Tuscarora descent, recorded the "Legend of the Founding of the Iroquois League" from native informants, mainly John Buck, who had also assisted Hale. According to Fenton, Hewitt's version "is richest in symbolism and contains detail nowhere else available." Hewitt also used Seth Newhouse and, later, Chief John A. Gibson as sources. Newhouse, an Onondaga, prepared an early version of the myth in 1885. Gibson, a Seneca who served as the ritual leader of the Onondaga longhouse, dictated the myth in Onondaga to Hewitt in 1899. Gibson later would dictate a longer version to A. A. Goldenweiser in 1912, just before the chief's death. According to those who knew Hewitt, he strove to find the one true
version of the League's creation myth, a desire that most likely served as both a driving force and a stumbling block to the man.

Seemingly in dissatisfaction with Newhouse's semi-official 1885 version of the myth, a committee of chiefs from the Six Nations reserve on the Grand River in Canada compiled another version of the myth that was published in 1912 by another student of the League, Duncan C. Scott, who for many years served as Secretary of the Department of Indian Affairs. According to Scott, the typewritten manuscript of the "Traditional History of the Confederacy of the Six Nations" was "prepared by one of the Indians, and the whole work from its shadowy basis of legend to its mechanical execution is a native production." Apparently, the chiefs realized that many of the Iroquois' traditions "have been long relegated to oblivion" because they were not recorded in writing, and the committee decided to take action. However, the chiefs did realize that the League "has been maintained in accordance with the rules of the Confederacy as laid down by the founder of the League," and hence, they had something positive to record.

Perhaps the best known version of the Iroquois Confederacy's creation myth came from the pen of Arthur Parker. Parker, State Archaeologist of New York in the early twentieth century and grand-nephew of Ely Parker, became an anthropologist and museum curator. Parker's version has been accepted as an original manuscript for too long. As William Fenton wrote, Parker performed "two acts of literary piracy." Parker claimed to have "discovered" two manuscripts at the Six Nations reserve in 1910. In actuality, however, one of these manuscripts was that of Seth Newhouse, and Hewitt already knew of this version; it was
Parker also "found" a second manuscript, the version prepared in 1900 by the committee of chiefs and published in 1912 by Duncan Scott. Although Parker's version is as accurate as any other, his apparent eagerness to publish caused him to sacrifice some of his integrity.

As a result, attacks came from two sources—A. A. Goldenweiser and J. N. B. Hewitt. Goldenweiser criticized Parker for failing to mention that the second manuscript, the chiefs', appeared earlier in print by Scott. Goldenweiser claimed that the chiefs' account "gives the fullest version of the legend recorded to date." He, like several other scholars, believed that the Newhouse version "reflects Iroquois society at a much later stage in its development than is the case in MS.2 [the chiefs' version]," and that Newhouse attempted to make a political statement in order to resurrect Iroquois culture. Finally, Goldenweiser concluded that "MS.1, as an integral code, cannot justly be regarded as a genuine native product. . . [and is] conspicuously un-Indian in character. In a sense, then, 'The Constitution of the Five Nations' is a figment. It does not exist. For, apart from the legend of Deganawida, Indians of the Iroquois League had no constitution, either written or unwritten."

J. N. B. Hewitt, bitterly critical of all versions except his own, lambasted Parker for the latter's failures and mistakes. In 1892 Hewitt wrote his version, the "Legend of the Founding of the Iroquois League," with information obtained primarily from John Buck in 1888. In 1899, Hewitt worked with Chief John A. Gibson. Through his experiences, Hewitt learned of the work of Newhouse in 1897, of the chiefs' version,
and ultimately, of Scott's publication. Hewitt criticized Parker for 1) failing to point out conflicts between the two manuscripts used by Parker, 2) failing to note that the chiefs' version was a substitute for MS.1 which the chiefs rejected as erroneous in a number of ways, and 3) stating that he "discovered" the two manuscripts in 1910, when, in fact, both were known, one since the 1880s, and the other since 1900.  

Although publications regarding the League's creation myth became scarce in the second quarter of the twentieth century, Paul A. W. Wallace related it again in 1946 in The White Roots of Peace. On the one hand, Wallace chose to rely most heavily on the Gibson version of the myth, the version most favored by Fenton. However, Wallace boldly stated that the "United Nations of the Iroquois" was "the famous Indian confederacy that provided a model for, and an incentive to, the transformation of the thirteen colonies into the United States of America."  

Wallace's version, only a combination of all versions, with no documentation to differentiate between them in the text, presented no new information and shed no new light on the Iroquois creation myth.

After reviewing all of the evidence given by informants and the statements recorded by ethnographers, William Fenton, the leading student of the Iroquois in the twentieth century, concluded that the "most satisfactory single native account of the League" is a combination of the two texts dictated by Chief Gibson—one in 1899 to Hewitt, and the other in 1912 to A. A. Goldenweiser. In 1975, Fenton set down his thoughts regarding the Dekanawidah epic. He procured his information from the two Gibson versions, translated by Gibson's descendants. In "The Lore of the Longhouse: Myth, Ritual and Red Power," Fenton noted that the myth
changed every time it was retold, and that it was not necessary, "as Hewitt vainly sought," to "pursue the search for the one true version."
Fenton continued, "We are rather grateful for what exists and we employ all of it, as the historian uses his sources critically." Fenton, not overly critical of Parker in the final analysis, praised the former for his success in collecting information from living sources, and "what he salvaged in the mesh of undeveloped ethnological theory can fortunately be reinterpreted and perhaps even reworked with living Iroquois informants." However, Fenton decided that "none of the versions, nor all of them together, approach the nature of a charter or constitution," as Parker and others stated.

Problems exist in trying to record an oral tradition such as the Dekanawidah epic. The discrepancies and disagreements between the versions hint at the danger in using such versions as documentary sources for the League's political structure. An accurate comparison with Benjamin Franklin's Albany Plan cannot even be made, because the League probably was incomprehensible, even to Iroquois informants of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Parker's "Constitution," Fenton noted, "represents the effort of native scribes to codify custom law and usage in the face of pressures from without and to answer criticism from within a native society." In other words, any informant's view of the political situation at his particular time colored his report of the myth.

So too in Franklin's time; his informants did not understand the League as they witnessed it, or colored their report to Franklin, based on their particular situation or relationship with the League's members.
Again, if the descriptions of ethnographers and ethnohistorians differ or are uncertain regarding the League's political nature, then Franklin certainly could not grasp its depth or degree of organization, and no comparison can be made between the two plans as they exist in the twentieth century.

In speaking of the character of the two ethnic groups, Daniel K. Richter of Dickinson College noted that "Europeans were dense, and Iroquois were secretive." Richter concluded that the League sachems wielded very little power in the colonial period, despite their traditional titles and the intended powers of the League Council; he maintained that others, sometimes Pine Tree chiefs and war chiefs, "eclipsed the League Sachems in matters of politics and diplomacy." Richter based his conclusions on the fact that the names of the fifty League sachems seldom appear in Euro-American records. More than likely, Franklin had a glimpse of the reality of the Iroquois situation, and never came into contact with the traditional, idealistic image the Iroquois desired for themselves that came down to the twentieth century as Dekanawidah's legend of the founding of the League. In other words, the League the ethnographers studied was not the same League with which Franklin had contact.

Perhaps Franklin honestly intended to use the League, as he saw it, as his model. Again, however, a stumbling block appears. Historiography shows that he was not the sole author of the Albany Plan; others, particularly Thomas Hutchinson, played a role. Franklin admitted that he was "oblige'd to alter some Things" and that a "few Amendments" were added by the Committee at the Albany Congress. In "The Drafting of the
Albany Plan of Union: A Problem in Semantics," Lawrence Gipson concluded that "each of the two men played leading parts in bringing the Albany Plan of Union into existence. They may therefore be properly called the joint architects of it." Hence, despite Franklin's intentions, a number of authors—namely, Franklin, Hutchinson, and the Committee members—contributed to the resulting Albany Plan, which very vaguely resembles the intended structure for the Iroquois League, as set down in the traditional myth of creation.

Myths or stories "live because people want to believe them," according to Francis Jennings. He believed that replacing myths with history is painful but is a necessary weapon against cultural egocentrism.

Replacing myths with historical fact is not always easy, especially when the facts are lacking. In this case, no one will ever know just how much Franklin knew or understood about the Iroquois, or how sincere his intentions were to create a duplicate of the Iroquois League, however it appeared to him in his century. Although he called the Iroquois "Savages," he was sensitive to their strength and cohesiveness in their League.

Actually, the Iroquois probably influenced Franklin very little. More likely he took his ideas from the writings of philosophers; a study of his philosophical leanings may reveal his sources.

Since historians are so uncertain about the basis for Franklin's ideas, the myth lingers; it is stubborn and difficult to debunk. In the last two centuries the myth concerning the Albany Plan and further, the United States Constitution, seems to have evolved easily. Like many
American myths, this one presents a way for students of the past to appreciate possible native American contributions to the developing United States. But Thomas Bailey's warning to historians must still be heeded: "New hypotheses should certainly be encouraged, but if the evidence is lacking or scanty, they should be advanced with the utmost tenderness."
APPENDIX I

ALBANY PLAN OF UNION

At a Meeting in the Court House at Albany on Wednesday the 10th July 1754. A.M.

PRESENT—Joseph Murray and W™ Smith Esqrs of the Council of New York. All the Commiss except Henry Sherburn Esqrs one of the Commissrs for New Hampshire.

Mr Franklin reported the draught in a new form of a plan of a Union, agreeable to the determination of yesterday which was read paragraph by paragraph, [and debated] and the further consideration of it deferred to the afternoon.
adjourned to 3 o'clock this afternoon.

At a Meeting &c. on Wednesday the 10th July 1754. P.M.

PRESENT—His Honour the Lieut. Govt and the four Gentlemen of the Council of New York and all the Commissrs for the respective Governments.

The consideration of a plan of a Union was resumed which plan is as follows:

PLAN of a proposed UNION of the several Colonies of Massachusets Bay, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jerseys, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina, for their mutual defence and security, and for extending the British Settlements in North America.

That humble application be made for an Act of the Parliament of Great Brittain, by virtue of which, one General Govern™ may be formed in America, including all the said Colonies, within, and under which Govern™ each Colony may retain each present constitution, except in the particulars wherein a charge may be directed by the said Act, as hereafter follows.

That the said General Govern™ be administered by a president General, to be appointed & supported by the Crown, and a grand Council to be chosen by the representatives of the people of the several Colonies,
That within months after the passing of such Act, the house of representatives in the several Assemblies, that happen to be sitting within that time or that shall be specially for that purpose convened, may and shall chose, members for the Grand Council in the following proportions, that is to say:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colony</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts Bay</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>New York</td>
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<td>New Jersey</td>
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<td>Pennsylvania</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Who shall meet for the present time at the City of Philadelphia in Pennsylvania, being called by the President General as soon as conveniently may be after his appointment.

That there shall be a new election of members for the Grand Council every three years, and on the death or resignation of any member, his place shall be supplied by a new choice at the next sitting of the Assembly of the Colony he represented.

That after the first three years, when the proportion of money arising out of each Colony to the General Treasury can be known, the number of members to be chosen, for each Colony shall from time to time in all ensuing Elections be regulated by that proportion (yet so as that the number to be chosen by any one province be not more than seven nor less than two).

That the Grand Council shall meet once in every year, and oftener if occasion require, at such time and place as they shall adjourn to at the last preceding meeting, or as they shall be called to meet at by the President General, on any emergency, he having first obtained in writing the consent of seven of the members to such call, and sent due and timely notice to the whole.

That the Grand Council have power to choose their speaker, and shall neither be dissolved prorogued, nor continue sitting longer than six weeks at one time without their own consent, or the special command of the Crown.

That the Members of the Grand Council shall be allowed for their services ten shillings sterling per diem, during their Sessions or Journey to and from the place of Meeting; twenty miles to be reckoned a days Journey.

That the assent of the President General be requisite to all Acts of the Grand Council, and that it be his Office and duty to cause them to be carried into execution.
That the President General with the advice of the Grand Council, hold or direct all Indian Treaties in which the general interest or welfare of the Colonys may be concerned; and make peace or declare War with the Indian Nations. That they make such Laws as they judge necessary for the regulating all Indian Trade. That they make all purchases from Indians for the Crown, of lands [now] not within the bounds of particular Colonies, or that shall not be within their bounds when some of them are reduced to more convenient dimensions. That they make new settlements on such purchases by granting Lands, [in the King's name] reserving a Quit rent to the Crown, for the use of the General Treasury.

That they make Laws for regulating & governing such new settlements, till the Crown shall think fit to form them into particular Govern...ts.

That they raise and pay Soldiers, and build Forts for the defence of any of the Colonies, and equip vessels of Force to guard the Coasts and protect the Trade on the Ocean, Lakes, or great Rivers; but they shall not impress men in any Colonies without the consent of its Legislature. That for these purposes they have power to make Laws and lay and Levy such general duties, impost or taxes, as to them shall appear most equal and just, considering the ability and other circumstances of the Inhabitants in the several Colonies, and such as may be collected with the least inconvenience to the people, rather discouraging luxury, than loading Industry with unnecessary burthens.--That they might appoint a General Treasurer and a particular Treasurer in each Govern when necessary, and from time to time may order the sums in the Treasuries of each Govern, into the General Treasury, or draw on them for special payments as they find most convenient; yet no money to issue but by joint orders of the President General and Grand Council, except where sums have been appropriated to particular purposes, and the President General is previously impowered by an Act to draw for such sums.

That the General accounts shall be yearly settled and reported to the several Assemblies.

That a Quorum of the Grand Council impowered to act with the President General, do consists of twenty five Members, among whom there shall be one or more from a majority of the Colonies. That the Laws made by them for the purposes aforesaid, shall not be repugnant, but as near as may be agreeable to the Laws of England, and shall be transmitted to the King in Council for approbation, as soon as may be after their passing, and if not disapproved within three years after presentation to remain in Force.

That in case of the death of the President General, the Speaker of the Grand Council for the time being shall succeed, and be vested with the same powers and authority, to continue until the King's pleasure be known.

That all Military Commission Officers, whether for land or sea service, to act under this General constitution, shall be nominated by the President General, but the approbation of the Grand Council is to be obtained before they receive their Commissions; and all Civil Officers are to be nominated by the grand Council, and to receive the President General's approbation before they officiate; but in case of vacancy by
death or removal of any Officer Civil or Military under this constitution, The Gov of the Province in which such vacancy happens, may appoint till the pleasure of the President General and grand Council can be known.--That the particular Military as well as Civil establishments in each Colony remain in their present State this General constitution notwithstanding. And that on sudden emergencies any Colony may defend itself, and lay the accounts of expence thence arisen, before the President General and Grand Council, who may allow and order payment of the same as far as they judge such accounts just and reasonable.

After debate on the foregoing plan:
Resolved. That the Commiss from the several Govern'ts be desired to lay the same before their respective constituents for their consideration, and that the Secretary to this Board transmit a copy thereof with their vote thereon to the Governor of each of the Colonies which have not sent their Commiss to this Congress.

His Honour proposed to the Board that agreeable to their resolution of the 24. June, they would now consider the expediency of building Forts in the Indian Country. It was determined, that considering the present wavering disposition of the Senecas it was expedient that a Fort should be built in their Country at a place called Irondequat or Tierondequat.

Ordered. That a Committee be appointed to consider what further Forts may be necessary in the Country of the Six Nations, and that each Colony name a Member for this Committee.

Ordered. That Mr. Chambers and Mr. Peters be a Committee to revise the Minutes settled and agreed to by this Board.

adjourned till tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock.

NOTES

1 He did express the feeling that the Plan was not as good as it could have been. See Leonard Labaree and Whitfield Bell, Jr., eds., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 24 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), 5:454. Letter to Peter Collinson, 29 December 1754.


5 Ibid., 184.


7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.


10 Donald A. Grinde, Jr. The Iroquois and the Founding of the American Nation (San Francisco: The Indian Historian Press, 1977), X, xii.

11 Ibid., 15, 34, 168.

12 Ibid., 34.

13 Ibid., 35.
Ibid., 169-171. Grinde omitted the last four paragraphs, which dealt with general accounts, a quorum for passing laws, a successor on the death of the President-General, and the organization of military and civil governments within the separate colonies. See E. B. O'Callaghan, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York*, 15 vols. ([Albany, New York: Weed, Parsons and Company, 1855](#)), especially volume 6, 891.


Ibid., 124.

Ibid., 20.


For a discussion on League versus Confederacy, see Daniel K. Richter, "League and Confederacy in the Colonial Period," paper presented to the Conference on Iroquois Research, Rensselaersville, New York, October 11-13, 1985. Richter presented the Great League of Peace as a cultural and ritual phenomenon, and the Iroquois Confederacy as a political and diplomatic entity. For the purposes of this study, the League as it was traditionally established will be analyzed.

Arthur Parker, "The Constitution of the Five Nations or the Iroquois Book of the Great Law" in *Parker on the Iroquois*, ed. William N. Fenton (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968), 30. Also William M. Beauchamp, "The Founders of the New York Iroquois League and Its Probable Date," *Researches and Transactions of the New York State Archaeological Association*, 3 (1921): 33. Historians have debated the date of the League's founding. Paul A. W. Wallace put it at 1450 ([Wallace, *The White Roots of Peace*](#), Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1946, 29-30), Parker said 1390, and the New York Onondagas thought 1600 was the best date (Beauchamp, 29). The description of the League in this chapter is the traditional view held by the Iroquois for centuries. However, it is very possible that the League was ineffectual, that it was a nebulous idea, and that it never really was an "empire" at all. Francis Jennings wrote: "if the Iroquois had conquered the western tribes who held indigenous 'natural right,' and had thus set up a 'savage empire,' Britain would have the Iroquois rights of conquest because Iroquois dependency meant that what belonged to the Iroquois belonged to Britain. . . . The British donated an empire to the Iroquois in order to claim it for themselves" (Jennings, *The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation of Indian Tribes with English Colonies from its beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744* [New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1984], 11).


Parker, "The Constitution," 101. Also Hazel W. Hertzberg, The Great Tree and the Longhouse: The Culture of the Iroquois (New York: Macmillan Company, 1966), 96. The Iroquois Covenant Chain also involved a great deal of symbolism. It developed from a rope into a "Silver Chain" with the English, indicating the strengthening of ties between the two. Both parties worked at keeping the chain bright and free of rust.


Ibid., 78.

Fenton, "Northern Iroquoian Culture Patterns," 310.

32 Lafitau, 1:287.

33 Fenton, "Northern Iroquoian Culture Patterns," 314.


40 Hertzberg, 96; Morgan, League, 70; Morgan, "Government and Institutions," 12.

41 Morgan, League, 63.


43 Trelease, 20; Stites, 69. Each tribe also kept its own treasury which was placed alternately in the chiefs' houses, and included wampum belts, furs, maize, meats, etc. (see Lafitau, 1:312).


Colden, 1:xxi; Trelease, 21; Hertzberg, 100; Grinde, The Iroquois and the Founding of the American Nation, 10.


Morgan, League, 92.


Hertzberg, 103; Morgan, League, 111-113. A phratry is an exogamous (marriage outside relation) group typically comprising several totemic clans (i.e. elder brothers, younger brothers).


Morgan, League, 77; Hertzberg, 99.

See Trelease, 126-127; Colden, 1:97-98.

Trelease, 22; Stites, 115; Barbara Graymont, The Iroquois in the American Revolution (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1972), 16.

Morgan, League, 133, 137; Morgan, "Government and Institutions," 26-27.

58 William Fenton, "Structure, Continuity, and Change in the Process of Iroquois Treaty Making," in The History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy, ed. Jennings, 21-22; Jennings, Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, 44-45. For information on trade goods, see ibid., 211, 284. Some historians support the idea that English goods were superior to and cheaper than French goods (see Jean Lunn, "The Illegal Fur Trade Out of New France, 1713-60," Canadian Historical Association Report [1939]:61-76). Others feel the opposite was true (see W. J. Eccles, "A Belated Review of Harold Adams Innis, 'The Fur Trade in Canada'," Canadian Historical Review 60 [1979]:419-41).

59 Carl Van Doren and Julian P. Boyd, eds., Indian Treaties Printed by Benjamin Franklin 1736-1762 (Philadelphia: Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1938), Table of Contents. The following treaties dealt specifically with the Iroquois League:
- Philadelphia, September and October 1736
- Philadelphia, July 1742
- Lancaster, June 1744
- Albany, October 1745
- Lancaster, July 1748
- Carlisle, October 1753


61 See Labaree and Bell, eds., The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 5:84-85.

62 Labaree and Bell, 5:85, 96-97; Carl Van Doren, Benjamin Franklin (New York: The Viking Press, 1938), 208.


64 Ibid., 198, 199.

65 Labaree and Bell, 5:100-101.


67 Wallace, Conrad Weiser, 199-204, 225.

68 Ibid., 187, 189.

69 Ibid., 195.
70 Ibid., 359-360 (quote on page 360).
71 Ibid., vii, 358; Labaree and Bell, Papers of Benjamin Franklin, 5:59.
74 For example, see Weiser's letter to Johnson of February 8, 1750/1 which concerned condoling with the Nations because of the death of some of their sachems (Johnson 1: 317-318). Weiser and Johnson were not on friendly terms however, and this letter is formal and brief. Weiser did not approve of the unconventional way that Johnson handled the Iroquois, and he did not condone Johnson's immoral behavior. Nevertheless, Johnson was effective with the Indians (Franklin to Johnson, 11 August 1755, in Johnson 1:843). Johnson presented suggestions for defeating the designs of the French at the Albany Congress (Johnson 1:404).
75 John Bartram, Observations, 77. See also pages 40, 55, 78.
76 Ibid., 58, 46.
78 Labaree and Bell, 5:197 (letter of 13 February 1754), also page 81; Van Doren, Benjamin Franklin, 140, 216.
79 Johnson 1:220.
80 Ibid., 228.
81 Colden, 1:191; Van Doren, Benjamin Franklin, 141. Colden later became governor of New York.
82 Colden, 1:xv-xvi.
83 Ibid., 1:xvi, xx.
84 Ibid., 1:xvi, xxviii, xxiv. Colden's motivation for writing was to propagandize the British belief that the Iroquois had conquered an empire and that the tribes controlled by the Iroquois were under British authority (see Jennings, History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy, 260).


Smyth, 2:341.

Franklin to Parker, 20 March 1751 in Smyth, 3:42.

Franklin to Collinson, 9 May 1753 in Labaree and Bell, 4:481–482. There is a debate as to whom this letter was written and when. Albert Smyth, editor of *Writings*, stated that Franklin wrote it to Richard Jackson, a London barrister and an agent for several of the colonies in the 1760s, on 5 May 1753 (Smyth, 3:136).

Smyth, 10:97, 99.

Van Doren, *Benjamin Franklin*, 706; Smyth, 10:102.

Smyth, 10:100.


Letter from Franklin to Collinson, 29 July 1754 in Labaree and Bell, 5:394.

Letter from Clarke to Franklin, 18 March 1754 in Ibid., 5:251, 227.

Ibid., 5:251.

Particularly famous conferences were held at Albany in 1751 and at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, in 1752.

Eccles believed that the price between French and English goods was minimal, and that some English goods were actually inferior to those of the French—gunpowder, cooking pots, cloth (Eccles, 425, 430). However, on June 19, 1743, New York Lieutenant Governor George Clarke wrote to the Duke of Newcastle: "I am pret[ie] sure that when the French yoke is taken off their necks, the Indians will no longer trade with them, for the English Manufactures are much better, and they prefer them to French goods" (O'Callaghan, ed. New York Colonial Documents 6:228).

William Clarke to Benjamin Franklin, 6 May 1754, in The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, eds. Labaree and Bell, 5:271. Also Osgood, 282.

Statement made by Hendrick, the Mohawk spokesman, at the Albany Congress, 2 July 1754 (in O'Callaghan, ed., New York Colonial Documents, 6:870). As early as 1745, Hendrick complained to the British that the latter were cheating the Indians out of their lands (in O'Callaghan, 6:294).


Archibald Kennedy, Observations on the Importance of the Northern Colonies under Proper Regulations (New York, 1750; Photostat Americana, 2nd ser., Massachusetts Historical Society Number 57), 6. This pamphlet also advocated the increase of production, particularly of ships, to strengthen the mother country.

Ibid., 7.


Van Doren, Benjamin Franklin, 219; Osgood, 299, 306.
Osgood, 307, 308; O'Callaghan, 6:817, 833. Shortly after taking office, Osborne committed suicide, and DeLancey became governor. Certain colonies, Rhode Island, Connecticut (both were invited later), North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Delaware were not invited to the Congress because the Lords felt that the Iroquois posed no threat to those governments (Newbold, Albany Congress and Plan of Union, 23).

Labaree and Bell, 5:259-260.

Van Doren, Benjamin Franklin, 220; Osgood, 309-311. See also Massachusetts Historical Society, "Journal of the Proceedings of the Congress Held at Albany, in 1754," Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, 3rd ser. (Boston, 1836), 5:9-17. Generally these instructions dealt with Indian relations; Governor William Shirley of Massachusetts, however, brought up his idea of a colonial union, which will be discussed later.

Osgood, 309.


Ibid., 6:869. Date is 2 July 1754. The King sent 400 firearms, lead bars for making balls for guns, 30 barrels of powder, and 10,000 flints; each colony also made a contribution (DeLancey to Hamilton, 1 April 1754, Pennsylvania Colonial Records, 16 vols. [Harrisburg: Theodore Fern and Co., 1838-1853], 6:14).

Ibid., 6:870.

Ibid., 6:884.

Van Doren, Benjamin Franklin, 222; O'Callaghan, 6:870.


Osgood, 316; Labaree and Bell, 5:366. In reality, the same men made up both committees. Atkinson's unpublished book, "Memo Book of My Journey as One of the Commissioners on Treaty with the Six Nations of Indians, Viz. 1754," is in the Library of Congress (see Newbold, 194).

O'Callaghan, ed., New York Colonial Documents, 6:859. Date is 24 June 1754.
127 Labaree and Bell, 5:278-279. On May 18, 1754, the Pennsylvania Assembly refused to sanction "an Union of the Colonies, in Indian Affairs," feeling that the laws of the separate colonies were adequate (Labaree and Bell, 5:277).

128 Ibid., 5:401-2.

129 Ibid., 5:399-400.

130 Van Doren, Benjamin Franklin, 215.

131 Ibid.; Labaree and Bell (1961), 4:117-121.


133 Van Doren, Benjamin Franklin, 220; Labaree and Bell, 5:337-8.


135 Labaree and Bell, 5:359-60.


137 Labaree and Bell, 5:336 (footnote 1).


139 Ibid., 294-295.


141 P. O. Hutchinson, ed., Diary and Letters of Thomas Hutchinson, 1:55.

142 Bailyn, 81.


145 Gipson, "Thomas Hutchinson and the Framing of the Albany Plan of Union," 7, 9, 13, 16, 18, 19.

146 Newbold, 97, 102. Robert Newbold disagreed. Whereas Gipson believed that the Albany Plan consisted of some ideas from the New England Plans, one of which contained the ideas of Hutchinson, Newbold felt that both the first and second New England Plans were formed after the Albany Congress was over, the first in Massachusetts and the second in Connecticut.

147 Ibid. The Connecticut delegation was not thrilled about the plan, but acquiesced in adopting it (Sparks, 3:24). William Smith, whose father was on the committee, also said that Governor DeLancey did not favor it either, but "made no great opposition" (Labaree and Bell, 5:375). Benjamin Franklin indicated that the plan was adopted "pretty unaniusmously" (letters to Cadwallader Colden in "The Letters and Papers of Cadwallader Colden," New York Historical Society Collections, 9 vols. (New York, 1918-1937), 4:459.

148 Van Doren, ed., Autobiographical Writings, 731.

149 Benjamin Franklin to Cadwallader Colden, 14 July 1754, in Labaree and Bell, 5:393.

150 Benjamin Franklin to Peter Collinson, 29 July 1754, in Labaree and Bell, 5:394.

151 Van Doren, ed., Autobiographical Writings, 732.

152 Benjamin Franklin to Peter Collinson, 29 December 1754, in Labaree and Bell, 5:454; Smyth, 3:242 (in this source, the word "perfectly" was used instead of the word "presently" in the quotation).

153 Newbold, 32. Clarke to Franklin, 6 May 1754, in Massachusetts Historical Collections, 4:74-5.

154 Rebecca Brooks Gruver, An American History (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1972), 133; Connecticut and Rhode Island saw the plan as a threat to their charter governments and Virginia stood to lose her extensive western lands if the plan passed. Only New York's Council consisted of men--Colden, Alexander, and Kennedy--who lent support; but it was not enough (Newbold, 129, 136, 158, 167-8).
Governor DeLancey of New York had sent a copy of the Albany Plan to the Lords of Trade, 22 July 1754 (O'Callaghan, 6:851). However, the Lords did not comment on the plan.

Benjamin Franklin to Cadwallader Colden, 9 August 1754 in Bigelow, Works, 3:10.

Bigelow, 1:257.


Benjamin Franklin to Peter Collinson, 29 December 1754, in Smyth, 3:242.

Osgood, 324-5.

Van Doren, ed., Autobiographical Writings, 732.


Van Doren, Benjamin Franklin, 209.

Johansen, Forgotten Founders, 20.

Franklin, "Reasons and Motives" in Labaree and Bell, 5:400. This comparison/contrast is based on the text of the Albany Plan as printed in Labaree and Bell, 5:387-392, 399-416. The text for the Iroquois constitution is from Parker, "The Constitution of the Five Nations," 30-60.

Labaree and Bell, 5:402.


Labaree and Bell, 5:413.

174 Labaree and Bell, 5:405-6.

175 William Fenton in Jennings et. al., The History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy, 25.

176 Labaree and Bell, 5:416.

177 Parker, 41.

178 Labaree and Bell, 5:413.

179 Ibid., 5:409.

180 Ibid., 5:410.

181 Ibid.

182 Ibid., 5:411.

183 Ibid., 5:391.

184 Ibid., 5:415.

185 Parker, 15, 52.


187 Ibid., 8.

188 Jennings, et. al., 268.

189 Morgan, League, xi, xii; also Fenton, "Introduction," Parker on the Iroquois, 1.


191 Fenton, "Lore," 134.

192 Ibid., 134-5.


194 Ibid., 196.
196 Ibid., 134-5.
198 Ibid., 435.
199 Ibid., 436.
203 Fenton, "Lore," 133.
204 Fenton, "Introduction," Parker on the Iroquois, 47.
205 Fenton, "Lore," 144.
206 Fenton, "Introduction," Parker on the Iroquois, 47.
208 Ibid., 15-16.
209 Newbold, The Albany Congress, Chapter 4, notes 145 and 146.
210 Gipson, "Drafting of the Albany Plan," 316.
212 Mrs. Lois K. Mathews presented a tentative suggestion in "Benjamin Franklin's Plans for a Colonial Union, 1750-1775," in which she suggested that Franklin used the New England Confederacy of 1643 as the basis for the Plan of 1754. However, she speculated, without offering proof. Lois K. Mathews, "Benjamin Franklin's Plans for a Colonial Union, 1750-1775," American Political Science Review 8 (1914):406.
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2. Journal Articles


3. Unpublished Material


VITA

Nancy Dieter Egloff


Additional experience includes a Scholar-in-Residence position at Snyder Museum, Bastrop, Louisiana, on a one-year grant from the Louisiana Committee for the Humanities in 1983, and a position as Research Associate with the Jamestown-Yorktown Foundation, 1985 to present.