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Behind the United Front: The Effects of Anglo-Powhatan Relations on Settler Conflict and Consensus in Virginia, 1607-1675

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BEHIND THE UNITED FRONT

*The Effects of Anglo-Powhatan Relations on Settler
Conflict and Consensus in Virginia, 1607-1675*

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of History

The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

by


Stephen D. Feeley

2000


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
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the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts


Stephen D. Feeley

Approved, August 2000


James Axtell


John Selby


Kris Lane

For my father whose enthusiasm for a good story helped me begin and my mother whose endurance and patience saw me through to the end.

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Abstract

This study observes the effects changing Indian relations had upon English colonists in Virginia between 1607 and 1675 in hopes of better understanding the trends that later erupted into Bacon's Rebellion.

Authors such as Edmund Morgan have suggested that "resentment of an alien race" could operate to create bonds of unity and cohesion in a fractious society. An examination of seventeenth-century accounts and court records shows that such an affect sometimes did occur. In several cases—the Powhatan uprising of 1644 being the most notable—settlers put aside their differences and found unity in the face of a common Indian threat. This cooperation, however, did not always come easily. Leaders used the threat of Indian attack as a means of coercion, crushing opposition among settlers and enforcing leaders' will upon the colony for their own personal gain. Sometimes Indian relations became a point of contention, driving a divisive wedge between groups of colonists. Dissatisfied settlers could even view Indian society as an alternative to English rule and try to run away—a practice that colonial leaders viewed as an attack on their authority over a united colony.

The key to understanding this confusing array of possibilities seems to be that, although settlers (and especially their leaders) operated upon the belief that the colony ought to have a single, unified Indian policy, in practice, different interest groups viewed the Indians in different ways. The result was a recurring contest to enforce a consistent policy towards the Indians. Unified policies and practices could result—but often at the cost of contention and conflict along the way.

BEHIND THE UNITED FRONT

INTRODUCTION

A United Front?

Captain Newport had never sailed so far up the river that he would soon rename after his king, James. His host, the Indian werowance Arahotec, (a “king” in his own right, according to English accounts) was certainly familiar with European metal and cloth obtained through trade with coastal tribes who flagged down and bartered with passing fishing vessels. But probably not since his youth decades ago when a few unsuccessful Spanish missionaries fled the region had the native ruler had such an opportunity to meet or see a European at such close quarters. For both men the encounter was tense, unfamiliar territory. But even though they had met only a few days before and each was at the head of heavily armed bands of warriors, they were already on good terms. Through gestures “to the Sunne,” signs scratched in the dirt, and drawings on a piece of paper (after the captain had demonstrated the use of the pen), these leaders had announced a “league of fryndship” between their two peoples.

But now, even while the ensuing celebrations were young, the fragile peace threatened to collapse. As the two leaders feasted on roasted deer and nursed mild hangovers from English “hott Drynkes” consumed earlier, word reached them that two of their men were entangled in a shoving match by the river. Captain Newport’s response, born of years of shipboard discipline, was harsh and immediate. The one-armed officer “sent for his own man, bound him to a tree” before Arahatec and, according to a witness, “with a Cudgell soundly beat him.” The thrashing lasted until the werowance, clearly impressed by the display, “stept up and stayed our Captaynes hand.” Later the Indian leader returned the gesture: after “sitting still a while,” Arahatec “spyed his own man that Dyd the injury,” and gathering a posse of “dyvers others,” chased him into the forest. They probably did not go far. Soon the werowance and his men returned holding “cudgells and wandes in their handes . . . as if they had beaten him extreamly.” The English witness who recounted this episode, an aristocrat with his own aspirations to leadership, felt that in beating his own man, Newport had been “misconstruing the matter;” the decisive captain probably considered his actions necessary to prove his authority and prevent a stillborn peace.¹

This 1607 incident calls into question the traditional treatment of Indian policy as merely European attempts at controlling, “civilizing,” and sometimes exterminating Indians. Just as much, Indian policy entailed ordering, punishing, and even executing white settlers. The often ignored corollary to Indian relations was the ways that it forced settlers to act among themselves. Jamestown, the first permanent English colony in the New World, took on a character very different from what it would have been had the settlers somehow landed in a land empty of native

inhabitants. The presence of the Indians forced the English to make a host of decisions. Indirectly, the Indians accounted for the rude forts the settlers hastily erected and hid in, the guns they carried, and the cumbersome chestplates they wore in the hot Virginia summers. Because of the Indians, laws regulated where settlers could travel, with whom they could trade or truck, and even how they buried their dead. Seemingly unrelated agricultural choices such as what crops to plant and how many fields to plow can be traced to the state of Indian affairs. Eventually, what the settlements became depended in part upon what the colonists wanted to be, or appear to be, to the Indians. Yet the answers to such questions of community identity were never simple or readily agreed upon. In early seventeenth-century Virginia, where control was always a problem, regulating such identity became one of the chief issues for authorities. The question of what to do because of the Indians could bind the colonists together or drive them apart.²

Perhaps the best demonstration of the divisive potential of Indian affairs occurred in 1676 when a Virginia militia raised to fight Susquehannock raiders turned around, marched east, and sacked the capital of Jamestown instead. In what came to be known as Bacon's Rebellion, English settlers, rather than attacking Indians, spent the bulk of their efforts spilling each other's blood over who would fight the natives and how. Although the time-frame of this thesis does not encompass that conflict, in many ways this study is a backward-looking attempt to understand the precedents for how such a crisis over the Indians could become a rallying cry for social reform and unleash dissention at every level of society. Other historians, notably Darrett Rutman and William Shea, have already pointed out how Indian tensions made necessary and

lent importance to the militia, the institution that later became a vehicle for violent protest in 1676 and more famously a century later. But although militias may have been the tool that made tension concrete and bloody, by themselves these institutions were not the cause of conflict. Instead, when looking for the motive behind problems of consensus in seventeenth-century Virginia, it often makes sense to look at the divisive effect among the English of a host of “Indian questions” that had no simple answers.³

Yet, at the same time, simply blaming the Indians for internal divisions among the settlers runs counter to the expectation that groups define themselves and gain cohesiveness by recognizing and excluding others based on differences of race, class, gender, or ethnicity. From the colonists’ perspective, the Indians who seemed so alien and recalcitrant towards English “civilization” often played the role of such outsiders. In the face of hostile native opposition to colonial expansion, xenophobic English settlers frequently turned to fellow settlers who shared the same cultural, ethnic, and racial background as natural allies. Thus in 1644, when colonists were beginning to feel the reverberations of civil war in England, a settler wrote that a sudden sneak attack by the Powhatan confederacy eased tensions among the English in Virginia and “did divert a great mischief that was growing among us.” In this instance, it seems that the “Indian question” unified English settlers.⁴

Such contradictions raise the question: Did the presence of the Indians unify or divide seventeenth-century Virginia society? Paradoxically, the answer is that it did both. Political theory draws a distinction between consociational systems, which depend upon the willing consent of the governed, and control regimes, which can

achieve a similar uniformity of outward behavior through coercion and force. Jon Kukla has already argued that a combination of these two schemes helps explain how Virginia achieved a sense of institutional stability and social order, despite the violent dissent and capricious greed described by Bernard Bailyn and Jack Greene as “chaotic factionalism.” This odd amalgam of consociational and coercive politics probably touched nearly all aspects of Virginia life. J Frederick Fausz has suggested that the greatest impact may have been felt in the realm of Indian relations. Images of the Indian as a common threat, refracted and magnified through the distorting lens of racism, often led to instinctive cooperation. Yet, because of the potential danger in Indian relations, settlers also felt that they *had* to cooperate. In the sense that colonists’ lives depended upon working together and that they often had little or no choice in the matter, events might seem closer to coercive politics. Moreover, through opportunities created by interactions such as trade and war, men in government and certain planters and merchants were able to accumulate real power: the ability to enforce their decisions upon unwilling or hesitant settlers. Imposing widespread policies through this power, however, meant overcoming, and on occasion, violently crushing opposition within the colony. Such struggles, which entailed arrests, threats, commercial warfare, and actual bloodshed, bore all the outward signs of a colony divided against itself. Ironically, the colony could be more obviously split while it fought to establish the common terms of behavior that one might define as unity.⁵

Thus, between 1607 and 1675, conflict and consensus regarding the natives operated as parts of a single process. The presence of the Indians created tensions

among colonists. However, the idea that there ought to be solidarity helped shape the form that conflict took. Men exploited and took advantage of each other under the excuse that they were working for the common good. Tensions erupted in the form of accusations that somebody was a traitor to an otherwise presumably cohesive colony. Whereas settlers fought Indians or Dutch invaders hoping to either eliminate or drive them off, when Virginians fought each other over what to do about such threats they primarily sought to force each other into compliance. Everybody felt that the colony should and would act as a single unit; the only real question was, on whose terms?

CHAPTER ONE

Early Patterns

Noblest of men, though tis the fashion now
Noblest to mixe with basest, for their gaine:
Yet doth it fare farre otherwise with you,
That scorne to turn to Chaos so againe . . .
—William Strachey, 1612.

More than half a century before the first group of 104 settlers spied the marshy spit of land that would later become Jamestown, the English jealously eyed the exploits of their Spanish rivals long entrenched in Central and South America, Mexico, the Caribbean, and Florida. Any Englishman who listened to sailors' yarns on the docks of Bristol or London or read traveler's accounts circulating in courts and public houses could enviously repeat reports of New World gold and silver, wealth that could entice eager conquistadors from their Iberian homes into dark Central American jungles, high Andean plateaus, and blazing Mexican deserts. American gold and silver made Spain the richest country in Europe and its fleets the target of every ambitious privateer. Lured by such wealth, bold English captains and adventurers attempted to create their own settlement in Roanoke, "Virginia," as a base for English privateering and exploration between 1584 and 1587. This narrow, sandy

island on the Outer Banks of present-day North Carolina, they hoped, would be the first step towards tapping into the riches of the Western Hemisphere.¹

But the glittering stories coming out of the Americas also had a darker side. Along with tales of gold and glory there had also trickled back grim accounts of bloodshed and tyranny. As early as 1555, translated portions of Peter Martyr's *De Orbo Novo* recounted to English readers tales of Spanish atrocities. These, however, paled in comparison to the blistering literary attack by the Dominican friar Bartolomé de Las Casas on Spanish mistreatment of American Indians which appeared in translation in London in 1583. Peaceful Indians such as the Arawaks on Hispaniola, who had joyfully greeted Columbus with basket loads of fruit, were enslaved and put to the sword. Andean peasants toiled in the silver mines of Potosí to fill the coffers of a king half a world away. Most sinister of all—for the fiercely Protestant English—an entire continent was being forced to embrace “damnable papism.”²

Therefore, in addition to being led by dreams of wealth, the English settlers of Roanoke also hoped to prove their moral and religious superiority to the Spanish in the course of their New World exploits. Rather than enslaving the Indians, the natives would race to embrace English religion and civility and then eagerly guide their new lords to nearby deposits of gold and silver or set them on their way towards a water route to China. But none of this happened. Valuable metals were nowhere to be found. There is no ice-free Northwest Passage. Maybe more important in the long run, even though several favorable images of the Indians emerged from the colony through the writings of Thomas Harriot and the remarkably lifelike and humane paintings of John White, the harsh military bearing of the settlers quickly antagonized

the native hosts and eliminated any chance of peaceful cooperation. Lacking food when one of their ships ran aground, spoiling the contents of its hold, and unwilling to lay down the sword to pick up the shovel and hoe, the military-minded colonists depended on the corn of surrounding Indian villages for survival. Increasingly in such dealings, the settlers resorted to violence. One English colonist later admitted that “Some of our companie towardes the ende of the yeare, showed themselves too fierce, in slaying some of the people, in some towns, upon causes that on our part, might easily enough have bene borne withall.” Such hostilities came to an ugly head when the English discovered a silver chalice missing and burned a nearby native village in reprisal. As the colonists realized to their horror, however, to retaliate the Indians had simply to move away, taking with them their invaluable caches of corn and leaving the English to starve. Without Indian assistance, dependence on a supply line made unreliable by the vicissitudes of war, weather, and finance left the settlers in a precarious if not hopeless position. When much-needed supply ships did not come, the colony and its inhabitants disappeared, swallowed up by the new continent and its people.³

The settlers sailing into the Chesapeake in the spring of 1607 knew all this, therefore they would not be acting upon this new stage entirely without a script. Along with a letter in a sealed box to be opened on arrival that named the colony’s ruling councilors, the men splashing ashore carried sets of orders and instructions from their superiors in England. These directives tried to take into account the lessons of the past. The first, a “Letter of Instruction” from the king, shows how much the mistakes at Roanoke and the moral repugnance towards the Spanish efforts

led English adventurers to cast their scheme in a different light. Rather than exercise brutal tyranny over the natives, the settlers were entreated by the king to hold “just, kind and charitable courses” to all those willing to accept English rule. Moreover, they were instructed to ensure that the “Christian Faith be preached, planted, and used” not only among the colonists, “but also as much at they may, amongst the salvage people.”⁴

Desire for American wealth could be cast in the language of charitable enterprise because of the effects the settlement would presumably have on Indians. Speaking in 1609, when the colony was still in its infancy, the Rev. William Crashaw preached to a London congregation in 1609 that “Out of our humanitie and conscience . . . we will give them . . . 1. *Civilitie* for their bodies, 2. *Christianitie* for their soules. The first to make them *men*: the second *happy men*.” Unlike the unhappy Indians who were forced by the Spanish to adopt Catholic idolatry, “the people of America crye out unto us . . . to come and helpe them,” imagined the famous promoter of English exploration, Richard Hakluyt the younger. With Christianity and civility, discipline made the third part of the trinity. The king, in his instructions, confidently assumed that once converted, the Indians would subject themselves to “such sever paines and punishments as shal be inflicted” by the President and Council of the colony. Eventually, settlers and civilized Indians could live side by side in perfect, well-ordered harmony, together under the authority of the king and his duly appointed councilors.⁵

A different set of instructions, “given by way of Advice” by the London Council, offered a less rosy view of Indian relations. More than the king’s

instructions, the council's advice offers a glimpse of the intended nature of the colony and the considerations that shaped it. A constant theme was defense. As potential enemies, the Indians shared their role with the Spanish, whose jealousy of its corner of the New World was well known. Already Spanish troops had destroyed several French outposts along the Atlantic seaboard. Therefore the settlers were advised to find "a Safe port" far upstream some navigable river so that if attacked by a Spanish fleet, "you shall from both sides of your river where it is Narrowest So beat them with your muskets as they shall never be Able to prevail Against you." Preferably the settlement would be situated on easily defensible high ground, possibly on "some Island that is strong by nature." The final choice of a site on Jamestown peninsula, a virtual island separated from the mainland by high-tides and a swampy creek, followed this second set of instructions, but it was not nearly as far up-stream as the council in London would have liked. Nor did their choice, surrounded as it was by pestilential marshes, heed the Council's advice to avoid "a low and moist place because it will prove unhealthful."⁶

The colonists probably ignored the council's instructions to settle deeper in the interior because of the danger of being cut off by Indians. Whereas the Spanish were a potential threat, the Indians were impossible to ignore. On the first night after landing, while the men were "recreating" ashore, some Chesapeakes crept close "upon all foure . . . like Beares, with their Bowes in their mouthes" and opened fire on the celebrating Englishmen, wounding Captain Gabriel Archer and a sailor named Matthew Morton. Moreover, even though the London Council had advised the settlers to settle far inland to avoid the Spanish, they too recognized the Indian threat.

Taking it for granted that “you cannot carry your Selves so towards them but they will grow discontented with your habitation,” the instructions urged the settlers to “in no Case Suffer any of the natural people of the Country to inhabit between You and the Sea Coast.” The difference was in the emphasis: the London councilors were afraid that discontented tribes might guide and help invading European powers; the settlers were afraid of completely immersing themselves among the potential native enemies at hand. Either way, the imperative was the same: “if You neglect this You neglect Your safety.”⁷

In other matters, consideration of the Indians weighed even more heavily. If followed completely, these injunctions would force the colonists into a mold of behavior designed to give the young settlement an appearance of strength. Outnumbered, the English knew that in any conflict they would depend on the superior fire power of their matchlock muskets, “which [the natives] only fear.” The Council recommended several rules to preserve and emphasize that advantage. Indians were not to be allowed to obtain guns under any circumstances. Even on long, wearisome marches, the soldiers could “never trust the Country people with the Carriage of their Weapons” for fear that fleet-footed and sticky-fingered Indians might “Run from You with Your Shott.” To enhance the natives’ awe and fear of the musket’s killing power, the leaders could let only those settlers “Chosen out of your best Markesmen” shoot in front of the Indians. Otherwise, “if they see Your Learners miss what they aim at they will think the Weapon not so terrible and will be [boldened] to Assailt You.”⁸

In addition to emphasizing their military firepower, the London Council's instructions and advice urged the colonists to hide their weaknesses. All deaths and sicknesses on the part of the colonists were to be carefully concealed. Assuming that all natives considered Europeans to be gods, the London Council hoped that by hiding their sick and dead, the settlers could prevent the Indians from realizing the settlers were "but Common men." More realistically, the writers of the instructions understood that if the Indian population was large and knew how few settlers there actually were, the natives could overwhelm the meager outpost with numbers alone—regardless of muskets.⁹

Such behavior could create only a mask of strength. Inevitably at first there would be weakness. From the failed Roanoke enterprise planners had learned that the young settlement probably could not survive without the help of at least some of the nearby Indians. "Not being Sure how your own seed Corn will prosper the first Year," the settlers were instructed to "imploy Some few of your Company to trade with them for Corn and Other lasting Victuals." Accompanying this realization was the almost neurotic fear that the Indians would abandon the settlers. "You must have Great Care not to Offend the naturals if you Can Eschew it," cautioned the Council. Perhaps they remembered an incident at Roanoke when a local tribe sent the settlers on a wild-goose chase in pursuit of nonexistent precious metals deep into the interior where they risked getting lost or destroyed by other tribes. The settlers going to Jamestown were to take precautions against a repeat performance: "Your Discoverers that passes Over Land with hired Guides must Look well to them that they Slip not from them." For a settler unfamiliar with the land the danger was real: in "that

Country having no way nor path . . . if Your Guides Run from You in the Great Woods or Deserts you Shall hardly Ever find a Passage back.” As an extra precaution, exploring Englishmen were enjoined to carry a compass and to constantly jot down their route.¹⁰

With such dangers in mind, shortly after landing on the peninsula where the future colony would be, the newly arrived settlers set about building a fort—but not soon enough. Before their defensive works amounted to more than “the boughs of trees cast together in the forme of a halfe moone,” another band of Indians attacked, mounting a “very furious Assault” for about an hour until fire from the ships anchored in a deep-water just off-shore drove them off. Eleven men were wounded (one mortally), and a boy killed. Yet one of the witnesses—perhaps remembering the London Council’s advice to conceal injuries—added in his account sent home that the Indian attackers “perceived not this Hurt in us.” Afterwards the men redoubled their efforts and by the middle of the next month completed the fort. The final structure was “triangle wise, having three Bulwarkes at every corner like a halfe Moone, and foure or five pieces of Artillerie mounted in them.” Improving these fortifications and building new ones as the settlement expanded became a frequent occupation in the following years.¹¹

These early works did not go uninterrupted. Before the fort was completed, three Indians (probably Paspaheghs) sneaked into camp, hid “themselves in the longe grasse” and shot an Englishman who went out to “doe naturall necessity.” It would not be the last time that the English were caught with their pants down. Another day, “some twenty appeared;” they “shott Dyvers Arrowes at randome which fell short” of

the yet unfinished fort, and then ran away. The fear of such ambushes made accomplishing daily tasks difficult and strained the manpower of the young colony. Settlers hoping to survive lived constantly on edge; less careful stragglers were often hurt or killed. Captain John Smith, the historian and briefly the leader of the settlement, later complained, “what toile we had, with so smal a power to guard our workmen adaies [at days], watch al nigh, resist our enimies and effect our businesse.”¹²

The settlers, however, were at war neither all the time nor with all the Indians. Even as some bands took pot-shots at settlers working around the fort, others appeared who “certified us who were our frendes, and who foes.” Afterwards they counseled the settlers to cut down the long weeds around the fort to prevent future depredations. Other tribes met them during explorations further inland (including those in the encounter between Captain Newport and Arahatec) and were similarly befriended.¹³

The London Council had been right in predicting that the early settlement would depend on Indian corn for survival. By the end of the first summer, supplies had dwindled to “but a small Can of Barlie sod in water to five men a day.” With famine came malnutrition and increased susceptibility to disease; the colony threatened to waste away. Starved shells of men moved slowly among the bare buildings or wearily manned the bulwarks; others lay in heaps, “groaning in every corner of the fort.” In the morning, bodies of the dead were dragged “out of the Cabines like Dogges to be buried.” Although Edward Wingfield, the first colony president, claimed to have “hid this our weakenes carefully from the salvages,” other

reports make clear that the natives were aware of the settlers' plight. Out of pity or desire to trade for iron tools, copper pots, and glass beads, Indians eventually saved the colony from disappearing altogether by bringing "Bread, Corne, Fish, and Flesh in great plentie." Soon a steady trade developed.¹⁴

Planners of the colony had imagined that this reliance on the Indians would last only until the settlers could sow and harvest their own first crop. However, in the following years, the settlers waged a constant struggle to get Indian corn. In return for English goods, corn became the chief currency of the Indian trade. When they could not barter for it, the colonists went to war for it, attacking villages, burning houses, and filling the holds of their small boats with the precious grain. When they could do neither, they starved. John Smith summed up the irony of men coming to America hoping to get rich and instead scrounging for corn: "Men maie think it strange there should be this stir for a little corne, but had it been gold, with more ease we might have got it; & had it wanted, the whole colony had starved."¹⁵

Gradually, in dealings with the Indians for food the leaders of the colony began to put their trust in Smith. The young mercenary's experience in numerous European wars and his knack for bold bluffs suited him for the task. His brief captivity among the Pamunkeys early on increased his knowledge of a local Algonquian language and gave him an acquaintance with Powhatan and his brother Opechancanough, the most powerful Indian rulers in the area. In his own descriptions of the first year, Smith stated that he was appointed to "the managing of all things abroad." When the "Salvages brought such plentie of bread, fish, turkies, squirrels, deare, & other wild beasts" to Jamestown to trade, he acted as the liaison between the

two peoples and set prices almost like a “market clerke.” Even his political enemy President Wingfield later confirmed that “Master Smyth especially traded up and downe the River with the Indyans for Corn, which releved the Collony well.”¹⁶

By committing Smith to dealing with “things abroad,” the president and the councilors in Virginia (who were the leaders in colonial Virginia, as opposed to the London Council) probably hoped to keep the troublesome soldier at arm’s length. On the voyage from England, they even put him in shackles briefly for his disrespectful behavior. In his dealings with the Indians, however, Smith proved just as irksome. He disputed with Captain Newport about how many goods to trade for corn. Whereas Newport hoped to establish friendly relations through conspicuous displays of generosity, Smith preferred hard dealing. In his own accounts (penned in the third person), Smith reported that Newport sought “to please the humor of the unsatiabie Salvage; Smith to cause the Salvage to please him.” Moreover, Smith refused to follow the colony’s injunctions not to anger the Indians. Rather, he was willing to “try such conclusions as necessitie inforced, though contrary to his Commission.” At any “first meeting” with a band of Indians, Smith made it his habit “to demaunde their bowes and arrowes swords mantles or furies, with some childe for hostage.” When the Indians became “insolent,” demanding guns and swords in the place of trinkets, the president and council “would rather be anything than peace breakers.” The colonial leaders felt it imperative to obey the “command from England . . . not to offend them [the Indians].” Smith, flying in the face of authority, “without farther deliberation” hunted Indians “up and down the Ile,” terrifying them with “whipping,

beating and imprisonment.” Although angered, the authorities could not stop him. Adding to the insult, his tactics seem to have worked.¹⁷

Rather than relegating Smith out of important affairs, the settlement’s leaders learned that, with the natives’ corn as valuable as gold, relations with the Indians were the key to power within the colony. Whomever the natives dealt with controlled access to the only dependable source of food, not to mention the prestige and influence that came with brokering between the two strongest military powers in the region. Smith records that the “President and Council so envied his estimation amongst the Salvages” that they offered greater prices to the Indians hoping to bolster the appearance of “their greatnesse and authority.” When the councilors began intriguing among themselves amid accusations of hoarding and stealing food (including “a Chickyn” and a “spoonfull of beere”), Smith emerged as the new leader of the colony. Throughout his presidency and during the confusion before, Smith depended upon his relations with the Indians to assert his authority over the settlers. Through the natives, Smith could bring food. Conversely, Smith constantly tried to give the impression that without him, the settlers would have been destroyed by the Indians. George Percy even accused Smith of directly using Indians to enforce his will on the colony. When “a greate devisyon” left Smith “perceiving bothe his authority and person neglected,” he invited the Indians to attack the offending party, “reporteinge unto them [the Indians] thatt our men had noe more powder lefte them then wolde serve for one volley of shott.” Smith’s own accounts mention the dispute but say nothing of this tactic.¹⁸

Smith imposed his own style of military discipline upon the formerly disorganized colony, reordering the settlers' lives. Although some of the settlers were veterans of wars in Ireland and the Netherlands, others had "tender educations and small experience in martiall accidents." During the first attack on the fort, many settlers were next-to-useless, "not knowing what to doe, nor how to use a Piece." After that debacle, Smith spent "six or seven daies . . . only in trayning our men to march, fight, and skirmish in the woods." After being made president, Smith set the settlers to work upon the fort, renewed the watch, and formed the company into squadrons. The settlement began to take on the appearance of a military camp. Once a week, the entire company exercised and practiced on the level field just outside the fort's west bulwark, partly for their own practice, partly to impress upon the Indians the settlers' power. Training became a spectacle of English firepower where "sometimes more than an hundred Salvages would stand in an amazement to behold, how a fyle [of gunmen] would batter a tree."¹⁹

Not forgetting the source of his own influence, Smith maintained careful control over all trade with the Indians. A little-known incident reveals how illicit contact was a threat to his authority in the colony. When Powhatan requested some settlers to build him an English-style house, Smith, "unwilling to neglect any opportunitie" sent three Dutchmen (who had probably been sent by the Virginia Company as glassmakers) and two Englishmen to spy on the aging chief. But the Dutchmen soon began acting like double-agents and, with the help of six or seven more "expert theeves" who joined their secret "confederacie," they smuggled "a great many swords, pikeheads, peeces, shot, powder," and hatchets back to the delighted

chief. Perhaps cultural enmity had arisen between these foreigners and the English settlers; perhaps they simply thought they had better chances of surviving or getting rich with Powhatan. Smith later suspected that they acted in return for the promise that they should be free of his control and “live with Powhatan as . . . [their] chiefe . . . free from those miseries that would happen [to] the Colony.” The treachery nearly went undiscovered. When the two Englishmen helping to build Powhatan’s house realized what was happening and attempted to escape to warn the colony, they were captured and “expected ever to be put to death.” Only gradually did Smith and the other settlers discover that equipment was missing. But even though they “could find the defect,” they “could not finde by whom.”²⁰

Meanwhile, two of the Dutchmen, Adam and Francis, instructed the Indians how to use their newly acquired guns. With Powhatan’s help, they promised, they “would not only distroy our Hoggs, fire our towne,” and capture the colony’s boat, but would also “bring to his service and subjection the most of our company.” Already, they claimed, many of the settlers were “agreed to their Devilish practice.” Without even knowing it, Smith faced the threat of a small civil war with Indian relations at the heart of the matter. The Dutchmen served as the point of contact, able to convey trade goods and negotiate promises of military support between Powhatan and a small group of malcontents; they bucked colonial authority by circumventing it. Smith had risen to power through similar dealings with the Indians; he risked losing everything the same way.²¹

Before this could happen, the unnamed third Dutchman was caught “disguised like a Salvage” lurking near the glassworks outside Jamestown. With the conspiracy

revealed, there began a long confused period of threats and violence between the Powhatans and the English over the fate of Adam and Francis. The English took Indians hostage and burned their houses; Powhatan complained that the Dutchmen were unwilling to return and that, even if wanted, the “stout” traitors could not be lugged fifty miles to the Jamestown on his men’s backs. Smith sent a Swiss craftsman with pardons to regain them, but the envoy switched sides. Two of the Dutchmen’s compatriots double-crossed *their* allies and promised to walk the rebels into an ambush. A different pair of angry gentlemen swore to cut the troublemakers’ throats “before the face of Powhatan,” only to fall into bickering when they got there. Confusion reigned.²²

Eventually, Powhatan, sensing that things were out of control, tried to wash his hands of the entire matter. He sent messengers “to signify that it was not his fault to detain them, nor hinder [Smith’s] men from executing his command: nor did he, nor would he maintain them or any, to occasion his displeasure.” The situation was brought further under control when supplies purchased from a passing fishing vessel relieved some of the tension among the settlers. Francis and Adam stayed with Powhatan for a time hiding from the punishment that surely awaited them, but eventually lost their favor and were probably killed by the chief.²³

In 1609, Smith was wounded in a gunpowder explosion and decided to return to England. Even before the accident, however, the colony investors in London had already decided upon a new government. Many of the reforms instituted under this second charter reflected the changes made by Smith. Rather than a civil government headed by a president elected by counselors in Virginia—a practice which Smith’s

virtual dictatorship had turned into a charade—the colony would be led by an appointed military governor. These new leaders were hand-picked, hardened officers from wars in Ireland and the Netherlands. Under the new orders and instructions, these governors were to make many of the *ad hoc* military practices Smith had started—watches, armed raids, and weapons practice—into a formal regimen. The Virginia company officials did their best to recruit the next supply of settlers from impoverished veterans who were familiar with such a routine. Any other men who came to Virginia using their own money were to come equipped with “sufficient . . . armour, weapons, ordinance, munition, powder, shot, victuals, and such marchandizes or wares as are esteemed by the wild people of those parts.” This time, the company thought, they would be ready.²⁴

Because of delays, storms, and a shipwreck, however, there was a several-month interim before the arrival of the first of the new governors and the departure of Smith. Without effective leaders, order broke down completely. The teetering balance of skirmishes, trading, bluffs, hostages, and barely suppressed antagonism that Smith had somehow maintained dissolved into an all-consuming war. The winter of 1609-1610 became the hellish period known as the “starving time.” Unable to forage for food in forests and fields controlled by their foes and unwilling to trade with the Indians (who were probably ready to let them starve), hunger reduced men to eating their animals and then each other. Corpses were dug out of graves to be eaten and men licked up the blood which “hath fallen from their weake fellows.” One man reportedly “murdered his wyfe Ripped the childe outt of her woambe and threw itt

into the River and after chopped the Mother in pieces and salted her for his foode.”

Battles with the Indians reached new heights of violence and atrocity.²⁵

When replacement governors finally arrived and discovered the state of the colony, they instituted a series of strict reforms that combined the suggestions from London contained in the second charter with the violent tenor of affairs with the Indians. This transformation of Virginia into a paramilitary colony culminated in 1611 with the issuing of the *Lawes, Divine, Morall, and Martiall*, which were mostly martial. The colony experienced nothing like it before or afterwards. Under this regime all the settlers were transformed into laboring soldiers subject to military discipline. The colonists, who were “not only to exercise the duty of a Souldier, but of the husbandman,” were forced to “learne the severall sounds of the Drumme, whereby hee may obey that which he is commanded.” Military hierarchy superseded English class structure: “All Captaines shall command all Gentlemen and Common Souldiers in their Companies.” The laws even regulated matters ranging from the height of one’s bed (one yard) to the disposal of wash-water (at least forty feet outside the palisade).²⁶

In practice, all of the colonists had to become trained troops. They learned to look the part: every gunman was to be “furnished with a quilted coate of Canvas, a headpeece, and a sword, or else with a light Armor, and Bases quilted.” Whenever a company’s rotation on guard duty came around, they were made to wear full armor to become accustomed to its weight, “least in the field, the souldier do finde them the more uncouth strange and troublesome.” Every soldier-settler learned “to handle his peece, first to present it comely, and souldier like, and then give fire, by false firing”

and then snap to attention with “his peece to the right side with the nose up.” While coming on and off guard duty, companies had shooting contests so “that every one may thereby emulously contend to do best.”²⁷

As the settlers’ numbers increased in the early 1610s, they expanded inland, building fortifications every step of the way. Settlements at Henrico, Coxendale, Rochdale, and Bermuda Hundred were built on river peninsulas which the settlers could fortify from the mainland by building wooden barriers and tall palisades. According to the *Laws*, every time the gates were opened, the captain of the watch sent out his sergeants to check against “ambushes or attempts of the enemy.” Then scouts checked further afield for signs of Indians. Finally, only after all was deemed safe, those desiring to enter or leave the town passed through in a single file so that “they may be better discerned by the guard.” The governors considered such precautions necessary in a land where “the devil and all the gates of hell [are] against us.”²⁸

Just as the governors ordered the building of palisades and the checking of gates, the laws they passed attempted to legislate a fortress mentality. All contact with the Indians was kept to a minimum. No settlers, even gentlemen, could “barter, trucke, or trade with the Indians” unless “appointed by the lawful authority upon paine of death.” Similarly, to hamper covert trading, anyone losing or selling his gun “or any part thereof” could suffer capital punishment. Settlers had to keep all “edge toole[s]” such as hoes, knives, and hatchets in the company storehouse, from which they could check them out for use. Indians who did come to trade were carefully escorted at all times. Any who ventured into the settlements entered at their own risk.

Suspecting that the “dyvrs Indyans [that] used to come to our foarte att James Towne bringeinge victewalls [victuals] with them Butt inded did Rather come as Spyes,” Governor Thomas Gates ordered “some of them . . . to be Apprehended and executed for A Terrour to the Reste.” Guards kept a vigilant lookout to see that settlers without permission from the governor did not even speak to such visiting Indians.²⁹

As in Smith’s day, the governors saw running away to the Indians as an act of treasonous rebellion. The punishment for nearly every major crime in Virginia during that period was death, but in the case of runaways the execution was exceptionally long and painful. A settler reported that Governor Thomas Dale, upon recapturing some runaways from the Indians,

in A moste sever mannor cawsed [them] to be executed. Some he apointed to be hanged Some burned Some to be broken upon wheles, others to be staked and others to be shott to deathe all these extreme and crewell tortures he used and inflicted upon them to terrefy the reste for Attemptinge the Lyke³⁰

Torture represented a new level of fear and anger directed towards runaways. Even in the case of the Dutch-led renegades who caused Smith so much grief, he had offered pardons to men willing to return. Moreover, in previous times, settlers were occasionally “billeted” among the Indians in times of extreme famine. Under the military regime, even soldiers recaptured from enemy Indians had to prove that they had been prevented from escaping to avoid punishment. Otherwise they were guilty of treachery by default.³¹

The government considered runaways a threat to their policies with the Indians. By stepping outside the reach of English law, they endangered the very idea

that the English were a single polity capable of dealing with the Indians as a unified, collective body. When they fled to the Indians, runaways might take goods, especially iron tools, guns, shot, and powder, that were restricted under regulated trading. Along with black market traders, who risked equally harsh punishments, they destroyed the Virginia Company's official monopoly on trade. Competition raised prices. Illicit contact with the Indians also threatened to destroy English technological superiority. Trades such "as Smythey, [or] Carpentry" that were prohibited in the second charter from being "taught the Savages or used in their Presence" could be learned from renegades. More dangerous was the alternative that the Indians presented to strict colonial law. Life with the Indians could seem relaxed and carefree to men whose lives with the English were ordered by the beating of a drum and enforced by the lash of the whip. The prisoners whom Governor Dale executed so savagely were said to have run away because they were "Idile and not willeinge to take paynes" in their labors.³²

However, not all of the colonial authorities' efforts were directed at preventing collusion between settlers and the Indians. In a period when peace and war alternated so quickly, unrestricted violence on the part of individual settlers threatened the collective position of the English as much as illicit trading and runaways. Anyone whose actions were found to have been the cause of a "breach of their league and friendship" without a "commission so to doe from him that hath authoritie for the same" risked execution. Similarly, soldiers could not ransack or "set fire to any Indian dwelling house . . . or temple" without the "commandement of the chiefe officers."³³

Sometimes, however, when the air was filled with the smoke of burning cornfields and bloodlust ran high, the settlers' emotions threatened to spill over and put them at odds with their leaders. In August 1610, a war party led by Captain George Percy returned from sacking the village of the Paspheghs. As soon as they had boarded their boats, his "sowldiers did begin to murmur" because he had spared the life of the Pasphegh queen and her children, holding them captive instead. Mutiny threatened. After a speedy council, Percy and his officers bowed to the pressure. "Itt was Agreed upon to putt the Children to deathe the wich was effected by Throweing them overboard and shoteinge owtt their Braynes in the water." The implicit compromise was almost not enough: "for all this Crewelty the Sowdiers weare nott well pleased," Percy reported, "I had mutche to doe To save the quenes lyfe for thatt Tyme." Later to prevent her from being cruelly burned at the stake, the war-weary soldier had her taken ashore and speedily dispatched with a sword.³⁴

In 1614, this period of warfare came to an abrupt halt when Pocahontas, the daughter of Powhatan and a hostage in Jamestown, married John Rolfe. For both sides the marriage was a face-saving way of avoiding a final, mutually destructive confrontation between the closely matched Pamunkey warriors and the English soldier-settlers.³⁵ "Ever since," reported a settler, "we have had friendly commerce and trade not only with Powhatan himselve, but also with his subjects round about us." Even the Chickahominies, "a lustie and daring people who have long time lived free from Powhatan's subjection," soon afterwards made treaties with the colony. Freed from fear of Indians and lured by the desire to plant tobacco, which became extremely profitable with the introduction of sweeter Caribbean strains, settlers began

to come out of their forts. In 1616 John Rolfe, returning to England, reported to the king that since the peace, “our people yearley plant and reape quietly, and travell in the woods a fowling and a hunting as freely and securely from feare of danger or treachorie as in England.” Fearing that the colony would less easily be governed and defended, the Virginia Company instructed Governor Yeardley in 1618 to ordain “that no particular plantation be or shall be placed straglingly in divers places.” However, large numbers of settlers, under relaxed rules allowing them for the first time to privately acquire their own farms, took little heed and planted far from the forts.³⁶

The “fortress mentality” gradually gave way to less guarded caution. Shortly after the peace, Ralph Hamor mentioned that the earlier “severe and strict” laws necessary to prevent the “utter subversion and ruine of the Colony” were “now much mitigated.” For several years, the harsh laws remained on the books but were enforced with less vigor and violence. In 1617, a settler named George White, who “deserved death according to the express articles and laws of this Colony” for “runing away to the Indians with his arms and ammunition,” was pardoned. Similarly, another colonist received a pardon for “Stealing a Calf & running to the Indians.” Even though a 1618 law continued the tradition of restricting trade with “perfidious Savages . . . lest they discover our weekness,” within another year new legislation made it “free for every man to trade with the Indians.” The exception was servants who, as potentially the most rebellious segment of colonial society, continued to be prohibited from private trading “upon paine of whipping.” The punishment for settlers who “purposely goe to any Indian townes, habitations or places or resortes

without leave from the Governor,” formerly a capital offense, was reduced to a forty shilling fine. Of the laws concerned with Indian relations, only selling or giving arms to the Indians still carried the death penalty—but by speedy hanging rather than torture.³⁷

Not only did settlers leave the forts, Indians began to enter them. As both sides began to relax their guards, natives and settlers mingled on a much more familiar level. In 1617, Powhatan, by then an old man, went “from place to place visiting his Country taking his pleasure in good friendship with us.” Not wanting to give up all semblance of control over the colony’s defense, the leaders of the colony were faced with the dilemma of how to react to the “better disposed of the Indians” who “live and labour” among the settlers. Such natives frequently found employment “in killing of Deere, fishing, beating of Corne and other workes.” Virginia’s general assembly finally decided “neither to utterly reject them nor yet to drawe them in.” Although “five or six” could be admitted to “places well peopled” such as plantations, large farms, and towns, “lone inhabitants” were “by no meanes to entertain them.”³⁸

Religion was another potential source of increased interaction between English and Indians. Hoping to “lay a surer foundation of the conversion of the Indians to Christian Religion,” every “town, citty, Borrough, and particular plantation” was recommended to adopt and educate a “certine number of the natives’ children.” Finding that Indian parents were unwilling to part with their children, entire families were invited. Governor Yeardley hoped that the plan would give “the opportunity to Instruct their Children” while native parents learned the graces of English-style work. By 1619, the Virginia Company with the help of parish

donations set aside £1,500 and more than ten thousand acres to create a mission college near the falls at Henrico. Even though all these plans went awry, they demonstrated a willingness on the part of the government to accept Indians—at least those willing to convert—into colonial society virtually unseen since the first days of settlement.³⁹

But freedom to meet, trade with, and host Indians did not translate into a complete withdrawal of the colonial government from regulating contacts. As before, heads of the colony drew much of their power from their ability to speak as the uncontested voice of the settlers in Indian relations. Sometimes other voices had to be silenced. On August 4, 1619, Captain Henry Spelman stood before the General Assembly because things he had said threatened the governor's power. Already that morning, the assembly's clerk had noted the "extream heat . . . later to ensue" that humid Virginia summer day—enough to cause the "alteration of the healthes of diverse of the general Assembly." By afternoon, sweat shone on everyone's face as the charges were read aloud. A interpreter claimed to have overheard Spelman speak "very unreverently and maliciously against the present Governor" in a meeting with Opechancanough (the brother of Powhatan and eventual successor to power after that chief's death). Although denying "the moste parte," Spelman confessed that he had told the chief that "within a yeare there would come a Governor greater then this that nowe is in place." This rumor, claimed the assembly, "alienated the minde" of Opechancanough from the present government. Spelman's words brought the governor's authority "in much disesteem, both with Opechancanough and the Indians,

and the whole Colony in danger of their slippery designs.” There was no predicting what “mischiefs might ensue from the Indians.”⁴⁰ Amid calls for “several and sharpe punishments” from “diverse of the Assembly” and muttered curses on Spelman’s part, it was finally decided to demote the captain to the post of interpreter for seven years. The clerk clearly wondered whether excessive pity had been granted in a case where the court might “perhaps both speedily and deservedly have taken his life from him.”⁴¹

* * * *

During colonial Virginia’s first fifteen years, the Indians and the English became acquainted with new notions of power. The two groups each offered possibilities to the other. From the settlers, natives hoped to gain trade goods, weapons, and new technology. The colonists, for their part, sought food, furs, land, and sometimes sanctuary from English law. Only culturally erected boundaries prevented the free flow of these “commodities” between the two groups living so close to each other. Colonial authorities constantly sought to negotiate, create, and control these barriers; at the points where they could be crossed—trade, war, and conversion—English leaders stood careful guard. By his own admission John Smith rose to power by acting as the “market clerke” in dealings with the Indians; in a more general way, all the colonial leaders tried to act as brokers with the natives. They recognized that power stemmed less from what was said at the cultural negotiating table than from who managed to sit there. Runaways and illegal traders risked severe punishment precisely because they circumvented regulated avenues of contact.

Through them, food, weapons, and chances at freedom from English control could pass back and forth hidden from the vigilant eyes of colonial authorities. In addition to the obvious danger of aiding and arming a potential enemy, such actions threatened the claims that brought the Indians to deal with the English leaders in the first place, namely their supposed ability to speak for *all* the settlers. Captain Newport's "league of fryndship" with Arahatec's people meant nothing unless the explorer could enforce it upon his men. Conversely, twelve years later, the "honour and dignity" of Governor Yeardley's "place and person" was "disesteemed" in the eyes of Opechancanough when Captain Spelman hinted at the arrival of a new head of the colony.

This struggle to stand at the head of an obedient, unified colony in the face of the Indians had profound ramifications for daily life in the settlements. Simultaneously, the state of affairs with the Indians affected the ability to elicit obedience. From the beginning, the leaders drew their men onto defensible river peninsulas and fortified themselves from the mainland. Dependent on Indian corn, the authorities in times of peace controlled trade of it; in times of war they led raids for it. Colonial leaders organized the character of the settlement under martial law for defense. Later, when war subsided, they exercised less strict control but still claimed and were willing to defend their prerogative. By 1622, some leaders were even beginning to believe that they could incorporate and extend their control over the Indians. As they were about to find out, the Powhatans had other plans.

CHAPTER TWO

Lessons Learned and Repeated

On Friday, March 22, 1622 the Jamestown settlement narrowly escaped destruction. Before sunrise, at a plantation on the other side of the James River, a Christian Indian employed as a hunter and “used . . . as a Sonne” by a settler named Richard Pace had shaken the startled Englishman out of bed to warn him: the Powhatans and their allies were going to attack. Not only had the Indian’s own brother urged him to kill his employer, but “commanded by their King,” Indians throughout the Virginia settlements were planning to rise against the colonists. “By such an hour in the morning a number [of Indians] would come from divers places to finish the Execution” and wipe out the colony completely. There was not much time. After quickly securing his own house, Pace had set off in his boat to row three miles through the predawn darkness to Jamestown to alert the settlers there and to spread the word to “such other Plantations as was possible for timely intelligence to be given.” A few hours later, when the attack came, the Powhatans found these colonists

of Jamestown “standing upon . . . Guard,” with cannons ready. Not expecting to find the settlers so prepared, the Indians hastily retreated “at the sight of a Peece.”¹

Most colonists, however, were not so fortunate. Those in outlying plantations received no such warning; nor did they have any reason to suspect the coming conflagration. Ever since the introduction of tobacco nine or ten years earlier, planters had been expanding their settlements farther up the James River. Having settled as far as the falls, this growth encroached on about half of the Powhatan chiefdom’s core area. Moreover, increased contact with English clergymen taught the Indians to distrust the settlers’ cultural intolerance. Nonetheless, the Powhatans carefully bided their time and masked these frustrations, leading many Virginians mistakenly to consider the period leading up to the attack as a golden age of Powhatan-English relations. The previous year, when Sir Francis Wyatt arrived in Virginia as governor, he found “the Countrey . . . in a very great amytie and confidence with the natives.” Symbolizing the supposed permanence of the peace, a copy of a late treaty was “stamped in Brasse, and fixed to one of . . . [the Pamunkey village’s] Oakes.” Opechancanough, the Pamunkey leader and successor to Powhatan, told the inexperienced governor that “he held the peace so firme, as the Skie should sooner fall than it dissolve.” In this era of supposed goodwill, loosened restrictions allowed frequent trade between the settlers and nearby Indians to develop.²

Therefore, on March 22, when bands of Indians arrived at scattered English homes and plantation communities carrying “presents of Deer, Turkies, Fish, and fruits,” the settlers, “lull’d into a fatal security,” let the natives “come freely among them, eating with them.” Then, at the appointed hour, the guests turned on their

hosts, leaping upon them with hidden knives, hatchets, or whatever tools were at hand. Along seventy miles of both sides of the James River and parts of the York River, small groups of Indians and settlers in isolated homes and secluded communities fought small, desperate battles for their lives, unaware that distant neighbors, engaged in their own struggles, could not help. Wherever victorious, the Indians killed all, “sparing neither Age nor Sex, but destroying Man, Woman and Child, according to their Cruel way of leaving none behind to bear Resentment.”³

By the end of the day’s fighting the Indians had killed about 350 colonists, more than a quarter of the English population. The colony’s iron works at Falling Creek, once the financial hope of the company, lay abandoned, the tools hurriedly thrown in the river and its workers all dead except two small children who had hidden themselves during the melee. A captain landing at another plantation after the attack “to search if anny of the people might have lyen wounded whome he might have saved and recovered” found among the smoldering houses little more than a few chickens, a sow, a dying calf, and some “old Chestes and barrells [strewn] about the field.” Temporarily, during the immediate aftermath, outlying homes and fields were abandoned as survivors fled east towards more secure settlements such as Kecoughtan, located deep in English-controlled territory.⁴

The death and destruction set back the Virginia colony’s progress by almost a decade. Yet even within a few days of the massacre, optimistic colonists wrote that although “treachery and cruelty have done their worst . . . this must needs to be for the good of the Plantation after.” In the long run, the biggest winners during the ensuing decade of war were a cadre of new councilors and captains who pursued the conflict

to their own benefit. Many of these leaders were relative newcomers to authority who previously had been either absent from the colony or excluded from power. As late as May 1623, the governor complained that there “sittes scarce one able and experienced Councilor.” Six of the colony’s former councilors had been slain in the uprising; many of the other leading men had either recently died of different causes or returned to England. Filling this vacuum, a new group of leaders rose in Virginia society. Rather than hailing from the ranks of the English elite, as most of the first generation of leaders had (with the notable exception of John Smith), several of the new men were like Lieutenant William Pierce who, it was said, displayed “a Capacitie . . . not to bee expected in a man of his breedinge.” Historians have often attributed the subsequent meteoric rise of these new leaders to their ability to wring material gain from the wilderness. More important was their success in twisting the resources and people of the colony to their own ends largely through their prosecution of the Indian war.⁵

The attack actually bolstered the authority of the government and helped unify the colony by bringing the settlers within easier reach. Before the uprising, planters looking for places to grow tobacco had set up plantations placed “scatteringly and straglingly as a choyce veyne of rich ground invited them, and the further from neighbors the better.” This quest for new tobacco fields that had drawn settlers deeper into Powhatan territory had also lured them far from the centers of English authority to “live like Libertines out of the eye of the Magistrate.” “How is it possible,” complained George Sandys, the treasurer of the colony “to governe a

people so dispersed . . . how can they repair to divine service . . . how can wee raise soldiers . . . or workemen for publique imploiments?”⁶

The ensuing war against the Powhatan alliance reined in these far-flung settlers, forcing them to quit many plantations to “unite more neerely together in fewer places the better for to Strengthen and Defende.” Settlers fleeing destruction congregated at James City and its surrounding plantations, Kecoughtan, Newport News, Southampton Hundred, Flowerdew Hundred, Shirley Hundred, and “a plantacione of Mr. Samuel Jourdes.” Even “these are more then wee would willingly have held,” reported the Council, “but that it was ympossible to retire from soe many dispersed and straglinge Plantacions, and bringe of soe much People, Goods, provisions, and Cattle to any one place.” Councilors hoped that by means of this retreat the settlers “might have been better governed and have added to their lyves both Comfort and securitie.” Thus, ironically, this terror-inspired exodus of people from their homes was seen by many members of the council as a “benefit . . . whereby the people might . . . [be] better governed.”⁷

Having left their homes, retreating settlers found themselves, for the “safe guarding of the people and their goodes,” carefully chaperoned by individual councilors enjoying extensive new war-time powers. Reminiscent of the days of John Smith, the leaders of these refuge camps acted like warlords, ascending to and holding power by feeding, protecting, and leading into battle the ragged bands of refugee-settlers. In return, the settlers’ “labors now for the most part redound to the Lords of those Lands.” Although theoretically each commander was to “observe such . . . commandes and instructions as he shall receive” from the governor, in practice,

isolation allowed them to rule with virtual autonomy. Commissions granted shortly after the uprising gave the commanders of the fortified plantations and towns “absolute power and Command in all matters of warr over all the people” in their respective domains. In a period of emergency where nearly every daily activity could fall under the rubric of public safety, this charge gave them a powerful mandate. In effect, each fortified settlement became a private chiefdom where a leader’s word was enforced “uppon paine of death.”⁸

In addition to creating an opportunity to gain tremendous personal power, the situation allowed the commanders to enrich themselves at the expense of the settlers in their charge. After the initial attack, famine probably killed more settlers than the Indians had. Most of the colony’s grain was either destroyed by marauding natives or abandoned by fleeing settlers. Even those fields that escaped destruction could not be harvested before autumn, and until then the tall green stalks of corn provided excellent cover for Indians, making farming a deadly chore. During this food crisis, the warlord councilors cornered the market. Already during the winter before the uprising, a shortage of corn that had driven prices up to as high as ten or fifteen shillings a bushel made trade with the Indians extremely lucrative. Even then, there were complaints that the men with the necessary boats and money, “onely haveing the means in these extremities to Trade for Corne with the Natives[,] doe hereby engrosse all into their hands and soe sell itt abroad att their own prizes.” Prices crept even higher after the attack, reaching twenty shillings “for a bushell of Indian Corne and none to be had but with great men.”⁹

During the 1620s, many of these same leading men or their business allies, through exclusive commissions, had their monopolies officially confirmed. The commission of Ralph Hamor, typical of the period, mentioned that “it was thought fitt . . . to restraine all perticuler trade for Corne, within the Bay, and to aproprate that trade, only for the publique benefitt of the Colony.” Hamor was granted “full power and absolute Command . . . to trade in any River or Rivers within the Bay.” Only several months before the commission, George Sandys had observed that “Captain Hamor is miserablie poore.” Yet even while supposedly working for the public benefit during war-time conditions, he sold goods at prices that brought charges of extortion, and within two years he could be counted among the fifteen richest men in the colony.¹⁰

The Virginia Company, expressing from London their frustrated credulity about the constant shortage of corn, mentioned rumors of men “Ingrossinge all” and even wondered if “there hath been in some (in whom it ought least to have been) an intent to hinder the increase of the Plantation . . . [for their] owne gaine and greatness.” There would have been good opportunity for councilors to do so. Not only did trade with the Indians keep money flowing directly into the pockets of certain councilors, it also allowed those men to direct the efforts of hungry refugees in their charge towards growing lucrative tobacco. Despite official proclamations encouraging colonists to grow corn, a settler complained that he would have had “Corne ynough if he might have ben suffered to have planted what he would” instead of being forced to tend tobacco. Another settler reported that it was made clear that Sir George Yeardley “should provide them Corne if they would provide Tobacco.”¹¹

In many ways, the line between warfare and trade during the 1620s was thin. Two years after the attack, Governor Sir Francis Wyatt wrote in a letter that “our first worke is the expulsion of the Salvages to gaine the free range of the country . . . for it is infinitely better to have no heathen among us, who at best were but as thornes in our sides, then to be at peace and league with them.” Occasionally, as when they poisoned the wine of approximately two hundred Indians who had assembled to toast a feigned peace treaty, Virginia settlers pursued this goal of complete extermination. More often, however, the war settled into occasional raids and “feedfights” as much designed to capture corn as kill warriors. A commission to George Yeardley encouraged him to “make warr, kill, spoile, and take by force or otherwise whatsoever boote of Corne . . . from any the Salvages or enemies.” The mission seems to have been a success: “in his last expedition,” reported the Virginia council, Yeardley “brought into the Colonie about a Thowsande bushell of come.”¹²

The clearest indictment of this policy of bringing the settlers together under the enlarged exploitive control of particular councilors is contained in a vituperative letter by an “old planter” and a “private man” named William Capps. Although praising governor Wyatt as “a Moyses [Moses], accepting no person, no profit,” Capps recognized that the continued authority of councilors like George Yeardley, a “right worthie Statesman for his owne profit,” depended upon continued warfare. “He will perhaps take the paynes to burne a few of their [the Indians’] houses everie yeare,” wrote Capps, but by doing so Yeardley was behaving like a crooked “surgion, that wanteth meanes” who prolonges an expensive treatment “to keep one in hand 3 yeares, that maybe Cured in 3 quarters, or 3 monthes.” When Capps, who had some

experience in Indian fighting, offered to lead a mission of forty men against the Pamunkey village, his request for forty men met nothing but resistance and hesitation. “Charitye first beginnes at home” he imagined the protesting councilors slyly whispering to themselves, “take away one of my men, there’s 2000 plantes gone, thats 500 waight of Tobacco, yea and what shall this man doe, runne after the Indians? soft, I have perhaps 10, perhaps 15, perhaps 20 men and am able to secure my owne Plantation; how will they doe that are fewer? Let them first be Crusht alitle. . . .”¹³

Even settlers threatened with being “crusht” by Indians were not always willing to leave their lands and give up their unregimented ways for the protection and leadership of the government, despite frequent orders to draw back. The governor commissioned several officers to collect and “bring away all the people” to James City and other secure areas. Daniel Gookin, however, “would not obey the Commanders command” to withdraw from his plantation. Willing to take chances among the Indians and thinking “himselpe sufficient against what could happen”, Gookin, together with thirty-five men, women, and children of all ages, held fast through the tumult. With so many people under his protection, perhaps Gookins himself was using the war to strengthen his position. In other instances, the government was more forceful in its efforts to round up the settlers. Mistress Proctor, a “proper, civil, modest Gentlewoman,” disobeyed orders to retreat for nearly a month until some English officers forced her to go, threatening that unless she came willingly, they would “fire her house themselves.”¹⁴

Perhaps the clearest evidence of the exploitation in these relationships is that despite the efforts of their leaders and the continued threat of Indian attack, free

settlers refused to remain concentrated together for long. They were eager to escape the direct control of the plantation commanders and to re-establish their own farms to grow tobacco for themselves. Moreover, eager to get the colony back on a sound economic footing, the Virginia Company shareholders, and later the crown itself, pushed for settlers to return to their homes—despite vigorous protestations on the part of the governor and his council. As new tenants flooded into the colony, under the pretense of protection they continued to be snatched up as workers on the individual councilors' lands in a manner similar to the way commanders had garnered refugees immediately after the 1622 attack.¹⁵

Even though direct control over the settlers gradually diminished, the commanders continued to hold considerable military authority through the 1620s. Two military expeditions in the summer and one in the fall remained the general rule as late as 1629. Moreover, the government continued to regulate trade to the northern Chesapeake. Thus, compared to the formerly “libertine” ways of the settlers, the colony achieved a greater degree of unity under the increased authority of the government in the aftermath of the 1622 uprising. For a short while, dispersed settlers were brought within greater control and reformed into what the council hoped would become a more cohesive settlement. But at the same time this process also atomized the settlement, breaking it into zones of domination under powerful, virtually autonomous leaders. During all this, the fear and hatred the settlers shared towards the Powhatans and their allies during the war masked and suppressed a great deal of potential internal animosity. In desperate letters to his parents, Richard Frethorne, a company servant at Martin's Hundred, complained bitterly of starvation

and harsh treatment in his new Virginia home. He cast the greater part of the blame upon the Indians, begging, “how then shall we doe for wee lye even in their [the Indians’] teeth?” Yet, the result was subjugation and exploitation of the less powerful by their own leaders. Planters wishing fellow colonists to be crushed by Indians; commanders discouraging planting corn to encourage half-starved dependence; officers threatening to burn English houses—these all reveal some of the hidden divisions of a colony supposedly united against a common foe.¹⁶

* * * *

Even though the wartime desperation for corn eventually subsided towards the end of the decade, traders continued to sail their light pinnaces into the northern Chesapeake to trade with the Indians there. As early as 1622, traders beginning to venture into the upper reaches of the “Great bay” reported “hope of good Trade of Fures there to be had.” Traders eager to maintain their bottom line and envious of the peltry profits pouring into Dutch traders’ pockets, tried to add a beaver-fur lining to their tobacco-cloud empire. Although this trade never comprised more than a small percentage of the total income of a colony almost wholly dependent upon “the stinking weed,” the dilemmas it created raised hackles among the highest echelons of Virginia government and even eventually contributed to the overthrow of Governor Harvey in 1635.¹⁷

Of course, no one initially suspected such a dramatic outcome. At first in the aftermath of the 1622 uprising, the settlers were forced to turn to Indians of the northern Chesapeake such as the Susquehannocks, Piscataways, and Patawomekes, as the closest corn-growing Indians not closely allied with Opechancanough. Trade with

these groups seemed to offer all the benefits without any of the risks of doing business with one's closest native neighbors. Safely removed from the conflicts of daily life amid colonists, Indians of this region could be recruited as potent allies against Powhatan enemies closer at hand. Even as the council was proclaiming that its chief mission was the extirpation of Indians from Virginia, the governor was working to build an alliance with the Patawomekes against Opechancanough.¹⁸

The far-ranging traders who linked Indian polities with Jamestown policies enjoyed the profits of being middlemen and the autonomy of having an itinerant lifestyle away from Jamestown. Above all, they worked for themselves. Although in the early 1620s Captain Hamor and Captain Fleet were the most notable Indian traders of the region, by the 1630s they had been overtaken by the stubborn, "subtle, and fayre spoken" William Claiborne. Arriving in June 13, 1621, the Pembroke College-educated Claiborne had quickly been designated as surveyor. Claiborne's real advancement in the New World, however, came after his appointment to the Virginia Council in March 1623 (and later to the post of Secretary of the Colony), where he stood in good position to harvest the fruits of the ongoing war. His first plums came from stints as a military commander, cosponsoring a plan to erect a palisade between the York and James rivers in 1626 and leading an attack against the Pamunkey capital in 1629. Trade served him even better. An expanding network of economic alliances that connected the merchants of London and Kent with Patawomeke and Susquehannock hunters made Claiborne the fulcrum of much politicking on both sides of the Atlantic. After an initial 1626 exploration up the bay, he gained an official trading commission and began leading full-scale expeditions to

the region in 1627. Later, armed with another commission, he established a semi-permanent beachhead in the northern Chesapeake trade by briefly erecting a trading post on Palmer's Island, a spit of land near the mouth of the Susquehanna River.¹⁹

Claiborne's legacy, however, is most often associated with Kent Island, where, shortly after receiving a license from the king to trade "in those parts of America for which there is not already a patent granted to others for the sole trade," he built a more substantial trading post in August 1631. Situated close to the Susquehanna, by which fur-laden canoes could be paddled, via several portages, from as far as the Great Lakes and the Ohio basin, Kent Island promised Claiborne's London investors the "very profitable and beneficial trade that might bee had and made in the bay of Chesapeake in Virginia and some other rivers ports and places there or neere thereunto . . . for furs beaver skins corns and other commodities." From his Kent Island outpost, Claiborne entered into a close-knit trading alliance with the Susquehannock Indians whose fortified capital was thirty-five miles upriver. Even though the Susquehannocks were powerful warriors and influential traders, previously rival tribes had enjoyed better access to French and Dutch wares. Therefore, when Claiborne began his enterprise the Susquehannocks were desperately casting about for a European partner in trade. Kent Island was an ideal meeting spot for the two groups, removed from the Powhatan wars raging to the south and safely distant from the hotly contested northern fur territories.²⁰

The island, however, soon became the center of a dispute that ruptured English unity in the Chesapeake. Hearing rumors that the future colony of Maryland would be established in the region, Claiborne had rushed to found the Kent Island

settlement in hopes of preempting any claim to the post. Back in England, attentive to rumors that the pelt trade could generate profits of three thousand percent, Lord Baltimore also dreamed of establishing the new colony of Maryland on a lucrative foundation of deer hides and beaver pelts. Little room for compromise existed between the two factions hoping to monopolize the same resource. The Roman Catholicism of many of the Maryland settlers insulted the sensibilities of the Protestant Virginians and fanned the flames of hatred even higher. The Maryland settlers, for their part, allied themselves with the Piscataway Indians, who, after years of having “warres and incursions” made upon them by the Susquehannocks, were ready for retribution against Claiborne’s native partners. The battle lines were drawn.²¹

Already entrenched in the area, Claiborne was well-positioned to make the first move. When the first Maryland settlers arrived, they discovered that many of the region’s Indians “were all in armes to resist” because of a rumor, spread by Claiborne, that the six English ships actually carried dreaded Spaniards, “coming to destroy them all.” Making a more conventional countermove, the Marylanders had Claiborne arrested by the sympathetic Virginia governor in 1634 for “animating, practizing, and conspiring with the Indians.” After being acquitted, Claiborne became even more animated against his Catholic competitors, believing that the Marylanders had “given directions for the taking and surprising of his boats that went to trade and likewise of his owne person.” Captain Thomas Young, a Maryland trading agent, thought that Claiborne was just being paranoid and reported that the supposed schemes to capture him were “only a mere supposition and jealousy of his owne, without any grounds.” It

was true, however, that the Maryland governor did “forbid him to trade” upon risk of having his ships confiscated. In retaliation, Claiborne threatened to “be revenged”—even if he had to do it “joined with the Indians in a canoa.”²²

This dispute spilled over into an already tumultuous Virginia Council. Ever since the dissolution of the Virginia Company in 1624, Virginians had been nervous that their estates, founded under the old charter, would be confiscated under royal control. During the intervening years, as settlers continued to stake new claims, the question remained unanswered and fears continued to fester. Therefore, when the royally-appointed Governor John Harvey, who was described even by close friends as “a proper man, though perhaps somewhat choleric and impatient,” announced the suspension of granting patents for new land upon his arrival in 1630, he immediately embroiled himself in controversy with his anxious council. Then, just when the Council was already nervous about its land claims, Lord Baltimore set about establishing a new colony on what previously had been considered Virginia territory. Making matters worse, Harvey acquiesced to the plan. Something had to be done.²³

The “strength and sinewes” of the anti-Harvey faction that emerged was the influential council-member, Samuel Mathews, a man with “bold spiritt, turbulent and strong.” He naturally supported the Kent Island efforts of his close-friend, business partner, and fellow council member, Matthew Claiborne. In Mathews’s mind, the far-flung Kent Island outpost became a test case regarding future land rights. “It is vehemently suspected,” wrote Captain Young, “that . . . [Mathews] hath bene the incendiary of all this wicked plott of Claiborne’s and yet continues to bee the supporter and upholder of him.” Governor Harvey, on the other hand, eager to please

Lord Baltimore and the king, opened himself to further charges of helping the hated papists by supporting the Marylanders against Claiborne.²⁴

In 1635, Governor Harvey announced his support of Maryland's prohibition against Virginians trading in Maryland waters. Shortly afterwards, Captain Matthew Fleet, acting on behalf of Maryland, captured one of Claiborne's pinnaces near the Patuxent River and confiscated the valuable trade goods in its hold. Enraged, Claiborne made good his previous threats of retaliation. On April 23, 1635, several of his ships ambushed a Maryland vessel near the Pocomoke River along the Eastern Shore. In the engagement, however, the defenders gained the upper hand and several Virginians were killed by their "cruel neighbors."²⁵

At about the same time, Harvey tried to arrest several of his councilors who were meeting in secret to complain about a "dangerous peace" Harvey had made "with the [Powhatan] Indians against the council's and countreyes advice [and that] . . . withheld us from revenging ourselves." Harvey wanted to end the very wars that had elevated so many of the councilors to power. When he asked the Council to dispose of the mutineers according to martial law, the headstrong councilors responded by arresting him at gun point and shipping him to England. Claiborne himself was not present to watch the stunned governor being manhandled because earlier Harvey, "seeking to discover his practice with the Indians against Lord Baltimore's plantation in Maryland," had sent a warrant to confiscate the trader's papers. Rather than comply, Claiborne "putting the warrant in his pocket, went out of the Colony of Virginia." Despite his absence, Claiborne's cause was well represented in the coup. Among other reasons for deposing Harvey—failure to communicate the Council's

letters to the king, threats upon other men's estates, and the previously mentioned unpopular peace with the Indians—the rebelling councilors noted Harvey's interference in Indian affairs of the northern Chesapeake. His policy of upholding Maryland's exclusive sovereignty in the region, complained the Council, left merchants like Claiborne with "all places of trade for come . . . shutt up from them, and no meanes left to relieve their wants without transgressing his commands." Even worse, they understood "with indignation that the Marylanders had taken Captain Claiborne's Pinnases and men with the goods in them, whereof they had made prize and shared the goods amongst them, which action of theirs Sir John Harvey upheld." "I doe believe that the [Marylanders] would not have committed such outrages without Sir John Harvey's instigation," wrote Samuel Mathews. One of the Council's first acts after nominating a new governor was to appoint envoys to "sayle for Maryland with Instructions and Letters for the [new] Governor and council desiring them to desist their violent proceedings."²⁶

Admittedly Indian relations alone did not directly cause the removal of Governor Harvey; however, problems stemming from Indian relations gave a certain urgency and rhetorical flair to the complaints of the Council that made their coup easier. Between Harvey's alliances with the Catholic Marylanders and his recent unpopular peace with local Powhatans, the council could portray their hated governor as friends with all of Virginia's worst enemies. By proposing peace with the Powhatans, Harvey was looking to end over a decade of intermittent warfare—an idea that outraged the councilors. There was the suggestion that all loyal Virginians should be willing to unite against their Indian enemies. At the same time, the dispute

certainly did not revolve around race alone. Even while some mutinous councilors sought to annul the recent peace with Powhatans, Claiborne was seeking to preserve his own alliance with the Susquehannocks against the encroachments of the Marylanders. The council was working as hard to continue peace with the one group of Indians as they were to striving to continue war with another group. On either issue, however, Harvey came down squarely opposite the Council. Unity, they felt, had to be preserved, even at the risk of treason.

* * * *

In 1644, war again swept through Virginia. This outbreak in many ways reenacted the same grisly script as the 1622 uprising. As before, the Powhatans felt the pressures of English encroachment, this time as claims north of the York River edged westward toward the Pamunkey capital of Cinquoteck, near the confluence of the Pamunkey and Mattaponi Rivers. Once again the Powhatans and their allies used the same tactic: coming to the outlying English settlements under the “feigned masque of Friendship” before attacking from within. By 1644, Opechancanough, the leader of the last Powhatan war, “had grown so decrepit” from the “Fatigues of War,” not to mention extreme age, that he “was not able to walk alone; but was carried about by his Men, wherever he had a Mind to move, and his Eye-lids . . . [had grown] so heavy that he could not see, . . . [unless] they were lifted up by his Servants.” Even so, the stubborn chief, still as crafty as ever, was there once again to direct his warriors, albeit this time in an armchair capacity. Also, as before, wartime Anglo-Indian dynamics produced among the white settlers a paradoxical combination of unity and dissent. However, whereas the 1622 war and the 1635 ousting of Governor

Harvey cast into stark relief the self-centered, atomizing effects of Indian policies upon society, the latest uprising emphasized the unifying role that Indians could play in Virginia colonial society.²⁷

During the 1644 war, the settlers self-consciously tried to foster a spirit of cooperation among themselves because they realized that the timing, if not the cause, of this latest uprising stemmed from Opechancanough's perception of the Virginians' internal conflicts. John Winthrop, in New England, characteristically felt that "this evil was sent upon them from God." The staunch Puritan noted that the attack "came upon them soon after they had driven out the godly [Puritan] ministers . . . and had made an order that all such as would not conform to the discipline of the church of England should depart the country." In a sense, Winthrop was close to the truth: although Opechancanough's military strategy played a greater role than divine wrath, English religious dissension did spark the Indian attack. Virginia was experiencing the same political and religious turmoil that split England—divisions that Opechancanough hoped to exploit. "They took this season," explained a native captive, "for that they understood that they were at war in England and began to go to war among themselves." This particular Indian claimed that Opechancanough had learned about English factionalism by watching "a fight in the river between a London ship which was for the parliament and a Bristol ship which was for the king." The Indians may also have received confirmation from a more direct source. Some Indians confessed that Opechancanough "was by some English Informed that all was under the Sword in England, in their Native Countrey, and such divisions [were also] in our Land." Split among themselves, and "having no supplyes from their own

Countey which could not helpe them,” the Virginia colony, hoped the Indians, would “be Consumed and Famished” after a single devastating assault. Opechancanough realized that “now was his time or never.”²⁸

The attack lasted two days, “allaruming them night and day, and killing all their Cattell . . . [and] destroying in the nights, all their Corne Fields, which the English could not defend.” Nearly five hundred settlers lost their lives, more than in 1622, but a much smaller proportion of the population overall. Then the Powhatans and their Pamunkey, Chickahominy, Pasphegh, Warraskoyack, and Mattaponi allies inexplicably stopped: they “fled away and retyred themselves many miles distant off the Colony.” Perhaps the natives thought that they merely had to wait and the hungry, frightened, and factious colony would collapse on its own. But this “little space of time gave the English opportunity to gather themselves together, call an Assembly, secure their Cattell, and to thinke upon some way to defend themselves.” As in 1622, the settlers further afield in the frontier flooded back to older, more secure sections of the colony. Moreover, once again some colonists, especially those north of the York River, needed to be compelled by force.²⁹

For the most part, rather than collapsing under the external pressure, Virginians put aside their religious differences and came together to fend off the Powhatan threat. “If the Indians had but forborne for a month longer,” wrote one settler, “they . . . [would have] found us in such a combustion among our selves that they might with ease have cut of[f] every man if once we had spent that little powder and shot that we had among our selves.” War with the Indians took the settlers from the verge of shooting each other and sent them fleeing into each others’ arms. Unlike

what was happening in civil war-torn England, or even nearby Maryland, “we are at peace among our selves,” remarked a settler the next year, “and have beene so ever since the massacre.”³⁰

Making it their policy to “pursue and root out” their “Irreconcilable enemyes,” settlers began to mount the familiar retaliatory raids against the tribes, using their “utmost endeavors to cutt downe the Indians Corne . . . in all places subject to Opochanckanough.” Once again, as in the 1620s conflict, wartime powers gave government officials increased authority over the population; this time, however, perhaps because of a stronger assembly more dependent upon settlers’ votes, conscious efforts were made to subdue the opportunities for rapacious exploitation of one’s fellow colonists. For example, with the “want of Corne . . . beyond all Miseryes,” traders again operated under public monopolies, but this time, the potential for graft was severely limited. Laws made it illegal for corn collected from the natives to be sold for more than 100 pounds of tobacco per barrel. Moreover, in order to prevent councilors from sending other settlers off on wild Indian chases while they and their own servants busily continued to grow tobacco, it was decreed that “wherein all persons whatsoever inhabiting within this colony ought to be engaged in respect the preservation of all depends thereupon . . . [,] those of the Council . . . shall noe longer exempt their . . . men from the charge of the said warr butt shall equally contribute with the rest of the inhabitants.” No longer were plantation owners to let their lesser neighbors be crushed (even a little); instead it was ordered that “the joyning plantations doe assist the ffrontiers or their Neighbours upon Alarums.” Any neglect of this duty to one’s fellow Englishmen was “to be

severely censured.” Indicative of the greater constraints placed upon the powers of commanders, who in earlier years might have emerged as semi-autonomous warlords capable of commandeering whatever they liked in the name of defending the colony, the assembly decided that “if any of the Capts. . . shall at any time presse any necessary tooles from the inhabitants for the publique service and not returne the same againe . . . they . . . shall for such default be liable to make the owners satisfaction for the tooles soe pressed.” Even court cases and law suits that might deprive a settler from his “mans servant, his corne, or Aummunition” and thereby leave an unlucky litigant “disabaled to defend themselves and their plantations,” were tabled until “when it shall please God we shall suppress our enemy.” Cooperation was the rule of the day.³¹

Not that some councilors did not try the usual tricks. Claiborne, by this time one of the few remaining men who had risen to power under the old school of trading and raiding, was elected “to be General and Chief Commander” of a 300-man expedition against the Pamunkeys, while forces from Henrico, Charles City County, and Upper Norfolk launched simultaneous diversion raids against the Nansemonds, Seacocks, Warisquoycacks, Chawanokes, and Tancks Weyanokes. Interpreting his mandate to fight Pamunkeys beyond the broadest possible sense, Claiborne diverted some of these troops for a doomed assault to retake his old Kent Island holdings. Frustrated by his appropriation of public power, however, Claiborne’s fellow councilors asked him “to surcease, for the present, his interference with the government of Kent Island” lest he “imbroggle the colony in further troubles.”³²

Into the former place of such over-mighty councilors stepped the recently appointed Governor Berkeley, accomplished playwright, younger son of a powerful family, and favorite of the king. Shortly after returning from a speedy trip to England to beg the king personally for more arms and ammunition (the settlers having had hardly enough to fight each other much less the Indians), Berkeley learned that the aged chief Opechancanough was “some distance from his usual Habitation,” encamped somewhere between the falls of the James and Appomattox Rivers. Gathering a party of mounted soldiers, the governor “made a speedy march, [and] surprised him in his Quarters.” Berkeley became an immediate war hero. The high regard his actions engendered made him immensely popular and helped strengthen his over-all authority for the next several decades. Realizing the prestige value of his captive in bolstering his own image of authority, Berkeley “hoping to get Reputation, by presenting his Majesty with a Royal Captive,” planned to ship Opechancanough to England. Before Opechancanough could suffer this final indignity, a vengeful English guard shot the old leader in the back.³³

Powhatan resistance crumbled soon after the death of Opechancanough. By October 1646 the confederation’s new leader, Necotowance, signed a treaty with the English settlers that would form the basis of Virginia’s first real effort to create a cohesive program for governing Indian-white relations. After laying out the theoretical justification for English authority by forcing the defeated werowance to “acknowledge . . . [that he held] his kingdome from the King’s Majestie of England,” the agreement created a new list of do’s and don’ts of Indian behavior. Reservations were created, free movement was limited, and cross-racial contacts were curtailed.

Rather than merely dominating the defeated Indians, however, the treaty also set out to control the victorious Virginians. Many of the treaty's provisions and subsequent addenda attempted to bridle English behavior that had been problematic in the past. However, even though the laws prescribed one set of actions, in practice settlers occasionally followed their own personal policy with regards to the Indians; such choices often put them at odds with their government.³⁴

The overarching theme of the agreements was containment—containment of the Indians *and* the settlers to more strictly defined spheres. Recognizing a long past of troubled Indian relations stemming from personal encounters between settlers and Indians, the government worked to ensure that the two should never meet. To this end, “Necotowance and his people” were given an area on the north side of the York River, which they “could inhabit and hunt . . . without any interruption from the English.” Not willing to completely divest themselves from any future in the territory, the English allowed that “it shall be thought fitt” that with the governor’s and Council’s approval and notification to the werowance, some English settlers might eventually “inhabit from Poropotanke downwards.” Beyond this broad exception, however, English settlers were prevented by law from encroaching upon the Indians’ reservation. The English, on the other hand, allowed themselves the “tract of land between Yorke river and James River, from the falls . . . to Kequotan”—essentially the whole peninsula.³⁵

The agreements not only set aside land for each group to live upon, they restricted even day-to-day movement between the territories. Although whites and Indians were both collared to their respective territories, the defeated Powhatans were

kept on the shorter leash. For natives to enter into their former territories, now an English preserve, they first had to apply to the commander of one of several border forts, announce the purpose for their visit, and then obtain a “coate of striped stuffe” as a badge to signify that they came in peace. The intent of the striped coat was “to avoid all injury to such a messenger and that no ignorance may be pretended to such as shall offer any outrage.” Unless suitably attired in such a frock, a visiting Indian hardly stood a chance; it was decreed “lawfull for any person to kill any . . . Indian” not so bedecked. Although the limits placed upon settlers were not nearly so deadly, their movements were also restricted. If any English were caught “contrary to the articles agreed upon” in the Indian territory on the “north side of Yorke river,” they could be “lawfully convicted [and] be adjudged as felons.” Exceptions, such as for gathering lumber, were built into the rule, but for the most part the settlers were to limit their wanderings.³⁶

Restricting physical mobility was only one means of achieving the treaty’s overall intent of hindering interaction between settlers and Indians. One reason for the hesitancy regarding white-Indian relations was obvious: already twice before the settlers had been surprised from within by Indians with whom they had grown overly familiar. It seemed unlikely that the government could ever again fully trust Indians in their midst. There were other reasons to limit contact between settlers and their native neighbors. Until the widespread adoption of slavery (which was still uncommon until the mid-1660s), indentured servants were the greatest discipline problem in the colony. Servants who had already received their remittance in the form of payment for their journey to the New World and who could only look

forward to several years of grueling, exploitive labor, were often attracted by the prospect of running away. Most often, fear of the Indians helped to prevent, rather than encourage, such flight. Demanding “wherefore should wee stay here and bee slaves and may goe to another place and live like gentlemen,” a servant plotted to escape to from Virginia and make his way to Dutch or Swedish settlements further north. Realizing that “there was never but one run thither and hee was almost kno[cked] on the head” by intervening natives who controlled the forests, he sought to buy “a booke to learne to speake the Indyan tongue” before he fled. A scattering of other servants undaunted by the language gap, or perhaps even initially captured against their will, lived among the Indians at various times throughout the century. Even during the warfare of the 1620s, when Indian hatred perhaps reached its height, George Sandys suspected that several of his missing servants had run off to join the Indians.³⁷

Theoretically, the zones of control created by the treaties would help contain such flights. A 1647 proposition to build another fort similar to the ones built during the 1644 war and described in the treaty, mentioned as one of its duties “to return with all conveniencie the persons of all runaway servants and others, who shall not be able to give a good accoumpt of thiere coming thither without warrant.” The plan was clearly not entirely successful, however, as demonstrated by a 1668 court case where an Indian named Norwas, “who hath entertained a run away mayd servant,” was ordered held by the Sheriff “in safe Custody without Bayle or Main prize untill that they produce the said Mayd.”³⁸

The colony also continued the policy of restricting trade with the Indians. Natives wishing to gather to trade were ordered to come together at specified forts around the perimeter of the English-controlled area. Once again, this can be partially attributed to an attempt to limit the excuses for Indians to enter the colony and potentially catch the English off-guard. Just as much, however, the restrictions were designed to control the actions of individual Englishmen who might throw the whole system of Indian relations into chaos. The assembly complained that “the disorders arising from a generall liberty [in trade] are many:” First, independent traders, by issuing often superior wares, were “debasings and making cheape, vile and contemptible our owne commodities.” Secondly, the traders who engaged “in a covetuous outbidding one another . . . consequently [were] enhancing the Commodities of the salvages.” Finally, the traders, because of the “doubts and jealousies by ignorance and mistake of language” have called into question treaties and “may probably againe drawe a warr upon the Collony.”³⁹

One need not look far to find the type of interactions that inspired these restrictions. By itself, Claiborne’s sordid history of embroiling the colony in strife to pursue his own trade would serve as an adequate reminder. Even after attempts to regulate trade, incidents continued to raise tensions. In 1673, Abraham Wood, a prominent Indian trader trying to expand his market to directly include the Cherokees of present-day south-central Virginia, lodged several weeks with the Occaneechees. Resenting Wood’s hopes of eventually circumventing their profitable position as middlemen, the Occaneechees trapped and killed the trader and several of his

companions. Memories of this attack may partially have inspired Bacon's revenge in 1676 when the rebel and his men destroyed the Occaneechee fort.⁴⁰

The government did not merely want to restrict trade contacts. Past experience had shown that any sort of encounter could have potential political significance. In 1635 "certine Indians" sent by the enigmatically named "laughing kinge" of the Eastern Shore came to the house of a settler named Daniel Cugly with a message. Unfortunately, neither Cugly nor his friends could fully understand what exactly the Indians were trying to say. As best as they could make out, the Indians had brought a parcel of roanoke (wampum) as recompense for an Englishman who had been killed, but, wrote Obedience Robins, a puzzled and frustrated witness, "how and wher I could not tell . . . but that it was for some man, ore other that was kyld I well understood." The men were put in the awkward position of negotiating a peace for a transgression they did not even know about. Should they accept the gesture, return the roanoke, or subdue the Indians? "For all the world I would not receive it," decided Robins, who then went home. The Indians stayed around another two days then, "stoale away and left the said roanoke" with Cugley. Cugley subsequently became embroiled in a three-way dispute over the valuable beads: he wanted to keep the roanoke, other settlers wanted it returned to the Indians, and the relatives of the victim felt they should receive it as blood money.⁴¹

Despite restrictions, the government was never able to completely regulate all Anglo-Indian interactions. Because most meetings were against the law, one can only catch glimpses of secret rendezvous through the records. When they do appear, reports often hint as much at the arguments and tensions among white settlers who

turned each other in as the details of the contact itself. In 1648, a settler named Arthur Price complained that some settlers along the York River “above Skiminnyoe doe dayly Entertayne the Indians in their howses both Day and Night contrary to an Act of Assembly.” The Court decided that if Price “shall at any time hereafter finde any Indians in the howses of any of the Inhabitants . . . it may and shall be Lawfull for him, [or anyone else] . . . to kill such Indians and to apprehend such offenders.”⁴²

Not all unwarranted interactions entailed the settlers getting too friendly with the Indians. Just as threatening were instances where settlers, letting their emotions get the better of them, attacked Indians with whom the colony was officially at peace. Despite the government’s efforts to ameliorate disputes, misunderstandings between the two cultures abounded. Indians killed English pigs, cattle, and the occasional settler. For their part, colonists looking for fertile tobacco plots continued to encroach on native lands. It was often all the government could do to keep planters from taking matters into their own hands. In 1651 a posse of men, contrary to the law, marched against a group of nearby Pocomokes hoping to capture or kill the werowance. In the process they shot at the natives, beat them, took prisoners, and bound one with a chain. As a result the region was on the verge of being invaded by a vengeful Indian army. Hoping to prevent the uprising, the court ordered a hundred arm’s length of roanoke sent to one chief, ten weeding hoes to another, twenty arms length of roanoke to the Indians who were bound neck and heels and another twenty to an Indian shot and wounded by the gun-toting wife of Toby Selby. Moreover, the fifty or so perpetrators were arrested and brought to Jamestown. In another case where Wahanganoche, sachem of the Potomacs, was unjustly arrested, the perpetrators were

fined fifteen hundred pounds of tobacco each and forever stripped of their civil and military offices.⁴³

By preventing frightened and angry frontier settlers from taking their own initiative, the government found itself in the uneasy position of protecting Indian neighbors from its own citizens. Often, respect and loyalty towards the government suffered in the process. In a 1660 letter to the court of Lancaster, William Berkeley mentioned that “so many and so various have been the complaints to me of and from the Indians of Rappa[hano]ck river that I know not at this distance what judgment to make of their grievances.” His response to the crises was to “make a diligent enquiry [to discover] what unnecessary injurys are done to the Indians and how our articles of peace are kept with them.” Although Berkeley might have felt at such times that he was counseling “humanity and Christianity” with such balanced treatment towards the Indians, angry English subjects might consider anyone with such sentiments a traitor. In 1661 Francis Moryson, who replaced Berkeley during the governor’s eighteenth-month trip to England, weighed the dangers of supporting the Indians against the wishes of the settlers: “these Panick fears [of Indian attack] stop not with the particular trouble of the authors but for the most part breake out into murmurings & repinings against their Governors & ye Government for not following their rash humors and immediately involving the Countrey in a destructive warr.” He probably did not realize how right he was.⁴⁴

* * * *

Between 1622 and 1675, contact with the Indians often brought settlers together physically, politically, and emotionally. Twice, in the aftermath of surprise

attacks of 1622 and 1644, settlers had to band together just to survive. Because of the Indians, Englishmen who ordinarily spent their days feverishly planting tobacco, jealously eyeing their competitors' crops, marched lockstep together to war. Settlers who crowded the courts charging each other with slander and vilification huddled side by side in fortified houses. Often tough frontiersmen who could agree on little else shared a common hatred and fear of the natives. In war, the Indians presented difficulties that, to be overcome, forced the settlers to cooperate. During intervening years of peace, settlers acted more competitive towards one another but retained the conviction that in matters relating to the Indians, they ought to work as a cohesive whole, that Englishmen should stick together.

However, in practice, English camaraderie was not always natural, nor did it stem from a harmonious spirit of cooperation. Often other conflicts arose during and from the process of creating a unified front towards the Indians. Even as the settlers were forced by the Indians to work together, to some extent underneath the whitewashed facade of racial cooperation they were always, in the words Governor Harvey, looking out more "for their owne endes then . . . seeking the generall good."⁴⁵ In matters of trade, expansion, and war, the Indians either directly or indirectly affected nearly every colonist in the Old Dominion. However, the exact way that the Indians influenced each settler differed from individual to individual. Whether they were carving rough-hewn farms from the forests near the western falls or living in well-tended tidewater estates, whether they were indentured servants or powerful councilors, whether they hoped to grow tobacco, trade furs, or curry royal favors—all influenced a colonist's particular outlook towards the Indians.

The problem was that, owing to the crucial nature of Indian affairs, settlers felt that in these matters they could hardly afford to disagree politely and go their own way. Instinctively, they felt that as Englishmen they ought to cooperate. Moreover, they recognized that any disunity weakened the colony as a whole. Trading monopolies and restrictions on supplying guns meant nothing unless everyone complied. Negotiating treaties would be all but impossible if the government could not vouch for the behavior of all the settlers. In such a situation, nonconformity was not just individualism, it looked like treason. Therefore, the trick was to gather enough support or authority to enforce a single policy towards the Indians. Typically, most settlers were convinced easily that their best interests in regard to the Indians rested in unity. A sense of racial and cultural distinctiveness contributed to this spirit of cooperation. Dissenting opinions, however, did emerge with the result often being violence. If the threat of the Indians themselves did not bring someone into line, perhaps staring into the muzzle of a fellow settler's gun would. Consensus could be achieved through force, but in the meanwhile, until one side was victorious, division would prevail.

Unity and authority on a variety of issues could be trumpeted along with the clarion call for racial cooperation. Religious disputes, for example, seemed less pressing and could be put aside when angry Indians prowled outside the gates. Similarly, a leader against the Indians often amassed broad authority for issues beyond the direct scope of Indian affairs. Most often settlers willingly granted such men power as an expedient to their own safety and best interests, but occasionally

councilors and governors used the opportunities presented by the Indians to crush their fellow colonists and exalt themselves.

Seen in the light of what had come before, the events of Bacon's Rebellion seem less of an anomaly than an exaggeration of previous patterns of division and unity, coercion and consensus. The murder of a few settlers and the subsequent misdirected retaliation against previously friendly Susquehannocks that escalated into full-blown war was just the type of unsupervised vengeful bloodshed that the policies of the last several decades had worked so hard to avert. When the powerful Susquehannocks descended upon the western plantations, killing numerous settlers and frightening the rest, settlers remembering 1622 and 1644 sincerely believed that their lives depended once again upon reaching a consensus and working together. It should come as no real surprise that in this situation, Nathaniel Bacon, an ambitious councilor, rose to power and became a military lord with broad dictatorial powers by promising to protect society from its Indian foes. Nor could Berkeley, who had gained his own start three decades earlier against Opechancanough, afford to step aside and let Bacon usurp his mantle as leader against the Indians. During the ensuing rivalry Berkeley and Bacon each branded the other with the label of traitor because of their refusal to abide by each other's strategy toward the Indians. Although the revolution eventually grew to encompass a broad number of social reforms, it was trouble with the Indians that initially brought the rebellious settlers together and the belief that the rest of the colony should agree with their policy of extermination that started them marching towards Jamestown. The Indian dilemma thus acted as a catalyst for broader revolution by bringing together a previously

divided collection of discontented settlers and spurring them to try to bring the rest of the colony into compliance with a wide body of ideas centered around but not limited to Indian policy. Thus, one of the greatest “Indian wars” of the seventeenth century toppled a colonial government and killed few Indians.

Notes

INTRODUCTION

¹ Gabriel Archer, "A relatyon. . . written. . . by a gent. Of ye Colony" in Philip L. Barbour, ed. *The Jamestown Voyages Under the First Charter 1606-1609*, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Hakluyt Society, 1969), 1:85, 89-90.

² For examples of articles that look at the Virginians' treatment of Indians from the point of view of the English attempts to control, exterminate, or civilize the natives, see Alden T. Vaughan, "'Expulsion of the Salvages': English Policy and the Virginia Massacre of 1622," *William and Mary Quarterly* (hereafter *WMQ*), 3rd ser., vol. 35, no.1 (Jan.1978): 57-84 and Gary B. Nash, "Image of the Indian in the Southern Colonial Mind," *WMQ*, 3rd ser., vol. 29, no. 2 (April 1972):197-230. Also see J. Leitch Wright, Jr., *The Only Land They Knew: American Indians in the Old South*, (New York: Free Press, 1981; reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), particularly pp. 53- 101. James Axtell provides a counterfactual conjecture of how settlement might have looked had the settlers not encountered natives in "Colonial America Without the Indians" in *After Columbus: Essays in the Ethnohistory of Colonial North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 222-42.

³ There are numerous studies of Bacon's Rebellion. The venerable, but still unsurpassed account is found in Wilcomb E. Washburn, *The Governor and the Rebel: A History of Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia*, (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1957). Whereas Washburn sympathizes with Governor Berkeley whom he sees as struggling with events beyond his control, Thomas Jefferson Wertebaker in *Torchbearer of the Revolution, the Story of Bacon's Rebellion and its Leader* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1940) and more recently Stephen Saunders Webb in *1676, the End of American Independence* (New York: Knopf, 1984) place more blame upon the failures of the colonial government to adequately respond to the Indian threat. William L. Shea, *The Virginia Militia in the Seventeenth Century*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. Darrett Bruce Rutman, *A Militant New World, 1607-1640* (Phd diss., University of Virginia, 1959; reprint, New York: Arno, 1979).

⁴ Joseph Frank, ed., "News from Virginny, 1644," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* (hereafter referred to as *VMHB*) 65 (1957), 85.

⁵ For purposes of this thesis, I am defining unity as behavior following or not conflicting with a single broadly established model. Disunity, therefore, can be assessed as the number of conflicting modes of behavior that operate in opposition to one another, and the amount of friction inherent in these differences. Ian Lustick, "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control," *World Politics* 31: 3 (April 1979): 325-44; Jon Kukla, "Order and Chaos in Early America: Political and Social Stability in Pre-Restoration Virginia," *Journal of American History* 90: 2 (April 1985): 275-98; J. Frederick Fausz, "Merging and Emerging Worlds: Anglo-Indian Interest Groups and the Development of the Seventeenth-Century Chesapeake," in Lois Carr, Philip Morgan, and Jean Russo,

eds., *Colonial Chesapeake Society* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1988), 47-98; Jack Greene, "Changing Interpretations of Early American Politics," in Ray Allen Billington, ed., *Reinterpretation of Early American History: Essays in Honor of John Edwin Pomfret*, (San Marino, University of California, 1966), 167-77.

CHAPTER ONE

¹ David B. Quinn, *Set Fair for Roanoke : Voyages and Colonies, 1584-1606*, (Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina Press, 1984); Karen Ordahl Kupperman, *Roanoke, The Abandoned Colony* (Totowa, N.J. : Rowman & Allanheld, 1984); Edmund S. Morgan, *American Slavery/ American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975), 6-24.

² The first half of Peter Martyr's *De Orbo Novo* was published by Richard Eden in 1555 under the title *The Decades of the Newe Worlde or West India*. Las Casas's *Brevissima relacion de la destruccion de las Indias* was published in 1583 as *The Spanish Colonie: or, Briefe Chronicle of the Acts and Gestes of the Spaniards in the West Indies*. Morgan, *American Slavery*, 7; Nash, "Image of the Indian," 202-203.

³ Nash, "Image of the Indian," 208; Paul Hulton, ed., *America, 1585 : The Complete Drawings of John White* (Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina Press, 1984); Morgan, *American Slavery*, 25-43; See also David B. Quinn, ed., *The Roanoke Voyages, 1584-1590: Documents to Illustrate the English Voyages to North America Under the Patent Granted to Walter Raleigh in 1584*, (London, Hakluyt Society, 1955).

⁴ "20 November 1606, Instructions for Government," in Barbour, *Jamestown Voyages*, 1: 43.

⁵ *Ibid.*; William Crashaw, "A Sermon Preached in London before the right honorable the Lord La Warre . . . Febr 21, 1609" (London, 1610) quoted in Vaughan, "Expulsion of the Salvages," 60; E. G. R. Taylor, ed., *The Original Writings & Correspondence of the Two Richard Hakluyts*, 2 vols. (London, Hakluyt Society, 1935), 1:216.

⁶ "Instructions given by way of Advice," in Barbour, *Jamestown Voyages*, 1: 50,52.

⁷ George Percy, "Discourse," in Barbour, *Jamestown Voyages*, 1: 133-34; Smith, "Map of Virginia," in Barbour, *Jamestown Voyages*, 2: 379; John Smith, *Travels and Works of Captain John Smith*, ed. Edward Arber, 2 vols. (Edinburgh: J. Grant, 1910), 5; "Instructions given by way of Advice," in Barbour, *Jamestown Voyages*, I, 50.

⁸ "Instructions given by way of Advice," in Barbour, *Jamestown Voyages*, I, 50-53. The terms "naturals," "natural people," and "country people," in this early document is a revealing alternative to word "salvages" which becomes common later.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 52.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 52-53.

¹¹ Smith, "Map of Virginia," in Barbour, *Jamestown Voyages*, 2: 380; Archer, "A relatyon," in *Ibid.*, 1: 95; Percy, "Discourse" in *Ibid.*, 1: 142.

¹² Archer, "A relatyon," in Barbour, *Jamestown Voyages*, 1: 96; Smith "Map of Virginia," in Barbour, *Jamestown Voyages*, 2: 380.

¹³ Archer, "A relatyon," in Barbour, *Jamestown Voyages*, 1: 98; 82-95. J. Frederick Fausz suspects that these friendly Indians and the earlier attackers were *both* commanded by Powhatan as part of his early attempts to feel out the strengths and intentions of the settlers ("An 'Abundance of Blood Shed on Both Sides,'" *VMHB*, 98: 1 (January 1990): 16-17).

¹⁴ Edward Wingfield "Discourse," in Barbour, *Jamestown Voyages*, 1: 217; Percy "Discourse" in *Ibid.*, 1: 144-45.

¹⁵ Smith, "Map of Virginia," in Barbour, *Jamestown Voyages*, 2: 437.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 2: 385, 390; Wingfield, "Discourse," in *Ibid.*, 2: 222. Although not a biography in the strictest sense, J. A. Leo Lemay's *The American Dream of Captain John Smith* (Charlottesville : University Press of Virginia, 1991) provides many instructive insights into Smith's character and his histories that serve as one of the dominant primary sources for researching early colonial Virginia.

¹⁷ Smith, "Map of Virginia," in Barbour, *Jamestown Voyages*, 2: 392, 393, 395-6; Smith, *Travels*, 2: 393.

¹⁸ Smith, "Map of Virginia," in Barbour, *Jamestown Voyages*, 2: 390; Wingfield, "Discourse" in *Ibid.*, 1: 219; George Percy, "A Trewe Relacyon" in *Virginia: Four Personal Narratives*, (New York: Arno, 1972), 265; Smith, *Travels*, 2: 480-84.

¹⁹ Smith "Map of Virginia," in Barbour, *Jamestown Voyages*, 2: 373; Smith, "True Relation," in *Ibid.*, 1: 202; Smith, *Travels*, 2: 433-34.

²⁰ Smith, *Travels*, 2: 447-67.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 2: 456-87.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ The acting governors during the "military regime" were Thomas Gates, (May 1610-June 1610); Lord De La Warre (June 1610-March 1611); George Percy (March 1611-May 1611); Thomas Dale (May 1611-August 1611); Thomas Gates (August 1611-March 1614). Virginia Council, "Instructions Orders and Constitutions . . . May, 1609," in Susan Kingsbury, *The Records of the Virginia Company of London*, 4 vols. (Washington: Library of Congress, 1933), 3:12-23 (hereafter *RVCL*); W. W. Hening, *The Statutes at Large : Being a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia from the First Session of the Legislature in the Year 1619*, (Richmond, 1809); 1: 92 (hereafter referred to as Hening, *Statutes*).

²⁵ Percy "Trewe Relacyon," in *Virginia: Four Personal Narratives*, 267. The most detailed narrative of events during this period is in Fausz, "'Abundance of Blood Shed,'" 3-56. See also James Axtell, "The Rise and Fall of the Powhatan Empire," in *After Columbus*, 182-222.

²⁶ For a discussion on the exact source and date of the laws see Darrett B. Rutman, "The Virginia Company and Its Military Regime," in Darrett B. Rutman, ed. *The Old Dominion: Essays for Thomas Perkins Abernethy*, (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1964), 1-20; *Lawes Divine Morall and Martiall* (hereafter *Lawes Divine*) in Peter Force, ed. *Tracts and Other Papers*, 4 vols. (New York: Peter Smith, 1947), 3: 44, 51, 52, 15.

²⁷ *Lawes Divine*, 31.

- ²⁸ Ralph Hamor, "A True Discourse," in *Virginia: Four Personal Narratives*, 29-32; Shea, *Virginia Militia*, 22; *Lawes Divine*, 51, 66.
- ²⁹ Percy, "Trewelacyon," in *Virginia: Four Personal Narratives*, 280-81; *Lawes Divine*, 13, 25, 15, 40.
- ³⁰ Percy, "Trewelacyon," in *Virginia: Four Personal Narratives*, 280.
- ³¹ Smith, "Map of Virginia," in Barbour, *Jamestown Voyages*, 2: 448; *Lawes Divine*, 33.
- ³² "Instructions Orders and Constitutions . . . May 1609," in *RVCL*, 3: 20-21; Percy, "Trewelacyon," in *Virginia: Four Personal Narratives*, 280.
- ³³ *Lawes Divine*, 27.
- ³⁴ Percy, "Trewelacyon," in *Virginia: Four Personal Narratives*, 271-73; see also Shea, *Virginia Militia*, 18-19.
- ³⁵ Fausz, "'Abundance of Blood Shed'," 46-48.
- ³⁶ Hamor, "A True Discourse," in *Virginia: Four Personal Narratives*, 11; Morgan, *American Slavery*, 90; Rolf, "Virginia in 1616," in *Virginia: Four Personal Narratives*, 105; *RVCL*, 3: 104.
- ³⁷ Hamor, "A True Discourse," in *Virginia: Four Personal Narratives*, 27; *RVCL*, 3: 74, 170-71.
- ³⁸ Morgan, *American Slavery*, 96-99; *RVCL*, 3: 92.
- ³⁹ *RVCL*, 3: 102, 165; James Axtell, *Invasion Within: The Contest of Cultures in Colonial North America*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 179-80.
- ⁴⁰ *RVCL*, 3: 174-75.
- ⁴¹ *RVCL*, 3: 170, 174-75.

CHAPTER TWO

- ¹ *RVCL*, 3: 554; Robert Beverley, *History and Present State of Virginia* (1705; reprint, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1947), 52; Axtell, "Rise and Fall of the Powhatan Empire," 215-19; Michael J. Puglisi, "Revitalization or Extirpation: Anglo-Powhatan Relations, 1622-1644," (MA thesis, College of William and Mary, 1982).
- ² Helen Rountree, "Powhatans and the English: A Case of Multiple Conflicting Agendas," in *Powhatan Foreign Relations, 1500-1722* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993), 184-90; *RVCL*, 3: 550, 583-84.
- ³ Beverley, *History of Virginia*, 51.
- ⁴ *Ibid.*, 54; *RVCL*, 4:515-16.

⁵ *RVCL*, 3: 556; 4: 110-11, 147; Bernard Bailyn "Politics and Social Structure in Virginia" in James Morton Smith, ed., *Seventeenth-Century America: Essays in Colonial History*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959), 91- 94; J. Frederick Fausz, "Merging and Emerging Worlds: Anglo-Indian Interest Groups and the Development of the Seventeenth-Century Chesapeake," in Lois Carr, Philp Morgan, and Jean Russo, eds., *Colonial Chesapeake Society* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1988), 53-56.

⁶ *RVCL*, 3:550; 4:24,70.

⁷ *RVCL*, 3: 550, 612; 4: 24, 66, 70-71.

⁸ Smith, *Travels*, 2: 584; *RVCL*, 3:609; Fausz, "Merging and Emerging Worlds," 53-56.

⁹ *RVCL*, 2: 375; 4: 89, 186.

¹⁰ *RVCL*, 4: 110-11, 447-48; Morgan, *American Slavery*, 119, 121-22.

¹¹ *RVCL*, 3: 684; 4:186.

¹² "Wyatt Documents," *WMQ*, 2nd ser., 6 (1926): 118; Fausz, "Merging and Emerging Worlds," 47; *RVCL*, 3: 678; 4: 9-10.

¹³ *RVCL*, 4: 37-39.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 3: 610; Smith, *Travels*, 584.

¹⁵ Morgan, *American Slavery*, 117-18.

¹⁶ Erich Isaac, "Kent Island," *Maryland Historical Magazine*, 52, no. 2, (June 1957): 97; *RVCL*, 3: 58.

¹⁷ *RVCL*, 3: 641.

¹⁸ Fausz, "Merging and Emerging Worlds," 47-48.

¹⁹ Puglisi, "Revitalization or Extirpation," 46; "Captain Thomas Yong to Sir Toby Matthew, 1634," in Clayton Colman Hall, ed., *Narratives of Early Maryland, 1633-1684* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910), 54; Annie Lash Jester and Martha Woodroof Hiden, eds., *Adventurers of Purse and Person, 1607-1625* (Richmond: Order of First Families of Virginia, 1964), 131; Isaac, "Kent Island," 95; Fausz, "Merging and Emerging Worlds," 59; Nathaniel C. Hale, *Virginia Venturer: A Historical Biography of William Claiborne, 1600-1677* (Richmond: Dietz Press, 1951), 101-114.

²⁰ Jester and Hiden, *Adventurers of Purse and Person*, 132; "Claiborne vs Clobery," *Maryland Historical Magazine*, 26 (1931), 386; Isaac, "Kent Island," 101-102; Fausz, "Merging and Emerging Worlds," 60.

²¹ Fausz, "Merging and Emerging Worlds," 65.

²² "Captain Thomas Yong to Sir Toby Matthew, 1635," in Hall, ed. *Narratives of Early Maryland*, 39, 54-56.

²³ J. Mills Thorton, "The Thrusting Out of Governor Harvey: A Seventeenth-Century Rebellion," *VMHB*, 76:1, (January 1968) 19.

- ²⁴ “Captain Thomas Yong to Sir Toby Matthew, 1635,” in Hall, ed. *Narratives of Early Maryland*, 59-61.
- ²⁵ Fausz, “Merging and Emerging Worlds,” 71.
- ²⁶ Warren M. Billings, ed., *The Old Dominion in the Seventeenth Century: A Documentary History of Virginia, 1606-1689* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1975), 251-54; “Mutiny in Virginia, 1635,” *VMHB*, 1 (1893-94), 429.
- ²⁷ Puglisi, “Revitalization or Exterpation,”⁵⁰; “A Perfect Description of Virginia” in Force, ed., *Tracts*, 2:11; Beverley, *History of Virginia*, 62.
- ²⁸ John Winthrop, *Winthrop’s Journal: History of New England 1630-1649*, ed. James Kendall Hosmer (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1908), 167-68; “A Perfect Description of Virginia,” in Force, ed., *Tracts*, 2:11.
- ²⁹ “A Perfect Description of Virginia,” in Force, ed., *Tracts*, 2:11.
- ³⁰ “News from Virginy,” *VMHB*, 65 (1957), 85-86.
- ³¹ “Acts, Orders and Resolutions of the General Assembly of Virginia 1643-1646,” *VMHB*, 23 (July 1915), 229-30, 235, 239; Hening, *Statutes*, 2: 307, 320; “News from Virginy,” *VMHB*, 65 (1957), 86.
- ³² “Acts, Orders and Resolutions . . . 1643-1646,” *VMHB*, 23 (July 1915), 230-31; “Some Recently Discovered Extracts From the Lost Minutes of the Virginia Council and General Court, 1642-1645,” *WMQ*, 2nd ser., 20 (1940), 67-69.
- ³³ Beverly, *History of Virginia*, 62.
- ³⁴ *Ibid.*
- ³⁵ Billings, *The Old Dominion*, 210, 226.
- ³⁶ Billings, *The Old Dominion*, 226-27.
- ³⁷ Susie M. Ames, *County Court Records of Accomack-Northampton, Virginia, 1632-1640* (Washington DC: American Historical Association, 1954), 120; *RVCL*, 4: 22.
- ³⁸ “Acts, Orders and Resolutions . . . 1643-1646,” *VMHB*, 23 (July 1915), 251; Billings, *The Old Dominion*, 231.
- ³⁹ Billings, *The Old Dominion*, 227. These fortifications included Fort Royal north of the York River, Fort Henry south of the James, and “the house of Capt. John Floud.” “Acts Orders and Resolutions . . . 1643-1646,” *VMHB*, 23 (July 1915), 252.
- ⁴⁰ T. E. Morgan, “Turmoil in an Orderly Society: Colonial Virginia, 1607-1754” (Ph.D. diss., College of William and Mary, 1976), 122.
- ⁴¹ Ames, *Accomack-Northampton Court Records*, 55-58.
- ⁴² Beverly Fleet, ed. *Virginia Colonial Abstracts, York Court Records, 1648-57*, vol. 26 (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co., 1961), 10.

⁴³ “Northampton County Records in the 17th Century,” *VMHB*, 5 (1897-98): 33-34; Morgan, “Turmoil in an Orderly Society,” 117; H. R. McIlWaine, ed., *Journals of the House of Burgesses, 1659/60-1693* (Bowie, Md.: Heritage Books, 1994), 14-15.

⁴⁴ Beverly Fleet, ed. *Virginia Colonial Abstracts, Lancaster County Records, 1654-66*, vol. 1 (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co., 1961), 115; Beverly Fleet, ed. *Virginia Colonial Abstracts, Charles City County Records, 1655-1666*, vol. 43 (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co., 1935), 347.

⁴⁶ “Notes from Council and General Court Records, 1641-1659,” *VMHB*, 8 (1901): 30, 43-45; Bailyn, “Politics and Social Structure in Virginia,” 97; T.H. Breen, “Looking Out for Number One: The Cultural Limits of Public Policy in Early Virginia,” in *Puritans and Adventurers: Change and Persistence in Early America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 106-126.

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