1994

A New Media Game: Challenging the Minimalist Consensus

Carolyn Castleberry
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences

A NEW MEDIA GAME: CHALLENGING THE MINIMALIST CONSENSUS

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of Government

The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

---

by

Carolyn Anderson Castleberry

1994

APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts



Author

Approved, August 1994

John McGlennon



David Dessler



Larry Evans

LIST OF TABLES

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX B

ABSTRACT

This thesis presents empirical evidence challenging the traditional, minimalist consensus of the impact of television on presidential political campaigns, especially for new, relatively unknown candidates. The multiple regression model provides statistical evidence showing that television may have a significant impact on how voters feel about new candidates and their perceived character traits. The model also confirms that the minimalist consensus is still accurate regarding well-known candidates, specifically President George Bush in the 1992 election. Before presenting the data analysis, this study begins with a literature review on the issues surrounding political campaigns and different forms of media. It also presents issues and facts surrounding the changing role of the television media in the 1992 political campaign. Finally, the thesis concludes with recommendations and implications for a new media-age democracy.

A New Media Game: Challenging The Minimalist Consensus

Introduction

The number of homes in the United States with televisions now exceeds the number with flush toilets.[1] While many political pundits would argue that these two products of modern technology certainly belong in the same category, the fact is that television has transformed the way political campaigns are run by politicians and perceived by the electorate. Exactly how much influence television has on political campaigns is the subject of much empirical analysis and theory. Taking into account both approaches and constructing a regression model based on the 1992 National Election Study, this thesis casts doubt on the widely held "minimal effects" consensus which maintains that television simply reinforces already-existing beliefs concerning a campaign and has no significant impact on the electorate's opinion formation. Before presenting the regression model, it is imperative that this study examine the literature concerning the impact of television and other forms of media on political campaigns. Facts and issues surrounding the 1992 campaign also precede data analysis, and the thesis concludes with implications and

---

[1]Stephen Ansolabehere, Roy Behr, and Shanto Iyengar, The Media Game: American Politics in the Television Age (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993), p.2.

recommendations for a democratic society living in a media-age where the minimalist consensus is now challenged by empirical evidence.

Literature Review

As Jeffrey Abramson, F. Christopher Arterton, and Gary Orren conclude in The Electronic Commonwealth: The Impact of New Media Technologies on Democratic Politics, the history of United States' elections seems to parallel the history of media. They maintain that in America's earliest days, the scarcity and relatively high cost of newspapers helped promote an elite government. Early in the nineteenth century, social and technological advances merged to create mass-readership newspapers, which aided the emergence of mass political parties. Later in the century, the appearance of opinion magazines nurtured policy-oriented interest groups that gave voice to the middle-class Progressive reform movement. In the twentieth century, the advent of electronic journalism has enabled public officials to build personal followings independent of party structures.[2]

For Abramson et al., the consensus is that "American society is in the midst of a communications revolution."[3]

---

[2]Jeffrey B. Abramson, F. Christopher Arterton, and Gary R. Orren, The Electronic Commonwealth: The Impact of New Media Technologies on Democratic Politics (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1988), pp. 66-67.

[3]Ibid., p. 5.

However, in much scholarly literature a different consensus has been widely accepted: a "minimal effects" consensus. As Doris Graber writes:

> The findings that media effects were minimal were so pervasive in early research that after an initial flurry in the 1940's and 1950's, social science research into mass media effects fell to a low ebb. In study after study dealing with political socialization and learning, the mass media were hardly mentioned as an important factor.[4]

Not all theorists accepted this consensus. In The Politics of National Party Conventions, Paul David, Ralph Goldman, and Richard Bain saw the process of campaigns changing beginning in the early part of the primaries in the 1940s. They write, "Since the early 1940's, presidential nominating campaigns have been subject to real and significant changes, for which the combined impacts of the primaries, public opinion polls, and the mass media of communication seem to be mainly responsible."[5]

In the 1940s, the electronic medium of radio began to play a relatively stronger role in political campaigns than did the newspaper. According to Paul Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet in The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign, radio coverage was cursory during the early phases of the 1940 election, but became more vigorous toward the close of the

---

[4]Doris A. Graber, "Mass Media and American Politics," Washington: Congressional Quarterly (1984): 10.

[5]Paul T. David, Ralph M. Goldman, and Richard C. Bain, The Politics of National Party Conventions (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1960), p. 146.

campaign. Second, the radio campaign consisted much more of "events" of distinctive interest: "a political convention is broadcast, and the listener can virtually participate in the ceremonial occasion: he can respond to audience enthusiasm, he can directly experience the ebb and flow of tension."[6] Finally, the listener got a sense of personal access from radio that was not available from print. The individual, personalized campaign later became the mark of television's influence on elections.

For the individual, early studies on mass media and political campaigns viewed mass communications as an avenue for informal participation by the electorate. It was believed that interested voters used the political content of newspapers, magazines, radio, and television as a principal means of relating to politics. However, in The American Voter, Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes believe that for the majority of voters, following the campaign in the mass media is a much more passive activity. Yet they conclude that since the audiences of the media screen out vast amounts of the content they are exposed to, the individual plays at least a minimal role in deciding what he will and will not attend to, and in this sense, following an election campaign in the

---

[6]Paul F. Lazarfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice: How the Voters Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1968) pp. 127-129.

media may be called a form of participation.[7] In the Eisenhower elections only about one-fifth of the population said that the campaigns had failed to reach him or her through any of the principal means of communication.[8]

Although the media was able to reach millions of potential voters, the question of influence on the electorate still remains. In Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign, Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee argue that it is absurd to question whether the mass media "influence" elections:

> In the first place, it is dubious whether any decisions at all would be possible without some mass device for enabling the leaders to present their proposals to the people. Second, typical debates about the role of the media too often imply a simple, direct 'influence'--like a hypodermic stimulus on an inert subject--and that is a naive formulation of the political effects of mass communications. Third, another common notion--that any influence of the media is somehow suspect, as if 'interfering' with the rational deliberations of the voters--implies an autonomously operating electorate. Such an image is also unrealistic.[9]

Although these authors conclude that media exposure primarily crystallizes and reinforces preferences more than it converts, they do acknowledge that media exposure may

---

[7]See Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, "Television and the Election," Scientific American 188 (May 1953), p. 47 in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 92.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 234.

have a direct correlation with the level of interest and intensity in the campaign. The more people read and listen to a campaign in the mass media, the more likely they are to know about the issues of the election and to perceive correctly the candidates' stands on the issues. Very simply, "the appetite grows by what it feeds on."[10]

Feeding on new studies and reports in the 1960s, the consensus that media effects were minimal began to dissipate as new evidence was found. Today most political leaders and scholars agree that the news media, especially television, plays a crucial role in influencing the electoral choices of American voters. Television has become a multibillion-dollar industry that reaches almost every household in the United States. In 1993, there were more than 9,000 radio and 1,400 television stations, and of the 92 million households in the United States, 98.6 percent have at least one television set.[11]

Exactly how this multibillion-dollar industry influences political choices in a campaign isn't easy to determine. In Mass Media and American Politics, Doris Graber writes that

---

[10]Ibid., pp. 240-248.

[11]Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, series R93-105 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 796; Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1990, 110th ed., table no. 914 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 550 in Ansolabehere, Behr, and Iyengar, p. 11.

understanding the role of television in elections is hampered by too little data, especially at the local, congressional, and gubernatorial levels. But even at the presidential level, comparatively little research has been done to point up differences in the role of the media as candidates and issues change from one election to another. Another problem in understanding the influence of television is the dearth of analyses of media content, mainly because of the cost.[12]

Yet another problem may be in the way we measure the impact of television. In a study of the 1980 presidential campaign, Larry Bartels suggests that measurement error in empirical analysis significantly increased the apparent impact of media exposure on opinion change in a presidential campaign setting but Bartels still subscribes to a modest, if not minimalist view of television's influence. He concludes:

> Nevertheless, to the extent that analysts focus upon observable opinion change over relatively short periods of time, the apparent effect of media exposure will often be modest in magnitude even when adjusted for the effects of measurement error--not just because the media cannot be persuasive, but because opinions at the beginning of a typical presidential campaign are already strongly held and because media messages during the course of the campaign are, in any case, only occasionally sharply inconsistent with those preexisting opinions.[13]

---

[12]Doris A. Graber, Mass Media and American Politics (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1984), pp. 178-179.

[13]Larry M. Bartels, "Messages Received: The Political Impact of Media Exposure," APSR 87, no. 2 (June 1993): 275.

However, in a different writing, Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice, Bartels refers extensively to the news media, especially television, as being of central importance to the contemporary nominating process. In analyzing the emergence and importance of primaries in modern campaigns, Bartels believes that "the major social trend was the long-term growth in importance and activism of the news media, and particularly television, in American society and in the American political system."[14] For example, discussing Gary Hart's unsuccessful 1984 bid for his party's nomination, Bartels initially finds that sizable segments of the public differed widely in their judgments about Hart's chances--judgments made on the basis of the same objective events. Bartels states:

> People's differences in their exposure and attention to the mass media might explain these differences. Because information about campaign events is provided primarily by the media, we might expect media exposure and attention to heighten public reactions to these events. . . . Those most attuned to the news media were quickest to perceive Hart's electoral potential in the early weeks of the campaign.[15]

Bartels concludes that the media may account for some of the wide differences in perceptions, but the influence of media exposure and attention is insufficient to account for

---

[14]Larry Bartels, Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 275.

[15]Ibid., pp. 51-52.

the bulk of these differences.[16] Like Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, Bartels also concludes that the media mainly serves to crystallize and reinforce preferences.

But the simple presence of television isn't the only factor that may influence voter choices. To begin with, party identification is no longer the dominant psychological force in political campaigns, mainly because of the mass media.[17] In Decline of Political Parties, Martin Wattenberg presents statistics showing that since 1952 fewer Americans have identified themselves as either Democrats or Republicans. Also the percentage of voters who say they have voted for different parties in presidential elections has increased from 29 percent in 1952 to 57 percent in 1980.[18] Abramson, Arterton, and Orren conclude that because television has brought a greater commercial and national role to the media, the press, overall, has become less partisan and evaluative. Faced with a vast, heterogeneous audience, television strives for a narrative rather than a

---

[16]Ibid., p. 53. It should be notes that Bartels treats the media as a single monolithic information source in the nominating process in this particular writing. Because of the unavailability of data, Bartels finds on every dimension, network television news, newspapers, and news magazines virtually indistinguishable in their emphasis and influence.

[17]Ansolabehere, Behr, and Iyengar, p. 132.

[18]Martin Wattenberg, The Decline of Political Parties, 1952-1980 (Cambridge, Mass,: Harvard University Press), p. 21 in Ansolabehere, Behr, and Iyengar, p. 132.

cue-giving tone.[19]

In **Media Politics**, F. Christopher Arterton writes that party decline has forced politicians to rely more heavily on news coverage for three reasons. First, politicians must communicate information to a larger segment of voters. Second, as parties' abilities to communicate with voters have deteriorated, campaign organizations are unable to develop the needed financial and volunteer resources without relying on the media. Third, changes in delegate selection rules enacted by the Democratic party in the early 1970s reduced the power of party leaders and contributed to the decline of the party, contributing to the growth of media politics.[20]

Graber likewise reports that major political changes have been wrought by television, especially concerning the influence of the party. She writes that during the 1940s, social scientists found party allegiance to be the most important determinant of the vote. But since the growth of television, the candidate as a personality has become the prime consideration at the presidential level. Second are issues associated with the candidate, followed by party

---

[19]Abramson, Arterton, and Orren, pp. 84-85.

[20]F. Christopher Arterton, **Media Politics: The News Strategies of Presidential Campaigns** (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1984), p. 9.

affiliation and group membership.[21] Therefore, the media takes on a very important role because through television images, the public makes judgments about a candidate's character and personality.

Second, through television individual candidates can now campaign as "free agents." The decades following World War II were marked by the emergence of television as the medium of mass communication and the presidential nomination process was fundamentally changed. The emergence of direct primaries in the allocation of convention delegates made candidates increasingly independent of the political party organization[22] and increasingly dependent on their own images and portrayal of character through the visual media. The news media, especially television, became the intermediary between presidential candidates and voters, which made public opinion more volatile. In **The Wilson Quarterly**, Michael Cornfield writes that in one scholar's opinion journalists hope for a close race to sustain audience interest; and their reports can subtly influence perceptions. In order to maintain the feeling of suspense they might highlight quotations from that segment of the populace that is undecided, adjust the length of the time

---

[21]Walter DeVries and Lance V. Tarrance, **The Ticket Splitters** (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1972), pp. 251-253 in Graber, p. 180.

[22]Ansolabehere, Behr, and Iyengar, p. 132.

period in which "recent" results are displayed (to emphasize the narrowing gap between candidates), and provide technical information about the range of error in opinion polls to suggest an unpredictable impending election.[23]

Graber also sees the media as kingmakers in that the new reliance on media politics increases the power of the media to influence the selection of candidates and issues. Emphasizing the entertainment factor, Graber writes, "Candidates, like actors, depend for their success as much on the roles into which they are cast as their acting ability."[24] This casting mainly occurs early in the primaries when winners and losers are predicted in seemingly horse-race reporting. Because of Jimmy Carter's ability to gain momentum during the 1976 campaign and his ability to rise above expectations for his success, he was also able to emerge as the winner during early primary victories. Many political experts observe that the public's perceptions of the campaign have more to do with the candidates' current status in the primary game than with issues or leadership capabilities on substantive grounds. William Bicker observed during the 1976 Democratic campaign: "issues and attributes of candidates seemed to play little if any role

---

[23]Michael Cornfield, "How to Read the Campaign," **The Wilson Quarterly** 16 (Spring 1992): 40.

[24]Graber, pp. 180-183.

in the voters choice."[25] Graber quotes political scientists Thomas R. Dye and L. Harmon Zeigler:

> Jimmy Carter was a media president. There is little likelihood that a one-term governor of Georgia would have been elected president without the instant celebrity that television brought him in 1976. . . . But what television gives, television can take away. By reminding Americans of international trade humiliation, military weaknesses, and administration blunders during the Carter years, the media set the stage for the Reagan landslide.[26]

Successful politicians have found that the earlier they attract the media's attention, the better their chances of winning. This means exploiting the media in the early primary process. Bartels notes that given the interest of the media in simple yet sensational stories, the best way to attract attention and possibly gain public support was to win primaries. Candidates who succeeded in this way found these early successes, magnified by the media, generated more monetary support.[27] Bartels writes that one way for a candidate to distinguish himself from the crowd "is to do something so dramatic that the media have to pay attention. Jesse Jackson's mission to Syria in December 1983 to negotiate the release of a captured U.S. airman is a case in

---

[25]William Bicker, "Network Television News and the 1976 Presidential Primaries: A Look From the Networks' Side of the Cameras" (1978) in Bartels, p. 83.

[26]Graber, p. 1.

[27]Bartels, p. 25.

point."[28] Because of this Jackson got more media coverage than all the other Democratic candidates combined in the first eight weeks of 1984.

Media images are also important during the general campaign. Consider, for example, the Kennedy-Nixon television debates of 1960 in which Nixon appeared nervous and shifty and Kennedy appeared poised and in control. Political observers also note that during the Nixon-Kennedy debate, Kennedy was able to demonstrate that he was capable of handling the oval office despite his youth. Television also helped build up the image of Ronald Reagan and gained him the nickname of "the Great Communicator."

Therefore, another development of media politics is the change it has brought in the types of candidates likely to be successful in the new media game. Ronald Reagan, a former actor; John Glenn, an ex-astronaut; and Jesse Jackson, a charismatic preacher, are examples of typical television recruits, although only one succeeded.[29] Graber observes:

> Because television can bring the image of candidates for high national and state office directly into the homes of millions of voters, political recruiters have become extremely conscious of a candidate's ability to look impressive and perform well before the camera . . . . Abraham Lincoln's rugged face probably would not have passed muster in the television age. Franklin D. Roosevelt's wheelchair appearances might have spelled damaging weakness (which he was aware of), as did George Wallace's in the

---

[28]Ibid. p. 60.

[29]Graber, p. 185.

1970's.[30]

Most political observers agree that no other medium can equal the reach and impact of television.

Part of the reason for this is the nature of the medium itself. Television news is easy, visual, and dramatic. But the reality is, not everyone who watches national or local news is particularly interested in current affairs. Just because the television is on doesn't mean the electorate is tuned in. Bartels believes it is unwise to assume that everything appearing in newspapers or on television enters the public consciousness. In describing the results of a 1984 survey of news coverage and public awareness, Robinson and Clancey write, "We found public memory about news and world affairs short enough to qualify as mass amnesia."[31] Reports involving Attorney General-designate Edwin Meese are examples:

> Meese made the network news forty-three times in just thirty-one days, and he was the lead story on at least eight separate occasions . . . total news time: 5,100 seconds. But despite Meese's ongoing status as a lead story on network news during the month before our survey, the Meese mess, no matter how generously defined, failed to penetrate the cognitive map of even four Americans out of ten.[32]

Ephemeral though it may be, politicians have begun to

---

[30]Ibid., p. 184.

[31]Bartels, p. 41.

[32]Ibid.

realize that mastering television may be the key to voters' hearts and, eventually, ballots on election day. Another major consequence of the new game, according to Graber, is the fact that mass media coverage has become the campaign's pivotal point. Campaigns are expressly arranged for the best media exposure before the largest possible audience.[33] Many press conferences are even scheduled to coincide with news times, thereby improving the chance of getting "live" coverage. Candidates plan photo opportunities in which they can be videotaped mingling with the working people, and of course, kissing the requisite number of available babies.

Certainly as the media is able to manipulate politicians, candidates have also learned the art of the game--manipulating the media for their own benefit. F. Christopher Arterton prefers the term "orchestration" to "manipulation" in describing the efforts of politicians to influence the content of reported news to benefit their campaign. Arterton notes that campaigners are increasingly explicit in their attempts to orchestrate news coverage. They frame campaign behavior according to their expectations of how the news-reporting process occurs. Second, as a presidential campaign gathers political strength, it becomes better able to manipulate the phenomena that reporters are trying to cover:

---

[33]Graber, p. 186.

> In 1975, Carter, for example, could only hope for national news coverage. By the close of the primaries, however, he was able to use his political leverage to enlist Mayor Daley in his effort to focus reporters' attention on the Ohio primary and away from the other primaries on the same day. The Carter-Daley cooperation was a political maneuver designed to affect the nomination race through the attitudes and behavior of journalists.[34]

Third, competition between journalists for access to the candidate and campaign staff allows the latter to deal with journalists as a group rather than as individuals. Tactics as simple as blocking follow-up questions, presumably to give everyone an opportunity to ask his or her questions, can be another method of influence.[35]

Because of candidates' ability to orchestrate the news, Americans are now exposed to ever simpler images of an ever more complex world. In **News: The Politics of Illusion**, W. Lance Bennett believes that Americans are also the targets of increasingly sophisticated communication techniques designed to control the balance of power on important issues affecting their lives.[36] Bennett observes that politicians manipulate the news through a formula emphasizing the dramatic, the immediate, and the human element of stories. A simple formula involves: 1) media composition--composing a

---

[34]Arterton, pp. 194-195.

[35]Ibid., p. 195.

[36]W. Lance Bennett, **News: The Politics of Illusion** (New York: Longman, 1983), p. ix.

simple theme or message for the audience to use in thinking about the matter at hand; 2) message salience--saturating communications channels with this message so that it will become more salient than competing messages; 3) message credibility--surrounding the message with the trappings of credibility so that, if it reaches people, it will be accepted.[37]

Lee Atwater puts it in simpler terms. Soon after his brain tumor was diagnosed in 1991, the former chairman of the Republican National Committee was interviewed about his image as a hardball politician who perfected the use of negative campaigning:

> "'Let me tell you what a national presidential campaign is,' Atwater said, gesticulating ferociously. 'You sit around every morning at your 7 or 8 o'clock meeting and you figure out what in the hell stunt you're going to pull to maximize your 15- or 20-second sound bite. You are reduced to, on a daily basis, sitting down and projecting what you can get on TV that night.'"[38]

However, it was Atwater who helped restrict access to George Bush in 1988 to the point where reporters were forced to use binoculars and megaphones to cover the campaign and ask questions that went unanswered. But even if Bush had been accessible, Atwater said, the reporters would not have asked him about substantive issues like the federal budget or his

---

[37]Ibid., p. 36.

[38]Mark Stencel, "Lee Atwater: Media Shape Campaigning," Washington Journalism Review (May 1991): 15.

energy policy. Instead they would have asked Bush to respond to the previous day's polling data or some other fluff.[39]

The reliance on television has led to a focus on superficial or sensational aspects of politics. Bennet notes that "the news provides, at best, a superficial and distorted image of society."[40] The electorate relying mainly on television for its education about political campaigns will find itself largely uneducated about the issues because in most cases television news is simply a headline service, barely scratching the surface of most important issues affecting voters. In an investigation of the impact of television commercials during the 1972 political campaign, Thomas Patterson and Robert McClure found that major campaign issues were covered more extensively in television commercials than in network newscasts.[41] Doris Graber observes, "most viewers, particularly those who did not read the newspaper and were poorly informed, remembered more from the commercials, which each took only five minutes or less of air time, than from the television news. Simplicity of content, expert eye appeal, and repetition of the message combined to produce

---

[39]Ibid.

[40]Bennett, p. ix.

[41]Thomas Patterson and Robert McClure, The Unseeing Eye (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1976), pp. 102-108 in Graber, p. 178.

this result."[42]

1992: A New Media Game

The 1992 presidential campaign has rewritten some of the rules of the political media game. Throughout modern history, Democrats and Republicans echo one common concern: in order for views to be heard by the public, they must first be filtered through the press. In 1968, Richard Nixon dealt with the problem by sharply reducing the number of his events on the campaign trail.[43] In 1992, candidates circumvented journalists by appearing on talk shows and satellite linkups. As John Smee observes in a review of John Anthony Maltese's **Spin Control: The White House Office of Communications and the Management of Presidential News**, the notion of image control and agenda setting, so deviously Nixonian a quarter century ago, stands revealed as naively delusional. He concludes that fast-paced change in the realm of mass communications has made a mockery of set-piece strategies and game plans. Radio talk show hosts, television's intrusive personal interviews, and supermarket

---

[42]Graber, p. 179.

[43]Jack W. Germond and Jules Witcover "The Year of the Talk Show Campaigns," **National Journal**, 24 (June 13, 1992): 1428.

tabloids now define the images of our public figures to a dismaying degree.[44] Whether alarmed or fascinated by this new media game, many observers would agree that in 1992 television redefined the rules of presidential campaigns, much to the establishment media's chagrin.

The biggest surprise entry in the 1992 presidential campaign was not Ross Perot or Pat Buchanan, but Larry King, who nosed out Phil Donahue and Geraldo Rivera for the honor. As Reese Cleghorn, president of the Washington Journalism Review noted, "halfway through the campaign, journalists who once used typewriters, were feeling as outmoded as typewriters. The networks and other mainstream organizations, which at one time dominated the election process, did not have that power in this presidential campaign."[45] Another observer aptly calls it the Politainment Era: the first presidential campaign that took place in a post-party, post-ideology, and post-literate era.[46] A few noteworthy media moments from the campaign include:

1. Ross Perot launched his campaign on Larry King Live.

---

[44]John J. Smee, Review of **Spin Control: The White House Office of Communications and the Management of Presidential News** by John Anthony Maltese (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), in **Political Science Quarterly** (Fall 1992): 542.

[45]Reese Cleghorn, "In 1992 The Pace Quickened Forever," **Washington Journalism Review** 14 (November 1992): 4.

[46]Jamie Malanowski, "Generals Fighting the Last War," **Washington Journalism Review** 14 (December 1992): 25.

He then decided to forego the traditional campaign bus or plane and decided to run his race by satellite linkup. The ratings of Perot infomercials rivaled those of major league baseball's playoff games.

2. Clinton made his nomination inevitable by winning the New York primary. He helped reverse his momentum not by a sit-down interview with The **New York Times** editorial board, or even with **Newsday**'s campaign correspondent. Instead, he won New York by poking fun at himself and going one-on-one with disc jockey Don Imus on his irreverent morning radio show.

3. Sitcom creator Linda Bloodworth-Thomason produced Clinton's convention biography film.

4. Bill Clinton played the saxophone on the Arsenio Hall Show.

5. Dan Quayle attacked Murphy Brown.[47]

Similarly, Jerry Brown was more likely to show up on MTV than on Nightline. In fact, this cable channel claims to have successfully involved a whole new generation of voters in presidential politics. MTV claims that more than 750,000 people registered to vote through a program called Rock the Vote. In August of 1992, MTV received more than 120,000 phone calls during a two-hour period from voters who wanted

---

[47]Ibid. See also John Alter, "How Phil Donahue Came to Manage the '92 Campaign," **Washington Monthly** (June 1992) 12.

information on how to register.[48] As the campaign progressed, ironically a Gallup poll conducted in July of 1992 indicated that George Bush was losing his grip on the youth vote, which in recent years had leaned toward the Republicans. The poll showed support for Bush among voters aged 18 to 29 slipping from 48 percent to 34 percent since the early spring, resulting in the largest decline in Bush's standing within any age group. Bill Clinton and Al Gore made themselves available to the younger electorate through avenues such as MTV, and the Gallup polls found the young voters felt closer to the Democrats than to the Republicans on issues of concern to their generation including abortion, AIDS, the environment, and race relations.[49]

In 1992, the establishment news media seemed to be always one step behind MTV, Larry King, Phil Donahue, and even **The Star** in directing the campaign. During the New York Primary, Clinton and Brown each appeared on the weekday show of Donahue, first separately and then together, and on a number of other such shows. Clinton also took call-ins on NBC's Today Show, while President Bush did local television interviews in which fluff questions from local newscasters

---

[48]Deidre A. Depke, "Talk Show Campaigning Helps Candidates Connect," **Business Week** (October 26, 1992): 34.

[49]Larry Hugick, "The 'Twentysomething' Set: Bush Losing His Hold on Younger Voters," **The Gallup Poll Monthly** (July 1992): 12.

were often the rule.[50] But no one worked the circuit like Perot when he invited viewers of CNN's Larry King Live to create his presidential candidacy by putting his name on the ballot in all fifty states. Germond and Witcover observe that, had Perot simply issued the challenge in a newspaper interview, it is unlikely he would have generated anything like the response that met his television pitch. Switchboards at CNN and Perot's Dallas office were immediately tied up and the Perot independent candidacy was off and running.[51]

The result was that the whole structure of the media came unglued and the dynamics of horse-race reporting were called into question. Clinton complained about the traveling press's excessive focus on the politics of the campaign--who's up and who's down, who's electable and who isn't--to the neglect of substantive issue coverage. He maintained this contributed to voter apathy and disgust about the entire electoral process. Clinton responded by holding what he called "electronic town meetings" that linked several cities by satellite and enabled voters to ask him questions on serious issues directly on cable television.[52]

---

[50]Germond and Witcover, p. 1428.

[51]Ibid.

[52]Ibid.

A report released by the Freedom Forum Media Studies Center at Columbia University finds that the candidates' use of direct-access media in the 1992 campaign was unprecedented and that it "indelibly altered the face of the American political campaign."[53] The report further states:

> In the past, presidential candidates rarely appeared on television or radio talk shows . . . . Today, encouraged by the success Perot achieved in reaching voters through the talk show format, television talk shows, especially the morning network shows, have become a whistle-stop on the campaign trail.[54]

The study found that in the first six months of 1992, Perot and Clinton appeared on morning programs almost thirty times, while President Bush had been reluctant to enter the talk show circuit. Call-in shows, it says, have allowed better access to the candidates and talk shows have allowed the politicians to reach new audiences.[55]

As the hegemony of the television networks has diminished, candidates have also been able to reach these new audiences through grass roots operations geared to key states' local media markets. U.S. News and World Report reports that the last generation brought the political dominance of television, as it supplanted the roles formerly played by the parties; the next generation could see local

---

[53]Tony Case, "Television and Presidential Politics," **Editor and Publisher** 125 (October 10, 1992): 32-33.

[54]Ibid.

[55]Ibid.

television, cable outlets, and "infotainment shows" like those of Larry King and Oprah Winfrey overtake the nations networks and old-style news shows. The outcome, according to one GOP strategist will be that: "Somebody watching TV in Ohio will get a totally different campaign from someone in California."[56]

These new audiences also refused to bow to the campaign rhetoric of the past, and the candidates who didn't learn the rules of the new media game paid the price. Malanowski writes this was a year when the electorate seemed to act like the neglected spouse who complains, "You never pay any attention to me." Bush acted like the cold husband who says, "Of course I do. Now can I watch the end of the game?"[57] When Bush was asked specific questions by members of the electorate, he never seemed to understand that he had to do more than frown, look concerned, and resort to some form of proposal-speak to show people he cared. Malanowski observes that nothing crystallized Bush's inability to adapt to the new media age and the new, impatient electorate than during the second debate when candidates were asked by a member of the audience how they were personally affected by the national debt. Bush avoided the question by saying,

---

[56]Kenneth T. Walsh, Michael Barone, and Matthew Cooper, "The Media Battle," U.S. News and World Report (August 31/September 7, 1992): 49.

[57]Malanowski, p. 26.

"just because you're a person of means doesn't mean you're not affected."[58] Clinton responded in a way that made it seem he identified with the voters' economic troubles.

In 1992, voters weren't just skeptical of candidates. In the past decade's presidential campaigns, the establishment media was also criticized for not identifying with the public. During the 1992 rise of talk-show democracy, voters learned how easy it was to get rid of the journalistic middleman causing even more skepticism concerning the media. The authors of the Freedom Forum Media Studies report concluded that never before in modern American politics had media members been so self-conscious as they had been in the 1992 election year. They report, "After years of critical appraisal that showed the media often to be out of touch with the public, the 1992 campaign provided a chance to redress the public concerns with more responsive coverage."[59]

Part of this trend started with bad press on the press. In a front-page story after the 1988 election, David Hoffman and Ann Devroy of the Washington Post attributed George Bush's victory to an immensely complex, largely hidden machine maintained by an army of supporters leaving nothing to chance. They write:

---

[58]Ibid.

[59]Case, pp. 32-33.

> Almost everything that could be controlled, influenced, or bargained in favor of Bush was attempted. For example, when he was being photographed outside his home in Kennebunkport, Maine, for the covers of news magazines (and television) just before the Republican convention, his aides insisted that photographers aim their lenses above the horizon and not capture the craggy rocks of the shoreline. Rocks, the photographers were told, would be "elitist." Nearly all of the photographers obeyed the rule--no rocks.[60]

Although reporters entered the 1992 campaign with the objective of not being trapped by the manipulation of politicians' ten-second sound bites (as they had been in the 1984 and 1988 campaigns), journalists found they were being bypassed altogether. Their goals were being realized without them. Through talk shows and infomercials, the previously succinct, well-planned, and practiced sound bites of politicians were lengthened to the size of good, nutritional infosnacks.[61]

The traditional media responded by providing more lengthy analysis of the candidates and their stands on crucial issues. The networks and newspapers made it a mission to fact-check candidates' statements and commercials. Malanowski argues that journalists did succeed in avoiding the pitfalls of 1984, when Ronald Reagan ran a campaign that was all image and personality, and of 1988, when Bush ran on a proposition that he was a lot like Reagan

---

[60]Walsh, Barone, and Cooper, p. 49.

[61]Malanowski, p. 26.

and not at all like Michael Dukakis.[62]

The Freedom Forum goes on to criticize the media for stooping to tabloid journalism in following the lead of The Star, which broke the Bill Clinton-Gennifer Flowers story. As well as sensationalizing stories, television also accorded presidential candidates a new star quality unprecedented in modern elections. The report determined "that presidential candidates have become worthy of the same treatment that is accorded movie stars and rock singers opens a new and potentially polluting influence in the campaign and our process of choosing leaders."

While the entertainment aspect of the campaign may appall traditionalists, an argument can be made that the new media game resulted in a more informed electorate. No one who wanted to be informed about the candidates or the issues had any excuse not to be. CNN alone aired a minimum of a half-hour program on the candidates and the issues every weekday. The broadcast networks did cut back their campaign coverage budgets, but didn't cut back on minutes allotted to the campaign. As Michael Cornfield writes in The Wilson Quarterly, "Coverage seems too mild a word to describe the reports, round tables, polls, predictions, analyses, profiles, rumors, shoptalk, advertisements, call-in shows, and comedy routines geared to the presidential

---

[62]Ibid.

campaigns."[63] Likewise, Cleghorn believes that the 1992 spectacle argues for lengthy campaigns, contrary to past conventional wisdom that a year is too long:

> Jerry Brown and Pat Buchanan marched to different drummers; they were in the floodlights long enough for the voters to consider (or reconsider them). People had time to avoid snap judgments about the Gennifer Flowers and Vietnam Draft factors, as well as the broken "read-my-lips" promise. People may have munched on the day's events only one or two days a week, but the passage of months enabled them to digest their thought about Ross Perot's durability, the meaning of the deficit and the presidential stature of the candidates.[64]

Early in a campaign, candidates are new faces with untold biographies, opinions, and characteristics. Voter allegiances can go any way, but in an effort to smoke out the true ideological positions of candidates, weekly updates emphasizing substantial issues are not just media-created opinion polls, but may in fact be necessary over a long-term campaign.

No matter what the length of the campaign, the real issue at hand is whether the new media game gave television an unprecedented influence in 1992 and whether interactive campaigning also introduced interactive democracy. Most of the talk shows, especially those with live audiences and telephone call-in periods have given candidates a new, direct link with the electorate. Deidre Depke, of Business

---

[63]Cornfield, p. 38.

[64]Cleghorn, p. 4.

Week, observes, "Surely, it is some sort of triumph for raw democracy when a sitting President takes questions from callers, as Bush did during one appearance on Larry King Live."[65] Critics disagree, saying the candidates have embraced the talk show circuit out of fear. Clinton, Perot, and Bush do not want to field tough questions from the establishment media members and are looking for "softballs" lobbed up by uninformed talk show hosts. However, during Clinton's ninety-minute question-and-answer session with 250 teenagers on MTV last June, he took questions on AIDS, abortion, and health care. Nor is it easy to field curveballs from adults during live call-in sessions.[66] Clinton's media advisor, Mandy Gunwald, argues that the growth of media outlets has "made the media (and ultimately, the presidential campaign) much more democratic."[67]

---

[65]Depke, p. 34.

[66]Ibid.

[67]Walsh, Barone, and Cooper, p. 51.

Challenging the Minimalist Consensus: A 1992 Regression Model

Whether the campaigns have become more democratic or simply more superficial because of the influence of television, the consensus that this medium plays only a minimal part in the 1992 campaign must be challenged empirically. The preceding literature review focused on the facts, events, personalities, and scholarly opinions leading to the widely accepted "minimalist" or "minimal effects" consensus concerning the impact of television on presidential political campaigns. However, in defending this thesis empirically for an earlier campaign, Larry Bartels presents a model of media effects using two measures of exposure. He notes that the only relevant item included in the three waves of the 1980 American National Election Study (NES) focus specifically upon exposure to television network news: "How often do you watch the national network news on early evening TV--every evening, three or four times a week, once or twice a week, or less often."[68] The mean levels of network news exposure derived from translating responses to

---

[68]Bartels, p. 269.

this question onto a zero (minimum exposure) to one (maximum exposure) scale declined slightly over the course of the campaign season, from .71 in February to .66 in June to .64 in September.[69] Second, Bartels states it would be rash to infer from the prevalence of "insignificant" parameter estimates that there are no underlying media exposure effects to be found. This is shown from his analysis of the candidate trait variables where the availability of several measures of character traits are used as estimates of media exposure effects.[70]

Bartels also notes that most previous analyses of media exposure effects have been vulnerable to the argument that the apparent effects of media exposure actually reflect the impact of politically relevant social characteristics that happen to be correlated with media exposure. For example, those with strong partisan leanings, the well-educated, and blacks are all disproportionately likely to watch television, and systematic opinion changes may be mistaken for the effects of media exposure.[71] Because of this partisan predispositions, age, race, and education are

---

[69]Ibid.

[70]Ibid., p. 271.

[71]Ibid., p. 269.

reported as additional exogenous control variables.[72] Overall, Bartels reports that responses to the media exposure question appear to contain a moderate amount of measurement error significantly increasing the apparent impact of media exposure. (See Table 1.)

Proceeding along the same lines, I have constructed a multiple regression model using the 1992 National Election Study. Two variables asking the questions "Did you watch any programs about the campaigns on television?" and "Would you say you watched a good many, several, or just one or two?" were recoded into a new, quantifiable variable. The variable was reworked because 1,130 respondents were not asked this question in the survey and were coded as "inappropriate." However, the independent variable still includes 1,355 valid cases that responded accordingly; zero means the respondent did not watch any programs, one indicates they watched "just one or two," two means the respondent saw "several" campaign programs, and three indicates the respondent watched "a good many" programs. (See Table 2.)

In the same way Bartels used control variables to eliminate the influence of exogenous factors, I controlled

---

[72] Ibid. Bartels notes that "the parameter estimates associated with these control variables in the opinion change equations are omitted from the tables due to space constraints . . . . It is conceivable that media exposure could be correlated with unmeasured causes of opinion change even after controlling for party identification, age, race, and education. Unfortunately, there is no obvious way to address this remaining potential endogeneity, since any available instrument for media exposure might itself be a direct cause of opinion change."

for the respondent's party identification, gender, race, education, income, and social class. Using this new ordinal, independent variable, I created a regression model to measure the impact of television exposure on the respondent's overall feeling about each presidential candidate before and after the election. Like Bartels, I also measured the influence of television on various candidate character traits that are included in the NES study.

My conclusions show that for Clinton and Perot, the new, relatively unknown candidates, the minimal consensus of the impact of television must be challenged because the model indicates a very significant influence regarding the message received through this electronic medium. However, for Bush the statistical findings were not significant, except for some of the individual character traits, indicating that for a well-known candidate, scholars such as Doris Graber are correct in concluding that television simply reinforces already existing attitudes and feelings.[73]

My first measure of analysis in this model begins with what is called the "feeling thermometer" on individual

---

[73]Bartels, p. 268.

candidates.[74] If the respondent does not recognize the name of the candidate, then that candidate is not rated. The question concerning overall feelings toward the candidate is asked both before the election and afterward. My analysis indicates that the more a respondent watched campaign programs on television, the higher they rated Clinton on the thermometer scale. My model produced a beta value of .0476 and a T statistic of 2.052 at the .04 level of significance indicating a positive slope. Although Perot ran his campaign through the television media, my regression model shows the tactic worked against him. The more a respondent watched television campaign programs, the worse they felt about Perot. My model produced an adjusted slope value of -.0568 with a T value of -1.916 and the .06 level of significance. The results are listed in Table 3 in Appendix A and all

---

[74]Warren E. Miller, Donald R. Kinder, Steven J. Rosenstone, and the National Election Studies, **American National Election Study, 1992: Pre- and Post-Election Survey** (Enhanced with 1990 and 1991 Data) (Computer file). Conducted by the University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies. CPSR ed. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies, and Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (producers), 1993. Ann Arbor: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (distributor), 1993, pp. 549-550. Regarding the "feeling thermometer" toward each candidate, the interviewer states, "I'd like to get your feelings toward some of our political leaders and other people who are in the news these days. I'll read the name of the person and I'd like you to rate that person using something we call the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 and 100 degrees mean that you favorable and warm toward that person. Ratings between zero and 50 mean that you do not care too much for that person. You would rate the person at the 50-degree mark if you do not feel particularly warm or cold toward the person."

significant results are provided for more in-depth reader analysis in Appendix B.

The post-election feeling thermometer still shows significant, negative results for Perot, but does not indicate that the influence of television was significant for Bush or Clinton after the election. It is important to note that the minimalist consensus of the impact television has on a campaign still holds for Bush who was already well known to the voters. But the fact that the model produces such significant results for both Clinton and Perot in the pre-election survey provides empirical evidence indicating that television exposure can make or break a lesser-known candidate especially by halting or increasing his momentum in a horse-race campaign.

In analyzing the candidates' character traits and perceived strengths and weaknesses, a Gallup poll report based on 1,000 telephone interviews with registered voters in June of 1992 found that Ross Perot's supporters most often saw him as superior on the economy (87 percent), as the candidate of change (83 percent), and as someone above politics (82 percent). The Gallup report concludes, however, that the "man on a white horse" might have pulled farther ahead if not for perceived weaknesses on substance and temperament. Perot's own supporters least often see him as well-versed on the issues (47 percent), a good crisis manager (52 percent), and as a man with a plan for solving

the country's problems (52 percent).[75]

George Bush supporters gave him the highest marks for his judgment in a crisis (92 percent), honesty and trustworthiness (81 percent), and his understanding of the issues (81 percent). While Bush was strong on personal dimensions, voters expressed doubts about where he was taking the country. Only about half of all Bush supporters (47 percent) said he was the candidate with a clear plan for solving the country's problems. Bill Clinton supporters saw this candidate as someone who cared about people (81 percent), could bring about change (77 percent), and could best handle the economy (76 percent). However, the poll found that even among his own supporters, the "slick Willie" image remained a problem. Only about half saw him as the candidate who is honest (51 percent) and who puts the country's interest ahead of politics (50 percent).[76] (See Tables 4-6.)

Unfortunately, in this paper's regression model based on the NES data, questions on the respondents' perception of an individual candidate's character traits were not available for Perot. But the model does produce significant results concerning how much a respondent watched campaign programs on television and how they felt about Clinton and

---

[75]Larry Hugick, "Positive Characteristics: Preferred Candidate," **The Gallup Poll Monthly** (June 1992): 46.

[76]Ibid.

Bush as caring, intelligent, compassionate, moral, knowledgeable, honest, leaders. The results are shown in Table 7 in Appendix A.

To begin this section on character traits, the interviewer words the question in this way:

> I am going to read a list of words and phrases people may use to describe political figures. For each, tell me whether the word or phrase describes the candidates I name. Think about George Bush. In your opinion does the phrase "he is intelligent" describe George Bush extremely well, quite well, not too well, or not well at all?[77]

It is important to understand the way in which these questions are coded. If respondents believe the word describes a candidate "extremely well," they will rate them one, "quite well" is coded two, "not too well" is coded three, and "not well at all" is coded four. This means that a negative slope and T value in this regression model indicates the respondents feel more positively about that particular character trait. A positive adjusted slope shows a negative feeling or the respondent has rated that candidate lower. Understanding this fact, the model clearly provides significant empirical evidence demonstrating that the more a respondent watches campaign programs on television, the higher he will rank Clinton on the perceived traits of intelligence, compassion, and knowledge and to a lesser degree, leadership and honesty. Again, most of the findings for Bush did not produce significant results with

---

[77]Ibid., p. 638.

two exceptions: caring and morality.

In The Election of 1992, Gerald Pomper also notes that voters consistently applied relevant yardsticks to the candidates, not personal meaning. Perot's early rise in the polls capitalized on weaknesses, as the public perceived them, in the major parties' nominees' strength of character and trustworthiness.[78] Although character traits on Perot are not available in my regression model, Pomper's empirical analysis shows that in June, 1992, by a three-to-one margin, those with opinions described Perot as having strong leadership qualities. By comparison, both Bush and Clinton were viewed as most often using a strictly political tactic--pandering to the voters. Pomper notes, however, that doubts about the candidate's credibility arose from more than just a perception that Bush and Clinton were "typical politicians." For much of Bush's administration, majorities had believed the president was lying about his involvement in the Iran-Contra affair. Voters were also divided about Clinton's honesty in answering questions about his efforts to avoid the draft. While Pomper's analysis shows Clinton was not initially viewed as a strong leader, his evaluations of all (character) issues improved after the Democratic convention, paralleling the rise in his popularity.[79]

---

[78]Gerald M. Pomper, The Election of 1992 (Chatham: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1993), p. 121.

[79]Ibid.

Another pinnacle of the presidential popularity contest in 1992 also centered around television less than one month before the election. After the first televised presidential debate in October, a Gallup poll found Clinton seeming to firm up his lead and Bush falling short, according to the viewing public. While Ross Perot's performance made the biggest impression on the viewers, the Gallup Poll Monthly reported that Bill Clinton may have done what was needed to consolidate his lead. Twice as many viewers said the debate left them with a more favorable opinion of Clinton than less favorable (29 percent vs. 14 percent). Similarly, a third of the viewers (32 percent) say the debate increased their confidence in Clinton's ability to be president, while only 15 percent reportedly had less confidence in him.[80]

It is apparent through 1992 polling data and this paper's regression model, that the minimalist consensus regarding the impact of television on campaigns still holds for such well-known candidates as George Bush, about whom voters have already made up their minds regarding leadership ability, level of compassion, and intelligence. However, this thesis' empirical analysis challenges the minimalist consensus for new, lesser-known candidates, and indicates that the amount of time voters spend watching some form of the campaign on television does, in fact, influence the way

---

[80]Frank Newport and Alec Gallup, "The First Presidential Debate: Perot Makes Best Impression; Bush Falls Short," The Gallup Poll Monthly (October, 1992): 11.

they feel about the candidate, and arguably, the way they will vote on election day. Clearly, this model in and of itself, does not overturn the minimalist consensus, but it does call for more research and empirical analysis in this area.

Implications and Recommendations

Whether focusing on an overall "feeling thermometer" in a regression model, analyzing individual character traits, or simply keeping up with the Gallup polls, the reality is that the media, particularly television, is now an important part of the campaign process from primaries to election day. As Larry Bartels observes, the media, particularly the elite segment of the press licensed to analyze national electoral politics, has gained an important long-running story, complete with a cavalcade of varied and colorful weekly contests to be previewed, reported, and interpreted. Indeed, the attention of the media is an essential element in the dynamics of momentum, injecting workways of journalists into

the electoral process in an important new way.[81]

Yet even television journalists see the flaws in this new system of selecting our leaders, a system that takes longer than any other country, costs more, and seems to please no one. Bob Schieffer, chief Washington correspondent for CBS News writes:

> We start out every campaign year declaring we need substantive men and women to run for president. We all agree that we want to them to "stick to the issues," have "the courage of their convictions," and offer "leadership for the future." And then we ignore all of that and focus our attention on negative campaigns to which both sides eventually resort. We wind up with contests that embarrass everyone, with battered and scarred candidates who no one can be proud of, and campaigns that produce no mandates . . . . Who is to blame? The reporters blame the candidates. The candidates blame the media. The public blames the media and the candidates, but in truth the answer is all of the above. We are all to blame.[82]

Beginning with the candidates, those who have learned to win the game have also had to relearn the rules. As one strategist observes, "All of the past rules about how quickly and suddenly and massively the electorate moves had to be put on the shelf quickly."[83] Unfortunately, issues have also been put on the shelf as the rules of the game have changed. Bartels notes at least three primary candidates have been specifically criticized by campaign observers for refusing to run issue-oriented campaigns. In

---

[81]Bartels, p. 275.

[82]Bob Schieffer, "Trivializing the Irrelevant," The Quill (October, 1990): 40.

[83]Reagan pollster Richard Wirthlin, in Bartels, p. 25.

1976 Jimmy Carter was charged with "fuzziness" soon after his first dramatic primary victories.[84] James Ceaser writes, "In 1976, Jimmy Carter won the nomination by blurring many of the issues and by emphasizing broad themes like efficiency and honesty."[85] In 1980, George Bush was also criticized for his lack of political substance in the first few weeks after his dramatic Iowa triumph. In 1984, Gary Hart's issue commitments were also questioned by the press and by Walter Mondale. "Where's the beef?" became the most memorable sound bite of the campaign season.[86] In 1992, Bill Clinton's appeal for "change" allowed the voters to perceive his stand on issues as similar to their own.

Through the medium of television, candidates have learned to run campaigns of ambiguity in order to be all things to all voters. Vague appeals for leadership and new commitment, along with a warm and winning smile, can and now do win elections. Ansolabehere, Behr, and Iyengar conclude that in this new media-oriented democracy the content of campaign coverage is substantially determined by the candidates rather than by the independent efforts of reporters. A vast majority of campaign stories originate in

---

[84]Bartels, p. 101.

[85] James Ceasar, Presidential Selection: Theory and Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 105 in Bartels, p. 101.

[86]Bartels, pp. 101-102.

campaign organizations; rarely do reporters take the initiative to determine whether a particular issue is worthy of attention.[87] Candidates will not change the strategy of evasion until they are forced to; unless reporters learn not to just repeat everything said at a press conference unchallenged, but to question candidates on all substantive issues. In order to bring substance back into the campaign, Bob Schieffer also recommends several institutional, legislative moves including an overhaul of election laws that would involve reduction of the power of incumbents. He also suggests limiting campaign spending as the Democratic party suggests and eliminate political action committees as the Republican party recommends.[88] An idealistic appeal to politicians to be more direct and offer substantive answers to issue-oriented questions simply will not play in this media democracy. Therefore, much of the reform will have to come from journalists and an informed electorate.

Schieffer recommends that journalists do more reporting and less polling, because not enough thought is given to the impact of the polls themselves on political horse races. Schieffer also points out that journalists may criticize candidates for trivializing campaigns, but in reality it is the press corps' desire for more and more

---

[87]Ansolabehere, Behr, and Iyengar, p. 233.

[88]Schieffer, p. 41.

pictures that have encouraged these irrelevant "photo op" sessions, making them the staple of the modern campaign. He believes journalists need to get back to pursuing the story instead of spending so much time capturing the picture.[89] Ken Bode, the director of the Center for Contemporary Media at De Pauw University and a special assignment correspondent for **CNN**, echoes the need to pull the plug on the media's photo-op addiction. He believes there are two points of view on this matter. The first gives presidential candidates a right to set their own agendas and whatever they do on a given day is news and must be covered. The other view holds that providing coverage for the contrived theme of the day photo-op amounts to nothing but conveyor belt journalism.[90]

A report by the Freedom Forum Media Studies Center at Columbia University also offers several recommendations to the news media in order to provide more objective and complete coverage of presidential campaigns:

> *News organizations could better serve the public by openly articulating the rationale for coverage and the ground rules by which they operate. They should offer a general road map of how the campaign is being covered and why.
> *Public discontent with and media ambivalence about coverage of the personal lives of presidential candidates, the so-called "character issue," suggests that the basis for such coverage needs far better explanation than it has gotten so far. The public's confidence in presidential reporting and overall media credibility may depend on it.
> *Media organizations need to devote greater resources to

---

[89]Ibid., p. 42.

[90]Ken Bode, "Pull the Plug," The Quill (March 1992): 10.

investigating the candidates and their backgrounds, with occasional cues to the public about this process, to avoid ceding news judgment to supermarket tabloids.

*Television needs to be more vigilant in identifying and labeling news footage paid for by candidates and campaigns, including video news releases and satellite news conferences and interviews.

*News sources other than candidates, campaign managers and special interests--including historians, political scientists, and ordinary citizens--ought to get more consideration in background and contextual reports on the campaign.

*Independent, nonpartisan organizations should be encouraged to sponsor public forums in which campaign coverage as the public's window on the election is seriously assessed and examined.[91]

The Freedom Forum's report also suggests that polling organizations (and the establishment media) de-emphasize the "horse race" aspect of public attitudes toward candidates and concentrate on more issue-oriented analysis.[92]

Bartels states that a steady diet of high-minded political substance from a reformed media establishment would make primary voters wiser and more responsible, and this reform has to be a voluntary, self-initiated process.[93] However, this is easier to articulate than accomplish. The ratings game and the commercial aspects of television mean high-minded television may only lead to low marks in the ratings book. Bartels does realize that this call for substance and education about the issues "is likely to have

---

[91]Tony Case, "The Media and Campaign '92," **Editor and Publisher** (July 25, 1992): 13, 39.

[92]Ibid.

[93]Bartels, pp. 283-284.

the same bracing effect on real life as a call for universal brotherhood, cheap gas, or perpetual sunshine."[94] One factor that must be taken into consideration is the inherent nature of television itself. Dramatic pictures drive stories that, in turn, pull in ratings that, in turn, attract advertisers who allow those pictures to continue being broadcast. Greenfield notes:

> (The) facts underlying the real campaign cannot be filmed or taped, and they make for very poor drama. They lack the dazzle of colorful balloons ascending from the crowd, the whiff of grape-shot accompanying angry charges from candidate to candidate, the compelling soundtrack provided by a brass band. And since they do not change from day to day, they cannot be touched on the day after day on the evening news programs without running the risk of repetition.[95]

However, researchers at the Joan Shorenstein Barone Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, encourage journalists to be repetitive concerning the issues of a campaign and to reuse profiles and "issues" pieces tied to voters concerns.[96] The project, "Campaign Lessons for 92," is based on the theories of educator Sissela Bok, who "concluded that there are three 'vicious circles' at play in any campaign: the people, the politicians, and the press.

---

[94]Ibid., p. 284.

[95]Ibid.

[96]Thomas Winship, "The New Curmudgeon," Editor and Publisher (December 7, 1991): 13.

Since these are 'dynamic systems, not static ones,' she believed that, if any one of them could be changed for the better, the other two would be similarly affected," wrote Marvin Kalb, director of the center.[97]

The theme emerging from the Harvard report is concern that campaigns have become distant from the concerns of voters; that a "disconnect" has developed between the electorate and their prospective leaders, and that journalism, rather than bridging the gap has helped create and sustain it. According to the report, the basic problems with campaign coverage include the following: 1) the press has generally adopted too much of an insiders approach to its campaign coverage. The insider's perspective is rooted in an overemphasis on the most obvious and enticing part of the campaign: the "horse-race" drama of which candidate is ahead and who is likely to win. Horse-race coverage leads to more stories about campaign strategy than about political substance; 2) the emphasis on political strategy over substance has allowed political advertising to supplant reporting as the most important vehicle for transmitting policy information to voters. Candidates take advantage of burgeoning volume of political ads in prime-time television; 3) the production demands of television, which place a premium on symbolic visual elements and powerful emotional

---

[97]Debra Gersh, "Campaign Coverage Lessons for the Media," Editor and Publisher (December 7, 1991): 12.

moments, have come to dictate the daily activities of presidential candidates and to drive out the extended explanation of issue positions; 4) reporters have responded to this development with an ill-advised new form of reporting, a kind of "theater criticism" about the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of event staging . . . . The economics and logistics of the news business make it difficult to undertake and gain attention for enterprising, research-based stories; 5) television, with its emphasis on the individual candidate and his or her skills in projecting a message, has contributed to the decline of political parties. As a result, there has been an increase in the stories about "character, gaffes, and scandal" at the expense of issue-based stories that might link public policy to the lives of voters.[98]

Ellen Hume, executive director of the center, believes that journalists see political coverage as having two purposes: "most feel they must report on the activities of the candidates'" campaigns, including ads and other "manufactured news" because that is the political news of the day; yet they also feel they must tell the voters what is really happening behind the scenes. Hume writes:

> However well-intentioned or well-grounded in tradition and ethics, there is a general feeling that neither mission is being conducted effectively in contemporary campaign coverage. Instead of successfully analyzing the distorted or empty images of the

---

[98]Gersh, p. 12.

campaign, the press in 1988 unintentionally legitimized them.[99]

However well-intentioned the Harvard study was, the regression model presented in this thesis clearly shows that the empty, superficial nature of television news images still did, in fact, impact the 1992 campaign, especially in the Clinton and Perot cases. The report does offer some concrete recommendations for journalists to enhance media credibility and responsibility to the electorate. It suggests news operations should: 1) establish a baseline agenda to monitor relevance in the news coverage. This agenda would be based on ideas, values, and concerns of the voters rather than the press. The goal is to discourage overattention to the "manufactured" news as the campaign moves along; 2) as well as reusing profiles and issues pieces, news organizations should refuse to use photo-ops and sound bites unless the candidate fleshes them out or the press puts them in context by enterprise reporting.[100]

This second recommendation obviously demonstrates that the authors of this report do not understand the nature of television news in a political campaign. Television thrives on new pictures to update a story, and because time is so limited in a newscast, short soundbites are the norm. Because television is a business surviving by ratings and

---

[99]Ibid.

[100]Winship, p. 13.

advertising, the nature of the medium will not change. Instead, potential voters must see much of the television news product for what it is, simply a headline service in competition with other channels to capture the latest campaign picture. One possible solution to this is a multi-media partnership on a project-by-project basis. Local television stations can and do work in conjunction with newspapers to educate the public on the issues. One possibility is to develop a series of in-depth, issue-oriented reports in which the viewers receive an overview of the subject on their local nightly news, followed by an in-depth analysis in the morning paper.

The Harvard report goes on to suggest that news organizations should: 3) take advantage of today's technology and data bases to track more closely voting records, past statements on issues, and campaign finances; 4) cease quoting the paid propagandists unless they say something that makes legitimate news; 5) take senior reporters off the campaign plane, leaving the day-to-day spot coverage to "pools," photos, and audio from the traveling campaign. This would release the "bigfoot" reporters to do the serious research-based journalism, so often ignored until it is too late.[101] Again, this last suggestion is not feasible in a campaign. Much of what is

---

[101]Ibid.

significant in a campaign occurs on the campaign trail on a day-to-day basis. This coverage cannot be left up to a generic "pool" agreement or to an audio operator. Instead, news management should delegate a campaign coverage team with at least two reporters sharing daily and in-depth coverage duties. Producers can also help research and enterprise background material on a candidate's experience and voting records. To bring even more substantive information into the campaign, journalist Thomas Winship suggests the news media print or broadcast the names of every single contributor of $100 or more to the presidential candidates as a method to track an elected official's subsequent political actions.[102]

While criticizing the media has become a form of sport for political pundits analyzing a presidential campaign, Ken Bode believes not all of the criticism is warranted. In dissecting the 1988 coverage, analysts found that the time devoted to a candidate's actual spoken words had dwindled to an average of nine seconds per candidate. Gerald Pomper, in The Election of 1992 notes that, as a result, politicians are not able to communicate very much information directly through the news process. Second, their ideas are truncated and embedded in commentary from both news anchors and correspondents, which inevitably puts their quotations into

---

[102]Ibid.

contexts not of the candidates' choosing.[103] In many sources of campaign coverage analysis, the nine-second soundbite has become the catechism of critics of television election coverage and even found its way into textbooks, speeches, foundation reports, and editorials.[104] However, according to Bode, this is based only on the reportage of the Brokaw, Jennings, and Rather programs on the three major networks. But as we have established, the networks are no longer the only or even major player on the media field. CNN devoted a daily half-hour program called Inside Politics to presidential political coverage. C-Span's Road to the White House, is a weekly program offering views and analysis on the campaign. The nine-second soundbite does not include air time for candidates on all of the morning shows, Nightline with Ted Koppel, or any Sunday broadcast such as Newsmakers or Meet the Press.[105]

In responding to complaints about campaign coverage, many of the media outlets did revamp programming to include more in-depth, issues-oriented material. In covering the 1992 presidential race, CNN set a goal of devoting 500 to 700 hours to campaign coverage, the cornerstone being a

---

[103]Pomper, p. 90.

[104]Bode, p. 14.

[105]Ibid.

three-part package called Democracy in America, featuring in-depth profiles of the candidates and their positions. PBS also delved into campaign coverage with Listening to America, with Bill Moyers and even presented a Back-to-School Special that offered a primer on voting and citizenship.[106]

Finally, with the knowledge that television has become a powerful, albeit superficial, player in the campaign process, the public has a responsibility to demand quality reporting from news organizations, including traditional and non-traditional media outlets, and substantive answers from prospective candidates. In my opinion, herein lies the real power in this new media-oriented democracy. Many analysts, such as Pomper, are skeptical, stating that we depend on the media and recognize their power, but our dependence is a mark of voicelessness and indignity. But his next observation holds the key to power: "Recognizing our resentment and their lack of authority, the media are desperately anxious to please us, as Tocqueville would have expected, especially since few things are easier than changing channels."[107] When preferences are aggregated into advocacy or special interest groups, the electorate has the means to change any aspect of the campaign process. The

---

[106]Ed Avis, "Broadcasters Take Heed of Complaints," The Quill (March 1992): 12.

[107]Pomper, p. 197.

simple fact is, media managers live in fear of offending the existing and potential audience. On the local level, a simple letter to the general manager can keep a story from ever seeing the light of air. Another letter can redirect and help form a station's news philosophy. Voter advocacy groups for quality campaign coverage might, in fact, rework the local and network system altogether.

Ansolabehere, Behr, and Iyengar fail to give the electorate much credit for any political or media sophistication:

> One of the most serious criticisms of contemporary political reporting is that reporters generally fail to understand how ordinary citizens process information about public officials and the political process. Reporters do not realize that the public frequently cannot evaluate the quality or veracity of competing claims.[108]

While the regression model presented in this paper confirms that television does influence the electorate's opinions on superficial character issues concerning candidates, many media managers and consultants take this one step further operationally by believing most audiences understand only what is presented to them at the sixth-grade level. In my estimation, true democracy is not elite driven and must let the public assume responsibility for what it watches and believes about political candidates. The electorate is much more media savvy than any reporter, analyst, or politician dares to believe. This view was

---

[108]Ansolabehere, Behr, and Iyengar, p. 236.

confirmed in the 1992 campaign when audience members were able to ask intelligent questions directly to candidates without any journalist holding their hands or offering crib notes. Citizens should be encouraged to participate in the process by tele-conferencing through electronic town-hall meetings. In 1992, the public could and did ask specific questions of the candidates while the reporters should have been ready to prepare background stories that would run repeatedly to further educate the audience about substantive issues.

Although studies and reports offer recommendations to candidates to tackle and clearly articulate their views on issues in a campaign, the reality is that the television age has made evasion a sure-fire strategy for success. Politicians will not change. While the media is criticized for operating an insubstantial horse race in which all bets are on the candidate with the warmest smile, the fact is that pictures bring ratings which, in turn, sell advertisements. The media will be slow to change. If reform is to occur, those holding the most power are also those holding the ballot on election day, not to mention holding the remote-control every remaining day of the year. By challenging the minimalist consensus concerning the power of television in political campaigns, we now know that the media game matters in presidential politics, especially for new, relatively unknown candidates. But with new technology

and the appearance of non-traditional sources of media in the process, it is quite possible that the most important player, the electorate, might exercise more control over this horse race than any elite politician or journalist will be comfortable with. We just may be able to call this new system "media-age democracy."

Appendix A

APPENDIX A

TABLE A-1:

Descriptive Statistics and Measurement Error Estimates

VARIABLE	MEANS S.D. FEB.	MEANS S.D. JUNE	MEANS S.D. SEPT.	STD. ERROR OF MEASUREMENT	AVERAGE COEFFICIENT OF RELIABILITY
Television news exposure	.708 .317	.662 .316	.644 .315	.158	.75
Newspaper exposure	.621 .485	.600 .490	.623 .476	.227	.78
Party identification	−.124 .657	−.099 .676	−.116 .678	.231	.88
Carter overall job approval	55.3 36.6	36.9 35.6	39.2 36.7	19.7	.71
Carter approval					
Iran	57.2 42.1	33.6 39.8	35.5 39.0	24.8	.62
Inflation	34.1 34.3	26.2 32.9	32.9 34.0	21.3	.60
Unemployment	47.7 33.5	30.1 32.4	35.0 33.6	21.1	.59
Energy	34.6 36.7	27.1 34.0	40.2 35.2	24.4	.52
Issue Preferences					
Lib./con. ideology	54.4 17.6	53.7 18.5	55.2 18.5	11.0	.63
Spending/services	42.6 28.4	44.1 27.8	45.9 27.1	18.2	.57
Defense spending	69.1 23.0	65.6 23.3	68.6 22.7	14.5	.60
Relations with Russia	53.2 32.6	54.6 30.0	54.4 28.4	20.7	.53

Source: APSR; Bartels (1993).

Table 1

TABLE A-1 continued

Descriptive statistics and Measurement Error Estimates

VARIABLE	MEANS S.D. FEB.	JUNE	SEPT.	STD. ERROR OF MEASUREMENT	AVERAGE COEFFICIENT OF RELIABILITY
Carter					
Thermometer rating	63.5 24.3	53.3 26.4	56.2 26.3	10.4	.84
Moral	74.1 23.5	70.8 24.4	70.8 24.5	15.9	.57
Dishonest	16.4 23.7	21.3 24.3	24.8 23.4	17.0	.49
Power-hungry	31.9 29.4	39.6 30.4	44.8 29.8	19.0	.60
Weak	40.7 30.1	49.7 29.7	44.9 26.9	19.7	.53
Inspiring	45.9 29.0	38.7 26.4	41.1 26.1	17.9	.56
Provide strong leadership	47.2 27.1	37.0 27.0	40.3 27.4	14.9	.70
Knowledgeable	65.3 25.2	59.8 26.4	61.1 23.8	17.4	.52
Solve economic problems	40.0 25.0	32.0 23.2	34.3 24.2	15.7	.58
Develop good relations	55.3 27.1	44.2 27.3	48.7 27.6	18.8	.53
Lib./cons. ideology	53.1 17.9	49.2 20.0	47.6 18.1	13.5	.47
Govt. spending/services	38.1 20.6	41.5 20.4	40.1 19.1	16.8	.29
Defense spending	59.2 21.4	51.0 20.7	50.8 19.9	15.9	.41
Relations with Russia	44.9 28.8	40.9 24.8	42.2 22.6	19.6	.39
Reagan					
Thermometer rating	52.5 23.6	58.4 23.3	56.2 25.0	11.7	.76
Moral	62.6 22.2	63.7 21.8	61.5 23.1	14.6	.57
Dishonest	27.5 23.7	26.5 22.7	25.6 [illegible]	15.2	.58
Power-hungry	48.9 28.2	49.1 28.0	53.2 30.4	18.8	.57
Weak	31.6 23.2	28.8 21.7	28.6 24.7	18.0	.39
Inspiring	45.9 25.7	48.1 25.8	44.8 27.6	13.5	.74
Provide strong leadership	52.5 23.9	55.5 24.5	51.7 27.3	16.3	.58
Knowledgeable	61.0 21.8	59.3 22.9	58.5 26.0	14.3	.63
Solve economic problems	46.3 22.5	49.4 22.5	44.2 24.2	14.4	.61
Develop good relations	49.0 23.3	51.2 22.9	46.3 26.0	15.7	.57
Lib./cons. ideology	60.4 21.3	63.3 21.8	62.6 20.8	13.6	.59
Govt. spending/services	53.7 19.8	54.7 19.8	55.5 21.3	14.4	.50
Defense spending	60.0 20.5	61.9 19.5	69.6 21.4	13.0	.59
Relations with Russia	55.4 22.6	54.2 20.8	57.1 21.6	15.7	.47

Note: All variables except network news exposure (0–1), newspaper exposure (0–1), and party identification (−1–1) are recoded to vary between 0 and 100. Number of observations = 758

Source: APSR; Bartels (1993).

Table 1 cont.

EXPOSURE TO THE TELEVISION CAMPAIGN

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
No exposure	.00	491	19.8	36.2	36.2
Watched 1 or 2 programs	1.00	329	13.2	24.3	60.5
Watched "several" programs	2.00	362	14.6	26.7	87.2
Watched "a good many" programs	3.00	173	7.0	12.8	100.0
		1130	45.5	Missing	
	Total	2485	100.0	100.0	

Valid Cases 1355 Missing cases 1130

Source: American National Election Study, 1992: Pre- and Post Election Survey.

Table 2

IMPACT OF CANDIDATE EVALUATIONS PRE- AND POST-ELECTION

	BUSH	CLINTON	PEROT
92 PRE	-.0145 (-.596)	.0476 *** (2.052) Sig T = .04	-.0568 ** (-1.916) Sig T = .06
92 POST	-.0026 (.104)	.0293 (1.164)	-.0591 *** (-1.959) Sig T = .05

*** Significance Level ≥ .05
** Significance Level ≥ .10

Source: American National Election Study, 1992: Pre- and Post Election Survey.

Table 3

Positive Characteristics: Preferred Candidate

(June 12-14, 1992; telephone; Survey GO 322201**, Q. 20.) (based on registered voters)

QUESTION: I'm going to read off some personal characteristics and qualities. As I read each one, tell me if you think it applies most to George Bush, Bill Clinton or Ross Perot... a) Would display good judgement in a crisis; b) is honest and trustworthy; c) can get things done; d) cares about the needs of people like you; e) can bring about the changes this country needs; f) has a good understanding of issues; g) puts the country's interests ahead of politics; h) has a clear plan for solving the country's problems (ROTATED)

	Good judgement				Honest, trustworthy				Get things done			
	Bush	Clinton	Perot	None (vol.)	Bush	Clinton	Perot	None (vol.)	Bush	Clinton	Perot	None (vol.)
National	**49%**	**17%**	**20%**	**3%**	**34%**	**15%**	**25%**	**14%**	**28%**	**18%**	**36%**	**7%**
Sex												
Male	51	15	21	3	31	14	28	15	27	17	40	7
Female	47	19	29	3	36	16	22	14	29	19	32	7
Age												
18-29 years	55	15	20	2	34	14	27	19	34	17	37	7
30-49 years	52	15	21	4	33	13	27	18	27	15	39	8
50 & older	44	19	21	1	36	18	20	8	27	21	31	7
65 & older	45	20	20	1	39	18	18	4	29	21	27	7
Region												
East	50	14	19	2	34	15	26	12	29	19	36	6
Midwest	49	16	22	3	32	14	26	14	26	17	36	10
South	49	16	23	3	38	14	23	13	32	18	33	7
West	48	22	17	4	30	17	24	19	24	16	38	8
Race												
White	51	14	21	3	36	13	25	14	30	16	37	7
Non-white	35	31	19	3	19	27	20	19	18	30	29	8
Education												
College grads.	47	18	23	4	32	14	27	16	22	15	45	10
College inc.	59	13	19	1	40	9	29	15	32	15	38	8
No college	46	18	20	3	32	18	22	13	29	20	31	6
Politics												
Republicans	80	1	12	2	67	1	16	8	55	4	26	9
Democrats	28	37	20	2	16	30	25	14	15	35	30	6
Independents	45	10	29	4	24	12	32	20	20	10	52	6
Trial Heat												
Bush	92	1	2	1	81	2	4	8	68	3	13	8
Clinton	23	56	7	1	9	51	11	16	6	59	17	5
Perot	30	7	52	2	11	5	59	14	8	4	75	6
Ideology												
Liberal	28	32	27	3	16	27	29	18	14	28	40	6
Moderate	48	16	22	3	28	15	26	17	24	16	42	9
Conservative	66	9	16	2	52	9	21	8	42	13	28	7
Income												
$50,000 & over	56	14	17	4	39	9	24	16	32	12	38	10
$30,000-49,999	53	13	22	2	32	11	29	19	28	16	40	8
$20,000-29,999	47	22	22	2	36	23	22	11	29	19	35	4
Under $20,000	42	20	21	3	31	20	22	11	28	24	31	7

Note: "Same" / "No opinion" omitted.

Source: The Gallup Poll Monthly; (June 1992)

Table 4

Positive Characteristics: Preferred Candidate (Continued)

	Cares about you				Bring about change				Knows issues			
	Bush	Clinton	Perot	None (vol.)	Bush	Clinton	Perot	None (vol.)	Bush	Clinton	Perot	None (vol.)
National	22%	26%	31%	12%	20%	24%	38%	10%	41%	23%	21%	6%
Sex												
Male	18	27	33	13	20	21	42	10	42	22	22	5
Female	25	26	28	12	20	27	34	10	39	25	20	7
Age												
18-29 years	19	27	33	12	22	23	41	7	46	21	22	5
30-49 years	19	28	34	15	18	23	40	12	40	23	22	7
50 & older	26	24	26	10	22	26	33	8	38	25	19	5
65 & older	33	20	24	8	23	24	34	4	41	23	19	4
Region												
East	23	29	28	11	21	26	39	6	41	24	19	5
Midwest	18	21	35	16	18	22	38	12	44	22	19	8
South	25	26	32	10	24	24	36	8	42	23	21	4
West	21	30	27	12	17	23	38	14	34	26	24	7
Race												
White	23	24	32	12	22	21	39	10	43	22	20	6
Non-white	15	43	20	11	11	40	30	9	24	37	27	4
Education												
College grads.	22	27	29	15	17	21	40	14	41	24	19	8
College inc.	20	28	34	14	26	21	40	10	42	22	23	4
No college	23	25	30	11	20	26	36	8	40	24	21	5
Politics												
Republicans	50	7	21	15	46	7	30	8	69	7	16	4
Democrats	8	46	27	8	7	43	31	9	20	47	17	6
Independents	12	23	43	12	12	19	51	11	38	15	28	7
Trial Heat												
Bush	59	9	11	14	58	8	14	11	81	7	5	3
Clinton	3	81	5	6	1	77	10	7	14	70	6	3
Perot	4	9	71	10	1	5	83	6	25	11	47	8
Ideology												
Liberal	9	45	30	9	8	39	36	11	21	40	23	7
Moderate	14	29	36	13	15	25	44	9	37	23	23	7
Conservative	38	14	26	12	34	14	33	10	57	15	17	3
Income												
$50,000 & over	29	24	29	13	25	18	39	11	45	19	19	9
$30,000-49,999	17	35	36	14	20	21	39	12	46	23	18	4
$20,000-29,999	18		30	12	19	28	39	8	36	27	23	7
Under $20,000	23	23	28	10	20	30	34	6	34	26	25	4

Source: The Gallup Poll Monthly; (June 1992)

Table 5

Positive Characteristics: Preferred Candidate (Continued)

	Country before politics				Has clear plan				
	Bush	Clinton	Perot	None (vol.)	Bush	Clinton	Perot	None (vol.)	No. of interviews
National	23%	15%	41%	13%	19%	21%	25%	28%	1000
Sex									
Male	22	12	47	10	16	21	26	30	496
Female	24	18	35	15	22	21	23	26	504
Age									
18-29 years	22	18	41	15	18	22	28	27	175
30-49 years	21	13	46	13	21	20	25	29	436
50 & older	26	16	34	11	18	22	23	26	381
65 & older	29	17	29	7	17	24	22	22	178
Region									
East	23	16	40	11	17	23	25	26	244
Midwest	25	14	40	14	19	21	25	29	244
South	25	15	39	12	25	19	24	25	300
West	19	14	45	16	13	22	24	34	212
Race									
White	24	14	41	14	20	19	24	30	888
Non-white	16	20	40	8	11	38	31	13	107
Education									
College grads.	18	12	50	17	18	21	20	35	323
College inc.	25	13	45	12	20	19	22	34	231
No college	24	17	35	12	20	22	27	23	445
Politics									
Republicans	46	3	32	13	37	7	18	31	300
Democrats	12	29	38	11	11	39	23	20	321
Independents	15	11	51	15	13	14	32	34	356
Trial Heat									
Bush	57	4	17	14	47	8	11	28	325
Clinton	7	50	22	13	3	63	7	19	230
Perot	4	2	82	8	7	7	52	30	361
Ideology									
Liberal	8	26	49	10	9	36	27	22	185
Moderate	19	15	43	16	15	21	26	31	403
Conservative	37	9	35	11	30	14	21	28	377
Income									
$50,000 & over	24	10	46	17	23	17	20	32	285
$30,000-49,999	22	13	45	13	18	21	26	25	277
$20,000-29,999	24	16	40	12	20	23	26	25	161
Under $20,000	26	20	33	9	18	23	26	26	225

** Gallup/CNN/USA Today

Source: The Gallup Poll Monthly; (June 1992)

Table 6-

MULTIPLE REGRESSION
Character Traits

	BUSH	CLINTON
Gets Things Done	.00098 (.361)	-.038 (-1.29)
Intelligence	-.023 (-.830)	-.1002*** (-3.529) Sig T - .0004
Compassion	-.023 (-.877)	-.0451 * (-1.601) SIG T = .1096
Moral	-.0507** (-1.835) Sig T = .07	.0029 (.105)
Inspiring	-.002 (-.075)	-.0188 (-.709)
Leadership	.0235 (.882)	-.0414 * (-1.542) Sig T = .12
Cares	-.0413 ** (-1.654) Sig T = .0983	-.0202 (-.754)
Knowledge	-.0016 (-.058)	.0581 *** (-2.080) Sig T = .0377
Honest	-.0316 (-1.188)	-.0377 (-1.4) Sig T = .16

*** Significance Level ≥ .05
** Significance Level ≥ .10
* Significance Level ≥ .12

Source: American National Election Study, 1992: Pre- and Post Election Survey.

Table 7

MULTIPLE REGRESSION

Listwise Deletion of Missing Data

Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable... V3306 92PRE: D2b. TH CLINTON

Block Number 1. Method: Enter NEWVA V554 V549 V3634 V547 V664 V668

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number		
1...	V668	Summary: R's Socl Class
2...	V547	R's Gender (Given By Inf)
3...	NEWVA	
4...	V549	R's Race
5...	V3634	92 Pre: K1z. Party ID
6...	V554	Education: R
7...	V664	R's Income 1989

Multiple R	.60730
R Square	.36881
Adjusted R Square	.36511
Standard Error	19.85983

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	7	274938.04906	39276.86415
Residential	1193	470534.35893	394.41271

F = 99.58316 Signif F = .0000

---------- Variables in the Equation ----------

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
V668	-.292600	.366027	-.020216	-.799	.4242
V547	.021948	1.266776	4.398E-04	.017	.9862
NEWVA	1.127727	.549554	.047574	2.052	.0404
V549	3.144323	1.118469	.065609	2.811	.0050
V3634	-6.986222	.284688	-.578328	-24.540	.0000
V554	-.046570	.228418	-.005295	-.204	.8385
V664	-.192289	.109964	-.048685	-1.749	.0806
(Constant)	73.499572	3.796296		19.361	.0000

Appendix B

Table 8

MULTIPLE REGRESSION

Listwise Deletion of Missing Data

Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable... V3307 92PRE: D2c. TH PEROT

Block Number 1. Method: Enter NEWVA V554 V549 V3634 V547 V664 V668

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number			
	1...	V668	Summary: R's Socl Class
	2...	V547	R's Gender (Given By Inf)
	3...	NEWVA	
	4...	V549	R's Race
	5...	V3634	92 Pre: K1z. Party ID
	6...	V554	Education: R
	7...	V664	R's Income 1989

Multiple R	.11955
R Square	.01429
Adjusted R Square	.00822
Standard Error	26.09742

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	7	11217.95348	39276.86415
Residential	1136	773701.51506	681.07528

F = 2.35299 Signif F = .0218

---------- Variables in the Equation ----------

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
V668	-.187325	.493690	-.012320	-.379	.7044
V547	-3.219092	1.704119	-.061389	-1.889	.0591
NEWVA	-1.412932	.737508	-.056798	-1.916	.0556
V549	-2.180841	1.510502	-.043028	-1.444	.1491
V3634	-.417523	.381417	-.032962	-1.095	.2739
V554	.162779	.312383	.017273	.521	.6024
V664	.217907	.147238	.052446	1.480	.1392
(Constant)	51.573507	5.146981		10.020	.0000

Table 9

MULTIPLE REGRESSION

Listwise Deletion of Missing Data

Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable... V5303 92Post B1c. TH PEROT

Block Number 1. Method: Enter NEWVA V554 V549 V3634 V547 V664 V668

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number

1...	V668	Summary: R's Socl Class
2...	V547	R's Gender (Given By Inf)
3...	NEWVA	
4...	V549	R's Race
5...	V3634	92 Pre: K1z. Party ID
6...	V554	Education: R
7...	V664	R's Income 1989

Multiple R	.12722
R Square	.01619
Adjusted R Square	.00990
Standard Error	24.17002

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	7	10533.44705	1504.77815
Residential	1096	640272.18248	584.18995

F = 2.57584 Signif F = .0123

---------- Variables in the Equation ----------

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
V668	-.301872	.464552	-.021294	-.650	.5159
V547	-1.192295	1.613297	-.024515	-.739	.4600
NEWVA	-1.364913	.696857	-.059112	-1.959	.0504
V549	-2.950904	1.439360	-.062177	-2.050	.0406
V3634	-.549934	.361816	-.046706	-1.520	.1288
V554	.373757	.293520	.042855	1.273	.2032
V664	.234965	.139587	.060572	1.683	.0926
(Constant)	54.773457	4.898341		11.182	.0000

Table 10

MULTIPLE REGRESSION

Listwise Deletion of Missing Data

Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable... V3644 92PRE: K3a. C INTELLIG

Block Number 1. Method: Enter NEWVA V554 V549 V3634 V547 V664 V668

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number

1...	V668	Summary: R's Socl Class
2...	V547	R's Gender (Given By Inf)
3...	NEWVA	
4...	V549	R's Race
5...	V3634	92 Pre: K1z. Party ID
6...	V554	Education: R
7...	V664	R's Income 1989

Multiple R	.28951
R Square	.08382
Adjusted R Square	.07827
Standard Error	.60571

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	7	38.80079	5.54297
Residential	1156	424.11587	.36688

F = 15.10831 Signif F = .0000

---------- Variables in the Equation ----------

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
V668	-.011700	.011282	-.031998	-1.037	.2999
V547	-.043797	.039414	-.034684	-1.111	.2667
NEWVA	-.060235	.017068	-.100202	-3.529	.0004
V549	-.037745	.034232	-.031584	-1.103	.2704
V3634	.074708	.008791	.245870	8.499	.0000
V554	-.016913	.007112	-.075595	-2.378	.0176
V664	.001721	.003423	.017250	.503	.6153
(Constant)	2.131663	.117840		18.089	.0000

Table 11

MULTIPLE REGRESSION

Listwise Deletion of Missing Data

Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable... V3645 92PRE: K3b. C COMPASS

Block Number 1. Method: Enter NEWVA V554 V549 V3634 V547 V664 V668

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number

1...	V668	Summary: R's Socl Class
2...	V547	R's Gender (Given By Inf)
3...	NEWVA	
4...	V549	R's Race
5...	V3634	92 Pre: K1z. Party ID
6...	V554	Education: R
7...	V664	R's Income 1989

Multiple R	.36386
R Square	.13240
Adjusted R Square	.12696
Standard Error	.60029

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	7	61.42258	8.77465
Residential	1117	402.50986	.36035

F = 24.35043 Signif F = .0000

---------- Variables in the Equation ----------

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
V668	.006506	.011414	.017420	-.570	.5688
V547	-.025693	.039656	-.019965	-.648	.5172
NEWVA	-.027630	.017255	-.045072	-1.601	.1096
V549	-.037993	.035615	-.030343	-1.067	.2863
V3634	.109070	.008919	.350754	12.228	.0000
V554	-.007776	.007131	-.034241	-1.090	.2758
V664	-.002930	.003450	-.028815	-.849	.3959
(Constant)	2.033088	.119470		17.018	.0000

Table 12

MULTIPLE REGRESSION

Listwise Deletion of Missing Data

Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable... V3637 92PRE: K2c. B MORAL

Block Number 1. Method: Enter NEWVA V554 V549 V3634 V547 V664 V668

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number		
1...	V668	Summary: R's Socl Class
2...	V547	R's Gender (Given By Inf)
3...	NEWVA	
4...	V549	R's Race
5...	V3634	92 Pre: K1z. Party ID
6...	V554	Education: R
7...	V664	R's Income 1989

Multiple R	.33372
R Square	.11137
Adjusted R Square	.10611
Standard Error	.71648

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	7	76.17113	10.88159
Residential	1184	607.79867	.51334

F = 21.19748 Signif F = .0000

---------- Variables in the Equation ----------

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
V668	-.008202	.013215	-.018656	-.632	.5349
V547	-.028102	.045799	-.018513	-.614	.5396
NEWVA	-.036537	.019909	-.050700	-1.835	.0667
V549	.104881	.040608	-.072021	2.583	.0099
V3634	-.113002	.010335	-.307557	-10.934	.0000
V554	.001324	.008223	.004986	.161	.8721
V664	-.004324	.003981	-.036042	-1.086	.2777
(Constant)	2.302255	.136729		16.838	.0000

Table 13

MULTIPLE REGRESSION

Listwise Deletion of Missing Data

Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable... V3648 92PRE: K3e. C LEADER

Block Number 1. Method: Enter NEWVA V554 V549 V3634 V547 V664 V668

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number

1...	V668	Summary: R's Socl Class
2...	V547	R's Gender (Given By Inf)
3...	NEWVA	
4...	V549	R's Race
5...	V3634	92 Pre: K1z. Party ID
6...	V554	Education: R
7...	V664	R's Income 1989

Multiple R	.48236
R Square	.23267
Adjusted R Square	.22772
Standard Error	.67733

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	7	150.93437	21.56205
Residential	1085	497.77560	.45878

F = 46.99874 Signif F = .0000

---------- Variables in the Equation ----------

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
V668	-.001059	.013080	-.002358	-.081	.9355
V547	-.034779	.045191	-.022548	-.880	.4417
NEWVA	-.030397	.019708	-.041406	-1.542	.1233
V549	-.076711	.039388	-.052747	-1.948	.0517
V3634	.162323	.010111	.437951	16.054	.0000
V554	.008109	.008127	.029982	.998	.3186
V664	.010948	.003914	.090296	2.797	.0052
(Constant)	1.854446	.135645		13.671	.0000

Table 14

MULTIPLE REGRESSION

Listwise Deletion of Missing Data

Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable... V3640 92PRE: K2f. B CARES

Block Number 1. Method: Enter NEWVA V554 V549 V3634 V547 V664 V668

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number		
1...	V668	Summary: R's Socl Class
2...	V547	R's Gender (Given By Inf)
3...	NEWVA	
4...	V549	R's Race
5...	V3634	92 Pre: K1z. Party ID
6...	V554	Education: R
7...	V664	R's Income 1989

Multiple R	.51940
R Square	.26977
Adjusted R Square	.26549
Standard Error	.78983

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	7	275.17919	39.31131
Residential	1194	744.85825	.62383

F = 63.01562 Signif F = .0000

Variables in the Equation

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
V668	-.024265	.014510	-.045274	-1.672	.0947
V547	-.042050	.050450	-.022775	-.833	.4047
NEWVA	-.036125	.021837	-.041279	-1.654	.0983
V549	.043370	.044110	.024708	.983	.3257
V3634	-.226492	.011340	-.506860	-19.973	.0000
V554	.035445	.008999	.110121	3.939	.0001
V664	-.007536	.004397	-.051543	-1.714	.0868
(Constant)	3.172138	.150190		21.121	.0000

Table 15

MULTIPLE REGRESSION

Listwise Deletion of Missing Data

Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable... V3650 92PRE: K3g. C KNOWLEDG

Block Number 1. Method: Enter NEWVA V554 V549 V3634 V547 V664 V668

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number

1...	V668	Summary: R's Socl Class
2...	V547	R's Gender (Given By Inf)
3...	NEWVA	
4...	V549	R's Race
5...	V3634	92 Pre: K1z. Party ID
6...	V554	Education: R
7...	V664	R's Income 1989

Multiple R	.33640
R Square	.11316
Adjusted R Square	.10778
Standard Error	.62135

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	7	56.80164	8.11452
Residential	1153	445.14324	.39607

F = 21.01805 Signif F = .0000

---------- Variables in the Equation ----------

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
V668	-.013529	.011634	-.035376	-1.163	.2451
V547	-.060538	.040435	-.045983	-1.497	.1346
NEWVA	-.036390	.017494	-.058146	-2.080	.0377
V549	-.064629	.036172	-.050436	-1.787	.0742
V3634	.098999	.009041	.312258	10.951	.0000
V554	-8.03085E-04	.007287	-.003452	-.110	.9123
V664	-.001246	.003515	-.011939	-.355	.7230
(Constant)	2.017874	.121908		16.552	.0000

Table 16

MULTIPLE REGRESSION

Listwise Deletion of Missing Data

Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable... V3651 92PRE: K3h. C HONEST

Block Number 1. Method: Enter NEWVA V554 V549 V3634 V547 V664 V668

Variable(s) Entered on Step Number

1...	V668	Summary: R's Socl Class
2...	V547	R's Gender (Given By Inf)
3...	NEWVA	
4...	V549	R's Race
5...	V3634	92 Pre: K1z. Party ID
6...	V554	Education: R
7...	V664	R's Income 1989

Multiple R	.47134
R Square	.22216
Adjusted R Square	.21717
Standard Error	.71263

Analysis of Variance

	DF	Sum of Squares	Mean Square
Regression	7	158.38633	22.62662
Residential	1092	554.55549	.50783

F = 44.55509 Signif F = .0000

---------- Variables in the Equation ----------

Variable	B	SE B	Beta	T	Sig T
V668	-.011910	.013691	-.025445	-.870	.3846
V547	-.076933	.047578	-.047723	-1.617	.1062
NEWVA	-.028910	.020652	-.037672	-1.400	.1618
V549	-.005533	.042490	-.003533	-.130	.8964
V3634	.162848	.010608	-.420595	15.352	.0000
V554	.028662	.008606	.100559	3.330	.0009
V664	.009203	.004158	.072153	2.213	.0271
(Constant)	1.799742	.141826		12.690	.0000

Table 17

Sources Consulted

Abramson, Jeffrey B., F. Christopher Arterton, and Gary R. Orren. The Electronic Commonwealth: The Impact of New Media Technologies on Democratic Politics. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1988.

Alter, John. "How Phil Donahue Came to Manage the "92 Campaign," Washington Monthly (26 October 1992): [p.12].

Ansolabehere, Stephen, Roy Behr, and Shanto Iyengar. The Media Game: American Politics in the Television Age. New York: Macmillian Publishing Company, 1993.

Arterton, F. Christopher. Media Politics: The News Strategies of Presidential Campaigns. Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company, 1984.

Avis, Ed. "Broadcasters Take Heed of Complaints," The Quill (March 1992): [p. 12].

Barber, James. Race for the Presidency: The Media and the Nominating Process. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978.

Bartels, Larry M. "Messages Received: The Political Impact of Media Exposure," APSR 87, no. 2 (June 1993): [pp. 267-280].

Bartels, Larry. Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.

Bennett, W. Lance. News: The Politics of Illusion. New York: Longman, 1983.

Berelson, Bernard R., Paul F. Lazarfeld, and William N. McPhee. Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1954.

Bode, Ken. "Broadcasters Take Heed of Complaints, Pull the Plug," The Quill (March 1992): [p. 10-14].

Boyer, Peter. Who Killed CBS? New York: Random House, 1988.

Campbell, Angus and Converse, Philip E. and Miller, Warren E. and Stokes, Donald E. The American Voter. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1960.

Case, Tony. "The Media and Campaign '92," Editor and Publisher (25 July 1992): [pp. 13, 39].

Case, Tony. "Television and Presidential Politics," Editor and Publisher 125 (10 October 1992): [pp. 32-33].

Ceasar, James. Presidential Selection: Theory and Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.

Cornfield, Michael. "How to Read The Campaign," The Wilson Quarterly 16 (Spring 1992): [pp. 38-40].

Cleghorn, Reese, "In 1992 The Pace Quickened Forever," Washington Journalism Review. 14 (November 1992): [p. 4].

Crouse, Timothy. The Boys on the Bus. New York: Vintage Books, 1972.

David, Paul T. and Goldman, Ralph M. and Bain, Richard C. The Politics of National Party Conventions. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1960.

Depke, Deidre A. "Talk Show Campaigning Helps Candidates Connect," Business Week (26 October 1992): [p. 34].

DeVries, Walter and Tarrance, Lance V. The Ticket Splitters. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1972.

Gans, Herbert. Deciding What's News. New York: Vintage Books, 1979.

Germond, Jack W., and Jules Witcover. "The Year of the Talk Show Campaigns," National Journal 24, (13 June 1992): [p. 1428].

Gersh, Debra. "Campaign Coverage Lessons for the Media," Editor and Publisher (7 December 1991): [p. 12].

Gersh, Debra. "Superficial TV: Harvard reports zaps television coverage of political campaigns; offers plan on how it can be improved," Editor and Publisher 124 (14 September 1991): [p. 18].

Graber, Doris A. Mass Media and American Politics. Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1984

Hugick, Larry. "Positive Characteristics: Preferred Candidate," The Gallup Poll Monthly. (June 1992): [pp. 33-44].

Hugick, Larry. "The 'Twentysomething' Set: Bush Losing His Hold on Younger Voters," The Gallup Poll Monthly (July 1992): [pp. 12-14].

Lazarsfeld, Paul F. and Berelson, Bernard and Gaudet, Hazel. The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1968.

Lichter, S. Robert and Amundson, Daniel and Noyes, Richard. The Video Campaign. Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1988.

Malanowski, Jamie. "Generals Fighting the Last War," Washington Journalism Review 14 (December 1992): [pp. 25-26].

Miller, Warren E., Donald R. Kinder, Steven J. Rosenstone, and the National Election Studies, American National Election Study, 1992: Pre- and Post-Election Survey (Enhanced with 1990 and 1991 Data) (Computer file). Conducted by the University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies. CPSR ed. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies, and Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (producers), 1993. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (distributor), 1993.

Newport, Frank, and Alec Gallup. "The First Presidential Debate: Perot Makes Best Impression; Bush Falls Short," The Gallup Poll Monthly (October 1992): [pp. 11-13].

Orren, Gary R. and Polsby, Nelson W. Media and Momentum: The New Hampshire Primary and Nomination Politics. Chatham: Chatham Publishers, Inc., 1987.

Patterson, Thomas and McClure, Robert. The Unseeing Eye. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1976.

Pomper, Gerald M. The Election of 1992. Chatham: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1993.

Rubin, Richard L. Press, Party and Presidency. New York: W.W. Norton, 1981.

Sabato, Larry. Feeding Frenzy: How Attack Journalism Has

Transformed American Politics. New York: Free Press, 1991.

Schieffer, Bob. "Trivializing the Irrelevant," The Quill (October 1990): [pp. 40-42].

Scientific American, "Television and the Election," May, 1953.

Smee, John J. Review of Maltese, John Anthony. Spin Control: The White House Office of Communications and the Management of Presidential News, Political Science Quarterly (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), (Fall 1992): [p. 542].

Stencel, Mark, "Lee Atwater: Media Shape Campaigning," Washington Journalism Review (May 1991): [p. 15].

Troy, Gil. See How They Ran: The Changing Role of the Presidential Candidate. New York: The Free Press, 1991.

Walsh, Kenneth T., Michael Barone, and Matthew Cooper. "The Media Battle," U.S. News and World Report (31 August and 7 September 1992): [pp. 49-51].

Winship, Thomas. "The New Curmudgeon," Editor and Publisher (7 December 1991): [p. 13].

VITA

Carolyn Anderson Castleberry

Born in Denver, Colorado, June 8, 1964. Graduated from Alameda High School in Lakewood, Colorado, in June, 1982. Received a B.S. in Business and a B.S. in Journalism from the University of Colorado in Boulder, Colorado in December, 1986. Currently an M.A. candidate in Government at the College of William and Mary in Williamsburg, Virginia.

The author is currently the five o'clock co-anchor and a reporter with WAVY-TV, an NBC affiliate in Portsmouth, Virginia.