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The Lonely Ones: Selfhood and Society in Harry Stack Sullivan's Psychiatric Thought

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The Lonely Ones:
Selfhood and Society in Harry Stack Sullivan's Psychiatric Thought

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A Thesis Here presented to the Graduate Faculty of The College of William & Mary in Candidacy for the Degree of Master of Arts

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This Thesis Here is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

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This thesis examines the contributions of psychiatrist Harry Stack Sullivan (1892-1949) to an ongoing conversation on the self and society in the United States, from classical liberal political theory to the mid-twentieth century social sciences. Existing literature overlooks the 1940s as a divided period in American intellectual history. This project argues that an accurate presentation of the era demands the inclusion of thinkers who were excluded from mainstream institutions as a consequence of their training in ‘professional’ academic disciplines or social marginalization along the lines of race, ethnicity, religion, gender, or sexuality. Careful examination of Sullivan’s lectures, scholarly articles, unpublished manuscripts, and biographical material locates his place in this conversation and further highlights the influence of his experiences as a gay, working-class, Irish-Catholic psychiatrist on his innovative theories. Sullivan’s ideas addressed aspects of life in the United States ignored by established academics, shaping the subjects and methods later associated with the very institutions from which he was excluded and resonating with late-twentieth century advances in queer theory. This thesis contributes to the expansion of intellectual history to include thinkers from a greater diversity of personal backgrounds who hypothesized foundational changes to a mainstream American society from which they were excluded.
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David Riesman’s *The Lonely Crowd*, a sociological analysis of the “changing American character,” was published in 1950 and immediately captured the imagination of the American middle-class reading public. Riesman posited that fundamental changes to American society in the previous decades had undermined the authority of introspective individuality in favor of a malleable figure that changed in relation to society’s demands. The contemplative search for an authentic, or “inner-directed,” self that concerned earlier generations of intellectuals gave way to Riesman’s “other-directed” individual that discovered identity and success in reflecting accepted social norms.¹ Riesman intended to support American individuality in a new theory of social humanism, imbuing the individual with a deeper understanding of existing social values. This thoroughgoing concern with the concepts of ‘self’ and ‘society’ preoccupied political thinkers in the United States from its founding.² Questioning the possibility of attaining unique individuality first emerged as part of the seventeenth century liberal political tradition and has continued across intellectual movements into the present. At the turn of the twentieth century, pragmatism established a process of intellectual inquiry that replaced the prevailing liberal faith in a hierarchy of absolute revealed truths with a system of relative truths that could only be agreed upon through conversation.³ Pragmatist intellectuals inaugurated a new theory grounded in the propensity of human beings to change over time. The pragmatist moment was in recession in the early 1930s and the social scientific revolution that included Riesman had started. Mark Greif argues that the American midcentury commenced in this moment of uncertainty and included a distinctive form of intellectual activity known as the “age of the crisis of man”.⁴

Greif rejects the tendency in American intellectual history to treat the 1940s “as interim years of war” or “as a divided period, a wishbone that goes half to the ‘thirties’ and half to the ‘fifties.’” His interpretation of political and social thought in the 1940s
bypassed philosophy, theology, and traditional academic disciplines, arguing instead that “the novel had the obligation to humanize a fallen mankind.”

Angus Burgin argues, however, that in looking exclusively to literature as the source of innovative ideas, “Greif has written a history of philosophy that is skeptical of the philosophical enterprise.” Greif’s skepticism leads him to turn a blind eye to the ideas that countless American intellectuals of various disciplines articulated through the language of political theory in the immediate postwar period. Burgin posits that “A different version of Greif’s book might have explored the echoes of these conversations in an American context, as homegrown and émigré theologians and philosophers attempted to develop a humanistic worldview that suited the needs of their moment.”

While Greif appropriately rejects a widespread tendency in intellectual history to bypass the 1940s, I join Burgin in arguing that Greif’s emphasis on literature as the sole medium of midcentury intellectualism likewise overlooks those thinkers who created a philosophical bridge between existing knowledge of the self and the inchoate demands of postwar society.

An accurate intellectual history of the 1930s and 40s requires the inclusion of thinkers who were excluded from mainstream intellectual institutions as a consequence of their training in ‘professional’ academic disciplines or social marginalization along the lines of race, ethnicity, religion, gender, or sexuality. Their theories addressed aspects of life in the United States ignored by established academics, concurrently shaping the subjects and methods later associated with the very institutions from which they were excluded. The ideas articulated by prewar and wartime thinkers in overlooked intellectual spaces became central to political and social thought in the United States after the Second World War. One of these overlooked thinkers is psychiatrist Harry Stack Sullivan. Sullivan’s psychiatric theories led him to actively participate in ongoing conversations of self and society in the United States. The following intellectual history of
Harry Stack Sullivan will demonstrate the innovative philosophical ideas developed in the United States in this period, the influence of political thought articulated through academic disciplines that were not expressly philosophical, and the role of individuals who did not identify as white, Protestant, or middle-class in changing the ideas and identities later taken for granted by mainstream society. Sullivan’s humanistic social and political thought is an important, previously overlooked contribution to intellectual history in the United States.

Sullivan (1892 – 1949) read political theory from a perspective shaped by his own experiences as a gay, working-class, Irish-Catholic intellectual and his professional psychiatric interventions with patients at the margins of American society. His medical and philosophical essays published between 1924 and 1947 advocated for a host of changes to psychiatric institutions. Such institutions included hospital spaces and treatment methods designed to discipline those categorized as mentally and sexually abnormal. Existing mental hospitals organized treatment around the argument that individuals could be reformed, or made to conform to normalized patterns of behavior. Sullivan argued that biological, cultural, social, and historical factors in the United States were not merely political, but personal. Psychiatric treatment was most effective when it unpacked an individual’s personality characteristics, or the relatively enduring pattern of representations that signified an individual’s place in real or imagined interpersonal relations. Each personality contained an accumulated body of referents attached to past, present, and perceived future social norms.

The self explained by Sullivan’s theories evolved from his interactions with patients who were designated socially ‘non-normal,’ or who needed adjustment to the established norms, by mainstream institutions. He observed the influence of sexual, racial, ethnic, psychological, religious, and socioeconomic exclusion on the ongoing
formation of the self through these interactions. Sullivan’s psychiatric theories rejected the absolute knowledge that classical liberal political theory claimed to possess of a unique human individuality tied to contractual agency. Rather, Sullivan hypothesized that his patients possessed a malleable individuality that emerged in a psychologically informed social space. His patients articulated their individuality through a personified self, the subjective “I” or objective “me,” referenced and shaped by formative interpersonal relations. Sullivan argued that individuals expressed their sense of self through the language of experience. These experiences included both individual behavior and the language used retrospectively to rationalize specific actions.\textsuperscript{14} The concept of individual personality included all human experiences and established a framework that enabled an individual to find themselves within the web of interpersonal relations.\textsuperscript{15} Sullivan’s theories placed the individual inside a ceaseless process of personality cultivation through actions and social appraisals within interpersonal relations.

Maintaining a sense of self required individuals to act in relation to established patterns of interpersonal relations. Sullivan argued that socially informed selfhood always referenced “integrating tendencies [that] are conceived to be in the psychobiological substrata of the corresponding integrated interpersonal situation.”\textsuperscript{16} Interpersonal relations referenced an accumulated body of historical, biological, cultural, and social norms. If an individual perceived a conflict between any aspect of the personified self and the social norms disciplined by society, Sullivan hypothesized that the individual would experience affective uncertainty, or anxiety. Individuals and societies affected by a strong sense of uncertainty created systems of rationalization or prejudice that was often rooted in previously dominant social norms and values. The process of interpersonal relations existed in a particular society and across history.
Interpersonal relations required individuals to locate their present concerns in the context of past norms and anticipated relationships in the future. Sullivan crafted a humanistic social theory that identified mainstream patterns of human relations and questioned the persistence of antiquated, exclusionary social norms in establishing a renewed faith in the potential of human beings.

The innovative theories that emerged in Sullivan’s articles and essays were articulated through an interdisciplinary lingua franca of the early twentieth century social sciences. This interdisciplinary vocabulary integrated recent advances in psychiatry, psychology, anthropology, political science, and sociology in a common conversation. Sullivan’s concepts, and their application in clinical research, were influenced by his active participation in the most pressing intellectual conversations of his day. At the same time, these concepts appear to anticipate many of the central intellectual preoccupations during the second half of the twentieth century. Contemporary students of postmodernism and queer theory can find strong resonances between Sullivan’s theories of sexuality and selfhood and theories developed by Michel Foucault, Elizabeth Grosz, Dana Seitzler Judith Butler, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, and the related inquiries of J.L. Austin and Irving Goffman. Careful consideration of these theories from the late twentieth and early twenty-first century opens up new readings of Sullivan’s ideas and exhibits the prescience of many of his innovative hypotheses.

* * *

In a 1976 lecture at the Collège de France, Michel Foucault argued that “power’s hold over life” from the nineteenth century through his present was central to understanding human society and necessarily lead to a theory of biopower. The ascendance of the nation-state coincided with the emergence of a new social and political “power to ‘make’ live and ‘let’ die.” The state established a new technology of
power that no longer sought to regulate human bodies individually through an apparatus of “anatomo-politics,” but invented a biopolitical mechanism for the regulation of the entire human race. Biopower, or the technology of power acting through biopolitics, established a set of processes to regulate the existence, persistence, and reproduction of human life. Biopower produced knowledge through the standardization and normalization of human life, establishing universally applicable expectations of sexuality, health, and human relationships. Social and political stability demanded that a process of discipline be replaced by a process of regularization, in making live and letting die.¹⁹ Sullivan’s work did not predict, but perhaps anticipated the underlying social and political normalization tendency that Foucault later assembled in his theory of biopower. Psychiatry, for Sullivan, necessarily involved the “study [of] the degrees and patterns of things which I assume to be ubiquitously human,” constrained by limits and absolutes.²⁰ For Sullivan, human beings were studied relationally, not individually, and always in reference to universal human norms and patterns of life. These norms regulated and constrained human beings through the social process of interpersonal relations. The psychiatric hospital was not an institution designed to discipline and punish individuals, but an institution and store of knowledge designed to reorient individuals to a set of mainstream human norms that regulated human society. Sullivan created an inclusive community in the hospital that provided a third space for patients, acknowledging the validity of their non-normative social position and supporting their transition back to a biopolitical, regularizing society.

Queer theorists Elizabeth Grosz, in The Nick of Time: Politics, Evolution, and the Untimely, and Dana Seitler, in Atavistic Tendencies: The Culture of Science in American Modernity, argued that the advent of modernity was characterized by disruptive biological and temporal tendencies that established the present in relation to the past,
and the past as it continued to exist in the present. According to Grosz, the invention of biology – and the corporeality of human beings – as a system that engendered historical, social, cultural, and sexual differences made possible the ceaseless transformation of these constitutive factors in a self-stimulating historical process. Human life occupied a state of constant *temporal becoming* that theorized the endless, unexpected, and unrepeatable interruption of historical events across time and space. In a state of temporal becoming the past and anticipated future encroach on the present moment – the present is both the consequence of the past and cause of the future, incited by unpredictable ruptures and sudden changes. The process of temporal becoming might only be understood in the articulation of broad, population-wide tendencies that fail at the individual, human level of analysis. The present was neither entirely determined by nor fully independent from the past and future, but “the ground from which divergence and difference erupt.” For Seitler, knowledge of an identifiable present was made possible by a process of modern temporality that coincidentally severed the present from the past and necessitated the past’s return in the present. Modernity diverged from pre-modernity through the invention of a distinction between two historical moments, the then and the now, articulated through the mutually reinforcing human concepts of progress and loss. Knowledge of the present moment was made possible in establishing knowledge of the past, or knowledge of a past presence purportedly left behind in the present. Aspects of the past were subsumed in the present, and, as a result, remained liable to resurface through a process that Seitler theorized as *atavism.* Sullivan developed a similar schema for individual patients. Both his interviews with patients and his theory of the self grounded personified individuality in the confluence of historical, social, cultural, and biological inheritances and experiences in a patient. The sudden, irreconcilable disruption and forced reorganization of this previously stable pattern of factors
precipitated the onset of schizophrenia in a patient. Sullivan defined *schizophrenia* as “meaning literally a fragmentation of the mind,” or terror-inducing perceptions that were independent from reality and seemingly more powerful than the individual.  

A patient on Sullivan’s ward lived in a moment that was neither entirely determined by nor independent of the patient’s social milieu, their interpretation of past experiences, and their anticipated future relationships.  

When individuals or collective groups failed to successfully adapt to the social demands of the present, self-preservation required that they search for acceptable rationalizations to explain away these demands. Rationalizations were often rooted in the return of previously normalized ways of knowing, being, and living that may have spent years in relative dormancy.

Judith Butler, in *Bodies that Matter* and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, in “Queer and Now,” developed two of the concepts of queer theory – *performativity* and *gender relations* – with the support of earlier work by British philosopher J.L. Austin and American sociologist Erving Goffman. Performativity and gender relations are concepts that interrogate the normalization of language, ideas, and behaviors through individuals and across a human population.  

For Butler, a subject constituted its personified form – and, concurrently, its gender – through the iteration of norms in a ritualized production that extended from the past to the future through the present. A subject was constituted by the interaction of subjects within gender relations and, in the process, constituted those relations into which it entered. Butler noted, “Subjected to gender, but subjectivated by gender, the ‘I’ neither precedes nor follows the process of this gendering, but emerges only within and as the matrix of gender relations themselves.”

Gender relations were both determined by and determined a subject that could only be known in gender relations that were necessarily constructed through the interaction of subjects. Sedgwick picked up from Austin in explaining that *queer performativity* is a
useful tool to interrogate “certain utterances that do not merely describe, but actually perform the actions they name.” The use of language to describe or articulate necessarily positioned the subject in relation to that which was being described or articulated, or the performance of a ritualized subject-position. J.L. Austin had developed the concept of performativity in the 1960s, arguing that there exists a cadre of utterances that do not simply describe or state an action, but in fact perform an action. Utterances that perform an action demanded shared, stable, and known – i.e., normalized – circumstances and an accurate iteration of the utterance that participants sought to perform. Austin emphasized the centrality of shared institutions, beliefs, and values to performance. Erving Goffman examined the sociological implications of the performance in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1956) and performed gender roles in Gender Advertisements (1976). Louis Althusser identified a similar social phenomenon in the concept of interpellation, or the embodiment of ideologies in social and political institutions that constituted individual identity through social interactions.

Sullivan articulated a theory of interpersonal relations that is similar to that developed by Judith Butler at the end of the twentieth century. Sullivan’s theory emerged in the context of his clinical experience and the evidence that he accumulated on the widespread failure of individuals to successfully uphold the expectations around sex and sexuality demanded by American society. The realm of interpersonal relations theorized a shared social space in which any two or more human organisms – real or imagined – interacted. An individual sense of selfhood was both necessary and the result of engagement with others through interpersonal relations. Individuals established a personality, or unique sense of self, through interrelations with others. The self was only possible within a complex of interpersonal relations and served as the node through which an individual entered these relations. The process of interpersonal relations
often required the repetition of or conformity to a set of shared, underlying expectations and resonated with later theories of gender and sexuality as performative. According to Sullivan, human behaviors were normalized through tendency systems that were upheld by social, cultural, and religious institutions. Tendency systems involved a broad spectrum of ritualized factors that established positionality, maintained social stability, and created a shared basis of self formation. An individual might attempt to perform markers of the tendency system – iterating a word, an image, or a belief – as a declaration and an act of conformity. Sullivan’s theory of interpersonal relations and the tendency system that structured its emergence appeared on the surface to gesture toward the innovative reorientation of philosophical preoccupation under the banner of queer theory in the second half of the twentieth century.

Queer theorists created new words and ideas to address a rapidly changing society in the second half of the twentieth century. There is a strong argument to be made that the affinity between many of Sullivan’s novel ideas and the central concepts of later queer theory identifies Sullivan as an early example of the desire to understand individuality in a society that rendered the individual essentially queer; however, that is not my intention here. Many of Sullivan’s individual contributions to psychiatry and the social sciences appear to anticipate this sea change in American social and political thought during the second half of the twentieth century, but simply portraying Sullivan as an early prognosticator of late-twentieth century queer theory risks diminishing the historical importance of the dynamic, interdisciplinary conversations around self and society to which he contributed in his historical moment. Sullivan accumulated a vast store of potentially useful ideas and metaphors from great thinkers of the past and his present, recast these ideas in a mold of his own creation, and contributed a wholly
unique perspective of who and what an individual should be in an uncertain and ever-changing American society through the language of psychiatric medicine.

The ideas that Sullivan articulated were also decidedly a product of the conditions that shaped the society in which he lived. Writing in the 1930s and 1940s, Sullivan could not possibly have anticipated the transformative social, legal, and political changes that inspired the development of queer theory in the decades after his death, nor could he have foreseen the wealth of intellectual applications that queer theory has generated on its own behalf. Sullivan did, however, witness firsthand the psychological consequences of prejudice and recognized the potential of his contributions to continuing discussions of self and society in the postwar era. The inclusion of American intellectuals from disparate disciplines in postwar conversations reveals a vibrant process of intellectual activity that connects these epochal ideas with the philosophical preoccupations of the present moment.

American intellectuals have a tendency to articulate new ‘philosophical’ ideas through a variety of disciplinary vocabularies and methods. Utilitarian philosopher John Stuart Mill once argued that “all students of man and society who possess that first requisite for so difficult a study, a due sense of its difficulties, are aware that the besetting danger is not so much of embracing falsehood for truth, as of mistaking part of the truth for the whole.” Looking for American intellectual engagement exclusively in privileged academic spaces necessarily overlooks the individuals who forever changed the conversations occurring within the very institutions from which their voices were excluded. Intellectual production in established academic disciplines is just one part of a far larger story of ideas. Sullivan never earned a Bachelor’s degree, did not complete formal training in philosophy, and he received only limited support from mainstream academic institutions in his career. His central ideas remained largely unassembled
throughout his life, transmitted informally through psychiatry articles, hospital lectures, and ad hoc intellectual collaboration. Yet, historical evidence reveals the depth of Sullivan’s participation in conversations at the heart of the twentieth century’s most enduring intellectual preoccupation: reimagining selfhood in a radically transformed American society. I argue that including Sullivan – and other overlooked thinkers – within an intellectual history of the United States demonstrates the experimentation that foreshadowed many of the foundational postwar changes to mainstream thought and identity. Sullivan’s life and ideas highlight the wealth of thought produced in the United States in the 1930s and 40s, the influence of ideas produced in disciplines that were not expressly philosophical, and the remarkable diversity of personal backgrounds from which individuals who were excluded from white, mainstream society hypothesized changes to its underlying structure.

I. Harry Stack Sullivan’s Life and Work

This section examines the influence of Sullivan's personal background and experiences on his later work. Sullivan’s unique life circumstances and academic training in the field of psychiatry combined to shape his ideas and the methods he used to share those ideas with others. I argue that this combination of training and personal background has contributed to his current disregard in intellectual history. His engagement with controversial neo-Freudian figures and the cooptation of his cardinal ideas by a radical, violent cult of “Sullivanians” that operated in New York City from the 1950s through the mid-1980s may partially explain the relative dearth of historical literature on Sullivan. However, these professional associations and the cooptation of his legacy will not be examined in this section. Sullivan should not be held responsible for the ideas of his colleagues or the frequent misapplication of his ideas following his death.
Harry Stack Sullivan was born to a family of Irish-Catholic farmers in rural Norwich, New York in 1892. He attended Cornell University on scholarship but left prior to earning his Bachelor’s degree. He entered the Chicago College of Medicine and Surgery without an undergraduate diploma, graduating with a medical degree in psychiatry in 1917. Sullivan started his career in 1919 at St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in Washington, D.C. before moving to Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital in Towson, MD (1923-1930), serving as the institution’s research director after 1925. Sullivan left medical practice in 1930 to pursue a career as an intellectual in New York City. He founded the William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation, academic journal *Psychiatry*, and helped establish the Washington School of Psychiatry. After World War II, Sullivan worked extensively with UNESCO and helped to establish the World Federation for Mental Health. He died in Paris on January 14, 1949 after attending a meeting of the Federation.  

Sullivan participated in countless interdisciplinary conversations throughout his life that diffused his ideas well beyond psychiatry.  

The content and direction of Sullivan’s intellectual activity is indelibly marked by the trajectory of his life, beginning with his childhood in rural Chenango County, New York. Tucked away in the Susquehanna River Valley of Upstate New York, Chenango was founded in the final decades of the eighteenth century by people of traditional Puritan, New England stock and with the pride that accompanied a thriving economy in agricultural products and small crafts. The succeeding decades found Chenango consistently shut out of economic progress, missing a connection to the Erie Canal forty miles to the south and by fifty miles to the north a link to New York City with the expansion of the Erie Railroad to Binghamton. Chenango’s resulting insulation left its residents particularly vulnerable to economic depression in the waning decades of the nineteenth century – including the social, political, and personal struggles that often
accompanied economic decline. Two years after Sullivan’s birth, the Panic of 1893 and subsequent depression hit his parents especially hard. In the course of a single year, Sullivan’s father Timothy lost his job as an unskilled laborer at a hammer company in Norwich, and his mother Ella experienced a mental health crisis that rendered her incapable of continuing life with her husband and young son. Ella Stack’s proud Irish yeoman-class family had never approved of her marriage to the working-class Timothy. The family unilaterally negotiated the terms of the family’s reunification, which forced Timothy to sell their humble home in the Irish part of town and move himself and the baby to become caretaker on the Stack family farm in Smyrna. The family rarely discussed this chapter in Ella’s life openly with Harry after her return. However, the kind of mental health crisis that Ella Stack experienced was common during Sullivan’s childhood amid the economic devastation in Chenango County.

Lingering reverberations from the Economic Panic of 1901 and impending Panic of 1907, or the Knickerbocker Crisis, generated economic stagnation in rural upstate New York and flurry of depression, murder, and suicide across Chenango County. The region was propelled to national notoriety in 1906 after the tragic murder of County resident Grace Brown, an event that Theodore Dreiser later fictionalized in An American Tragedy (1925). In 1906, Grace Brown and Chester Gillette traveled by train to Big Moose, New York in the Adirondack Mountains. Brown was discovered at the bottom of the lake with several abrasions on her head. Gillette was promptly arrested on charges of murder. Following a lengthy trial that was closely reported by America’s widest reaching newspapers, Gillette was sentenced to die by electric chair. The American reading public was captivated by the appalling circumstances of Brown’s death and the dramatic human relationships at the trial’s center. For the adolescent Sullivan, this particular news story represented more than the sensationalized murder of a young
woman in America’s yellow presses. Sullivan’s early sexual attractions did not conform to the accepted norms of Chenango County and overlapped with the events preceding Brown’s murder.

Brown was born and raised on a farm near Ostelic, Chenango County; likely no more than ten miles from fourteen year-old Harry’s home on the Stack family farm in neighboring Smyrna. Brown left her poor, farming family in Ostelic to move to Courtland, New York in search of additional social and economic opportunities. She first met Gillette while working in his uncle’s skirt factory. Newspaper accounts cast Brown as the epitome of the hardworking, Christian moral simplicity of yeoman farmers and Gillette an example of the aristocratic values of American’s new upper class elites. These newspaper accounts overlooked the psychologically debilitating influence these rigid rural values exerted over Brown in the weeks preceding her murder. An autopsy following her death showed that she was several months pregnant, giving Brown few options in a county that upheld strict norms of sexual behavior. Brown was ostracized by those that she had known for her entire life, an ‘otherness’ that Chenango enforced upon any individual deemed racially, religiously, ethnically, or sexually different. Brown desperately penned, “I was down at the village Friday morning, and I would speak to people, and instead of speaking they would stare and then tell me I was too pale to be out of bed.” The residents of Chenango County lacked any tools for addressing, let alone accepting, Brown’s unique sexual circumstances. Existing social patterns essentially rendered Brown invisible in plain sight. The adolescent Sullivan, an engaged fourteen-year-old when Brown was murdered, may have started to recognize that his sexual desires placed him outside the bounds of Chenango’s social values and compounded the isolation that he experienced as a consequence of his ethnicity, religion, and economic status.
While Grace Brown’s murder is the most vivid example, sensational stories of murder and suicide from various corners of the County were standard fare in the pages of the *Norwich Sun*, the region’s most widely circulated newspaper. Traumas reported in the *Norwich Sun* and made into local lore called into question the ways in which area residents understood class, gender, sexuality, religion, and mental illness during the first decade of the twentieth century. Chenango’s prejudicial norms shaped Sullivan’s early sense of himself and his world. Sullivan reflected on his early exposure to prejudice, writing “In my own early years, by a series of irrelevant accidents, I heard things said about Jews, but I didn’t know any Jews. Because of an extremely fortunate accident of what seemed to be otherwise a very unpleasant developmental history, I did not have very much interest in these vague rumors that I’d never seen exemplified, and so I did not adopt this stereotype.” He likely also heard many things said about Irish-Catholics. Equally important, however, was the sense of loneliness and isolation that Sullivan personally felt from his earliest childhood through leaving home on a scholarship to Cornell University and across the remainder of his professional and personal life.

Eulogizing Sullivan at his funeral, psychiatrist Dr. Clara Thompson told mourners that “Harry Stack Sullivan was a lonely person from his earliest childhood.” As a young child, Sullivan befriended the livestock on his family’s farm to abate his loneliness. According to Sullivan’s biographer Helen Swick Perry, until he began attending the village school in Smyrna at the age of five his childhood contact with other people was largely “limited to relatives who were still not assimilated into the old Yankee society of Chenango County.” Only occasional visits from his Aunt Margaret relieved Sullivan’s childhood loneliness. A school teacher at PS 164 in Brooklyn, Aunt Margaret fostered Harry’s love of the written word and sparked his curiosity about the more distant world. Unfortunately, he remained the only Irish-Catholic boy in the Smyrna school system from
the day he first stepped inside a classroom until he graduated, leaving him nearly as lonely and alienated at school as on the farm.\textsuperscript{56}

The specter of loneliness accompanied Sullivan to Cornell University, where he studied on scholarship. Sullivan revisited this period in a series of unpublished writings that were assembled posthumously as \textit{Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry}. Loneliness, argued Sullivan, should be considered a “quintessential force” in life so great as to defy description. “A lonely child has a natural bent toward social isolation.” In time, it “makes people around you not so much enemies as unpredictable sources of humiliation, anxiety, and punishment with respect to what you communicate; and that naturally tends to reduce the freedom and enthusiasm of your communication.”\textsuperscript{57} Sullivan’s lonely existence, the cause and consequence of his consistent inability to properly orient his personality to his situation, profoundly influenced his disposition and affiliations in his later life. Perry, using a method like Sullivan’s own, identified a pattern in Sullivan’s efforts at belonging: “he would usually be more comfortable with those who had had the experience of not belonging – with patients, with the uneducated, with women – than with those who were the successful ones.”\textsuperscript{58} Sullivan’s self-identification with the lonely ones, inflected by his own experiences of alienation and marginalization, influenced his later theories.

The Sullivan family’s Irish-Catholic heritage placed Harry firmly on the outside of mainstream society in rural, upstate New York. Noel Ignatiev and others have demonstrated that Irish-Americans were racialized subjects in the United States during the second half of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{59} Sullivan experienced racial prejudice from his earliest childhood. The 1907 economic and social collapse in Chenango County elicited a virulent strain of nativism that was often directed toward the Sullivan family, one of only a handful of Irish-Catholic families in the region. This nativism resurfaced
with startling virulence the day after Ella Stack’s funeral in 1926 when he was 34 years old. On March 17, the Ku Klux Klan celebrated St. Patrick’s Day and the departure of the countless Irish Catholic mourners who attended Ella’s funeral by burning two, large crosses on a hill overlooking the train depot. Sullivan had already left Smyrna after the funeral and did not witness the event. However, the hill upon which the “celebration” was staged could be seen from the living room of the Stack family farmhouse that his father – the last Irish-Catholic left in Symrna – still maintained. News of this event undoubtedly reached Harry, a final affront from the town that shunned him all his life.  

Sullivan left for Cornell to study physics after graduating from Smyrna High School in 1908. Only one year into his studies in Ithaca, Sullivan experienced an onset of anxiety and corresponding schizophrenic break that his biographer attributes to peer-group bullying and his chronic failure to attain a sense of belonging among his fellow students. Little information exists on the exact circumstances of Sullivan’s departure or his treatment, though evidence suggests that he spent a period of time under the care of Thurston Packer and A. A. Brill – the first to translate Sigmund Freud into English – in the psychiatric ward of Bellevue Hospital in New York City. This mental health crisis inspired him to become a psychiatrist, and he subsequently enrolled at The Chicago College of Medicine in 1911 – a medical program for which an undergraduate degree was not required. Sullivan completed his medical degree in 1917 and arrived at the District of Columbia’s famous mental institution St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in 1919. There he came under the tutelage of William Alanson White at a moment of peak influence in White’s career. His mentor’s work at the intersection of society and psychiatric methodology established a blueprint for Sullivan’s succeeding clinical career at Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital in Towson, Maryland and formed the intellectual foundation for future elaborations in his social thought.
Sullivan achieved his greatest clinical influence during an eight-year tenure at Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital starting in 1922. He enjoyed an unprecedented degree of autonomy that he leveraged in redesigning the hospital to include a small psychiatric ward reserved for male schizophrenic patients, staffed by carefully selected male attendants, and fully equipped with recording equipment for ongoing research projects. Michael Stuart Allen demonstrated in a 2000 article published in *The Gay & Lesbian Review* that nearly all of the ward attendants were homosexual men personally selected and trained by Sullivan to work with the schizophrenic patients on the ward who themselves were nearly all gay. Allen quoted Arthur Linton, a nurse who started at Sheppard and Enoch Pratt in 1929, noting that “all of his patients were young male homosexuals. The attendants were of the same background, homosexuals who were potentially schizophrenic. The reason was therapeutic. The patients could hug, embrace, and kiss the attendants without feeling rejected, odd, embarrassed or humiliated.” The atmosphere on Sullivan’s wing at Sheppard and Enoch Pratt that Linton described was consistent with an institutional approach that Dr. Mary White described as “‘milieu therapy,’ in which the hospital administration and entire staff are utilized in the therapy of schizophrenic patients.” Sullivan recognized that the clinical environment was an extension of the patient’s social environment and that clinical treatment was part of the lived experience of patients – a factor that became part of the patient’s self-understanding. Sullivan argued in an initially unpublished tract discovered by White that the concept of the psychiatrist as a participant observer demanded that “The therapist has an inescapable involvement in all that goes on in the interview; and to the extent that he is unconscious or unwitting of his participation in the interview, to that extent he does not know what is happening.” The therapist, attendants, staff, fellow patients, and hospital design were integral to the patient’s understanding of themselves and their
society. Treating a schizophrenic patient in accordance with Sullivan’s institutional model necessitated that the hospital provide an antidote to the loneliness and eviscerated sense of self that accompanied a long period of social marginalization. The hospital provided an inclusive community that these patients failed to discover elsewhere in society.

Historian Naoko Wake, in *Private Practices: Harry Stack Sullivan, the Science of Homosexuality, and American Liberalism*, argues that Sullivan’s clinical work must be read in the context of a prevailing interwar liberalism that led scientists to treat the public and the private as separate spaces. While Sullivan created an inclusive community in the privacy of his personal life and hospital ward that did not treat homosexuality as a problem in itself, he publicly upheld a medical definition that classified homosexuality as a disease. This scientific liberalism, argues Wake, limited the potential power of his ideas in advocating for broader social and political changes around sexuality. Sullivan’s clinical philosophy focused instead on providing an inclusive environment that nurtured a patient’s understanding of themselves and their worth as human beings. Dr. Phillip Wagner, who was trained in Sullivan’s institutional model, argued in 1952 that “His position is underscored by the remarks our patients sometimes make when they refer to the gains from the analytic experience: ‘I feel as if I have found my self-esteem,’ or ‘I am better able to accept myself – and others.’” The ward at Sheppard and Enoch Pratt did not have a system of treatment because, according to Wagner’s training, “A system of therapy tends to stifle research, ingenuity, intuition. It can become therapy by imitation.” Each patient was treated distinctively and each therapist was encouraged to develop a method of interaction that best fostered the patient’s cultivation of a positive sense of self and place in the world.
For Sullivan, sexuality was an important but secondary factor in eradicating loneliness. In an unpublished note, Sullivan argued that “Therapists should avoid galloping into the enormous forest of sexual preoccupations with schizophrenics; it is so much more important that a great deal be done about the business of loneliness.” The pragmatic institutional redesign of Sheppard and Enoch Pratt enabled Sullivan to cultivate an environment attuned to the social, cultural, and sexual factors that were essential to establishing a stable sense of self in society. In providing a clinical alternative to debilitating loneliness, Sullivan designed a safe and accepting place for homosexual patients otherwise cast to the margins of American society.

Sullivan’s intellectual preoccupations extended beyond the institutional design of psychiatric hospitals to include the scientific methodology that both guided clinical intervention with patients and made possible the accumulation of observational evidence to support his ideas. The credibility of psychiatry as a scientific discipline, argued Sullivan, demanded the articulation of new knowledge rooted in evidence that held true even for different attending physicians and patients. Sullivan rejected many of the ideas articulated by Sigmund Freud and other psychoanalysts that could not be consistently reproduced in the clinical setting. Writing in Psychiatric Quarterly after addressing the Neurone Club in 1927, Sullivan argued that the “plausibility of application to facts of observation already at hand is not a scientific sanction if the hypothesis cannot be tested.” Drawing inspiration from the rigorous methodology advanced by other scientific disciplines, Sullivan attempted to render subjective human experience scientific through systemic data collection techniques. Sullivan observed numerous psychiatrists whose “data are wholly subjective or so tainted with his preconceptions as to be useless. Behind this situation, all the fundamental questions which bear on his data have been ignored or begged.” However, consistent observational methods did not imply the need
for a shared or uniform definition against which patients could be measured. Writing against the ‘averaging’ tendency in the social sciences, Sullivan argued that “it is preposterous, however, to imagine that the individual in the depths of schizophrenic processes is to be understood by a reference to an ‘average’ individual of corresponding chronologic age or the like.” Standardizing shared methods for collecting psychiatric data and rejecting uniform or averaged human experiences provided Sullivan a body of data relevant well beyond the scope of clinical psychiatry. Sullivan explained his methods in a lecture entitled “Schizophrenic Individuals as a Source of Data for Comparative Investigation of Personality” at a 1930 interdisciplinary social sciences conference devoted to the study of personality. He stated that “my attempts at collecting data on personality take the form of living with schizophrenic individuals.” Sullivan developed a systematized methodological approach that advanced psychiatry as a scientific discipline, accumulated data with broad implications outside psychiatry, and contained hints of the social theory that would emerge after his move to New York City in 1930.

In New York, Sullivan found unprecedented opportunities for intellectual and personal fulfillment. New York City stood at the center of radical intellectualism in the 1930s United States, home to many of America’s most prominent Neo-Freudian psychiatrists; Leftist social activists; revolutionary social scientists Harold Lasswell and Edward Sapir at nearby Yale University; and Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict and Franz Boas in the emerging field of cultural anthropology at Columbia University. Almost immediately after arriving in New York City, Sullivan began hosting a weekly gathering of friends and colleagues over dinner and drinks at a speakeasy. Sullivan named the gathering a meeting of the “Zodiac group” and required each of its members – among them, Karen Horney, Erich Fromm, Clara Thompson, and other guests or infrequent
attendees – to select an appropriate animal as his or her symbol. The group established a unique blend of social and theoretical conversations that shaped Sullivan’s later ideas and in turn enabled him to influence scholarship outside of his discipline. Sullivan’s biographer Helen Swick Perry noted that each member of the group maintained independence of thought while contributing to the collective whole through their particular area of expertise:

    Thompson and Horney combined their knowledge of women patients, emergent from two different societies, and each seemed to benefit, as reflected in their writings; Fromm, the only social scientist in the group, supplied important perspectives on the political situation in Germany and its meaning for the psychological state of its citizens; Billy Silverberg, who had taken over Sullivan’s ward at Sheppard for a year after Sullivan left, could compare his findings with Sullivan’s earlier experience and could act as a bridge between the European psychoanalysts and their American colleagues; Sullivan brought to the group his ability to observe scientifically and to put into some sophisticated theoretical form what they were all talking about.

Each Monday evening, Sullivan served as moderator and therapist for these conversations that drew together many, often seemingly disparate, strands of life and ideas. Sullivan placed himself and his ideas at the intersection of disciplines, perspectives, and theories; an aptitude that also led him to develop intellectual friendships with anthropologists Edward Sapir and Ruth Benedict.

Sullivan and Sapir first met in the fall of 1926, shortly after a long illness led to the death of Sapir’s first wife. Sapir, then at the University of Chicago, reached out to Sullivan after encountering an article he had written. The pair met at Sullivan’s downtown Chicago hotel room when Sullivan attended a conference in the city.
Sullivan's biographer related that during this first encounter “the two men had talked in an almost uninterrupted fashion for eight hours” before Sapir’s second wife, Jean, called to see why her husband was not yet home. “But Sapir did not return home immediately after the call; the two of them could not stop talking to each other.” That first meeting in Chicago was the start of a deep friendship between the pair that would last until Sapir’s death in 1939. Sullivan helped inspire Sapir’s increasing interest in the role of culture and personality in anthropology, while Sapir willingly shared an intellectual acumen, the credibility of formal training in an academic discipline, and a collaborative spirit that inspired Sullivan’s emerging sense of intellectual self-assurance and his arguments on the illusory character of individual personality. Perhaps most importantly, Sullivan and Sapir shared the experience of growing up at the margins of American society. These experiences led both thinkers to search for what Perry calls “the idea of the essential similarity of people, beneath the veneer of ethnicity or social class” that might serve as the basis for discovering shared human understanding.81 In November 1929, Sullivan and Sapir served together on a panel examining schizophrenic individuals as a source of data in the study of personality at the Second Colloquium on Personality Investigation. Sullivan argued that data collected through clinical treatment possessed far-reaching value, for “in this simplified situation we see manifestations of the subject matter of each of the social sciences.” Sapir was asked to elaborate on potential connections between Sullivan’s presentation and the field of anthropology, to which he noted that in both American society and the ‘primitive’ societies traditionally under the purview of anthropology “it is a question of one’s preferential pattern of expression or behavior fitting in or not fitting in so well into the socially transmitted patterns of behavior.”82 Sapir acknowledged Sullivan’s role in expanding anthropology beyond language and primitive customs. Writing only a few years before his death, Sapir noted “The conceptual
reconciliation of the life of society with the life of the individual can never come from an indulgence in metaphors. It will come from the ultimate implications of Dr. Sullivan’s ‘interpersonal relations.’” He continued, “We should also be moving forward to a realistic instead of metaphorical definition of what is meant by culture and society.” The relationship between Sullivan and Sapir provided the pair with personal fulfillment and expanded the tools available to each thinker in articulating new perspectives on the self and society.

The kinship between Sullivan and anthropologist Ruth Benedict was a story of similarity and profound difference that began with two distinctive – albeit equally lonely – childhoods in Chenango County, New York. Both were lonely, but Benedict came from a Protestant, upper-middle class background. Helen Swick Perry noted that,

For both Ruth Benedict and Harry Stack Sullivan, Chenango County, with its precise but conflicting value systems, spurred them on to find answers in the larger world: Benedict seeking value systems of other societies as a way of understanding the incoherencies in her early family and community environment; Sullivan searching for the relation between outworn value systems and the sickness that infected gifted adolescents in the delicate transition from the early environment to the larger world.

Benedict’s quest for answers in the larger world led her first to undergraduate study at Vassar College before enrolling in an anthropology PhD program at Columbia University under Franz Boas. Following the completion of her dissertation in 1923, Benedict joined the faculty at Columbia and remained associated with the university until her death in 1948. In spite of their vastly different experiences, disciplines, and career trajectories, Sullivan and Benedict’s interests overlapped again at the 1948 UNESCO conference in Poděbrady, Czechoslovakia during the final year of their lives. Sullivan arrived in
Poděbrady as a member of an international panel of social scientists interested in “the causes of tensions which make for war” and as an informal participant at a conference on “Childhood Education” at which Benedict was a featured speaker. The seminar was part of an ongoing series of discussions on the psychological development of children and education in a global society. Benedict’s lifelong interests in anthropology, education, and psychology made her a natural selection for the conference. Only a few years earlier, at a 1944 meeting of the American Psychiatric Association, anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn credited Ruth Benedict, along with Margaret Mead and Edward Sapir, with integrating the tools available in psychiatry into a program for the advancement of anthropological thought. Benedict, Mead, and Sapir cultivated an anthropological method that demanded the orientation of scholarship around the subject as a whole person, a total personality, and located the individual as an active participant in a larger, dynamic social environment. Many of Benedict’s signal contributions to anthropology as a discipline were undoubtedly influenced by the ideas and methods that she acquired in her relationship with Sullivan. And Sullivan’s theories of self and society were profoundly influenced by Benedict’s investigative approach to the cultural continuities and discontinuities that existed between childhood and adulthood. Sullivan’s admiration for Benedict led him to write her obituary for the journal he started years earlier, Psychiatry, concluding that “Ruth Benedict had come to be at home in the world.”

Perhaps just as important as the intellectual relationships that blossomed during this period, Sullivan experienced a largely stable domestic life for the very first time with his lifelong partner, James “Jimmie” Inscoe. Sullivan’s work with queer patients and experiences as a gay man shaped his intellectual activity and social thought. Sullivan’s sexuality – including his domestic partnership with Inscoe – was rarely discussed openly during his life or after his death. Perry, Sullivan’s secretary and biographer, noted that
Sullivan’s childhood friend Clarence Bellinger often referred to him as “a homosexual and a son-of-a-bitch” after a falling out between them. However, in discussing Sullivan’s sexuality, Perry only went so far as to note that friends and colleagues acknowledged that Sullivan “had some sexual experiences with women as well as with men. But there is no ready label for how he lived and thought and yearned.” 91 Seeking clarity on Sullivan’s sexuality, psychologist Michael Stuart Allen interviewed one of his former students, Dr. Benjamin Weininger, who “stated flatly that he and Sullivan had had sex--twice, in 1937 or maybe in ’39. Both encounters were after a few drinks at Sullivan’s New York home on East 64th Street, when Weininger was a psychiatrist-in-training and Sullivan was his supervisor.” Beyond connecting with several interviewees willing to share Sullivan’s experiences, Allen struggled to find more than a rogue photo or letter to friends signed by both Harry and Jimmie.92 Why the dearth of historical evidence? According to Naoko Wake, Inscoe “reported that he had burned Sullivan’s personal letters soon after Sullivan died in 1949, to protect his deceased partner’s reputation. Inscoe believed that Sullivan had ‘experienced hostility from a great many people’ throughout his life; hence he must be defended against ‘nasty rumor’ that might rise out of releasing any aspects of his personal life.” 93 For as little as we know about his personal life, Inscoe’s comments reveal a tension between Sullivan’s sexuality and the values of his society. Sullivan’s personal background and life experiences left him consistently outside of the bounds of white, mainstream American society. His place as a relative outsider led him to develop unique solutions to a continuous tension of the self in-and-out of step with society that extended from the classical liberal tradition to the pragmatist school of thought in the late nineteenth century and the sociological revolution of the first half of the twentieth century.
II. Ongoing Conversation on Self and Society

If we are to truly appreciate Sullivan’s contributions as an innovative and overlooked thinker, we must first locate his position in a common conversation on the self and society in the intellectual history of the United States. This section explores the wider context of Sullivan’s participation in this conversation. It will first consider a theory of ‘possessive individualism’ in classical liberal political thought before examining the pragmatism of William James, John Dewey, and Wilhelm Dilthey. Next, it will entertain George Herbert Mead and Charles Horton Cooley’s symbolic interactionism, and the sociology of European thinkers Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. It will then consider Talcott Parsons’ reading of Weber and Durkheim, in addition to the work of Austrian-American phenomenologist Alfred Schütz. The affinities and antipathies among these thinkers, disciplines, and epochs profoundly shaped the conversation around selfhood and society that Sullivan entered in the 1930s and 40s. This conversation both enabled and constrained Sullivan’s intellectual contributions. Sullivan advanced, challenged, and reimagined these established notions of self and society through a framework guided by his experienced marginalization and the social evidence that he accumulated in clinical observation.

The classical liberal tradition in political thought, dating back to Thomas Hobbes in 1651, was constructed through an essential category of selfhood that political theorist C.B. Macpherson articulated as a theory of “possessive individualism.” According to Macpherson, modern individualism was founded on a faith in the individual as a sole proprietor of the characteristics and attributes that created and maintained a sense of self. The individual right to absolute ownership of the self was endowed in an ahistorical condition – by God or by Nature – and could not be alienated or abridged by the state, society, or coexistent individuals. Differences in human characteristics
remained irreconcilable in the social state because they could not be evaluated independent of the individual selves in which they existed. Macpherson identified seven shared characteristics within Hobbes, Locke, and other thought critical to the United States' founding texts and ideas. Possessive individualism entailed for the self freedom from dependence on the wills of others; freedom from any and all relations except those entered voluntarily and in one's self-interest; absolute property unto one's person and capacities, and absence of debt to society for the ownership of one's person and capacities; the right to alienate one's capacity to labor; knowledge of an *a priori* construction of human society as a series of market relations; individual freedom limited only by those obligations and rules considered absolutely necessary to secure and preserve equivalent freedom for others; and a political society oriented around the protection of individual property and maintenance of orderly exchange of the fruits of one's property unto oneself. Macpherson argued that possessive individualism tenuously constructed selfhood through interdependent theories of obligation and morality, a marriage that was necessarily articulated as negative freedom.96 Traditional liberal political theory maintained that the individual self existed in a promise of preservation, or the promise of *freedom from* the changing influence – or norms – of social engagement and political dispositions. In transforming the epistemological certainty that preserved the possessive individualist self, William James, John Dewey, and the American pragmatists established a positive *freedom to* discover and reinvent the self to changing social, political, and intellectual conditions.

Shifting intellectual preoccupations in the late nineteenth century stimulated the emergence of an innovative school of philosophical pragmatism that destabilized and replaced the epistemological certainty that characterized traditional liberal political theory with a shared process of determining relative truths through consensual validation in
social spaces. William James and John Dewey participated (in their own way) in an intellectual movement that subsumed the concepts of political liberalism within new language and logic of pragmatism. William James modified liberal political theory to include the accumulation of social, cultural, and political possessions as the self. James’ empirically conceived sense of self expanded the constitutive scope of the formation of individual identity but preserved the proprietorship that one had to oneself and one’s capacities as articulated in traditional liberal political thought. James wrote, “In its widest possible sense, however, a man’s Self is the sum total of all that he CAN call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and his children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his lands and horses, and yacht and bank account. All these things give him the same emotions.” An individual continued to possess his or her body and those possessions generated in using that body to transform nature, but acquired additional ownership of psychological accumulations resulting from experiences. For James, knowledge included all that individuals perceived or experienced, such that “What these people experience is Reality.” There is nothing else. Hypotheses emerged from “the personal experience of those best qualified in our circle of knowledge to have experience, to tell us what is.” James’ logical emphasis on experience and perception provoked an epistemological revolution, transforming the stable and observable truths central to political liberalism into a malleable and ever-changing body of truths that coincided with the individual and collective experiences of human society. James argued that the only “test of probable truth is what works best in the way of leading us, what fits every part of life best and combines with the collectivity of experience’s demands, nothing being omitted.”

That epistemological transformation of political liberalism in James’ thought, argued historian Andrew Jewett, also guided the contributions of pragmatist John
Dewey. Jewett noted, “Positivists believed it was possible to determine ahead of time where empirical inquiry would produce interpretive consensus and where it could never do so because of the intrinsic nature of the subject matter. Pragmatists, on the other hand, concluded just the opposite from the past successes of the sciences: one could never presume to know in advance where consensus would or would not emerge.” Further, Jewett argued that James and Dewey “described all scientific truths as human creations – more or less reliable tools for navigating an ineffable external world.” The process of articulating truth and knowledge as the deliberate construction of human beings marked a radical epistemological departure from all preceding philosophical understanding. In acknowledging the constructed nature of current knowledge, pragmatism invented the possibility of refuting, altering, or establishing new knowledge through collective human experiences in the future. Dewey’s epistemological framework supported the assertion that knowledge was “valid only to the extent that it enabled the manipulation of reality in the interests of human beings.” Dewey’s pragmatism cast a pall of uncertainty on American political thought, coincidentally destabilizing the epistemological certainty that guided the liberal tradition and expanding opportunities for the creation of new knowledge in the future.

According to historian James Kloppenberg, the contributions of James and Dewey were not limited to expanding the scope of possible knowledge and destabilizing epistemological certainty in liberal political theory. Rather, the pragmatists – Kloppenberg also included German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey in this camp – entirely upended the prevailing faith in a dualistic construction of human life that had guided the philosophical enterprise since Descartes. “By lifting the veil imposed by dualism, Dewey, James, and Dilthey uncovered richly textured contours of experience that eluded British empiricism.” The pragmatists were relentless critics of the static nature and inherited
passivity of Lockean epistemology. The conceptualization of knowledge as inherent or found, they argued, ignored ceaseless historical change in the realm of human society, culture, and experience. The pragmatists argued that true “understanding involves recognition of the sociocultural dimensions of human experience.” The historicizing tendency of social and cultural factors in pragmatist philosophy was key to understanding the movement’s critique of Cartesian dualism embodied in liberal political thought. Kloppenberg noted, “All these thinkers contended that the historical quality of experience and knowledge placed the epistemology of theorists from Locke to Mill on very unsteady ground, and they linked the ahistorical quality of associationist psychology with the associationists’ failure to recognize the sociocultural and value-laden quality of experience.” The pragmatists identified the ways in which liberal political theory’s reliance on an ahistorical state of nature for the construction of self and society curtailed intellectuals’ ability to identity and respond to transformative changes across time and space. The logic of human experience in pragmatist thought integrated the individual, the totality of collective sociocultural forces and personal perception through a process of knowledge creation that connected the past, present, and future. James articulated the process:

The most violent revolutions in an individual’s beliefs leave most of his old order standing. Time and space, cause and effect, nature and history, and one’s own biography remain untouched. New truth is always a go-between, a smoother-over of transitions. It marries old opinion to new fact so as ever to show a minimum of jolt, a maximum of continuity. [...] To a certain degree, therefore, everything here is plastic. The pragmatists transformed the epistemological orientation of political liberalism and established a process of changing knowledge of selfhood and society over time.
Sociologists George Herbert Mead and Charles Horton Cooley continued the conversation around self and society in developing a theory of symbolic interactionism that adapted pragmatist epistemology to the behavior and interactions of individuals in human society. Mead and Cooley examined pragmatist notions of truth in the context of communication and language in the development of human behavior, social organization, and distinctive patterns of interaction. The centrality of a ‘primary group’ in Jamesian thought evolved in Cooley’s work into a theory of the intrinsically social nature of humankind. Knowledge of the self and society developed within a process of communicative action that created understanding and sympathy among and between individuals. A known, independent self emerged through the individual synthesis of disparate perspectives, or experiences, articulated as a form of communication within a process of socialization. Cooley maintained that the socialization process, including communication, was key to understanding the creation of communities and recognition of a distinctive or unique sense of self. According to Cooley, “Self and society go together, as phases of a common whole. I am aware of the social groups in which I live as immediately and authentically as I am aware of myself.” Cooley did not envision primary groups as static or culturally specific, but a universal form of social organization of indeterminate size. The socialization process existed in small, intimate primary groups that may include a nuclear family to the relatively impersonal, secondary and tertiary groups established through institutions in a liberal democratic society. For Cooley, “Primary groups are primary in the sense that they give the individual his earliest and completest experience of social unity, and also in the sense that they do not change in the same degree as more elaborate relations.” Consequently, “These groups, then, are springs of life, not only for the individual but for social institutions.” Cooley amended pragmatist epistemology to include the pervasive influence of culture and social norms in
the development of an individual sense of self. His theory on the development of social values articulated a process through which communication between individuals in a primary group established a shared understanding of normalized group behavior. Unique individuality was defined in relation to these norms in a process that was coincidentally a process of acculturation.

Mead remained largely ambivalent toward Cooley's ideas. Mead advanced the pragmatist's rejection of Cartesian duality in founding his structures of the 'self' and 'society' on a foundation of the process of symbolic interaction. The self was not simply a projection of the mind's perception onto the social environment, nor an object constituted through preexisting evidence in the material environment discerned by the mind, but a being that arose in awareness through communication and interaction in the social sphere. Mead acknowledged that “Cooley and James, it is true, endeavor to find the basis of the self in reflexive affective experiences.” However, “the theory that the nature of the self is to be found in such experiences does not account for the origin of the self, or of the self-feeling which is supposed to characterize such experiences.” Cooley and James rooted their theory of knowledge in the propensity of individuals to establish patterns within human experience without developing a theory of the individual that was necessarily present in each and every individual experience. Mead argued that a theory of pragmatism – and symbolic interactionism constructed in a pragmatist epistemology – demanded the creation of a normative theory of the self that was both objective and subjective, individual and social. The bipartite structure of selfhood that Mead developed united a subjective, individual “I” that experienced and an objective, social “me” that was narrated through past experience. Mead argued that “The ‘I’ is the response of the organism to the attitudes of the others; the ‘me’ is the organized set of attitudes of others which one himself assumes. The attitudes of others constitute the organized ‘me,’ and
then one reacts toward that as an ‘I.’” Further, “it is due to the individual’s ability to take the attitudes of these others in so far as they can be organized that he gets self-consciousness.” An individual necessarily existed as a subjective “I” that felt and experienced. Yet, this individual only achieved awareness of their subjective existence in establishing a narrated form of the self as an objective “me” that was brought into existence through the organization of social relationships into discernable patterns. Mead’s sense of self was neither exclusively objective nor subjective, but the embodiment of a very real process that endowed it with social meaning and normative value. “Meaning is thus a development of something objectively there as a relation between certain phases of the social act; it is not a physical addition to that act and it is not an ‘idea’ as traditionally conceived.” Mead and Cooley amended pragmatist epistemology to include a theory of the self in social groups and a process for discovering a sense of self and meaning in American society.

European sociologists Emile Durkheim and Max Weber articulated theories of the self and society that emphasized the powerful influence of social institutions over individuals and the centrality of ideal types in the study of modernity. In Economy and Society (1922), Weber articulated a theory of social relations organized around the institutions of custom, convention, and law. Weber defined ‘custom’ as a widely accepted, typically uniform activity that persisted as a result of repetition or tradition; ‘convention’ as a norm or custom that induced behavior entirely absent physical or psychological coercion; and ‘law’ as any coercive apparatus that enforced compliance to a given social norm. Weber considered each institution equally powerful in organizing human behavior, arguing that,

Adherence to what has as such become customary is such a strong component of all conduct and, consequently, of all social action, that legal coercion, where it
transforms a custom into a legal obligation (by invocation of the ‘usual’) often
adds practically nothing to its effectiveness, and, where it opposes custom,
frequently fails in the attempt to influence actual conduct. Convention is equally
effective, if not even more so.107

Like Weber, Durkheim defined an institution as any form of organization established in a
shared social space. Durkheim argued, “One can, indeed, without distorting the meaning
of this expression, call institutions all the beliefs and modes of conduct instituted by the
collectivity. Sociology can then be defined as the science of institutions, their genesis
and functioning.” Institutions emerged as a product of human society, but did not
necessarily depend on human will for their persistence. The persistence of an institution
– or, an idea as an institution – in accordance with its own logic transformed the
institution into a social fact. Durkheim continued,

“If, once they come into being, ideas continue to exist independently, without
being perpetually contingent upon the arrangement of neural centres, if they are
capable of reacting directly upon each other and combining according to their
own laws, then they are realities which, while maintaining a close relation with
their substratum, are to a certain extent independent of it.”108

The process of identifying social facts and institutions that act on and through individuals
was central to empirical sociological investigation in Weber and Durkheim.

Weber’s sociology depended on the concept of Ideal Types. He argued that
“Theoretical differentiation (Kasuistik) is possible in sociology only in terms of ideal or
pure types,” or as a series of “average types of an empirical statistical character,
concepts which do not require methodological discussion.” Ideal Types were not a
perfect depiction of reality, but simplifications made through empirical generalizations
and in accordance to the social facts and institutions that necessarily conditioned
individual existence. Weberian Ideal Types framed his foundational study of the influence of religious institutions on the emergence of capitalist organization in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*.¹⁰⁹ Durkheim preferred to generalize social processes through the invocation of categories of thought or ideas.¹¹⁰ Categories, for Durkheim, were stable and impersonal social facts with definite form and specific qualities that emerged as the product of social interaction. According to Durkheim, “It is because men were organized that they have been able to organize things, for in classifying these latter, they limited themselves to giving them places in the groups of which they were members.” Therefore, “the fundamental ideas of the mind, the essential categories of thought, are the product of social factors. We now see in fact, that this is the case with the very notion of ‘category’ itself.”¹¹¹ Categories were useful as analytical generalizations of reality and could in fact become real in the same manner an idea and institution became a social fact. For Weber and Durkheim, institutions conditioned human existence and established the possibility of studying the ideals and categories that coincidentally emerged from and limited social existence.

American-born sociologist Talcott Parsons and Austrian-American émigré phenomenologist Alfred Schütz entered the ongoing conversation around self and society in the twentieth century United States equipped with differing perspectives of a shared intellectual ancestry. Parsons propagated a school of sociology in the United States that he considered an offspring of the institutional – or structural – theories of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. Schütz, on the other hand, sought answers to the unresolved epistemological tensions in Weberian sociology through a phenomenological method developed in relationship to the social sciences, empiricism, and American pragmatism.¹¹² Parsons utilized an adapted form of Weberian institutional analysis to categorize experiences, culture, ideas, and relationships scientifically. In so doing,
Parsons established a theory of the self and society that condoned – if it did not outright encourage – the ordering of social norms and values. Historian John Gilkeson noted that Parsons “restricted the meaning of ‘culture’ to ‘values, ideas, and [symbols],’ while allowing the ‘social system’ (or ‘society’) to designate ‘interaction’ and ‘social action.’”

Parsons’ differentiation between culture and the social system represented a radical departure from Edward Sapir, Ruth Benedict, and anthropologists that had argued culture was part and parcel to the experience of social interactions. Andrew Jewett further noted that Parsons was a leading advocate of a perspectival approach that sought to integrate sociology with the study of culture and personality. As a result, “Parsons portrayed the normative core of a pluralistic, democratic society as an intricate hierarchy of values, differentiated toward the bottom but held together at the top by a few core commitments such as individualism and freedom.”

Parsons argued that accepted schemas of scientific inquiry, including temporal-spatial frameworks and economic theories of supply and demand, produced knowledge far beyond that conceived through the experiential lens applied by pragmatism and symbolic interactionism. Writing in *The Structure of Social Action*, Parsons argued “When scientific observation begins to transcend common sense and becomes to a degree methodologically sophisticated, there emerge explicit schemata which may be called descriptive frames of reference.”

These descriptive frames of reference were fundamental to the scientific enterprise, for “Facts cannot be described except within such a schema.” Parsons advanced a theory of self and society that acknowledged engagement with key theorists of the self but elevated sociological knowledge above the social experiences it studied and established the possibility of a hierarchical organization of society.

Alfred Schütz attempted to philosophically reconcile the dichotomous objective-subjective position in the social sciences from a phenomenological point of view. Schütz
accepted Weber’s methodological individualism, ideal types, and emphasis on social action as the primary concern of the social sciences. Scholar George Walsh summarized Schütz’s position, “A social action is, therefore, an action which is oriented toward the past, present, or future behavior of another person or persons. The specific mode of orientation is its subjective meaning.” The social relationships between individuals – past, present, and future – both limited and made possible individual action. Yet, Schütz argued that the essential characteristics of ‘understanding,’ ‘subjective meaning,’ and ‘action’ remained unresolved in Weber’s thought. According to Walsh, Schütz demonstrated that “a thoroughgoing philosophical investigation of the nature of action is essential to a coherent statement of the proper subject matter and methodology of the social sciences.”

His search for the intellectual foundations of modern sociology led Schütz to articulate theories of self and society rooted in the meaning that emerged in experience. In a 1941 article, Schütz identified “certain essential starting points as well as principal views” held in common by pragmatist philosopher William James and phenomenologists Henri Bergson and Edmund Husserl. Schütz joined James, Bergson, and Husserl in rejecting both the atomistic data of individuality that characterized liberal political thought and the Kantian concept of a transcendental ego. Schütz argued that there existed an essential unity of streaming cogitations in the personality, or “the incessant presence of two elements: an objective person – the Empirical Self or Me – known by a passing subjective Thought – the I – and recognized as continuing in time.”

Further, Schütz adapted Husserl’s hypothesis on the reflective character of psychological experience,

While just living along, we live in our experiences, and, concentrated as we are upon their objects, we do not have in view the “acts of subjective experience” themselves. In order to reveal these acts of experience as such we must modify
the naïve attitude in which we are oriented towards objects and we must turn ourselves, in a specific act of “reflection,” towards our own experiences.\textsuperscript{118} The objective and subjective qualities of the self were reconciled in the capacity of the individual to reflect on and draw knowledge from their experiences. “Here and here only, in the deepest stratum of experience that is accessible to reflection, is to be found the ultimate source of the phenomena of meaning [\textit{Sinn}] and understanding [\textit{Verstehen}].”\textsuperscript{119} Schütz articulated a theory of self and society that reintegrated the social distinctions that Parsons read in Weber and Durkheim’s sociological approach. The individual engaged experientially as both a subjective and objective self, and assigned meaning and developed understanding through the reflective act of locating the self in myriad social relationships.

Sullivan grappled with the ideas of the liberal political theorists, pragmatists James and Dewey, symbolic interactionists Mead and Cooley, sociologists Weber and Durkheim, and twentieth century sociologist Talcott Parsons and phenomenologist Alfred Schütz. His contributions to this conversation must be read as an act of writing back to these discussants, and their theories, ideas, methodologies and intentions.

Sullivan debated throughout his writings the ‘individual’ as conceived in liberal political theory. He frequently categorized this possessive form of absolute individuality as an ‘illusion’ or ‘illusory’ form of individuality in the United States. The widespread acceptance of liberal political theory, argued Sullivan, convinced Americans that they were entirely unique as individuals and were not dependent on society for the derivation of that individuality. According to Sullivan, “The most general category of these inhibitions of awareness is the overweening conviction of authentic individual selfhood which permeates all the implicit and explicit communicative efforts of nearly everyone. This amounts to a delusion of unique individuality, related to beliefs in one’s
omnipotence and omniscience, and is only a very complex and personally misleading expression of the real unique individuality.”\(^{120}\) Consequently, many Americans failed to recognize that they had constructed a sense of self on assumptions that were no longer functional.\(^{121}\) Sullivan joined the pragmatists in rejecting the duality of liberal individuality in favor of ways of knowing that were rooted in experience. Sullivan regularly cited the influence of Jamesian pragmatism on his emerging conceptions of knowledge and consensual validation in a shared social space.\(^{122}\) The concept of ‘truth’ was essentially social in character, the result of an interpersonal process. This process enabled individuals to establish knowledge and a sense of self through the identification of patterns in experiences. Sullivan’s reconciliation of the objective and subjective functions of the social self drew heavily on Mead and Cooley’s symbolic interactionism. He developed a theory of the bipartite self similar to that articulated by Mead in his theory of the subjective, individual “I” and the objective, social “me.”\(^{123}\) The similarity is not coincidental. Sullivan lectured at the Washington School of Psychiatry in 1946 and 1947, where he declared, “Under provocation of some very original thinking by Charles H. Cooley, George Herbert Mead, at the University of Chicago, developed a formula of social psychology which included the development of the self – not too far removed from what I discuss as the self-system – on the basis of reflected appraisals from others and the learning of roles which one undertook to live.”\(^{124}\) Sullivan shared with Cooley an emphasis on the pervasive influence of culture and social norms in the development of an individual sense of self and the organization of society through the primary group, or group of significant others.\(^{125}\) Knowledge was created in a shared social space that included individuals, culture, norms, and experiences.

Sullivan shared with sociologists Weber and Durkheim an interest in institutions. The normalized social patterns of behaviors and values that Sullivan argued influenced
individuals indexed a similar stable of social, political, cultural, and religious factors that Weber and Durkheim labeled institutions.\textsuperscript{126} Sullivan recognized that the process for identifying patterns in individual experience often led to generalized types, categories, and stages of human experience; however, he warned that personal insecurity may lead individuals to harden these patterns as stereotypes and prejudice. Categories in Sullivan’s thought were always of type and not of kind, the result of different experiences and not of essential qualities.\textsuperscript{127} An emphasis on the shared quality of humanity differentiated only through experience placed Sullivan’s ideas of personality far closer to those of Alfred Schütz than Talcott Parsons. Whereas Parsons viewed culture – values, ideas, and symbols – as an entity distinct from social relations, Sullivan understood the individual, culture, biology, and history as embodied in and inseparable from interpersonal relations. Sullivan refuted Parsons’ belief in the potential of science to transcend individual experience, for knowledge may only be created through the organization of experiences within a process of consensual validation.\textsuperscript{128} Schütz and Sullivan both emphasized the importance of experience as a reconciliation of the subjective and objective iterations of the self. Further, both argued that the past, present, and future connected in social relations – or social action – between and among individuals. Sullivan argued that new social patterns necessarily emerged from past patterns and were oriented toward an anticipated future.\textsuperscript{129} Competing methodological approaches in the study of personality during the twentieth century led Parsons to search for a scientific schema for objectively analyzing experience, while Sullivan and Schütz established a uniform process for understanding disparate human experiences. Sullivan’s participation in these ongoing conversations led him to develop novel conceptions of self and society that will be further explored in the next section.
III. Selfhood and Society in Harry Stack Sullivan

As we have seen, Sullivan’s personal background and life experiences placed him firmly outside white, middle-class American society as a young person. His position as an outsider shaped the circumstances of his participation in an ongoing conversation on self and society that extended from the classical liberal tradition through pragmatism and the twentieth century social sciences. Having examined his life and intellectual inheritances, we may proceed to analyze the intricacies of the innovative political thought that Sullivan articulated through the language of psychiatry and leveraged in positing foundational changes to mainstream American society in the aftermath of war.

Sullivan viewed the self as made in an endless iteration of processes within the realm of interpersonal relations, or the interrelation between any two or more human organisms – real or imagined – in a shared social space. Sullivan defined the field of psychiatry as “the study of processes that involve or go on between people [emphasis added]. The field of psychiatry is the field of interpersonal relations, under any and all circumstances in which these relations exist. It was seen that a personality can never be isolated from the complex of interpersonal relations in which the person lives and has his being.” The personality comprised a relatively stable and enduring pattern of biological, historical, cultural, and social characteristics manifest in a single organism that was formed in and could not be abstracted from the realm of interpersonal relations. In the 1931 issue of the American Journal of Psychiatry he argued that the study of the psychobiological character of the self was “a study of human persons in dynamic interrelation with other persons and with personal entities (culture, tradition, man-made institutions, laws, beliefs, fashions, etc.). To isolate its individual subject-matter, a personality, from a complex of interpersonal relations involving most meaningfully other persons physically exterior to the subject-person, is preposterously
beside the point…” Sullivan rejected the existence of unique individuality and coinciding belief that a personality could be conceived independent of the processes of interpersonal relations. Sullivan wrote in *Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry* that he intended “to stress the central fact that the true or absolute individuality of a person is always beyond scientific grasp and invariably much less significant in the person’s living than he has been taught to believe.” The only form of individuality that could be ascribed to a human organism emerged through a dynamic, transformative process of interpersonal relations that was personified in an entity named the self.

Sullivan’s self acquired personality differences through a shared process within the field of interpersonal relations. The process of establishing personality amplified human difference across history with the accumulation of different environments, inheritances, and experiences. All human individuals were united by “common motives, differentiated as to their manifestations by sole virtue of different experience.” The shared process of self-acquisition created individuals that were far more alike than otherwise. “All these individual differences are much less important than are the lack of differences, the similarities in the arts for instance, the parallels in the manifestation of human life wherever it is found.” But Sullivan’s emphasis on a universal human process of transforming the self – or manifesting life – created the possibility of an ever-widening diversity in human personality across history. Sullivan speculated that “there are probably a great many different sorts of personality not only because there have been a great variety of organism-environment complexes in which these personalities were formed, but also because there have been a variety of predetermined (hereditary, congenital, somatological) limitations as to evolutionary potentialities.” The increasing diversity of environment and experience created the possibility of discovering a unique sense of self through the unitary processes of interpersonal relations.
An individual could personify and assign volition to this sense of self through the use of labels “I” and “me.” Sullivan argued that “The personification of the self is what you are talking about when you talk about yourself as ‘I,’ and what you are often, if not invariably, referring to when you talk about ‘me’ and ‘my.’” Human organisms in Sullivan’s social and political thought conceived their sense of self in reconciling personal inheritances and experiences with perceptions informed by a series of social appraisals. The process that constituted the personality engendered historical, biological, cultural and social inheritances and experiences.

Lived and received historical experiences constituted one of the core tenets of personality in Sullivan’s social thought. Each individual formed a personality in the present by filtering new experiences through the conscious and latent manifestations of the past in closely held memories, ideas, symbols, meanings, and historically informed fantasies. Sullivan contended in *Personal Psychopathology*, an unpublished book manuscript written in 1929, that an individual’s past experiences continued to exist in the personality. He asserted, “The factor of the past experience enters into every total situation, and enters so effectively that on occasion the true character of the situation may actually be quite beyond the power of the observer to conceive.” The past not only entered into every total situation but shaped the patterns and perceptions of the present moment. “All this leads to the invention of new patterns from the old,” or the repetition of old patterns. If traumatic historical experiences prevented the patient from successfully forming a personality in the present, the psychiatrist could facilitate a “dissipating [of] the continuing parataxic influences of unresolved historically past situations through which the patient has lived.” Parataxic influences shaped interpersonal interactions through individuated and distorted relationships projected from the real or constructed past onto the present, even if the individual remained unaware of
their persistence. The psychiatrist and patient subverted individuated practice by connecting a single, historical performance to a larger chain of behaviors and ideas. The personified self acted or behaved in accord with the unique personality that it named, performing through a universal interpersonal process.

The cultural values assigned to biological characteristics – particularly hereditary, congenital, and somatological distinctions – demanded conformity and constrained the development of personality. Differences in sexuality, ability, psychology, and gender shaped an individual’s perception of the present moment and in so doing became engendered in the self. Patrick Mullahy, one of Sullivan’s most devoted students, wrote that “there is no way of separating the strictly ‘biological’ from the cultural” in Sullivan’s thought. Biological interrelations were normalized through Sullivan’s ‘tendency systems’ that established the terms of biologically typical relationships in the past and present. Social and cultural tendency systems acted through the process of interpersonal relations, allowing an individual to identify relatively stable patterns of biological characteristics subsumed in their personality.

Sullivan illustrated the influence of normalizing tendencies that acted on biological experiences in case study in the July 1925 issue of American Journal of Psychiatry. “P.J.” was consumed with “hating his father with a great hate, and already lonely and unhappy when he submits to fellatio for the first time.” Anticipating a “loss of esteem in the eyes of others,” P.J. attempted to reclaim his sense of self through a “religious sublimation.” P.J.’s failure to recover his lost sense of self “gave place to rapidly developing and very severe panic.” His biological and sexual experiences irreparably contradicted the tendency systems established through the religious and cultural institutions in his society. The only path toward personality required P.J. to discipline his biological experiences to align with the cultural expectations that were
embedded in the processes of interpersonal relations. “The underprivileged then obviously fail to live up to the rules, and are open to censure and punishment.” Sullivan continued, “The tendency systems that have been subjected to this dogmatic thwarting in our culture are numerous, but by far the most powerful of them is that manifesting in sexual behavior.” The normalizing tendencies in interpersonal relations prevented many of the patients with whom Sullivan worked as a psychiatrist from successfully maintaining a sense of self. Sullivan’s social and political thought acknowledged the influence of past and present biological distinctions in creating human variation within the universal process of personality acquisition by disciplining differences in sexuality, ability, psychology and gender.

Cultural experiences constituted another of the central aspects of personality, in addition to acting in concert with biological processes. Sullivan borrowed his definition of culture from anthropology. He noted in the unpublished Personal Psychopathology that “Culture is made up of and includes all those entities of the world which are wholly or partly products of the human mind. Material culture includes inventions, constructions, wealth, and the like. Substantive culture includes languages, mores, customs, folkways, law, religion, and other institutions and the like.” In a more succinct passage, Sullivan wrote that “By ‘cultural’ I mean what the anthropologist means – all that which is man-made, which survives as monuments to preexistent man, that is the cultural.” Cultural inheritances included all artifacts used or acknowledged in interpersonal relations that were created by human actors. Sullivan never removed cultural artifacts from the processes of interpersonal relations, recognizing that their perpetuation required human interactions. Sullivan explained that “since culture is an abstraction pertaining to people, that man requires interpersonal relationships, or interchange with others.” Sullivan applied culture as an abstract category to material and substantive artifacts produced by
humans in the past that continued to act through the processes of interpersonal relations engendered in the self.

The social experiences and inheritances engendered in the self were part and parcel to psychiatry as a discipline. Sullivan defined psychiatry as “the field of thought within which there are insights that seem destined to illuminate some age-old and many future problems of living, of the relations of man to man, perhaps even of peoples to peoples.”¹⁴⁹ The processes personified in the self did not simply exist in a “social heritage, but the interpersonal situations through which persons manifest mental health or mental disorder.”¹⁵⁰ The process of interpersonal relations was structured by social organizations. The human “personality is made manifest in interpersonal situations” that encompassed “configurations made up of two or more people, all but one of whom may be more or less completely illusory.”¹⁵¹ The process of personality forced individuals to formulate selfhood through interconnections – real, personified, or parataxic. The character of the other mattered less than the perceived relationship between the personified self and personified others. “In this connection,” wrote Sullivan, “it must be obvious to anyone, that the social milieu to which the patient has to return, has a great deal to do with his future.”¹⁵² Patterns of social relations and experiences in society were a core pillar of Sullivan’s self.

Sullivan’s theories of self and society established a universal process through which individual difference flourished across a myriad of inheritances and experiences. But what happened when an individual failed to realize a personality that conformed to the historical, biological, cultural and social demands of interpersonal relations? What was the consequence of nonconformity to normalized behaviors and ideas in American society?
This process of incessant change often created a *disjuncture* between previously stable or fixed values that were personified in the self and the changing content and direction of experiences in society. Personal disjuncture could be catalyzed by an incompatibility between an individual’s biological experiences and the bio-cultural norms that disciplined human life, as in the case of Sullivan’s psychiatric patient named P.J.\textsuperscript{153} The onset of personal disjuncture could also follow changing historical and social conditions beyond the realm of individual control, as in the case of Ella Stack following the economic collapse of 1894.\textsuperscript{154} Collective disjuncture could follow the destabilization of collective identity through the introduction of new conditions, as experienced by the traditional Yankee-stock residents in Chenango County when frequent economic depressions undermined assumed association between hard work and the accumulation of wealth.\textsuperscript{155} The disjuncture highlighted in each of these instances coincided with the onset of individual or collective *anxiety*, or the undirected fear that accompanied an incompatibility between the personified self and changing social environment.\textsuperscript{156} Affective anxiety prevented the individual from differentiating between the self and the environment, precluding the recognition of a source or means of alleviation.\textsuperscript{157} An individual could adapt to the changing environment through sublimation, or the “substitution, for a behavior pattern which encounters anxiety or collides with the self-system, of a socially more acceptable activity pattern which satisfies part of the motivational system that caused trouble.”\textsuperscript{156} Put differently, the onset of anxiety could lead to the adoption of coping mechanisms that preserved the self by curtailing the process of making the self.

Individuals often adopted *selective inattention, patterned rationalizations*, or *prejudices* to cope with anxiety following disjuncture. Sullivan considered these to be a “self-deceptive pattern,” or “a way of eliminating awareness of the motive called out by
the event, and thus of diminishing the tendency to become informed as to ‘what is going on’ in the situation.”

Selective inattention was a strategy “in which one ignores things that do matter; since one has found no way of being secure about them, one excludes them from awareness as long as possible.”

While rationalizations often helped individuals discover patterns in their lived experiences, the use of rationalizations in the face of anxiety caused individuals to deal with “other people with a wonderful blend of magic, illusions, and incoherent irrelevancy.” The rationalization coping tendency was “a special aspect of the delusion of unique individuality which is necessitated by the peculiar limitations of conceptual ‘me’ and ‘you’ as a governor of one’s perceptions, a reference frame that determines the accessibility of one’s experience to awareness.”

The patterned rationalizations that an individual developed to cope with anxiety became particularly dangerous as a system of personal or collective prejudices. Sullivan noted that “instead [of] a series of rationalizations; that is, plausible statements,” an individual could cope with affective anxiety by “appealing to prejudices (unwarranted beliefs), held by many persons known to the speaker, without particular regard to probability but only to interpersonal expediency, to the end that the observer shall defer to the ‘explanations’ and thus withdraw the challenge to the other’s self-esteem.”

Prejudices deployed in coping with anxiety often caused the atavistic return of previously accepted beliefs about the world that only remained tenable – if ever they were – in so far as these ideas remained divorced from the “real” self.

The passage of time never fully eradicated prejudicial ideas, but rather subordinated them within the material of new ideas and in so doing, preserved the potential for these ideas to reappear after a period of dormancy. A prejudice once accepted as a basis for the self always held the potential to reappear as an explanation for the self at a later moment in American history, particularly if that idea could be
isolated from the changing currents in the interpersonal process. Virulent prejudices, even those that were “eradicated” in the past, would resurface to justify hatred and exclusion in each succeeding moment of personal and collective affective uncertainty in the United States.

The persistence and prevalence of prejudice in American society was a consequence of the vast store of accumulated exclusionary rationalizations deeply embedded in the personal and collective histories of its people. The religious, racial, cultural, and biological distinctions that organized and normalized society remained part of the genealogy of American ideas and held the potential to shape selfhood in the present. Sullivan recognized that “The roots of any hatred of a collectivity are to be sought in influences as widespread as are its manifestations.” Eradicating prejudice against Jews or Catholics might be impossible since “the personal origins of these particular hostile dynamisms are not intimately related to the influence of economic, political, or socio-geographic factors. In hatred of Jews or Catholics, the origin is much too early.”

It was insufficient to refute the explanations that individuals gave for holding prejudices, because these reasons masked the far deeper roots of passionately felt hatreds. Prejudices remained “complex entities that are relatively uncommunicable, quite beyond consensual validation, and therefore unsuited to rationalize the basis of any collaborative interpersonal action.”

Sullivan argued that the most effective way to penetrate and weaken prejudice was to reduce a single prejudiced act to a set of historically reoccurring ideas, doctrines, or faiths. Prejudices were often iterated patterns of (previously) acceptable social ideas or behavior for which there was no origin, only copies and examples. These ideas and behaviors referenced past patterns of hatred that could be rationalized, but were disconnected from any concrete social factors. Sullivan argued that anti-Semitic ideas
and behaviors in the United States cited the unrecognized patterns of behavior that young Christian children learned in Sunday schools across the country. The recognition of this performance of past social and political norms freed the individual to intervene in the behaviors and ideas that constituted the formation of personality in the interpersonal realm. Recognizing an act of prejudice as the repetition of historical norms made it possible for a therapist – or other committed individual – to undermine the prejudice-conforming personality. Hatred stemmed from the significance assigned to particular behaviors in the process of interpersonal relations and in reference to social norms. Sullivan wrote, “Hatred is an attitude of a person involved in interpersonal relations. Unpersonalized objects and abstractions are not hated. Collectivities of people are hated only in so far as they are embodied in concrete personalizations or personifications.” Sullivan hoped to undermine prejudice, destabilize the distorted patterns of historical performance that were reenacted in the present, and empower the subjectivity of individuals cast to the margins of US society.

Writing in collaboration with prominent African American sociologist E. Franklin Frazier, Sullivan argued that “The tragedy of the Negro in America seems to be chiefly a matter of culturally determined attitudes in the whites, by the manifestations of which the Negro is generally distorted into a pattern of interracial behavior which permits the continuance of the attitudes without much change.” Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal made a similar argument four years later in *An American Dilemma*, a book that challenged ‘separate but equal’ racial policies in the United States and sold 100,000 copies. The resonant prejudices deeply established in white Americans’ sense of self continued to structure relations with black Americans in the present. The persistence that Sullivan observed in the distorted, prejudicial attitude of whites toward blacks was the consequence of social atavism, with previously held discredited “social truths”
returning to protect a tenuously constructed white sense of self in a changing society. Racist ideas functioned through social interactions within political and social institutions to preserve the value assigned to white identity in the United States. Sullivan’s theories of the self historicized prejudices as atavistic beliefs subsumed in an intellectual genealogy. Beliefs about human difference were part of an ever-changing process of interpersonal relations that was personified in the self and could only be made stable by insulating ideas and behaviors from the social and personal reality of American life. Sullivan’s life outside of mainstream society and privileged academic spaces precipitated his participation in an ongoing conversation on the concept of selfhood and incited his desire to discover a new form of humanism that embraced a greater diversity of human beings and experiences.

IV. The Search for a Social and Political Theory of Humanism

“It is profoundly disturbing,” wrote Sullivan in 1942 on the possible creation of a global community after war, “that no moving conviction of the universal worth and dignity of man exists.” Intellectuals from disparate disciplines and from around the globe joined in common cause after World War II to restore a lost sense of collective human worth and dignity. Postwar intellectuals injected new energy in an interdisciplinary conversation around the self and society. These conversations were often hailed as a new discourse on humanism or human rights, but in reality represented an important sea change in the long history of the Western world’s most frequently reoccurring intellectual preoccupation. The inclusion of thinkers from a wider range of personal backgrounds and academic disciplines under the banner of humanism expanded the conversation and coincided with the invention of radically innovative methods of addressing the prescient need to establish a new, shared foundation of individuality in a moment of grave uncertainty. Harry Stack Sullivan exemplifies the commitment of innovative political
theorists writing at the margins of white, mainstream society to incite foundational changes to the ideas and identities that defined the postwar milieu. Sullivan, once a poor, gay, Irish-Catholic who became a psychiatrist after failing to earn his bachelor's degree, experienced first-hand the prejudice and racism that this new, global discourse on humanism intended to overcome. From his earliest childhood memories in upstate New York through the final days of his professional career in a discipline that still categorized homosexuality as a medical disease, Sullivan remained committed to leveraging his own experiences to advance the cause of humanism and the unity of human beings around the globe.175

The ongoing conversation to which Sullivan contributed extended from liberal political theory through the postwar era. Sullivan entered this conversation equipped with a broad set of interdisciplinary tools, a trove of data accumulated through clinical observation, and personal experiences on the edges of American society. Sullivan’s unique positionality enabled his novel hypotheses that diverged in important ways from previous knowledge of the self and society. Given the influence of his background and life experiences on his understanding of the self, it is reasonable to argue that Sullivan is an important forbearer of queer individuality. It is entirely valid to argue that Sullivan’s experiences writing as a gay man in a discipline that still classified homosexuality as a diagnosable medical condition led him to develop a methodology that anticipates the hallmarks of queer theory at the end of the twentieth century. However, that is not the argument that I intend to make in this piece.

I argue that Mark Greif aptly identified the unfortunate tendency of intellectual historians to ignore the 1940s as an interim period or extension of the decades that precede and succeed it; yet, I join Angus Burgin in arguing that Greif’s sole reliance on literature as the medium of intellectual production ignores those individuals at the
margins of American social and academic life who developed novel theories of
humanism articulated through the language of political theory. These intellectuals
grappled with features of American life that were largely ignored by established
academics in the 1930s and 40s and, in the process, established new methods and
subjects that were eventually incorporated in the very institutions from which they were
barred. Sullivan exemplifies the commitment that these intellectuals shared to
challenging existing ideas in imagining foundational changes to American society in the
interwar and postwar eras.

Sullivan’s theories established a dynamic process of ‘interpersonal relations’
through which the individual located the self within a shared social space. The process
of becoming oneself changed constantly and established the preconditions that made
future change possible. Engaging with others through interpersonal relations brought
together historical, biological, cultural, and social experiences of the past and present in
an individual. Sullivan’s theory united human beings – whom he considered to have
more in common than not – through a process of becoming and made possible a
boundless diversity of human characteristics. Human diversity became a product of
history, the inevitable consequence of individual and collective differences. Yet, the
process of arriving at a unique sense of self was fundamentally the same for all people
and peoples. Sullivan made human diversity an integral part of humanist social and
political theory. Human diversity allowed individuals to recognize all that was held in
common and appreciate the different experiences that made possible a faith in their
uniqueness as individuals.

Sullivan’s self-identification as one of the twentieth century’s ‘lonely ones’ is key
to understanding his unique contributions. He was socially isolated from his earliest days
on the farm in upstate New York. Loneliness characterized his studies at Cornell, clinical
associations, intellectual relationships, and even his legacy after death; with his longtime
partner Jimmy Inscoe burning his personal effects to protect him from further prejudice.
Sullivan hoped that his ideas would alleviate human loneliness – his patient’s, his
colleague’s, and his own. He created a theory of socially informed selfhood that included
a way for those who did not feel at home in society to create new communities for
themselves and others like them. Sullivan anticipated a postwar era that saw more
and more Americans question how they knew who they really were and who frequently
reported that their lives were lonely.

David Riesman and the midcentury social scientists saw the rise of suburbia as a
source of widespread loneliness and uncertainty. In 1950, Riesman wrote in *The Lonely
Crowd* that “What is more, it is no longer clear which way is up even if one wants to rise,
for with the growth of the new middle class the older, hierarchical patterns disintegrate,
and it is not easy to compare ranks among the several sets of hierarchies that do
exist.” The middle-class was frustrated with their recently discovered inability to
control the social norms with which they were expected to conform. For Sullivan and
countless intellectuals at the margins of American life, this control could not be lost,
because it had never existed in the first place.

Sullivan remains a largely overlooked intellectual who contributed insightful
answers to questions of who we are and how we relate to one another in an ever-
changing world. Yet, Sullivan is just one example. Intellectual history matters because
ideas matter. Ideas help us to develop a sense of who we are as individuals, locate our
place in and potential contribution to our society, establish a sense of collective purpose,
and provide reassurance in an unpredictable world. Intellectual histories that look
exclusively to the thought produced in academically privileged spaces will always
commit the error that John Stuart Mill once described as “mistaking part of the truth for
How can Sullivan challenge us to write more inclusive histories of thinkers and their thoughts? What new knowledge might be produced by expanding the breadth and depth of achievements included in American intellectual history? What new things will the process of discovering intellectual continuities and discontinuities in previously overlooked spaces teach us about ourselves and our past? I hope that additional scholarship will continue to pose these questions and countless others in the years ahead.

Note: Riesman assumed that these accepted social norms were synonymous with those held by white, middle-class, and Protestant American families living in the postwar suburbs. David Riesman, Nathan Glazer, and Reuel Denney, The Lonely Crowd: A Study in the Changing American Character (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1950); David Riesman and Nathan Glazer, Faces in the Crowd: Individual Studies in Character and Politics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1952).


14 Sullivan posited an intimate connection between behavior and its categorization/rationalization, i.e. “The phenomena of rationalization are the principal ingredients of most explanations of one’s behavior; the extreme ease with which a commendatory principle is found for any action is the outstanding handicap to self-understanding.”: Harry Stack Sullivan, *Personal Psychopathology: Early Formulations*, ed. Helen Swick Perry (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), 6.


35 See: Richard Pells, *Radical Visions and American Dreams: Culture and Social Thought in the Depression Years* (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 131-132. Pells writes, Sidney “Hook was also a founding father of what Norman Podhoretz later called the ‘family’ of young Jewish intellectuals just beginning their careers as the depression dawned. […] Included in this group were Philip Rahv, Meyer Shapiro, Lionel Trilling, Harold Rosenberg, Clement Greenberg, and Lionel Abel. As immigrants themselves or the children of immigrants, as products of the New York ghetto who rarely felt at home in America.” Pells continued, “Often unable to find jobs in universities because they were Jews (though Hook taught philosophy at NYU, more severely victimized by the depression than their predecessors because they had no reputations or contacts on which to fall back, they awaited the revolution at least in part as an answer to their personal and professional anxieties.” See, also: Christopher Phelps, *Young Sidney Hook: Marxist and Pragmatist* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 23, 132. Phelps notes, “City College was an intellectual hothouse, featuring a quality education for poor students, lack of ‘school spirit’ in the conformist sense, and an openness to Jewish students unmatched elsewhere in higher education in a decade of rising xenophobia and anti-Semitism.” Further, “In 1936 Lionel Trilling, a familiar acquaintance of Hook’s, was told by Jacques Barzun that he would not be happy at Columbia as a Jew, a Marxist and a Freudian.”


41 Helen Swick Perry, 69, 8, 44, 42, 14, 24.

Ibid., 165, 177, 183.

64 Helen Swick Perry, 190, 284.

65 Ibid., 190-200.


70 Mary White, 144.


78 Helen Swick Perry, 344.

79 There is no evidence that Sullivan’s Zodiac group is a reference to New York’s Zodiac gentleman’s club, a twelve-member gathering that included JP Morgan and many of the city’s most powerful political and financial residents. The Morgan Library & Museum, Library Ceiling, accessed at: http://www.themorgan.org/about/architectural-history/6.

80 Helen Swick Perry, 354-355.

81 Helen Swick Perry, 242-243, 247-248.

82 Proceedings, Second Colloquium on Personality Investigation (held under the Joint Auspices of the American Psychiatric Association, Committee on Relations of Psychiatry and the Social Sciences, and of the Social Science Research Council, New York City, November 29-30, 1929) in Schizophrenia as a Human Process, 224-225, 227.


84 Helen Swick Perry, 56-57.

85 Ibid., 66.


Ibid., 313, 334.

Michael Allen, “The Island of Dr. Sullivan,” 16.


C.B. Macpherson, 263-264.


Andrew Jewett, Science, Democracy, and the American University: From the Civil War to the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 84, 89, 90, 95.

James Kloppenberg, 48, 51-53.

William James, Pragmatism, 80.


Hans-Joachim Schubert, 52.


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community: Harry Stack Sullivan, 241. For examples of primary group, see Sullivan's theory of significant others and the significant personal psychopathology 42, 193.125

Helen Swick Perry, 236 concepts developed by James, Dewey, and Peirce in working with psychiatrist Adolf Meyer. See: Sullivan's biographer, Helen Swick Perry, noted that he likely first encountered the words and concepts developed by James, Dewey, and Peirce in working with psychiatrist Adolf Meyer. See: Helen Swick Perry, 236-237.


113 John Gilkeson, 259-260.

114 Andrew Jewett, 288.


116 Parsons adopted Durkheim’s definition of “institutions as those social arrangements regulating human action primarily by force of moral commitment.” Furthermore, Parsons “added Freud to Durkheim and Weber as his touchstones and borrowed a ‘structural-functional’ definition of analysis from anthropology. He also acknowledge a distinctly ‘American’ element of his social theory, a debt to the Chicago school of W. I. Thomas and George Herbert Mead.” (146) See: Brick, Transcending Capitalism, 121-151.


122 Harry Stack Sullivan, Fusion of Psychiatry and Social Science, 55; Harry Stack Sullivan, Personal Psychopathology, 330; Harry Stack Sullivan, Schizophrenia as a Human Process, 211. Sullivan’s biographer, Helen Swick Perry, noted that he likely first encountered the words and concepts developed by James, Dewey, and Peirce in working with psychiatrist Adolf Meyer. See: Helen Swick Perry, 236-237.


142 Ibid., 93. Please note: an identical passage that predates the one included in *Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry* may be found in: Harry Stack Sullivan, “A Note on the Implications of Psychiatry, the Study of Interpersonal Relations, for Investigations in the Social Sciences,” *American Journal of Sociology* 42, no. 6: 848–861 in *The Fusion of Psychiatry and Social Science*, 23.


This thesis, 47.

This thesis, 12.

This thesis, 14, 25.


Ibid., 193.


Ibid., 193.

Ibid., 76.

Ibid., 80-82.


David Riesman, Nathan Glazer, and Reuel Denney, The Lonely Crowd: A Study in the Changing American Character, 47.