Mobutu and Nyerere, 1960-1979: Trajectories and Creativity in Re-Imagining the Nation

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Mobutu and Nyerere, 1960-1979:
Trajectories and Creativity in Re-Imagining the Nation

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ABSTRACT PAGE

This thesis intends to challenge conventional historical understandings of the political leadership of Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania by placing them in comparison, specifically in the key early post-independence period of 1960-1979. It examines points of convergence and contrast in their rises to power, their methods of leadership, and their ideological and pragmatic modes of executing the power of the state. It also demonstrates how the contexts from which each man emerged, both personally and within the nation, played a crucial role in their respective ascensions to power and subsequent leadership played out, and, by proxy, how the trajectories of each nation were set in place by these processes.

The thesis focuses on the period from 1960-1979 preceded by introductory biographical sketches of each man. The first section of this thesis briefly contextualizes the national and personal histories which are at the center of the project. The second section focuses on deployments of language in each nationalization project. The third section addresses the construction and implementation of ideologically important documents in each context. The final section analyses Mobutu and Nyerere’s respective relationships with the U.S. government during the early stages of the Angolan conflict.
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It would not be possible for me to overstate the role that Robert Vinson had in the formation of this document. Many crucial insights, perspectives, stylistic ideas and vital sources came directly from conversations with Professor Vinson over the months that I worked on this project. The weaknesses of this document come from my own limitations as historian, but the strengths of it must be recognized as emerging from the watchful eye, considerate opinion and experience of my advisor and chair of my thesis committee. For that and advice on all matters of the academic life and beyond, I am deeply grateful.
Finally, I must recognize that all the considerable pleasures associated with writing and researching a project like this pale in comparison with the joy that it is to hold my sons in my arms and watch them grow. Their joy and energy proved infectious many times while working through this document. I must conclude by recognizing the most important contributor to this document: my wonderful wife Kate. Without her none of this would have been remotely possible, and her sacrifices on my behalf to make this project happen are kindnesses I can never repay. She was and is a wonderful editor, friend, critic, encourager, patron, mother, wife and supporter. Of all my considerable blessings she is my greatest, and this project is dedicated to her.
Introduction

I saw that old Father Nile without any doubt rises in the Victoria N’yanza, and, as I had foretold, that lake is the great source of the Holy River which cradled the first expounder of our religious belief.

—John Hanning Speke

Passing thence to the south ... Cão become soon aware that he was approaching a large river, for when still 5 leagues out at sea... he found the water fresh, by no means an exaggeration, for islands of floating vegetation coining out of the Congo have been encountered 100 miles from its mouth, and 9 miles to seaward the surface water is quite fresh.

—Ernest George Ravenstein

*Maji huteremka bondeni, hayapandi mlina.*
Water must flow into the low places, for it cannot climb up the hill.

As it bisects the African continent the equator crosses two of the world's great bodies of water: the Congo River and Lake Victoria. These waters have long sustained the lives of millions of Africans, and captured the fancy of the first European explorers to encounter them—people like Diogo Cão, Henry Morton Stanley and John Speke. Artists from the author Joseph Conrad to filmmaker John Huston have found inspiration in these bodies of water. The Congo River is one of the most powerful rivers on the planet, pulling water from countless tributaries that drain the immense Congo rainforest basin. Over 900 miles upriver from where the river disgorges itself violently into the Atlantic

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3 A Swahili methali, or proverb, translated by the author. As with many Swahili proverbs this methali contains shared wisdom, and the origin of it lies in oral tradition, thus the “original” author is unknown.

4 Huston's "The African Queen" was filmed on location on the Congo River in 1951.
lies a small town called Lisala. Still a sleepy backwater, Lisala's most famous product is Mobutu Sese Seko, born Joseph-Desiree Mobutu in 1930. Lake Victoria, the source of Nile and thus one of the most important transnational natural resources in the world, is also the largest tropical lake on the planet. On its southeastern bank lies the small community of Butiama, also famous for its own native son, Julius Nyerere, born Kambarage Nyerere in 1922.

Like many others on the continent both Mobutu and Nyerere had a connection to the waters of Africa beyond just physical sustenance. Nyerere’s mother was renowned for her spiritual power to help summon the rains, and named Nyerere after a spirit of lightning which she said presided over his birth—a night pervaded by a furious thunderstorm. Mobutu possessed a “visceral love of the water” his entire life, and routinely built homes on the banks of great bodies of water. In contrast to the power of these waters were the men’s inauspicious home towns, each beside these marvels of nature. Each came from families without colonial connections, and from ethnic groups on the margins of national society without any significant political power base to mobilize, and yet these men emerged from these beginnings to dominate the politics of east and

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5 It is now known that the Congo is the second most voluminous river, after the Amazon, on the planet. However, even at the time of its European “discovery” by Diogo Cão, the explorer was stunned to find detritus from the river ejected several miles into the Atlantic. According to the Smithsonian Magazine (see full citation in the conclusion) the Congo flows at “1.25 million cubic feet of water per second.”


8 Michela Wrong, In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz: Living on the Brink of Disaster in Mobutu’s Congo (New York: Harper Perennial, 2002), 71. Even his homes in Europe tended to be built near water, such as his villa on the French Riviera.
central Africa for more than three decades. Today, the Congo River and Lake Victoria bear witness to the multiple legacies left Nyerere and Mobutu on Tanzania and the DRC.9

The Democratic Republic of the Congo and Tanzania emerged from the colonial period with two markedly different national contexts.10 Tanzania’s bloodless independence struggle produced one clear choice for head of state: Julius Nyerere, moving into independence at the head of his highly mobilized, multi-ethnic Tanganyikan Africa National Union party. Educated in Scotland and Uganda11, brilliant, philosophical and calm, Nyerere’s rise to national leadership was predetermined with colonial officials and peaceful, but would not have been possible without sustained political pressure and grassroots organization on the part of the Tanzanian populace.12

By contrast, the abrupt Belgian withdrawal from the Congo was marked by violence and chaos, and a severe lack of premeditation. Only 26 Congolese in a population of over thirty million had completed post-secondary education by independence in 1960.13 Ethnically aligned political leaders like Joseph Kasa-Vubu and Moise Tshombe vied for control of the nation during the Congo Crisis of 1960-61, and the elected president, Patrice Lumumba, was assassinated within his first year in office.

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9 For the sake of coherence, I will use the term “Congo” for the state called variously the Congo Free State from 1885, the Belgian Congo in 1908, the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1960, Zaire in 1967, and then again in 2007, the Democratic Republic of the Congo. “Tanzania” will be used instead of Tangayika, except where the distinction is relevant to provide context.


11 At Makerere University in Kampala and the University of Edinburgh.


Foreign powers, especially the United Nations, United States, and the Soviet Union, in the fervor of the Cold War, attempted to control Congolese proxies who in turn attempted to manipulate their supposed puppeteers. Out of this maelstrom emerged an unlikely leader: a man who had not completed secondary school, achieved power through establishing client networks within the military, and had no major ethnic base to consolidate his leadership. In light of these political challenges, Joseph-Desiree Mobutu, despite intense support from the United States, seemed destined to be, within a short time, another victim of Congo’s exceptionally bloody political history. This, of course, would not be so. Thirty years later both men were still major forces in their respective nation’s politics, but were in the twilight of their influence.\textsuperscript{14} Their legacies today, however, are as divergent as were the conditions of their emergence into national leadership. Julius Nyerere’s beatification to sainthood in the Catholic Church and informal veneration by Tanzanians and others around the world is ongoing.\textsuperscript{15} By contrast, many still vilify Mobutu, blaming him in part for the world’s deadliest conflict since World War II which continues in the Congo, ignited in the wake of his violent fall from power.\textsuperscript{16}

These preponderant perspectives are not universal. Ali Mazrui famously critiqued what he called a “Tanzaphilia” among western Africanists, eager to see the very best in Nyerere’s ideals and implementations because of Nyerere’s intellectual ability, his pan-

\textsuperscript{14} Nyerere stepped down from the presidency in 1985, but remained chairman of the party in power, \textit{Chama Cha Mapinduzi}, until 1990.

\textsuperscript{15} Robert Mugagga, "Yes, Nyerere Could Make a Great Saint!" \textit{The Observer} (Kampala), October 29, 2009.

Africanism, and his moderate leftism.\textsuperscript{17} Mobutu, also, has been written off too often in academic critique, and many scholars have allowed the kleptocratic aspect of his regime to overshadow any possible ideological contributions made by his regime to Zairian consciousness and regional politics.\textsuperscript{18} Despite this, scholars such as Crawford Young and Thomas Turner suggest that Mobutu’s idea of “authenticite,” initially at least, was an effective, popular, and ideologically interesting political construct, with “genuine resonance” and power.\textsuperscript{19} Indeed, the common wisdom that Mobutu was a puppet for American interests in Africa is also due for challenge. An ex-U.S. ambassador to Zaire, for example, recognized that Mobutu was “an extraordinary political animal” and ultimately admitted that Mobutu had far more influence and power in the bilateral relationship than the United States.\textsuperscript{20}

A reason for these complex views of each man is that they can be seen to represent a category of Africa’s first generation of independent leaders. Nyerere is prototypical of what Toyin Falola calls a “small elite of political theorists who doubled as political leaders.” These were well educated, ideologically committed statesmen/intellectuals—men like Ghana’s Kwame Nkurumah, Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda and Senegal’s Leopold Senghor.\textsuperscript{21} Mobutu represents leaders who acquired

\textsuperscript{17} Ali A. Mazrui, "Tanzaphilia," \textit{Transition} \textit{75/76} (1997).

\textsuperscript{18} Examples include \textit{In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz} by journalist Michela Wrong, cited frequently in this book, \textit{Chief Of Station, Congo} by former CIA station chief Larry Devlin, and \textit{Mobutu or Chaos} by Michael G. Schatzberg.

\textsuperscript{19} Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, \textit{The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State} (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 220.

\textsuperscript{20} Elise F. Patcher, "Our Man in Kinshasa: U.S. relations with Mobutu, 1970-1983: Patron-Client relations in the international sphere " (diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1987), 321. The ambassador is not named in Patcher's dissertation, and the quotation is attributed to "Informant 32."

\textsuperscript{21} Toyin Falola, \textit{Nationalism and African Intellectuals} (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 2000), 27. Falola also includes “Ndamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya… Sekou Toure of
power through control of the military, autocrats who ruled through repression and left power in disgrace through violence. Sadly, Mobutu-like leaders are plentiful in modern African history, including men like C.A.R.'s Jean-Bedel Bokassa, Somalia's Siad Barre, and Ethiopia's Mengistu Haile Mariam. This thesis intends to challenge these macro-categories of African leadership through placing Mobutu and Nyerere in comparison, specifically in the key period of 1960-1979. This project does not intend to elevate Mobutu, or denigrate Nyerere, but rather intends to examine points of convergence and contrast in their rises to power, their methods of leadership, and their ideological and pragmatic modes of executing the power of the state. Finally, this thesis intends to demonstrate how the contexts from which each man emerged, both personally and within the nation, played a crucial role in how each man's rise to power and subsequent leadership played out, and, by proxy, how the trajectories of each nation were set in place by these processes.

Comparing these particular leaders also proves valuable because their states' affairs have long been entangled geographically, politically and in terms of the trajectories of leadership. The nations share physical proximity—Lake Tanganyika is a common border. The historical timelines of Mobutu and Nyerere's lives and periods of

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Guinea, and Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire” in this group. Of these, Sekou Toure certainly could have a place on the list included above, but his predilection for secret prisons and reports of many hundreds murdered during his time in power cloud his worthiness on a list of Africa’s most auspicious statesmen.

22 It is worth noting how closely these men adhere to the “Mobutu pattern.” Bokassa, Barre and Mariam all entered the military as low level officers, seized power during chaos generated by a power vacuum, consolidated power under one party, and eventually were forced out of power through military action after overseeing brutally repressive regimes for many years. Mengistu has also been connected to Nyerere because of his forced villigization process intended to nationalize farming, but the level of oppression and repression he utilized in this process dwarfs any used in Nyerere’s Tanzania.

23 The Lake Tanganyika border is almost three hundred miles long, and at its most narrow points is under 25 miles wide.
power are remarkably similar. Each rose to power in the early days of African independence, and solidified their power and national boundaries from 1960-1963. Each spent three years consolidating power internally, from 1964-1966, and then crafted defining documents regarding the course of each nation in 1967. Each saw their nations and national visions largely thrive until key points in the mid-70s when several factors, both internal and external, set each nation on a downward trajectory in terms of economic development, political freedom, and cultural expansion. This scope, from 1960-1979, is the period examined in this thesis, with introductory biographical sketches of each man. The first section of this thesis briefly contextualizes the national and personal histories which are at the center of the project. The second section focuses on the use of language in each nationalization project. The third section addresses the construction and implementation of ideologically important documents in each context. The final section analyses Mobutu and Nyerere's respective relationships with the U.S. government during the early stages of the Angolan conflict, which saw a post-colonization Angola serve as proxy hot war between Cubans and Soviets against the United States and continental allies.  

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24 The Angolan Civil War begin in 1975 after it gained independence from Portugal and continued until the death of UNITA’s Jonas Savimbi in 2002.
Part I. Establishing Context

In order to effectively contextualize the comparison at the center of this thesis, it is important to briefly examine the development of the states of Congo and Tanzania, and then to sketch out the biographical details of each leader up to 1960, the beginning of the period examined more closely in the rest of the paper. The states that are now Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of the Congo share the same infamous birth year: 1885. This was the penultimate year of the Conference of Berlin, where the European powers arbitrarily parceled out Africa for economic exploitation, political experimentation, and resource extraction.\textsuperscript{25} To the residents of these newly minted nations, little would change for over a decade, and even then a new history of resistance and proto-independence would emerge, but in the imaginations of the cartographers of Europe the African continent was to be forever transformed.

Colonial Congo

King Leopold II of Belgium had been laying groundwork for the acquisition of the Congo Free State since at least 1876, almost a decade prior to the Conference of Berlin.\textsuperscript{26} Leopold’s audacious plan was to gain for himself personally—not as the titular head of the state of Belgium—an economically bountiful region almost seventy seven times the size of his own nation.\textsuperscript{27} Leopold recognized in the Congo the potential for massive mineral extraction, agriculture, and saw in its mass a space for a tiny nation to engage in large projects, impossible in the metropole. He also knew that Belgium needed to take its

\textsuperscript{25} Thomas Packenham’s \textit{The Scramble for Africa} is an excellent account of this process.


\textsuperscript{27} Belgium is just under 11,800 square miles and Congo is over 905,000 square miles.
place in Africa for reasons of prestige and influence, the colonization of Africa quickly became a status project as well as brimming with economic potential. He knew from the outset that he needed strong public support in from the Belgian people, international humanitarian groups and other national powers, especially Britain, France and Germany, for his African project. One method he used to generate this was by enlisting the famous explorer, Henry Morton Stanley, to chart the area around the Congo River and extract treaties from chiefs in the region. At the Conference of Berlin, Leopold’s near decade of intense politicking paid off, and using Stanley's reports and treaties as evidence of the righteousness of his claims he was granted by the conference delegates a massive land grant—the size of Western Europe—in Africa as a “humanitarian venture” under his supervision.\textsuperscript{28} The outcomes of this “humanitarian venture” are well known, revealed especially powerfully by journalist Adam Hochshild in \textit{King Leopold’s Ghost}. Despite his success in convincing the world to adopt his plan for Central Africa, the economic viability of the Free State was by no means a foregone conclusion. However, rubber, newly adapted for commercial use, proved the engine of financial gain which justified economically Leopold’s massive gamble, but the extraction of the sap from the rubber vine \textit{cryptostegia grandiflora} proved highly deadly to the people of the “Free State,” events described well by Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja as "the Congo holocaust."\textsuperscript{29} After Leopold’s 23 year period of rule, Congo lost approximately half of its population to the unimaginable utilizations of violence under the \textit{Force Publique}.—Leopold’s military

\textsuperscript{28} Nzongola-Ntalaja, \textit{The Congo}, 16.

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 18.
force—disease and massive displacement.\textsuperscript{30} The grotesque violence achieved its economic purpose, however: estimates suggest Leopold extracted approximately $1.1 billion of raw materials, adjusted for inflation, during his reign over the Free State.\textsuperscript{31}

Activists like E. D. Morel and George Washington Williams, missionaries like William Sheppard, and authors like Joseph Conrad and Mark Twain brought the atrocities being committed in Congo to world attention, and in 1908 Leopold lost control of the Congo to the state of Belgium.\textsuperscript{32} The Belgian government itself did not pressure Leopold to relinquish the state—he always imagined "grandly bequeathing" Congo to his people—but he did not wish for the transfer of power to be impelled by humiliation and international condemnation.\textsuperscript{33} This time, however, Leopold did not get his wish.

Belgium reluctantly took control of the state, having nothing like the economic capacity of Britain to fund the expenses of colonial experimentation. For this reason, the Belgian government maintained the system of exploitive and regressive governance Leopold had established, albeit with the whitewash of a "constitution" overseeing political practices.\textsuperscript{34} They also followed in the trajectory of their monarch by brutally exploiting the region for Belgian economic benefit while expending the bare minimum effort on humanitarian or "civilizing" projects. Thus, by the time domestic pressure from

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 22. The 1911 census recorded 8.5 million Congolese, and the estimates taken by Leopold when he came into possession of the Free State indicated between 20 and 30 million people.

\textsuperscript{31} Adam Hochschild, \textit{King Leopold's Ghost a Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa} (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999), 277.

\textsuperscript{32} Conrad’s book is the famous \textit{Heart of Darkness}, and Twain’s book on the subject was \textit{King Leopold’s Soliloquy}.

\textsuperscript{33} Hochschild, \textit{King Leopold's Ghost}, 257.

\textsuperscript{34} Nzongola-Ntalaja, \textit{The Congo}, 27.
Congolese dissidents, and the rising tide of African independence movements across the continent, overcame the rickety Belgian colonial apparatus, what was handed over to the Congolese was, in the words of Patrice Lumumba, “a regime of injustice, suppression and exploitation.”

Colonial Tanzania

In 1885 when European powers granted Leopold the right to attempt to conquer the area that became the Congo Free State, the fourteen-year-old nation of Germany received a number of African territories as well, including what was called Tanganyika and the state of Ruanda-Urundi combined into a region called German East Africa. The German Empire's Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s reasons for acquiring holdings in East Africa have been characterized by John Iliffe as “obscure.” Bismarck appeared to think it would be “very simple” to gain territory in East Africa: “for a few muskets one can obtain a paper with some native crosses,” he observed. This proved to be anything but the case, and widespread rebellions, most notably the Maji-Maji rebellion in 1905, shattered German expectations of ruling a simple, docile populace in East Africa. The Germans were never able to ignite rapid economic growth in Tanganyika, and gold mining, later a major component of the Tanzanian economy, did not begin until 1909. Likewise, the Germans were not able to consolidate enough labor to make any large scale industry viable due to Tanzania's relatively low population density.

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37 Quoted in Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 90.
In the aftermath of World War I, and Bismarck’s loss to the allies, the League of Nations designated colonies formerly held by the Germans as "trustee" territories which would be administered by various Allied states. Tanganyika fell into the "trusteeship" of the United Kingdom. Unlike Congo under Leopold, Tanganyika had not been a highly successful economic project for the Germans. Neither country possessed large scale agricultural projects, and Tanganyika had nothing like the nascent copper mining operation in the Katanga region of the Belgian Congo when the British took control. The very low population density—and the subsequent inability of German colonialists to generate a large enough labor pool to develop massive agriculture, in this case sisal farms—dramatically inhibited their ability to profit from their colonial dealings in Tanganyika. The British had already invested very heavily in Kenya to the North, and thus were not prepared to invest the money necessary to convert Tanzania into the high-producing agrarian colony they were developing in Kenya, despite relatively similar geography. In some key respects, such as offering aid to encourage migration of European settlers to the region, Britain invested even less in Tanganyika, and even in their capstone colony of Kenya, than the Germans had.

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39 It is perhaps of indication of how poorly Germany did as a colonial power in general that Tanzania was considered its “most valued colony.” From Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika, 261. This certainly has to do with the lack of investment, highlighted by Elliot Green in the citation above.


41 Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika, 303. The British had fewer colonists in Kenya than did the Germans in Tanganyika by 1914.
In fact, the only key economic development during the British rule was the growth of cash cropping, especially coffee, by Africans themselves outside of colonial control. Tanzanians also resisted colonial attempts at controlling economics through centralization and coercive agricultural mandates. The relative paucity of economic benefit from the Tanganyikan colony, and the same international pressures pushing for African liberation which were affecting Belgium in the Congo, made the decision for the British to abandon their colonial aspirations in Tanganyika easier than in other colonies like Kenya. They engaged in a peaceful transfer of power to the Tanzanians, headed by Julius Nyerere, on December 9, 1961. This peaceful transfer was not, however, the product of the paternal largesse of former colonizers, rather it also came about due to intense political pressure applied by TANU and its activists for many years, including Nyerere's pressure on the U.N. to allow the "trustee" state its full rights as an independent nation.

Biographical Sketch: Nyerere

Despite some heirarchization of influence within Zanaki culture, the notion of consensus-based decision making and the reality that a functional community could be largely devoid of institutional hierarchy stayed with Nyerere his entire life. Kambarage Nyerere was born during the March rains of 1922 into the “acephalous Zanaki society” and had origins not unlike many of his countrymen. The Zanaki largely hunted for food, in a “stark… land of granite outcroppings” but were famed cattle raisers as well. Zanaki

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42 Ibid.


communities were often loose affiliations of homesteads spread across the savannah region of northwest Tanzania. Decisions were arrived at through negotiations between homestead leaders, and discussion would continue until consensus was achieved.\textsuperscript{45} It is important to point out that this consensus was sometimes achieved through forms of coercion, and people who violated Zanaki cultural precepts to a profound degree were exiled from their community when it was deemed essential.\textsuperscript{46} Community respect was determined largely by gerontocracy, though spiritual and technological practitioners—especially rainmakers and blacksmiths—were deemed particularly important to community life.\textsuperscript{47}

Nyerere’s mother, Mgaya, the fifth wife in her household and thus not a prominent member of it, has been accounted for variously in histories of his life, and some modern revisionist histories claim her to be an important practitioner of “witchcraft” in her community.\textsuperscript{48} Whatever the position of his mother, it is beyond dispute that his father, named Burito, was considered a diviner of some talent within the region.\textsuperscript{49} This local influence caused the Germans to appoint him “chief” when they formalized indirect rule powers in the region. According to Nyerere this construct did not resonate within the Zanaki community, and neither his father, nor Nyerere himself

\textsuperscript{45} Stöger-Eising, “’Ujamaa’ Revisited.” 122.

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{47} For example, see John Iliffe, \textit{A Modern History of Tanganyika} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 203. Iliffe suggests that rainmakers were not used only for summoning rains, but were to be consulted for all matters of life, from the mundane upward.

\textsuperscript{48} Robert Mugagga, “Yes, Nyerere Could Make a Great Saint!” \textit{The Observer} (Kampala), October 29, 2009.

\textsuperscript{49} Stöger-Eising, “’Ujamaa’ Revisited.” 124.
received special treatment from peers because of this titular commendation. The benefits received from Burito’s position in the colonial system did have profound effects on Nyerere’s educational opportunities, however.

Nyerere’s formal education began when he turned 12, when he began attending a local primary school in the region. At the Native Authority Boarding School in the town of Mwisenge, Nyerere’s academic gifts became immediately apparent. A classmate recalled that “because of his brilliance” Nyerere became a focus of attention and affection from fellow students and teachers alike. He was soon transferred to the Tabora Boys Secondary School, a Catholic-run institution, and one of the only secondary schools open to Africans in the country. Tabora graduates were being groomed by the British to occupy management positions within the indirect rule system of governance. It was an elitist academy “modeled upon Eton”, and was exclusively open to the sons of chiefs. These children of “superior upbringing” received numerous privileges, including having servants who cleaned up after them. At Tabora Nyerere converted to Catholicism in 1944, and his faith became an instrumental part of the rest of his life, including his political philosophies. No account exist to explain the nature of his conversion, but it seems his encounter with Catholicism, even within the context of parochial school

50 Ibid., 124.
52 Kiluba Lukuba-Mvwanda Nkulu, "Julius Kambarage Nyerere's vision of higher education for Tanzania" (diss., University of Kentucky, 2001), 105. As the school’s name implies it was a school which largely catered to the sons of local chiefs, of whom Burito Nyerere was one.
53 Stöger-Eising, "'Ujamaa' Revisited," 128.
54 Ibid., 106.
affected him deeply, and his faith was something profoundly meaningful to him. After his conversion he was given the “Christian” name “Julius.”

Nyerere graduated with distinction from Tabora in 1942, and immediately received a scholarship to study at Makerere University, then Makerere College, in Uganda. It was here that Nyerere first explored politics as he helped found a chapter of the Tanzania African Association, the body which later became the Tanzanian African National Union (TANU) political party, at the college. After distinguishing himself academically at Makerere through mastery of his subject fields and his obvious eloquence as a speaker and writer, and attaining a good teaching position at a secondary school in Tanzania, Nyerere received the first scholarship of its kind offered to a Tanzanian that enabled him to study for his Masters degree at the University of Edinburgh.

Nyerere left for Edinburgh in 1949, and his political interests grew during his time in the land of Tanzania’s colonizer. He joined the Fabian Colonial Bureau, an anti-colonial socialist organization in Britain, and wrote passionately on the subject of East African independence during his time at the university. Upon his return to Tanzania in late 1952, he was among a handful of highly educated Tanzanians, and quickly moved through the ranks of the Tanzanian African Association to be elected its president in 1953.

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55 Nkulu, "Julius Kambarage Nyerere's vision", 108. In Shirley Graham Dubois’ Julius K. Nyerere: Teacher of Africa she quotes Nyerere as saying adopting the name Julius was the only major drawback of converting to Christianity (see page 71).

56 Dubois, Julius K. Nyerere, 75.

57 Ibid., 84. The scholarship also supported his family in Tanzania while he was in Scotland.

58 Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika, 508-509.
Now officially the leading political figure in the nation, Nyerere agitated for independence before the United Nations in 1955, and in the following six years led an insistent but non-violent push for autonomy from Britain, which was achieved in late 1961. It was during this crucial period, from 1955-1961, that Nyerere mobilized various groups of people, especially women, wage-earners and the poor, around the vision of a TANU-led independent Tanzania.\(^{59}\) While this push toward national unity was not without dissent and political contestation, especially from Swahili nationalists and ethnic loyalists, it was nothing like the bloody chaos which would birth the political dominance of Nyerere’s counterpart in Congo, Joseph Mobutu.

Biographical Sketch: Mobutu

Mobutu’s early years are somewhat shrouded in mystery as Mobutu routinely attempted to “mythologize his own upbringing.”\(^{60}\) While there are a number of biographers and memoirists in the French language who have provided perspective on Mobutu, only the journalist Michela Wrong in her *In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz* provides a long form English language take on Mobutu’s life.\(^{61}\) Whatever the paucity of research, it is clear that Joseph-Desiree Mobutu was born in Lisala, Belgian Congo on October 15, 1930. His mother, who came to be known as Mama Yemo, was “either unmarried or abandoned by her spouse” when she became pregnant with Mobutu.\(^{62}\) Some accounts

\(^{59}\) Ibid., 542

\(^{60}\) Michela Wrong, *In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz: Living on the Brink of Disaster in Mobutu's Congo* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2002), 71.

\(^{61}\) Her book is fascinating and a compelling read, but is almost unsourced. Even direct quotations are unsourced, only in the end does she make passing references to various works she read researching the book. This makes her scintillating prose subject to serious academic critique.

place her in the "harem" of an Ngabandi chief when Mobutu was conceived, thus giving Mobutu some "chiefly" lineage, though this claim is of questionable legitimacy on several levels.\textsuperscript{63} Regardless, Yemo met and married a local cook named Albéric Gbemani while pregnant with Mobutu, a man who died when Mobutu was eight. Mobutu's uncle was an important figure in his early life, and was the one who gave him his "Christian" name, Joseph-Desiree.

Yemo's social support network was never strong in her home community of Lisala, and she moved to Kinshasa (then Leopoldville), while Mobutu was still a child. This migratory impulse was very common in the Belgian Congo in the late 30s and early 40s as colonial administrators centralized governance and economics in urban areas like Kinshasa (Leopoldville) and Lubumbashi (Stanleyville). When he reached school age Yemo sent Mobutu to the care of another uncle, this one in Mbandaka, where he attended a local parochial boarding school. Like Nyerere, Mobutu's intellectual abilities were immediately evident—former classmates recall him always being in the top three students in his classes.\textsuperscript{64} It was here that Mobutu demonstrated two key qualities that differentiated him from his peers: physical prowess, especially through athletic achievement, and linguistic capability, often exceeding the abilities of his instructors in the French language. Despite these attributes, Mobutu proved to be a troublemaker with disdain for authority. In 1949, as Nyerere was travelling to Edinburgh to begin his graduate studies, Mobutu ran away from school, an act which was considered a crime at

\textsuperscript{63} Wrong, \textit{Mr. Kurtz}, 73. This is questionable both because it is unclear whether or not Mobutu legitimately was connected to the chief, and also the relative authority and power of this chief, even among the Ngabandi.

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.
the time, stowed away on a boat bound for Kinshasa, and when caught was forced to join the Force Publique, the Belgian Colonial armed forces, on a seven-year stint.65

His linguistic ability served him well in the Force Publique—he spoke French with much greater fluency and style than any of his peers—and he became a translator and voracious reader, consuming especially political works such as Machiavelli’s The Prince.66 He developed an interest in journalism, and after completing his required seven years in the army, during which time he achieved the highest rank available to a Congolese, he quit to join the staff of L’Avenir, a French language daily in Kinshasa. In 1958 he was sent by the newspaper to Brussels to cover the World’s Fair, and during his time in Belgium met Patrice Lumumba.67

With Lumumba, as was the case with Sergeant Joseph Bobozo in the Force Publique and the Belgian editor of L’Avenir, Mobutu continued his pattern of attaching himself to people in power above him, and after ingratiating himself, profiting from their expertise and connections. True to this method, he quit L’Avenir while in Belgium and joined Lumumba's political party. He quickly gained the trust of Lumumba and became "one of his top assistants".68 By the end of his twenties, positioned beside Lumumba, Mobutu was to be near the center of the political maelstrom that would envelop the country as the Belgians ceded power to indigenous leadership. Such was Mobutu’s relationship with Lumumba that as the chaos of late 1960 began to overwhelm the


66 Ibid.

67 Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo, 143.

68 Ibid., 144. Lumumba’s political party was the Mouvement National Congolais.
president, Lumumba dispatched Mobutu across the country to quell rebellious proto-
movements.\textsuperscript{69} It was in the chaos after the assassination of Lumumba, which occurred
with instrumental support from Mobutu, that Mobutu found conditions ripe for his rise to
power.\textsuperscript{70}

Biographies and Trajectories

It is clear that both men possessed remarkable personal attributes which enabled
them to excel in whatever context they were placed. Both were brilliant, ambitious,
politically masterful and resilient. It is, in fact, the context of development, as much as
any other factor, that made Mobutu into Africa's most hated dictator and Nyerere into the
fondly remembered Mwalimu. Nyerere's constructed connection to the chiefhood
provided him opportunities unavailable to other Tanzanians at the time. Mobutu, on the
other hand, had no structural advantages that would prefigure the political success he so
long enjoyed. His ethnic group was irrelevant on the national scene, he did not complete
secondary school; his martial advancement had more to do with his language ability than
his military prowess, although this skill developed as he climbed ranks in the Force
Publique. It is clear that Mobutu's political gains were the product of his own wit, his
ability to manipulate alliances, and his genius in propaganda and patronage systems.

Nyerere, who clearly was a brilliant politician in his own right, was also given as
many opportunities to succeed as any Tanzanian of his era. His innate talents were
validated and expanded by his life progression, but had he not been the 'son of a chief' or
had he not been able to attend Tabora or Makerere, he would likely have been an

\textsuperscript{69} Sean Kelly, America's Tyrant (Lanham, Md.: American University Press, 1993), 27.

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., 6. Mobutu gave the Belgians details of Lumumba's activities, and his troops were "guarding"
Lumumba when he "surprisingly" managed to leave his protected residence.
excellent and brilliant school teacher in Tanzania, rather than perhaps the most influential African political thinker of all time. Mobutu had no such privileges, and yet clung to power in a country that was exponentially larger, more complex and less stable than Nyerere's Tanzania.\footnote{This is not to say that Mobutu was a better leader, per se, but it certainly suggests that his political skills were among the most remarkable of his era of African leaders.}

This contextualizing is important because it speaks to a central theme of this thesis: Mobutu and Nyerere were men whose national and personal contexts were deeply relevant in determining the leaders they were to become. A Mobutu-type figure could not have become the leader of Tanzania because of colonial realities and the nature of meritocratic model of African advancement in the German and British colonies. Likewise the political context of Zaire made a Nyerere-type leader impossible because of the chaotic and violent nature of the system which did not reward thoughtful and inclusive politics. Indeed, perhaps Lumumba was as close to a Nyerere as Congo has ever seen, and the tragic case of his life serves as a critical example of the impossibility of a Congolese Nyerere during the immediate post-colonial era.
Part II. Speaking The Nation

[Authenticite], for me, is a French word. It is... the situation, the life of our forbears, how they lived, their mentalities, their actions, their travels. I think.

— from an interview with an unnamed Zairian JMPR schoolboy, 1975

The word "ujamaa" was chosen for special reasons... it is an African word and thus emphasizes the African-ness of the policies we intend to follow.

— Julius Nyerere, 1968

In Imagination Communities Benedict Anderson examined the instrumentality of language in the production of nationalism. He suggested that the language of the nation operates as a proxy for sacred language, and suggested these "languages-of-state" become entwined with the will and purpose of the government. The elevation of a vernacular to the position of language-of-state, or the acceptance of an external universal-imperial as the national language, Anderson argued, profoundly affects the character of the state. In the period immediately following the end of European colonialism Mobutu and Nyerere engaged in similar attempts to coalesce divergent ethnic, political and economic inteests around conceptions of national identity. The languages at the core of these projects were French, a universal-imperial colonial import, and Swahili, an “elevated” vernacular.

The Zairian schoolboy confused about “authenticity” (authenticite) was a member of the JMPR, the youth wing of Mobutu’s Mouvement Populaire de la

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Revolution, and was from Lisala, Mobutu’s birthplace.\textsuperscript{75} The JPMR schoolboy belied the implemented realities of Mobutu’s aspirations for “authenticity” in two key ways. Before any attempt to define the term the boy identified that the phrase was derived from French. In doing so he expressed alienation from the concept, and distanced its implications from his own experience. If the term was in his mother tongue, identification of the language would have been unnecessary. Even more critical than his distance from language, is that he concluded his remark about the definition of one of the three tenants of Mobutuism with the phrase “I think.” His lack of comprehension about this crucial aspect of state policy mirrored broader societal disconnect with this legislated attempt to bridge a "common cultural heritage" with a "revolutionary" future.\textsuperscript{76}

Mobutu’s use of French as the language of the new state alienated his project from the people of Congo. The failure of this nation-building project occurred because the ideas behind it had no social meaning, and remained an “outside” conceptualization of a deeply internal identification process. If a youth member of Mobutu’s own party, from his hometown, propagandized through an education system of Mobutu’s own devising could not identity this core principle of the Mobutist state, who could?

Nyerere’s words above provide a counterpoint to the JMPR youth’s confusion. Nyerere suggested that \textit{ujamaa} was a word every Tanzanian would immediately recognize and understand, and indeed the idea of family and its social implications was obvious to any African society based on kinship networks. \textit{Ujamaa} is variously

\textsuperscript{75} Schatzberg, 425-426. The MPR was Mobutu’s political party, and until 1990 totally dominated the politics of Zaire, often with legally sanctioned exclusion of all other parties. The \textit{Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution} is most often Anglicized as the “Revolutionary Popular Movement.”

\textsuperscript{76} Zaire, Makanda Kabobi, \textit{Manifesto at N'Sele}, by Mobutu Sese Seko (N'Sele, 1967), 30.
translated, but is best rendered in English as “family-ways.” Connecting this political philosophy with family tied it to a fundamental principle of self-conception in most African communities: kinship. Being “authentic” had no such cultural resonance. Ujamaa’s familiarity to every Tanzanian imbued it with meaning born of personal experience—it was no foreign invader that required identification and explication before exploration and implementation. Nyerere further emphasized that ujamaa was an African word, reflecting the “African-ness” of his political movement. It is instructive that Nyerere focused on ujamaa as an African construct, and de-emphasized its Tanzanian or even Zanaki roots. This speaks to Nyerere’s Pan-Africanist aspirations for both his national model and for the Swahili language. The language of ujamaa is not identified as Swahili; it is simply "African." Despite other failures of his regime, this section will argue that Nyerere’s use of Swahili as a nationalizing language was a key factor in contributing to the successful development of a de-ethnicized, highly literate, and socially connected national populace in post-colonial Tanzania, and that ultimately Nyerere’s implementation of Swahili as Tanzania’s national language and the language of his political philosophy contributed to its rise to become the preeminent African language.

Language in Colonial Tanzania and Congo

These national languages did not emerge ex nihilo; both French and Swahili played important roles in the colonial era of Congo and Tanzania respectively. The Belgian’s colonial project was overtly commercial, but relied upon a coercive method of

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77 It is also translated as family-hood and family-ness, but “ways” speaks better to its pragmatic intent. Nyerere himself translated it as family-hood.

78 See, among many others, Robert O. Collins and James M. Burns, A History of Sub-Saharan Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Collins and Burns textbook is one of many synthetic works that distill kinship as among the principle, and nearly universal, elements of pre-colonial African societal structures.
commerce that required the routine implementation of brutal military force to generate sufficient labor. Administrators expressed little desire or experienced any incentive to institutionalize an African language for reasons other than administrative utility.

The origins of Lingala, the language that became Congo’s African lingua franca, coincide with the first Western incursions—initially in the form of H. Morton Stanley’s “exploratory” trips—into Congo’s interior, and does not appear to be an even regionally used language prior to that point. Unlike Swahili, Lingala was borne to serve the immediate needs of colonialists, and their precursors, who were attempting to administrate and exploit a vast and culturally non-contiguous space. The eventual practice of using Lingala in the colonial military was merely pragmatic, as many Congolese in the military were from western provinces, and already spoke Lingala as lingua franca. Lingala was also useful because it did not derive from an ethnic community, a fact which prevented the militarization, and thus empowerment, of any specific ethnic group. Prior to World War I, the Belgians used parallel African lingua franca in the militaries of the east (Swahili) and west (Lingala), but unified the military under Lingala after the war. Lingala’s repurposing as a lingua franca, born in Congo of European imperative, was in the eyes of the colonial administrators preferable to Swahili,

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79 So many texts support this claim that is uncontested. Most prominent among accounts of the brutality of Leopold's regime is Adam Hochschild's *King Leopold's Ghost* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999).


81 There is some dispute about the origins of Lingala, but current consensus points toward the obscurity to the point of insignificance of any Bangala "core" ethnic group from which Lingala emerged as a lingua franca.

82 Charles Gilman, "Convergence in Lingala and Zairian Swahili," *Anthropological Linguistics* 21, no. 2 (February 1979): 106. The heritage of this can be seen in the fact that many Lingala words for weaponry, in particular, are directly derived from Swahili. See this section of Gilman for cases.
which after World War I was considered a foreign tongue, belonging in British
colonies.\footnote{This concern with Swahili as a foreign force is similar to concerns many in the administration, including
Leopold II as an early example, with the possibility of “English colonies” cropping up within the Congo if
protestant missionaries were allowed to teach students in English. This led to a prohibition against all
English instruction. For more see Barbara Yates, "The Origins of Language Policy in Zaire," \textit{The Journal of Modern African Studies} 18, no. 2 (June 1980): 264.} Lingala was also deemed preferable to French in military applications, as
teaching common soldiers French would begin a process of “social elevation,” something
the Belgians were not keen to encourage among the rank and file of the armed forces.
The preponderant usage of Lingala over French in the military can be seen as early as
1904.\footnote{As quoted in Yates, "Origins of Language Policy," 261.} The schismatic nature of Belgian identity, pulled between Flemish and Walloon
cultural-linguistic heritages, provides some explanation of why the Belgians sought to
slow French assimilationist pretensions which could emerge culturally in Congo. The
French assimilationist model of colonialism theoretically tied the usage of the French
language to the “evolution” of an African toward the ideal of French citizenry. \footnote{Benedict Anderson, \textit{Imagined Communities Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, New Edition} (New York: Verso, 2006), 110. This claim can be contested by works such as Yates’ "Origins of Language Policy," 258. Here she quotes Belgian policy documents which encourage military officers to use French when possible with their Congolese soldiers. However, this can be seen as a component of the “gift” of French for “deserving” Congolese: only elites in the military were encouraged to be fluent in French.} Walloon
French was the language of the Belgian elite, including Leopold II, and was thus deemed
superior to Flemish, which was used by the working classes. “Protecting” French was in
the interest of these elite colonialists. The norm of authority in Congo was thus
established with French as a signifier of power and privilege, Lingala as signifier of far
less potent African power, and other ethnic languages part of the milieu of the masses.
French was held as a prized commodity for the elite of Congo’s populace, its serious
usage “restricted” for most, and passed down to those deemed worthy by the state as
something of a reward. The use of language in symbolic domination suggests that French inferred external domination on the Congolese populace, and Congolese who used French participated in this stratification and external domination. Further opposition to French acquisition by Congolese citizens came from the powerful Catholic Church in Congo for reasons similar to the ones eventually propagated by the Belgian colonial state.

The Congolese people also found ways to implement the emergent African lingua franca into their social interactions. These pseudo-indigenous lingua franca, largely Lingala and Swahili, were used in ethnic interactions as social leveler, “a language nobody knows,” as a way to avoid privileging the language of either group in sensitive talks. In both colonial and indigenous power hierarchies French was used for the exact opposite purpose: deliberate social stratification. A key point on this subject is that Lingala and French were both non-ethnic languages applied largely as instruments of military and colonial administration, and thus were not socially transmitted in Congolese ethnic communities to a large degree.

In addition to English, Swahili was used by the British in Tanganyika, and by the Germans before them, for logistic expediency to facilitate the direct rule model of colonial administration. In colonial Tanzania “Kiswahili was the national language while

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86 Gilman, "Convergence," 99. See also the section of this paper on French as a “false reward” for more on indigenous perception of the “gift” of French.


88 Yates, “Language Policy,” 261-263. Yates adds complication to this statement, however, by pointing out that many of the ground level religious workers, such as missionaries, were lower class Flemish Belgians whose own grasp of French was tenuous, and thus had low personal impetus to propagate the language.

89 Gilman, “Convergence,” 100.
English was the official language. “Beyond being simply a “horizontal means of communication between various people in society...” Kiswahili also became an instrument of nation-building, colonial state-formation, and vertical mediation between the government and the wider society.” This co-option of Swahili, of course, had implications on the development of the language and the perception people had of the language itself. However, unlike French, Swahili had a long history as a lingua franca in East Africa, and the adoption of Swahili as a language-of-power by colonial administrators did not radically transform people’s relationship to the language on a practical level. It was still, throughout the colonial period, a language that was more often spread through socialization than formal education.

Naming the Nation

The use of an imperial European language to articulate an authentic African context is not without complication. This can be seen in a brief study of the origin of the word “Zaire” itself. The term "Zaire" first appeared as Portuguese explorer Diego Cao’s bastardization of the Kongo word nzadi, an indigenous name for the great river that emptied itself into the ocean at the coast. This Portuguese interpretation of nzadi travelled back to Europe, where its exoticism briefly caught the attention of the enlightenment artists of the period. Eventually it emerged in Voltaire’s famous eponymous play. It was the word Zaire popularized in this play that Mobutu interpreted

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91 Ibid., 277.

92 Ibid., 284.

as “authentic”, removed the name “Congo,” obviously derived from the Kongo people, and replaced it with a French co-opted, Portuguese bastardized, coastal Kongo created term for the great river. Such were the complexities of co-opting a European language to speak “authentically” about an African cultural product.

In Congo, French was tied to official bureaucracy, and a mastery of the language was a pre-condition for entering the petite bourgeoisie of evolues, and with it access to the greatest measure of indigenous power in the Belgian colonial state. Despite its instrumentality in social mobility, it was not taught in indigenous schools.  

Later, language stratification contributed to relative positions in the hyper-bureaucracy of the Zairian state, a product itself of the relegation of the petite bourgeoisie to the second tier of state power after Mobutu’s meteoric rise. Mobutu presided over the upper level of politicians who “clustered around the Presidency and State commissaries” and created a “lower level, … the refuge of the bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie, a group which lost its privileges and whose standard of living declined, so that its actual economic position [became] closer to that of the labouring masses.” Thus the disparity between the mass of Zairians who spoke various ethnic and preponderant African languages and the French-speaking elite was made more complex by stratification within the French-speaking elite themselves. Indeed, the usage of French was denied to those in "inferior capacities" within government buereocracy; they used Lingala officially instead.  

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structural level, the French language was perhaps the European language least suited to the articulation of an alternate nationality and culture, as it “has an unparalleled history of concern about its cultural identity” that is “deeply intertwined with the idea of a French nation.” Despite the Belgian national colonial influence, the French language itself intrinsically connected the culture of Congo to both Brussels and Paris.

Neither Mobutu nor Nyerere instituted a language policy off the trajectory of the colonial administrators use of language. Doing so would have been pragmatically impossible. That said, both had the opportunity to address and modify the strategic importance of the national language on a comprehensive level. While Nyerere took Swahili, already a major linguistic force in Tanzania, and centralized its importance and utility in the state, Mobutu retained the essential ideological and strategic importance of French in the state, and continued Belgian policies of Lingala propagation as a second tier language of administrative authority, clearly removed from elevated positions held by French-speakers.

Language, Ethnicity and Nationalism

During Mobutu’s rise to power in the early 1960s the two major African vehicular languages present in Congo were Lingala, based largely in the west, and Swahili, based in the east and south, and two relatively minor ones: Kikongo and Tshiluba, both of which had stronger ethnic ties than either Swahili or Lingala. While Congo’s first elected leader, Patrice Lumumba, spoke fluent Swahili in addition to Lingala, Mobutu spoke no Swahili and never learned the language. Mobutu, Lumumba’s right hand in the late 50s,
saw the impact of ethnicized politics in Congo in the Katangan secession and the implications of ethnically based party politics contributing significantly to much of the chaos in the Congo Crisis. Mobutu’s own kinship community had never really been among his native Ngbandi, as they were a small ethnic group, unsuited for Mobutu’s insatiable ambitions. Instead, he created a pseudo-kinship network in the military, the command structure of which was organized around two linguae francae: French and Lingala. He did this by maintaining Lingala as the language of the military, and refusing to learn or speak any other African languages, like Swahili, other than his native tongue and Lingala. Neither French nor Lingala could be claimed as “belonging” to a specific Congolese ethnic group, as French was an obvious foreign import and Lingala was a non-ethnic indigenous vernacular. Thus Mobutu’s two languages, beyond his mother-tongue, Ubangi, were commercial, political, military and utilitarian, but not ethnic. A case study of Mobutu’s attempt to create a non-ethnic African identity centers around the 1971 process of renaming himself Mobutu Sese Seko. In doing so Mobutu re-christened (or de-christened) himself using Lingala, the language of his constructed politicized and militarized kinship network, rather than his own ethnic Ngbandi mother tongue. Although he lacked much formal education, being expelled from Catholic school in junior high for running away from school for a romantic tryst in Kinshasa, Mobutu’s relationship with French was important at an early age, when his mastery of it exceeded many new army recruits, and won him a plum desk job. He learned French during his first encounters with formal education, and French became the language he used for government, political theorizing and propaganda. Mobutu was further fighting against an internal ethnic

99 Young and Turner, Rise and Decline, 174.
“redefinition” process which was occurring, a process which was doing the opposite of what Mobutu was attempting.\textsuperscript{100} This “redefinition” was moving particularly urban Zairians toward greater differentiation and acceptance of ethnic adherence, rather than towards the generic “African-ness” Mobutu was pushing. This process was emerged as political parties attempted to create power bases, and the most obvious mechanism for doing so was around ethnic identities. Mobutu’s systematic attempts to “de-ethnicize” the people of Zaire wilted in the face of the power ethnic identification had to energize nascent political mobilization.\textsuperscript{101} Nonetheless, Mobutu’s political acumen and divide-and-rule leadership style was able to quell ethnic mobilization in a way that French could not. Using a monolithic non-African language to mitigate against ethnic affiliation was made more complex as ethnic identity in Africa consists of “interlocking, overlapping, multiple collective identities,” few of which, in Congo, were French-based.\textsuperscript{102}

Distilling Africanity to a single linguistic form with no pre-colonial connection to indigenous identity held little chance for success. Indeed, even at the time some critics of Mobutu’s \textit{authenticité} campaign wondered why he did not implement an African language to replace French if his stated goal was to faithfully reflect African traditions. By contrast, Swahili partly de-ethnicized the people who used it simply by its method of transmission. It was disseminated through socialization, and thus could act as a replacement language for a mother-tongue. In the context of language it is important to distinguish between creating a national identity and a shared cultural identity. As Nyerere

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., 144.

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., 149-150.

said, “A country which lacks its own culture is no more than a collection of people without the spirit which makes them a nation.”\textsuperscript{103} This becomes the tension between constructions of ideology and constructions of identity. Because of the ultimate hollowness of the ideology, as suggested at the outset of this paper, Mobutu’s ideology of authentique failed to impact the people he propagandized. The notion of Zaire dissipated as quickly as Mobutu himself in 1997, remembered by contemporary Congolese as something of a bad dream. Indeed, the intense integration of ideology and identity in Mobutuism fated the failure of the political/social system if it could not be integrated as a meaningful personal identity by the Zairians themselves. It clearly failed in this respect. Ujamaa as political ideology and economic system failed as well, and this “conceptualization of Tanzanian socialism as Ujamaa… clearly remained... little more than rhetoric” to most Tanzanians.\textsuperscript{104} That said, Nyerere’s vision of Swahili as a transformative language in Tanzania was realized in other ways, as is revealed in a brief examination of the development of language.

Swahili has gone through four major stages of development, but began as the language of a small coastal ethnic group in East Africa. Ethnic Swahilis interacted with Arab Muslim and Portuguese traders and missionaries for centuries prior to the colonial era, and through these interactions the language was transformed, and became infused with Arabic vocabulary and Islamic theology. Indeed, Islam in East Africa was the first force to widely disseminate Swahili, both as a language of trade, and as a “truth-


\textsuperscript{104} Gregory H. Maddox and James L. Giblin, eds., \textit{In Search of a Nation: Histories of Authority & Dissidence in Tanzania} (Athens, Ohio: Ohio UP, 2006), 308.
language” imbued with “the impulse to conversion.” With German and British colonialism, Islam’s influence in Tanzania’s Swahili-speaking areas waned, and Swahili’s development was co-opted by the new dominant power, Germany, as a suitable language to organize bureaucracy in the colonial state. The German language had little influence on the structure of language, which actually bore more signs of its first European linguistic contact: Portuguese. German Tanganyika was also the only state under German control to use Swahili—they made no attempt to integrate Swahili into Rwandan or Burundian administration. The decision to administrate through Swahili was reaffirmed by Britain when they became “entrusted” with Tanganyika after World War I by the League of Nations. British colonial administrators were already familiar with Swahili from colonial usage in Kenya, Tanzania’s northern neighbor. This made Swahili a connective agent for all of British East Africa. Swahili remained an important administrative language in the British East African structure until independence.

The final co-option of Swahili by political authority occurred when Tanganyikan nationalists, lead by Julius Nyerere, recognized Swahili as a potentially useful instrument in the attempt to create and refine a particular national/African identity among the people of Tanzania. This was because it was both “African,” that is Bantu-derived and associated with African speakers, and non-ethnic, as the Swahili people made up a relatively small component of the population of Tanzania and lacked the demographic

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105 Ibid., 14-15.

106 Gilman, “Convergence,” 101. Gilman’s examples of Portuguese lexicography in Swahili are mesa (table), anamasi (pineapple), and bendela (flag). Gilman points out that these terms are shared between Lingala and Swahili because the languages share Portuguese influence in their development.

107 At the time this was, of course, one nation called Ruanda-Urundi.
mass to rise into power on Swahili nationalism. This trajectory of evolution can be seen as a movement from a particular language, that of a small ethnic group on east Africa’s coast, into its current “universalist stage where the language has become the most widely used African language internationally and is becoming the medium of scientific discourse and technology.”108 There is great intentionality in the way Nyerere directed this rise, as discussed below. Both French and Swahili straddled the universal/particular divide, but in the African context Swahili succeeded in ways that French did not. Swahili could be “owned” by an African nation, whereas French, at least culturally, derived its linguistic authority from the directives and innovations of Paris, and politically from Brussels in the case of colonial Congo.

The Implementation of Nationalizing Languages

An obvious implementation of French in Mobutu’s Zaire was with the articulation of the guiding political principles of the nation as put forward in the political theory known as Mobutuism. Mobutu’s famous Manifesto at N’Sele in 1967 provided the justification and framework for this paternalistic political philosophy. But how accepted and internalized was this top-down directive? A case study produced by Allan Roberts, a Congo expert at UCLA, based on his experiences in the early 1970s in Lubanda, eastern Congo, reveals some deep dissonance between the French-speaking government based in Kinshasa and Zairians in Lubanda who spoke Swahili. Roberts witnessed a sorcery trial which was underway, and government officials wished to intervene and impose centralized law over the traditional methods of interpretation and imposing justice. The locals had executed a suspected sorcerer, and during contestation between a representative of the state and a local leader, the frustrated state official realizes he is not

108 Mazrui and Mazrui, ”Dominant Languages.” 276.
being taken seriously because he does not speak the local language, and “shouted in broken Swahili that ‘fire will rain down on you’ for allowing the murder to occur.”¹⁰⁹ The people are nonplussed, and further lose respect for the official as he is unable to speak the “real” language of the region with any proficiency. Despite a mastery of Lingala and French, the “commandant's broken Swahili was evidence of his outsider status, and a source of quiet derision by people in Lubanda.”¹¹⁰ This same dissonance could not have occurred in the same way in Tanzania, not specifically because of the prevalence of Swahili per se, but because the language of the state and the common language of the people were one.

Nyerere’s first encounter with Swahili was at the age of 12, during his initial experience with formal education, having spoken only his native Zanaki as a child.¹¹¹ Nyerere later made education, and the use of Swahili in it, a fundamental component of his political reform and nationalizing vision. This emphasis on education did not consist merely of empty promises. Tanzania went from an abysmal literacy rate of approximately 20 percent at independence to over 66 percent of all citizens in 1976, the highest in Africa at the time.¹¹² This had much to do with a policy enacted in 1970 that mandated the elimination of illiteracy in Tanzania by 1975 through educational reform, which


¹¹⁰ Roberts, 157.


created compulsory education and language instruction. Swahili became the language of every strata of Tanzania society, and far beyond Mobutu’s usage of language as a political, bureaucratic and propagandistic tool, Nyerere had grander visions for the language. He worked to translate some of the most important literary works in the English language into Swahili in order to “indisputably refute” notions of the inferiority of Swahili to other universal languages. Indeed, Nyerere’s translations of some of William Shakespeare’s most famous works manage to impeccably reproduce in Swahili the complexity, levels of meaning, and beauty of the words of the man who was arguably the English language’s greatest ever practitioner. Nyerere translated Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar (Jitliasi Kaizari) and The Merchant of Venice (Mapebari wa Venisi) and oversaw the translation of Macbeth. To Nyerere, Swahili was not just a tool for creating a nation; it was proof that the expressions of the African mind were equal in quality and power to any produced by the function of Western intellect.

Finally, when looking at implementations of these languages by these men, it is instructive to look at the ways in which each man named and renamed themselves as a way to examine their relationship to language. As mentioned in the biographical sketches, Mobutu was born Joseph-Desiree Mobutu, emerging from the womb imprinted with an identity of French origin. Nyerere’s transition from “Kambarage” to “Julius” was, despite its origins from the priests at Tabora, was something Nyerere later embraced, and he formally used only his middle initial later in life. This was perhaps an attempt to distance

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the animism of his origins from the devout Catholicism of his later life. An alternate explanation would be an attempt to de-ethnicize his name, moving away from Zanaki roots to a more generally African identity. Mobutu was content to use his birth name until he proclaimed an en masse return to African roots, a move that included casting off colonial nomenclature by returning to “African” names. The extent, meaning and utility can be questioned at the outset, and it is worth noting that his wife, Marie-Antoinette Mobutu, refused to “Africanize” her name.115

Marie-Anoinette provides an interesting entre to briefly examine how gender and language interplayed in these regimes. In contrast to French, Swahili is a non-gendered language. The pronoun yeye is neutral, and is always either him or her, and this principle extends to all pronoun usage in Kiswahili. French ascribes gender to every noun. Nyerere’s honorific mwalimu (teacher) must be compared to Mobutu’s “father” honorific. Indeed, in a remarkable inversion, Tanzanian female political activists called Nyerere mwanangu, my son.116 These two conceptions of leadership, one non-gendered (or at least of complex gender orientation), one instrumentally associated with gender, play out in the symbols and of the nation presented. Mobutu’s usage of leopard print dates to a tale he told about his childhood, and conquering his fears to slay a leopard and claim his man-hood. Nyerere, by contrast, elevated the intellectual and agrarian aspects of Tanzanian life. Certainly the agrarian life was one which concerned both male and female members of society equally. Working for the common good, rather than for Papa Mobutu, in Tanzania became a national project both genders could partake in equally, at least in theory.

115 Young and Turner, Rise and Decline, 360.
116 Maddox and Giblin, In Search of a Nation, 284.
Conclusion

Finally, it should certainly be acknowledged that Mobutu and Nyerere had different intentions in their national imagination projects. Mobutu's use of French, and to a lesser extent Lingala, reflects his conception of the state as an appendage of his will. French suited Mobutu's personal goals for the state, as it reinforced stratification in society between those who could utilize the imperial language and those who could not, and by extension those who had access to power and those who did not. Indeed, even this disconnect reflected the hollow political ideologies proffered under Mobutuism, which embodied a kind of Orwellian double-speak. How could a word like authenticité, emanating from a language of oppression and colonization ever hope to deeply reconnect Africans to a meaningful sense of their past?

Nyerere's intentions with Swahili were at once both grander and more simple. Nyerere sought to Africanize his people, meaning that he wanted to connect them to an identity broader than their nation and ethnic heritages. In doing so, he wanted to make a further philosophical point about the elegance, power and beauty of African identify as manifest in Swahili, a language he sought to universalize. The current demographics of Swahili's spread into east, and now central and south, of Africa speak to the success of this project. Swahili has spread widely from its coastal East African roots, and is now the most widely spoken African language, with an estimated 100 million speakers. By comparison Lingala firmly remains a language particular to Congo, spoken by approximately 10 million people. Nyerere undeniably had much to do with the popularization and dissemination of Swahili, even beyond Africa's borders. Indeed, African-American interest in African languages has been focused largely on Swahili (as
seen in the holiday Kwanzaa, for example) no doubt because of Nyerere’s stances on Pan-Africanism, African liberation and his decision to seriously consider and support African intellectualism. Nyerere’s sincerity, intellectual acuity and passion for African identity transcended his limitations and failings as a political leader, making his legacy in Africa’s modern history one viewed in a largely positive light.  

French is still very much a force in Congo today. Congo has become the largest French-speaking nation on earth, and French-language music and art produced by Congolese definitively impacted metropolitan French and Belgian culture. Congolese ethnic identities are still of instrumental importance in modern Congolese politics, and were protected, as this paper argues, by the veneer of the imperial language used by the state—none of the ethnic co-option of language as occurred in Nyerere’s Tanzania could occur in Mobutu’s Zaire. Mobutu’s ideas of Zaire, Mobutuism, authentique are now viewed as ideological smokescreens for his insatiable kleptocratic tendencies, and even at the time “fooled no one—except those on the take, who were more than willing to be deceived.”

Benedict Anderson can usefully be invoked again, especially with his comment that “All profound changes in consciousness, by their very nature, bring with them characteristic amnesias.” French, by its inability to supplant indigenous language systems, failed to implement a change in consciousness, and likewise a collective amnesia. Indigenous collective memory was firmly entrenched in the colonial period, and Mobutu’s language policy did nothing to displace it—if anything he solidified it further.


118 Roberts, 152.
French remained a language of the other, Lingala a language of the servant class. Swahili, as it passed socially and replaced or supplanted cultural linguistic elements, succeeded in the project of imagining a community, because it changed the way the past, and thus communal identity, was remembered. Tanzania remembered the “family-ways” because *Ujamaa* political philosophy, for all its failings as an idea and a process, took root in socialized modes of communication and community-building in Tanzania.

This section is obviously just the beginning of the process of examining the complex ways language, nationalism and African identity interacted in Mobutu’s Zaire and Nyerere’s Tanzania in the immediate post-colonial period. The ways in which each country’s development and self-concept emerged independently and through interaction is of primary importance in understanding how the tension between Africa’s future and past are negotiated now, and have been since independence.
Part III: Writing The Nation

On February 5, 1967 Julius Nyerere delivered one of the most important political and philosophical statements of Africa’s modern era, the Arusha Declaration. In elegant Swahili Nyerere outlined a vision for Tanzania, and Africa, that would cement his place among the handful of leading lights in Africa’s nascent political firmament.119 Just over two months later Mobutu Sese Seko delivered a French language articulation of African political philosophy, outlining the ideology behind the Zairian state in a document he called the N’Sele Manifesto. Both documents attempted to bridge gaps between nationalism and political universalism, but one was received with rapturous praise, the other with a deafening silence. This section of the thesis intends to look more closely at the ideas expressed in the Arusha Declaration and the N’Sele Manifesto by placing key ideas from each documents in comparison. The second part of this section will briefly examine the implementation of these guiding documents in the context of each nation’s socio-political realities.

Analysis of the Arusha Declaration

Immediately after the Arusha Declaration was delivered it was heralded across the world as a critical document in the development of a distinct African political philosophy. Some called it a “clear and unequivocal rejection” of neocolonialism through economic exploitation, and that an “Arusha disease…started a chain reaction” of liberationist thought in the southern, white-minority ruled African states.120 Others called it a “radical

119 Shirley Graham Dubois in Julius Nyerere: Teacher of Africa called it a “twentieth century Magna Carta” (177).

break” with previously unsuccessful African attempts to forge a new destiny, and said it provided a “vision of a different and better future” for many African nations, not just Tanzania.\textsuperscript{121} C. L. R. James famously called it “the highest stage of resistance ever reached by revolting Blacks.”\textsuperscript{122} Even critics, like The Washington Post’s Donald Louchheim, said the Declaration provided “an immense psychological boost to Nyerere’s…nation building.”\textsuperscript{123} Despite accepting critique, and critiquing himself, on the many failures of his leadership, Nyerere himself would say over three decades later, “Maybe I would improve on the Kiswahili that was used but the Declaration is still valid: I would not change a thing… The Arusha Declaration was what made Tanzania distinctly Tanzania.”\textsuperscript{124} What is in this document that was so heralded by so many?

As the Arusha Declaration begins, Nyerere described the document as being “discussed and then published in Swahili.”\textsuperscript{125} The emphasis on the process of discussion rather than accepting sole authorship speaks to a powerful impulse in Nyerere’s leadership style, one which impacts the rest of the document as well, towards decisions being made by a group, rather than by an individual. Indeed, the relevance of community in the life of the nation forms the bedrock of the document. Beyond this the two major themes in Arusha are the emphasis on self reliance, and Nyerere’s “deep concern for the

\textsuperscript{121} Henry Bienen, "An Ideology for Africa," \textit{Foreign Affairs} 47, no. 3 (April 1969): 559.

\textsuperscript{122} Quoted in Ikaweba Bunting, "The Heart of Africa: Interview with Julius Nyerere," \textit{The New Internationalist}, January/February 1999


\textsuperscript{124} Bunting, “The Heart of Africa.”

\textsuperscript{125} Nyerere, \textit{Ujamaa}, 13.
well-being of the poor, the peasants, and the workers."\textsuperscript{126} Initially the document outlines generic principles of global socialism, describing the ideal society as one in which "every worker obtains a just return for the labour he performs; and the incomes derived from different types of work are not grossly divergent."\textsuperscript{127} Beyond boilerplate socialist principles such as this, Nyerere contextualizes his vision of political evolution specifically for the Tanzanian context. Part of the way he achieves this is by critiquing farm laborers, by a wide margin the largest class of worker in Tanzanian society:

Many do not even work for half as many hours as the wage-earner does. The truth is that in the villages the women work very hard...Women who live in the villages of Tanzania work harder than anybody else in Tanzania. But the men who live in villages...are on leave for half their lives...\textsuperscript{128}

The remaining content of the Arusha declaration provides a critique of money as the basis of economy, the problems with excessive foreign aid, and the need for Tanzanians to engage in "hard work...[which] is the meaning of self reliance."\textsuperscript{129} Nyerere's desires for the nation, combined with reflections on the realities of the challenges in front of them, conclude the brief text.

Analysis of the N'Sele Manifesto

The N'Sele Manifesto was presented as the guiding document for Mobutu’s political party, the \textit{Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution} (MPR).\textsuperscript{130} As all other political parties were outlawed at the time of the N'Sele Manifesto’s production, this directly

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{128} Ibid., 31.
\bibitem{130} This is most often translated into English as Popular Movement of the Revolution.
\end{thebibliography}
elucidated official state doctrine. The document’s central thesis was provided in its introduction: “The MPR wishes to make Zaire a genuinely independent country. Its doctrine is Mobutism.”\textsuperscript{131} The subsequent portions of the Manifesto address the ways in which the MPR will “revolutionize” various elements of Zairian society including education, the role of women in society, economics, the arts and youth culture, among many others. Much of the document contains vague language about how these changes will occur, for example the suggestion that “The MPR affirms that all Zairians should be able to profit from the goods of modern civilization.”\textsuperscript{132} Such vague proclamations about “enhancing youth” and “protecting folklore” permeate the Manifesto, and very few tangible statements about how specifically the MPR will achieve these goals were offered.

The primary theme of the Arusha Declaration was self-reliance, and by contrast the “N’Sele Manifesto declared nationalism to be the doctrinal touchstone of the MPR.”\textsuperscript{133} The obvious implication is that rather than relying on the people of the state to elevate the nation, the people of Zaire were expected to rely on the party to elevate the nation. The most important philosophical concept in the N’Sele Manifesto is the concept of “authenticity.”\textsuperscript{134} This doctrine, although ostensibly about maintaining African cultural motifs in the modern era, really had more to do with an umbrella concept under which such activities as the nationalization of foreign companies could be justified. Young and

\textsuperscript{132} Makanda Kabobi, \textit{N’Sele}, 13.
\textsuperscript{133} Young and Turner, \textit{Rise and Decline}, 209.
\textsuperscript{134} While N’Sele never uses the word “authenticite” explicitly, its tenants are expounded and articulated throughout the document in the guise of what Crawford Young and Thomas Turner call “authentic Congolese nationalism.”

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Turner helpfully segment the nuanced development of authenticity as a central regime construct as having three key phases:

From 1966 until about 1970, ‘authentic Congolese nationalism’ was the regime motif. In 1971 this was eclipsed by an ambitious promotion of “authenticity” as a philosophic innovation of the new order. In 1974, this in turn was supplanted by ‘Mobutuism.’

Despite these evolutionary changes, authenticity was purportedly about a return to the African past from which Zairians drew their cultural power. Immediately after its introduction the doctrine of authenticity came under internal critique for two primary reasons: it engaged in “undue glorification of the past”, prominently espoused by Catholic leaders, and due to “the vagueness of the creed,” a critique championed by intellectuals. While much of Mobutu’s sincerity as a political ideologist has been rightly questioned, it is clear that Mobutu viewed the Manifesto, and its keystone concept of “authenticity,” as a move towards being taken seriously not just as a “leading political figure, but also as a major thinker; this explains the decision to unveil ‘authenticity’ at a congress of Senghor’s Union Porgressiste Senegalaise in Dakar rather than before a home audience.” The clear implication is that Mobutu was attempting to position himself as a continental political thinker and philosopher, not merely a masterful political figure; undoubtedly, his desire to do so had much to do with Nyerere’s prominence and his perceived place in the hierarchy of African political thinkers. However, unlike Nyerere, Mobutu did not have a cache of international intellectual goodwill that would enable his Manifesto to be heralded, or even taken seriously. Thus, in 1973 when “a major international colloquium was announced” at which intellectuals from around the

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136 Ibid., 212.
137 Ibid., 210.
globe were expected to “acclaim and elaborate authenticity,” no prominent intellectuals could be enticed to attend, and after two postponements, this legitimizing effort was abandoned.\(^{138}\)

**Connecting the Texts**

Even with cursory examination it is clear that the N’Sele Manifesto is highly derivative of the Arusha Declaration. Using a “founding” document to articulate a party platform, as Nyerere had done with TANU in the Arusha Declaration, was the motif of N’Sele as well. Major themes of critiquing capitalism’s inadequacy in the African context, the need for a mobilization of human capital, and the need for comprehensive reform in all aspects of national life read very similarly in the two texts. One interesting connection, in the light of history, is that both texts advocate for the liberation of white-minority dominated southern African states. While the Arusha Declaration only contains a one line pledge to “co-operate with all political parties in Africa engaged in the liberation of all Africa,” the N’Sele Manifesto goes into much greater detail.\(^ {139}\) The manifesto specifically mentions Rhodesia as deserving concerted focus and effort from all “liberated” African states to achieve independence—Rhodesia being the nation of most interest and international attention at the time on issues of African majority-led governance.\(^ {140}\) As the next section will reveal, Mobutu and Nyerere wound up on either side of the liberation struggles in South Africa, but this divergence was not revealed in these documents.

\(^{138}\) Young and Turner, *Rise and Decline*, 212.


\(^{140}\) Ibid., 29.
There are certainly dramatic differences between the texts as well. The final resolutions articulated in Arusha regard the behavior of the leaders of the party. Calls to radical accountability, relative poverty, and a total freedom from corruption are powerfully articulated in Nyerere's Declaration, and he personally took the commitment to simplicity and incorruptibility to heart. Despite vague claims about fair representation and avoiding personal enrichment, nothing in the N'Sele Manifesto speaks to the accountability of party leadership, or demands responsibility in the use of power.\footnote{141} Also, Nyerere’s Zanaki heritage, and its aforementioned acephalous leadership structure, by nature presumed that leadership through consensus building was not only functional but also elegant and powerful. Mobutu also claimed a connection to “traditional” leadership to justify his own political structure, but with the opposite purpose. “In our African tradition, there are never two chiefs... [and] after having taken counsel and informed himself, he must decide and resolve the issue alone, in full cognizance of the problem.”\footnote{142} In this trajectory these documents have remarkable different objects.

On the most basic level, Arusha can be construed as a document dedicated to promulgating “self-reliance.”\footnote{143} N’Sele, on the other hand, is a document devoted to instructing the populace to rely on the MPR and its “guide” Mobutu.\footnote{144} The document even promises that the MPR will “liberate Zairian men and women from all subjugation

\footnote{141} Ibid., 11.
\footnote{142} Quoted in Young and Turner's Rise and Decline on page 211, but is originally from Mobutu: Discours, allcutions, messages et 1963-1975 (Paris: Editions J.A., 1975) 2: 100-101
\footnote{143} Indeed, the preamble and the conclusion both focus on the objects of reliance traditionally used in Tanzania: money and society, as the primary fork in the decision tree.
\footnote{144} The entire document uses the state as the agent of action in the text.
and assure their progress by promoting a truly social and truly democratic republic.”

This claim, which burdens the state with all the responsibility for liberating the populace, is an effective encapsulation of the tone and sentiment of the larger document. N'Sele further quashes individual action by warning "that individual liberties may lead to anarchy, [so] the authority of the regime" could not be challenged. Despite these differences, it is clear that the idea of a seminal "founding text" as presented in the Arusha Declaration was just what Mobutu was after. This was not the first time Mobutu had sought to emulate Nyerere, nor would it be the last.

One anecdotal example of Mobutu’s desire to follow Nyerere’s lead was embodied in the costume known as the abacost. From the declaration of “authenticity” in 1967 until the “Third Republic” political liberalizations of 1990, Zairian men were required by law to wear the abacost instead of western-style suits. The dress itself, however, was not a product of Mobutu’s vision of an “authentic” society, rather it was borrowed from the wardrobe of Julius Nyerere. This simple, plain suit was worn by Nyerere throughout his time in leadership and until the end of his life. Inspired by the fashion of the egalitarian Chinese and the Indian nationalist Nehru, Nyerere adopted the suit as an alternative to western suits, and also as a way to indicate his connection to the average Tanzanian. Ironically in Zaire, “the poor could not afford to equip their wardrobe with this garb, which soon became a sartorial symbol of class, rather than an articulation of national identity.” Abacost wearers were “politicians [in the] top

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146 Kevin C. Dunn, Imagining the Congo (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 114.
148 Young and Turner, Rise and Decline, 117.
cadres... owners of Mercedes cars." In both societies the abacost was a class symbol, but in Tanzania it was a class leveler, in Zaire it became the costume of privilege. This dichotomy is also true of these documents. The N'Sele Manifesto was not widely read, not least because relatively few Zairians could read French by 1967, but served as something of an ego stroke for those already in the cadre in power in Zaire. The Arusha Declaration, on the other hand, was widely distributed in both Swahili and English, and became a touchstone text for many around the continent, and the world, to engage with and be empowered by. The founding texts themselves, like the abacost, was not important because of the form, which was shared, but because of what filled it, which was not. Even though the N'Sele Manifesto was meant to be the “basis of the obligatory instruction in civics in all the schools in the country” its message was not widely received or understood. Like most other social constructs in Mobutu’s Zaire, education became a tool for leverage. Eventually, a university education "became necessary (but not sufficient) for entry" into the elite of society. Thus, parroting truths of the N'Sele manifesto, like the abacost, was simply another marker for someone wanting to enter the elite classes of society, not a set of truths which would guide the construction of a nation.

Another similarity in the outcomes of the documents was the nationalizations of industry which were justified by N'Sele and Arusha. American newspapers strongly connected the ideological documents with the pragmatics of nationalization.

\[149\] Ibid., 132.


\[151\] Young and Turner, Rise and Decline, 136.

Arusha Declaration especially makes clear the "centrality of state control of the economy" in Tanzania.\textsuperscript{153} The disastrous nationalization of agriculture in Tanzania, probably Nyerere's worst tactical mistake in his presidency, was borne of ideas first espoused in the Arusha Declaration.\textsuperscript{154}

Conclusions

As "Zaire" has been erased from maps, and "Congo" has taken its place, so the N'Sele Manifesto has dissipated totally from the Congolese national consciousness, although it seems never to have gained purchase in the first place. "Authenticity" proved to be a doctrine which was as ephemeral and ultimately meaningless as anything else ideologically proffered by Mobutu's regime. It is telling that some of the first moves of the post-Mobutu regime were to rename the country, taking the name originally provided by Leopold II, rather than maintain the nomenclature of the Mobutu regime; such was the failure of Zaire as an idea.\textsuperscript{155}

Arusha persists, now seen more as a philosophical text produced by a "radical thinker" than a legitimate political system.\textsuperscript{156} Nyerere's Pan-Africanism gains more credence even as his model of civic life in Tanzania fades, and historians contest the merits of his presidency. To Nyerere, however, the Arusha Declaration was meant to be

\textsuperscript{153} Kjell J. Havnevik, \textit{Tanzania: The Limits to Development from Above} (Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1993), 43.

\textsuperscript{154} Nyerere himself admitted as much later in life. He articulates this failing especially clearly in Ikaweba Bunting, "The Heart of Africa: Interview with Julius Nyerere," \textit{The New Internationalist}, January/February 1999.


something embedded in Tanzanian society’s DNA—not something that he put there, but something he found which was there already.\footnote{This comes out in the Ikaweba Bunting interview, see citation 154 above.} The reality of this hope, and whether Nyerere’s legacy in Tanzania continues to inspire its people, remains to be seen.

The use of language in each national project also connects to this thesis’ larger theme of limited contextual determinism in each leader’s political policies. Neither leader altered language policies inherited from the colonial administrations dramatically. Nyerere’s implementation of Swahili was certainly more nuanced and influential than Mobutu’s usage of Lingala, but the language themselves evolved rather than were transformed, or even replaced, during the transition to independence. There were logistical considerations, of course, in addition to the ideological benefits of maintaining a colonial and "African" language in these new states, but as this section intended to demonstrate: the uses and implementations of language in each context dramatically impacted the success of each nationalization project.
Part IV. Zaire, Tanzania and the U.S. in the Cold War Context

"When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers."
- Gikuyu proverb

On the morning of August 9, 1974, as Richard Nixon, who only moments before had been President of the United States, awkwardly waved his V-shaped fingers in the air, a rogue’s smile on his weathered face, and boarded Navy One for the last time, Henry Kissinger remained behind in the White House. Indeed, just under the massive headline "NIXON RESIGNS" on the front page of that day's New York Times ran the sub-heading "'Sacrifice' is Praised; Kissinger to Remain." Such was the association between these men. That immortal V salute signaled the death rattle of the "painfully excruciating"

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158 Eric Walters and Adrian Bradbury, When Elephants Fight (Victoria, B.C.: Orca Book Publishers, 2008). This is likely, in fact, an apocryphal quotation, but it is also probably the most famous of the so-called "African proverbs."


national experience that was the collapse of the Nixon years.\textsuperscript{161} Kissinger remained, and inherited much of the nation’s pent up anger with Nixon and with the government in general. The nation was raw with feelings of self-doubt in the wake of the Vietnam debacle and the moral collapse of the Presidency. While Gerald Ford entered office largely free of the dirt that Nixon would never wash away, it was undoubtably Kissinger who was the intellect behind the last vestiges of the Nixon White House, and it was only Kissinger who had any chance of redeeming, at least partially, one of the most humiliated executives in American history and, by proxy, himself.

Meanwhile, thousands of miles away in Africa a new hot phase of the Cold War was developing. Freshly independent African nations were aligning and re-aligning themselves with the great powers, leveraging the behemoths against each other in service to their own nationalistic visions. The last major hold-outs of white minority rule- South Africa, Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola and Southwest Africa- faced increasing foreign, domestic, and intra-African pressure to allow black majority-rule. Within this context, Julius Nyerere and Mobutu Sese Seko were seeking ways to quell, or at least distract, domestic dissidents and gain influence and relevance in the region.\textsuperscript{162} In 1976 these three instrumental leaders, Nyerere, Mobutu and Kissinger would converge through diplomatic engagement around the Angolan Civil War conflict. Through these interactions a microcosm of the way Cold War diplomacy was carried out by the United States on the continent of Africa was generated.


\textsuperscript{162} The country of Belgium has accepted responsibility for the slaying, and the 1979 Church Report recognized formal American involvement in the assassination plot. Larry Devlin, the CIA Station Chief at the time reported in his book \textit{Chief of Station, Congo} that Eisenhower had ordered him to kill Lumumba by poisoning, but because of a moment of moral vacillation, the Belgians got to him first through Mobutu.
The intention of this section, then, is to specifically examine the triad relationship between Henry Kissinger, then the U.S. Secretary of State, the President of Tanzania Julius Nyerere, and the President of Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko. This will be examined through two lenses. The first engages the broader history of U.S. involvement in Africa during the Cold War, and situates the importance of these three men in the broader historical context. The second section explores the personal as political—looking through Kissinger’s eyes at these two men, and asking questions of these relationships and the ways tensions between reality and the ideal played out during Kissinger’s trip to Africa in 1976.

America in Africa

American involvement in African affairs began prior to the formal existence of the United States. The dubious origin of this relationship can be traced to the moment that the first Africans were sold into slavery in Jamestown in 1619. A massive importation of African slave labor followed. This forced migration across the notorious Middle Passage ultimately impacted American history in the most profound ways possible, even to the point of bringing the Union to the brink of destruction. Even after the end of slavery Africa and America maintained a complex, unequal relationship—a relationship which continues to this day.

During Africa's colonial period America’s influence was obvious. While America received no formal African holdings during the Scramble beyond its extant connection to

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the “independent” Liberia, the United States sanctioned the partition of the continent and had powerful economic interests in the region long before and after 1895. The rising American demand for consumer goods, and the subsequent demand for the raw materials required to produce them, became much of the impetus behind European colonial extractive economics in the African colonies. After independence, however, American interest in African affairs abated as other concerns like Vietnam and domestic political strife pulled attention inward. The U.S. was also dealing with the expansion of the Cold War’s tentacles in other parts of the world. This brief period of ignoring Africa would end soon after Navy One flew Richard Nixon into permanent political exile, and Henry Kissinger turned his attention to Southern Africa.

This section will shift the focus of this paper westward, not to remove attention from the key figures at the heart of this thesis, but to explore these men through the eyes of the most powerful nation in the world in the late 1970s. This is possible because of nature of Kissinger himself. Because of the complexity of his motives, the prominence of his power and the contested nature of his legacy, Kissinger can be viewed as something

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164 Liberia is complex to classify on the continuum of colonial project vs. independent African state. American involvement begins with the migration project of African ex-slaves “back to Africa” culminating in Liberian independence in 1847, a move which can be construed as an American colonial action conducted by Afro-descended Americans, as they clearly established their governance as an elite over indigenous peoples of the region. The color of the skin of the “colonizers” complicates the conventional colonial narrative, but had these initial settlers happened to be white, Liberia would certainly have been classified as a colonial project orchestrated by Americans.

165 As we circle back to Kissinger, and use his writings in much of this section, it is appropriate to ask if there has been a more discussed American diplomat than Henry Kissinger? It would be difficult for any other potential candidate to match Kissinger’s prodigious writings on his own diplomatic career—his three volume set concerning his time in the Nixon and Ford administrations comes in at over 3,500 pages. This says nothing about the many volumes others have written on the man, his policies, psychology and influence. Kissinger is so discussed and dissected precisely because he functions as something of a Rorschach test for the American public. Equally despised and admired by neo-conservatives, liberals, centrists, idealists and realists alike, Kissinger is a proxy for all manner of American perceptions of failings and successes in foreign policy. Certainly no figure has dominated the discussion of American foreign policy in the last quarter of the 20th century more than the Harvard-trained immigrant.
of a proxy for the United States. Because of this he proves a useful figure to follow in order to examine two of Africa’s most influential leaders in the late 1970s, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, and Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire.\footnote{Indeed, Kissinger himself told a meeting of members of Congress that Zaire “is a very rich country and could be the keystone to political and economic progress in Africa” and that Tanzania was the “intellectual leader of Southern Africa.” – From the MOC, Bipart Congress, May 12, 1976.}

The Frying Pan and the Fire: Angola in the Shadow of Vietnam

This famous image seemed to capture in one frame the chaos that permeated the American withdrawal from Saigon, and continues to dominate the national memory of the end stages of the Vietnam War. The image symbolized that the dawning national realization that in Vietnam terror had triumphed over reason. This irrational fear was played out by the dozens of people trying to get on that last helicopter, frantically trying to escape from “the one clear failure in American military history.”\footnote{Hubert Van Es, \textit{Vietnam Airlift}, April 29, 1975, Saigon, Vietnam. Universal Press International.} The image distilled the humiliating withdrawal process for which Kissinger endured much critique. These raw feelings of failure and frustration, coupled with the national shame and anger associated with Nixon’s Watergate implosion, left Kissinger in a delicate position as Ford

took office. America was experiencing “emotional exhaustion” and self doubt, and the presidency seemed less austere and transcendent than at any other point in history.\textsuperscript{169}

It had been so different only a few years before. Kissinger became a major political force during his time in the Nixon White House. Scholars like Jussi Hanhimäki have suggested that Nixon even “lost the struggle for the limelight to Kissinger” during his own presidency.\textsuperscript{170} By the end of Nixon’s time in office, it was Kissinger, not Nixon, who was “the leading policy maker” in the administration.\textsuperscript{171} Had Nixon left office under remarkably different circumstances Kissinger’s prominence could have immortalized him among the most important and influential cabinet members in U.S. history, but instead his place in a scandal-ridden administration deeply tainted his reputation as the executive branch imploded under the weight of Nixon’s indiscretions. Finding a major policy victory under Ford then became vital for Kissinger’s personal rehabilitation, as well as the self-concept of the embittered country. It was during this crucial time in the life of the nation and his personal career that Kissinger turned his gaze to Angola.

By November of 1975 Ford had been President for just over a year, and continued Nixon’s “policy of supporting Portuguese control of Angola and Mozambique, feeling that it represented the best possibility for stability in Southern Africa.”\textsuperscript{172} This tactic dovetailed with the American policy of publicly criticizing and privately supporting


\textsuperscript{171} Ibid., 292.

white minority rule in Southern Africa. Part of the reason for this seemingly incoherent policy in Southern Africa was that “before 1975 Kissinger paid little attention to political developments in Africa.”\textsuperscript{173} A coherent foreign policy was not possible in a region that received no attention from the Secretary of State. Kissinger was certainly not alone in this disinterest. Africa was not viewed as an American “problem” and seemed to possess little strategic relevance to America’s broader foreign policy interests. This view changed dramatically in late 1975.

The catalyzing event to pull America’s gaze to Southern and Central Africa was Angolan independence, which formally occurred on November 11, 1975. This happened amidst rising political fears about the future of Angola that were triggered by a convergence of political and economic concerns, both international and domestic, which surrounded which "way" Angola would ultimately go. Within the broader Cold War context, Angola looked to be a new front in the proxy hot war between the USSR and the United States. White-minority led nations like Rhodesia and South Africa did not want Angola to become a leftist state, as it would inevitably serve as a base for liberation movements against them. These concerns and a complex of other factors led to the explosion of violence in Angola in 1975.

First, the Carnation Revolution, which culminated in April of 1974, ended the dictatorship in Portugal and the leaders of the new junta pushed for rapid decolonization and democratization within former Portuguese foreign territories, especially in Africa.\textsuperscript{174}


\textsuperscript{174} There were many reasons for the push for decolonization, but certainly a factor was the cost to the treasury to maintain colonial holdings. The desperately poor nation spent approximately 40 percent of its national budget on quelling African freedom fighters in Mozambique and Angola in 1974.
The vacuum left by the sudden withdrawal of Portuguese forces and political leaders, combined with the remaining presence of the black Angolan groups who were in the process of fighting the Portuguese for freedom, meant factionalized, armed Angolan forces were left to determine who would run the newly free nation. There were three main factions which emerged from this period. The MPLA, a leftist group backed by the USSR and Cuba came to control the formal government and Luanda after independence.\textsuperscript{175} The FNLA under Holden Roberto became the primary group backed by the United States and its allies, especially Zaire.\textsuperscript{176} Finally in the south of Angola was a group called UNITA under Jonas Savimibi, also backed by the United States but to a lesser extent than the FNLA.\textsuperscript{177} These groups emerged as opposing powers immediately after independence and the nation was plunged into civil conflict that would continue for 16 years. Seeing the potential for Angola to go “either way,” and the relevance of the state to broader Southern African politics, both the United States and the Soviets began supporting various factions in the conflict.\textsuperscript{178} Primarily the U.S. used its regional proxy, Zaire, to supply and train the forces under Holden Roberto in the FNLA, but also supported UNITA, who drew support from South Africa, another ally of the United States in the region.

\textsuperscript{175} MPLA stands for Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola or Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

\textsuperscript{176} FNLA stands for Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola, or the National Front for the Liberation of Angola.

\textsuperscript{177} UNITA stands for União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola or the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.

\textsuperscript{178} Ultimately it was Cuba, however, who provided the MPLA with the most military and economic aid during the Angolan conflict, particularly in the early years of the fighting.
Beyond global politics, the situation in Angola, and the world of Henry Kissinger, the mid-1970s had also been hard on Julius Nyerere and Mobutu Sese Seko. Nyerere had overseen steady economic growth in Tanzania in the late 60s, emerging from principles elucidated in the Arusha Declaration, and enjoyed much early success in his *ujamaa* socio-political program. In the early ‘70s Nyerere’s economic and social policies looked to be bearing fruit, and his vision of societal reinvention by being true to “African traditions” seemed to be succeeding. However, in the mid-1970’s forced “villagization” of the rural populace, increasingly corrupt lower-level leadership, years of drought, the 1973 oil crisis, and disastrous nationalizations of business substantially weakened the state.\(^{179}\) Nyerere was in danger of losing power and relevance in the region, and saw in the Southern African liberation movements a situation of personal concern to him which also would allow him to re-assert regional influence and power even as domestic problems grew.

As acknowledged by Zaire experts like Crawford Young, Mobutu Sese Seko enjoyed public support through rising to power and asserting political stability after a tumultuous, violent five year period following independence in 1960.\(^{180}\) His subsequent moves toward dictatorship, like banning all political opposition, were not widely criticized because the consolidation of power seemed to herald even more years of national stability. The people of Zaire were also ready for a definitive end to the internal ethnic and political divisions inevitable in a country the size of Western Europe which contained over 200 ethnic groups. However, things began to collapse for Mobutu around

\(^{179}\) For more on this, especially the crises early in the decade see John Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Pr., 1999).

\(^{180}\) Young and Turner, *Rise and Decline*, 220.
the same time as Tanzania began slipping into economic trouble. Similar factors like the oil crisis, regional drought and growing political pressures related to Cold War escalations impacted Zaire. The biggest factor in Mobutu’s weakening position, however, was the precipitous decline of copper prices in the early ‘70s. After years of continually increasing in value, copper prices fell 18% from 1974-1975, and did not recover for over three years.\textsuperscript{181} The economic engine of Zairian society was in the Copper Belt region, called Shaba, and the decline in revenue from that region precipitated something of a national economic meltdown. Mobutu sought an external distraction to draw focus from the economic collapse, and also believed that a friendly government in Angola would lead to cheaper export costs for copper through Angolan rail lines.

Kissinger, Nyerere and Mobutu all needed success in Angola for their own futures. Despite Angola’s previous irrelevance in geo-politics, these three powerful men had personal, political and foreign policy problems which looked like they could be solved by a major success in Angola. Each had differing conceptions of what that success would look like, but the potential for collaboration existed between these men, and ultimately it was Kissinger who would be the connection between them all.

Kissinger: Recollections and Inventions

Kissinger went to Africa with a sympathetic ear for the concerns of leading African statesmen as part of his “new willingness to use moralism as a foreign policy tool.”\textsuperscript{182} He signaled his intent, and new-found commitment to black majority rule, in his departure statement where “he spoke of the ‘commitment of the U.S. to majority rule in


\textsuperscript{182}Isaacson, \textit{Kissinger: A Biography}, 686.
This new moral commitment meant that he needed to treat Nyerere with particular respect as he was “key to any solution” to the troubles embroiling Southern Africa. Nyerere’s instrumentality was not borne of his country’s political prominence, but because of Nyerere’s moral and intellectual preeminence throughout the region.

Almost immediately upon arriving in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, Kissinger seemed seduced by Julius Nyerere, saying he found him “graceful and elegant, his eyes sparkling, his gestures fluid,” and because he possessed an “awesome command of the English language… Nyerere could be a seductive interlocutor.” In a different context this kind of language could have been the words of schoolboy to a crush. Indeed, at a parade early in his visit to Tanzania, Kissinger recalled sitting "beside Nyerere in the presidential box. He looked cool and elegant in a light gray bush suit. I felt clumsy and uncomfortable in my blue pinstriped diplomat’s uniform." To recall so acutely some 23 years later a feeling of personal inadequacy when placed in contrast with Nyerere reveals the intensity with which Kissinger was struck by the man. More remarkable is that this powerful moment did not occur.

As the photograph below indicates, Kissinger was not sitting next to Nyerere at the parade in question; in fact, Nyerere oversaw the parade from a podium on the parade

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183 Ibid., 687.


185 Ibid.

186 Ibid., 935.
grounds (seen in the background of the image below) and only afterward met with Kissinger in a private room for conversation and discussion:  

Further vividly recalled details by Kissinger, such as a patronizing recollection of Tanzanians soldiers unintentionally hurling off sandals during attempts to goosestep, are belied by previously unreleased photographic evidence of the event. Here are the supposedly sandal-clad troops:

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187 According to archivists at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, these photographs taken by White House photographer Ricardo Thomas during Kissinger’s trip to Africa have never been reviewed by another researcher nor have they been published in any context, therefore it is highly likely Kissinger has never seen them, nor does he perhaps have any knowledge of their existence. Ricardo Thomas was the first African-American White House photographer.

188 Ricardo Thomas, photographer. “Kissinger’s Trip to Africa.” From the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, photograph taken in 1976. This man is unnamed in the photographic documentation, but appears to have been a high official in Nyerere’s government.

189 This tale, which, again, is undoubtedly false based on photographs of the event, is found on page 935 of Years of Renewal. Any attempt to determine the purpose of the fabrication is obviously guesswork, but it seems to indicate a kind of psychological gamesmanship Kissinger conducted: if he was personally less impressive than Nyerere, at least the nation he represented had a sophistication that could only be crudely imitated by Nyerere’s people.
These lapses in memory, or intentional fabrications, are not mere trivialities that can be chalked up to the vagaries of time. They reveal something interesting about the psychology of Kissinger. The man prided himself on his mental acuity, and these anecdotes of foreign adventures are just the kind of thing Kissinger routinely brought out at parties to impress guests. Kissinger’s tale of personal embarrassment sitting next to the elegant Nyerere speaks to the fact that Kissinger was indeed impressed, perhaps even intimidated, by the Tanzanian leader. However, how can these moments where the “facts” according to Kissinger do not comply with recorded images of these events be understood? Do these inaccuracies or fabrications belie Kissinger’s other contentions about this trip to Africa specifically?

Few would contest the fact that Kissinger possessed genius-level political skills, and given the effort Kissinger has put into “correcting” the record of his time in government, his own writings on his career must be read with some suspicion. Kissinger must have been aware that including detail enhances the believability of a story. Using

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these vivid moments of personal observation to frame political discussions allowed Kissinger space to “own” the context surrounding important political discourse, and is meant to reveal his command of the past, especially when there are few present to contest him. The problem comes when these detailed recollections are proved false. If Kissinger is incorrect about a moment of personal anguish, why would he be significantly more accurate about the intricacies of multi-hour conversation with a leader he had never met before? Kissinger’s account, while overall worthwhile and certainly useful, must be examined with some suspicion in the light of this emerging documentation.

Whatever was behind the complex feelings Kissinger had for Nyerere, and his decision to obfuscate the record of their interactions, he obviously had a low opinion of Mobutu. Kissinger never mentions anything of Mobutu’s personal charisma, and viewed Zaire in instrumental terms, perceiving Mobutu as something of an American functionary, doing largely what he was told. Mobutu’s predilection for gauche opulence rubbed Kissinger the wrong way as well; Kissinger said his accommodations in Zaire “never managed to cross the line from the ostentatious to the attractive.” Nor was he wowed by Mobutu’s fleet of vehicles or private zoo, though he appeared impressed while touring it with Mobutu who proudly displayed his totemic animal: the leopard.

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191 Julius Nyerere died in 1999, the year that *Years of Renewal*, from which this account is taken, was published.

192 Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 942.
The unflattering feelings Kissinger had for Mobutu extended to his perception of Mobutu’s political policies as well. Where Nyerere was seen as a worthy opponent, who differed with Kissinger on an ideological level, Mobutu’s pragmatic sense was largely devoted to generating “the ostentation he so clearly enjoyed to establish himself an aura of overwhelming power and majesty.”\(^\text{194}\) Mobutu thus presented much less of a challenge politically and subsequently warranted less attention from Kissinger than other potential enemies did. By 1976 Mobutu had proved himself to be the ultimate ally of the United States in the region, and as early as the summer of 1975 the United States was planning interventions into Angola through Zaire, and was training U.S.-backed FNLA troops using “North Korean military instructors based in Zaire.”\(^\text{195}\)

By the time Kissinger readied to leave Zaire he literally felt sick to his stomach. The likely culprit for the ailment was the “wild boar and manioc plants” he had dined on


\(^{194}\) Kissinger, \textit{Years of Renewal}, 945.

\(^{195}\) Isaacson, \textit{Kissinger: A Biography}, 676.
the previous evening. Perhaps another source of unease in the Secretary’s bowels was the intractability of the opposing parties in the Southern African context. On one side were the moral opponents to white minority rule, led by Julius Nyerere. On the other were the whites themselves. Somewhere in between stood proxies like Mobutu.

Indeed, some of the headaches faced by Kissinger on the Africa trip emanated from his attempts to work with all sides of the South African liberation issue. Nyerere repeatedly denounced the racist regimes in Southern Africa in speech and print. The South African whites told Kissinger in private that Nyerere brought Chinese operatives to Tanzania to “train terrorists” for action Rhodesia.197 Despite these conflicting pressures Kissinger was very willing to apply intense pressure to the white leaders of Southern Africa’s minority led governments. Ian Smith, the leader of Rhodesia, said that Kissinger was trying to “Get me to sign my suicide note,” by advocating for black majority rule in the nation.198 Kissinger’s gastronomic challenges passed and he went back to Washington, ready to push American involvement in Southern Africa to a degree never before considered.

As he left, the usefulness of the United States to Nyerere and Mobutu became clearer to each man. Kissinger felt that “Nyerere wanted to ‘borrow [America’s] power,’ as he expressed it to me some months later, to help bring majority rule to southern Africa and to expel the white minorities influence in the aftermath…. To Nyerere, the United


States was a weapon to be employed to accelerate the liberation struggle. Nyerere was not alone in viewing American foreign policy in Africa in the late 1970s in militarized terms. Mobutu also saw the U.S. as a gateway to military power—correctly it turns out. Even Kissinger saw American diplomacy in Angola as carrying with it the heft of military power, through proxies, of course.

Ultimately Kissinger returned from Africa with the situation there almost exactly where it had been when he arrived on the continent. Black majority rule and white minority rule were not political ideologies which could be brought into compromise. The potential cataclysmic violence which could spring from power vacuums created by white flight from these nations was being displayed in Angola. Angola also represented a key region for Kissinger to demonstrate American muscularity in foreign policy through forces backed by the U.S.’s proxy in the region: Zaire. Despite Kissinger’s repeated promises to support black majority rule, the final racist regime in the region, South Africa, did not collapse until 1994, almost twenty years after Kissinger’s continental jaunt. What were the real outcomes of the trip then?

In order to get at what Kissinger thought happened on his trip to Africa, it is useful to examine conversations Kissinger and Ford had about the situation in Southern Africa immediately after his trip. Here we can see the back room considerations and maneuvers Kissinger came away from the trip understanding, and the way the public message Kissinger and Ford presented regarding the situation there was modified from their private understandings of the context of Southern Africa. Kissinger saw Zaire as not only a military ally which could help bring about American policy goals in Angola, but as a potential model of American-African relations to the rest of the continent. In a meeting

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199 Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 931.
with Ford he said, “If we could make a couple of countries showcases, we would be doing great. It won't take all that much--$100 million for Zaire.” He also told Ford that “we do have to make a major effort in Zaire. Mobutu says he has to have tanks psychologically because Angola has them.” Clearly Kissinger, despite positive personal feelings about Nyerere, recognized the deep strategic importance of Zaire to U.S. designs in Southern Africa. It is also interesting that Kissinger and Mobutu discussed the psychological impact of U.S. support, and were, in some ways, recreating a mini-Cold War arms escalation between Mobutu's forces and the forces of the MPLA in Angola.

Despite these private conversations with Ford, Kissinger told a group of members of Congress two days later that “Tanzania is politically the most influential country in this region right now,” and that “Tanzania is the intellectual leader of Southern Africa and as such is the key to the future of the area.” Further he said of Zaire that “its leaders are really not too interested in Southern African matters.” He knew this was not the case: Mobutu was continually asking the U.S. for greater military investment in forces based in Zaire who were making war in Angola, but beyond this, Zaire was interested in Southern African matters because the United States was. Days earlier Kissinger told Ford that Zaire was the political key to Angola.

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203 Ibid.
Obviously, Kissinger and Ford recognized that on a pragmatic level, Zaire was the essential nation in Africa for the United States to enact its policies. In public, however, Kissinger routinely praised Tanzania and Nyerere, clearly knowing that this was the best way to earn some points for liberation-minded Africans across the continent. The documentary evidence is, unfortunately, lacking on the inverse perspective: what was it that Nyerere and Mobutu felt about their foreign interlocutor? Nyerere wrote prolifically, but preferred the philosophical and political to the memoir. Mobutu, other than a concern with regime mythology rarely spoke or wrote on his own life, and kept his political dealings very close to the chest, as he must have to have remained an island of power in the maelstrom of Congo for so many years.

Conclusions

Examining the 1976 visit of Henry Kissinger to Africa, and the context surrounding it, reveals several important aspects of American foreign policy in Africa around the Cold War. First, it clearly shows that Africa was not a relevant concern of U.S. foreign policy prior to 1975. Other than manipulating Zairian politics to prevent the massive nation from joining the Soviet bloc, the U.S. had a hands off, disinterested approach to African affairs. Kissinger’s visit changed that. From 1976 on, especially through the Angolan conflict, the United States took an active role in exerting diplomatic power, and occasionally military force (as in Somalia), across Africa, and actively worked against those nations which the United States did not see as benefiting its strategic interests.

Second, Kissinger’s obfuscation of African realities connects well to the American tendency to patronize African politics. As recently as 1994 America threw up
its hands and refused to become involved in the Rwandan genocide, claiming that the Hutu-Tutsi conflict was part of an ancient feud between the groups. This is roundly rejected by scholars as even the solid construction of these ethnic groups coincided with Belgian control of the states of Rwanda and Burundi in 1908.204

Kissinger’s unique mix of idealism and realism brought his, and subsequently America’s, gaze onto African affairs. The legacy of this attention is yet to be determined, but the impact of U.S. involvement in the Angolan Civil War, which was solidified on that trip, has dramatic and horrific consequences for thousands of people in Angola today.

Ultimately, a great deal was at stake for each of the major players in this Kissinger-Mobutu-Nyerere triad. Kissinger felt pressure to salvage something of the Nixon presidency, particularly with regard to foreign policy, through diplomatic and martial interventions in Southern Africa. Nyerere was positioning himself as Pan-African leader, and felt personal conviction about the necessity of majority-rule in Southern Africa, and especially about the moral failure of the apartheid South African state. Mobutu Sese Seko's motives were harder to scrutinize, but no doubt he sought to bolster his personal power by any means, and knew that a strategic partnership with the most powerful nation on earth was the best way to achieve this.

Less than three years after Nixon boarded the Navy One in disgrace, Kissinger was exiting the White House as well. Jimmy Carter won the presidency, and Kissinger's time in appointed office came to a close. His policy in Angola was roundly criticized.205

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204 For much more on this, see Philip Gourevitch's *We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families: Stories from Rwanda* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1998).
205 An example would be John A. Marcum, "Lessons of Angola," *Foreign Affairs* 54, no. 3 (1976). Despite its moderate tone, Marcum makes clear that Angola was a major mistake, and blighted Kissinger’s legacy.
America had not yet failed in Angola—which it ultimately would—but neither was Angola a validation of the Nixon/Kissinger foreign policy strategy.

Even as Kissinger packed up his things in the White House, Julius Nyerere and Mobutu Sese Seko were still only mid-way through their periods of power. Mobutu's "Presidency" collapsed under violent rebellion in 1997, as retaliatory Rwandan Tutsi's took over his deeply weakened Zaire. Mobutu had been a staunch supporter of the Hutu regime that ultimately committed the 1994 genocide.

Julius Nyerere became one of the few from among the first generation of African leaders to step down from office peacefully. His grand vision of *ujamaa* had failed in spectacular fashion, and Tanzania was worse off economically when he left office in 1985 then when he took the presidency in late 1961.206

In the final analysis it is clear that Henry Kissinger played a large role in making Africa a critical domain of U.S. foreign policy. The case of Angola proved to be beyond his considerable diplomatic and martial foresight, but the continent itself, as it was coming into its own as a collection of sovereign states, benefited in key ways from being taken seriously by the foremost diplomat of the modern era. Kissinger's respect for Africa's leading intellectual, Julius Nyerere, proved to be visionary, and while the dynamics of power between the United States and the African states are still be negotiated, Henry Kissinger fateful trip to the continent in 1976 was a watershed moment in this complex and vitally important relationship.

This thesis is not about Henry Kissinger. Kissinger proves useful, however, as a lens to examine the leaders of these nations through the eyes of America. The African

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206 Nyerere remained the head of the ruling party, *Chama cha Mapinduzi* until 1990.
context of the mid-1970s cannot be studied without examining the impact of the bi-polar Cold War on the continent. Congo in particular directly experienced the effects of an American interventionist policy in Africa at that time as their elected leader fell in part due to American machinations. Kissinger's utility to this thesis, then, is to challenge American assumptions about these men: a challenge which belies over simple conceptualizations of the men which continue to persist. Kissinger's own recollections, challenged in this section, can be seen as proxy for the flattening and misremembering of America's role in Africa, and to some degree the irrelevancy, in the long term, of America to the policies of these African leaders. Both Nyerere and Mobutu influenced, manipulated and perhaps politically bested one of the great diplomats of America's twentieth century, and thus Kissinger's brief but complex experience of these two men and their nations, provides a window into how these men functioned in the international sphere, dealing with nations exponentially more wealthy and militarily mighty than their own.
Conclusion

The Congo River is the deepest river on the planet.\textsuperscript{207} At its deepest, 755 feet down, new species of marine life are being discovered. The Congo River has featured in numerous pieces of global disseminated art, perhaps most notably Joseph Conrad's \textit{Heart of Darkness}, and the John Huston directed Katherine Hepburn and Humphrey Bogart film \textit{The African Queen}. The impenetrability of the Congo Rainforest, the largest outside the Amazon, feeds into the trope that the river winds its way into literal and metaphorical darkness—the impenetrable fortress of evil and wildness in the human heart. Particularly in English language sources, this trope is largely intact with regard to Mobutu Sese Seko. Written off as a troublesome dictator, Mobutu’s genuine political power and regional influence has been ignored. French-language scholars, on the other hand, have written many worthy works on Mobutu, such as \textit{Le Dinosaure—le Zaire de Mobutu} and even the apologetic \textit{Mobutu—Dignite pour l’Afrique}.\textsuperscript{208}

The darkness, deepness and impenetrability of the Congo could not be more different than the character of Lake Victoria, a food source for millions, and the ever reliable source of perhaps the world’s most important river. Nyerere, like the lake that sheltered his home town, was deliberate, knowable and constant. He published prolifically on his own political ideas and thoughts. He gained tremendous global respect during his presidency, even to the point of being “one of the most prominent socialist in


\textsuperscript{208} Michela Wrong pointed me in this direction in the afterword to her book (327). She includes a number of other excellent French-language texts on the man as well.
the world and one of the most articulate spokesmen of the poor and oppressed.”

He defended well his own legacy saying, “we took over a country with 85 per cent of its adult population illiterate. The British ruled us for 43 years. When they left, there were 2 trained engineers and 12 doctors. This is the country we inherited. When I stepped down there was 91-per-cent literacy and nearly every child was in school. We trained thousands of engineers and doctors and teachers.”

In the end, despite what they achieved or did poorly, like the source of the Nile, and highlands where the Congo River emerges from the earth, the final product of each man had much to do with their origins. Mobutu would never have the opportunities for study and scholarships to go abroad that Nyerere was given. Because of its vastness and complex ethnic milieu Congo could never have engendered the peaceful transfer of power TANU achieved in Tanzania. The British, for all their faults, ruled Tanganyika in a way that at least gave Nyerere something to work with, in terms of administration as he set out to develop his nation into an *Ujamaa* paradise. Mobutu inherited a bloody, fragmented maelstrom. No other mechanism, other than the exertion of martial power, would have allowed him access to the highest office in the land, especially after the assignation of Lumumba, perhaps the only person who had the opportunity to take Congo on a path much more like Tanzania’s.

This is not intended to make a deterministic point about Nyerere’s relative triumphs as a leader versus Mobutu’s stream of vagaries and oppressions, but rather to suggest that ignoring the context of a situation when evaluating a leader diminishes the

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significance of how power reasonably could be achieved in a given context. Nyerere is
Nyerere in no small part because of what Tanzania was, in addition to, of course, his own
massive influence on the nation. Congo, too, must be seen as both a product, and source,
of Mobutu Sese Seko. Men are made and make themselves, and much like the waters
from which they emerged, their legacies will long outlive the men, continuing to
influence and impact millions of lives today and into the unknowable future.

The Waters Run Down

Like the waters of Africa, there was, and is, a cyclic nature to the production of
the nation in the African context. Nyerere and Mobutu were shaped by their origins, and
by the processes by which they gained power. Once in power, however, they shaped the
nations they led. As a result the next generation of leader in the nation became a product
of the national conditions which led to their rise, largely products of the two men in
power.

It can be dangerous to draw to large a conclusion from a study with limited scope,
but in the context of Tanzania and Congo, it seems fair to say that the nation which was
the less successful colony in terms of economic exploitation fared much better politically
and in terms of ethnic conflict than the one which still remains an object of much interest
from multinational extractive corporations. Tanzania’s “failure” to prove viable in terms
of commercial sisal agriculture or coffee production, other than in pockets of the country,
meant that Britain had less to lose in allowing it independence, and largely staying out of
its affairs as it gained independence. This opportunity was not afforded Congo, and the
UN, the United States and Belgium all exerted dramatic, intense and continued pressure
on the newly independent nation, most obviously in the assassination of its first elected
president. This theory is well summarized in recent work by political scientist Elliot Green:

I argue that both high amounts of capital and labour and inter-regional imbalances in labour, land and capital can contribute to political instability and conflict. Conversely, low amounts of capital and labour, combined with an equitable distribution of all three factor endowments, can encourage political stability and nation formation.211

Contemporary analysts of Africa heap criticism on Mobutu for his obvious corruption and repressive instincts. While Mobutu is accused of emulating the corruption of his colonial forbearers, continued foreign involvement in the Congo adheres to the trajectory of economic exploitation which has permeated Congo’s 20th century. The reality of continued exploitation suggest Mobutu can be seen as a symptom of exploitation run amok rather than as the producer of it, per se.

Like water too, it can be difficult to grasp the nature of these complex and powerful men in a brief introductory study such as this. Even as one closes a hand around an aspect of these men's lives, the slippery nature of history, memory and political ideology force the realities of Africa's nation state-building projects and their leaders further from grasp. Future development of this research will centralize the response of Nyerere and Mobutu to Kissinger and other American representatives as source material becomes more available on the subject. Further versions will also move the narrative down to the ground level more often, to demonstrate what effect these men had to people on a day-to-day level, as access to local archives becomes more possible. Despite the limitations of this project, this study intends to provide a starting point in examining these


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influential, important men, and the legacies they have left behind for their people and the people of Africa.
Bibliography


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