Ideology and Change in the Kibbutz

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IDEOLOGY AND CHANGE IN THE KIBBUTZ

A Thesis

Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of Sociology
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

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Jeffrey Wilhelms
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This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Jeffrey Wilhelm
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Approved, July 1977

Dr. Lawrence S. Beckhouse
Dr. R. Wayne Kernodle
Dr. Marion G. Vanfossen
DEDICATION

This paper is dedicated to the memory of my grandfather.
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEDICATION</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER I. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER II. THE ORIGINS OF THE KIBBUTZ MOVEMENT</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER III. ASCETICISM AND SIMPLICITY</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER IV. AGRICULTURE, INDUSTRY, AND HIRED LABOR</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER V. EQUALITY</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER VI. COMMUNAL LIVING</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER VII. PROGRESS AND COMMUNALITY:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRISIS IN THE KIBBUTZ</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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ABSTRACT

We seek to understand the relationship between the evolving society and the evolving ideology of the kibbutz movement. In the middle stands the kibbutznik who, through a process of ideological reformulation, attempts to maintain a sense of consistency between the ideology and the real kibbutz world, while at the same time attempting to maintain the internal consistency and integrity of the ideology itself.

On the one hand, the kibbutz is committed to modernity in its technological and economic organization and, on the other hand, to primitivity in its social relations. The problem facing the kibbutz is simply that it has embraced two fundamentally contradictory value positions—progress and communality—and yet its survival and integrity depend to a great extent on how successfully it maintains the commitment to each.

The whole process of ideological elaboration, or reformulation, is an attempt to render compatible these divergent trends. Under the economic conditions of progress, however, the kibbutz cannot maintain the commitment to communality in precisely the same way it did in the early days of settlement.
IDEOLOGY AND CHANGE IN THE KIBBUTZ
INTRODUCTION

This paper examines the ideological development of the kibbutz movement. There are three major hypotheses concerning this development.

First, ideology impacts upon itself and upon social structure and, in turn, is impacted upon by social structure.

Second, in the course of ideological development, the original values have been continuously reinterpreted so as to preserve the integrity of the kibbutzim as a unique and highly successful socialist movement which has remained true to its ideals. This whole process may be called ideological elaboration.

Third, the individual kibbutzim have always been dedicated to economic progress—progress both of the movement itself and of the Jewish people as a nation—and therein lies the crisis in the kibbutz and, specifically, the problem facing ideological elaboration.
CHAPTER I
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

In attempting to understand the relationship between kibbutz ideology and kibbutz society the ideas of Karl Marx, Max Weber, Karl Mannheim, and Maurice Cornforth were important frames of reference.

Karl Marx's analysis of the existential determination of ideas dates back to early criticism of his teacher, Georg Hegel. Marx observed that "it has not occurred to any of these philosophers to inquire into the connection of German philosophy with German reality, into the relation of their criticism to their own material surroundings" (1930:6). Marx maintained that ideas were historical and transitory products and were no more eternal than the relations which they expressed.

With this response to Hegel, Marx focused upon the role of social position, particularly class position, in the formulation of ideas. To Marx, ideas were the intellectual manifestation of underlying economic interests, reflected through the prism of social class. It was from these interests that ideas gained their source and meaning. We must go astray, he suggested, if we
...detach the ideas of the ruling class from the ruling class itself and attribute to them an independent existence, if we confine ourselves to saying that in a particular age these or those ideas were dominant, without paying attention to the conditions of production and the producers of these ideas, and if we ignore the individuals and the world conditions which are the source of these ideas (1964:79-80).

Marx stated further that the manner in which individuals relate to the means of economic production, and to each other in the process, constitutes the real foundation, or the infrastructure, upon which the cultural superstructure of society is built.

In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society—the real foundation, on which legal and political superstructures arise and to which definite forms of social consciousness correspond. The mode of production of material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness (Marx; 1964:51).

Simply put, "determinate individuals, who are productively active in a definite way, enter into...determinate social and political relations" (Marx; 1964:74).

It is interesting to note that in his earlier writings Marx was insistent on the priority of economic factors; however, later writings represent a substantial compromise on this point.¹
The political, legal, philosophical, literary, and artistic development rests on the economic. But they all react upon one another and upon the economic base. It is not the case that the economic situation is the sole active cause, and that everything else is merely a passive effect. There is, rather, a reciprocity within a field of economic necessity which in the last instance always asserts itself (Marx; 1962:304).

Marx went on to say that

...the ultimately determinant element in history is the production and reproduction of real life. Hence if somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is the only determining one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract and senseless phrase. The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure...also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggle and in many cases preponderate in determining their form (1962:488).

In the Marxian formulation, bourgeois ideology was conceived to be a distorted, falsified and therefore invalid defense of their privileged social and economic position.

1. "Similarly, Marx has been proved wrong on almost every single count on which he made a prediction specific enough to be tested: the revolution did not occur in highly industrialized, but rather in industrially "backward," countries; it did not bring about the classless society, nor did it eliminate internal conflicts and contradictions; and the middle class did not diminish in a process of polarization, but instead increased steadily; and so on. On the other hand, the proposition that the "final" causes of social change lie in the economic sphere is untestable. Since no empirical specification for the concept "final" has been provided, any impetus originating in the economic sphere can be viewed as a final cause, whereas any impetus originating in another sphere may be viewed as nonfinal. Moreover, when he predicted the fading away of the state in a classless society, Marx, like Spencer, did not specify the conditions or time at which he expected this to come about. Consequently, this thesis, too, is untestable" (Etzioni; 1964:8).
Marx's own ideas, on the other hand, were held to be unbiased and factual statements of a class, the proletariat, with no privileged social or economic position to defend.

It is at this point, and with this fundamental assumption, that Marxist theory comes under criticism for a failure to satisfy certain intellectual requirements inherent in ideological development (Cornforth: 1972), and becomes of questionable heuristic value. These intellectual requirements are equally applicable to Marxist and kibbutz ideology.

Failing to recognize that in ideology there takes place a process of the reflection of the real world in men's ideas, (the Marxists) regard ideology exclusively as a development of various ideas expressing and serving various material, economic interests. This leads them to one or other of two conclusions. On the one hand, they conclude that since all ideas are merely practical instruments serving various material interests, no ideas, including their own, can lay claim correctly to reflect reality—so that every ideology, including their own, is as illusory as every other in all respects. On the other hand, they are led to make an exception of themselves as special people who, by some intellectual miracle, have transcended every class point of view and can look down on the rest of mankind from an ivory tower of complete and absolute "objectivity." In either case they are clearly involved in self-contradiction (Cornforth; 1972:73).

While Marx's conception of society was one of conflicting social classes within changing social structures and economic relations, Max Weber was concerned with the subjective meanings that individuals impute to concrete social relationships in a particular socio-historical context. First, Weber postulated four basic types of socially relevant action: (1) purposive or goal-oriented rational action; (2)
value-oriented rational action; (3) action predicated on emotion or affection; and (4) traditional action. Second, he used the typology as a tool to understand historical change. In doing this he conceived of historical change as a shift from traditional to rational action, and he used the greatest historical change of the century—the Industrial Revolution—as an excellent case in point.

In his monumental work, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber theorized that certain religious ideas were at work in Western Europe, that were not present in India, China, Babylonia, and Egypt, which provided a positive ethical sanction for discarding old ideas concerning economic behavior and thus paved the way for the emergence of modern capitalism.

The pioneers of the modern economic order were, he argues, parvenus, who elbowed their way to success in the teeth of the established aristocracy of land and commerce. The tonic that braced them for the conflict was a new conception of religion, which taught them to regard the pursuit of wealth as, not merely an advantage, but a duty. This conception welded into a disciplined force the still feeble bourgeoisie, heightened its energies, and cast a halo of sanctification round its convenient vices. What is significant, in short, is not the strength of the motive of economic self-interest, which is the commonplace of all ages and demands no explanation. It is the change of moral standards which converted a natural frailty into an ornament of the spirit, and canonized as the economic virtues habits which in earlier ages had been denounced as vices. The force which produced it was the creed associated with the name of Calvin. Capitalism was the social counterpart of Calvinist theology.²

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The central idea Weber used in confirming his theory is expressed in the characteristic phrase "a calling."

To the Calvinist, Weber argues, the calling is not a condition in which the individual is born, but a strenuous and exacting enterprise to be chosen by himself, and to be pursued with a sense of religious responsibility. Baptized in the bracing, if icy, waters of Calvinist theology, the life of business, once regarded as perilous to the soul...acquires a new sanctity. Labour is not merely an economic means: it is a spiritual end. Covetousness, if a danger to the soul, is a less formidable menace than sloth. So far from poverty being meritorious, it is a duty to choose the more profitable occupation. So far from there being an inevitable conflict between money-making and piety, they are natural allies, for the virtues incumbent on the elect-diligence, thrift, sobriety, prudence—are the most reliable passport to commercial prosperity. Thus the pursuit of riches, which one had been feared as the enemy of religion, was now welcomed as its ally. The habits and institutions in which that philosophy found expression survived long after the creed which was their parent had expired, or had withdrawn from Europe to more congenial climes. If capitalism begins as the practical idealism of the aspiring bourgeoisie, it ends, Weber suggests in his concluding pages, as an orgy of materialism.3

Weber's emphasis on the function of religious ideas in the emergence of modern capitalism was the cornerstone of his critique of Marx's theory of economic determinism.4

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3. Ibid., pp. 2-3.
4. In emphasizing the role of religious ideas in the emergence of the capitalist system, Weber is not without criticism himself. "Why insist that causation can work in only one direction? Is it not a little artificial to suggest that capitalist enterprise had to wait, as Weber appears to imply, till religious changes had produced a capitalist spirit? Would it not be equally plausible, and equally one-sided, to argue that the religious changes were themselves merely the result of economic movements? Brentano's criticism, that the political thought of the Renaissance was as powerful a solvent of conventional
He maintained that Marx had myopically emphasized the causal connection leading from the economic infrastructure to the cultural superstructure, and that this simplified explanation did not adequately take into account the complex cause-and-effect relationships of the economy to cultural products and human behavior. Weber suggested instead that economic, technological, political, religious, and ideological factors should all be viewed as potentially independent variables which impact upon each other as well as on the course of society.

Perhaps no other name is more closely associated with the sociology of knowledge than that of Karl Mannheim. It is not surprising therefore that his analyses are particularly important in understanding the relationship between kibbutz ideology and kibbutz society.

Kibbutz ideology, or any ideological system, may be viewed as an attempt "made by people to understand and give restraint as the teaching of Calvin, is not without weight. In England, at any rate, the speculations of business men and economists as to money, prices, and the foreign exchanges, which were occasioned by the recurrent financial crises of the sixteenth century and by the change in the price level, were equally effective in undermining the attitude which Weber called traditionalism. Recent studies of the development of economic thought suggest that the change of opinion on economic ethics ascribed to Calvinism was by no means confined to it, but was part of a general intellectual movement, which was reflected in the outlook of Catholic, as well as of Protestant, writers. Nor was the influence of Calvinist teaching itself so uniform in character, or so undeviating in tendency, as might be inferred by the reader of Weber's essay. On the contrary, it varied widely from period to period and country to country, with differences of economic conditions, social tradition, and political environment" (Ibid., pp. 8-9).
an account of the real world in which they live, or of some aspect of it and of their own lives, so that it may be of service to them in the definite conditions in which they live" (Cornforth; 1972:70).

Mannheim, on the other hand, distinguished between two levels of ideology, the particular and the total. The particular conception refers to the possibility that a given statement may be tendentious, and considers the psychological motivation of the individual. The total conception refers to "the ideology of an age or of a concrete historico-social group, e.g., of a class...(and is) concerned with the characteristics and composition of the total structure of the mind of this epoch or of this group" (1936:56). The distinction here is whether an isolated idea or an entire mind may be viewed as ideological. Within the total conception of ideology a further distinction is made, between special and general ideology, in which "the decisive question is whether the thought of all groups (including our own) or only that of our adversaries is recognized as socially determined" (1936:77).

In fact, Mannheim held that, strictly speaking, it was incorrect to say that the single individual thinks.5

5. Mannheim suggested that "opinions, statements, propositions, and systems of ideas are not taken at their face value but are interpreted in light of the life-situation of the one who expresses them. It signifies further that the specific character and life-situation of the subject influence his opinions, perceptions, and interpretations" (1936:55).
Rather it is more correct to insist that he participates in thinking further what other men have thought before him. He finds himself in an inherited situation and attempts to elaborate further the inherited modes of response or to substitute others for them in order to deal more adequately with the new challenges which have arisen out of the shifts and changes in his situation (1936:3).

To Mannheim, it was clear that men do not confront the world "from the abstract levels of a contemplating mind as such, nor do they do so exclusively as solitary beings. On the contrary, they act with and against one another in organized groups, and while doing so they think with and against each other" (1936:3).

In analyzing the existential determinants of knowledge and ideas, Mannheim assigned great importance to social class and generational differences. Both variables locate individuals in the social and historical process, and thereby "limit them to a specific range of potential experience, predisposing them for a certain characteristic mode of thought and experience, and a characteristic type of historically relevant action" (1952:291). To Mannheim,

6. As a point of comparison, Thorstein Veblen emphasized the ways in which thought and knowledge are linked to particular lifestyles and the organization of the community. "The scheme of thought or of knowledge," he wrote, "is in good part a reverberation of the schemes of life" (1919:105). Veblen suggested that ways of thinking are determined by social and occupational position in particular, and are reflected in knowledge and behavior. "The scheme of life which men perforce adopt under the exigencies of an industrial situation shapes their habit of thought on the side of their behavior.... Each individual is but a single complex of habits of thought, and the same psychical mechanism that expresses itself in one direction as conduct expresses itself in another direction as knowledge" (1919:105).
all knowledge and ideas are "bound to a location," and consequently all thought is situationally relative, inevitably perspectivistic. As he defined it, perspective "is something more than a merely formal determination of thinking. (It) signifies the manner in which one views an object, what one perceives in it, and how one construes it in his thinking" (1936:244).

Underlying and reflecting these existential considerations is something called the ideological mentality. Attempts to qualify this concept are at the heart of this analysis of the kibbutz, and necessarily focus on the manner in which kibbutz ideology has been developed, elaborated upon, and justified. One way in which the ideological mentality may be manifested is in what Mannheim called the utopian state of mind, which is "incongruous with the state of reality within which it occurs (and) when (it passes) over into conduct, (tends) to shatter...the order of things prevailing at the time" (1936:192). Out of this arises a false consciousness, or an incorrect interpretation of one's own self and one's role, in which

...persons try to cover up their "real" relations to themselves and to the world, and falsify to themselves the elementary facts of human existence by deifying, romanticizing, or idealing them, in short, by resorting to the device of escape from themselves and the world, and thereby conjuring up false interpretations of experience. We have a case of ideological distortion, therefore, when we try to resolve conflicts and anxieties by having recourse to absolutes, according to which it is no longer possible to live. This is the case when we create "myths," worship "greatness in itself," avow allegiance to "ideals," while in our actual
conduct we are following other interests which we try to mask by simulating an unconscious righteousness, which is too easily transparent (1936:96).

Cornforth called this state of mind "ideological illusion" and located the source in the production relations of society. However, he suggested that these illusions are not "created by (individuals) consciously reflecting on their own social relations and working out for themselves, in a scientific manner, an accurate and systematic account of the social structure which they find in existence" (1972:82).

As any ideological system develops, that is, as it is elaborated, the tension-management properties of the system come into clearer focus along with the realization that ideological illusion may be a natural by-product of the development. It is important to note that while ideological systems may be characterized in terms of tension-management, this simply identifies the objective of the process of ideological elaboration and does not mean the system is necessarily successful in reducing tensions.

Cornforth suggested that the intellectual requirements facing ideological systems are simple, yet very difficult to satisfy.

Ideologies must be made to satisfy, in the first place, the general requirements of the reflection of reality in ideas, that is to say, the laws of logic. In the second place, they must satisfy the particular requirements of the reflection of a particular part of reality, that is to say, they must be made to square with the facts so far as people have experienced and ascertained them.
Ideologies, therefore, are developed on the basis of the given structure of society to serve the interests of one or another class, and in this ideological development the effort is always being made to render the views developed self-consistent and logical, and to make them cover and give some consistent account of the principal facts which emerge in the experience of society at the given stage of development.

This gives rise to continual contradictions in the development of ideologies. For on the one hand, the views developed by the representatives of various classes prove logically inconsistent and inconsistent with plain facts; and on the other hand, facts and the requirements of logic lead to conclusions which do not accord with views tenaciously held. Such contradictions give rise to a continual process of the elaboration of ideologies, as the ideologists endeavour to find ways and means of resolving them....

Ideologies are always peculiarly vulnerable and open to criticism on the score of self-contradiction and of failure to reckon with experienced facts. Those who, as intellectual representatives of a given class, espouse a general point of view in ideology, are always being driven for this reason to elaborate their ideology, which leads them to the creation of often very complicated and far-fetched ideological structures.... If this process of criticism goes on in the development of ideology of a particular class, it takes a different and sharper form when, on the basis of new factors in the material life of society, new and rival views begin to be formed, expressing the interests of different classes. Such views do not emerge until the development of material life gives birth to them. But once they emerge, they attack from the new point of view the manifold inconsistencies of the already established views. They make use of logic and appeal to facts as powerful intellectual weapons with which to discredit and demolish the old views (1972:70-72).

According to Mannheim, ideologically determined action always falls short of its intended meaning, a condition manifested in the ideological mentality, of which there are three fundamental types:
As the first type...we may regard the case in which the conceiving and thinking subject is prevented from becoming aware of the incongruence of his ideas with reality by the whole body of axioms involved in his historically and socially determined thought. As a second type of ideological mentality we may present the "cant" mentality, which is characterized by the fact that historically it has the possibility of uncovering the incongruence between its ideas and its conduct, but instead conceals these insights in response to certain vital-emotional interests. As a final type there is the ideological mentality based on conscious deception, where ideology is to be interpreted as a purposeful lie. In this case we are not dealing with self-delusion but rather with purposeful deception of another (1936:195).

In attempting to understand the relationship between kibbutz ideology and kibbutz society the debt to Marx, Weber, Mannheim, and Cornforth is apparent; to Marx for his theory of economic determinism; to Weber for his analysis of the role of ideas in historical change; to Mannheim for his analysis of the existential determination of ideas; and, to Cornforth for his conception of the process of ideological elaboration as presenting certain intellectual requirements and having built-in tensions. While these analyses certainly do not constitute the whole of the contributions to the sociology of knowledge, together they do indicate that the linkages between ideas, social structure, cultural products, and human action are complex indeed. In short, they are an important frame of reference in which to consider the case of the kibbutz.
CHAPTER II
THE ORIGINS OF THE KIBBUTZ MOVEMENT

Kibbutzim are collective settlements, the largest of which has about 1,500 members and about 70 of which have fewer than one hundred. The average size is roughly 350 members. In 1971 there were 236 kibbutzim, the majority located in border areas, with a combined population of almost 100,000. This represents about three per cent of the total Israeli population.

The kibbutz movement is a construct of four fundamental principles: voluntarism, communality, equality, and the pioneering spirit. To fully understand the ideological development of the kibbutz, one must begin with the realization that the movement is the confluence of three historical trends or forces, namely, Zionism, socialism, and the youth movements of Eastern Europe shortly before the turn of the century.

Historically, the kibbutz movement is one of the expressions of modern Zionism. Jews have always been "a pariah people, an extra-territorial people, dispersed among many areas and populations, having common religious identity rooted in a normative past and pointed toward a messianic
future" (Sturm; 1971:101). Always on the periphery of total social acceptance, the shtetl (ghetto) Jew was excluded from many jobs, and thus tended toward self-employment, i.e., as a shopkeeper, moneylender, or merchant. The entire Jewish community at the turn of the century very nearly represented a petty bourgeois caste,7 surrounded and restricted by the Gentile society (Diamond; 1957). The connotation of the Jew as a "mercenary man" made him somewhat less of a man in the physical, masculine sense; in fact, it could be said that the Jew was "a caricature of a natural and normal man, both physically and spiritually" (Spiro; 1970:47).

The intense feeling of personal parasitism, a feeling that was raised to the level of ideology and said to describe Jews everywhere, cannot be explained solely on the basis of a reaction to objective social conditions. It goes beyond the conception of the Jewish bourgeoisie as a socially parasitic body, damned once for its Jewishness, and again for its bourgeoisie status, and singles out the individual Jew as a parasite in the deepest recesses of his nature. It is, in short, a feeling ad hominen. It was a feeling that the vattikim had about themselves as Jews, as people fleeing from work and productive labor (Diamond; 1957:78).

Indeed, "those pioneers who did not come from the technically delimited shtetl areas were reacting against parallel or convergent elements in their own milieux, against what can be called a more diffused version of shtetl culture"

7. "We use the expression "petty bourgeois" technically because most of the manual laborers were self-employed or worked in small, family-owned shops. Further, neither the peak nor the base of the Jewish pyramid extended significantly beyond the petty bourgeois range in the Gentile pyramid" (Diamond; 1957:76).
In the kibbutzim the shtetl generated its own antithesis, in which a quasi-religious significance was attached to the soil and to the intrinsic value of productive self-labor as instruments in the personal and national regeneration of the Jewish people. Both of these aspects of the pioneering principle were perhaps best expressed by Aaron D. Gordon, a worker at the first kibbutz and an important spokesman for the kibbutz movement in the early days. In 1911, he wrote:

In Palestine we must do with our hands all the things that make up the sum total of life. We must ourselves do all the work, from the least strenuous, cleanest, and most sophisticated, to the dirtiest and most difficult. In our own way, we must feel what a worker feels and think what a worker thinks. From now on our principal ideal must be Labor.... The ideal of Labor must become the pivot of all our aspirations.... What we need is zealots of Labor.  

However, Zionism was not the only causal factor in the ideals and conduct of the early kibbutzniks. The second most dominant influence was socialism. Most Jewish immigrants to Palestine at about the turn of the century were from Eastern Europe, particularly Russia. "In that context, the socialist movement represented the same effort to overcome exploitation, alienation, and dependency as the Zionist movement" (Sturm; 1971:104). Sturm went on to point out the convergent elements in Zionism and socialism:

The difference between Zionism and socialism, as expressed by one kibbutznik, is that while Zionism is the effort of the person as Jew to attain liberation, socialism is the effort of the person as man to attain the same end. Thus the socialist principle is the more universalistic counterpart of the Zionist principle. But neither principle is individualistic. Liberation within these categories of thought does not mean each man going his own way. Quite the contrary, liberation means cooperation, a working together for the mutual benefit of all (1971:104).

Another causal factor in the development of the kibbutz movement was the creation of countless Jewish youth movements in Europe at about the turn of the century. Rejected by the Gentile society, these youths, in turn, rejected the traditional Jewish identity. For them every aspect of shtetl life, the physical and psychological narrowness of the ghetto, the traditional Jewish culture and the personality type it created, and the so-called Jewish physical type, was repugnant.9

Not even in the midst of his family life did the Jewish youths find consolation and stimulation. The split between fathers and sons widened. The sons stood, as it were, at the crossroads. They had escaped from the world of yesterday, in which their fathers were still immersed, but the world of the future was still enveloped in fog (Spiro; 1970:42).

"We were always opposed to the life of our parents," was the comment of one settler. "We always," said another, "stressed the necessity for rebellion against parents and the parental way of life" (Spiro; 1970:42). As Becker put

9. In Kibbutz Kiryat Yeddim, members would still point with pride to Jews who were "so nice-looking you would never know that they were Jewish" (Spiro; 1970:41).
it, they "loathed and hated the world of their elders, and were ready to follow any Pied Piper whose mystery and power held promise of a new realm where longings found fruition" (1946:73).

"Many ideals, both social and national, appeared on the market and offered themselves to the young, bewildered Jew" (Baratz; 1949:30). First, the appearance of political Zionism with the dreams of a Jewish National Homeland; then the ideals of the Russian socialist movement; and, finally, the preservation of the diaspora, associated with the creation of the Socialist-Jewish League.

The revolutionary idealism of the young Jews was manifested in membership in the various youth movements throughout Europe at that time, which incorporated both socialist and Zionist philosophies. Through these youth movements many young Jews sought to escape Jewish traditionalism, retreating to nature and searching for adventure. With the main emphasis of the movement on scouting and camping, the escape from "Jewishness" was as much physical as psychological.

Trudging along with the beloved leader, came the new way of life: wandering at will through the fields and forests, and hills, pitching camp in a ruined castle or under the lindens fringing a little cluster of peasant homes where the shames of the city were absent (Becker; 1946:75).

So deep-seated and profound were these early experiences that one kibbutz leader, thirty years later, stated that "communal living came from the hikes in The Movement"
The youths also rejected the bourgeois materialism of their parents in favor of asceticism and simplicity. They saw...

...in the luxurious life of the privileged few in the societies in which they were reared a decadent form of existence. The Utopia they envisioned would not be one of artificial embellishments of nature but of the fundamental, natural expressions of mankind. This assumed two forms: one of an almost religious character of asceticism and deprivation, the other an emphasis upon the simple and natural gratifications in life (Golomb and Katz; 1970:42).

"Equality, in the form of a reaction against the gross social inequalities of European society, became a (kibbutz) value in itself without qualification" (Maron; 1971:18).

The traditional family, (the youths) felt, was characterized by the subjection of the wife to her husband and the subservience of the child to the father. Moreover, they charged the division of labor that characterized the family and which, in turn, was a reflection of the broader social system, confined the woman to the home, relegated her to the role of housewife, and precluded her participation in the economic, cultural, and political life of the community (Spiro; 1955:283).

Howard Becker outlined two important functions of the group in the lives of the youth movement members. First, "the sense of belonging to a band of dissenters, to a conventicle of the elect, had a peculiar thrill for you," said one kibbutznik. Another kibbutznik remembered that the group "gave substance to our lives, for we felt that we were
different from others, better than they, for we were going
to start a new life" (1946:77).

The crucial significance of this feeling of being "different" and "better" than others because of a determination to build a "new life," cannot be underestimated. It is this feeling, together with its social and psychological consequences, which served--and continues to serve--to transform a nebulous and romantic scouting movement into a self-conscious political community (Becker; 1946:47).

The other function served by the group was to provide its members with precisely those emotional experiences which would give them the sense of joy, freedom, and commumality they sought. "Their cherished selves," commented Becker, "would expand and deepen in and through the surging emotions called forth by banding together with the like-minded and undergoing the experiences of the "expedition" and the "nest" (1946:77).

The emigration of these radical youths to Palestine began shortly after the turn of the century, for others the exodus came as the pogroms increased after World War I. Post-war anti-semitism was merely one item in a long Jewish indictment of Western culture and of the "bourgeois ideology of the French Revolution" (Spiro; 1970:49). Thus, when these young Jews found that the Western Enlightenment, with its liberalism and emancipation, was not intended for Jews, many emigrated to Palestine. The insistence on aliya, or immigration, claimed a perceptive kibbutznik,

...was the real solution for us, since it was the final outlet, the culmination of the youth movement.
Instead of collapsing like other youth movements, (some) succeeded because (they) offered a final realization or culmination in Palestine. If it weren't for Zionism, (the movement) would have become just another episode in the life of those who did not want to continue the life of their fathers (Spiro; 1970:51).

The intensity of the historic mission attached to the establishment of the Jewish State was strengthened by "the sense of shame of Jewish existence, so widespread among the Jewish youth of Eastern Europe. They were impressed by Russian socialism, and this shame found its need for action in Zionism" (Infield; 1944:18-19). The synergy of these three elements explains in large part how and why the kibbutz movement came to be. However, a fourth factor wrought considerable influence on the course of kibbutz development, namely, the pragmatic considerations facing the immigrant-pioneers.

SETTLING THE DESERT

In 1904-1914 approximately 35,000 Jewish immigrants came to Palestine, among them 10,000 young socialists from Eastern Europe who wanted to do manual work. However, Jewish agricultural settlements had been trying to establish themselves in Palestine since 1882, with little success. The young Jews began immigrating at a time when the trial-and-error procedure of finding the most efficient means of organizing Jewish agriculture was ready for a full-blown collective experiment. "After the bitter experiences of the early, privately-owned individualistic settlements, the
pioneers turned to collective living, believing that the collective unit built on mutual aid would succeed where individual enterprise had failed" (Darin-Drabkin; 1963:59). At that time, at least, it meant "either settlement in groups or no settlement at all" (Infield; 1944:14).

From the beginning, Jews were attempting to create a "grass roots" society, that is, a society rooted in agriculture, without which the hope of a Jewish National Homeland could not materialize (Crown; 1965). Only by working the land could the Jewish people ever hope to possess it. This required manual labor to which Jews of the First Aliya (in the 1880s) were unaccustomed. Instead of becoming workers, they exploited the large supply of cheap Arab labor to establish themselves as landlords. A. Bein, the historian of Zionist settlement in Palestine, stated that "if this development had gone on unchecked, Jewish settlement in Palestine would have been in danger. A small class of Jewish owners would have controlled a big number of Arab workers--and for how long?"¹⁰ In addition, these estates were losing money and had to depend on subsidies from the Jewish philanthropist, Baron de Rothschild. At the beginning of the century, there were only a thousand Jewish farming families (many of whom were existing on such subsidies from relatives and friends), the existing farms were not very successful, and "the formation of a solid farming community seemed as distant a goal as ever" (Darin-Drabkin; 1963:63).

¹⁰. From Darin-Drabkin; 1963:63.
"A viable Jewish national community could never have come into being under such conditions" (Sanders; 1965:50).

The Jews of the Second Aliya, which began after the Kishinev pogroms of 1903, set about, first, to establish self-sufficient agricultural settlements in Palestine and, second, to establish a Jewish laboring class. Of the 10,000 young socialists who came to Palestine in 1904-1914, only about 1,000 of them found the manual work they sought. Thus, 90 per cent of them became discouraged and left for the cities, or left the country altogether. The Jews that remained had to live collectively to keep the costs of living low enough to compete with Arab labor (Sanders: 1965). Also, "the method of communal living helped them emotionally and physically to bridge their way into a new and difficult life" (Sanders; 1965:50). Soon the Arabs began to understand the political motives of the new settlers. It was no longer the settlement of individual farmers; Jewish settlement was becoming a national movement (Baratz: 1949). Under these circumstances, collective organization served an additional, protective, function.

After the ill-fated "Rothschild villages," the Zionist settlement authorities, headed by Dr. Arthur Ruppin, sought to establish large farms under public control rather than support a collective venture. The large, publicly-owned farms had the advantage of being able to attract the needed agrarian experts, conduct large experiments, and serve as training centers for new immigrants. The Zionist authorities
were also short of funds, and these farms would require little capital expenditure in the initial phases (Darin-Drabkin: 1963). In this scheme the workers received an equal wage, and the farms were managed by individuals with a higher salary. At the Kinneret farm the managers were concerned simply with economic profitability and even resorted to the hiring of Arab labor. Tensions increased and a strike of Jewish workers resulted.

In 1909 a historic step was taken by seven men and women at the Kinneret farm. They received permission from Dr. Ruppin to work a portion of the land themselves. They formed a collective community, no cash payments were distributed, and at the end of the year they showed the only profit at Kinneret. A permanent collective was established there, which the members called Deganiah, and thus the first kibbutz was born.

In 1911, at Merhavia in the Valley of Jezreel, a cooperative was organized by Professor Franz Oppenheimer. Here the workers were to be cooperative owners but the wages were determined by output. At both Kinneret and Merhavia the principle of differential wages proved to be a source of great conflict (Darin-Drabkin: 1963 and Sanders: 1965).

After the collapse of the Oppenheimer cooperative, the settlement authorities had no choice but to support the kibbutz concept or Jewish settlement might have come to a complete standstill. At that time it meant "either settlement in groups, or no settlement at all" (Infield; 1944:14).
Writing to the London offices of the Zionist Organization in 1912, Dr. Ruppin stated that "we had only one choice: to do nothing or follow the inexpensive project of backing the kibbutzim."\textsuperscript{11}

Thus, the creation and internal structure of the early kibbutzim may be explained, at least in part, simply in terms of expediency. However, the deep-seated commitment of the founding fathers to the original values must also be placed in proper socio-historical perspective. The relationship of all these factors is at the heart of an understanding as to how the kibbutz came to be, and how and why kibbutz ideology has evolved through the years.

\textsuperscript{11}. From Darin-Drabkin; 1963:66.
CHAPTER III
ASCETICISM AND SIMPLICITY

There was a time when being a kibbutznik meant living in tents or wooden huts, perhaps using furniture made of masonite or empty oil drums, and having no personal possessions except a pair of slippers and a toothbrush.\(^{12}\) Such were the conditions of existence for the early settlers, without substantial improvement until the mid-1930s. Of course, many gave up and left for the cities, or left the country altogether, but the idealism and commitment of those who stayed sustained them through some very hard

\(^{12}\) Moshe Kerem's account of the first days of his own kibbutz described what life was like in the period which is known as "Commune A." "...cooking was done for a community of several hundred on primitive kerosene stoves. Boiling water was a matter of hours and water itself was severely rationed--through one cold water tap connected to a decrepit tank which required refilling three times a day. The dining area was a concrete-floored, cement-block-walled room sheltered from the elements by a ceiling constructed of various-sized pieces of leaky corrugated tin salvaged from abandoned British army installations. Tables for ten were made out of masonite and seating was on backless benches. Crockery was non-existent--one tin plate sufficing for all courses" (1965:17). The living accommodations were equally as bleak: "Tents--in my kibbutz I lived in one for over two years--gradually gave way to huts of corrugated aluminum which in turn were replaced by wooden bungalows and succeeded...by concrete-block houses, without sanitary conveniences, in which one room was allocated to a family" (1965:21-22).
times. They drained the marshes, cleared the land, survived malaria, withstood the Arabs, and ultimately made the desert blossom. The kibbutzim thus survived a difficult birth and prospered.

As discussed in the previous chapter, there is evidence to suggest that the puritanical denial which marked the early days of the kibbutz movement stemmed, at least in part, from the conditions facing the early immigrants to Palestine. This point of view is summed up quite well by Stanley Maron, who stated that at the time "absolute austerity was necessary for survival, and so the distribution of food, clothing, shelter, and other material fruits of labor was made on the scale of the minimum possible. Asceticism in consumption became a standard practice" (1971:17).

However, asceticism and simplicity also fulfilled a more subjective need in the hearts and minds of those early settlers, reflecting the shtetl experience.

The particular way the kibbutz has chosen to approach its goal of social justice has been through a morality of austerity. Two factors have guided this course. One, undoubtedly, has been the poverty which prevailed during the long formative years of the kibbutz. A morality which de-emphasizes the importance of possessions and stresses service to society is easier to accept in times when material things are hard to come by. But the second, and surely the most important reason for the selection of a morality of austerity was opposition to the moral degeneracy of European society, which had come to place more value on things than on people. The kibbutz has been, in this moral respect as well as politically, economically, and socially, a reaction against the injustices and untruthfulness of the society from which most of the members came (Maron; 1971:106).
As the kibbutz movement established a firm economic base and showed signs of prosperity, changes occurred in the ideological system. Through it all, kibbutzniks have quite expectedly tried to hang on to certain ideas and ideals they considered essential to their way of life. However, these ideas have been continually reinterpreted in light of changes in the conditions of kibbutz life. Thus, on the one hand, there is an evolving society and, on the other hand, an evolving ideology. In the middle is the kibbutznik, who attempts to maintain a sense of consistency between the ideology and the real kibbutz world, while at the same time attempting to maintain the integrity and consistency of the ideology itself. The process that seeks to mediate between the ideology and the real world is called "ideological elaboration" (Cornforth: 1972).

Of all the original kibbutz values, the most complete and far-reaching changes have probably occurred in the area of asceticism and simplicity, causing perhaps the first great strain in kibbutz ideology. The problem confronting the kibbutz at that time was simply that the

13. Moshe Kerem described how his kibbutz had changed from the austere beginnings: "The kitchen is ultra-modern and cooking is done in steam-jacketed kettles. Dishes are washed mechanically and the stores contain mechanical potato peelers, walk-in refrigerators and deep-freeze lockers. Tables for four are made of easy-to-clean formica. The hall can be turned into a movie theatre in the evening, and weekly general meetings as well as large cultural affairs all take place in it. In some kibbutzim, kibbutz offices and committee-rooms are housed in the same building. The soda tap which my kibbutz has just installed in the anteroom of our dining hall is a far cry from that lonely water faucet of 15 years ago" (1965:17-18).
ideal no longer corresponded to the actual conditions of existence in the collectives. The image of the pioneer-farmer living a simple and natural life, carving a Jewish National Homeland out of the desert through sweat and toil, had been replaced, to a considerable degree, with the presence of automatic dishwashers, air-conditioning, private apartments complete with kitchenette and bathroom and, alas, swimming pools and paid vacations abroad.

This situation caused a good deal of tension within kibbutz ideology as two of the original values were eventually abandoned. There was great socio-historical significance attached to these values and, as such, they held an important place in the ideological mentality of the first generation member.

However, this was not at all the case with the second generation, the first generation actually born in the kibbutz. They saw asceticism and simplicity as values for survival and not as goals in themselves. They were sufficiently removed from the shtetl experience of their parents to fail to identify with values derived from that experience. And so it has been with each succeeding generation born into the kibbutz, idealism gives way to pragmatism.

The process of aging itself inevitably requires the ascetic and simple ethic to be relaxed somewhat with the first generation (Talmon: 1961 and Friedmann: 1968). Older members were just not able to tolerate what in their youth seemed to be great adventure and fun. In the winter they
required warmer clothes, perhaps an extra blanket on the bed, had no desire to return to sleeping in tents, and generally could not indefinitely endure privation. Thus, asceticism was viewed by some of the older members as primarily a virtue of the young. On this point, Golomb and Katz (1970) suggested that the older generation as a rule did not even see asceticism as desirable for their children.

Perhaps the most important factor explaining the passing of asceticism and simplicity was that as the kibbutz became more firmly established it became apparent that these values were inconsistent with economic and material development, to which the movement was also committed and, indeed, had to be committed to in order to insure its survival in the larger (capitalist) Israeli society. The kibbutz movement has always been preoccupied, perhaps even obsessed, with the ideal of productive self-labor. In emphasizing productivity, of which individual accomplishment and achievement are parts, at least a modicum of economic success could reasonably be expected. This economic success, accelerating after the late 1930s, created modes of consumption and conditions of existence which were considerably removed from the austere and simple beginnings (Kerem: 1965; Friedmann: 1968; Leon: 1968). Specifically, the notion of productive labor dictated the eventual shift from an agricultural to an industrial economy, thereby creating a value dilemma with ideal of farming as a way of life, upon which asceticism and simplicity were predicated.
Clearly, the kibbutz faced a dilemma: how could changes in the material conditions of existence be reconciled with the original conception of asceticism? Three alternatives appeared to be open to the kibbutz movement.

First, the viability of the original tenets could have been reaffirmed, while acknowledging that significant departures from these values have occurred. This, of course, would involve the tacit admission that the kibbutz is evolving, or has already evolved, into a different sort of collective experience.

Second, the original tenets could have been reaffirmed, while a departure from the values of asceticism and simplicity denied. Nowhere does this appear in the literature, although Golomb and Katz (1970) do maintain that the kibbutz remains "relatively" austere and simple in comparison to life in the larger Israeli society.

Third, the original tenets could have been rejected as no longer essential to the kibbutz way of life, or as never really being value positions in and of themselves, while at the same time acknowledging and legitimizing the extensive changes in the material conditions of kibbutz life.

According to Cornforth (1972) the latter alternative comes closest to fulfilling the requirements of ideological elaboration. By eliminating asceticism and simplicity as
essential values, kibbutz ideology was no longer open to
criticism on the score of self-contradiction and of failure
to reckon with the facts.14

Arguments against asceticism and simplicity as
essential values frequently include the contention that
ideas embraced during the infant stages of the kibbutz are
not, by definition, essential to the kibbutz. They may con­
stitute means to ends, rather than being ends in themselves,
a fact not apparent to kibbutz members at that time due to
the severe conditions of existence which tended to blur the
distinction between ends and means. As economic and material
conditions improved, certain values became inconsistent with
the course of progress in the kibbutz, at which time they
were considered, by definition, to be means rather than ends
in themselves.

The reformulation of certain values from ends to
means has been justified by pointing to the great structural
diversity of the kibbutzim throughout Israel, indicating

14. This brings to mind Mannheim's conception of
the ideological mentality, and the three fundamental types
thereof. Only the final type involves conscious deception
and this is not relevant to the case of the kibbutz. The
mentality at work in the kibbutz is best understood by
examining both types one and two: "...we may regard the case
in which the conceiving and thinking subject is prevented
from becoming aware of the incongruence of his ideas with
reality by the whole body of axioms involved in his histori­
cally and socially determined thought. As a second type of
ideological mentality we may present the "cant mentality,"
which is characterized by the fact that historically it has
the possibility of uncovering the incongruence between its
ideas and its conduct, but instead conceals these insights
in response to certain vital-emotional interests" (1936:195).
that change and self-evaluation are on-going processes in
the kibbutz; the means-ends dichotomy is simply a natural
outgrowth of this process.

It will be difficult to find overwhelming similarity between the kibbutz at the present time and its original, basic form. The two differ in practically all spheres of life: in size, in economic structure, in their sources of employment, in their style of life, in the organization of their governing institutions, in their methods of education, in their estimation of the family and its role, and so on. Clear changes have taken place in every kibbutz--especially in the veteran ones--and there are noticeable differences between kibbutzim: there are those with industrial ventures, and those without; some are large, and others small; in some children sleep in special children's houses; some employ hired workers, while others do not; some depend upon regional centers, while others have no such nearby institutions; some are religious, others purely secular; some follow a "rightist," others a "leftist," ideology; they allocate goods to their members for consumption on the basis of "need," of "norms," or of "budget" (Ben David; 1971:76-77).

Pointing to a specific example, the optimum size of the kibbutz was at one time a crucial question upon which the very nature of kibbutz life was thought to rest. Ben David (1971) pointed to this past issue as a means of showing how certain values, once thought to be essential, have in fact been shown to be peripheral to kibbutz life.\textsuperscript{15} In this case, the kibbutz

\textsuperscript{15}. I use the phrase "have in fact been shown" advisedly since ideological elaboration in the kibbutz, or anywhere else for that matter, seeks to understand only if it is self-serving. Unpleasant realities have a tendency to be ignored or explained away.
has obeyed a certain inner logic of its own which contradicts the opinions held by disputants; neither is it small as had been envisaged by the dreamers of the "small groups" ("the kibbutz should be small, by nature of a family, with eight or ten members..." Zvi Schatz said at one time. Later the desirable number was set at 20 to 30, then 60 to 80, and later at 100 to 150. From time to time limits were broadened, various ideological justifications being presented), nor as large as the vision of the "large group" (S. Lavie at one time called it "the large and growing kibbutz" in his explanation of the kibbutz established on 3,000 dunams of land, with each dunam providing the livelihood for one individual). At present time the most common kibbutz size is between 100 and 400 members (1971: 77-78).16

16. Georg Simmel considered "one of the most abstract characteristics of a group: the mere number of its participants. He examines forms of group process and structural arrangement insofar as these derive from sheer quantitative relationships" (Coser; 1971:186). "In small groups, members typically have a chance to interact directly with one another; once the group exceeds a relatively limited size, such interaction must be mediated through formal arrangements. In order to come to grips with the increasing complexity of relationships among large numbers of individuals, the group must create special organs to help the patterning of interactions among its members. Thus, no large group can function without the creation of offices, the differentiation of status positions, and the delegation of tasks and responsibilities. This is the reason larger groups become societies of unequals: in order to maintain themselves, they must be structurally differentiated. But this means that the larger group "gains its unity, which finds expression in the group organs and political notions and ideals, only at the price of a great distance between all of these structures and the individual."

The smaller the group, the greater the involvement of its members, for interaction among a few tends to be more intense than interaction among many; if only because of the greater frequency of contact. Inversely, the larger the group, the weaker the participation of its members; chances are high that they will be involved with only a segment of their personalities instead of as whole human beings. The larger group demands less of its members, and also creates "objective" structures that confront individuals with super-personal powers: "For it is this large number which paralyzes the individual element and which causes the general element to emerge at such a distance from it that it seems
The evolution of the institution of collective education also has been used as a case in point that the kibbutz movement has been positive and dynamic in its ability to adapt and change.

The members of the first kibbutz had given no thought to the structure and development of education that would be in keeping with their convictions. The problem was confronted only with the birth of children. The primary desire of the women who had given birth was to retain their status of equality with men and not be forced into the traditional Western mold of housekeeper, kitchen worker, and child-raiser. The question of what to do with and for the children became a matter of serious debate within individual kibbutzim and at conventions of women workers. The matter became resolved in principle only after several years, when it was determined that the children should be raised and educated in communal fashion (Sturm; 1971:107).

By pointing to the numerous structural changes brought about in the course of kibbutz development, the implication was that, because the kibbutz movement was flourishing economically and was still instrumental in helping to preserve the State of Israel, a hard core of essential

that it could exist by itself, without any individuals, to whom in fact it often enough is antagonistic." Although through its formal arrangement the larger group confronts the individual with a distant and alien power, it liberates him from close control and scrutiny precisely because it creates greater distance among its members. In the dyad, the immediacy of the we is not yet marred by the intrusion of structural constraints, and... in the triad two members may constrain the third and force their will upon him. In the small group, however, the coalitions and majorities that act to constrain individual action are mitigated by the immediacy of participation. In the large group, the differentiated organs constrain the individual through their "objective" powers, even though they allow freedom from the group through segmental rather than total involvement" (Ibid., p. 188).
values had endured through the years of change. Thus, the
task facing kibbutz ideologists in the past, as well as in
the present, has been to clarify which values are indeed
essential and which are non-essential to the kibbutz way of
life and; furthermore, to interpret those essential values
in order that they might be consistent with the course of
kibbutz development.

This reformulation (Diamond: 1957; Arian: 1968;
Golomb and Katz: 1970; Azania: 1971; Ben David: 1971; Maor:
1971; Maron: 1971; Shenker: 1971; Sturm: 1971; and Pawel:
1972) was necessary in light of the fact that excessive
idealization of kibbutz origins caused the simple fact of
change to be perceived as an ideological crisis threatening
the very existence of the collectives.

The reformulation gained articulation and consis­
tency in the early 1970s, responding to what Ben David (1971)
saw as two very pragmatic considerations:

...the conclusion is that the desire to preserve
the kibbutz necessitates the strict maintenance of
certain conditions and of the basic ideology. A
certain degree of structural and ideological flexi­
ibility is essential and even desirable for the sake
of stability, but not an excessive degree capable
of distorting the very fundamentals (1971:76).

Implicit in this statement is the notion that
"structural and ideological flexibility" will literally have
to be created, since in the excessive idealization of kibbutz
origins there was no room for value change without a concom­
itant ideological crisis. In an apparent attempt to fulfill
this need in kibbutz ideology, the rank ordering of value 
principles was undertaken. "Here it first becomes necessary 
to draw the line between virtue and necessity, for much of 
what had been initially regarded as ideologically germane 
turned out to be mere pragmatic need raised to the power of 
a moral injunction" (Pawel; 1972:23).

We must...distinguish between values that 
are ends in themselves and values that are only 
instraments for the realization of these ends. The 
sole validity of the second kind is as means; they 
are not absolute values in themselves.... There is 
tendency...in the kibbutz to blur the distinction 
between the two kinds of values and to mistake means 
for ends (Shenker; 1971:21).

Azania's (1971) reference to "fundamental socialist 
values" seemed to provide at least a partial answer as to 
what the criteria would be for differentiating between ends 
and means. It seems reasonable that any reformulation of 
values will reflect what Merkl (1967) called the "vital core 
of socialist thinking," i.e., complete social and economic 
equality, economic efficiency, peaceful cooperation instead 
of all-out competition, the abolition of private property, 
and some form of communal living.

While it is certainly correct to say the kibbutz is 
a socialist society, it is also a unique socialist experi-
ment due to its Zionist roots. It is, in the estimation of 
Diamond, "a highly specialized and unique society established 
by people of a particular type at a particular time, in re-
ponse to and in fulfillment of particular needs" (1957:71). 
Indeed, Diamond stated that the major historical motivation
of the kibbutz movement was a reaction of Jews to shtetl culture. "Those pioneers who did not come from the technically delimited shtetl areas were reacting against parallel or convergent elements in their own milieux, against what can be called a more diffused version of shtetl culture" (1957:74). In light of these factors at work in the creation of the kibbutz movement, it seems rather myopic to characterize the movement in the most general terms. In other words, how can the line between virtue and necessity be drawn in such a manner as to align only fundamental socialist values on the side of virtue, when the historical experience of the Jews may, in fact, account for other values being pursued as values in their own right? Thus, looking at the kibbutz movement as a particular kind of socialist experiment, particular values not accounted for in the core of socialist thinking may nevertheless be fundamental values. The problem of criteria remains.

The lack of criteria allows kibbutz ideologists to draw the line between ends and means, or between virtue and necessity, in such a way that virtually all changes in the sixty year history of the kibbutz movement can be chalked up as changes in means. Thus, a good deal of self-serving retrospect seems to be at work here. Writing in the early 1970s and looking back over a half-century of considerable change in the kibbutz, how is an individual committed to the kibbutz way of life likely to perceive such changes? Obviously, he will be hard-pressed to see changes in the
basic principles, for that would be an admission that "kibbutzness" in the kibbutz had deteriorated. During the '40s and '50s, asceticism, simplicity, and farming as a way of life became outmoded as value positions. A reformulation of principles simply redefined "basic" principles to eliminate those tenets in the original kibbutzim which had been breached in the course of kibbutz development.

Golomb and Katz (1970) and Ben David (1971), in particular, have developed detailed typologies in attempting to categorize certain values as ends and others as means. Ben David posited the existence of two levels of kibbutz ideology. One level was that of basic concepts, making up the ideological backbone of the kibbutz, i.e., collective living, equality, mutual responsibility, and self-labor. These basic ideological tenets "must be maintained with great precision since (they) constitute the very justification for the existence of the kibbutz" (1971:70).

The second level was that of means, incorporating "the seed of change and...almost always given ideological justification on the strength of functional reasons" (1971:79). These value positions may be modified or abandoned at any time as dictated by pragmatic considerations. Ben David went on to say that in the final analysis

kibbutz ideology has proven itself adaptable, except for its very general ideological backbone.... This was the strength of this ideology and thus it helped to preserve stability in the kibbutz. Concerning a number of subjects this ideology has changed from one extreme to the other, and this happened during the very periods of glory. It happened in connection
with the size of the kibbutz, the composition of
the farm and employment, the family and education,
principles of consumption, the standard of living,
centralism or decentralization in the movement, and
so on (1971:76).

Using this means-ends dichotomy to select out what
he thought were values of marginal importance, Ben David
concluded that "in spite of (some changes) one can observe
continuity in everything that is essential in the kibbutz;
its very existence proves this" (1971:76). As a point of
fact, the physical existence of the two hundred-odd kib­
butzim has absolutely nothing to do with the question of
whether the ideological integrity of the communes has been
preserved. In fact, Ben David does not reject the notion
that changes in substance have occurred: "The determination
to maintain a certain social structure, certain social
relationships, even under unfavorable conditions, made com­
promise necessary regarding essential and basic matters"
(1971:76). This is obviously at odds with his previous
position vis-a-vis changes "regarding essential and basic
matters" and indicates an attempt to obfuscate the issue
concerning the real nature and extent of ideological change
in the kibbutz.

In looking at Ben David's level of fundamental con­
cepts, the connotations attached to these concepts have
shifted over the years. In stating that these values must
be maintained with great precision, however, Ben David pre­
cludes the possibility of even slight changes being incor­
porated at this level of kibbutz ideology. But changes have,
in fact, taken place at this level (Golomb and Katz: 1970). A second typology, actually preceding Ben David, is more sophisticated in dealing with the problem of justifying change.

In this scheme (Golomb and Katz: 1970), virtually any change in the kibbutz can be accounted for without destroying "kibbutzness." Distinctions were made between values which have been abandoned, values which have remained unchanged, and values which have been "creatively modified." The first category is for non-essential values and the fundamental principles fall into the latter two groups. Farming as a way of life, asceticism, and simplicity are put into the first category; voluntarism and direct democracy into the second; and equality, the dignity of work, and communality into the third category.

What is so interesting and significant in this typology is the use of the term "creative modification." Golomb and Katz defined it as a "reformulation which adapts to new situations but does not destroy the basic ideological principle involved. There is no compromise in the literal sense of a concession which violates the basic doctrine, as in the case of compromised virtue" (1970:46). Golomb and Katz sought to make a distinction between ideological modification and ideological change. Just when a value that has been modified becomes a value that has been changed is a subjective determination. The difference in terminology is a difference in degree, not in kind. Again, the problem of
establishing criteria remains. The result of all this seems to be that "creative modification" becomes a rather convenient category into which possibly ideologically embarrassing changes may be cast. Again there seems to be an attempt to obfuscate the issue concerning the real nature and extent of ideological change in the kibbutz.

How was this reinterpretation of values accomplished? I believe the answer lies in the structure of kibbutz ideology itself. It has never been a system free from inconsistencies and contradictions. These ambiguities have, of course, compounded problems in attempting to mold the ideas into a coherent philosophy.

This system is not, as it often seems, some well-integrated and unchanging system of basic concepts towards which the members of the community are oriented and which they tended to follow more conscientiously in the past than in the present. Contrary to this popular opinion, the ideology of the kibbutz is a heterogeneous system composed of elements stemming from Socialism, Zionism, humanistic ethics and sometimes religion, which are integrated only in a most strenuous way; as a result, the system contains many potential internal contradictions which, under certain circumstances, create dilemmas of decision and action for the members (Cohen; 1966:4).

As a result, Cohen concluded that some of the changes taking place in the kibbutz can be understood "not as results of external pressures upon the value system, but as rearrangements within the value system itself forced upon it by its inner logic, its Eigengesetzlichkeit" (1966:4). Menachem Rosner added that this incoherence permitted "an elastic and many-sided interpretation of the original values of the
Exactly what did Cohen mean when he talked about the inner logic of kibbutz ideology? Basically, the kibbutzim were always dedicated to economic progress—progress both of the movement itself and of the Jewish people as a nation—and herein lies the crisis in the kibbutz and, specifically, the problem facing ideological elaboration. On the one hand, the kibbutz is committed to modernity in its technological and economic organization and, on the other hand, to primitivity in its social relations. The problem facing the kibbutz is simply that it has embraced two fundamentally contradictory value positions, progress and communality, and yet its survival and integrity depend to a great extent on how successfully it maintains the commitment to each. The whole process of ideological elaboration is an attempt to render compatible these divergent trends.

While it is true that kibbutz ideology contains many potential internal inconsistencies, these were not fully developed, nor was the development clearly foreseen, in the early days of settlement. However, as the kibbutz movement developed economically, these potential inconsistencies came into clearer focus. In short, the ideas and ideals underlying the kibbutz way of life were least inconsistent in the period of extreme hardship and austerity.

The basic Marxist position is that "ideological
development is...governed by the material development of society" (Cornforth; 1972:69). Furthermore, "...the causes impelling ideological development in one or another direction are always to be found, in the last analysis, not within the sphere of ideological development itself but in the sphere of the conditions of material life" (Cornforth; 1972:69). There is some validity to the theory of economic determinism. However, it should be remembered that the system of ideas that underlies kibbutz life is a peculiar admixture, and the ideas themselves have been significant forces of social change.
CHAPTER IV
AGRICULTURE, INDUSTRY, AND HIRED LABOR

The early kibbutzim were agricultural communities. The first steps toward industrialization were taken in the 1930s when small workshops were established to meet the needs of agriculture. By 1975, about 170 of the 225 kibbutzim had some type of industrial enterprise, and many had more than one. It is now estimated that about one-half of the total income of the kibbutz movement is derived from industrial sources, although only 25 per cent of its members are actually employed in the industrial sector. Industrialization in the kibbutz, itself a breach of the original values, brought with it a breach of much greater importance, that of hired labor.

The early, agricultural emphasis of the kibbutz

17. The various areas of manufacturing and the number of kibbutzim engaged in each, as of 1975, included: metal manufacturing (67), plastic and rubber products (39), textile and leather products (26), electronics and electrical products (25), and food processing (21). Other important areas are printing, wood products, building materials and chemicals. The total number of industrial workers has increased from 5,000 in 1960 to about 13,000 at present. Most of the plants are quite small, 75 per cent employ fewer than 50 workers and 17 per cent employ 50 to 100. Kibbutz industry produces about 7 per cent of the nation's industrial output, with about 3 per cent of the population (Stoddart: 1975).
reflected both pragmatic and socio-historical considerations. First, the dream of establishing a Jewish National Homeland could not have been accomplished without establishing a viable Jewish agricultural sector (Leon: 1964 and Crown: 1965).

Second, the notion of hard, physical labor, originally manifested in farming as a way of life, was central to the kibbutz movement as a means of personal redemption and national survival for the Jewish people (Diamond: 1957; Talmon: 1961; Golomb and Katz: 1970; and Shenker: 1971). Diamond suggested that physical labor was, in part, "a ritual of expiation for the personally perceived sin of parasitism" (1957:81-82).

Strenuous work, a dire economic necessity, has become much more than that: it has been endowed with deep meaning and dignity and invested with a quasi-religious seriousness, as an important instrument for the realization of social and national ideals as well as an ultimate value in itself. The idealized figure of a farmer-pioneer tiller of the soil has become one of the main symbols of personal redemption and of national revival (Talmon: 1961:285).

Barry Shenker stated further that control over one's life was one of the conditions of attaining the freedom that Jews sought, and work provided this opportunity. "By this means a working man grants himself both the objective conditions for self-realization and the subjective feeling (no less important) that he is himself gaining his freedom" (1971:30). The Jewish Ethic found in the kibbutz is not unlike Weber's Protestant Ethic.
From the early 1920s through the mid-1940s the kibbutz movement became more firmly established; the agricultural economy expanded through increasing mechanization. However, it was during this period that agriculture expanded to a point beyond which available land and water reserves would not support continued growth (Cohen: 1966; Darom: 1968; and Friedmann: 1968). In the mid-1950s a new problem arose in the form of food surpluses in Israel which compounded the already critical situation in the kibbutz economy (Shatil: 1970). In addition, throughout its history the kibbutz had to compete with the larger (capitalist) Israeli society, not only for new members, but for economic survival as well. Especially after the establishment of the State in 1948 this competition was spelled out in terms of industry. Thus, the kibbutz had to make adjustments or face stagnation; and, as a result, farming as a way of life ceased to be valued as an end in itself.

The eventual breach with the ideal of farming was facilitated by the fact that farming itself had changed considerably:

The change (was) not as abrupt as might be anticipated in that farming itself became specialized and mechanized. The poultry branch, common to most kibbutzim, is a highly specialized, mass-production type of farming which is considerably removed from the idyllic conception of the back-to-nature movement (Golomb and Katz; 1970:43-44).

Not only had farming changed, but the young Jews who founded the kibbutz movement were also becoming its
elderly citizens. The glorification of hard, physical labor meant that aging was a physical and a moral decline. In a system that recognized worth and allocated prestige on the basis of the ability to be productive, aging was viewed as a gradual privation of grace. Thus, the redefinition of productive self-labor, to include industrial work, greatly increased the ability of the kibbutz to provide satisfying jobs for elderly members of the first generation.

Industrialization... (provides) jobs... for members whom age or illness has made unfit for land work. In the environment in which such high moral prestige is attached to work, to aging haverim total retirement would be both economically and psychologically harmful, and even unthinkable (Friedmann; 1968:57).

This redefinition also provided greater opportunity for job satisfaction and individual development to those members of the second generation just entering the kibbutz labor market.

In addition, because most kibbutz industries are small units with advanced technology, and because the kibbutz has always tried to maximize job satisfaction, there is minimal depersonalization, alienation, or loss of self-esteem one would normally associate with industrial work (Golomb and Katz: 1970; Rosner: 1971; and Stoddart: 1975).

As opposed to the transformation of an independent farmer into a hired worker, with all the change of social status implied, the cooperative-collectivistic industrialization enables the preservation of the workers' feeling of independence within the democratic framework of management of the enterprise and his participation in the decision (Rosner: 1971:55).
The introduction of industry was also justified on the basis that while it opened up avenues for economic expansion and improved the standard of living in the kibbutz, it was not intended that industrial ventures should be financed at the expense of the full development of the agricultural sector (Darom: 1968 and Rosner: 1971). "Hardly any kibbutz would deny the principle of "agriculture first" or deliberately forego the development of its full agricultural potential in order to free manpower and capital for other sectors of its economy" (Darom: 1968:18).

One major justification of industrializing the kibbutz relates back to the notion of the inner logic of kibbutz ideology. By definition, the movement is dedicated to the personal and national regeneration of the Jewish people. In the early days, farming was viewed as nourishment for the soul of the Jew, and it was also what the kibbutzniks had to learn to do to survive. But as the dream of the State became a reality, the realization came that continued growth of the kibbutz movement ultimately required industrialization. Thus, when it was expedient to emphasize farming as a way of life, and to view progress, growth, and achievement in the context of farming, there was ideological

18. In contrast, Blumberg's more sociological observation suggested that the future of the kibbutz will, indeed, depend more and more on industrialization: "The factories (in) the kibbutz represent a new and inevitable direction in the economic activity of the collectives. In every industrializing country, of course, the importance of agriculture diminishes, and to adapt to changing economic circumstances the kibbutz must industrialize" (1972:16).
justification for it. When it later became necessary for the kibbutz to justify the introduction of industry, it was emphasized that the ideals of self-labor and, more importantly, progress were not necessarily limited to farming, simply because heretofore they had been. Farming was only one way in which self-labor and progress could be expressed.

Weintraub, Lissak, and Azmon observed that "at the basis of the kibbutz there lay a fundamental entrepreneurial image, embodying sustained initiative and absorption of change, as well as constant experimentation, and allowing it to give scope to the "large business" potential embodied in its projected structure" (1969:73). They stated further that "much of this drive to constant innovation was embodied in the basic ideology of the settlers which, conceiving of rationality, growth, and achievement as values in themselves, fostered improvement and experimentation" (1969:91).

The introduction of industry enabled the kibbutz to become economically more profitable, improve the standard of living of its members, and find productive and satisfying work for its young and old members. However, the economic reach of the kibbutz exceeded its grasp: the expansion of the movement far out-stripped its demographic growth and the kibbutz was compelled to hire outside labor to keep the economic structure intact.

The employment of hired labor by the kibbutz movement is perhaps the most serious breach of original values (Yissakhav: 1949; Arnold: 1950; Aurbach: 1953; Vallier: 1962;
The employment of hired labor in the agricultural sector has been kept at low levels; but, in the industrial sector the percentages have been high for the last fifteen or twenty years. In 1964, hired labor reached its numerical peak at which time only 37 per cent of the work force in kibbutz industry came from within the kibbutz and 63 per cent came from outside. By 1971, the percentage of outside workers had dropped to 52 per cent, with no realistic expectation that the situation will ever be brought under control. The percentages of hired workers varies among the three major kibbutz federations, from a low of 21 per cent in the Kibbutz Artzi to a high of 76 per cent (Stoddart: 1975).

There has been little attempt at the ideological justification of the use of hired labor in the kibbutz. The breach with kibbutz values is clear and of such magnitude that it defies a coverup. Hired labor is simply viewed as a necessary evil and is tolerated, if not accepted, by the kibbutz movement.

This brings us to an important point. Is there a key to understanding the evolution of kibbutz society? I believe it is safe to say there is no one key, no one perspective, that adequately explains social change in the kibbutz, but there are several which will place the kibbutz in proper sociological perspective.
THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN SOCIETIES

The explanation of stability and change in human societies has long been a major concern of sociologists. Some of the more notable explanations are in the old sociological tradition of typing social entities antithetically, i.e., Maine's status society and contract society; Tönnies' community and society; Durkheim's mechanical and organic solidarity; MacIver's communal and associational relations; Sorokin's familistic and contractual relations; Becker's sacred and secular societies; and, Redfield's folk-urban continuum.19

Herbert Spencer's primary concern was with the evolution of social structure and social institutions, and in this analysis his sociology was inextricably tied to biological reasoning. He defined evolution as "a change from a state of relatively indefinite, incoherent, homogeneity to a state of relatively definite, coherent, heterogeneity."20 It was a universal process which explained the "earliest changes which the universe at large is supposed to have


undergone... and those latest changes which we trace in society and the products of social life" (Spencer; 1898: 337). Thus, Spencer viewed the evolution of human societies as an example of universal natural law.

The notion of increasing size applied to organic and social life as well. "Societies, like living bodies, begin as germs--originate from masses which are extremely minute in comparison with the masses some of them eventually reach." Societal growth results from a population increase either "by simple multiplication of units," or by "union of groups, and again by union of groups of groups." Increases in the size of organic or social units brings with it a corresponding differentiation of structure and functions. "At first the unlikeness among its groups of units is inconspicuous in number and degree, but as population augments, divisions and subdivisions become more numerous and more decided." 

As society grows, its parts become unlike: it exhibits increase of structure. The unlike parts simultaneously assume activities of unlike kinds. These activities are not simply different, but the differences are so related as to make one another possible. The reciprocal aid thus given causes mutual dependence of parts. And the mutually dependent parts, living by and for another, form an aggregate constituted on the same general principle as is an individual organism.

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22. Ibid., p. 10.
23. Ibid., p. 3.
24. Ibid., p. 8.
"This division of labor, first dwelt on by political economists as a social phenomenon, and thereupon recognized by biologists as a phenomenon of living bodies, which they called the "physiological division of labor," is that which in the society, as in the animal, makes it a living whole." 25

Spencer suggested that the evolutionary growth of society, like organic growth, involved increasing size, increasing structural and functional differentiation, and increasing interdependence and hence integration of the parts. To Spencer, evolutionary growth simply resulted in integration at a more complex developmental level.

"Describing not merely the range of human existence, but what to him appeared as an irreversible historical trend, Durkheim in his study of the division of labor polarized society into two types." 26

The first type was what he termed the mechanically solidary society, which prevail to the extent that "ideas and tendencies common to all members of the society are greater in number and intensity than those which pertain personally to each member. This solidarity can grow only in inverse ratio to personality" (Durkheim; 1956:129). Furthermore, "solidarity which comes from likeness is at its maximum when the collective conscience completely

25. Ibid., p. 5.
envelops our whole conscience and coincides in all points with it" (Durkheim; 1956:130).

People are homogeneous mentally and morally, hence communities are uniform and nonatomized. It is in this type of society that a totality of beliefs and sentiments common to all men exists, and which Durkheim called the conscience collective. This conscience is characterized by the attributes of exteriority and constraint. Exteriority refers to the fact that the conscience as totality is never a product of the members of society at any one point in time; constraint has reference to the significant point that the membership of a mechanically solidary society cannot morally refute its collective conscience. Offense against the collective conscience is moral offense and is punishable by repressive law.27

The organically solidary society, on the other hand, is held together precisely because of the differentiation of parts. "The division of labor is a result of the struggle for existence, and the specialization of labor stimulated individualism and differentiation. People in the society are heterogeneous; their mental and moral similarities have disappeared."28

Each element in a differentiated society is less strongly tied to common collective routines, even though it may be bound with equal rigor to the differentiated and specialized tasks and roles that characterize systems of organic solidarity. While the individual elements of such a system have less in common, they are nevertheless much more interdependent than under mechanical solidarity. Precisely because they now engage in differentiated ways of life and in specialized activities, the members are largely dependent upon one another and

27. Ibid., p. 13.
networks of solidarity can develop between them. In such systems, there can be some release from external controls, but such release is in tune with, not in conflict with, the high degree of dependence of individuals on their fellows (Coser; 1971:132).

"The change from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity does not result in an automatic loss of conscience collective, but an alteration in its form." 29

In his earlier work, Durkheim stated that strong systems of common belief characterize mechanical solidarity in primitive types of society, and that organic solidarity, resulting from the progressive increase in the division of labor and hence increased mutual dependence, needed fewer common beliefs to tie members to this society. He later revised this view and stressed that even those systems with a highly developed organic solidarity still needed a common faith, a common collective conscience, if they were not to disintegrate into a heap of mutually antagonistic and self-seeking individuals.

The mature Durkheim realized that only if all members of a society were anchored to common sets of symbolic representations, to common assumptions about the world around them, could moral unity be assured. Without them, Durkheim argued, any society, whether primitive or modern, was bound to degenerate and decay (Coser; 1971:132).

I believe that the kibbutz movement illustrates some of the concepts of social evolution put forth by Spencer and Durkheim.

The first small communes with undeveloped farms and, perhaps, up to 50 members, had no need for distribution of functions. It is reported that every evening the whole group together planned work for the next day, and a member who needed some money for going to town found it in a certain drawer. But the kibbutz grew, their economy became far more

complicated, and needs diversified. A kibbutz village of the present, with a population of 500-1,000, and an economy comprising agriculture and industry with a yearly turnover of millions of dollars...is in need of an efficient and properly functioning organization (Shatil; 1970:27).

Today, the formal kibbutz structure is made up of three elements. Administration of the kibbutz rests with the Secretariat, the Work Coordinator, and the various Work Team Leaders. The General Assembly and the various Work Teams are operated on the principle of direct democracy, and numerous committees are set up in an advisory capacity.

The General Assembly is the symbol of direct democracy in the kibbutz, in which each member is accorded one vote. It normally meets once a week and discusses matters which do not pertain to the normal operation of the kibbutz.

The various Work Teams are run democratically and have considerable autonomy in their individual operations, although major decisions must necessarily reflect the larger economic plan of the collective.

The Secretariat consists of three full-time individuals, the Farm Manager, the Treasurer, and the Social Secretary (and perhaps a few additional members which varies from kibbutz to kibbutz), and is the supreme authority in terms of the on-going economic operation of the community.

The system of committees in the kibbutz (there are perhaps 10-15 in a developed collective) is important because it involves a large percentage of the members in a system of social responsibility. The most important are the
Economic Committee, the Work Committee, the committee for individual needs or the Social Committee, and the Committee for Education.

The various kibbutz offices are filled on a temporary, rotation basis, and it is important to note that

...those who happen to hold these offices do enjoy considerable power. Moreover...though the tenure of office is limited to 2 or 3 years, only a small number of chaverim possess the necessary skills required to cope with the complexities of such offices...so that in effect these offices rotate among a small core of 12 to 15 persons (Spiro; 1970:25).

These individuals comprise the managerial stratum, or what might be called the "power elite," of the kibbutz. "Thus there emerges a group of members whose personal status is so high that their re-election to managerial positions is a matter of course, the benefit to the group in making best use of them being obvious to all" (Rosenfeld; 1951:769).

The trend toward organic solidarity is consistent with the kibbutz commitment to modernity in its economic and technological organization. For example, it is evident that the rise of a managerial stratum has made for efficient operation of agricultural and industrial enterprises. Durkheim's theory also isolates two serious developments in the kibbutz. One is that the increasing specialization of labor is creating a class of managers in the kibbutz, which seems to go against the principle of egalitarianism. Second is that the trend toward organic solidarity is sure to
undermine the spirit of communality in the kibbutz. In Durkheim's scheme, the division of labor literally changes the ties that hold society together, so that we could expect the relationship of individual to individual and individual to society to reflect less and less the intense feeling of community found in the early days of settlement.

Thorstein Veblen shared Spencer's idea that evolution was a process of selective adaptation to the environment. While greatly influenced by Marx in other respects, Veblen rejected the notion that mankind was evolving toward some end. Rather, he interpreted evolution to be "a scheme of blindly cumulative causation, in which there is no trend, no final term, no consummation" (1919:436).

Evolution involved above all the invention and application of more and more sophisticated technology. "The process of cumulative change that is to be accounted for is the sequence of change in the methods of doing things--the methods of dealing with the material means of life."30 Thus, the adaptation of man to the environment is predicated upon what Veblen called the "state of the industrial arts." The evolution of human societies must then be seen as "a process of natural selection of institutions" (Veblen; 1934:188). "Institutions are not only themselves the result of a selective and adaptive process which shapes the prevailing or dominant types of spiritual attitude and

aptitudes; they are at the same time special methods of life and human relations" (Veblen; 1934:188).

Crucial as technology was to his theory of social change, Veblen realized that its impact on society was not immediate and direct. A new technology does not automatically bring forth new systems of laws, new moral attitudes, or new types of education. Rather, it challenges old institutions and evokes their resistance. "Institutions are products of the past process, are adapted to past circumstances, and are therefore never in full accord with the requirements of the present" (Veblen; 1934:191). In the end, he believed, the new technology erodes the old order and reshapes institutions in line with its own needs.

Technology has played a central role in the problems and progress of the kibbutz movement. From the early 1920s through the mid-1940s the kibbutz agricultural economy expanded, primarily through increasing mechanization. The eventual breach with the ideal of farming was facilitated by the fact that farming itself had undergone this process of modernization. The new industrial technology enabled the kibbutz to provide meaningful work for the older members and challenging opportunities for the young, technically trained kibbutzniks.

There is one important point concerning industrialization, technology, and hired labor not yet considered. The movement has always experienced a manpower shortage and when industrialization expanded the kibbutz economy, more
and more hired workers were needed. This was the source of much embarrassment to kibbutzniks, who attached a quasi-religious significance to productive self-labor. Despite the embarrassment, the use of hired labor has now become institutionalized in the kibbutz. The case of hired labor is an excellent example of how economic considerations can take precedence over, and ultimately shape, the ideas of a people.

Thus, the economic development of the kibbutz, committed as it is to progress, growth, efficiency, productivity, and rationalization, is on a collision-course with one value to which the kibbutz must maintain its commitment, that of communality. This is perhaps one of the unanticipated consequences of increasing technology. Indeed, as Veblen suggested, technology erodes vested interests.
CHAPTER V
EQUALITY


To reiterate, there are two basic reasons for the value placed on equality in the early kibbutzim. It may first be explained as a reaction against the traditional family structure and status differentiation in both the shtetl and the larger European society at the turn of the 20th century (Diamond: 1957; Spiro: 1970; and Maron: 1971). The intrinsic value of self-labor was stressed in the early kibbutzim as a means of destroying the gross social inequalities of European society.

There is no class structure in Kiryet Yedidim, and there is no differential reward system for different kinds of labor based on some ranking technique. Some kinds of work...are valued more highly than others; but those who occupy the more highly valued jobs receive no greater reward than
the others. The important psychological fact about the kibbutz culture is that everyone, regardless of work, is viewed as a worker, with the same privileges and responsibilities as anyone else (Spiro; 1970:23-24).

Second, in the early days of the movement the problem of equality was relatively simplified by the austere economic conditions facing the settlers. Survival imposed on each member a uniform measure of maximum work and minimum consumption. In this respect, equality was the product of circumstances. It was, as Georges Friedmann observed, a time when all were equal in poverty.

Soon after the establishment of the first kibbutz, the principle of equality encountered a gigantic hurdle which Spiro (1970) called the "biological tragedy of women." From the beginning, the pioneers

...believed that the basis of inequality was an economic one—that the confinement of woman's work to domestic duties and the rearing of children as a full-time occupation made her dependent on her husband and thereby produced a state of inequality within the family and the wider society as a whole (Yissakhar; 1949:1).

Thus, "it was naively assumed that equality would follow from the conquest by the woman of the hardest physical work" (Leon; 1964:134).

For a time the austere conditions necessitated that every able person lend a hand wherever needed. As the kibbutz movement grew, and as the economy expanded, a certain amount of task differentiation did occur.
Various agricultural and other areas were given the name of branches, and members began to specialize in one particular branch, such as the dairy, the orchards, field crops, or the carpentry shop. Every such branch was managed by a member with some experience and know-how who gathered a core of permanent workers around him (Weintraub; 1968:105).

As a result, women were gradually relieved of their duties in production areas of the kibbutz economy and shifted to tertiary sectors, i.e., the vegetable garden, poultry, orchard and vineyard, and beekeeping. Ultimately, they came to be employed almost exclusively in the laundry, dining room, serving room, kitchen, and children's houses (including teaching and nursing). Vallier reported that in Mayeem Kareen, "out of a total of 84 adult women, only one worked regularly in the field. A second woman assisted with the poultry, a third worked in the dairy" (1962:240). Other than that, the women were employed in the various "social services."

These occupations did not directly contribute to the economic welfare of the collective, and as such were not viewed as productive labor in the early days.

Many women who (had) been freed from the drudgery of housework paradoxically now (found) themselves still doing "housework" which (had) become depersonalized, rationalized, and mechanized, and subdivided so that their tasks (were) less diverse than those of traditional housewives and far more repetitious, as they spend their time either by cooking all day or cleaning or sewing or baby tending (Blumberg; 1972:40).

Thus, the role of women, like that of the elderly, tended to
be devalued in the over-all economic operation of the collective:

...the early values of the youth movement (were) still operative to a considerable extent, so that women develop a certain feeling of inferiority as a result of working in these "menial" tasks. This feeling is exacerbated by the fact that the kibbutz values most highly those branches which bring in the greatest economic returns (Spiro; 1970:226).

There are several possible explanations for the sexual division of labor in the kibbutz. One is that despite the ideological commitment of the founders, the kibbutz revolution has not been a total one.

At first, more than half the women worked in production. And yet very few men shared cooking and washing, and none sewing and child care. When more children were born, service work increased and women had to leave their work in production to attend to those tasks, which men still did relatively rarely (Tiger and Shepher; 1975:263).

Also, the jobs of men and women did not become interchangeable as kibbutz society mechanized. In a study of 34,000 kibbutzniks, Tiger and Shepher concluded that the answer is "that women have no personal or social inclination to yield certain service tasks to men, and men are reluctant to yield certain production tasks to women. Even when technological development obviates one of the basic reasons for sexual division of labor, the division remains" (1975:264).

A second possible explanation is based on the notion of retreatism and is associated with incomplete revolution. It suggests that when women lost hope of stay-
ing in production areas, they retreated into service branches and to the seclusion and comfort of family relations.

Men show ambition in their desire to advance in political and economic affairs, while the ambition of women is felt to be expressed in family life, arts, belles-lettres, and raising the standards of life and personal comfort. 79% of the respondents agreed that there were differences in the relative importance given by men, as compared to women, to work, family life and social activity. This difference is expressed in the primary consideration given by women members to family life, all other affairs remaining secondary. Men usually placed these activities in a reverse order. These replies reflect the situation as it actually exists (Rosner; 1971:62).

Tiger and Shepher (1975) agreed that the main instigators of familization are women.

The division of labor may also be explained by the fact that the founders of the kibbutz movement were socialized into the culture of the shtetl. Is it possible that norms and values were internalized that precluded the implementation of a revolutionary system and the successful socialization of the second generation? If this is the case, that primary socialization processes are unalterable, why do we not see similar features in other areas of kibbutz life?

If we accept that the founders came from the shtetl as described by Zborowski and Herzog (1969), we must wonder what happened to the norms of individualistic, achievement-oriented, competitive behavior central to that society. Instead of these, the kibbutz stressed cooperation, mutual help, and economic rewards independent of social role and work performance. Despite some small compromises, the system of equal economic rewards is intact and flourishing today. Why didn't basic socialization
remain unalterable here? The same question must be raised about the shtetl's plutocracy and piety, lastingly replaced on the kibbutz by direct democracy and a secular or even antireligious ethos (Tiger and Shepher; 1975:264).

Another explanation is that men attempt to exclude women from the upper echelons of kibbutz management, i.e., the top managerial positions in the collective ordinarily rotate among 10-15 individuals, almost all men. It has been suggested that the bonds men form are unhelpful to the careers and ambitions of women (Tiger; 1969; 1975). Does this idea have application to the kibbutz? Probably not, because the kibbutz was established in the search for social equality. However, it is true that the ideology of equality does not always correspond to the reality of life in the kibbutz. This has led to recurrent soul-searching and to the reinterpretation of the original values.

The problem of women is closely associated with the problem of aging in the kibbutz. The chalutzuit ideology stressed the value of labor and productivity, which were youthful values. The pioneer who reclaimed the marshes, cultivated the desert, and lived on the dangerous frontier was necessarily a young man, or a man in the prime of his life. Friedmann characterized the young kibbutznik as "a symbol of national renascence and of the personal redemption of the Jew by manual labor, and Zionist youth movements were (and to an extent still are) impregnated with these ideals" (1968:72).

The glorification of hard, physical labor in the
early kibbutzim meant that aging was a physical and a moral decline as well. In a system that recognized worth and allocated prestige on the basis of the ability to be productive, aging was viewed as a gradual privation of grace.

The rise of a managerial stratum in the kibbutz provided a third front on which the notion of egalitarianism was attacked. The process of differentiation in the social structure of the kibbutz, which resulted in this managerial stratum, is related to the economic development of that society (Rosenfeld: 1951; Etzioni: 1959; Shatil: 1970; and Spiro: 1970).

In her article, "Social Stratification in a 'Classless' Society," Eva Rosenfeld discussed social ranking in the kibbutz.

The concept of rank is...based on objectively defined attributes of seniority and managerial position in work or administration. The informal leaders of the kibbutz movement and within the collective are always members who belong to this upper stratum of old timers/managers. The rank and file (amlo) are composed of the middle stratum of "responsible workers" (both oldtimers and middlecomers) and of the lowest stratum of "pkaks" (1951:770).

Given the problem of women, the problem of the aged, and the rise of the managerial stratum, it is a foregone conclusion that there would have been a reinterpretation of the original definition of equality (Golomb and Katz: 1970; Ben David: 1971; Golan: 1971; Maron: 1971; and Rosner: 1971), in order to legitimize individual differences in consumption and production of goods and services, and to allow for a
maximum of human freedom in general. The original definition of equality "emphasized the need to ignore even the differences in the physical capacities of the sexes---women were encouraged to take up hard physical activities, such as work in building construction and roadmaking" (Rosner; 1971:57). With regard to justifying a change, Ben David observed that "an equality is needed which relates to the differences existing between the members due to their very natures and needs" (1971:81). To this point, Yona Golan flatly stated that "our former definition of equality of the sexes has been exchanged for the concept that both sexes are equal in value" (1971:164).

The notion of equality has therefore been "creatively modified," in the words of Golomb and Katz (1970), from the arithmetic or mechanical equality among members that characterized the early kibbutzim, to a "relative" equality. The position now taken, according to Stanley Maron, is that "equality in status is unnatural, however desirable. Some individuals are inevitably more respected than others, some are more loved than others, some are better leaders. These status differences cannot be entirely eliminated" (1971:19-20). Thus, the kibbutz in no way now stands opposed to inequalities in status arising out of real or natural differences. It does, however, rigidly oppose differences in status as the result of material conditions and has effectively removed monetary and/or materialistic rewards as a means of achieving status. The kibbutz maxim
of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need," which at one time was interpreted to mean equal effort and minimum consumption, now is interpreted to recognize inherent differences in ability, as well as in need.

Maron contended that "to subordinate the individual member, his needs and his growth as a human being, to the unnecessary demands of a rigid collective ideal is to reduce him to an instrumental value, i.e., to a means instead of an end" (1971:18). He drew the following analogy to emphasize the point:

When it comes to clothing, though, they find that they cannot give everyone the same size. Despite all the best will in the world to build social equality, the fact remains that the human body grows into different shapes and sizes and everybody needs to be fitted for their clothing individually. We see this clearly because it has to do with the body and is external. It is really no different, though with what is inside the body. The individual personality has its own individual needs and tastes, and a fixed measure of food, education, or anything else cannot be better than giving a fixed size in clothing.

The true equality of all men lies in their intrinsic value as human beings (1971:15-16).

As the kibbutz movement developed, it became apparent that a broader definition of equality, and through this a broader definition of productive self-labor as well, was necessary. This broader definition was accomplished by interpreting the original meaning of equality as inconsistent with the goal of human freedom, a larger objective of the kibbutz movement (Leon: 1964; Kerem: 1965; Golomb and
Katz: 1970; Azania: 1971; Rosner: 1971; and Shenker: 1971). "In order to attain (human freedom) we have taken five secondary values: work; mutual faith; direct democracy and participation; solidarity; equality; all of which serve the end of human freedom" (Shenker: 1971:21-22). Azania elaborated on this point, suggesting that there might be a contradiction or conflict between equality and human freedom:

The absolute communal control over both the means of production and man's ability to work creates an internal conflict within socialism. It seems that the socialist community cannot achieve all its aims without infringing upon the individual's freedom. How can the individual's liberty be assured when the community holds full control over his ability to work? The more equality is assured (through the community controlling work and its sources), the more will the infringement of liberty become necessary. This, of necessity, creates a feeling of oppression.

The socialist society to which the kibbutz aspires will be built on two fundamental elements: control of the economy by the community, and the maintenance of human freedom (1971:9).

In this respect, the kibbutz has gotten away from the definition of equality that reflects the socio-historical experience of the shtetl, and is reminiscent of Engel's strictly socialist conception of equality: "The real content of the proletarian demand for equality is the demand for the abolition of classes. Any demand for equality which goes beyond that, of necessity passes into absurdity."31 Since the traditional economic determinants are not present in the kibbutz, it is accurate to say that while the kibbutz

31. From Maron; 1971:19.
is indeed a differentiated society, it does not have the traditional class structure (Rosenfeld: 1951).

In the implementation of the concept of equality in the broader sense, the kibbutz, despite its drawbacks, has reached a level unmatched by any modern society. In the long run, no members of the kibbutz benefit economically from the superior social or managerial position. The kibbutz ultimately provides every member with similar housing, similar furnishings, and similar opportunities for recreation. It grants all members equal education for their children, similar food, similar clothing, complete medical care, equal economic security, and similar opportunity for creative self-expression. Each and every member is entitled to the full measure of all these benefits no matter what his job in the kibbutz, how long he has been in the kibbutz, what his previous background, or what his technical skill (Kerem; 1965:55).

Thus, using the criteria established by the kibbutz, the existence of a managerial stratum is not inconsistent with the broader definition of equality.

The redefinition of the principle of equality necessarily brought a redefinition of productive self-labor. Whereas hard, physical labor was glorified in the early days of the movement, it is now recognized that members can contribute only "according to ability," and this inevitably results in differences in output.32 To restate Yona Golan's earlier comment: "Our former definition of equality of the

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32. It should be kept in mind that the reinterpretation of the principle of equality, and other original principles as well, has basically been accomplished by second generation and third generation kibbutzniks. The fact that this reinterpretation has come to be spelled out in pragmatic terms should not be surprising—the idealism of the founders is not easily passed on to their children. This would explain the pragmatic nature of ideological elaboration.
sexes has been exchanged for the concept that both sexes are equal in value" (1971:164). This is a very important point, embracing the idea that true equality is in the recognition of all kibbutzniks as human beings, and not in the maintenance of artificial standards of production.

The kibbutzim have moved a long way in recognizing that individual differences are a basic fact of life and, in one sense, their optimization is the goal of a utopian community. What they attempt to maintain is the essential equality of opportunity for the development of different human potentials (Golomb and Katz; 1970:48).33

According to the reformed ideological position, the employment of women in tertiary sectors of the kibbutz economy is now considered to be on a par with employment in all other sectors of the economy, as each task is regarded as socially necessary. This has not changed the fact that women, as compared with men in the kibbutz, still tend to find their jobs less satisfying and less productive. Thus, the ideological elaboration of the value of equality has, in effect, justified the plight of women in the kibbutz, and there has been little done to remedy the causes of their dissatisfaction and frustration within the work role itself. The fact that women were more likely than men to be dissat-

33. As an example, Golomb and Katz point to the Kibbutz Artzi, with 74 collectives and 17,441 members (1968), where 3.6 per cent of the people are granted release time from regular work assignments in order to pursue artistic interests. Of the 629 total there are 116 sculptors and painters, 50 authors, 71 actors and other personnel in drama, 68 musicians and composers, 75 dancers, 132 photographers, and 117 in other areas.
isfied with the collective experience had serious repercussions for the kibbutz, bringing into question the whole notion of an egalitarian society. "Almost every couple who has left the kibbutz has done so because of the unhappiness of the woman; and there seem to be a number of women who would like to leave but remain because of their husbands" (Spiro; 1970:223).

As a function of the collective ownership of the means of economic production, the absence of a system of differential rewards, and equal access to political power, the kibbutz does not have discernible stratified groups. This goes against the classic statement of the functionalist view of stratification by Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore. In their article, "Some Principles of Stratification," they stated that "the main functional necessity explaining the universal presence of stratification is precisely the requirement faced by any society of placing and motivating individuals in the social structure" (1945:242). In addition, a society places and motivates individuals by the differential distribution of rewards, of which there are three kinds. There are things which contribute to: (1) sustenance and comfort; (2) humor and diversion; and (3) self-respect and ego-expansion. All three rewards are present, in some degree, in each position in society (Davis and Moore: 1945).

If the rights and prerequisites of different positions in a society must be unequal, then the society must be stratified, because that is precisely
what stratification means. Social inequality is thus an unconsciously evolved device by which societies insure that the most important positions are conscientiously filled by the most qualified persons. Hence, every society, no matter how simple or complex, must differentiate persons in terms of both prestige and esteem, and must therefore possess a certain amount of institutionalized inequality (Davis and Moore; 1945:243).

Eva Rosenfeld suggested that the kibbutz was an exception to the Davis and Moore argument vis-à-vis the distribution of rewards by society:

They claim...that "In any social system all three kinds of rewards must be dispensed differentially according to position." The stratification system in the kibbutz certainly supports the statement concerning the existence of special rewards, but it shows also that it is not necessary for any system to dispense all three kinds of rewards. Special sustenance and comfort are not associated with high prestige positions; neither is there any indication that, all other forces remaining equal, future developments will necessarily lead to preferential treatment of the managerial stratum with regard to the standard of living. To the contrary, a pressure for higher material rewards comes from the rank and file who are underprivileged in "humor and diversion" as well as in "self-respect and ego-expansion." The former type of rewards is sought by them as a compensation for the lack of the latter two (1951:771).

The most important fact determining a kibbutznik's position is work. From Parsons' (1940) point of view, stratification was a matter of "moral evaluation." Because all societies have systems of values, Parsons suggested that a person's relative standing in the society reflected the extent to which his or her characteristics and achievements correspond to those values. For example, if a society placed a special value on physical strength, the stronger
members will be accorded higher prestige than weaker members. In a society like the United States, where economic achievement is very important, persons with wealth are accorded high status.

In the original kibbutz ideology, work was an end in itself. However, once the economic system became differentiated, specialized expertise became a new basis for evaluation.

When everyone did similar and simple work, differences in performance were not always striking. As both agricultural and industrial production became more technologically sophisticated, the elaboration of work branches made specialization more pronounced, and differences in professional knowledge appeared among workers. Professional knowledge was not always equivalent to effort and devotion. Now a more intelligent person might achieve a higher professional level with less effort than relatively untalented co-members. In some cases, the new criterion replaced the old one (Tiger and Shepher; 1975:48).

Especially after the establishment of the State in 1948, the country's economic development was such that neither effort nor professional knowledge was sufficient for the survival of an agricultural branch; there had to be a profit. The kibbutz grew faster economically than it did in manpower; the branches that required high manpower but were not profitable were gradually abandoned. Economic success became the criterion for evaluating work branches, and a branch's status partly determined the personal status of its workers.

The primary source of prestige is that of membership
in the kibbutz, and it influences behavior principally when members meet nonmembers, such as candidates and temporary workers. Another source of prestige, enjoyed by the old-timers, reflects their past achievements and puts them above the possible daily criticism of activities. There is also prestige for those members actually born in the collective, and for kibbutzniks who have held a number of important posts.

All of these factors carry some weight in determining status, but what still counts first and foremost is not who one is but rather what one does. In short, since economic rewards and very great payoffs through power and authority do not exist, informal social rewards are tremendously important. Personal status is based chiefly on the esteem in which one is held as a worker. Other factors in status are social relations, adherence to the norms of collective consumption, participation in the political system, behavior as spouse and parent, and performance in the cultural areas. An ideal kibbutz member would be described as a good and devoted worker—energetic, enthusiastic, and successful—preferably in a prosperous work branch.

It must be stressed, however, that differences in personal status do not constitute formal stratification. Only if persons with higher status are concentrated and organized in a distinguishable group, and transmit their status to their offspring, does stratification exist. There is no current or specific research on stratification in the
kibbutz, but in the early 1950s a group of American social scientists studied this question. Their results were divergent; Eva Rosenfeld’s claim of a class structure in one kibbutz was completely refuted by Y.G. Talmon (1956) and Shepher (1952). Later research findings touching the same issue supported Talmon’s findings and interpretations (Leshem and Cohen: 1968 and Shepher: 1974).

Talmon (1956) and Shepher (1974) explained the mechanisms that prevent the emergence of formal stratified groups in the kibbutz. First, the integration of subgroups based on age, seniority, and national origin is stronger than the integration of main officeholders. Second, recruitment to the managerial elite is by rotation, so that membership is temporary. Not only do important officeholders have no economic advantages, but the social disadvantages of exposure to constant criticism, and possible jeopardy of personal and family contacts because of work overload, discourage people from seeking elite positions. In fact, a person elected to such a position usually demands the right to stand down after two to three years. Elite positions are therefore constantly open to newcomers.

Third, political and organizational activity outside the kibbutz offers an outlet for people who have served within it. The influence of outside jobs, i.e., those serving the State, on one’s internal status is often corrosive. This also prevents the crystallization of a closed and solidarity elite group.
Two basic ways of forming a stable class are by strategic placement of children and by endogamous marriage within the class group. Talmon (1972) has dealt with the first strategy and Talmon (1964) and Shepher (1971) with the second. Status by placement is largely prevented by the egalitarian and collective system of education. "Inter-marriage between second-generation adults is relatively rare and limited to couples where there is an age difference of at least four years. The cohesion of age groups counteracts the formation of the extended family, which itself is under severe social control" (Tiger and Shepher; 1975:50).

The egalitarian system of economic reward successfully prevents the development of classes in the Weberian sense. Of course, in the Marxist sense, this is prevented a priori by the complete socialization of production. The relative absence of prestige differences also prevents the formation of (Weberian) status groups. The paradoxically mixed rewards of occupying elite political positions inhibit striving for such positions and, by definition, the formation of groups aspiring to power (which would typically become formal political parties). Thus, there is no convergence of the various rewards which elsewhere greatly contribute to stratification.
CHAPTER VI
COMMUNAL LIVING

The communal nature of the kibbutz has changed over the decades of development and perhaps the most important elements in this change can be found in the system of collective consumption, in the institution of collective education and child rearing, and in the pioneering spirit of the movement.

Focusing to this point on changes in the original values of farming as a way of life, asceticism, simplicity, labor, and equality, we have sought to understand the relationship between the evolving society and the evolving ideology of the kibbutz movement. In the middle stands the kibbutznik who, through the process of ideological elaboration, attempts to maintain a sense of consistency between the ideology and the real kibbutz world, while at the same time attempting to maintain the integrity and internal consistency of the ideology itself.

In his *Paths in Utopia* (1949), Martin Buber characterized the kibbutz as an "experiment that did not fail," principally because it committed itself to broad social and national goals, thus avoiding the isolation and progressive
atrophy of other utopian experiments. Indeed, at least part of the success of the kibbutz movement has been, and continues to be, its ability to compete economically with the larger (capitalist) Israeli society. Thus, the kibbutz has, out of necessity, committed itself to expansion, productivity, and modernization.

Pressure for "progress"—in the secular and even materialistic sense of dynamic social and economic development—follows then partly from the relation of the kibbutz to the broader society and its goals. It is reinforced by pressure within the kibbutz for a higher standard of living and the provision of facilities for a fuller life and the personal fulfillment of its members (Cohen; 1966:5).

It is suggested here that the commitment of the kibbutz movement to economic progress has indeed secured its physical survival, but at the price of undercutting the basic gemeinschaftliche character of the kibbutz. In other words, the economic development of society altered not only the strictly economic relations within that society but impacted on social relations as well. It is precisely this occurrence which has brought about the comment that the spirit of "kibbutzness" has irreparably changed from the early days of settlement. The process of ideological elaboration may be understood in this context, as an attempt to explain away, or at least to minimize, any erosion in the value of communality and to render compatible the commitments of the kibbutz to both economic progress and communal life. This is indeed difficult to do.

In the early days of settlement, the kibbutz was an
agrarian movement. Industry, before the mid-1930s, was generally confined to small shops which supplied parts and equipment to the agricultural sector. It was an austere, uncertain, yet exciting and challenging time for kibbutzniks. The agricultural development of the movement was in its adolescence, the industrial development in its infancy.

As the kibbutz movement developed, it became quite clear that the original conception of farming as a way of life was inconsistent with the larger kibbutz commitment to progress—progress both of the kibbutz itself and of the Jewish nation. In order to insure that progress, the basic ideological tenet of farming as a way of life was then simply and pragmatically reinterpreted to justify the industrialization of the kibbutz movement.

A similar ideological conflict developed vis-a-vis collective consumption. In the early days, there was a uniform and modest consumption of goods and services. On the one hand, there was a commitment on the part of those who fled the shtetls of Eastern Europe to avoid the bourgeois materialism of their parents and the larger European society. On the other hand, asceticism was "also a response to the early material conditions of the kibbutz wherein money was scarce, productive potential low, and consumer goods difficult to obtain" (Diamond; 1957:93).

During the period of total collectivity, known as Commune A, the kibbutznik owned only a toothbrush and a pair of slippers. Clothes were owned in common and were
redistributed after being cleaned.\textsuperscript{34} This system continued until about the mid-1930s when, as the kibbutz movement prospered, the austerity of consumption was gradually changed.

The fundamental ideological problem was that, beginning in the mid-1930s and accelerating steadily after the creation of the State, the kibbutz was able to increase the level of consumption of goods and services and also make accommodations to individual needs and tastes. However, this represented a breach of original values that stressed that consumption should be on a strict collective basis and should be maintained at an ascetic and simple level.

There are two important factors in the transition of collective consumption. First, when the kibbutz economy was able to support a more modern style of life, the system of collective consumption changed accordingly. Specifically, the trend toward individuation in consumption ran counter to the original concept of collective consumption, but not at all (so the kibbutz argument goes) inconsistent with a modern, affluent society to which progress in the kibbutz was also committed.\textsuperscript{35} Thus, ideological elaboration

\textsuperscript{34} Rosner summed this up quite well: "In regard to consumption, the kibbutz in its early days manifested marked features of "secular asceticism," the importance of consumption was largely disregarded and its level held to a minimum" (1971:99).

\textsuperscript{35} We previously discussed that women were not as likely to be rewarded in terms of either humor and diversion or self-esteem and ego-expansion, and were therefore much more concerned with increased sustenance and comfort. It is primarily the women who have been responsible for the growing consumer orientation in the kibbutz.
had to reconcile the impact of economic development on the value of collective consumption.

Friedmann summed up the thoughts of critics and some kibbutzniks alike when he stated that "concessions made to individual consumption, limited though they may be, constitute a serious breach in the collectivist ideology of the communities" (1968:77). He further stated that "the kibbutz is no longer a place where "all are equal in poverty," but it cannot become a place where "all are equal in affluence" without denying its principles" (1968:74). In this respect, ideological elaboration has basically been an attempt to show that the kibbutz can indeed become affluent and provide for human freedom, of which individualized consumption is a part, without compromising the ideals of equality and communality.

Second, the whole notion of communality took on a different meaning. The sturm und drang of the early kibbutzim weakened, I believe, so that communality came to be viewed more and more in terms of a general sharing, mutual responsibility, and cooperation.

The kibbutznik continues to observe the outward forms of what has become established kibbutz virtue, but the spirit underlying it all, often seems to have flagged. He continues to work hard, and to observe a certain austerity in his personal way of life; and yet a certain momentum, tied up with his own personal history, with the history of the kibbutz and with the development of the new Jewish national community, a momentum which had once been the very condition of his hard work, seems to have been lost (Sanders; 1965:48).
In a 1968 study, Arian suggested that the notion of the "decline of ideology" is subject to three possible interpretations, i.e., changes in the content, intensity, and general acceptance of the ideology.

The "decline" might refer to a change in the systematic relations among the elements of the ideology; that is, the content of the ideology formed an integrated whole in the past but has "disintegrated" in the present. Alternatively, we might mean by the decline that the intensity with which the ideology was once held has diminished over time—that more of the elements of the ideology were accepted in the past than in the present or that they were more firmly believed then. We might mean by the concept that more people accepted the ideology in the past than in the present (Arian; 1968:120).

He found evidence that the "decline of ideology" refers to a decline in the intensity of belief but not to a disintegration of the content of the ideology.

What I have called the kibbutz ideology appears to retain the properties which justify our including it under the definition of ideology in the ideological present and in the ideological past. Fewer people unanimously identify with the ideology among the public servants interviewed, but the structure of the ideology remains relatively stable (Arian; 1968:126).

Before discussing how the ideal of communality has evolved, and more importantly, how this change was explained and justified, it would be appropriate to look at communal life in the early days of the movement. Gerson explained that during this period group activity was reified:

That was the period when every bit of strength was needed to build and protect the farm economy. The
difficult struggle for existence and the desire to prove that the new collective way of life could maintain itself led to the demand that every member grant absolute priority to the kibbutz's interest, even above his concern for his own family. At that time it was even customary for a couple not to appear together publicly, with man and wife going separately to meals and to kibbutz meetings. It was not surprising that at the time wedding ceremonies were entirely negated (1971:152).

Invariably, the first permanent building erected in the kibbutz was the dining hall. Located in the center of the community, the dining hall dominated much more than just the physical plant of the early kibbutz. In those days, many kibbutzim were small in size, with populations of under one hundred members. The community was very much a Gemeinschaft and the dining hall was the place where these close personal relationships were nurtured. Events were taking place there every night—community meetings, special social and cultural events, or the typical talking and dreaming with comrades and dancing the hora into the night. The dining hall represented the coming together of many different people to form an organic whole. It is difficult to underestimate the special significance these events held for the early kibbutzniks, or the symbolic significance of the dining hall at that time.

The difficult years of physical survival are now past and "there is more freedom to relax informal pressures toward unity on all fronts. As a result, the kibbutzim are

36. It is obvious that the family was purposefully deemphasized at this time.
less rigid about ideological standards of communal living; they are more discriminating in their beliefs about doing things together and more tolerant of individual deviation" (Golomb and Katz; 1970:51). Additionally, "there has been a gradual trend toward allowing individual members to own more personal possessions--furniture, children's toys, records, etc" (Weingarten; 1952:21). This trend has been defended by Melford Spiro:

There are at least four reasons why this increase in private property has created little friction: (1) Those who have acquired personal effects do not flaunt them--there is no conspicuous consumption. Moreover, they are quite willing to share them when asked. (2) "Things" still have no effect on one's standing in the community, the contribution one makes to the group being far more important, so that a member's possessions have no import on his work pattern. (3) The increase in private property is now almost incorporated into the ideology. Not only are some things seen as a legitimate extension of "to each according to his needs"--a musician's tape recorder, for example--but it is now accepted that the public and private sectors of life can grow and expand together. Few would deny the dangers involved in this philosophy, but the idea that self-development must counterpoint group-development has taken root in (what seems to be) an irreversible manner. (4) It is a source of kibbutz pride that they have been able to maintain--at least as much as anyone in Israel "maintains"--a standard of living which allows for these goods (1970:261-262).

In fact, Spiro viewed the whole trend toward material progress as quite possibly having a positive impact on the \textit{gemeinschaftliche} character of the kibbutz:

The absence of an abundant and diversified diet, the overcrowded and noisy dining room, the din and dinginess of the shower rooms, the long distance to overused and frequently inefficient toilets--malodorous in summer and muddy in winter--all take
heavy psychological tolls. Add to these the almost constant pressure of an acute labor shortage, and the inevitable strains induced by the consequent long work week and not infrequent labor drafts, and it may not be remiss to suggest that though material progress may not be a necessary condition for greater brotherhood in the kibbutz, it would surely serve to alleviate many of the tensions which currently stand in its way (1970:245-246).

The ideological justification of individualized consumption, and the consequent ownership of some personal items, has been in line with the reinterpretation of equality in the kibbutz. The kibbutz maxim of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need," which at one time was interpreted to mean equal effort and minimum consumption, is now viewed as recognizing inherent differences in ability, as well as in need. Once inherent inequalities in financial, administrative, or general labor abilities were recognized in kibbutz ideology, and the concept of relative equality applied in this area, it was little time before the concept was applied in the area of consumption also. The change in the ideal of equality, as it related to production, paved the way for change in equality as it related to consumption. Both trends were reinterpreted in the context of, and legitimized by, the basic kibbutz maxim.

There is little doubt that the trend toward individualized consumption, and the ownership of personal items, marked the decline of the central role played by the dining hall. Gradually, the individual apartment, and the family life centered around it, came to be more and more important
in the lives of the kibbutzniks. However, the process of ideological elaboration was not intended to come to grips with the relationship between the increase in individualized consumption and the consequent increase in individual (as opposed to strictly collective) lives and lifestyles, and the significance this has for the kibbutz as a Gemeinschaft. Rather, the focus is on how changes in the system of collective consumption have enabled the kibbutz to provide for more human freedom than at any other time in its history, a much more positive and constructive view.

On this point, Stern concluded that "the standard of living is primarily a matter of individual taste and not of inequality. Each member is entitled to a radio, an electric fan, a small refrigerator, perhaps even to a television set when available as long as it does not interfere with the growth and development of the kibbutz" (1965:139). The solutions reached in the areas of consumption "usually permitted a minimum gratification of individual desires, while at the same time strictly preserving the egalitarian pattern" (Weintraub; 1969:110).

Dan Leon summed up the kibbutz thinking on this matter, as well as some of the problems facing the kibbutz, stating "There is no evidence that collective consumption, as such, cannot cater for individual tastes or that freedom of choice is incompatible with equality. But as the kibbutz is able to provide more for its members, it must prove this not only objectively, but also subjectively, and the two do
Throughout the history of the kibbutz movement, members have been flexible and willing to modify the ways in which non-essential or marginal values have been put into practice. But there has also been the requirement that they should remain steadfast in their commitment to essential values. When critics have been quick to suggest that "kibbutzness" has diminished substantially, the reply has been that the movement is "essentially" the same as in the early days. While some aspects of the ideal of communality have indeed changed, other aspects have not, i.e., the system of mutual responsibility. In the process of ideological elaboration this unique system of social security is regarded as fundamental to the communal way of life in the kibbutz, and is pointed to as an example of the amazing continuity of the movement over the years.

Cartwright and Zander (1960) stated that there are two sources of individual attraction to the group, both of which are present in the kibbutz: (1) the group itself is the object of need, and (2) being in the group is a means for satisfying needs which transcend the group itself. On the first point, the kibbutz movement attaches great significance to communal production and to the system of mutual responsibility, both of which tend to affirm the validity and primacy of the group experience. On the second point, kibbutz members believe that the movement is a prime factor in the success of Zionism in Palestine, and in the repudia-
tion of the historical image of the Jew.

As a means of understanding the ideal of mutual responsibility, the kibbutz way of life may be contrasted with that of the larger (capitalist) Israeli society. In the city, the family is the focal point of life. A division of labor usually exists wherein the man provides economic support and some degree of protection, and the woman maintains the household, bears, and cares for the children. The family is the source of sustenance and security for its members. In the city, an individual assumes various identities depending on the nature of his activities. In our society, for example, it is not uncommon for a man to be a teacher, an officer in the Army Reserves, and a member of the Rotary Club. Each role is acted out in a different social context, and his social position is the result of several factors.

In the early days of the kibbutz, the group formed the framework for the member's entire existence. As long as he was a member of the collective, the kibbutznik had little identity apart from the group experience, for he was judged entirely on how he contributed to the attainment of group goals.

The founders saw a community in which people worked together in attaining their own goals as a means for achieving what Martin Buber called the I-Thou relationship, rather than the I-it relationship, the former being expressive and cooperative, the latter exploitative. Soloman Asch has referred to the relationship of people interacting in this fashion as shared psychological fields (Golomb and Katz; 1970:41).
Unlike an organizational or group membership in the city, in the kibbutz one could never put aside the group experience. It is not an aspect of his life but his entire life. It reached into and controlled every aspect of life, and it is this totality of the group experience that sometimes drove members from the kibbutz.

The early form of this belief in collective living emphasized the oneness of the individual and the community. All members were supposed to be completely identified with the collectivity. Differentiation of individuals in property, in dress, and in roles was to be avoided as expressions of egocentricity. And this lack of differentiation, as Durkheim maintained, did produce a common collective conscience. To be part of a community and to behave as one of its similarly acting members was, and to some extent remains, a moral value (Golomb and Katz; 1970:41-42).

The traditional functions of the family do not exist in the kibbutz, they continue to be supplanted by the primacy of the group (Spiro: 1954). Thus, one's commitment is not ultimately to the family but to the group. The group assures the relative equality and social security of its members. The individual member improves his life-situation as a result of the general improvements of the community, and the community needs the contentment of the individual members for its own stability. In this system of mutual responsibility, the individual has a vested interest in the progress of the kibbutz as a whole and not his family in particular.

The difference between the kibbutz and town as far as individual freedom is concerned can be
defined as follows: in town the individual depends on society for essentials, but this dependence is as a rule disguised, and he is free in small things. In the kibbutz, on the other hand, the individual is free in essential points—his living and that of his family, the future of his children—but in small things he is more dependent on the community (Darin-Drabkin; 1963:176).

In addition, the group insures the complete social security of every member, regardless of his relative value to the kibbutz. For example, as long as there is food in the community, everyone is given a share "according to need."

Cooperation, rather than competition, is the norm of kibbutz life. Competition exists only insofar as various productive sectors of the economy are concerned, and only then in terms of which sector contributes most to the economic objectives of the community. Competition at the individual level is considered detrimental to the communality of the kibbutz; egoism and selfishness are regarded with extreme displeasure. "It is probable that the lack of competitive individualism creates the feeling that one is always a member of the 'in group'" (Crown; 1965:432).

Though material incentives are collective and not personal, they undoubtedly have great importance in determining the kibbutz member's attitudes to work. He knows that the standard of living and the social security of him and his family depend upon his efforts—though not only his efforts. Along with others, he feels the obligation not only to pay his passage, so to speak, but also to raise his own standards through his contributions to the general effort (Leon; 1964:74).

With his entire future laid out before him, each member can easily identify with the means and ends of the
kibbutz. He can see, due to the small size of the average collective and the visibility of its members, how his productivity fits into the over-all economic scheme and what the consequences are if he fails to do his job. He is aware that in the system of mutual responsibility, each member is dependent on every other member, and as long as he works hard and contributes to the group, the group, in turn, will take care of him. The democratic structure of the kibbutz often results in public referendums at community meetings and the individual not only sees the opinions of others affecting change, but he also knows that at any given time his personal opinion will be listened to and valued. The children of every member, regardless of his standing in the kibbutz, are eligible to reap the benefits of the collective educational system. The security of the individual is also guaranteed. If he is physically disabled he may have better accommodations and be eating better food than the General Secretary of the collective, for an indefinite period of time and without loss of social security for his family.

Thus, ideological elaboration in the kibbutz indicates that in every aspect of collective life the concepts of equality and communality are operationalized so that every member feels that the kibbutz is more than just a place to live. In short, it is maintained that the notion of a Gemeinschaft continues to be a living, vibrant reality. However, the trend toward individuation must undercut the
feeling of communality, for that is what individuation means. Group involvement is no longer viewed as an intensely emotional experience; the spirit of the founders has been replaced by the pragmatism of the succeeding generations. The decision to live in the kibbutz is therefore based more and more on practical considerations, i.e., the system of mutual responsibility. But for the founding fathers, communality was based on the subjective aspects relating to interaction, rather than on the objective merits of the system.

The effectiveness of the early kibbutzim in developing an attitude of community is perhaps best exemplified by the system of education and child rearing. Recently, however, this system has also been the source of considerable ideological tension in some kibbutzim. From the time the child is born the community plays a central role in the process of socialization. After the weaning period the child is placed in one of the children's houses, in a group of six or seven other boys and girls with whom he will live until he enters high school. He typically visits his parents in their quarters for about 2 to 3 hours daily (and for longer periods on weekends), after which he returns to the children's house to sleep. At high school age his group merges with three or four others. Every aspect of life is in the group context--eating, sleeping, playing, and learning. Most importantly, for the kibbutz, the children are instilled with the virtues of the collective way of life. It is a
major purpose of the educational system that the children should grow up with the idea that collective living is the only life. Thus, it is maintained by kibbutzniks that the feeling of community is still strong in the collective, remaining essentially unchanged in this respect from the early days of settlement. As an example of the high degree of group cohesion, kibbutzniks point with pride to the fact that

...the great majority of the kibbutz second generation, after their contacts with the outside world through their service in the armed forces, return to the kibbutz--either to their own community or to the kibbutz of the spouse. The low attrition rate is all the more remarkable in view of the greater affluence and the greater variety of stimulation provided by the urban environment (Golomb and Katz; 1970:8).

Women, in general, have been at the forefront of demands for a more individualized lifestyle. This has primarily focused on the consumption of goods but, as the kibbutz has prospered economically, women have been pressing for a more traditional family life. Specifically, many kibbutz women have found parting with their children at night very difficult to accept. Of course, the children's houses are an integral part of the kibbutz system of child rearing and education, permitting children to sleep in the parent's apartment would reduce the educational system to little more than a day school not unlike schools in other towns in Israel. Also, it would reduce the central role played by the community itself in the rearing of its
children, and generally weaken the ties binding individuals and families to the collective.

While many critics and some kibbutzniks alike have viewed this trend as further undermining communality in the kibbutz, ideologists have pointed out that the movement has always been structurally diverse. Specifically, more than 20 collectives have always provided for children sleeping with parents, never causing a furor over their integrity as kibbutzim. The justification for this trend seems to be that it increases human freedom, while the value in question historically seems to be of only peripheral importance given the larger socialist character of the movement. The unspoken question seems to be: how important can this particular issue be if the practice has always existed, to some degree, within the movement and in no way does it undermine the fundamental economic relations of the collective?

This practice varies among the three major kibbutz federations. Ihud is more inclined toward experimentation and change than either the Meuhad or Artzi federations and has, in fact, been more receptive to having children sleep with parents. However, in looking at the concessions already made by each of the federations to demands for more individualism, it is quite likely that this particular trend will gain momentum in the years to come.

Some of the changes in the kibbutz way of life reflect the fact that the kibbutz is a socialist movement existing in a larger capitalist society. The kibbutz com-
mitment to economic progress has socio-historical roots, to be sure, but it also reflects the fact that the kibbutz has to compete economically to remain a viable concern. This explains one of the reasons why the kibbutz abandoned the idea of farming as a way of life.

Because the kibbutz movement represents only about 3 per cent of the total Israeli population and there is a chronic labor shortage, it is sensitive to the need to recruit new members and meet the individual needs of existing members. It is difficult to do this if the larger Israeli society offers a much more modern lifestyle. Thus, the trend toward individuation in consumption can be viewed as an attempt to make kibbutz life more attractive. Again, this suggests that living in a kibbutz today is more and more of a practical consideration, rather than the moral and emotional commitment found in the early days.

A number of historical events have also taken place with direct effects upon how the kibbutznik views the group and his relation to it. Before the establishment of the State in 1948 the kibbutz was the primary instrument of Zionism in Palestine. After the creation of the State much of the prestige and influence of the kibbutz was absorbed by the Jewish government. Suddenly, the kibbutz was no longer the priority, the existence of the State was more important. Many of the activities of the kibbutz were taken over by the government, and many kibbutz leaders (including Moshe Dyan, Levi Eshkol, David Ben-Gurion, and Golda Meir)
were drawn into national rather than kibbutz service. From 1948 to 1967 the role of the kibbutz movement in the affairs of the State steadily declined in the eyes of the general public. It was during this period that the kibbutz industrialized and began to provide for increased individual freedom in an attempt to curb attrition.

As a result of the Six-Day War (1967) and the Yom Kippur War (1973), the kibbutz enjoyed a rebirth of sorts. Lining the frontier, the kibbutzim were invaluable in the defense of the country. For example, in the Six-Day War kibbutzniks incurred over 25 per cent of the casualties, yet represented only 3 per cent of the population. Kibbutzniks also proved to be the best fighter pilots in the Israeli Air Force. This reaffirmed to members of the movement and to the Israeli nation as a whole that the kibbutz still plays a central role in the realization of a Jewish National Homeland. It is interesting to note that those kibbutzim in the most dangerous areas never want for volunteers, while those in more secure areas often experience attrition.

I believe that a very important element in communal life is the degree to which kibbutzniks view the kibbutz as the pioneering movement it certainly was before 1948, and the degree to which the Israeli people do also. There have been two periods of prestige for the kibbutz—before 1948 and since 1967—also periods of group cohesion and deep feelings of community. With the revival of the pioneering
spirit has come the recognition that the integrity of the movement may indeed rest on how well the kibbutz is able to support the national government's attempts to secure its survival, rather than how effectively the kibbutz is able to defend certain value positions. This is an important aspect of the kibbutz ideological mentality.

If the spirit of "kibbutzness" is changing, what is it changing from and what is it changing into, sociologically speaking?

THE CHANGING FACE OF COMMUNALITY

One way to characterize this trend is as a change from the primary group relations of the early days. The conception of "primary groups" originated in the mind of Charles Horton Cooley. Although he did not specifically use the term "secondary groups," he implied that they were groups with characteristics opposite to primary groups.

Type examples of the primary group are the family, or household group, the old-fashioned neighborhood, and the spontaneous play-group of children. In such groups all children everywhere participate, and the intimate association there realized works upon them everywhere in much the same way. It tends to develop sympathetic insight into the moods and states of mind of other people and this in turn underlies the development of both the flexible type of behavior and the common attitudes and sentiments which we have mentioned....

The chief characteristics of a primary group are:

1) Face-to-face association.
2) Unspecialized character of that association.
3) Relative permanence.
4) Small number of persons involved.
5) Relative intimacy among the participants.
Such groups are primary in several senses, but chiefly in that they are fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals of the individual. The result of intimate association, psychologically, is a certain fusion of individualities in a common whole, so that one's very self, for many purposes at least, is the common life and purpose of the group. Perhaps the simplest way of describing this whole¬ness is by saying that it is a "we"; it involves the sort of sympathy and mutual identification for which "we" is the natural expression. One lives in the feeling of the whole and finds the chief aims of his will in that feeling (Cooley, Angell, and Carr; 1933:55-56).

Another way to characterize this trend is as a change from community to society. Ferdinand Tönnies saw a clear and irreversible trend from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft, in which primitive, traditional, closely knit communities are torn and uprooted, to be replaced by a large, urbanized, industrialized society in which human relations are impersonal and instrumental.

The key concepts in Tönnies' system are ideal types which are based on the individual will that underlies the concrete social relationships. Tönnies characterized the Gemeinschaft in terms of natural will and the Gesellschaft in terms of rational will. In the case of rational will, relationships are established because they are mutually beneficial to the interactants. Means and ends have been sharply differentiated, as in Weber's Zweckrationalen. On the other hand, people may enter into relationships because they are valued in and of themselves. In this case natural will predominates.

The concepts of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft are
used to differentiate social entities, or soziale Wesenheiten. These are classified as social relationships, collectives, and social organizations or corporations.

Tönnies also described three types of norms: (1) order, (2) law, and (3) morality. Those norms which relate to order are the most fundamental to daily life. The more complicated social life becomes, the more complicated are the mechanisms needed to insure basic order. For example, traffic regulations are a necessary creation of modern society. In a Gemeinschaft, the norms relating to order are based on concord, or Eintracht. In a Gesellschaft, they are based on convention.

It is important to note that these concepts are mental constructs which are not empirically extant. Also, one type does not exist to the exclusion of the other. In the kibbutz we can talk of a general drift from gemeinschaftliche to gesellschaftliche social forms, but this does not mean that elements of a Gemeinschaft will not persist. The most important elements in this change can be found in the system of collective consumption, in the institution of collective education and child rearing, and in the pioneering spirit of the movement. However, the system of mutual responsibility is an excellent example of a gemeinschaftliche social form that has endured the years of social change.
CHAPTER VII
PROGRESS AND COMMUNALITY:
CRISIS IN THE KIBBUTZ

Three major hypotheses were herein explored concerning the development of the kibbutz movement.

First, ideology impacts upon itself and upon social structure and, in turn, is impacted upon by social structure. "Ideologies are always peculiarly vulnerable and open to criticism on the score of self-contradiction and of failure to reckon with experienced facts" (Cornforth; 1972:72). The kibbutz movement has been particularly guilty of self-contradiction in value positions.

This system is not, as it often seems, some well-integrated and unchanging system of basic concepts towards which the members of the community are oriented and which they tended to follow more conscientiously in the past than in the present. Contrary to this popular opinion, the ideology of the kibbutz is a heterogeneous system composed of elements stemming from Socialism, Zionism, humanistic ethics and sometimes religion, which are integrated only in a most strenuous way; as a result, the system contains many potential internal contradictions which, under certain circumstances, create dilemmas of decision and action for the members (Cohen; 1966:4).

As a result, Cohen concluded that some of the changes taking place in the kibbutz can be understood "not as results of
external pressures upon the value system, but as rearrange-ments within the value system itself forced upon it by its inner logic, its Eigengesetzlichkeit" (1966:4).

The preoccupation in the early days with farming as a way of life, asceticism, simplicity, and physical labor was, in part, the result of deep-seated feelings the early kibbutzniks had about the physical and spiritual aspects of traditional Jewishness. The kibbutz movement is an attempt at personal and national regeneration, the affirmation of a new Jewish ethic.

Relative to the last point, the abandonment of farming as a way of life, the consequent industrialization of the kibbutz movement, and the use of hired labor all impacted upon the development of kibbutz ideology.

The second major hypothesis is that in the course of ideological development, the original values have been continuously reinterpreted so as to preserve the integrity of the kibbutzim as a unique and highly successful socialist movement which has remained true to its ideals. This whole process may be called ideological elaboration (Cornforth: 1972), in which (a) some values have been abandoned altogether; (b) some values have been modified; and (c) other values have been maintained. Specifically, maintained values have been determined to be essential to the kibbutz way of life, to be ends in themselves, while modified or abandoned values have been determined to be of marginal importance to the kibbutz way of life, and were conceived as
means to achieve desired ends.

Third, the individual kibbutzim were always dedicated to economic progress--progress both of the movement itself and of the Jewish people as a nation--and herein lies the crisis in the kibbutz and, specifically, the problem facing ideological elaboration. On the one hand, the kibbutz is committed to modernity in its technological and economic organization and, on the other hand, to primitivity in its social relations. The problem facing the kibbutz is simply that it has embraced two fundamentally contradictory value positions, progress and communality, and yet its survival and integrity depend to a great extent on how successfully it maintains the commitment to each. The whole process of ideological elaboration is an attempt to render compatible these divergent trends.

The point is, that under the economic conditions of progress, the kibbutz cannot maintain the commitment to communality in precisely the same way it did in the early days. We know from Durkheim that the trend from mechanical to organic solidarity is predicated on certain economic factors that relate directly to societal growth and development. This is not to suggest that the kibbutz is not committed to the ideal of communality, but simply that the institutional arrangements that constitute the ideal in practice have evolved as the kibbutz itself has evolved.

In the early days, the feeling of community was one of intensely emotional commitment to the activities of the
group which, in turn, embodied a quasi-religious ideal. As the founding fathers grew older, the second and third generation took their places of leadership, and the revolutionary movement itself became institutionalized. One of the most difficult things for any revolutionary group is to inculcate in their children, the second generation revolutionaries, the ideas and ideals of the parents. The emotional commitment of the founders cannot be passed on very easily since the children are one generation removed from the direct experience. The result of all this has been that an air of pragmatism has been ushered into the kibbutz with the second and third generation. Those things which tie individual to individual and individual to community, or in other words promote a feeling of communality, are more and more the objective aspects of the system, i.e., mutual responsibility. The *sturm und drang* is gone.

There is an important exception to this however. Since the Six-Day War in 1967, there has been a rebirth of spirit in the kibbutz. Once again (and not since the establishment of the State in 1948) kibbutzniks feel proud of their role in the preservation of the State, of the dream. This has greatly contributed to a feeling of community in the kibbutz.

Throughout its history the kibbutz has remained committed to progress. That which constitutes progress has always been defined by kibbutzniks as encompassing growth, innovation, efficiency, and productivity. However, that
which constitutes communal life has indeed changed, and this change has been justified through the process of ideological elaboration.
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