2008

You're in the Army now: The Students' Army Training Corps at selected Virginia universities in 1918

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https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.25774/w4-8wzj-pq02

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YOU'RE IN THE ARMY NOW:
The Students' Army Training Corps
At Selected Virginia Universities in 1918

A Dissertation
Presented to
The Faculty of the School of Education
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

by
Michael J. Faughnan
May 2008
YOU'RE IN THE ARMY NOW:
THE STUDENTS’ ARMY TRAINING CORPS
AT SELECTED VIRGINIA UNIVERSITIES IN 1918

By
Michael J. Faughnan

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To Alynne: my wife and friend of twenty-two years upon whom I depend.

To my children, William, Daniel, Abigail, and Rachel: I did the work, but you made the real sacrifices.

To my parents: You gave me the vision of possibilities through hard work. I could not have asked for better parents.
Preface

This study began during a discussion in which my committee chair and advisor asked if I had heard of the Students' Army Training Corps (SATC). As a former Reserve Officer Training Corps cadet, former active duty Army officer, and a current Army civilian working at the Training and Doctrine Command, I am certain that the expected response was, “Of course.” Far from it, I had never heard of the SATC nor did I have any idea that the Army had worked so closely with universities during World War I.

In fact, I assumed, as many due I suppose, that the current relationship between the federal government and universities evolved in a measured pattern. Had I given it much thought or attempted to express those thoughts, I would probably had drawn something akin to a relatively simple straight line graph depicting increasing contact from an easily defined start point past today and into the future. Peaks and valleys would certainly exist, but the central tendency would be easily discernible.

What I found was that the relationship between the federal government and universities had a very murky past during which both sides stumbled in their efforts to determine what the appropriate relationship should be. The SATC evolved from the needs of both sides during the early stages of American participation in World War I. As such, it became one of the earliest examples of federal–academic cooperation.

Several works concerning twentieth century higher education have addressed the SATC. None to my knowledge have attempted a detailed examination of how the SATC worked and why it could be determined a success or a failure. From the question of what the SATC was, the focus of this study evolved over time into a case study of the SATC.
experience at two universities: the College of William and Mary and the University of Virginia.

Lengthy visits to the archives at the College of William and Mary and the University of Virginia yielded a wealth of information concerning the functioning of the SATC at those two schools. Documents from the National Archives provided depth and filled in many gaps concerning the program, particularly from the perspective of the War Department staff responsible for developing training across the Army. Additional archival visits at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech), the Virginia Military Institute, Washington and Lee University, and Hampden-Sydney University provided additional background material supporting the study. Unfortunately, these schools did not maintain a significant amount of material concerning the SATC.

The Virginia Military Institute and Virginia Tech both have lengthy files on the SATC. However, these institutions have histories that differ from the other schools in the state. Virginia Military Institute was founded as a military academy with the idea of replicating life at the United States Military Academy at West Point. Virginia Tech is Virginia’s Land Grant institution, which required it to provide military training from its inception. As a result, in 1918 both schools had lengthy experience providing military training and dealing with the War Department and the Army. Consequently, the archives at both schools contain files of information important to the school, generally directives from the War Department. The back and forth between the military and civilian authorities is not in the files – most likely because it never existed.

One of the best sources of information concerning the College of William and Mary is the student newspaper the Flat Hat. The local newspaper publisher printed the
paper for the college. Unfortunately, the publisher was out of business for the brief period during which the SATC existed. Consequently, what might have been a vibrant record of student life during the time was lost.

As I analyzed the thousands of pages of material obtained from the various archives patterns began to emerge. At first nebulous, over time these patterns began to coalesce around the several personalities involved with the program. At both universities, the principal players were the presidents and the senior Army officers. The relationship established at each university emerges as the reader follows the train of communications both internal and external to the university through the duration of the summer and fall of 1918.

The SATC emerged as a good idea in the summer of 1918, activated in the fall, and was a memory by winter. As such, the SATC is but a very brief hiccup in the complex history of the relationship between the federal government and universities. It does, however, represent two things in my view. First, it represents an initial foray into the relationship on both sides. Second, it represents an extreme. Never again has the federal government attempted to take over universities and never again have universities come close to allowing it to do so.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ix
List of Tables x
List of Figures xi
Abstract xii

Introduction 2

Chapter 1: The Call to Arms 5
Factors Affecting the University Response 5
Constitutional Provisions Concerning Education 10
The Relationship between American citizens and the Army 13
Colonial Heritage 12
Continued Mistrust 16
Neutrality or war — the election of 1916 19
The Plattsburg Movement -- The Loyal (and Vocal) Opposition 22
From Neutrality to War – Wilson’s Mind Changes 24
Universities in American Society 29
Higher Education in Virginia 34
The College of William and Mary 35
University of Virginia 37
Universities answer the call to service 39

Chapter 2: Loss of Students and Faculty to the War Effort 48
Enrollment declines 49
The Right Level of Participation 54
Efforts to Influence the Government 59
Accommodations for departing students 62
Accommodations for Departing Faculty 63

Chapter 3: Universities Seek to Become Part of the War Effort 71
The Universities Seek a Mission 75
The College of William and Mary Supports the War Effort 81
The University of Virginia Supports the War Effort 83
Student Interest Develops 83
Miscellaneous Requests for Support 89

Chapter 4: Negotiation for a Campus Presence 97
The Negotiation Begins 100
The Negotiation Continues-National Army Training Detachments 104
The Negotiation Continues – the Students’ Army Training Corps 111
Implementation – the Students’ Army Training Corps Begins 115

Chapter 5: The Reality- the Students’ Army Training Corps Activates: Fall 1918 125
Equipping the SATC 126
Acknowledgements

I owe a debt of gratitude to the staffs of the archives and/or special collections at the College of William and Mary, the University of Virginia, Virginia Military Institute, Virginia Tech, Washington and Lee University, Hampden-Sydney University and the National Archives in College Park, Maryland. The willingness of the staffs at each of these organizations to support a novice researcher prone to foolish questions and research missteps was truly instrumental to the success of this project.

My greatest debt is to Dot Finnegan, my committee chair and advisor. Over the years of my doctoral program, she has served as mentor and friend. To Dot goes my thanks for her guidance, support, and willingness to devote time to my project on my schedule rather than her own.
List of Tables

Table 1: Enrollment Decreases at Selected Virginia Universities 1916-1919 40
Table 2: Student Departures from the University of Virginia 52
Table 3: University of Virginia SATC Enrollment October 1, 1918 66
Table 4: College of William and Mary Enrollment October 16, 1918 67
Table 5: Technically Trained Men Required in January 1918 105
Table 6: William and Mary Drill Schedule October 23, 1918 138
Table 7: Influenza Prevention Guidance from the University of Virginia Surgeon 150
Table 8: Virginia SATC Deaths 151
List of Figures

Figure 1: President Woodrow Wilson 47
Figure 2: Secretary of War Newton D. Baker 47
Figure 3: New York Times ad October 18, 1918 83
Figure 4: Dr. Edwin A. Alderman 163
Figure 5: Lieutenant Colonel James A. Cole 163
Figure 6: University of Virginia Rotunda 214
Figure 7: Formation of SATC Soldier on the Lawn at the University of Virginia 214
Figure 8: Victory Celebration in Charlottesville, Virginia Nov 1918 215
Figure 9: Victory Celebration in Charlottesville, Virginia Nov 1918 215
Figure 10: Victory Celebration in Charlottesville, Virginia Nov 1918 216
Figure 11: University of Virginia SATC Junior Officers 216
Figure 12: Dr. Lyon G. Tyler 218
Figure 13: First Lieutenant Dana B. Van Dusen 218
Figure 14: William and Mary Campus circa 1918 260
Figure 15: SATC Formation at the College of William and Mary 260
Figure 16: Kitchen at the College of William and Mary 260
Figure 17: Post Exchange at the College of William and Mary 261
Figure 18: YMCA Activity Room and the College of William and Mary 261
Figure 19: SATC Depiction of Lieutenant Van Dusen as the “Little Rooster” 262
Figure 20: Depiction of Victory Celebration in Williamsburg 262
Figure 21: Cartoon of The Army Capturing the Kaiser 262
Figure 22: Soldier Cartoon Depicting Life in the SATC – Cleaning 263
Figure 23: Soldier Cartoon Depicting Life in the SATC – Kitchen Police 264
YOU'RE IN THE ARMY NOW: THE STUDENTS' ARMY TRAINING CORPS AT SELECTED VIRGINIA UNIVERSITIES IN 1918

ABSTRACT

Following the American Declaration of War on April 6, 1917 an increasing number of college-age men were forgoing their studies and faculty resigned their positions in favor of enlisting for military service or accepting a government appointment. This drain of men reduced the available student and teaching populations creating potentially dire fiscal situation on college campuses.

The War Department sought a means of efficiently accepting men into military service and determining which soldiers were best suited for duty as officers. In the summer of 1918, the War Department announced the formation of Students’ Army Training Corps. Under this program, the students would enlist in the Army with an initial assignment on a college campus. Depending upon their age, students could expect to stay on campus for up to forty-eight weeks. During this period, they would receive pay and training as Army privates. The design of their academic program would enhance their military skills and capabilities. The best would attend an officers’ training camp.

The SATC officially organized on October 1, 1918 at 516 universities around the United States. The universities effectively ceded control of their operations, their curriculum, and their academic life to the Army. For the next three months, these campuses were armed, guarded military camps. With the coming of the Armistice on November 11, 1918, the SATC faded into history as quickly as it had arisen.

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xii
YOU’RE IN THE ARMY NOW:

THE STUDENTS’ ARMY TRAINING CORPS

AT SELECTED VIRGINIA UNIVERSITIES IN 1918
Introduction

As the United States entered the World War I in April 1917, it had done precious little to prepare for war. The entire nation mobilized and quickly moved to put the country on a war footing, but changes of such magnitude cannot be occur immediately. Some elements of society had more difficulty addressing and supporting war needs than did others.

In the summer of 1918, the War Department proposed a program designed to utilize the assets of the institutions of higher education within the United States for two purposes. First, the Students’ Army Training Corps (SATC) was created to provide basic military training to the young men of the United States while simultaneously assessing the leadership potential of each young man. Second, the SATC intended to provide collegiate level instruction in subjects with military utility to the young men. The Army was fairly successful in accomplishing the first objective. It was much less successful in accomplishing the second.

Living in the early 21st century Americans are used to a large measure of governmental intervention in daily life. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the number and types of federal intervention in daily life increased beyond anything that anticipated the day before. We lament this intrusion in our daily lives as newscasts remind us that the impositions have not always been the case. However, the amount of federal involvement in American life has been, in fact, a consistent point of political debate throughout the history of the United States.

Jefferson's concern about over stepping his authority in agreeing to the Louisiana Purchase is well documented. Lincoln's efforts to raise an Army without
specific Congressional authority and the suspension of habeas corpus are equally well known. Despite the occasional instances of intrusion, such as these, Americans prided themselves on their independence and freedom of action. Historically, Americans debated the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798\(^1\) and the Espionage Act of 1917\(^2\) in much the same manner we currently debate the Patriot Act of 2002.

It was not until the Great Depression presented its severe, widespread economic hardships that voters chose a leader who intended to increase significantly the involvement of the federal government in daily life. Americans elected Franklin D. Roosevelt in the hope that he would lead the nation back to prosperity. Roosevelt began an immediate program designed to stimulate the economy and relieve the effects of the Great Depression. The New Deal and the relative merits of individual programs and policies need not be discussed here, except to point out that much of what we now take for granted in daily life is a direct result of the programs Roosevelt established in the 1930s. For example, New Deal legislation created social security and the Tennessee Valley Authority. Both programs continue in the twenty-first century life of the United States.

The world of 1918 was vastly different. Americans were new players on the world stage and viewed the actions of foreign governments with measures of disdain and trepidation. Nonetheless, America entered the world stage in the late nineteenth century by defeating Spain in war and claiming the remnants of the Spanish colonial empire. The American role in international affairs continued to expand over next twenty years. By the end of World War I exposure to the wider world had altered the fabric of much that was viewed as American.
At home, perhaps no group had a greater struggle finding a niche than institutions of higher education. The relationship between American education and the federal government has always been unique. The lack of any mention of education within the Constitution resulted in a system of state, local, and private control of education. The federal government, at the time, did not have a mechanism by which it could influence education. During World War I, this began to change with the introduction of widespread federal financing of higher and secondary education. The Students' Army Training Corps was one of the first, if not the first, widespread program used by the federal government to control education.

Virginia colleges were among the many to respond to the government's call for support. The War Department selected thirteen Virginia collegiate institutions for inclusion in the SATC. As in the rest of the country, the desire to assist in the nation's war effort spanned the gamut of institutions; seven private colleges, five public colleges, and one historically black college enlisted in the program. This study analyzes the implementation and impact of the SATC the College of William and Mary and the University of Virginia.

1 Coakley, *Federal Forces in Domestic Disorders.*
3 Kolbe (1919). The Virginia Colleges and Universities included in the SATC were: College of William and Mary; Emory and Henry College; Hampden-Sydney College; Medical College of Virginia; Randolph-Macon College; Richmond College; Roanoke College; University of Virginia; Virginia A&M Polytechnic Institute; Virginia Christian College; Virginia Military Institute; Virginia Union University; and Washington and Lee College.
Chapter 1
The Call to Arms

In simultaneous ceremonies held on October 1, 1918 at colleges and universities across the country, more than 100,000 men enlisted in the United States Army as members of the Students’ Army Training Corps (SATC). In the process, nearly all colleges and universities in the United States with more than one hundred able-bodied male students ceded control of the institution to the federal government in the guise of the War Department. Active duty army officers, many recently assigned to duty at the colleges, read a message from President Woodrow Wilson at the induction assemblies of the Students’ Army Training Corps:

The step you have taken is a most significant one. By it you have ceased to be merely individuals, each seeking to perfect himself to win his own place in the world and have become comrades in the common cause of making the world a better place to live in. You have joined yourselves with the entire manhood of the country and pledged, as did your forefathers, your lives, your fortunes and your sacred honor to the freedom of humanity.

The enterprise upon which you have embarked is a hazardous and difficult one. This is not a war of words; this is not a scholastic struggle. It is a war of ideals, yet fought with all the devices of science and with the power of machines. To succeed you must not only be inspired by the ideals for which this country stands, but you must also be masters of the technique with which the battle is fought. You must not only be thrilled with the zeal for the common welfare, but you must also be masters of the weapons of today.

There can be no doubt of the issue. The spirit that is revealed and the manner in which America has responded to the call is indomitable. I have no doubt that you too will use your utmost strength to maintain that spirit and to carry it forward to the final victory that will certainly be ours.

Signed/ Woodrow Wilson

Factors Affecting the University Response

Across the United States, more than five hundred colleges and universities volunteered more than simple membership in a government program; they volunteered their present and their future. Why would any university allow the federal government to
restructure the curriculum, reorient student activities, relieve administrators of responsibilities, demand particular instruction from individual professors, and place armed guards at campus and building entry points? That the United States arrived at the point at which colleges around the country gave up control of their students, faculty, curriculum, and facilities to the federal government is only understandable through the context of the times.

The development of the SATC resulted from the confluence of several separate yet simultaneous patterns of development within American society. Societal structure, educational tradition, attitude toward the army, and political evolution mixed with increased international commitments converged in support of total war against Germany. Individually none of these patterns was sufficient to unite the efforts of the federal government and the colleges. Combined, these developments acted symbiotically to create a government-collegiate partnership, never before and never again experienced.

First, the United States possessed a unique societal structure. Belonging to a 138-year old nation at the outbreak of World War I, Americans did not possess the historical baggage associated with European societies. European societies presented staid, anachronistic structures lingering from the feudal history of the Middle Ages. The United States, with vast empty spaces, was a transient society in which the unhappy and dispossessed simply left their disenchantment behind and moved farther west. With only two international borders, wide oceanic barriers, and no hemispheric competitors the United States did not have the history of international distrust and deceit that drove Europeans to shifting alliances and regular warfare between 1650 and 1914.
Second, Americans had an historical appreciation for education that had found root in widely disparate communities as settlement extended across the continent. Though American higher education had a long history, with the first college, Harvard, founded nearly three hundred years before, many colleges only began operations following the Civil War. By 1870, Americans had established 563 colleges, though according to Rudolph, only 250 of those colleges survived to remained in operation into the twentieth century. Previous failures did not dampen the educational aspirations of Americans however. Between 1870 and 1917, the founding of additional institutions increased the number of colleges to 934.

These colleges were not static institutions; they developed and changed as the people and communities around them matured. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, college curricula were in flux as many schools sought opportunities to have a wider impact upon their communities. In one element of this change, colleges began to expand by establishing graduate and professional schools rather than send advanced students to Europe to study. Founded in 1876, The Johns Hopkins University provided the first European-style graduate study in the United States.

As a result of their growing self awareness and the need to standardize operations, college administrations and faculty began forming cooperative and professional organizations. For example, administrators founded the Association of American Universities in 1900, and professors founded the American Association of UniversityProfessors in 1915. Few organizations of this type had existed for more than a decade by 1917, and none could provide effective leadership during a time of major crisis.
Third, though a nation created through warfare, Americans distrusted their army. Americans preferred to maintain an ineffectual standing force in favor of reliance upon state-controlled militias.\textsuperscript{13} Provided the right to bear arms by the Second Amendment to the Constitution, Americans time and again chose to build a regular force when needed and to disband it when the immediate military requirement passed. The nation paid a heavy price each time it went to war as a result of these policies.\textsuperscript{14}

Finally, the election of Woodrow Wilson to the Presidency in 1912 came at the height of the Progressive Era in American politics and completed his rapid rise to power. Wilson became president of Princeton College in 1902. Running as a reform-minded candidate, he won election as governor of New Jersey in 1910. Two years later, he ran against split Republican opposition with President Taft running as the party candidate and Theodore Roosevelt seeking a third term as the candidate of the Bull Moose Party. Wilson won overwhelming Electoral College support though garnering only 42 percent of the popular vote.\textsuperscript{15} When elected, Wilson, two years removed from a college presidency, had only two years of experience in state government. Yet, with his election, American foreign policy entered a new era. Wilson abhorred the strongman rhetoric of the Roosevelt Republicans, preferring a diplomatic style based upon a liberal humanist, intellectual approach. This diplomatic style changed American diplomacy for the remainder of the twentieth century,\textsuperscript{16} but it had dramatic, unfortunate consequences during World War I.\textsuperscript{17}

Despite the close election in 1912, the nation was stable. Universities were finding their place in society and the federal government was in the hands of an academic. But in August 1914, another war began in Europe, and in 1917 it expanded to include the United States. By the fall of 1918, many colleges were in dire financial straits as a result of losing
students and faculty who enlisted in the military, joined volunteer ambulance corps, or
became government civilians to support the war effort.\textsuperscript{18} The drain of talent began with
the outbreak of war and increased as the war dragged on. As shall be seen, the interplay of
these various developments positioned American colleges and created the temperament on
them to support the nation during time of crisis.

However strong the temperament to support the war effort was, many universities
required drastic measures to avoid facing the stark prospect of closing their doors for the
duration of the war, if not permanently. Alexander Meiklejohn, President of Amherst
College, was not an ardent supporter of the military though he was a supporter of the war
against Germany. Meiklejohn summarized the potential impact of the war on his
institution, suggesting that if young men were willing to sacrifice their lives to defeat
Germany, he was willing to sacrifice his college and see it closed.\textsuperscript{19}

The War Department created the SATC to support its efforts to man an army and
defeat Germany. On university campuses, the SATC had the beneficial effect of providing
the students required for colleges to remain open and a steady stream of students for them
to teach. This came, however, with a cost. The arrangement presented by the War
Department in the form of the SATC was new and highly unusual. Government-university
partnerships were not the norm, and never had colleges and the federal government
entered into such a deep and interdependent relationship.

That the United States and its universities arrived at the point of SATC
development was the result the interplay between its societal structure, educational
tradition, attitude toward the army, and political evolution. Three contexts for reviewing
this decision are constitutional provisions concerning education, national attitudes about
the military along with the historical causes for the development of these attitudes, and the
readiness of universities to participate in the national debate concerning the war.

Several constituent stakeholders possessed significant interest in ensuring the
success of any program. Constituencies included the American people, the American
government, universities as a corporate body as well as individual groups of students,
professors, and administrators, and the United States Army. Each constituency, based on
its historical background and future expectations, had an agenda and reasons for
supporting the development of the SATC. To understand fully why universities ceded
control of their operations to the War Department in 1918 one must understand the
elements of these historical relationships and the context as it stood at the time.

Constitutional Provisions Concerning Education

Simply stated, the Constitution contains no provision for federal authority over
education. Why the authors of the U.S. Constitution, themselves for the most part a highly
educated group of men, did not concern themselves with the education of the country’s
citizens is curious. The Constitution specifies a series of powers to the three branches of
the federal government and provides a series of checks and balances to prevent any one
branch from gaining permanent domination. The document at some points is incredibly
detailed. At others it is somewhat vague. At no point is the process for educating
Americans mentioned.

Several delegates to the Constitutional Convention refused to sign the document
because they believed it failed to protect adequately the rights of individual citizens.
George Mason, of Virginia, and Elbridge Gerry, of Massachusetts, were among the most
prominent delegates who chose not to sign. These delegates fought for and eventually
won the addition of ten amendments to the Constitution. This Bill of Rights specifically and famously protected individual freedoms, such as speech and worship. The Tenth Amendment limits the powers of the federal government to those enumerated within the body of the basic document. Since the Constitution does not mention education, it falls to the individual states as a responsibility under the Tenth Amendment, which states, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”

The consequence of the Tenth Amendment is that the United States has no authority to centralize an educational program. Each state is responsible for establishing and maintaining an educational program as it deems appropriate. Massachusetts passed the first mandatory attendance law in 1852. At the beginning of the twentieth century, approximately 50 percent of white children and 30 percent of black children attended school. By 1918 each of the states required elementary school education as a minimum. Virginia passed its compulsory attendance law in 1908; Mississippi was the last of the original forty-eight states to pass such a law. Between 1910 and 1920 the number of teenagers enrolled in high school rose from 14 percent to 31 percent, reflecting the expansion of both primary and secondary education.

Hundreds of thousands of local school boards controlled public education in the United States. Though access to education was expanding at the beginning of the twentieth century the system of local control resulted in widespread variation of requirements and results. Each local board provided governance and developed the curriculum it deemed appropriate for its students. Needless to say, few tools were available to the federal government to impact such a widely dispersed system.
Academic dispersion of the 934 colleges in existence in 1917 was equally widespread, representing a variety of governing organizations. Public universities received at least partial funding from their respective states. The Morrill Act of 1862, the first federal funding program for higher education, required designated universities in participating states to provide military and mechanical arts training. The Morrill Act will be discussed in greater detail later. Private universities ranged from large, well-established schools like Harvard and Yale to smaller, less secure institutions. Many private schools received support from a religious organization.

Following the passage of the Morrill Act, the Army placed a few officers in land-grant colleges to conduct military training. Until the federal government provided additional funds through various acts toward the turn of the century, these military trainers represented the extent of the relationship between the federal government and the universities. Research institutions were forming, but had as yet no significant relationship with the federal government and had yet to achieve a significant standing within American society.

Viewed from the perspective of the twenty-first century, some form of partnership between the colleges and the government seems reasonable and expected, perhaps even necessary. In 1918, the military-industrial complex, large research universities, and federal funding of scientific and social research lay thirty years and another war in the future. The development of the SATC represented a profound change, the initial wave of the paradigm shift to come.
The Relationship between American citizens and the Army

Americans, from before the name represented a nation, have had an uneasy and often paradoxically complex relationship with the notion of a standing army. According to Perrett, this puzzling relationship nearly qualifies as a tradition. Americans are both fascinated and repelled by the military. The fascination is often tempered by contempt for those who pursue a military career. Brooks summarized the confused relationship America has with its armed services as follows.

Our attitudes seem bipolar: we’re either at the military’s throat or we’re at its feet. Sometimes the military is regarded as a bizarre, primeval institution dangerously at odds with enlightened American culture. Then, at the flick of a cultural switch, the same people who were watching “Dr. Strangelove” are lining up to see “Top Gun”... Suddenly the military is a bastion of the higher virtues—selflessness, duty and honor. Suddenly military service is practically a requirement for political office.

The Army has navigated this shifting relationship with its parent society throughout its existence. Its leaders, frequently tone-deaf to the current feelings of society, often fail to see the shift until it is too late. They bask in the adulation of the “Top Gun” periods and wonder what happened when they become as Slim Pickens riding a nuclear bomb at the end of “Dr. Strangelove.” The foundation for this attitude rests in the very roots of the American mindset, passed down generation to generation throughout American history.

Colonial Heritage

Prior to 1763, few regular soldiers of any nationality landed on the North American continent. Sporadically, soldiers disembarked from the occasional ship, but European nations did not station large units in the New World until North America became a battleground in the continuing conflict between France and England. The British
sent several thousand regular soldiers to counter French incursions from Canada into the claimed but sparsely inhabited American West. French settlers were not numerous in the interior, but trappers, traders, and missionaries fomented trouble with Indians in an effort to slow British settlement of the Northwest Territories (current Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan, and Minnesota).  

To support their troops and to recoup the expense incurred protecting the colonies from French incursion, the British attempted to institute several forms of taxation. The American colonists rejected the legitimacy of all of these taxes since they had no voice in the governmental decision making process. Finally, this conflict over taxation and representation escalated into full-scale rebellion and open war. In 1776, the colonist issued a Declaration of Independence in which they detailed grievances against the British government and declared themselves free of its rule.

The Declaration of Independence not only voiced American beliefs about King George's use of the British Army to support his policies, but it set the political tone for future generations. "He has kept among us, in time of peace, standing armies, without the consent of our legislatures. He has affected to render the military independent of, and superior to, the civil power." Elbridge Gerry, expressed the prevailing sentiment stating, "standing armies in time of peace are inconsistent with the principles of republican Governments, dangerous to the liberties of a free people, and generally converted into destructive engines for establishing despotism." Later experiences during the Revolution like the British occupation of Boston, New York, and other American cities reinforced the notion that an army was a threat to liberty.
In declaring their independence, colonial Americans based their knowledge of a standing army upon their experience with British forces during the twelve years between the end of the Seven Years War (French and Indian War) in 1763 and the beginning of the American Revolution in 1775. With so little experience upon which to base an opinion, Americans equated standing armies with support of the despotism they attributed to King George III. After the Revolution, as Gerry suggested, Americans feared the use of an army to restrict the liberties of citizens and took pains to reduce such likelihood as they formed a new government.

Although Americans were suspicious of all armed services, subjecting them to a certain amount of mistrust based upon their experience with the British, they considered the Army the most likely service to restrict individual liberties. This concern resulted in a constitutional provision for a two-year limit on the duration of appropriations for the Army. Fortunately, the nation, protected oceans and having limited competition from its continental neighbors, could afford the luxury of not having a large standing army. There was little fear of the Navy abusing its position; American political leaders perceived its naval forces as a requirement to protect American trade rights throughout the world.

The twin notions that standing armies are useful only in war time and that the military should be subject and responsive to civil authorities rather than the tools of a king were new concepts and found unique implementation in America. Article II of the Constitution names the President of the United States as the Commander-in-Chief of the military forces of the country, placing the military under the orders of elected officials. The Second Amendment to the Constitution protects the rights of the individual states to
create a militia force by guaranteeing the right to bear arms, further reducing the risk of abuse a large, centrally-controlled Army posed.\textsuperscript{37}

Continued Mistrust

As a further means of reducing the threat posed by a standing army, the First Congress severely restricted its size.\textsuperscript{38} Throughout its history, Congress expanded the Army through the activation of militia and drafts of civilians during times of crisis and retracted its size, scope, and responsibility when the crisis passed. Between conflicts, rather than utilize what little Army it did maintain toward military ends, the federal government used the Regular Army as a construction crew supporting the developing nation’s need for roads, dams, and other infrastructure requirements.\textsuperscript{39} Nearly every major city between the Appalachian Mountains and the Pacific Ocean had its start as a fort or other military post.\textsuperscript{40}

The continual fluctuation in size and the regular use for non-military purposes created a military establishment ill-suited for all but the most basic defensive responsibilities. This resulted in a series of catastrophic military defeats as each generation of Americans repeated the mistakes of previous generations and relearned the lessons of the past.\textsuperscript{41} The first example of ineffective militia response occurred when the Army defended the Northwest Territories against Indian attack in the 1790s. After the militia-dominated forces suffered major defeats in three major battles, General “Mad Anthony” Wayne was given command of the American Legion, a short-lived force based loosely on the ancient Roman formation.\textsuperscript{42} After a period of harsh training, the Wayne-led Legion defeated an Indian force in the Battle of Fallen Timbers to secure the Northwest from both further major Indian attack and possible British incursion from Canada.
Following Revolutionary War precedent, the federal government disbanded this successful army immediately and returned the Army returned to its quiescent state.

By the turn of the twentieth century, the Army had gained little stature in the eyes of the American public. In 1903, Joseph Dana Miller, writing in the liberal journal, Arena, reacted to the American defeat of Spain and the conquest of Cuba, found little virtue in the military or with those choosing military service as a career. Using the hyperbolic style popularized during the Spanish War by many newspapers, most notably those owned by William Randolph Hearst, he observed:

To be true to conscience is the Supremest manly virtue. Such virtue is impossible in the soldier. It is this that makes militarism so dangerous to a republic. For the qualities that make a good soldier are the antithesis of those that make a good citizen. Soldiers are the Acephala among the human species—belonging to an order having no head. How strangely perverted is the soldier’s ideal of duty, which prevents him from throwing up his commission when ordered to fight in a cause that he knows to be unrighteous! But this is precisely because the soldier’s ideal of courage is a low one; because he can conceive of no finer heroism than the passive kind—that merely animal sort, of which, as has been said, even the rodent has his share.

While an extreme view, Miller represents one side of the bipolar views of the armed services mentioned by Brooks. Whether his own view or representative of the views of many, his comparison of officers to Acephala and rodents indicates how very low the stature of the military was in the eyes of some portion of the American populace. Particularly striking is his contention that a good soldier is the antithesis of a good citizen. Less strident but no less damning was the view of liberal government as evidenced by the Wilson Administration, which held that men, because they are rational beings, should be capable of resolving conflict peacefully and that the professional soldier is a warmonger fitted for little else.
Yet, the opposite pole did exist. Twenty-two of the twenty-eight men who had served as the president of the country also served in the military as regular soldiers or as members of a state militia. Only Abraham Lincoln, briefly, and James Buchanan served as enlisted men. Nearly one-third (nine) served as generals: Washington (American Revolution), Jackson (War of 1812), Taylor (Mexican War), Johnson, Grant, Hayes, Garfield, Arthur, and Harrison (Civil War). Several, like Theodore Roosevelt were not generals but became high-profile officers and were elevated to the Presidency by virtue of the fame resulting from their wartime service. World War I is the only American War fought prior to 1950 that did not result in the election of a general or colonel to the Presidency.\(^{47}\)

By 1917, with previous conflicts well in the past, sentiments such as those expressed by Miller following the Spanish War again gained support. Partly as a result of such attitudes and partly due to lack of need to understand, naiveté concerning military matters extended throughout American society and into the highest reaches of the government. Having no prior experience in such matters, President Wilson was unable to see any relationship between foreign and military policy.\(^{48}\) Such was the lack of understanding of the military within the political leadership of the country, that Wilson ordered the relief from duty of all officers assigned to the General Staff who were engaged in planning for war against Germany. One account has Wilson turning “white with passion” upon reading a newspaper article describing war planning activities.\(^{49}\) Informed by Acting Secretary of War Henry Breckinridge of the president’s action, the Assistant Chief of Staff of the Army, Major General Tasker H. Bliss, was able to forestall
the firing with an explanation of the purpose and use of the General Staff. Breckinridge directed that such activities remain hidden from the President in the future.\textsuperscript{50}

Though forestalled, the order to fire the officers indicated the limited understanding within the Wilson Administration of military structure and operations. Certainly hiding this function from the President did nothing to alleviate this lack of understanding and teach administration officials skills they needed to operate effectively in the tense international environment. Wilson, though an historian, did not understand the historic command relationships and command experiences of his predecessors. And what he presumed to be correct was usually wrong.\textsuperscript{51} Within two years, this lack of understanding would adversely affect American preparation for war, and perhaps more importantly, would limit the ability of the Wilson Administration to appreciate, understand, and engage diplomatically with those countries already in conflict.\textsuperscript{52}

\textit{Neutrality or war — the election of 1916}

Entering the twentieth century, the United States was a new and large, though not yet dominant, player on the world stage. Unnoticed by contemporary actors, the world economic structure was changing. The three-hundred year-old Eurocentric world economic system was breaking down and the world economy was moving toward domination by two powers emerging on different continents: the United States and Russia.\textsuperscript{53}

No longer confined to the eastern seaboard, the United States spanned the North America continent, possessed a transcontinental transportation system and communications network, led the world in manufacturing, and, controlled non-continental territorial possessions ranging from Cuba to the Philippine Islands. Its vast resources,
rapidly growing manufacturing capability, and resulting power coupled with the unstable international system in Europe served to catapult America into the affairs of the world, a situation filled with nuance of which neither Americans nor Europeans were cognizant.  

Historically, American foreign policy served two basic tenets: to fulfill the nation’s manifest destiny of expansion to a continent-wide nation and to follow George Washington’s guidance to remain free from foreign conflicts. With possession of territories distant from its continental base and with economic interests spanning the globe, remaining free from foreign entanglements was considerably more difficult in 1916 than it had been at Washington’s retirement to Mount Vernon in 1796. Still, one can hear Washington’s advice clearly in Wilson’s Declaration of Neutrality, delivered on August 19, 1914. He said,

The effect of the war upon the United States will depend upon what American citizens say and do. … I venture, therefore … to speak a solemn word of warning to you against … taking sides. The United States must be neutral in fact, as well as in name, during these days that are to try men’s souls. We must be impartial in thought, as well as action, must put a curb upon our sentiments, as well as upon every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party to the struggle before another.  

Wilson was clearly trying to serve a higher purpose in maintaining American neutrality. In fact, the Doctrine of Democratic Universalism or the belief that the duty and divine mission of the United States was to spread democracy as far as the doctrine can reach marked Wilson’s foreign policy. This doctrine was rooted in liberal ideology toward international affairs. The tenets of the doctrine included a general indifference toward international affairs, the use of United States domestic-style solutions in the international arena, and a search for objectivity. Caused by these sentiments and
compounding their impact is the view that "American idealism has tended to make every war a crusade, fought... on behalf of universal principles..."\textsuperscript{59}

Americans had long possessed a messianic world view. Historical claims of manifest destiny served this sense through the mid-nineteenth century conquest of much of North America. The notion of America as an international messiah grew with the election of Woodrow Wilson to the Presidency in 1912. In attempting to deal with European leaders as a neutral party, Wilson proclaimed "principles which, while representing the truisms of American thought... marked a revolutionary departure for Old World diplomats."\textsuperscript{60} Basing his views of foreign policy on moral principles, Wilson believed that peace was dependent upon the spread of democracy, since no democratic state had ever attacked another democracy.\textsuperscript{61}

As Europe slipped toward and into protracted war in 1914, Wilson felt America should use its influence as a mediator, a disinterested party to the conflict unselfishly working toward a peaceful solution for all. Wilson failed to understand that the United States did not have the standing in the eyes of the European powers to provide such a service. He was also unable to see that the European powers, by nature of the men, the blood, and the money already committed to the conflict could not accept anything less than victory.\textsuperscript{62} As the war continued unabated, the 1916 American presidential election served as a referendum on Wilson's neutralist policies. Debate raged throughout the country concerning the American role on the world stage and potential involvement in the European conflict.\textsuperscript{63}

Wilson did not suggest that America withdraw from world affairs and assume an isolationist stance as some counseled; rather, he sought to spread the American form of
government to the warring nations. Wilson’s foreign policy contained four essential points. First, America’s mission in the world reached beyond mere diplomacy. America served as a beacon of liberty for all. Second, citizens of democracies are peace-loving and, therefore, their foreign policies are superior to those professed by leaders of non-democratic regimes. Third, a nation’s foreign policy should contain the same ethical standards demanded of individuals. Fourth, nations have no right to claim a different set of moral standards for themselves than they allow for other nations or their citizens. These points indicate Wilson’s hubris; he assumed that the warring nations would listen to the dictates of the American President, which of course they were not willing to do. Wilson “was one of those rare men who believed almost to the point of mental illness in his own righteousness.” Because of his certainty in the righteousness of his position, Wilson was unwilling to listen to criticism or accept the possibility that those disagreeing with him might, in some measure, be right.

*The Plattsburg Movement -- The Loyal (and Vocal) Opposition*

A loud and vocal opposition to the neutrality espoused by the President developed following the outbreak of hostilities and grew as the European conflict dragged on. This group felt that the United States needed to prepare for war. Proponents of preparedness saw threats to the United States in the European conflict and advocated measures to protect the nation’s growing interests around the globe. Retired Major General Leonard Wood, who served as Chief of Staff of the U. S. Army from 1910 to 1914, led the preparedness efforts. Former Secretaries of War Elihu Root and Henry L. Stimson campaigned in support of the movement as well.
One of the principal preparedness measures was the creation of training camps to teach military skills to civilians. The camps focused on preparing America for war through the training of young men during summer breaks from school or during their vacation if businessmen. The preparedness movement became known as the “Plattsburg Movement” taking its name from the first camp, held in Plattsburg, NY. The Plattsburg camp opened under the direction of Wood while he was serving as Army Chief of Staff.

To the chagrin of President Wilson, Wood continued to travel the country in vocal support of preparedness following his retirement. In a speech given on June 15, 1915, Wood explained the military goals of the movement.

We do not want war, but we must not forget that there is many a peace which is infinitely worse than war.... We ... do not want a large standing army.... We do need ... an adequate army. By this I mean an army sufficient for the peace needs of the nation which means the garrisoning of the Philippines, Panama, Hawaii, Alaska, and Puerto Rico together with such force ... sufficient for an expeditionary force....

Rather than publicly debate Wood, President Wilson preferred to ignore him hoping thereby to minimize his importance as an opposition leader. Wilson indicated his intent in a conversation in August 1916 related by Professor William F. Dodd, then a Professor of History at the University of Chicago and a future Ambassador to Germany.

General Wood has tried from the beginning of this administration to make me make a martyr of him. He constantly disobeys orders and shows every disposition to make trouble, but I am not going to play into his hands.... we think the best way is to let him hang himself—not give him opportunity to pose before the general public as a hero badly treated....

Throughout the country, preparedness became a dividing issue of the day and a major topic in the national debate as the election of 1916 approached. Educators lined up on both sides of the Plattsburg Movement. Leading supporters and opponents of the Plattsburg Movement included college presidents from around the country, politicians,
businessmen, and military officers. The debate concerning preparedness continued unabated through the presidential elections of 1916 until the nation finally declared war in April 1917.  

**From Neutrality to War – Wilson’s Mind Changes**

Wilson ran for re-election in 1916 on a liberal platform emphasizing peace and maintenance of American neutrality. The slogan repeated by many of his supporters—"He kept us out of the war!"—succinctly summarizes the prevailing national mood concerning the conflict. The Plattsburg Movement, led by former Army Chief of Staff, Leonard Wood, continued to demand that the government prepare for war militarily and operated camps to provide military training to college students and to business men. Wood accurately predicted the requirement for a trained force: "We cannot depend upon volunteers in future wars ... [because] the onrush of a modern war is so sudden and all our antagonists ... are to thoroughly prepare that there will be no time to train volunteers, and certainly no time to train officers." However, no national effort prepared the country for participation in the war.

America required preparation. During World War I, the world realized the full impact of the Industrial Revolution upon warfare for the first time. The European quest for colonial acquisition fueled technological advancement and led to arms races on land and sea during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These advances led to the development of weaponry for which no army was ready. Machine guns, poisoned gas, and armored vehicles all had a major impact on the fighting.

Initially, the machine gun, resulting in stagnant trench warfare, affected war fighting the most. The ability to fire rapidly and accurately at a target 500 meters away
provided a capability unanticipated by military doctrinal thinkers. Improvements in transportation, communications, and aviation resulted in the need for specialists capable of operating, maintaining, and repairing the new equipment found on the battlefield.\textsuperscript{74} As the war progressed and the armies searched for ways to break out of trench warfare, armored vehicles and chemical munitions emerged as new battlefield weapons. These changes in warfare were worrisome to the military professional, but the political leadership of the United States did not recognize them.

Wilson campaigned during the 1916 election on a neutrality-based platform, avoiding any plan to prepare the country for war. Yet, within two years the mood of the President and the country had not only changed, it reversed course. Lyon G. Tyler, President of the College of William and Mary wrote his opinion of Wilson’s turnabout to Senator Martin of Virginia:

Wilson has undoubtedly shown the greatest possible facility in changing his position on public questions. This may be a mark of greatness, but he did not consider [it] that way in his treatment as a historian of the actions of his predecessors in office. In writing of them he maintained the adage “that consistency is a jewel.”\textsuperscript{75}

Largely due to the sinking of the Lusitania, in May 1915, and the renewal of unrestricted submarine warfare by the German navy,\textsuperscript{76} the United States began to prepare for war. Misguided and unsophisticated American statesmanship, British diplomatic skill, German actions due to fear of isolation through British control of the seas stirred war fever and acted in concert to force the United States into the war.\textsuperscript{77} Additionally, American journalists presenting a pro-British version of events contributed to the belief that Germany was solely responsible for the outbreak and continuation of the war.\textsuperscript{78} The Plattsburg Movement had not carried the day by winning public opinion and gaining
dominance in the national debate but preparedness eventually won out, as the United States was drawn closer and closer to the war.

The success in convincing the American public of German fault is more surprising when one considers that the single largest ethnic group in the United States was German-American, and it maintained a strong, active German-language press.\textsuperscript{79} Despite this, Britain enjoyed several advantages over the Germany in gaining American public support. First, despite the cultural capital of German-Americans and an active German language press, English was the national language of the United States and the primary base of the nation's culture. The bond between the nations had a potent historical basis. Second, the American and British press corps had a traditionally strong, professional relationship. Third, average Americans were used to getting news through British sources rather than German sources.\textsuperscript{80} Wilson did not use these international bonds nor did he use national interests as justification for America's entry into the war. On April 2, 1917 in his message to the 65\textsuperscript{th} Congress requesting a declaration of war, Wilson proclaimed:

\begin{quote}
Vessels of every kind, whatever their flag ... have been ruthlessly sent to the bottom without warning and without thought of help or mercy for those on board.... I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the Government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it, and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defense but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war.\textsuperscript{81}
\end{quote}

Surprisingly, he asked the nation to assume the status of a belligerent having taken no steps to prepare it for such a course. Wilson, perhaps in recognition of the nation's ill-preparedness stated, "It isn't an army we must shape and train for war, it is a nation."\textsuperscript{82} With the passage of the Espionage Act in February 1917 and its modification shortly after
the Declaration of War, Wilson gained a tool with which he could begin to shape America to his vision. Under the Act, the Postmaster could refuse to deliver any periodical he felt unpatriotic or critical of the administration. The Postal Service delivered few foreign-language publications not enthusiastically supporting the war effort. The Espionage Act of 1917 provided for twenty-year sentences to those who were to “utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the government of the United States.”

As the nation moved to a war footing with the passage of the National Defense Act of 1916, the Army was composed of approximately 200,000 men, including activated militia. The regular army comprised approximately two-thirds of the force and the militia comprised one-third was militia. A cadre of 5,791 officers led the Regular Army at the declaration of war in 1917. Wilson called for an increase of 500,000 men, far more than the current officer corps could manage. Instead, the Army configuration reflected the need to defend the Mexican border with the Punitive Expedition to control Pancho Villa’s raiders and to meet the requirements of defeating the continuing insurgency in the Philippines.

When the United States acquired the Philippine Islands following the Spanish War, it inherited fighting an insurgency dedicated to the overthrow of nonnative government. Despite American aversion to large standing armies, the United States government responded to the requirement to control the Philippine Islands, acquired as a territorial possession following the Spanish War. To meet this demand, the Army grew in size during the first decade of the twentieth century. Military growth, however, was limited to meet only the immediate requirements at hand.
Congress passed the National Defense Act of 1916. Principally written by members of the National Guard Association as a means of protecting, if not improving, its status in response to the needs in the Southwest and the continuing war in Europe, the Act raised the peacetime strength of the Army, without militia, to 175,000 over a five-year period.\textsuperscript{87} The Act met crisis situations, using an expansible army approach initially proposed by John C. Calhoun in 1822, by increasing the authorized strength to 286,000.\textsuperscript{88} It revised the status of the National Guard, formalizing its relationship to the federal government and the individual states. The Act also created the Army Reserve, essentially a federal militia, the Reserve Officer Corps, and allowed the creation of Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) detachments on college campuses. The college-based training organizations in place as a result of the Morrill Act served as a model for the ROTC detachments.\textsuperscript{89}

American entry into World War I, in the spring of 1917, presented the Army with the requirement to increase rapidly its prewar force of approximately 175,000 to several millions, generating innumerable problems. Initially, finding the men to fill out the ranks to reach 175,000 was comparatively easy. President Wilson met some of this need by calling most National Guard troops to federal service immediately after passage of the National Defense Act.\textsuperscript{90} The War Department met the remaining manpower requirement through drafting men and recruiting volunteers.

The more difficult problems were integrating the reserve troops into the army, organizing newly-enlisted soldiers, and training the rapidly expanding force. These tasks placed a tremendous strain on the Regular Army. Expanding to several times its size in a matter of months required equipment, military bases, and leaders that did not exist. These
needed resources had yet to make even the planning stages. Estimates suggested that 200,000 officers would be required in the larger Army, yet at the declaration of war only 5,791 officers were serving on active duty.  

A standing army remained anathema to the American psyche—even in the face of global conflict, but on May 18, 1917, Congress passed an authorization again increasing the size of the Army. The legislation authorized enlarging the Regular Army and National Guard. It also authorized creating a National Army raised by conscription, which ultimately led to a total conscript and volunteer force of 4 million, half of which saw duty in France.  

Soldiers require leadership. The incumbent 1916 Regular Army's small complement of officers could not possibly provide the scope of leadership required for the required expansion. After the initial elements of the American Expeditionary Force sailed to France in June 1917, the stateside leadership shortage became even more acute as all available officers and noncommissioned officers prepared for overseas deployment. Anticipated combat losses created a further need to locate and train additional officers critical to the war effort.  

Universities in American society  

When the European War began in August 1914, military instruction on civilian campuses was limited to a few military academies, like the Virginia Military Institute, and to the land-grant institutions, like Virginia Polytechnic Institute, whose charters included military training. The Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) did not yet exist. However, seventeen months following the American declaration of war on April 6, 1917, more than
five hundred institutions of higher learning participated in the SATC and virtually ceded control of their institutions to the War Department.

The Great Crusade [World War I] was not the first war to pose the issue of the public role of men of knowledge in America. But it was the first war in which there occurred a conjunction of the needs dictated by a technological, total war and of the universities, scholarly disciplines, and academic professionalism that were sufficiently developed to be considered resources for serving those needs.\textsuperscript{94}

In previous wars colleges provided men and resources, but World War I required these on a far greater scale than any of its predecessors. As Gruber notes, World War I was a total war, requiring the commitment of an entire society, a total nation, and for the first time the academe could provide tangible, practical support to soldiers in the field. Scientists, engineers, doctors, historians, and practitioners of nearly every discipline and field of study sought ways to support the national war effort.\textsuperscript{95} The SATC became the most visible and complete collegiate effort providing support. To understand why and how the colleges became willing participants in the complete restructuring of their historic purposes and functions requires a brief discussion of the state of the colleges at the time.

Colleges reflected the changing nature of American society throughout the nineteenth century. Major changes, beginning shortly after the turn of the century, brought a wider range of course offerings many emphasizing practical education. As the frontier moved farther west, settlers transplanted their religious beliefs and their desire for education to their new communities. The settlers established colleges across the plains. College founding roughly followed the pattern of western migration: Oberlin (Ohio), 1833; University of Missouri, 1839; Iowa College (Grinnell), 1846; University of Wisconsin, 1849; University of Minnesota, 1851; University of Kentucky, 1865; University of Illinois, 1868; University of Nebraska, 1869; Stanford University, 1891.\textsuperscript{96}
The founders of these western colleges valued a more Christian-based, egalitarian education than that provided by the well-established eastern schools.\textsuperscript{97} Often in rural areas, the communities that created them and provided most of their students expected frontier colleges to support local needs, leading to an increase in practical education relating to agriculture, mining, and manufacturing. The U. S. Congress passed the Morrill Act of 1862 to assist the growing nation with the practical education required on the edges of civilization by funding the institutions known as land-grant colleges.\textsuperscript{98} Congress dedicated the funds acquired through the sale of government land grants under the act “to the endowment, support, and maintenance of at least one college” where the primary purpose was teaching the agricultural and mechanical arts in addition to scientific, classical and military studies “in order to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes on the several pursuits and professions in life.”\textsuperscript{99}

To ensure provision of practical education the Morrill Act mandated the teaching of utilitarian and military subjects. The Act provided little guidance concerning implementation of this teaching to the colleges, requiring only that state legislatures determine the manner of instruction.\textsuperscript{100} Frequently, the land-grant universities hired former officers to teach the military arts. Occasionally, the Army assigned an active duty officer as an instructor at a college. Not until 1891 when Congress raised the number of active duty instructors allowed on campuses to one hundred did the War Department become a minimal campus presence. In 1904, Congress authorized detailing retired officers at no expense to the government to conduct military training in colleges.\textsuperscript{101} Under this system, the War Department selected the officers, but the college paid them.

\textit{The idea of university service develops}
Following the Civil War, several innovations began to transform colleges across the nation. During the nineteenth century, the academic-minded developed a sense of professionalism through graduate study in Europe, where higher education had a much longer history. As more American academics earned and returned with European doctoral degrees, the need to create American graduate schools became increasingly evident. This process began with the founding of Johns Hopkins University, in 1876, and spread throughout the country.

As the professorate matured, gaining in professional consciousness and stature, three legs of the academic profession gained acceptance: teaching, scholarship, and service. Service to the community was a natural byproduct of the growing social awareness of professors and legislation like the Morrill Act. Within many colleges, close ties to local communities created the desire among faculty members to enhance local achievement. This was particularly evident in the still developing land-grant colleges. In 1904, one example of this desire began at the University of Wisconsin under the leadership of President Charles R. Van Hise. The Wisconsin Idea built upon the developing notion of service to the community by focusing upon using graduates to create “civic virtue”, train political leaders, and develop scientific solutions to political problems. Van Hise stated that he would “never be content until the beneficent influence of the university reaches every family in the state.”

When President Wilson signed the Smith-Lever Act in 1914, federal monies facilitated the idea of universities serving the nation. The Smith-Lever Act sought to “diffuse among the people of the United States useful and practical information on subjects relating to agriculture, home economics, and rural energy and to encourage the
The Act linked the U. S. Department of Agriculture and the land-grant universities, which were required to appoint a director of extension. The federal government and land-grant universities united in an effort to provide useful knowledge to all residents of participating states.

The concept of the university providing service to the community infused a value within universities that eventually contributed to supporting the national war effort. Service was to have an ever increasing impact following the declaration of war as all America mobilized to support the crusade against Germany. Ultimately, with the creation of the SATC, the concept of service included ceding control of universities to the War Department.

At the same time Smith-Lever was linking land-grant colleges with the Department of Agriculture, a trend to include military education within the standard curriculum of the colleges developed. Many college presidents lent support to Army Chief of Staff Major General Leonard Wood's Plattsburg Movement. The supporters considered universal military service and universal military training as methods of providing structure to the activities of American youth. Clearly, the Plattsburg Movement provided military training to American males in camps during students' summer vacations. Another aspect of this movement consisted of including military training within the collegiate curriculum of male college students.

Proponents of adding military training to the curriculum included presidents from many of the nation's leading colleges. Some Americans perceived military training as a means of teaching discipline to youth and a panacea for student indifference and dissolution. The Adjutant General, Major General H.P. McCain, sent a letter to
President Alderman\textsuperscript{111} of the University of Virginia in August 1917 in which he detailed why college men were unsuccessful in the Plattsburg Camps. McCain wrote that the young men suffered from "slouchiness," that is, mental and physical indifference. He continued, stating that the men were unable to articulate their ideas clearly to others. McCain's final complaint was that the young men lacked grit. They were likely to quit the camp and return home if their feelings were hurt by rebuke or criticism.\textsuperscript{112}

The military curriculum and the Plattsburg Movement were not without collegiate opponents. Alexander Meiklejohn, President of Amherst College, was a leading critic of the military training movement. Despite his willingness to close Amherst if need be, Meiklejohn argued against the utility of military training on several grounds. First, he suggested parents did not perceive the function of college to include this emphasis. Second, he believed the proposal required something the American people did not want because the need for such training had no national consensus. Finally, he questioned the logic of those arguing in support of such training, "If the virtues in question can not be practiced in other fields, then there is no value in getting them from the military exercises; if they can be practiced in other fields, then there is no need of giving military training in order to secure them."\textsuperscript{113} The debate about including military training in the curriculum continued until the declaration of war.

\textit{Higher Education in Virginia}

The Commonwealth of Virginia has a long history as a leader in American higher education. The College of William and Mary, established in 1693, possesses the only royal charter issued to a colonial school. By the beginning of the Civil War, Virginia had two public colleges, the University of Virginia, founded in 1819, and the Virginia Military
Institute, founded in 1839, and several private institutions. The University of Virginia, which accepted its first students in 1826, was ground-breaking in its hiring practices and curriculum. Virginia Military Institute was the first state-sponsored military school in the country.

During times of war, Virginia universities always suffered. In part, this resulted from the need to support deployed troops with men and resources. However, Virginia has a unique history, providing the location for many of the major battles fought in the Revolutionary and Civil wars. Union forces occupied both Charlottesville, home of the University of Virginia, and Williamsburg, home of the College of William and Mary, during the Civil War. Both campuses received purposeful damage, though the harm to William and Mary was much greater. The climactic battles in each of those wars, Yorktown and Appomattox, respectively, occurred on Virginia soil.

War and its aftermath were not the only difficulties faced by Virginia’s universities. Despite recovering from the horrors and damage of wars, the trials of the post-Civil War Reconstruction period, and the difficulties associated with frequent marginal economic times brought their own grief to the colleges. Yet, the University of Virginia and the College of William and Mary remained ready and willing to support the war effort in 1917. Both of these universities answered the call to participate in the SATC. The College of William and Mary

Established by royal charter in 1693, the College of William and Mary is the second oldest institution of higher education in the United States. It is the only university in the United States to receive such a charter directly from the British crown. William and Mary claims among its alumni many of the famous names associated with the American
Revolution, including George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and James Monroe. Students established the first chapter of Phi Beta Kappa at the college in 1776.\footnote{116}

Issued to the Rev. James Blair, the rector of James City Parish and the Church of England’s senior representative in Virginia on February 8, 1693, the charter was to “establish a certain Place of universal study, a perpetual College of Divinity, Philosophy, languages, and other good Arts and Sciences”. The purposes of the college included furnishing Virginians with “a Seminary of Ministers of the Gospel, and [that] the Youth may be piously educated in good Letters and Manners, and that the Christian Faith may be propagated amongst the Western Indians, to the Glory of Almighty God....”\footnote{117}

Despite this historic lineage and high-minded mission, William and Mary closed its doors three times. In 1780, anticipating the British occupation of Williamsburg during the Revolution, the college closed for one year. The Civil War and extended Union occupation following the Battle of Williamsburg caused the next closure. By 1881, collegiate-level activity at the college ceased due to a lack of students, resulting in the third closure. The President, Benjamin S. Ewell, and an occasional assistant taught grammar school subjects to local youth in an effort to maintain the appearance of continuity. William and Mary’s days as a private institution were coming to an end.\footnote{118}

For years, the Board of Visitors prevented the college from accepting state aid, believing the charter did not allow it. The choice, ultimately, came down to accepting aid from the state or closing the doors of the school forever. Finally, in 1888, after years of avoiding the fate, the Board of Visitors agreed to accept ten thousand dollars from the General Assembly to establish a normal school for male Virginians at William and Mary.\footnote{119} With the passage of the appropriation, the College entered an unusual quasi-
private/public status. The state and a state institution supported the normal school, yet the
main body of the school and its assets remained private.

Lyon G. Tyler, who would remain in office until 1919, succeeded Ewell.\textsuperscript{120} Despite the impediments, a faculty assembled, building repairs occurred, students matriculated, and classes commenced on October 4, 1888 with four dozen students. By the end of the session, the number increased to 102.\textsuperscript{121} The level of enrollment, however, was not strong to allow the school to sustain itself. The college could not attract enough students to allow growth.

By 1902, Tyler was convinced that the only way to save the college was to turn it over to the state and end the quasi-private/public status. His campaign to convince the legislature to accept William and Mary as a state institution took four years. On March 7, 1906, Governor Claude A. Swanson signed an act converting the college to a state institution and accepting state responsibility for the school’s property and assets. Despite its new status as a state institution, by 1918-19 enrollment had fallen to 131. Of these students twenty-six were regular male students and twenty-four were women, first admitted during that academic year. The remaining students were members of the SATC.\textsuperscript{122}

University of Virginia

The University of Virginia was the creation of the third President of the United States, Thomas Jefferson. He selected the site for the university, a hilltop visible across a wide valley from his own hilltop home, Monticello. The official founding of the university occurred in 1819, but it did not accept its first students until 1826.
From the beginning, the University of Virginia established a reputation as a different kind of school. Perhaps Jefferson's most lasting impact on American higher education was the hiring process he used to staff the new school and the resulting instructional methods. In other American colleges, the college president, sometimes aided by a small group of faculty, taught classic subjects, like Latin and Greek. Jefferson staffed his university with specialists who were expert in and taught a single subject. The school also instituted an honor code regulating student behavior. University of Virginia students pledge not to lie, cheat, or steal. They also agreed to report it to authorities if they have knowledge of someone else doing so.

By 1860, the University had grown to approximately the same size as Harvard College and Yale College with roughly 600 students. However, it too, suffered during the Civil War, though it did not close during the conflict. Union troops, under General George Armstrong Custer occupied Charlottesville briefly during March 1865. Faculty and students convinced him to not destroy the campus. Union troops did, however, camp on the campus grounds and intentionally damage some of the buildings.

A stillness marked the years following the Civil War at the University of Virginia. Students and faculty performed their academic duties, but no significant actions or activities occurred to make the period particularly memorable. Not until the academic year 1899-1900 did attendance rise again to 645, the level achieved in 1856-1857.

Another of the innovative aspects of Jefferson's original plan was the governance of the university. Under Jefferson's plan the university had no role of president. The faculty received guidance directly from a Board of Visitors. Debate concerning this structure began as early as 1842 and intensified during the 1890's. By the early
twentieth century, a consensus existed that the university needed a different governance structure. In 1902, the Board of Visitors offered the presidency to Woodrow Wilson, an alumnus and professor of history at Princeton. Preparing for his run for Governor of New Jersey, Wilson declined. Edwin Anderson Alderman, the president of Tulane University, was offered the position in 1904. Alderman accepted and became the first president of the University of Virginia. Alderman served the University of Virginia from 1904 until his death in 1931.

During his tenure, Alderman oversaw significant changes at the university. Enrollment rose from 662 in 1904 to over 1,000 in 1915. Alderman established a Departments of Education and Graduate Studies. He sought and obtained greater funding from the state general assembly and placed the university on more secure footing by obtaining funds to increase the endowment. During this period the size of the faculty rose from forty in 1904 to eighty in 1914.

*Universities answer the call to service*

World War I was not the first war in which the issue of the proper involvement of the academic community in conflict arose. In previous wars, academic men served as both officers and soldiers. From the Civil War, Thomas Jackson (VMI), Josiah Chamberlain (Bowdoin), and William Tecumseh Sherman (Louisiana State University) are but three examples. World War I, however, was the first time military requirements and the needs of academia directly coincided. With the declaration of war, the academic community—students, professors, and administrators alike—answered the call to service, leading to a drain of on all aspects of university life.
Universities became a repository of knowledge useful to the military through the growth of technical disciplines in the late nineteenth century. They were also a ready source of men to serve as soldiers. Seeking to serve their country in any way possible, college men accepted service in the only manner available—enlistment in the military or employment with the federal government. The result of this movement to service was a hemorrhaging of manpower, both student and faculty, from the colleges. The loss of students resulted in severely reduced income at colleges throughout the country. According to Capen, "...student bodies melted away. Losses of 40 percent in enrollments and even higher began to be reported by the autumn of 1917. Instructors answered the military service or were drawn off for nonmilitary activities." 

A sample of enrollments from the four of the thirteen Virginia colleges that participated in the SATC shows a substantial reduction between the fall of 1916 and the fall of 1917 (see table 1). The only school reflecting an increase in 1917 was the Virginia Military Institute which, due to its military tradition, presented an opportunity for future service to young men.

Table 1: Enrollment Decreases at selected Virginia Universities 1916 - 1919

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School</th>
<th>Enrollment 1916-1917</th>
<th>Enrollment 1917-1918</th>
<th>Enrollment 1918-1919</th>
<th>Percent Change 1916-17</th>
<th>Percent Change 1917-18</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>College of William and Mary</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>-26%</td>
<td>-25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Virginia</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>824</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia Military Institute</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>+44%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia Polytechnic Institute</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>477</td>
<td></td>
<td>-3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The armed services and the colleges increasingly competed for the same group of young men. In 1914, European armies placed young, educated men in trenches with little concern for their prior experience and training. By 1916, European scholars recognized
that World War I had consumed a large portion of Europe’s youth. American scholars feared a similar fate awaited the young men and universities of the United States.\textsuperscript{139} According to Capen, “As far as the responsible officers of colleges and universities could see, their institutions were disregarded by the government departments. There was no evidence of the formulation of a government policy for the use of the universities.”\textsuperscript{140} Not until the spring of 1918 was a plan finally developed that would attempt to effectively utilize the structure of American colleges, train leaders, and preserve colleges for the future. This result of this plan was the Students’ Army Training Corps.

As World War I approached, universities across the country and in Virginia in particular were maturing rapidly. Faculty associations were developing and the members of the academic community, collectively, began to look at better ways to serve their students and their communities. Though it received fame as the Wisconsin Idea, the concept of service to the public gained ground as a national movement, especially at land-grant institutions.

At the turn of the century, though many colleges in Virginia experienced the hardships associated with warfare, few students were training with an eye toward possible military careers. Yet by 1916, a Reserve Officer Training unit was developing on the campus of the University of Virginia. And within two years, most of the students at both the University of Virginia and William and Mary were enlisted soldiers and the campuses were armed, guarded military camps.

\textsuperscript{5} Mann, Committee on Education and Special Training (CEST) and Gruber, Mars and Minerva. \textsuperscript{6} Mann, Committee on Education and Special Training (CEST). Woodrow Willson was born in Staunton, Virginia in 1856, the son of a Presbyterian minister. He lived in Atlanta, Georgia during the Civil War and in Columbia, South Carolina during the reconstruction period. He attended Princeton University, graduating in 1879. After attending the University of Virginia Law School for one year, Wilson transferred to Johns Hopkins University, where he earned a Ph.D. in History. Wilson became the President of
Princeton in 1902. In 1904, he declined the opportunity to become the first president of the University of Virginia. In 1910, he was elected Governor of New Jersey. He won election as President of the United States in 1912 and reelection in 1916. Wilson died in February 1924.

(http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/)

7 Schlesinger, Paths to the Present.
8 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.
10 Veysey, The Emergence of the American University.
11 Geiger, To Advance Knowledge
12 Veysey, The Emergence of the American University.
13 Perrett, A Country Made by War provides a thorough description of the use of war to liberate the nation from British dominion and to maintain the pace of development
14 Millis, Arms and Men; Bernado and Bacon, American Military Policy; Ambrose, Upton and the Army; Weigley, History of the United States Army.
15 Millis, Road to War.
16 Kissinger, Diplomacy.
17 Millis, W., Road to War
18 Kolbe, The Colleges in War Time; Hawkins, Banding Together; Gruber, Mars and Minerva.
20 U.S. Constitution, 10th Amendment.
23 NCES, 120 Years of American Education
24 Kist, Local Control.
25 Geiger, To Advance Knowledge
26 Millis, Arms and Men; Ambrose, Upton and the Army; Coffman, The Old Army.
27 Perrett, A Country Made by War.
28 Brooks, Snapping to Attention.
29 Perrett, A Country Made by War.
30 National Archives, Declaration of Independence.
31 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 144. Elbridge Gerry, of Massachusetts, was signatory to the Declaration of Independence, a member of the Constitutional Convention, member of the House of Representatives, Ambassador to France, and Vice President of the United States from 1812 until his death in 1814.
32 Millis, Arms and Men, Perrett, A Country Made by War.
33 Millis, Arms and Men, Perrett, A Country Made by War.
34 U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8.
35 Bernado and Bacon, American Military Policy.
36 Ibid.
37 U.S. Constitution, Second Amendment
38 Bernado and Bacon, American Military Policy; Millis, Arms and Men; Perrett, A Country Made by War.
39 One sees the continuation of this process during current times. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Americans reduced the size of the Army by fifty percent and find with the conflict in Iraq that there are not enough troops. Peacekeeping missions in locales like Somalia and Bosnia are the latter day equivalent to widespread engineer work.
40 Perrett, A Country Made by War.
41 Bernado and Bacon, American Military Policy; Millis, Arms and Men.
42 Coffman, E. The Old Army.
43 Millis, Arms and Men discusses the relationship between the army and American society at length.
Bernado and Bacon, American Military Policy discuss the development of the navy.
44 Miller, Militarism or Manhood, 90.
45 At the time, only officers received commissions to their office. Under current policy, warrant officers are commissioned upon promotion to the rank of chief warrant officer 2 and receive the same rights and privileges accorded to traditional commissioned officers.
Kissinger, Diplomacy and Huntington, The Soldier and the State discuss the prevailing liberal view of the Wilson Administration.

Post World War I this phenomenon did not begin to change until the 1970s. Of the forty-three men elected to the Presidency, thirty served in the military. Truman (WWI), Eisenhower, Nixon, Kennedy, Johnson, Ford, Reagan, G.H.W. Bush (WWII) and served during the World Wars. Carter served during the Korean War era. G.W. Bush served in the Texas Air National Guard during the Vietnam era, but he did not see combat service.

Williams, Americans at War.

Pappas, Prudens Futuri; Coffman, The Regulars; Perret, A Country Made by War. In defense of Wilson, it must be pointed out that the General Staff, as structured in 1915, was a relatively new organization. As such, its design and uses had not yet become an integral part of the governmental process. Created on 15 August 1903 as part of the reorganization led by Secretary of War Elihu Root, the General Staff was designed to provide a central organization for the high level planning that had been so deficient in the recent Spanish War. Additionally, the General Staff was part of Root’s plan to break the stranglehold dating to the early nineteenth century that individual branch chiefs had over decision making within the Army.

Williams, Americans at War.

Millis, Road to War discusses the Wilson Administration preparations for World War I.

Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers discusses the emergence of world powers.

Ambrose, Nothing Like it discusses the development of the trans-continental railroad; Schlesinger, Paths to the Present discusses the development of American manufacturing; Bernado and Bacon, American Military Policy discuss the American acquisition of territorial possessions; Kissinger, Diplomacy discusses American diplomacy; and Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers discusses the emergence of world powers.

Kissinger, Diplomacy.

Wilson, Declaration of Neutrality.


Huntington, The Soldier and the State

Ibid, p. 152.

Kissinger, Diplomacy, p. 30.

Millis, Road to War.

Ibid.

Kissinger, Diplomacy; Millis, Arms and Men.

Kissinger, Diplomacy, Millis, Arms and Men, Perrett, A Country Made by War.

Barry, The Great Influenza, p. 121.

Prior to the reorganization of the War Department in 1903 under Secretary of War Elihu Root, the senior officer in the Army was the Commanding General. He had command authority over the tactical army but not over the individual staff agencies, like ordnance, personnel, or artillery. These were controlled by branch chiefs. Under Root’s reorganization, the title of the senior officer changed to Chief of Staff. Operating under the direction of the President or the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff gained responsibility for the entire Army. Under the Defense Reorganization Act of 1949, the Chief of Staff was removed from the operational chain of command, which now flows from the President and Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to operational commanders in the field. The Army Chief of Staff is charged with ensuring that the Army is trained and equipped to perform its mission, but he does not have operational command of tactical forces. He is a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is considered the senior officer in the Army, unless the Chairman of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is an Army officer.

Matloff, American Military History. Plattsburg eventually incorporated camps for businessmen, in which they received minimal military training during the summer. Perrett, A Country Made by War describes the camps as Boy Scouting for adults.

Matloff, American Military History. Plattsburg eventually incorporated camps for businessmen, in which they received minimal military training during the summer. Perrett, A Country Made by War describes the camps as Boy Scouting for adults.
Wood, “Civil Obligation”

Mabry, *Professor William F. Dodd Diary*, p. 11. The diaries of Ambassador Dodd provide insight into the thoughts of American faculty during the Presidential campaign of 1916 and the period preceding American entry into World War I.

Millis, *Road to War*.


Wood, “Civil Obligation”


Letter, Tyler to Martin, dtd 7 Feb 1916, William and Mary Archives, Tyler Presidential Papers, Box 15, File World War I.

Millis, *Road to War*. In response to the Allied blockade on her ports in February 1915 and after declaring the waters around Britain a war zone, Germany began a campaign of submarine attacks against all Allied shipping, both military and commercial. This resulted in the sinking of numerous ships, the Lusitania included. Militarily the attacks were successful, but politically, they were disastrous to the international view of Germany. The program was halted in September 1915. Early in 1917, the unrestricted attacks resumed as Germany hoped to defeat Britain before the United States could become engaged in the war. The unrestricted attacks ceased when, realizing the war was lost, Germany sought terms of surrender.

Millis, *Road to War* and Schlesinger, *Political and Social Growth*.

Kissinger, *Diplomacy and Millis, Road to War* discuss the impact of the sinking of Lusitania. Millis, additionally, discusses the general tone and conduct of British foreign policy prior to the American declaration of war.

Barry, *The Great Influenza*.

Peterson, *Propaganda in War*

Wilson, *War Message*.


Barry, *The Great Influenza*.


Millis, *Arms and Men: A Study of American Military History*

Weigley, R., *History of the United States Army*.

Calhoun, “The Expansible Army.”

Weigley, *History of the United States Army*.

Ibid.

Bernado and Bacon, *American Military Policy*.


Bernado and Bacon, *American Military Policy*.


Dates for university founding were obtained from university websites as follows:

Oberlin College http://www.oberlin.edu/newserv/facts.html
University of Missouri http://www.missouri.edu/mufacts.htm
Iowa College (Grinnell) http://www.grinnell.edu/aboutinfo/history/
University of Wisconsin http://www.wisc.edu/about/facts/
University of Minnesota http://www.umn.edu/twincities/01_abt_gen.php
University of Kentucky http://www.uky.edu/Home/AboutUK/history1.html
University of Illinois http://www.uiuc.edu/overview/
University of Nebraska http://www.unl.edu/unlpub/index.shtml
Stanford University http://www.stanford.edu/home/stanford/history/begin.html

Potts, “College Enthusiasm!”.

Funding the land-grant institutions and the instruction created under the Morrill Act came from the sale of public lands in the vast, uninhabited tracts of the western United States. The federal government granted paper script representing lands in the American West to the states to provide an endowment for the establishment of a university. In effect, the passage of the Morrill Act caused the federal government to give each state control over 30,000 acres of land (generally undeveloped parts of the Louisiana Purchase) for each member of Congress. This land, when sold, provided the means to establish a land-grant university at a site of the state’s choosing. Restrictions in the legislation prevented expenditure of more than 10 percent of the funds raised to purchase a site for the university; states could not expend these funds to erect buildings. Virginia held 10 seats in the 42d Congress and gained the right to sell 300,000 acres of federal lands.

99 Morrill, Morrill Act.
100 Ibid.
101 Reeves, Military Instruction
102 Turner & Bernard, The German model and the graduate school.
103 Geiger, To Advance Knowledge
104 Veysey, The Emergence of the American University.
105 Van Hise, Wisconsin Idea as cited at www.wisc.edu/Wisconsin Idea
106 Smith-Lever Act, p. 1
107 Wallenstein, "Virginia Tech."
108 Gruber, Mars and Minerva, p. 222.
109 Dunn, Military Camps for College Students. Those from eastern colleges included John G. Hibben (Princeton), Arthur T. Hadley (Yale), A. Lawrence Lowell (Harvard), Richard Cockburn MacLaurin (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Harry Augustus Garfield (Williams), and John Huston Finley (New York). Southern presidents included Edward W. Nichols (Virginia Military Institute), George Hutchenson Denny (Alabama), Charles Herbert Stockton (George Washington), and Robert Sharp (Tulane). Midwestern presidents included Robert Maynard Hutchins (Michigan), William Lowe Bryan (Indiana), George Edgar Vincent (Minnesota), and Chancellor Samuel Black McCormick (Pittsburgh). Benjamin Ide Wheeler (California) represented the west.
110 The Adjutant General of the Army was the officer in charge of personnel matters. McCain was a distant uncle of future Senator John McCain of Arizona.
111 Edwin Anderson Alderman was born, May 10, 1861 in Wilmington, He graduated from the University of North Carolina in 1882, University of North Carolina. He graduated from the University of the South (LL.D.) in 1899 and Tulane University (LL.D.) in 1902. He taught at Johns Hopkins University as a professor of pedagogy and at the University of North Carolina as professor of history and philosophy. He became president of the University of North Carolina in 1896 and president of Tulane University in 1900. In 1904, he became president of the University of Virginian, serving until his death in April 1931 (http://alumni.tulane.edu/potpourri/IIF.pdf)
112 Letter McCain to Alderman, dtd 28 Aug 1917, UVA ArchivesRG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 6 File 2 of 7.
113 Meiklejohn, A Schoolmaster’s View of Compulsory Military Training, p. 12.
114 Johnson “Between the Wars.”
115 Ibid.
116 Tate, “The Colonial College.”
117 Hofstader, American Higher Education, p. 33
118 Walker, “Colonel Ewell’s College.”
119 Ibid.
120 Goodson, “The Tyler Era.” Tyler was the son of U. S. President John Tyler.
121 Ibid.
122 Wallenstein, Virginia Tech, Goodson, “The Tyler Era.”
123 Geiger, Introduction
125 Ibid.
126 Dabney, Mr. Jefferson’s University.
127 Ibid.
129 Dabney, *Mr. Jefferson's University*.
130 Ibid.
131 Capen, *The Effects of the World War*, Perry, *The Universities in War Time*
132 Gruber, *Mars and Minerva*.
133 Capen, *The Effects of the World War*, 44.
134 Email Rebecca Suerdieck, Special Collections, Earl Gregg Swem Library, The College of William and Mary to author 6 June 2005.
135 Bruce, *History of the University of Virginia*.
136 Email Diane B. Jacob, VMI Archivist to author June 2005.
137 Email Tamara Kennelly, Virginia Tech Archivist to author June 2005.
138 The armed services in 1917 consisted of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. The War Department, controlling the Army, and the Department of the Navy, controlling the Navy and the Marine Corps were cabinet level agencies. The Secretary of War (Army) and the Secretary of the Navy (Navy and Marine Corps) were both members of the President's Cabinet.
139 Capen, “The Effects of the World War.”
140 Ibid
Figure 1: President Woodrow Wilson
Courtesy: White House .gov

Figure 2: Secretary of War Newton D. Baker
By Edmund Hodgson Smart
Courtesy: Center for Military History
Chapter 2

Loss of Students and Faculty to the War Effort

When war broke out in Europe during the late summer of 1914, young men patriotically rushed to the service of their respective countries. As is the often the case, few expected a protracted war. Caught up in the excitement of the moment many young men anticipated glory in heroic action. Though history provided many examples of extended, continental wars, none had such continuous contact between adversaries and such wanton slaughter as allowed by modern weaponry. Thus, many of the young men of Europe rushed off to eternal rather than earthly glory.

The enlistment of young men in European armies and the unexpected duration of the conflict deprived European universities of a generation of academic minded young men, both students and professors. American scholars saw the impact that the war had on their European counterparts and searched for a means to avoid a similar fate. With the haphazard approach America took as it moved toward war, university presidents judged that the government was making no provisions for the requirements of their institutions. When the war began to consume the American youth, university presidents took an active role in the preservation of their institutions. According to Capen, “As far as the responsible officers of colleges and universities could see, their institutions were disregarded by the government departments. There was no evidence of the formulation of a government policy for the use of the universities.”

After discussions with representatives from Canadian universities, who related their experiences, the membership of the College and University Division of the Education Section of the Advisory Commission of the Council on National Defense, in its
fourth meeting made several recommendations to university presidents. First, that each college attempt to convince students to remain in school until drafted or their education was complete. Second, that universities arrange for military drill on campus. Finally, that universities provide a credit course in military science and tactics for students approaching draft age.\textsuperscript{142}

To preserve the universities, presidents and administrators took several distinct yet mutually supporting approaches. They took steps to induce students to remain in school, often establishing a Reserve Officer Training Corps unit, authorized under the National Defense Act of 1916. Next, they conducted information campaigns aimed at convincing students that their most effective means of service was to study and prepare for the future. They also attempted to influence government policy and programs. And finally, yielding to reality, they accommodated students who chose to leave school prior to graduation.

Virginia university officials used elements of each approach as they tried to stem the tide of student departures. Enrollment at Virginia's universities had been on a generally upward path since the end of the Civil War. The path was not straight or easy. With the exception of, perhaps, the University of Virginia, growth at many institutions was hard won and jealously guarded. The coming of the war jeopardized these gains and placed some institutions at the verge of closure.

\textit{Enrollment declines}

Fighting a shortage of students was nothing new at The College of William and Mary. The college traces its history to 1693, placing it second only to Harvard University as the eldest of American colleges. Unlike Harvard though, William and Mary had had an uneasy financial history that forced its closure more than once. Following the
reorganization and conversion to a quasi-public institution in 1888, the faculty at William and Mary continued to expand. Beginning with seven during the reorganization in 1888, the number of faculty members grew to nine in 1906 and fourteen in 1918.

As part of the 1888 conversion, President Tyler established a normal school at William and Mary. This new program attracted some students, induced to matriculate by the award of free education through state support in exchange for agreeing to teach in needy areas following graduation. But the added support proved insufficient. As noted earlier, Tyler campaigned for, and eventually won, conversion of the college from a private institution to a part of the state university system in 1906.

Enrollment at the school peaked at 244 in 1906. Between then and the beginning of the war it averaged 208. Following American entry into the war in 1917, enrollment fell to 149. This decline in enrollment and simultaneous loss of faculty led President Tyler to yet another effort to shore up the college's finances. Beset by financial trouble and faced with certain collapse, President Tyler was forced to grasp any straw that might stave off the ruin about to befall the college.

However, in February 1918, the students of William and Mary, like President Tyler, had concerns more pressing than the war on their mind. Like many institutions of the time, William and Mary was a men's college. As part of his strategy to save the ailing college, President Tyler was on the verge of gaining approval of the Virginia legislature to do the unthinkable—admit women as students. Writers in the student newspaper, the *Flat Hat*, were adamantly opposed to such a step, suggesting, "women may be parading the historical campus" and questioned the wisdom of the law passed by the General Assembly stating:
We seriously question the economy of such a step and doubt if it will help our tradition in the least. We fail to see the object of such a law. Is it the establishment of the principle of co-education in Virginia? Or is it to make this college one that will give a full degree to the women of the state? If it is the former, we ask, why should the tradition of our school—the noblest tradition of any institution—be sacrificed when such a principle could be tried out elsewhere? If it is the latter, we ask, is it not more economical and much easier to improve one of the norms to give such a degree? 147

By March 1918, the *Flat Hat* reflected student resignation to the fact that women would join the student body at William and Mary. Following final passage in the legislature and in a rapid reversal of the opinion stated only three weeks earlier, the paper editorialized that, “The scarcity of students here, and the fact that there is no state school giving a full college degree to women, made this college the logical place and furnished sufficient reason for such a school.”148 This decision represented the most lasting and perhaps the most significant change at William and Mary brought on by the war. William and Mary admitted its first coeducational class, which included 24 women, in 1918.149

The University of Virginia experienced a similar decline in enrollment. As the academic year 1917-1918 approached, officials at the University of Virginia became concerned about the number of students preparing to return to the school. On August 13, barely weeks before the scheduled start of classes, Dean Page reported a projected occupancy of 33 percent of dormitory space to President Alderman. Page worried that enrollment might fall as low as five hundred for the fall session.150 The Dean’s concerns were realistic, as the University of Virginia enrollment dropped throughout the war period, falling from 1,064 in 1916-17 to 761 in 1917-18 to 536 in 1918-19.151

Following American entry into the war, the losses became frequent. As of February 28, 1918, the University of Virginia lost 111 students from those that initially
arrived in the fall. Among these departures, were seventy-nine students who left for war-related reasons, as shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Student Departures from the University of Virginia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Munitions Works</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Officer Training Camp</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Aviation Service</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina Hospital Unit</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Navy</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Naval Academy</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Signal Service</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Virginia Hospital Unit [#41]</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Await Draft</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Flying Service</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 2 indicates, the vast majority of the students leaving the university for war related reasons were doing so to enter the military or a military training program. The Selective Service Act of 1917 established a national draft of eligible men over the age of twenty-one. The draft age was a significant issue affecting the life of the universities across the country. President Alderman, responding to a request from the Yale Daily News for his opinion concerning the possible reduction of the draft age wrote,

I am heartily opposed, at this time, to the lowering of the draft age to nineteen years. Of course, in order to protect our country against tyranny and autocracy, I would be willing to consent to anything, but the use of youth of nineteen years at present to fill our army seems to me to be thoroughly unwise. There are millions of fit men over this age, and it would be a deadly blow at the very life of the nation to deprive its youth, while in their undergraduate years, of the training necessary to
lay wisely and broadly the foundations of peace. Nothing but the direst necessity of national existence could justify such an action.\textsuperscript{153}

In this response, Alderman reflects several consistent themes voiced across the universities of Virginia and the nation at large. First, nothing was more important than the preservation of the American nation. The statements from several university presidents discussed earlier suggest this sentiments was widespread as the nation moved toward war in April 1917. Second, Alderman reflects the American consensus opinion that the Anglo-French Alliance was in the right and that Germany reflected tyranny and autocracy. Third, to remain stable and influence the nation universities require youth. Fourth, the creation of a lasting peace requires that universities train young men for such an effort.

Student departures for military service created another area of potential hazard for university officials. Prior to the reorientation of colleges in the 1970s and 1980s, the concept of in loco parentis was the rule. College officials acted in lieu of parents while students were on campus. As the age of majority at the time was twenty-one, nearly all students fell into this category. When underage students attempted to withdraw from the university for enlistment, misunderstanding could easily occur. A.J. McKelway created just such a misunderstanding in December 1917. Accidentally, he timed his departure from the University of Virginia when neither President Alderman nor the Dean of the College was available, causing a young secretary to coordinate his exit. McKelway’s father reacted forcefully when notified of his son’s departure. McKelway did not object to his son’s enlistment; rather, he objected to the administrative errors that delayed the school notifying him concerning the whereabouts of his son. Several letters between Alderman and the elder McKelway saw Alderman becoming increasingly apologetic and
conciliatory. Ultimately, he blamed all misunderstanding on his absence and the secretary’s lapse in judgment.¹⁵⁴

In addition to students enlisting in the service, the Plattsburg Movement continued to recruit students, expanding into establishing junior camps for college-age men. Alderman received a letter from the President of the Junior Plattsburg seeking his support for the upcoming summer camps. The purposes and virtues of the camps included preserving the students for the universities until graduation, preparing students for military training that colleges and universities would require during upcoming sessions, forming the character of young men and preparing them for association with older men in full Plattsburg and officer training camps, and finally, to increase the number of trained men available to the government.¹⁵⁵

While the camps did induce some students to remain in school, as Table 2 suggests thirteen students elected to leave school to enter officer training camps during the 1917-1918 academic year. On Dec 5, 1917, the Flat Hat reported that several William and Mary students graduated from the same officer’s training camp at Fort Meyer, Virginia. William and Mary students received laudatory comments and attained high marks during the training.

The Right Level of Participation

In the spring of 1915, the war in Europe was beginning to stagnate. Europeans on both sides were realizing that this conflict was not a repeat of the 1870 Franco-Prussian War. There would not be rapid victory on either side. Stateside, the Germans were beginning to lose the propaganda war as the tide of American opinion swung toward the British. Preparedness advocates began expanding Major General Wood’s Plattsburg
training camps to locations around the country. These realities were not lost on college administrators, but determining the proper response and level of participation on their campuses was problematic.

The Boards of Visitors and Faculties of the College of William and Mary and the University of Virginia were not inclined to rush toward participation in any venture that might militarize their campuses. Both schools valued the traditions established over their long histories and neither wanted to dilute those traditions by incorporating the military on campus. At the time, the only models available were those of full cadet life as established at Virginia Military Institute.

In 1915, the College of William and Mary Rector, Robert Morton Hughes, suggested establishing military training on campus. However, the faculty would only allow the creation of a rifle club. In November, twenty-five students and faculty signed on as charter members of the club, and two faculty members visited possible sites to locate a suitable campus rifle range location. Despite overwhelming student support, in the range of four-to-one, no military training occurred at the college prior to the country’s entry into the war.

As noted earlier, the National Defense Act of 1916 created the Reserve Officer Corps and the Reserve Officers Training Corps with the intention of providing a base of men trained in military skills should the need for them arise. Schools that had been uncomfortable with the idea of a military presence on camps were more inclined to accept the idea of an ROTC unit on the campus because ROTC did not require that the school behave as a military academy. Students enrolled in ROTC only wore uniforms during drill periods and not during the rest of their day.
Significant debate concerning military training occurred within the University of Virginia Board of Visitors. The Rector, Armistead C. Gordon was adamantly opposed to inclusion of any military training on campus, believing it in violation of the university charter and state law. On March 19, 1917, the Board of Visitors considered requesting the creation of a ROTC detachment and adjourned without reaching a decision because they felt that they lacked sufficient information. The Board of Visitors recognized the university’s leading position among southern colleges and wanted to ensure the preservation of its reputation.  

The Board of Visitors debated including the military on campus. To assist in the process, President Alderman sought the counsel of other university presidents. On March 23, 1917, the University of Virginia Board of Visitors met again to consider requesting a ROTC detachment. In a seven to one vote, the Board approved the application, stating that they did not want to turn the university into a military school. 

The only dissenting vote, Rector Gordon thought the board was overstepping its authority by voting to include ROTC. In spite of Rector Gordon’s opposition, the University of Virginia submitted an official request to establish a ROTC detachment to the War Department on March 27, 1917. In his letter, Alderman specifically requested that the War Department assign a graduate of West Point to serve as the instructor.

**Convincing Students to Stay in School**

Colleges used a variety of methods to convince students to remain in school. The messenger varied, but the message remained the same: the highest service a student could render the nation was to pursue his studies in preparation for future leadership. Other common themes included the folly of enlistment and the sacrificing of future success.
At William and Mary, the student staff of the *Flat Hat* conducted a spirited campaign against enlistment. They suggested that it was unpatriotic to deprive the college and the country of the future benefits of their education. On April 24, the *Flat Hat* published an article titled "Prepare on Campus" that extolled the virtues of remaining in school.

The training pursued on the campus is directed by army officials ... procured to drill the college men without serious interference with academic work.

The military leaders of this nation have decided that a detachment of officers to the colleges is more practicable than the enlistment of the students in the army.... The services of Capt. Puller were obtained for the purpose of holding the students in College by giving them military instruction on our campus.... without a collapse in the College work, against which the Educational system of our country has been warned by the leaders of our Army.

...We laud the patriotic spirit of our students ... but we question their judgment.... The wisest course ... is that prescribed by our College authorities, a continuance of your college work with the training in military tactics as provided here.... This will prepare you for service. This will enable you to enter the military encampment with two months of preliminary training. An immediate enlistment is an unnecessary interruption of College work, and is without the approval of those best informed as to our country’s need.

The *Flat Hat* staff continued to exhort students to remain in school throughout the 1917 fall semester. On Nov 13, the paper asked the rhetorical question: “What part should the American college student play in this great world crisis?” The problem, according to the editors was that “The service demands them [the students], industry claims them, and agriculture desires them.” The student journalists’ solution: “Students make the most of your college life. Let each second count. Your country demands it!”

As the number of students opting to depart school continued to increase in March 1918 the *Flat Hat* again took up the cause of remaining in school, asking if students who departed were taking a foolish course of action. Concluding that departing students were being rash, the editors suggested that,
There will come a time when they can easily see the folly of their leaving college ... when our country assumes its normal condition.... High wages will drop ... and then it will be the man, who has deserted college, who will be wakened to the fact that he has lost a few years of his life, which he can never hope to regain.166

The University of Virginia Council on Military Service officially recommended that students refrain from enlisting, but rather enroll in the forming ROTC detachment on the campus. They wrote that "we do not wish...to make the mistake made in England at the outset of the Great War and deplete the universities of their immature youth for immediate field service."167 The Council then voted unanimously to suspend intercollegiate athletic events for the remainder of the session. The administration initially deemed participation in intercollegiate sports frivolous. This policy changed following the creation of the SATC, though the Army placed restrictions on the duration of travel. For University of Virginia students, advised to remain in school, serving in ROTC became a means of supporting the war effort while continuing their education.168

Efforts to convince students to remain in school continued up to the development of the SATC. Once created, the SATC provided remaining in school the imprimatur of society as a whole by virtue of War Department sponsorship. Students also knew that as enlisted members of the Army they were subject to the orders of the President. More importantly, students no longer felt that they needed to justify, in their own minds or to others, their failure to support the nation at war. In September 1918, the University of Virginia Alumni News stated:

The War Department desiring to preserve the continuity of university education during the war, and wishing at the same time to insure that proper men receive training that will make them better soldiers, has ordered some 400 institutions in America to adopt a radical alteration in their administration and curricula.... The new draft act ... would have depopulated most of the American universities. Only men from 16 to 18, and those physically incapable of service, or exempted for cause, would have been available as students. The number of such students would
have been exceedingly small. The universities would have been so seriously crippled that it is doubtful whether they could have survived. In order to prevent the closing of these institutions, the Government decided to provide students for them by sending drafted men to them until they are needed in the army or navy.\(^{169}\)

The author of this piece has the facts concerning the SATC basically right but completely misses the intent of a program in this description. He misled his readers to believe that the SATC was an altruistic attempt by the government to protect the schools. As statements by Secretary of War Baker\(^{170}\) and other suggest, protection of the schools was an agreeable by-product of the opportunity to segregate and train potential officers. The War Department made no attempt to hide or dilute this interest, yet some in the university community remained completely oblivious to the intent of the program.

As the government and universities prepared for the beginning of the SATC, they began a concerted effort to inform the nation of the new program and to find students to participate. This program was the first of its kind. No precedents suggested success. In early August 1918, a poster distributed to campuses around the country explained the purposes and processes for enrollment in the SATC. The broadside opened with the exhortation, “How can I render the most valuable service to my country during the period of the war?”\(^{171}\)

*Efforts to Influence the Government*

Several efforts to influence governmental actions occurred after American entry in the war. As described, university presidents met and offered President Wilson assurance that their institutions would support the government.\(^{172}\) Among those most dedicated to protecting the interests of their constituency was Dean Theodore Hough of the University of Virginia Medical School. Dean Hough, believing that the country and the military
needed trained medical personnel, worked tirelessly to gain exemption from the draft for medical and pre-medical students. 173

Throughout June and July 1917, Hough, carried on a spirited correspondence with the Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, concerning the long-term benefits of exempting medical students from military service until the completion of their studies. Much of the national medical establishment, especially the academic community joined Hough in this effort. Hough and other medical professionals felt that continuing medical studies was in the national interest and would provide future benefit, as the military and civilian sectors would continue to need doctors. Hough suggested that the seven years required to train a doctor made it a national imperative that these students finish their studies rather than stand for the draft and eventual placement in the ranks. 174

Secretary Baker hesitated to provide such an exemption, believing that similar requests would be made for others, including engineers, technicians, high school teachers, and agricultural students and workers. Baker was correct; proponents of each of these groups made such requests. 175 Baker wrote Hough on July 7, explaining that constraints contained in the legislation passed by Congress precluded an exemption for medical students. Baker stated that he understood the future importance of the service of these men, but Congress considered and rejected just such an exemption. 176

Deterred but not defeated Dean Hough continued his efforts to prevent the drafting of medical students. In something of a pyrrhic victory, Hough reported to the University of Virginia Board of Visitors on May 10, 1918 that he received a letter from the Surgeon General of the Army requesting that medical schools begin their 1918-1919 sessions early to allow an earlier graduation. To support this effort, the Dean reported that classes for
fourth year medical students would begin on June 24th and continue until March 1, at which point the students would graduate. Other medical students would remain on the normal schedule.177

The War Department's Committee on Education and Special Training (CEST) oversaw efforts to train and develop soldiers. After a reevaluation of the policy concerning medical students, the CEST ordered that students of engineering, medicine, mining, dentistry, veterinary medicine, and pharmacy should continue their studies until otherwise directed. Dean Hough's efforts finally succeeded when on October 14, 1918, President Alderman received a letter with new instructions from the CEST concerning the studies of students in technical and medical fields.178

Questions concerning the draft status of professionals caused other inquiries. In mid-December 1917, President Alderman inquired of the Attorney General of the Commonwealth of Virginia if university professors were state officers under the selective service regulations. Under the regulations, such state officials were not subject to the draft. Alderman sought to preserve the structure and integrity of the university by finding a method to prevent the drafting of University of Virginia professors.179

The articles contained in the Flat Hat, the efforts of Dean Hough to preserve medical education, and the efforts of President Alderman to retain faculty in the face of the draft suggest that many believed that training American youth in universities was as much of a contribution to the war effort as active military service. Nonetheless, not all students and faculty members responded to these calls and inducements. Some students and faculty members chose military or government service over remaining at the
university. Given the patriotic tenor of the times, universities felt a responsibility to support these men, despite their departure from the school.

*Accommodations for departing students*

The loss of students to the war was a reality that colleges faced and the government sanctioned. The loss had serious administrative consequences and required a variety of administrative decisions. Every college has procedures in place to deal with student departures during the academic cycle. No college was prepared for the number of student departures they were experiencing. Nor did colleges have procedures for students leaving to fight in a national crusade. Administrators needed to determine how and when they would award credit to students and when they would collect tuition and fees from students and when to reimburse those monies.

On March 31, 1917, President Alderman, at the University of Virginia, received a letter from John McIlhenny, the President of the United States Civil Service Commission, requesting support for graduating seniors who left school early for government service. McIlhenny suggested "your institution agree to graduate any such students who may be called upon, and allow service with the government in lieu of any period of study which may be required." Since seniors would graduate in two or three months, the time lost would be minimal. Thus, receipt of college credit for time spent in the military or in other government service received the support of the governmental body responsible for civilian personnel management.

Despite the efforts to induce students to remain in school, the call to duty was too great for many resist. At the University of Virginia 230 students applied for admission to the summer ROTC camp held at Fort Meyer, Virginia in July 1917. The Army rejected
sixty of these students, for various reasons. Those accepted attended the camp and competed for commissions in the Army. The possibility of an officer's commission rather than service as a line soldier provided further inducement to participate in such camps.

Passage of the Selective Service Act in 1917, with its draft age of twenty-one-years, meant that upper level college students were prime candidates for draft notices. The Board and administrators at the University of Virginia understood this fact. Consequently, they voted to refund fees to students drafted for military service. On May 31, 1917, the Board of Visitors at the University of Virginia authorized the President to refund fees paid by students drafted for the military service, resolving: "that the release of fees by students who may be drafted be left to the President, with the expression of the Board that as a policy such release be made."

Student departures led to another issue—the amount of credit, if any, to award for partially completed coursework. At the University of Virginia, the Committee on National Service decided to award the same credit to students who left for a Federal Training Camp committed to the Officer Reserve Corps as to students who departed for enlistment in the military. In providing credit and refunding fees, the University of Virginia more than met the request of the Civil Service Commission.

*Accommodations for Departing Faculty Members*

Draft-aged faculty members and administrators, no doubt, were concerned about their futures should they receive a draft notice, take a leave of absence, or resign to support the war effort. The University of Virginia supported faculty members and administrators as generously as it supported departing students. As a matter of policy,
should a member of the University of Virginia faculty enter government service, the school was committed to holding the professor’s position open until his return. Additionally, should the professor accept a reduced salary in governmental service, the school determined to pay the difference, so long as its financial resources allowed.\textsuperscript{184} These commitments to faculty members and administrators in government service exacerbated the financial difficulties cause by student departures, since the school committed itself to making payments to employees not engaged in university activities. Politically and morally, President Alderman and the Board of Visitors judged it the correct course, but they did so knowing that it presented additional difficulties for them to overcome.

Throughout April 1917, President Alderman maintained a correspondence with his counterparts around the country. His principle purpose was to determine if other schools intended to provide employment protection to faculty and staff departing the school for government service. The presidents, collectively supported the war effort, but were divided as to whether faculty and staff positions would be protected.

Perhaps the most interesting correspondence came from President W. J. Martin, of Davidson College in North Carolina. Martin sent a letter to the U. S. Secretary of Agriculture suggesting that the government coordinate a mass closing of colleges in May 1917. The closure would last until September for the purpose of providing the students’ service to the country as agricultural workers.\textsuperscript{185} Alderman responded to Martin, “I think your suggestion...a very fine one, and I would like to see it generally adopted in America.”\textsuperscript{186} Nothing suggests that Alderman’s support extended beyond the correspondence. Alderman also received responses from Presidents Denny (Alabama),
President Denny, in a hand-written note at the bottom of his formal response to a second letter from Alderman, stated “I am in sympathy with the suggestion...I should myself like to serve the country: and expect to do so if I am called and my board is willing to give me a leave of absence and take care of my family.” While seemingly altruistic, one must wonder about Denny’s real interest since the statement of desire for service was only if care was taken of his family, while millions volunteered for service without such a safety net.

Determining that he was on the right course following his correspondence with other university presidents, in preparation for the 1917-1918 academic year, President Alderman prepared two budgets, one for war and one for peace. In his war budget, Alderman sought to protect the faculty. He maintained salaries and provided for the differential to be paid to faculty members in governmental service. He recognized that cuts were required and tried to make them as painless as possible by limiting cuts to support and equipment. The cuts, based upon input from department heads, were those that would not result in “a ruinous difference in their work.”

Despite the efforts of university presidents, intercollegiate organizations, student and alumni newspapers, and other interested parties, young men continued to leave school to enlist in the armed services or seek commissions in training camps. As the months went on and public support for the country’s engagement in the war increased, to do less, one can surmise, was seemingly to display cowardice or a lack of patriotism. The young men of America, when placed in this position responded as young men always have. They
reacted in the same way their counterparts in England, France, Germany, and Russia reacted. Absent an alternative, they moved to the colors and supported their nation as they thought best.

However, when presented with the innovative prospect created by the establishment of the SATC, the young men of America were willing to take a second look and reevaluate the possibilities. The SATC allowed young men to serve as *bona fide* members of the military. It also gave them the opportunity to compete for officer’s training while continuing their education on the college campus. The most successful candidates would receive further training at an officer’s training camp.

Table 3 shows the impact of the SATC on enrollment at the University of Virginia. Total enrollment was 1,016. Eight hundred and twenty-four men or slightly more than 81 percent of the all-male student body enlisted as privates in the Army. The rise in enrollment in the fall of 1918 is a direct result of the interest in attending college generated by the SATC “within every young man of draft age, who had obtained a high school education...to hold a commission in the army or navy.”

Table 3. University of Virginia SATC Enrollment October 1, 1918

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>College</th>
<th>Medical Dept</th>
<th>Engineering Dept</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inducted</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrolled</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Unit</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reserve Force</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>824</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
On October 16, 1918, H. L. Bridges, the Registrar at the College of William and Mary, reported the enrollment to President Tyler\textsuperscript{191}, as shown in Table 4.

Table 4. College of William and Mary Enrollment October 16, 1918\textsuperscript{192}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SATC applicants meeting academic requirements</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SATC applicants with only 12 high school units</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total applicants for SATC</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number non-SATC entering college</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of women entering college</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total admissions</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number withdrew before Oct 1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number rejected by SATC and departed</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total withdrawals</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number now in college</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number rejected by SATC</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number departed before induction</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number held up because 21 years of age</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number in SATC to date</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the totals in Tables 3 and 4 suggest, the SATC was successful in bringing students to the campus. At the University of Virginia, the SATC raised the student body to an acceptable level. In fact, following the disbanding of the SATC the student body at the University of Virginia declined. President Alderman reported that the university had 890 students in residence on 1 March 1919, which was down from 1,203 in residence earlier in the year.\textsuperscript{193} At the College of William and Mary, the SATC may have been the only program that could have prevented the school closing again as it teetered on the brink of collapse. The influx of students at the college is unlikely to have resulted from any other means.
Despite the difficulties associated with the SATC and the dissatisfaction in many quarters with the overall administration of the program, it did effectively serve its secondary purpose. The SATC was responsible for the continued operation of some universities and it enhanced the operations of others, which would have curtailed some services without it. On this measure, if on no other, the SATC was a smashing success.

141 Minutes, College and University Division of the Education Section of the Advisory Commission of the Council on National Defense, dtd 2-4 July 1917, UVA Archives RG2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 6 File 2 of 7.
142 Walker, H., "Col Ewell's College."
143 Goodson, S. "The Tyler Era."
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
149 Goodson, S. "The Tyler Era."
150 Letter Page to Alderman dtd 13 Aug 9117, UVA Archives RG2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 6 File 2 of 7.
151 Wallenstein, *Virginia Tech*.
152 UVA withdrawal report 28 Feb 1918, UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 4 of 7.
153 Letters Cohen to Alderman dtd 8 Dec 1917 and Alderman to Cohen dtd 11 Dec 1917 UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 3 of 7.
154 Letters McKelway to Page dtd 6 Dec 1917; Alderman to McKelway dtd 12 Dec 1917; McKelway to Alderman dtd 14 Dec 1917; and Alderman to McKelway dtd 15 Dec 1917. All letters are contained in UVA Archives RG 2-1-2.472 Subseries III Box 6 Files M/Mc 1 of 7.
155 Letter President, Junior Plattsburg to Alderman undated UVA Archives RG2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 6 File 2 of 7.
156 Goodson, S. "The Tyler Era."
159 Letter Echols to War Department, 19 Mar 17, UVA Archives RG 2-1-2.472 Subseries III Box 6 Files M/Mc 1 of 7.
160 Letter Fackenthal (Secretary of Columbia University) to Alderman, 21 Mar 17; Letter Hibbens to Alderman, 21 Mar 17; Letter Goodnow (Pres, Johns Hopkins) to Alderman 22 Mar 17; Letter Schurman (Pres Cornell) to Alderman, 22 Mar 17; Letter Kelly (Prof of Mil Sci, UPenn) to Alderman, 23 Mar 1917.
161 Minutes, UVA Board of Visitors, 23 Mar 1917 UVA Archives BOV Minutes Box IX File 2/3 of 8.
162 Ibid.
164 Ibid.
167 The UVA and the War, Council on Military Service, 11 April 1917, UVA Archives RG 2-1-2.472 Subseries III Box 6 Files M/Mc 1 of 7.
168 Exhibit H to Minutes of the University Council on Government Service, dtd 11 Apr 1917, UVA Archives RG 2-1-2.472 Subseries III Box 6 Files M/Mc 1 of 7.
Newton D. Baker was born in Martinsburg, West Virginia on December 3, 1871. He graduated from Johns Hopkins University in 1892 and received a law degree from Washington and Lee University in 1894. He served as Secretary to the Postmaster General 1896-1897. After practicing law for several years, he was elected mayor of Cleveland, Ohio in 1912, serving until 1916. He served as the Secretary of War during the second Wilson Administration, 1916-1921. After returning to private practice, Baker also served on several international commissions. He died on December 25, 1937. (Bell, G. Secretaries of War and Secretaries of the Army (Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History 1992.).

Gruber, Mars and Minerva, Capen, The Effects of the World War, Perry, The Universities in War Time, Perry, The Demobilized Professor.


The national leadership of the Young Men’s Christian Association (Y.M.C.A.) made efforts to exempt local directors of Y.M.C.A. college programs from the draft. They requested President Alderman’s support to exempt the University of Virginia Y.M.C.A. campus director so he could “stick to his task and ... conserve the characters of the men who are to be conscripted....” Letter, Wratherfron to Alderman, dtd 25 July, 1917, UVA Archives RG2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 6 File 2 of 7.

191 Lyon G. Tyler, son of President John Tyler, was born late in his father’s life on August 24, 1853 at Sherwood Forest, in Charles City County, Virginia. Lyon Tyler graduated from the University of Virginia in 1874. He taught at the College of William and Mary 1877-1878, leaving because he was dissatisfied with his salary. He served as a school principal, practiced law, and practiced law. In 1887, he was elected to the House of Delegates. In 1888, Tyler became President of the College of William and Mary, serving until his retirement in 1919. Tyler died in February 1935. (Godson, S. “The Tyler Era, 1888-1919,” In Goodson, et.al. The College of William and Mary: A History Volume II, 1888-1993, 439-516.)

192 Letter Registrar to Tyler, dtd 16 Oct 1919, William and Mary Archives.

193 Minutes, UVA Board of Visitors dtd 4 Mar 1919 UVA Archives Board of Visitors Minutes Box IX File 2 and 3 of 8.
Chapter 3

Universities Seek to Become Part of the War Effort

From the time it became apparent that the United States could not avoid participating in the European conflict escalating into World War One, the University of Virginia and the College of William and Mary sought ways to support productively the war effort. At first, their efforts were haphazard and amounted to little. But, as their knowledge matured, the schools, as collective organizations, were able to effectively harness the tools at hand and begin to provide support to their students and the country.

College leaders became increasingly alarmed during the latter stages of 1917 as enrollments continued to decrease. Students and faculty responded to President Wilson’s call by enlisting for service or accepting federal government positions. College leaders worried that their institutions would be drained of talent, as had occurred in Europe. It took until the spring of 1918, but a plan was finally developed that would effectively utilize the structure of American colleges, train leaders, and preserve colleges for the future. The embodiment of this plan was the Students’ Army Training Corps.

A year passed between the American declaration of war on April 6, 1917 and when the plan for the SATC began to emerge in the spring of 1918. Conflicting information and sometimes adversarial governmental programs marked this period. College leaders, collectively and individually, looked for ways to increase the involvement of their campuses in the war effort and to preserve their institutions for the future. At the same time, the services and civilian government agencies increasing sought the support of colleges to fulfill their requirements, which included recruitment, training, veteran placement, administration and management.
The Army in 1917 did not have the sophisticated recruiting procedures that would become available in later years. In 1917, it relied heavily on word of mouth as soldiers recruited friends and acquaintances to the service. To complicate matters, the armed services, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps competed for servicemen. Additionally, competition for recruits existed between the various Army branches as coordination of recruiting practices did not occur until the establishment of the draft by the Selective Service Act of 1917.

Indicative of the uncoordinated recruiting procedures of the time, University of Virginia's President Alderman received correspondence by the fall of 1917 from several sources seeking his support for the enlistment of students in the Army. Many of these letters were of a vein similar to one written by three University of Virginia alumni serving as Army captains. The captains, all assigned to the 313th Field Artillery Regiment at Camp Lee, outside Petersburg, VA, sought Alderman's permission to make a recruiting visit to the campus in an effort to lure students into an enlistment with their unit. Alderman, undoubtedly conflicted by his support for the war effort and by the potential loss of students, responded that he "would not deny you the privilege for anything in the world." However, he believed "that young men who are here under the draft age should not be encouraged to leave at this stage in our relation to the war. Science must live, and universities must exist for the nation's sake not for their own sake." Thus, the universities not only had to respond to the individual services competing with each other for enlistees, but to the branches which at times competed with the parent service. Further, members of individual units made recruiting contacts and visits seeking enlistments directly into the unit organization.
In addition to permission to recruit on campus, Alderman also received requests for names from branches of the Army in the War Department’s recruiting effort. In one response to such a request, Alderman sent a list of fourteen names of graduates he deemed suitable for flying service to the Aviation Section of the Army’s Signal Branch. He communicated these fourteen names by rank order according to his view of how qualified and useful they would be to the Army. Far from being merely Virginia graduates, his list indicates a distribution of alumni from Texas, Arizona, Kentucky, and the Carolinas.196

The War Department was not the only governmental organization soliciting information concerning the skills and availability of American students. Prior to the declaration of war, John McIlhenny, Chairman of the United States Civil Service Commission asked President Alderman in March 1917 for a list of students studying scientific and technical courses who might be willing to enter government service following their graduation. McIlhenny also requested that any student called to government service prior to his actual graduation be granted constructive credit for his remaining coursework and be graduated with his class.197 As previously discussed, the University of Virginia offered financial support to faculty members who took a federal position at a reduced salary and presumptive credit plus tuition refunds to students departing for government service.198

As the summer of 1917 wore on, the War Department was as befuddled as the colleges and uncertain about the proper relationship and function of the colleges. On June 3, the Adjutant General’s office asked among others President Alderman if the University of Virginia would host, as part of the expanded Plattsburg Movement, a Junior Training Camp to train men too young for other camps, like those held in Plattsburg, NY.199 By the
end of the month, the Adjutant General authorized the creation of junior training camps using the arms and equipment available at the host institutions. The Adjutant General established two requirements. First, Army personnel were to involve themselves only in military training. All other aspects of running the camps were the host institution’s responsibility. Second, the camp could not realize extra revenue for the school. Participants paid their own expenses, but the host institution could not profit from the camp. Eventually, the War Department, for unknown reasons, decided against such a camp on the University of Virginia campus.

Seeking locations for summer camps was not the only indication of the continuing struggle to develop programs to support the Army’s needs. As previously mentioned, the War Department opened several aviation schools at universities during the summer of 1917. In June 1917, the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, asked President Alderman if the University of Virginia would be interested in hosting such a school as the program expanded. Ultimately, an aviation school did not open at the university, but a school for truck drivers and other skilled artisans did.

When the country entered into the World War I, veteran’s benefits, as defined today, did not exist. No governmental programs supported the reintegration of soldiers into society or provided long-term medical treatment to those wounded in the conflict. In recognition of these needs, the War Department initiated support programs for veterans. One such re-entry program proposal sought higher education placement for returning wounded veterans. Responding positively to a September 28, 1917 letter from the War Department, President Alderman detailed the possibilities for the entry of such men as students at the university adding “[have] any young men deserving to come here write me
and I will attend to each case individually and quickly."²⁰³ No records suggest that this proposal advanced beyond the initial discussions.

The War Department also used the universities as vetting agencies for attendance at the officer training camps by only accepting nominees who certified as graduates by the submitting university. This process increased the flow of correspondence to university presidents as graduates sought certification from their alma mater to gain admission to the officer training camps.²⁰⁴

The picture that the government presented to university presidents during 1917 and the first half of 1918 was cloudy at best. Governmental agencies competed for the support from universities. However, the government developed no coherent approach or program to utilize available resources at colleges and universities in an efficient and effective manner. Further, the information received from various government agencies represented their organizational needs in the competition for recruits. In response, University presidents banded together in an effort to bring order to chaos.

**The Universities Seek a Mission**

One such organization that included presidents and enabled them to strategize together was the Council of National Defense. Congress established the Council of National Defense to manage the domestic aspects of the nation’s war effort as part of the National Defense Act of 1916. Chaired by Secretary of War Baker, the remaining members included leaders in government, business, and education.²⁰⁵ State and local committees formed along similar lines to effective utilize resources within smaller regions. President Alderman served as a member of the College and University Division of the Education Section of the Committee on Engineering and Education of the Advisory
Committee of the Council of National Defense.

Congress declared war on April 6th, a mere forty days prior to the CEE's first meeting. Conducting its first meeting on May 6, 1917, a group of more than 150 representatives of the leading colleges met in Washington to discuss their collective future. Their principal concerns were to support the nation during the wartime crisis and to determine means of enabling universities to continue operations. At the conclusion of the conference, the college presidents posted resolutions to President Wilson. These resolutions affirmed their desire to support the war effort and to work together toward that end. The preamble to the resolutions indicates how widespread belief in the war effort had become and continued the American tradition of viewing warfare as a crusade:

In the supreme crisis that confronts the Nation the colleges and universities of America ... consecrate their every power to the high task of securing for all mankind those ideas and ideals that gave them birth and out of which have grown their most precious traditions.

The Committee on Engineering and Education (CEE), one of several major subcommittees of the Council of National Defense, composed of several university presidents, was one of the earliest examples of the universities joining together to create a consolidated approach toward dealing with the government and the war. The committee recognized that fifty-seven different governmental organizations were receiving offers of service from universities. As a consequence, the CEE took control, acting as a clearing house for university queries and responses.

Resolved, That this committee [shall] advise all colleges and universities that all communications upon all questions relating to the present emergency in which they are interested may be sent here to this committee, and that the committee will answer these communications or will request that they be answered by such other agencies as the officers of the committee in cooperation with the Bureau of Education of the Department of the Interior and the states relations service of the Department of Agriculture may select.
Using their status as a subcommittee of the Council of National Defense to their benefit, the CEE also addressed the need for qualified men to teach military instruction at the colleges and the lack of military equipment available to the colleges.

Resolved, That the Council of National Defense be requested to recommend to the Department of War the recruiting of men competent to give military instruction, but ineligible for active service, and that detailing of such men for the giving of military instruction in the colleges and universities and that, so far as possible, equipment be provided, in accordance with the provisions of the National-Defense Act of June, 1916; and, further, that, wherever it is impossible for a college to muster a unit of 100 men for military training, it be approved that, for the purposes of military instruction, two or three colleges may be served by a single instructor.\(^{208}\)

At its second meeting on May 16, 1917, the CEE formed a subcommittee to address questions to the War Department. Through these questions the universities attempted to determine the parameters of War Department support to the schools because the college presidents and the War Department were both uncertain as to the extent and type of their relationship. The colleges sought financial support to expand their curriculum to incorporate military instruction. They submitted questions which fell into five categories of support for the Reserve Officer’s Training Corps, including personnel, equipment, uniforms, arms, and training.

Answers arrived quickly and in time for the third meeting, two weeks later.\(^{209}\) The responses to the questions indicated that the War Department intended long-term support, but due to the needs of the active force, support to colleges would not occur quickly. Viewing the competing priorities, the War Department ranked the developmental work at the colleges lower than other requirements. Uniforms were unavailable for colleges because the requirement to clothe hundreds of thousands entering active service. Against this, the needs of a few college boys must have seemed trivial.
In response to the War Department's increased attention to the colleges, the college presidents demonstrated that they were willing to make drastic changes on their campuses to support the war effort. As shall be shown, they revised their collegiate curricula and the academic calendars. Through the CEE they called for closer cooperation between their administrations and the government. Finally, at first individually then in an effort coordinated by the CEE, they asked for information concerning the government's plans to pursue the war so they could better plan their support.²¹⁰

The War Department did not respond to these offers of support from the university presidents immediately, primarily because it didn't have a single point of contact to handle the issue. Initially, the Adjutant General's office handled much of the traffic from the universities. The Adjutant General's Committee on Personnel Classification handled questions concerning trades. In February 1918, Adjutant General formed the Committee on Special Education and Training (CEST). This organization, ultimately, became the War Department point of contact for universities.²¹¹

One of the early programs created by the CEST was the National Army Training Detachments (NATD). Under NATD, the War Department established training centers at universities and technical schools around the country. These schools contracted with the War Department to provide technical and skills training, such as truck driving and automobile maintenance. The NATD proved extremely successful, preparing several thousand soldiers each month for deployment each month.

Following several weeks of discussion during the spring of 1918, the CEST decided to extend the NATD program to incorporate the training of men considered candidates for attendance at officers' training camps. On May 8, 1918, Secretary of War
Newton Baker announced his plan to the presidents of all colleges. The War Department intended to create a comprehensive system of military training at the colleges in September 1918. The War Department’s primary objective was to train young men for military service; preservation the colleges for the future was a secondary consideration and benefit.212

Baker predicated the expanded program upon provisions of the National Defense Act of 1916. Among those provisions was the establishment of a military draft of men over the age of twenty-one. Significantly, this left the pool of young men aged eighteen to twenty relatively untouched by the military and available to the colleges. General Orders,213 dated June 28, 1918, provided details of the proposed implementation of the plan discussed in Baker’s letter. The order created a new organization called the Students’ Army Training Corps (SATC). Units were to be established at colleges enrolling more than one hundred able-bodied male students. The members of the SATC would enlist in the Army, becoming active duty soldiers, and be placed on furlough status during their time on campus. As soldiers, they would be subject to the orders of the President.214

The War Department agreed, in principle, not to call SATC soldiers from their furlough status prior to the completion of their studies or their attaining the draft age of twenty-one years established in the National Defense Act of 1916, which ever came first. While enrolled in the SATC, the soldier-students would receive six hours of military drill and four hours of military instruction in addition to their normal curriculum each week.215

Passage of the Selective Service Act of 1918 in August rendered the plans for the SATC obsolete before it could become a reality by reducing the draft age to eighteen-years of age.216 The guarantee concerning continuation of studies made by Secretary
Baker gave rise to political concerns that some might view the SATC as a means of protecting college students from the draft and subsequent combat service in Europe. Continuing its improvisational program development, the CEST rapidly modified the plan for the SATC to meet the new reality presented by the Selective Service Act.

When the War Department announced its intention to request the reduction of the draft age, the CEST began immediate revision of the plans for the SATC. The CEST developed and presented a plan for a modified version of the SATC, which Secretary Baker announced to the colleges. Under the new plan the government would, essentially, take over entire collegiate institutions. College administrators would assume a support role with responsibility for the physical plant but not the curriculum. The only requirements the current faculty would perform would be those relating directly to instruction, the subject of which the War Department would approve. To participate in the program, universities submitted applications to the War Department. Following acceptance, the campuses would become active duty military posts and serve as officer training facilities with all able-bodied male students enlisted as privates.217

As a former university president, President Wilson understood the long-term importance of collegiate education to the nation. On July 31, 1918, he wrote to the Secretary of the Interior, Franklin K. Lane praising the efforts of Americans to maintain consistency in all levels of education during the war. Wilson did not limit his thinking to present needs; he was well aware of future requirements. "After the war there will be urgent need not only for trained leadership in all lines of industrial, commercial, social, and civic life, but for a very high average of intelligence and preparation on the part of all people."218
The College of William and Mary Supports the War Effort

At William and Mary, the student newspaper, the Flat Hat, began agitating for military training for students in early 1917, but little action occurred until the US officially entered the war.\(^{219}\) On February 13, 1917, the Flat Hat suggested that it would be wise for students to familiarize themselves with the requirements the college must meet to obtain Army support for military training. They printed an extract from a War Department bulletin detailing the requirements that the school must fulfill prior to the assignment of an Army officer. These included:

1) Military training must be compulsory for physically qualified students.
2) Students must be uniformed at no expense to the government.
3) Detailed officers must be considered members of the faculty.
4) The course of military instruction will be determined by the War Department, but the university will provide a suitable classroom.\(^{220}\)

On March 6, 1917, S. J. Hubbard, Jr., an athletic coach at the college, suggested in the Flat Hat that the college should hire an athletic coach with the requisite military training to provide instruction to the student body.\(^{221}\) Hubbard, in the same issue, suggested that the college should consider whether military training truly had the support of the students and faculty prior to hiring an officer to run the military program.\(^{222}\)

Later in the month, on March 29, 1917, the students and faculty of William and Mary met to discuss “measures against the outrages upon humanity involved in the German submarine’ campaign.” Following speeches by President Tyler and several faculty members the assembly unanimously adopted several resolutions. These resolutions clearly show that the student body at William and Mary was desirous of military training. The faculty and students affirmed their support for severing diplomatic ties with
Germany, for taking measures to protect American interests on the seas and for adopting measures to increase national defense.\textsuperscript{223}

When the US officially entered the war on April 6, 1917, the students and faculty at William and Mary held a joint rally supporting President Wilson.\textsuperscript{224} As shall be seen later, William and Mary was slow to apply for participation in the ROTC program authorized by the National Defense Act of 1916. In the spring of 1917, the college hired a reserve captain to conduct military training. During 1917-1918 academic year, an active duty captain provided training to students and faculty. When the War Department announced plans for the SATC, President Tyler lost no time in applying. The program seemed tailor made for a school like William and Mary, which continued to struggle to maintain a student body large enough to support its operations.

In the fall of 1918, Major Stone, the former military instructor at Virginia Tech, was reassigned by the War Department and arrived in Williamsburg to take command of the program. First Lieutenant Van Dusen\textsuperscript{225}, an activated reserve officer arrived training shortly afterward to assist. The War Department assigned additional officers as the final structure of the SATC began to take shape.

Like many colleges, William and Mary began to advertise its participation in the SATC in local and distant newspapers and sought students from far and wide by advertising in newspapers such as the New York Times (Figure 1).\textsuperscript{226} The Virginian-Pilot, the local newspaper of Norfolk, announced on October 26 William and Mary was accepting applications for admission into the SATC. "The government is very anxious to have civilians who are qualified by education and practical experiences for the different branches of the service," reported the newspaper.\textsuperscript{227} Several potential students responded
to these advertisements and received notification from the Lieutenant Van Dusen that they could enroll if the reported to William and Mary, with the proper prerequisites. As advertised, applicants for the SATC-A needed thirteen units of high school credit.

Figure 3. New York Times Ad October 18, 1918

VACANCIES
at
William and Mary College
Williamsburg, Va.
in Students Army Training Corps
13 Units Required
Wire Application to
LYON G. TYLER, President
WILLIAM AND MARY COLLEGE

The University of Virginia Supports the War Effort

The situation at the University of Virginia was somewhat different than the other universities in the state in that it had a functioning medical school that prepared physicians for service to the community and beyond. During the early years of the war, before the entry of the United States, many universities organized ambulance companies to support the Red Cross and Allied field operations in Europe. The University of Virginia was among the first to do so and was the first to purchase and equip an ambulance to provide this support. University personnel donated one thousand dollars toward the effort. The ambulance company deployed to France and provided service to the allied armies.
Awareness of international events did not end with the deployment of the ambulance company. In late March 1917, after gaining Board of Visitors approval despite stiff opposition from the University Rector, President Alderman officially requested that the War Department establish an ROTC detachment at University of Virginia. He specifically requested the War Department to assign a West Point graduate as the instructor. The War Department assigned Lieutenant Colonel Cole, a graduate of West Point and Army retiree residing in Charlottesville to serve as the instructor.

Several days after the Board of Visitors approved the ROTC application, President Alderman addressed the student body concerning the international situation, placing the conflict and the university’s new role in the war in context. Germany, in response to the continued stagnation of the ground war in Europe, had increased the tempo of attacks on international shipping in an effort to reduce the supplies reaching the allies and to force the British to discuss seriously terms of peace. Alderman sought to provide information and justification for the new endeavors in which UVa was about to engage.

I have never drawn a neutral breath since August 1914 .... For the past few weeks perhaps no strong maritime nation has ever endured such humiliation. American ships have stayed in their harbors, not daring to go out because they were informed that if they came out on any errand, however peaceful, their crews would be murdered and their ships sunk ... our ships cannot sail the seas carrying a cargo of flour without paying the price of the life of their crews.... So we stand on the brink of war, and the question is - what is our duty....Personally I believe in universal military service.... universal military service fights against militarism by putting the social emphasis on duties instead of arbitrary rights, and by teaching discipline, obedience to law, and common obligation and sacrifice. It is our purpose to establish here at this University a unit of the Officers’ Reserve Training Corps. The object of this new department in the university will be to train and fit men for service as officers in the army of the United States ... Universities are reservoirs out of which the men and the talents needed for officers must come.... As a practical matter, I believe it would be best for young men, under twenty, to remain at college, certainly for young high school graduates to come to college and remain there, taking both the training that will sharpen their brains and the training which will prepare them for military service.... When democracies
organize, they have to organize their souls before they organize their machines, and to organize the soul of a nation or an individual is a difficult business. 32

Alderman, in this single speech, addressed the issues facing both the universities as corporate entities and the faculty and students as individuals. First, he set the context of the war and justified the country's coming participation by describing German submarine warfare and its impact upon the individual merchant seaman and on commerce. Second, he discussed the need and benefits deriving from military service and preparatory training for it. Third, he described how this training would fit within the life of the university, already a major concern of Rector Gordon's. 33 Finally, he recommended to the student body that at least those not yet of majority age remain in school and not enlist. By doing so, he implied, they would be offering a greater service to the country by preparing their minds and bodies for service as leaders in the future. Faculty, too, should stay since, by implication, someone must be available to teach the students convinced to remain on campus.

Many of the faculty at the University of Virginia, especially those highly trained in a scientific, engineering, or medical field, wished to use their talents to support the war effort as well. 234 In April 1917, Professor Theodore Bunting, sought and received permission from the faculty military council to begin a training program designed to provide instruction to students in the use of wireless telegraph equipment for future service in the Signal Corps. The Board of Visitors approved the purchase the equipment required to train fifteen to twenty students, but when thirty-eight students applied, and the size of the equipment purchase request was doubled. 235

The University of Virginia established the Council on National Service with President Alderman serving as chair. The committee met for the first time on April 1,
1917 and voted to recommend the creation of a military course, which would carry degree credit, to the Board of Visitors. Additionally, the committee sought inclusion of the anticipated Federal military officer in the faculty organization.\textsuperscript{236} A special committee of the Council on National Service developed a policy that the Board of Visitors ratified in its April 19\textsuperscript{th} meeting to guide the University of Virginia for the duration of the war. The policy stated:

(1) All the resources, in the way of men and equipment, which it possessed, should be put at the disposal of the National Government;
(2) Its regular functions and activities should not be interrupted;
(3) The students under twenty-one years of age,-- who were not eligible to commissions ... should continue in their classes at the University of Virginia, and if physically fit, prepare themselves for the front by acquiring the military training offered on campus;
(4) The departments of engineering and medicine, and the hospital also, should be used for the national benefit;
(5) All college athletics should be suspended; and
(6) Leave of absence should be granted to all members of the Faculty and officers of administration whose offer of their services should be accepted by the government at Washington.\textsuperscript{237}

In addition to the University Council on National Service, the University of Virginia faculty created several committees from among the faculty departments, including law, Medicine, Engineering, and the College and Graduate schools. These committees sought ways to more effectively utilize the resources of the individual schools and departments to support the war effort.\textsuperscript{238} The faculty efforts extended to their own physical involvement as well. About twenty members of the University of Virginia faculty who did not have gardens at their homes formed a Farm Club and began cultivating two acres of land near the university. They grew staple crops for local consumption and soon undertook responsibility for supervising the cultivation of eight additional acres.\textsuperscript{239}
As the nation approached entering the conflict in the spring of 1917, students who remained on campus continued vocal and material support for increasing university. After the nation entered the war, the student body at University of Virginia displayed, like the faculty, willingness to sacrifice for the war effort. In one example, the brothers of the Delta Psi fraternity, who by long standing tradition hosted an annual social gathering for the university community and guests on Easter Sunday, changed their plans. Rather than hold the festivities, they donated the $250.00 they would have spent on the party to the Council on National Security to support preparation of students for future service. Additional sacrifice occurred on the athletic field, as the Executive Committee of the General Athletic Association suspended all inter-collegiate athletic events for the semester.

Student Interest Develops

While the War Department and the colleges rushed planning during the summer of 1918 to enable the SATC to begin in October, young men began gathering information as well as supporting documents in an effort to secure positions within the program. Some responded to advertisements such as those posted by the College of William and Mary in the New York Times. Many young men began writing to colleges seeking information concerning the SATC and securing letters of recommendation to prepare for their application to the program.

One such young man, J. A. Moore of Norfolk, Virginia, sought and received several letters of recommendation from his employer and others. Moore forwarded the letters to the SATC at the College of William and Mary. He included a letter written specifically recommending him to the U. S. Navy for a position as an assistant Paymaster,
suggested that his principal interest was entering the service. He also submitted letters from his employer and his high school assistant principal.

As news of the creation of the SATC spread, at least one young man who was already in military service saw in it the possibility of completing their education. One such young man, Private Walter H. Cheatham, writing on William and Mary Debating Society stationary, sought the advice and support of the Commanding Officer of the William and Mary SATC unit in an effort to return to college. Cheatham wrote,

As I have been a student at the above college for the past three sessions and am very desirous to complete my courses in order that I may fit myself more thoroughly to render my most efficient service to the Government. I am writing with regards to the possibility of obtaining a transfer or release from duties at this camp to the unit of the S.A.T.C. at W&M.

Writing on September 13, 1918, President Tyler offered his support to the request of Private Cheatham, writing to the Commandant of Camp Humphreys.

Mr. Cheatham ... could ... take his degree in one more year. Mr. Cheatham is a steady, consistent student and is a very excellent young man. I think he would be greatly benefited ... without detriment to the service. The work ... would be in chemistry, physics, mathematics, history, and modern languages. All of which ... will be offered this session in the S.A.T.C. Mr. Cheatham would also be able to secure military training at the College of William and Mary.

Tyler's letter displays his growing understanding of the ways of the military. As shall be seen, one of the principal difficulties encountered at William and Mary was communication. Although he mentions the benefit to Cheatham in his being allowed to complete his studies, Tyler couches it by saying that there should be no detriment to the service. He also describes the training that will be available via the SATC with the implicit suggestion since there will be no detriment that the training available at William and Mary will be equivalent to the training available at Camp Humphreys.
The number of men making such requests was sufficient to induce Brigadier General Rees, Chairman of the CEST, to provide the following policy statement concerning such transfers.

The purpose of the Students Army Training Corps is to supply the Army as rapidly as possible with technically and vocationally trained men, and officer material; not to provide either soldiers in the military service or civilians an opportunity to continue their education for personal reasons.\textsuperscript{245}

Not all applicants were acceptable. The Army established height and weight parameters for enlistment; for instance, potential SATC members who stood 73” tall had to weigh between 156 and 196 pounds with a chest measurement of at least 35 1/2” with three inches of mobility during breathing.\textsuperscript{246} On December 4, 1917, President Alderman received a letter in support of a Mr. Erskine Buford who had applied for admission to the officer training camps. Lieutenant Colonel Cole denied Buford, a University of Virginia graduate, admission because he had not attended officer training while an undergraduate, he was underweight, and his chest measurement was under the minimum. Buford submitted statements concerning his health and vitality; however, the War Department advised Cole against admitting him.\textsuperscript{247}

\textit{Miscellaneous Requests for Support}

In response to a request from the Committee on Public Information Foreign Press Bureau for an article concerning the activities of the University of Virginia during the war, President Alderman asked James Bardin to write a response. Bardin’s submission summarizes the activities at the University of Virginia since the declaration of war. Titled “The University of Virginia and the War,” it leaves no doubt that the administration was fully cognizant of the historical implications of its actions and wanted them recorded accordingly.\textsuperscript{248}
When the United States declared war upon Germany, the University of Virginia contained within itself not single element that was designed to assist directly the nation in an affair of arms.... But unprepared as she was, the spirit of Virginia arose to the occasion.... One of the first acts was to organize...Reserve Officers' Training Corps.... with an enrollment of 784 out of a total student registration of about 1,100.... The university placed all her scientific resources at the disposal of the Government, and the departments of Chemistry, of Physics and of Geology have been steadily engaged in valuable research work, while the Engineering School has undertaken a great deal of practical, constructive work, as well as certain forms of research, at the request of the Government. Thirty-two students enrolled themselves in the Industrial Reserve for Chemistry.... the University has organized a Truck Driver’s School, to accommodate and train six hundred men.

As the war effort matured, the universities increasingly received requests for support from governmental, military, and civilian organizations. These requests ranged from informational to the provision of potential soldiers. Additionally, a multitude of private and quasi-private organizations developed. Many sought the support of universities for their recruiting efforts. The number of requests and the variety of sources indicate that the universities, the War Department, and other agencies still had not determined appropriate levels and methods of interaction.

In early March 1918, President Alderman received a letter from the Office of the Chief Signal Officer seeking immediate assistance in supplying experienced personnel for the Army. Captain Kinsley, a staff officer, requested that Alderman poll the university for experienced radio operators – not those currently undergoing radio training on campus but students with prior experience. In an example of poor operational security, Kinsley advised the President that if they agreed to enter the Army, they would place these students into small groups and train them on “methods and equipment so secret no hint of their nature has been allowed to reach the public.” Ultimately, three University of Virginia students responded to the call.
In a letter dated April 20, 1918, President Alderman was offered the opportunity to provide a scholarship to the summer Junior Plattsburg camp to a deserving student. He nominated a soon to be graduated senior named A. R. Shands. Two days later, in a telegram dated April 22, 1918, President Alderman notified the Adjutant General of the Army that the University of Virginia could not meet its quota for student participants at the Fourth Officers' Training Camp that summer, unless graduates and undergraduates with one year of military training were allowed to attend. The requirement established by the Army was that attendees must be college graduates to attend the Officer's Camps. Junior camps, such as the one for which Shands was nominated, were for undergraduates.

On April 22, 1918, P. P. Claxton, the U.S. Commissioner of Education, notified President Alderman, a member of the Committee on International Relations, of a meeting to discuss the best methods of training American students on international relations. The collective university presidents realized that once the war was over the need for men trained as experts in international affairs, economics, finance, and other business and social fields would be in high demand. American universities at the turn of the century were only beginning to develop programs capable of providing the breadth and depth of service that would be required.

University presidents across the country were sensitive to the needs of agriculture as well. While migrations to cities began following the Civil War, large numbers of Americans remained on family farms and required the support of their sons to bring in the harvest. This need was particularly acute with so many young men in uniform. On April 17, the President of Cornell University, Jacob Gould Schurman, wrote to Alderman that Cornell was delaying the opening of the term in the fall of 1918 until October 7th, to allow
student participation in harvesting crops. He also reported that the University of California and the University of Missouri had similar intentions. Cornell intended to make up for the delay by reducing the Christmas break to ten days and canceling other breaks during the academic year.253

President Alderman was not above seeking support from other organizations if he thought there would be a benefit for the University of Virginia. Two examples of this occurred during 1917. First, Alderman sought international support in the training of University of Virginia students. He contacted the British and Canadian embassies seeking to obtain the services of officers with frontline experience. Alderman thought that such officers would provide students with greater stimulations by increasing the realism of training and providing an example younger in age that LTC Cole, who was in his mid-fifties.254

Second, President Alderman wrote to the Surgeon General of the Army requesting that he consider the University of Virginia as a location for a reconstruction and rehabilitation hospital for returning soldiers. After extolling the virtues of the climate around the university he offered the laboratories of the several engineering fields as suitable for training recovering veterans in new vocations. He added that the soon to be opened School for Motor Truck Operators would provide additional training opportunities.255 Alderman continued his pursuit a veteran’s hospital with a letter to COL Frank Billings, Army Medical Corps, on May 10, 1918. Alderman requested an inspection of the UVA should a decision be made to place a hospital in the district which included Virginia.256 This discussion, like the discussion concerning the proposed aviation school, did not result in new programs at the University of Virginia.
Each of these propositions provided opportunities for the university to become involved in a different aspect of the war effort. In some instances, an outside organization approached the university, for example the Commissioner of Education seeking information on instructional techniques. In other instances, the university attempted to find a new mission on which it could work, like a hospital for wounded veterans. Each of these opportunities provided another step along the path to integrated effort between the universities and the federal government.

As the United States moved closer to war, the War Department and universities began an uneven and haphazard courtship. Slowly both sides developed an appreciation for what the other had to offer and both sides developed conceptions of how to best integrate needs and capabilities. From the passage of the National Defense Act of 1916, which created the ROTC through the spring of 1918, the War Department developed several programs that increasingly relied upon the support of universities. Initial efforts focused on the ROTC detachments.

With the creation of the CEST, the universities became involved with skills training. While at first blush, this seems beneath the university, few organizations had the ability to train any technical trades and skills in the numbers required by the Army. Given the need and the numbers, using engineering schools to train automobile mechanics, for instance, was not such a stretch of imagination.

As an increasing number of students and faculty ignored administration pleas to remain in school, the universities moved from a patriotic desire to assist in the war effort to a need to be needed. The only organization able to muster the resources, money, and
people to accomplish some missions is the federal government. Such was the case as the summer of 1918 approached.

194 Letter Christian, Bukely, Bartar, to Alderman dtd 21 Nov 1917, UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 3 of 7.
195 Letter Alderman to Christian dtd 3 Dec 1917, UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 3 of 7.
196 Letter Alderman to McConnell dtd 13 Nov 1917, UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 3 of 7.
197 Letter Mallhenny to Alderman, dtd 31 Mar 1917, UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 6 Files M/Mc/1 of 7.
198 Minutes, UVA Board of Visitors, dtd 31 May 1917, Board of Visitors Minutes Box IX File 2 and 3 of 8; Minutes of the University Council [Corps] for National Service, dtd 17 Apr 1917, UVA Archives RG 2-1-2.472 Subseries III Box 6 Files M/Mc 1 of 7; Alderman to Martin, dtd 19 April 1917, UVA Archives RG 2-1-2.472. Subseries III Box 6 Files M/Mc 1 of 7.
199 Letter HQ, Eastern Department, War Department to President UVA, dtd 3 Jun 1917, UVA Archives RG2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 6 File 2 of 7.
200 Memorandum Clark to The Commanding General, Eastern Department, subject: Junior Training Camps at Educational Institutions, dtd 28 Jun 1917 UVA Archives RG2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 6 File 2 of 7.
201 Letter Straub [sic] to Alderman dtd 23 July 1917, UVA Archives RG2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 6 File 2 of 7.
202 President Hoover signed Executive Order 5398 creating the Veterans Administration July 21, 1930. The Veterans Administration was elevated to cabinet level as the Department of Veteran’s Affairs in 1989.
204 Letter Weems to Alderman, dtd 18 Oct 1917, UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 3 of 7.
205 New York Times, “President Names Defense Advisers”. Secretary of War Newton Baker chaired the Council of National Defense. Additional government members included Secretaries of Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor. The appointed members were Daniel Willard, President of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, Dr. Franklin Martin, surgeon, Mr. Howard Coffin, American Automobile Association, Dr. Hollis Godfrey, President Drexel Institute, and Mr. Julius Rosenwald, President of Sears, Roebuck, and Co.
206 Kolbe, The Colleges in War Time p. 27.
207 Minutes of College and University Division of the Education Section of the Committee on Engineering and Education of the Advisory Committee of the Council of National Defense, 6 May 1917, UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 6 Files M/Mc/1 of 7.
208 Minutes of College and University Division of the Education Section of the Committee on Engineering and Education of the Advisory Committee of the Council of National Defense, 6 May 1917, UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 6 Files M/Mc/1 of 7.
209 Minutes of College and University Division of the Education Section of the Committee on Engineering and Education of the Advisory Committee of the Council of National Defense, 16 May 1917, UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 6 Files M/Mc/1 of 7.
210 Mann, Committee on Education and Special Training (CEST).
211 Mann, Committee on Education and Special Training (CEST), p. 57 and Kolbe, The Colleges in War Time, p. 70-71 cite the complete text of Baker’s letter as follows. May 8, 1918.
212 Gruber, Mars and Minerva.
Letter Gordon to John Skelton Williams, dtd 15 Jan 1917, UVA Archives MSS 38-145 Gordon Papers; UVA BOV minutes 23 Mar 1917, UVA Archives BOV Minutes Box IX File 2/3 of 8.

Bruce, UVA; University Military Activities, UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 6 File 2 of 7.

Bunting, Letter to Mil Council of UVA dtd 2 Apr 1917, UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 6 Files M/Mc 1 of 7

Bruce, UVA.

Ibid. p. 363-364.

Minutes UVA Board of Visitor Minutes, dtd 19 Apr 1917, p. 114, UVA Archives Board of Visitor Minutes Box IX Files 2 and 3 of 8.

The UVA and the War, Council on Military Service, 11 April 1917, UVA Archives RG 2-1-2.472 Subseries III Box 6 Files M/Mc 1 of 7.

Echols to Delta Psi, dtd 4 Apr 1917, UVA Archives RG 2-1-2.472 Subseries III Box 6 Files M/Mc 1 of 7.

Minutes, University Council on National Service, dtd 11 Apr 1917, UVA Archives RG 2-1-2.472 Subseries III Box 6 Files M/Mc 1 of 7.

Letter, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 682 (WM).

Letter, Cheatham to CO SATC at William and Mary, undated, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 682 (WM).

Letter, Tyler to Commandant, Camp Humphreys, VA, dtd 13 Sep 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 682 (WM).

Memorandum, Rees to Unstated, dtd 18 Oct 1918, Subject: Policy in re transfers, William and Mary Archives.


Letter Hunton to Alderman dtd 4 Dec 1917 and Cole to Alderman undted, UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 3 of 7.

Letter Bardin to Alderman dtd 29 Apr 1918 UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 4 of 7. Bardin's work with hand-written corrects submitted to Alderman for submission to the U.S. Committee on Public Information Foreign Press Bureau.

Letter Kinsley to Alderman dtd 1 Mar 1918 and Letter Hoxton to Alderman dtd 26 Mar 1919 both contained in UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 4 of 7.

Letter Capps to Alderman dtd 20 Apr 1918 and Alderman to Capps dtd 6 May 1918 UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 4 of 7.

Telegram Alderman to the Adjutant General of the Army dtd 22 Apr 1918, UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 4 of 7.

Letter Claxton to Alderman dtd 22 Apr 1918 UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 4 of 7.

Letter Schurman to Alderman dtd 17 Apr 1918 UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 4 of 7.

Letters Alderman to Trotter dtd 11 May 1918 and Alderman to Gwatken dtd 11 May 1918 both found in UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 4 of 7.

Letter Alderman to the Surgeon General of the Army dtd 19 Apr 1918 UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 4 of 7.

Letter Alderman to Billings dtd 14 May 1918 UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 4 of 7.
Negotiation for a Campus Presence

Though tenuous, the links between the American military and universities extend to the earliest periods of national history. Writing to James Monroe during the War of 1812, Thomas Jefferson professed the need for military training to enable the nation to respond to national emergencies. Given the tenor of other Jeffersonian writing, one cannot avoid being struck by the militaristic tone of his comment.

It proves more forcibly the necessity of obliging every citizen to be a soldier. This was the case with the Greeks and Romans, and must be that of every free State. Where there is no oppression there will be no pauper hirelings. We must train and classify the whole of our male citizens, and make military instruction a regular part of collegiate education. We can never be safe till this is done.257

Were it spoken by a Prussian Emperor or a later descendant, the German Kaiser, it would seem less out of place. John Keegan believes that one of the principle causes of World War I was the very militarization of society that Jefferson seems to support. European societies, according to Keegan, spent the nineteenth century developing a military caste that ultimately led the continent to the catastrophe of 1914.258

Jefferson, however, had a different intent. He realized following his presidency that, despite his personal misgivings, the nation must have an Army. Given that, Jefferson thought that the best way to minimize the army’s potential negative influence was provide military training to all citizens. He felt that by training all citizens, the few would be unable to abuse the power of the army.259 His was not a popular idea, and it did not garner much support through the years. Despite this, the nation still debated universal military service as part of the Preparedness Movement prior to World War I.
Looking across the national landscape, little military training was available to college students prior to the Civil War. Jefferson founded the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1804. At least two public and one private military college existed in 1861. Until the Morrill Act of 1862 provided that the land grant colleges establish some form of military training few schools offered any. This situation did not change significantly until the National Defense Act of 1916 sought to standardize and expand the role of the military on campus through the creation of Reserve Officer Training Corps units and the authorization to provide instructors.

As discussed previously, colleges across the country were losing students and faculty to the war effort. They were enlisting at a rate alarming to administrators dependent upon these young men for the tuition required to keep the colleges open. At the same time, the colleges, as corporate bodies, sought means to be a meaningful part of the national debate on preparedness and the war in general. Colleges wanted to be meaningful players in what the most significant international conflict in a generation. After several false starts and localized efforts, the colleges and the federal government entered into a period of negotiation over the appropriate role for colleges to play.

While trying to keep students, universities sought the means to support the war effort and, perhaps as important to them, to establish the importance of higher education upon the American psyche. They reflected this desire in the debate on preparedness conducted earlier in the decade and in the popularity among some university presidents for military training of students. Considerable consternation arose within the academic community as the nation moved to a war footing without taking the particular needs and aptitudes of the colleges and their faculties into account. Initially, it seemed that colleges
would realize their worst fears. During the seven months following the declaration of war, little coordination occurred between the government and the colleges. To make matters worse, government agencies did not coordinate with each other, issued conflicting guidance to the colleges, and competed against each other for recruits.  

Recognizing the need to coordinate the educational activities and the recruiting activities of the various Army branches, the War Department established the Committee on Education and Special Training (CEST) in February 1918. The CEST was to locate, enlist, train, and assign soldiers skilled in the specialized functions just emerging as requirements on the technical, modern battlefield. Within months, this charter expanded to include the development of officers.

The establishment of the CEST spoke to the modern requirements of warfare by specifically addressing the need for technicians. The War Department charged the CEST with studying the Army’s need for skilled technicians and acting upon its findings. It was to develop a plan for meeting these needs, secure the cooperation of educational institutions capable of providing the required training, and represent the War Department in the development and operation of the program.

The CEST consisted of four military members, initially headed by a lieutenant colonel, who received counsel from a civilian advisory board, thus giving it a quasi-military and quasi-civilian outlook on the war effort. Though the military retained authority, the military committee and the advisory board normally met daily and decisions were the product of their combined judgment and experience. The advisory panel, drawn from the ranks of academia, was intimately familiar with the difficult situation that colleges faced. Its familiarity contributed to the rapid development of
linkages between the War Department and the colleges.269 But the United States was seven months into its war effort before the War Department established the CEST.

The Negotiation Begins-Pre Committee on Education and Special Training Efforts

The declaration of war on April 6, 1917 finally relieved the Army of the burdens of doubt concerning American involvement in the war. The War Department now suffered under the stress of turning a two hundred thousand man force trained for desert and jungle warfare into a major army prepared for European war. The Army began by examining its needs. The National Defense Act of 1916 provided for increased strength, to 175,000 over a period of five years and increased the strength of the National Guard to 475,000 over the same period. The Selective Service Act of 1917 provided additional soldiers after the declaration of war. As discussed earlier, the pre-war supply of 5,791 officers was insufficient for wartime requirements. The immediate need faced by the War Department was to find and train men to lead the growing force. Once it received authorization to enlarge, the Army took immediate steps to accomplish this.

In a telegram, dated April 17, 1917, the Adjutant General of the Army, Major General McCain directed the Commanding General, Eastern Department to prepare and conduct training camps at seven locations under the provisions of the National Defense Act of 1916. The camps were to train reserve officers and candidates for appointment as such. The object of the camps was to produce a sufficient number of trained officers to man a full division and an additional cavalry regiment. The camps were to begin in two weeks, on May 8, 1917, but should be ready to receive soldiers no later than May 1st.270

These camps were not mere repetition of the camps run by the Plattsburg Movement during the preceding three years. Those camps amounted to little more than
adult summer camps that provided minimal training to civilians. The War Department established these camps to train men as officers to lead the growing army. Whereas the Plattsburg camps trained personally-interested volunteers, the Army’s camps trained soldiers preparing for overseas deployment. Fun and games were over; this was serious business.

The War Department began an advertising campaign seeking to increase interest in the officer training camps. It spread the slogan, “The first ten thousand” to create a sense of urgency and consequence. Working with conflicting objectives, colleges were using a variety of appeals to keep students in school while the Army now tempted to them to leave by appealing to the students’ patriotism and vanity with the slogan it chose. Implied was that the men selected were to be among the ablest leaders in the country; essentially they would be hand-picked to lead the first five hundred thousand new soldiers. The campaign slogan was memorable and certainly something to attract talented, patriotic young men.

Manning a rapidly growing army was only part of the problem. The new soldiers needed uniforms, rifles, tents, and thousands of other items that were neither on hand nor readily available in the marketplace. Many difficult choices were required, though some easier than others. Deciding whether to provide equipment to training soldiers or college students was an easy choice. On May 11, 1917, the Adjutant General of the Army suspended issuing arms, equipment, and other government property to educational institutions and rifle clubs due to the increased need for such material at active Army installations.
Equipping soldiers was only one part of the equation to solve. Training new soldiers on the wide variety of skills needed was an equally daunting task. The Signal Corps\textsuperscript{274} was one of the first elements of the Army to seek the support of colleges. One early effort to utilize the colleges was a training program developed by the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics and the Signal Corps. They designed the program to alleviate the shortage of aviators within the Army. The program was indicative of the rapid, improvised methods employed during the spring and summer of 1917.

At the beginning of the war very few facilities, military or civilian, were available for aviation training. The National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics and the Signal Corps selected six scientific schools to conduct preliminary training. The Secretary of War approved the plan on May 19, 1917. Two days later, on May 21, 1917, the six schools opened with no defined curriculum. They conducted three weeks of military training as aviation-related lesson plans were developed.\textsuperscript{275}

On the 18\textsuperscript{th} of June the War Department requested that the University of Virginia consider joining the six schools already engaged in training future aviators.\textsuperscript{276} The War Department proposed that it would send approximately twenty-five students to the university each week to learn military drill and the technical basics of flight. At the completion of training, selected students would enter flight training after transferring to a military post. The Government would provide compensation in the amount of one dollar per student per day for food and fifty dollars in tuition for the eight week course. Once the course was running at full capacity, one hundred students would attend and the Government payments would total five thousand dollars each month. The Government expected the university to fund instructors and facilities from the tuition.
In a hand written note at the bottom of the letter, Captain Page, the author, included the following, “Dr. Alderman, I think that this is a fine opportunity for the university and that it will do much toward keeping it together during the war. Also, it would be a kind of memorial for Jim McConnell—our reports of Jim from the French are the very highest. The University of Virginia faculty agreed and recommended pursuit of the aeronautics school.

In his note Captain Page addressed two of the issues with which Alderman struggled. Both issues revolved around the difficulties the universities were facing. First, like other university presidents, Alderman was concerned with maintaining the financial viability of the school. Five thousand dollars each month was a desirable infusion of cash. Though the aviation students would not be traditional Virginia men, they would be students and be on campus. The proposed rotation of one hundred students each month would go a long way toward keeping the campus open and vibrant. Aviation training required the addition of new curricula. The university would provide instruction in aeronautical engines, theory of flight, cross-country and general flying, aerial observation, gunnery, signaling and wireless, and military regulations.

The second issue in Page’s letter hit home at the University of Virginia, though other schools struggled with similar losses. One of the most difficult aspects of fighting a war is the loss associated with death of loved ones and friends. Efforts to support any war inevitably lead to this result. At the time of the letter from Captain Page, Alderman and the rest of the university community were trying to cope with the emotions associated with the loss of McConnell and discussing the creation of a suitable memorial to him.
The Negotiation Continues-National Army Training Detachments

The CEST’s priority was to secure men trained in the technical trades, such as auto driving and repair, bench wood work, general carpentry, electrical communication, electrical work, forging or blacksmithing, gas-engine work, machine work, and sheet-metal work. Estimates suggested that the Army required one hundred thousand men skilled in trades prior to September 1, 1918.  

The lack of available facilities required to train men in technical trades led the CEST to seek support from the colleges. Engineering schools were capable of providing training in many of the required skills. The CEST followed the novel approach used in aviation training a few months earlier by contracting with suitable colleges to provide training to soldiers. To manage the students on campus, the CEST established National Army Training Detachments (NATD) at 147 locations, most of which were engineering schools. 

A letter sent by the War Department to various universities surveyed the schools on their ability to provide training in the need skills. Broken into individual trades, the survey runs for eight pages. The sheer number of soldiers required suggests the War Department’s dilemma. Table 5 displays the broad categories of desired training.

The NATDs were located at both major universities and at smaller technical schools. A cadre of active duty officers and enlisted men, serving as a coordinating staff, and a transient group of enlisted soldiers assigned for training comprised the detachments. On April 6, 1918, the first six thousand NATD student-soldiers began training at fifteen sites. Bi-weekly the Army added new schools as training sites. By July 1, fifty thousand men were training at the full complement of 147 schools.
The schools provided training to the soldiers continuously throughout the summer of 1918, eventually providing approximately twenty-five thousand trained men each month.\textsuperscript{282} The intensity and rapidity of the development applied by the military suggests the level of importance accorded to the program. Moving from zero to 147 locations with fifty thousand participants in less than three months is a testament to the desire for success, tenacity, and attention to detail demonstrated by all parties involved with the NATD.

Table 5. Technically Trained Men Required in January 1918\textsuperscript{283}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation Groups</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Occupation Groups</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>87,485</td>
<td>Mining Trades</td>
<td>1,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building Trades</td>
<td>7,333</td>
<td>Printing</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Occupations</td>
<td>4,789</td>
<td>Railroad</td>
<td>6,814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical Trades</td>
<td>22,443</td>
<td>Steam Engineers</td>
<td>1,892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>5,636</td>
<td>Textile Trades</td>
<td>574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather Trades</td>
<td>1,652</td>
<td>Woodworking Trades</td>
<td>1,473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumbering</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>Woodworking (Aeroplanes)</td>
<td>14,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal Working</td>
<td>29,536</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>186,951</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The soldiers assigned for training received instruction consisting of intensive two-month vocational or technical courses and a daily regime of military training. The training sought to "give the men some practical skill in the simple underlying operations of carpentry, metal working, blacksmithing, auto mechanics, and other mechanical activities useful in the Army."\textsuperscript{284} The nature of these tasks suggests the transition that all advanced societies were undergoing at this time. The requirement to recruit
simultaneously blacksmiths and automobile mechanics indicates that the United States straddled the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The rapid advance of technological development in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries changed the face of warfare before World War I began and continued to change it throughout the conflict. The American Army, which had been slow to modernize, quickly developed processes to overcome these deficiencies. As the rapid development suggests, once energized the American society had the capacity to move very quickly indeed.

The University of Virginia entered federal government programs immediately following the first wave of universities. Professor J.L. Newcomb, of the Engineering Department, contacted the Federal Board for Vocational Education and coordinated the university's effort to participate in the NATD. The expectation was that the University of Virginia would have 240 soldiers stationed on campus for five months as they learned one of the several skills required by the Army. The Army requested instruction in automobile repair, electrical installation and repair, engineering draftsmanship, general machinist, and woodworking. For this instruction the government would reimburse the university at a rate of seven dollars per man per week for instruction and seventy-five cents per man per day for rations and quarters, which could amount to payments of $64,500 to the University for training the full compliment of soldiers over the five month period.

Newcomb met with Dr. James P. Monroe, Vice-Chairman of the Federal Board for Vocational Training, at the end of February 1918. As a result of the meeting, the University of Virginia received official notification that the school's application for a
National Army Training Detachment was accepted. Monroe told Newcomb that the University of Virginia could expect an inspection party to arrive in late March to ensure that the barracks conditions were adequate for the expected soldiers. Monroe also said that the anticipated course in Engineering Drafting was not required. Consequently, the number of enlisted soldiers stationed at the UVA would only rise to 160, not the expected 240.287

Though not established with the specific intent of providing liaison between the War Department and the colleges, the CEST soon embraced this mission. As the CEST was developing the NATD they began to consider other potential uses of colleges. The CEST was well aware that the most successful officer candidates were often college graduates.288 In March 1918, even before the creation of the first NATD, the CEST planned to extend its program to incorporate higher technical professions and officer candidates. On March 6, 1918, the Advisory Board of the CEST submitted a proposal to establish a reserve corps into which eighteen to twenty-one year old college men could enlist.289 It would take several months before this plan would come to fruition.

In April 1918, the Board of Visitors of University of Virginia appointed a special committee to handle arrangements for the establishment of a NATD unit to teach Army truck drivers as an addition to the skills previously mentioned. On April 5, the university entered into an agreement with the War Department to train six hundred truck drivers every two months. The Board instructed Newcomb to find barracks space for six hundred privates, seven officers, and forty instructors. The university agreed to construct barracks, dining facilities, a machine shop, and a garage at a cost of sixty-five thousand dollars. The university erected barracks for the soldiers and they remained occupied from May to
November 1918. In an unusual action showing the support of the local community, the City Council and citizens of Charlottesville guaranteed the university against loss up to twenty thousand dollars.\textsuperscript{290}

On May 1, a telegram from the CEST notified President Alderman that six hundred men would report to the university on May 23. This was the first installment of soldiers for the Motor Truck School that had been in the planning stages since January.\textsuperscript{291} The entire university campus felt the impact of the arrival of the truck driving school. President Alderman’s had commented in a letter to the Fuel Administration that the university was nearly a military installation.\textsuperscript{292} This state of affairs was coming to fruition quickly. As the School for Motor Vehicle Drivers opened and soldiers began to arrive, life at the university began to change. One such indication came in a memo to company commanders ordering all soldiers to attend a Y.M.C.A. open air theater.\textsuperscript{293} As with many things military, even fun was not optional.

Ultimately, the University of Virginia trained 1,800 soldiers through the NATD. Eleven hundred of these men served overseas.\textsuperscript{294} The majority of these students were the sons of farmers with the sons of merchants a close second. They were followed by the sons of lawyers, physicians, clergymen, real estate agents, bankers, railway employees, clerks, teachers, and brokers. Most were graduates of public high schools. One hundred forty-six of the students were graduates of private schools.\textsuperscript{295}

On June 10, Professor Newcomb reported to the University of Virginia Board of Visitors on the School for Motor Vehicle Drivers that had opened two weeks previously. The Army, Newcomb reported, wished to modify the contract with the University of Virginia to change the manner in which per diem and housing were paid. The Board
resolved that it did not wish to change the contract except to agree to remit to the government any profit made on the construction of new facilities.\textsuperscript{296}

Fortunately for the university, an experienced officer was available to run the NATD program on campus. Lieutenant Colonel Cole, the pre-war ROTC instructor, assumed command of the NATD unit at the University of Virginia. The University of Virginia had applied for and created a ROTC detachment following the passage of the National Defense Act of 1916. Lieutenant Colonel Cole, a retired officer living in Charlottesville, brought more than thirty-years of experience to his position.

Ultimately, the NATD and later the SATC unit at the UVA consisted of twenty-seven officers.\textsuperscript{297} Most of the officers assigned to the NATD and later the SATC were products of the 90-day officer training camps throughout the Army. These officers were hardly, if at all, older than the charges they supervised and they had precious little experience. They were derisively called “Ninety-day Wonders” throughout the Army.\textsuperscript{298} Cole, on the other hand, was able to provide stability and leadership to his subordinates.

As shall be seen, these were elements that resulted in a much stronger university-military bond at the University of Virginia than at William and Mary.

\textit{NATD Issues}

As the National Army Training Detachments became established on college campuses, one of the issues facing the War Department was providing medical and dental care to so many soldiers scattered around the country at so many locations. On April 30, 1918, the War Department authorized District Inspectors to hire civilian dentists to provide several routine procedures, though more advanced dentistry, such as production of crowns and bridges required special approval.\textsuperscript{299} Providing medical care to soldiers
scattered at the 147 NATD locations was more than the Surgeon General of the Army had prepared to do.

The existing personnel and supply systems were developed to support an Army of approximately two hundred thousand soldiers. The rapid influx of men required support for nearly ten times that number. War Department systems were incapable of managing the vast quantity of paperwork and logistics requirements associated with the growing Army.

Early in the twentieth century, Secretary of War Elihu Root modified the linear, stovepipe systems in place since the founding of the Army. The Adjutant General’s office, traditionally responsible for manning the Army, saw its duties restricted, as did the Quartermaster General, responsible for general supply. Changing duties on paper was easier than changing them in fact, a point that LTC Cole noted in his trip report following a visit to Washington in May 1918. 300

Representing the University, Cole went to Washington to conduct direct coordination with members of the War Department Staff. Cole reported that errors in processing paperwork at the War Department prevented the selection of several University of Virginia students for training camps. Cole also noted that the UVA would probably receive some old Springfield rifles, but the chances of receiving other equipment were slim. 301

Obtaining rifles and later a machine gun for the university’s soldier-students to use in training was a mission Alderman pursued aggressively. Alderman was an avid outdoorsman and fisherman, even after a near fatal bout with tuberculosis in 1912. 302 Alderman wrote letters to congressmen and to the Secretary of War in an effort to gain
access to rifles for training. He felt that without weapons, the training available to the universities students was incomplete.\(^{303}\)

Though not a university issue another problem that occupied Alderman’s time was the commissioning plan used by the Army. Young men would enlist in the Army and attend officer training camps, but they would not receive commissions immediately after completing their training. Frequently, these young men were sent to France without rank to serve in the line until such a time as the Army desired to provide a commission. The father of former student Braxton Valentine asked Alderman to intercede and gain the support of the Virginia congressional delegation to have the younger Valentine commissioned prior to his departure for France.

The original letter to Alderman no longer exists, but the tone of his initial telegrammed response and the subsequent letter of explanation suggests that the elder Valentine carried some weight at the university. The elder Valentine apparently expected Alderman to personally travel to Washington to attend to the matter. Alderman wrote to Representative Swager Shirley on May 16\(^{th}\) requesting his assistance in the matter. “I do not want to seem loath to serve any boy who is taking this training and wants to give his services to his country; neither do I want to seek to dictate any policy to the War Department.” His beleaguered tone suggested that this was not the most important business to which he could attend.\(^{304}\) But it was apparently a duty that he could not avoid.

*The Negotiation Continues – the Students’ Army Training Corps*

On June 20, 1918 the Adjutant General of the Army sent the plan for the SATC to university presidents.\(^{305}\) The plan called for providing military instruction at institutions enrolling the minimum number of students, defined as schools of college grade with one
hundred or more able bodied young men. Curricular modifications would allow ten hours of classroom training each week and six hours of practical military instruction. Additionally, students would receive six weeks of intensive military training during a summer camp.

Members of the SATC would enlist in the Army and immediately enter a furlough status to return to their studies. As enlisted members of the Army, they were subject to the immediate call of the President of the United States, but because they were on furlough they would not receive and pay, allowance, or equipment unless called to active duty. The Army pledged to refrain from calling men to active service until they attained the draft age of twenty-one years. This program would create a pool of volunteer, partially trained manpower.

The War Department agreed to provide officers as instructors and noncommissioned officers for support, as they were available. To supplement the active contingent, a force of assistant instructors would be provided through sixty-day training camps to be conducted during the summer of 1918. Colleges would send a limited number of professors and highly regarded students to “the School of Adjutants” where they would learn the rudiments of military life and some of the administrative skills required to run a unit. Those selected would support the active officer assigned in command.

The CEST mission required it to coordinate the effects of several programs designed to support the Army. The National Defense Act of 1916 authorized ROTC programs. These programs provided military training to future officers. Participation in the final two years of ROTC nearly guaranteed the student a commission as a reserve
second lieutenant. The CEST established the National Army Training Detachments (NATD), as previously discussed, in April 1918 to provide enlisted technicians to the Army.

The War Department was creating the SATC to provide initial training to young men while they were in school in an effort to prepare future officers and to shorten the amount of training they required once activated. The War Department did not intend that the SATC units replace ROTC on campus. Units with an ROTC program were eligible to apply for a SATC program as well. Both programs would exist simultaneously. The War Department did not produce detailed instructions as to how this would occur.308

Additionally the National Defense Act of 1916 also authorized the creation Enlisted Reserve Corps (ERC) that allowed students to enlist for later duty. The ERC permitted students in scientific and highly technical studies to enlist in the Army and return to their work. Generally, students in the ERC were generally those engaged in studies that were highly valued by the Army, such as medicine and engineering.309

On July 1, 1918, the War Department formally published the initial guidance for colleges planning on becoming SATC institution.310 Under this original plan, the colleges would provide a specific type of training, preparing the student-soldiers for future duty in a specific branch of service, such as field artillery or infantry. While the War Department expected the academic coursework the student-soldiers undertook to support the branch of service needs, there was little attempt to regulate this area.311

One of the difficulties faced by the War Department was integrating the new programs with those that already existed. In addition to ROTC, the Army created NATD units during the summer of 1918, and enlistment in the Enlisted Reserve Corps was
becoming more common among technical students.\textsuperscript{312} The War Department now added the SATC to the list of campus-based options available to students. At the beginning of the 1916 academic year very few schools, primarily the land-grants, offered any military training. Barely two years later, students had several options at a wide variety of schools.

As was previously discussed, there was considerable confusion among medical and technical students concerning their draft status and where they fit within this new program structure. Dean Hough of the University of Virginia Medical School wrote numerous letters to the Secretary of War and other government official seeking to clarify this issue.\textsuperscript{313} The War Department compounded its difficulties by failing to adequately vet and coordinate information made available to the public.

An announcement released by the War Department on July 10, 1918 concerning SATC membership caused considerable confusion among students of medicine, engineering, and other technical professions. The War Department was creating the SATC to support Army needs, but the announcement soft-pedaled this requirement. It emphasized the need for highly “trained men as officers, engineers, doctors, chemists, and administrators of every kind,”\textsuperscript{314} creating the impression that students of highly specialized disciplines could anticipate separate categorization by War Department officials. The announcement continued, stating that the Army wanted “to mobilize and develop the brain power of the young men of the country” and to “to prevent [their] premature enlistment for active service” so they “could by extending the period of their college training multiply manifold their value to the country.” To further emphasize the importance of these disciplines, the announcement called scientific training “indispensable.”\textsuperscript{315}
On the surface, this classification of scientific training was well and good. The War Department appears to be recognition of the importance of scientific training. However, the SATC, as it was organized, would allow students to remain in school on military furlough until they reached the draft age of twenty-one years. There was no provision for extending an exemption from the draft to students of scientific and technical disciplines. Nor did Secretary of War Baker intend to support one. 316

Students of highly technical fields do not even begin their studies until after reaching the age of twenty-one. Entry into most programs, like medical school, meant that students would pass age twenty-one and enter the draft before starting let alone completing their studies. The only way to “multiply manifold their value to the country” was through several years of study and completion of graduate programs, taking most well past the age of twenty-one. The announcement implied that extensive training was desirable to the War Department. Obviously, the authors of the announcement did not adequately confirm the material prior to releasing it to the public. The loose language concerning the use of scientific and technical students contributed to the continuing confusion concerning their draft status.

Implementation – the Students’ Army Training Corps Begins

Developing a semi-skilled force to support the professional officers assigned to the SATC universities was the first step in developing the program. Each university that would host an SATC detachment could send a select few members of the student body and faculty to a School of Adjutants during July 1918. These men temporarily enlisted in the Army to facilitate paying them while at the school. Upon completion of the school their enlistment would terminate. The purpose of this School of Adjutants was “to fit the
faculty [and other selected student] members of the Students’ Army Training Camp, for the duties of Adjutant and Assistant Adjutant in the Colleges.” When they returned to their institutions, “they will be equipped for such military administrative duty as may be assigned.” The men trained in the School of Adjutants were to provide “intelligent and trained helpers” to the active officers assigned to the schools. 318

Colonel C. E. Dentler delivered the opening address at the School of Adjutants held in Plattsburg, NY. The speech is noteworthy in that it illustrates the changing conceptual view of citizenship. Dentler proclaimed “I want to call your attention to the fact that the country is at war – YOUR country, of which, if you have reached the age of twenty-one, you are citizens, if not, that you are approaching that station – a citizen of the United States." 319 Obviously, neither the Constitution nor accepted practices support the notion that a person must reach the age of majority prior to the conferral of citizenship. That Dentler used citizenship as a patriotic call for the purpose of the school was creative.

By the beginning of September 1918, the War Department presented the plan to college presidents in three meetings held at San Francisco, CA; Fort Sheridan, IL; and Plattsburg, NY. 320 Meanwhile, as the war continued unabated, American military commitments increased. What was to become the final retreat of the German armies had begun by August 1918, but continued German resistance led the Army to assume that combat would extend into 1919. Two months earlier, in June 1918, General Pershing, commanding the American Expeditionary Force, called for an increase in the American effort to one hundred army divisions 321 with more than three million men, including more than one hundred thousand new officers. 322 Pershing’s call for more men further increased the War Department’s concern about providing the leaders the Army required.
General Orders No. 79, issued on August 24, 1918, suggested what was to come and provided the authority for the SATC, “the President directs that for the period of the existing emergency there shall be raised and maintained by voluntary inductions and draft, a Students’ Army Training Corps.” General Orders No. 79 also formally merged the National Army Training Detachments established to train soldiers in skilled vocations with the SATC.

As final preparations for the beginning of the 1918-1919 academic year were underway, the government’s requirements for establishing the SATC were clear. In a memorandum sent to the university Presidents on Aug 28, 1918, the CEST explained the anticipated contractual obligations it expected to use. Since time was short, the CEST proposed using a temporary contract for all institutions, with negotiations and individualization based upon each universities unique situation to follow. The basic provisions included similar tuition, housing, and per diem payments as were developed for the NATD. There were some additional requirements. The CEST desired that men eat in large groups. Consequently, some dining facilities required modification before they could become mess halls.

The CEST proposed several new governing principles in the final contracts. Chief among them was the major assertion that “the War Department will have authority to specify and control the courses of instruction to be given by the institution.” The requirement to control curricular issues created conflict between faculty and military, which will be discussed later. Additional governing principles included the need to preserve universities in a form that would allow them to return to normal operations
following the war, the preservation of faculty, and freedom from interference in conducting non-Army academics.

However, the senior of the several guiding principles was, obviously, the needs of the Army. Another memorandum dated August 28, 1918, from Colonel Rees the Chair of the CEST, makes this fact perfectly clear.

Fundamental changes must be made in college ... practices in order to adapt them to effective service in this emergency.... The primary purpose of the Students’ Army Training Corps is to utilize the executive and teaching personnel and the physical equipment of the colleges to assist in the training of our new armies.... The colleges are asked to devote the whole energy and educational power of the institution to the phases and lines of training desired by the government.\textsuperscript{325}

Conflict was bound to occur when the needs of the Army and the preferences of the faculty did not coincide. As shall be seen later, some handled these conflicts more effectively than others.

The long term plan called for the continued arrival of young men as they completed high school or transferred from Depot Brigades.\textsuperscript{326} Planners also suggested that high schools accelerate the graduation of students so that young men became qualified for enlistment in the SATC upon eligibility for the draft. The SATC plan called for five potential outcomes from participation in the program. First, the Army could transfer a soldier to one of the officer training camps positioned around the country; following which, he would receive a commission as a second lieutenant. Second, the Army could transfer a soldier to a noncommissioned officer training camp; following which, he would become a sergeant. Third, the Army could assign a soldier to continue his studies in his specialized area. The planners envisioned using this option for highly skilled specialties like medicine and engineering. Fourth, the Army could assign a soldier
to vocational training in the NATD. Finally, the Army could transfer a soldier who displayed no potential for leadership to a training depot as a private.327

On August 6 in response to General Pershing’s call for more men, the War Department announced that it would ask Congress to reduce the draft age to eighteen years. The reduction in age meant that students would not be able to enlist and spend two or three years attending school and training while on furlough from the Army. The draft would begin to take students almost immediately. More students would enlist prior to being drafted because enlistment allowed them the choice of service that was lost if they waited for the draft. The reduction in draft age and the additional announcement that all men between the ages of eighteen to forty-five years would receive a call to service within one-year made it likely that no students would remain available to attend college. Under the expectation of a coming draft call, it was unlikely that many young men would return to school in September 1918.328

Compounding the planning difficulties, the Judge Advocate General329 ruled that placing men on furlough status yet expecting them to perform military duties was inappropriate. This ruling called the underpinning of the SATC plans into question. Actually inducting the men into the Army and providing them the benefits of a soldier was the only way that the planned system could work.330

The Secretary of War approved a modified plan for the SATC on August 28 and issued his guidance after Congress passed the Manpower Act on August 31. The Manpower Act authorized the Secretary of War to assign soldiers to educational institutions for special and technical training and to contract with the institutions to provide subsistence, quarters, military instruction, and academic instruction. Congress
appropriated $54 million to pay to the colleges for housing and instruction under these contracts. Payment for soldiers assigned to the SATC would come from the general subsistence fund.\textsuperscript{331}

Under the revised plan, the SATC members enlisted in the Army and entered active duty immediately, with assignment to their particular college.\textsuperscript{332} To avoid the accusation of privilege, the men were divided into three groups, according to their age. Twenty-year old men were to remain on campus for three months. Nineteen-year old men would remain for six months. Eighteen-year old men would remain for nine months. This schedule made the men available for movement to Army training camps at approximately the time the non-SATC members of their birth cohort would be called to active duty through the draft. As the Army drew older men out of the SATC, younger men would arrive as replacements. The NATD maintained its mission of vocational and technical training, but its name changed to the SATC-B. To demonstrate further egalitarianism, promising students from the vocational and technical courses would be afforded the opportunity to enter the SATC-A sections and compete for commissions as officers.\textsuperscript{333}

The revised plan presented significant changes for the colleges to accept, though it is unlikely that many fully comprehended their impact. First, the initial plan called for the student-soldiers to enter a furlough status prior to attending classes. Under the revised plan, the soldier-students would be active soldiers whose place of duty was the university. In a furlough status, the students were free to do much as they pleased. In a duty status, Army regulations would govern them. Second, in preparation for the initial version of the SATC, the colleges agreed to curricular changes and to teaching subjects
of immediate military interest and value. The revised plan increased the number of courses the Army desired and, with the inclusion of the NATD as SATC-B incorporated men who would not normally enroll in college. Third, the academic calendar at most universities had to change. The semester system would not allow student to leave in nine week increments.

Fourth, since the campuses were about to become military camps they needed to meet the facility requirements established for soldiers. This requirement included floor space and air space per man, the number of bathing facilities, the number of wash basins, and the number of toilet facilities. The Army provided kitchen requirements so that the university dining facilities would comply with military regulation. 334

Torn between complete loss of students leading to probable closure and providing the Army with some different classes and living facilities, the colleges did not really have a choice. The stark reality was they could comply, or they could close. Given the draft requirements the vast majority of colleges had no alternative.

On September 20, 1918, Colonel Rees of the CEST sent a memorandum to SATC unit commanders advising them of War Department desires and expectations for the observance of the October 1 induction ceremonies around the country. While not specifying a specific program of events, Rees gave sufficiently detailed expectations that the least experienced of the commanders could effectively coordinate the requirement with the university president and administers. 335

Assemble the command ... where the American Flag will be raised. If no band is available ... provide a bugler to sound To the Color.... Read the oath of allegiance.... Read the order of the day and any message sent by the Secretary of War or Other Federal official.... Brief addresses may be made.... pass in review.... During the oath ... and order ... and messages ... stand at attention.
During World War I, the Army was divided into several functional branches which assumed specific warfighting and support responsibilities. The branches were: infantry, cavalry, field artillery, coast artillery, adjutant general, quartermaster, signal, and medical. During the war, air services were separated from the signal corps, becoming an additional branch.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert I. Rees received promotions to Colonel and Brigadier General during the war.

The War Department did not fully understand the impact of aviation on warfare prior to World War I. The idea of airborne weapons platforms was beyond the ken of many, in uniform and out. The principal purpose seen for aircraft was communications. Consequently, the Signal Branch was responsible for aviation. This changed in 1926 when the Army Air Corps was established. The US Air Force was created in 1947, separating much aviation from the Army. The Army continues to have more air platforms than the Air Force, mostly helicopters. In 1983, the Army created a separate Aviation Branch.

The schools were Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cornell University, Ohio State University, University of Illinois, University of Texas, University of California, Princeton University, and Georgia School of Technology.
Announcement, dtd 10 July 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.

Historically, the title of adjutant has varied in the U.S. Army. Initially, the adjutant was an assistant to the commander. Over time, this evolved. Adjutants became the chief administrator of a unit. The senior staff officer, prior to the 1904 reorganization was the Adjutant General of the Army. Currently, the heads of the individual state National Guard elements are called the state’s Adjutant General. In Army units, at brigade and battalion level, the personnel officer is known as the unit adjutant.


During World War I, what we now today as basic training was not centralized. It was conducted by units. During the rapid mobilization caused by the war, Depot Brigades provided an initial point of entry for recruits while they awaited assignment to a unit for training.

Memorandum Dapray to The School of Adjutants, dtd 14 Aug 1918, William and Mary Archives.

A World War I era division contained approximately 28,000 soldiers.

Mann, Committee on Education and Special Training (CEST).

Memorandum, CEST to The Colleges of the United States, dtd 28 Aug 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.

Memorandum, CEST to The Commanding Officers, Students’ Army Training Corps, Subject: Observance of October 1, 1918 dtd 20 Sep 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.
Chapter 5
The Reality - the Students’ Army Training Corps Activates: Fall 1918

With the creation of the officer’s training camps and the SATC, the Army was establishing a competition among the young men of America for commissions. The Army intended to use the SATC as a tool to find young men who wanted to be leaders. The campaign slogan “the first ten thousand” spoke to the elite status the Army was trying to create. Competitive from the start, “success in winning a commission ... depends both on the needs of the service and the student’s individual ability. Any impression that entrance in the S.A.T.C. insures admission of officers’ schools should be dispelled.”336 And unlike many of the competitions that college students enjoy, the consequences were real in this one. Failure to win a commission did not result in the young man returning to a comfortable academic life; it resulted in reassignment to the ranks. “Any man who does not demonstrate his ability after a fair trial, to profit by the S.A.T.C. training will be transferred to a camp or cantonment to continue his training as a private.”337

In keeping with the egalitarian nature of American society, members of the old technical National Army Training Detachments (now the SATC-B) as well as members of the SATC could win entrance to officer training camps. “It should be made clear in cases where there are both A and B sections in the same location that there is no discrimination between them with respect to selection for officers’ schools.”338 Once the soldiers of the SATC transferred into the larger Army, they would receive assignment to a basic branch. The War Department expected 60 percent to enter the infantry, field artillery, or coast artillery. Twenty percent would enter the aviation service; 10 percent would enter ordnance or quartermaster. Engineers, signal, and chemical warfare service
would split the final 10 percent. The process for making these assignments was, as to be expected, based primarily upon the needs of the Army. However, "the guiding principle will be to place each man where he can render his maximum service.... Generally speaking, a soldier is likely to give the best account of himself in the line in which he is most interested."\(^{339}\)

_Equipping the SATC_

As the SATC began operations, officers from across the country peppered the CEST for information and support. Requests for enrollment forms, uniforms and supplies, and a multitude of other requirements arrived at the War Department daily. On September 17, 1918, Major Stone, the first commander of the William and Mary SATC, wrote to the CEST that since his arrival he had received only two regulations\(^{340}\) and he did not have the office equipment or materiel required to run the unit. His letter carried the request that the CEST provide the equipment, documentation, and forms required to run a unit.

The new soldiers were supposed to receive standard Army olive drab issue: one overcoat, two cotton coats, two pairs of breeches, one campaign hat, one pair of canvas leggings, one red, white, and blue hat cord, one pair of russet high-top shoes, and one bronze "US" collar insignia.\(^{341}\) However, the needs of troops deploying to France created a backlog of orders making it difficult to provide uniforms to many SATC troops. As the weather began to turn colder and students began to show symptoms of illness, Major Stone apparently requested guidance from the CEST concerning winter uniforms for the SATC.
The CEST sent a telegram to Major Stone at William and Mary on September 25, advising him to “exercise judgment as to [the] health of men.” He was also advised to allow the men to wear their own warm clothing if that was healthier than wearing any uniforms that had been provided. The CEST appears to have recognized that the health situation on the campuses was potentially serious. The health issues are discussed later in this chapter.

The University of Virginia experienced similar difficulties with equipment. Early on, President Alderman requested equipment to support the ROTC program that was developing at the university under Lieutenant Colonel Cole. The Office of the Quartermaster General notified Alderman that the Secretary of War had suspended providing arms and equipment to educational institutions.

As noted, President Alderman took an active interest in obtaining weapons for use in military training, first for the ROTC then for the SATC at the university. William and Mary and the University of Virginia were not the only schools having difficulty obtaining suitable weapons for military training. In correspondence between presidents, Superintendent Nichols, at the Virginia Military Institute, reported to President Alderman that he also was unable to obtain weapons. Nichols, too, had spoken with Secretary Baker. Nichols also contacted Virginia’s Senators Flood and Martin seeking support. Due to the Virginia Military Institute’s military structure, it had weapons on hand, but the War Department wanted them for use in the field. The Virginia Military Institute had the modern 1903 Model Springfield rifle. The War Department promised the Virginia Military Institute either older Springfield rifles or Canadian rifles as replacements. The University of Virginia had neither the historic need for weapons nor did it have the good
fortune to have something the War Department wanted as trading material. Ultimately, the Virginia Military Institute turned in their Springfields and received replacement rifles. The University of Virginia did not receive rifles until the war was nearly over. 346

Even after the signing of the Armistice, the CEST continued to even out the distribution of equipment around the nation, reducing the shortages that some units experienced. On November 12, the SATC at William and Mary received notification that one hundred pairs of breeches were enroute from Washington and Lee in Lexington, one hundred coats were enroute from the University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, and 330 blankets were enroute from Virginia Polytechnic Institute. 347

Manning the SATC

At the time of the opening of the SATC, American forces had been engaged in actual combat operations for nearly a year, since October 21, 1917, and concerns about providing qualified leaders to the Army continued to grow. 348 The Army, as previously discussed, did not have the officers available to man its combat formations and General Pershing called for additional soldiers in July 1918. As plans for the formation of the SATC were developed, the lack of qualified officers presented a problem of command for the units.

The SATC represented the creation of five hundred unit formations, each of which required leadership. Because of the need for military leadership in France, assigning officers and noncommissioned officers to the SATC was something the Army could do only if the return on the investment would be swift and sure. The bulk of the officers assigned to the SATC came from three sources. The pool of older, retired officers was one source. The second primary source was reserve officers, some of whom were
recent graduates of the officer training camps themselves. A third source was officers returning following service in France. Most of these officers were wounded and recovering.

In a letter dated September 17, 1918, Stone requested that CEST assign additional officers to William and Mary, explaining that the school was “practically virgin territory and the need of officers will be felt more acutely at the beginning than later.” The indorsement to his letter informed Stone that he could expect the assignment of at least one additional officer.\textsuperscript{349}

At the University of Virginia, Lieutenant Colonel Cole requested the assignment of three noncommissioned officers to support running the ROTC program. The Adjutant General approved this request; however, he also notified Cole that no sergeants were available for such an assignment.\textsuperscript{350} In the traditional Army structure, officers are responsible for the majority of planning and scheduling of events. Sergeants are responsible for the day to day management of soldiers, maintenance of facilities and equipment, and the actual conduct of training.

When sergeants are not available, officers must perform both roles. The SATC felt the lack of both officer and noncommissioned officers on several levels. These deficiencies made establishing effective relations with university administrators and faculty more difficult. Compounding these difficulties was the requirement to provide a large number officer candidates immediately. Older members of the SATC would fill this requirement with little training and evaluation of their abilities. As Ralph Barton Perry, himself a professor on active duty noted,

In addition, however, to the normal difficulties involved in the adjustment of collegiate machinery to new conditions ... it was necessary ... to supply some ten
thousand officer candidates within the first five weeks; whereas it had been
planned not to make any drafts on the Corps for three months when the units
would have been thoroughly organized and the men systematically classified. In
spite of the exceptional conditions, certain definite results were accomplished. 351

*Academic Issues*

Olive drab uniforms changed the appearance of the campus, but other changes
were deeper and potentially more meaningful. The seeds of potential discontent were
already beginning to appear in September 1918 before the official creation of the SATC.
On September 28, the CEST sent a memorandum to college presidents that once again
reminded them that the preeminent purpose was to support the Army.

Since this training is designed to meet the specific needs of the war program in the
shortest possible time, its value cannot be appraised by ordinary academic
standards of college admission or the requirements for academic degrees.
Colleges may give credit for this work toward their degrees if they desire to do so,
but the courses must not be considered, or their results measured, from the
ordinary standpoint of college standards and customs. 352

If no other part of the planning and preparation for the SATC caused university
presidents to pause for consideration of the step they were about to take, this statement
should have caused them to stop for thought. There is no doubt what the War Department
was planning. As previously discussed, both the University of Virginia and the College of
William and Mary already provided academic credit for participation in military training.
That normal academic standards did not apply, however, is a concept critical to the SATC
development as it resulted in the notion that academics were a secondary and tangential
part of the SATC experience. As shall be seen, the CEST developed standards for
evaluation of soldiers that highlighted academic requirements in an effort to counter the
perception of their unimportance. 353
Curricular issues did not stop with the manner by which colleges taught courses taught and evaluated students. The scheduling of the academic year was also a potential issue, as stated in the September 29 memorandum. “As Officers’ Training Schools desire monthly increments of candidates and the colleges are to operate on a quarterly basis, certain colleges will probably be asked to close their first ‘quarter’ on Dec 1, others on Jan 1, and others on Feb 1.” The Army did not implement this system, which would have created a rolling academic year that varied from school to school because the war ended and the SATC demobilized. The long-term impact of such a system for campuses would be incalculable.

If there is one area that colleges consider sacrosanct it is the selection and admission of new students. By the early twentieth century, colleges began moving toward admitting only high school graduates who met at least minimum academic requirements. The September 28 memorandum also contained the admonition that admissions were no longer within the purview of the universities.

When students are withdrawn from the colleges for assignment to other organizations, the intent is so far as practicable to fill their places with new recruits. After October 1, these recruits will be selected by Army rating methods and Army examining boards. This selection will be made so as to secure as far as possible, the best available material from the point of view of ability and maturity, but without explicit reference to the usual college entrance requirements and ordinary academic rating systems.

If the change in academic standards discussed earlier in the memorandum did not cause university presidents to wonder what they were doing, this paragraph should have. The War Department announced that it intended to utilize universities as holding areas for new recruits. Assignment to a university would occur based upon “Army rating
methods and Army examining boards." College admission requirements and procedures no longer applied to the selection process.

The War Department's General Orders of the Day on October 1 declared, "The patriotism of American educational institutions is demonstrated to the world by the effective and convincing manner in which they are supporting this far-reaching plan [of the SATC] to hasten the mobilization and training of the armies of the United States." Yet, many academics were not happy with the growing role of the military on campus. The Alumni News of the UVA presented several issues, on campus and in the surrounding community, that were already becoming apparent as the War Department, the Army, and the universities prepared for the beginning of the SATC.

A considerable number of interesting problems have...arisen, as a consequence of this profound alteration of everything about our life. A number of professors are wondering how they will fit into the new scheme, in which no provision is made for teaching the subjects they teach. The administration is sitting up nights trying to find instructors enough for the few subjects allowed in the government's program. The boarding house keepers are wondering what is going to happen to them, since the students are not going to be allowed to live outside the dormitories, which have been converted into barracks by military order, and will have to eat in mess halls provided by the University. What will become of the few men not included in the military organization is also a pretty problem: can the University manage to teach them as usual? What relation will by bear to the other students? What credits shall be given them?

The Alumni News missed the point while providing essential elements concerning changes in the curriculum. While the War Department required universities to teach specific classes in a set period of time, it did not attempt to restrict the ability of the schools to teach their remaining course load. This does lead to a different question, unasked by the Alumni News. With the vast majority of students enrolled in the SATC, how many students would be available to take other course offerings? As shall be seen,
more than two-thirds of the student body at both the University of Virginia and the College of William and Mary enrolled in the SATC and enlisted in the Army.\textsuperscript{360}

The War Department and the Army were specific in the types of courses in which they wanted soldiers enrolled. They valued topics with universal military applicability. Specialized branches, like the field artillery, valued skills in mathematics. Colleges adapted the regular curriculum to accommodate these requirements. In an article dealing with the SATC, the University of Virginia Alumni News stated, "Such subjects as French, Mathematics, and Military Geology, which embrace topography, map-making and other matters indispensable to all officers, will be given great prominence."\textsuperscript{361} To this they added, "More general courses will provide intensive instruction in the history, philosophy, and aims of the war, the mastery of such terse and unequivocal English as officers need in writing and understanding orders, international and military law, and government."\textsuperscript{362}

In fact, for the course on the aims of the war, the War Issues course, the War Department went out of its way to ensure an inter-disciplinary approach, which was a new teaching methodology. In discussing the War Issues course, the Alumni News of the UVA reported that the "course is divided into five divisions: (1) history, (2) economics and government, (3) English literature, (4) international law, and (5) philosophy. Each division is planned as a three month's course, and will be repeated every quarter."\textsuperscript{363}

\textit{The War Issues Course}

The War Department mandated many significant curricular changes to support the SATC. Only one, the War Issues course, had any lasting impact on higher education.\textsuperscript{364} Professor E. D. McDonald of the Wentworth Institute in Boston began teaching a course
to soldiers assigned to the school in early 1918. Staff members from the CEST became aware of the course and after evaluation decided to incorporate it throughout their programs. The purpose of the War Issues course was to help soldiers understand the causes and purposes of American involvement in the war and, thereby, increase morale by convincing them of the correctness of the American position. Taught originally to the members of the NATD, it became a requirement in the SATC as well. More than 250,000 soldiers received the instruction. 365

The long-term significance of the War Issues course derives from the unique instructional methodology employed in its delivery. The first interdepartmental course offering in an American college or university, the course blended information from a number of disciplines and fields. 366 The CEST directed that the college organize the course to combine the points of view of history, government, economics, philosophy, and modern literature. 367 Assuming that an eighteen-year old SATC student remained on campus for three complete sessions he would receive instruction in historical and economic causes of the war in the first three month period. During the second session, the topics would shift to discussing the differing forms of government in the warring nations. National character and ideals would occupy the third three-month period. 368

Rather than prescribe detailed course material, the CEST provided guidance in the form of requested topics and points to cover. Some of the topics for the first three-month period included the geography and races of Europe; mineral and agricultural resources; transportation systems; colonial expansion; origins of the Prussian state and German Empire; and development of the British Empire and its popular form of government. 369
The CEST had a good idea of how it wanted the colleges to present the course material; it wanted the course to present facts not propaganda and hoped for a class designed around student participation rather than instructor oratory. The CEST also want a specific type of instructor for greatest effect.

The instructors should be men who have made a careful study of the issues of the war ... of attractive personality ... successful teachers [at] getting their classes to ask questions.... A dogmatic presentation ... would be fatal to ... the work.... It need not be pointed out that the instructors ... must have the power of presenting their ideas in simple and easily understood terms.

Unlike many elements of the SATC, the War Issues course was one about which professors agreed. As noted earlier, many younger professors left their university positions to enter the military or government service. After the moths of fretting about the importance of service and searching for a way to serve, the War Issues course provided professors to old for enlistment with a tangible means of contributing to the war effort.

“The new work [War Aims course] was entered upon with interest, indeed with enthusiasm, inasmuch as it was not only a radical departure from the normal college curriculum, but it brought to the teacher what seemed to be an opportunity to render a more or less patriotic service.”

There were difficulties associated with presenting the course, but these tended toward the same complaints that professors raised about the academic environment of the SATC in general. The reality of the military presence on campus reduced initial excitement at participation in the War Aims course. “Regardless of any zeal which the student may possess for study...there is the ever potent voice of a Plattsburg lieutenant or top sergeant ready at any moment to drive the student from his quiet place...to kitchen police, guard duty....” Finding time to reflect and consider issues when confronted...
with the daily requirements of learning to soldier reduced the impact of the course; yet, despite the difficulties associated with coordinating activities with the Army, professors found some changes benefited both students and institutions.374

One of the benefits of the War Issues course was its reliance on primary sources for information. “One question in method ... [that] the War Aims Course has answered.... It has settled ... an old controversy among history teachers as to the wisdom of requiring students to use primary sources in their study. Here primary sources are imperative. The subject-matter is brought down even to the morning newspaper."375 Additionally, the use of contemporary German authors allowed instructors to compare effectively opposing positions. Within the colleges themselves benefits derived not only from the cooperation inspired amongst the faculty in support of the war effort, the War Issues course caused faculty to consider different approaches to learning and instruction.

The course was said to have broken down departmental isolation, ended departmental jealousies and bickering, and promoted harmony and cooperation that would benefit the departments, and the institutions, and the students for years to come. The War Issues Course lent weight to arguments in favor of reintroducing prescribed courses in the undergraduate curriculum...because it promoted the idea that a certain amount of basic education should be required for every student."376

Following the war, Columbia University began a Peace Issues course. This course continued to develop and became the basis for the Western Civilization survey courses required in many present-day universities.377 In this regard, the SATC continues to touch nearly every college student in the nation.
Relationship with Administration and Faculty

As the military first became a presence on the campus, faculty reacted with excitement. At the University of Virginia the faculty senate voted the ROTC instructor, Lieutenant Colonel Cole, membership. As the ROTC program at the university began in April 1917, thirty faculty members entered ROTC as a faculty squad and drilled with the students. At William and Mary, the faculty senate supported military training by reducing class schedules thereby allowing the military additional time. This satisfaction with the military was short-lived however. Three major areas affected the relationship between the military and the faculty: respect, regimentation, and class attendance.

In early October 1918, the CEST published Special Regulations Aa-1 governing the SATC. In an effort to prevent what was to become one of the more significant issues regarding the SATC, commanding officers received guidance concerning their relationship with college faculty.

The Commanding Officer and the other officers assigned to duty with units of the Students' Army Training Corps will, in their relation to the institution, observe the general usages therein established affecting the duties and obligations of members of the Faculty and other academic instructors. Officers will not without permission of the Secretary of War, undertake instructional or administrative duties in the institution other than those connected with the work of the Students' Army Training Corps.

Other authors report administrative difficulties dealing with the Army. Some faculty members did not feel that some of the military respected their position within the university or the importance of their contribution to the training of the SATC soldiers. Dr. Davis of the William and Mary faculty complained a corporal had insulted him. Davis was talking to a Private Robinson, who was on duty performing an unspecified task. The
Corporal approached Davis and reprimanded him for speaking to a soldier on duty. Davis reported the incident stating his feeling that the corporal’s words and manner were inappropriate when addressing a member of the faculty. Davis thought the corporal behaved in an ungentlemanly manner. 382

The second area that began to bother the faculty was the regimentation of life on a military post. The day began with the playing of reveille to waken the troops and ended with taps to put them to bed. In between, there came a dizzying array of bugle calls directing the soldiers to one mission or another. The drill schedule signed by Lieutenant Van Dusen, at William and Mary, on Oct 23, illustrates this point. Published as General Order No. 6, it does not leave much, if any, time for academic work during the day.

Table 6. William and Mary Drill Schedule October 23, 1918383

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Call</th>
<th>Morning</th>
<th>Afternoon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>6:00 AM</td>
<td>Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reveille</td>
<td>6:10 AM</td>
<td>Call to quarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assembly</td>
<td>6:15 AM</td>
<td>2:00 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatigue</td>
<td>6:15 AM</td>
<td>First call for drill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First call for mess</td>
<td>7:00 AM</td>
<td>Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruit</td>
<td>7:10 AM</td>
<td>Recall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First call for drill</td>
<td>7:50 AM</td>
<td>5:15 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assembly</td>
<td>8:00 AM</td>
<td>First call for retreat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recall</td>
<td>8:50 AM</td>
<td>5:20 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call to quarters</td>
<td>9:00 AM</td>
<td>5:25 PM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First call for mess</td>
<td>12:55 PM</td>
<td>5:50 PM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since campuses were now installations supporting the war effort, SATC student guards required professors to show identification to enter the same buildings in which they had
worked for years. Orders published at William and Mary even directed the manner in which soldiers would stand to answer question in class.

The lack of time for academic work was the third major complaint that the faculty had with the SATC. To the chagrin of the faculty, students missed class to perform purely military duties like guarding the campus and kitchen police. Early on in the development of the SATC the idea that academics did not matter caught hold within the student body.

Some students in the SATC believed that their academic performance would not affect their opportunity for assignment to an officers' training camp. As a consequence, some soldiers neither applied themselves to their studies nor availed themselves of the various academic opportunities available. To counter this, the CEST developed and announced an evaluation plan to use in judging student performance. The plan would evaluate academic work, ability to command men, physique, business ability, character, honor or scrupulousness, and other qualities.

In the first of several memoranda aimed at the notion that academics were unimportant the CEST published Administrative Memo No. 20, on October 15. It called for commanding officers to “assist the educational authorities in securing from all men under their command a full performance of their academic work....” The memo continued, stating that “energetic and thorough prosecution of their academic studies” would figure heavily in selections for officers’ schools. It finished with an admonition to the commanders stating that except in extraordinary cases “individual soldiers should not be detailed for military duties which would interfere with their academic appointments and studies.”
War Department guidance mandated that each SATC student would work for fifty-three hours per week. Freshmen were to receive forty-two academic hours and eleven hours of military instruction. Upper classes were to receive forty-eight academic and five military hours. Although this schedule might have allowed for effective learning, its implementation left the faculty desiring much. In Patton’s words, “the officers charged with the military duties were simple soldiers.” They did not understand the rigors of the learning process nor have any interest in developing such an understanding. 389

This complaint was fairly standard throughout schools with SATC detachments. 390 By November, it was obvious that many of the SATC units were not following the guidance concerning the use of soldiers on details. On November 2, the District Headquarters of the CEST issued additional guidance. The headquarters ordered commanders to eliminate all but the most essential extra duties. 391

The problem of soldiers missing class was sufficiently widespread that General Rees, Chief of CEST, issued guidance from the War Department on November 5, 1918. Rees noted that reports from schools indicated that the academic work of the soldiers was unsatisfactory. Citing the newness of the SATC and the influenza epidemic as factors, he also wrote, “it has also resulted in part from the practice of detailing men to military duties which conflict with their academic programs, and to the prevalence of the idea that academic grades will count for relatively little in the selection of men for Officer Training Camps.” 392

Rees continued, noting that commanding officers should consult with the academic authorities of their institutions regularly. He directed commanders to ensure that the members of their commands recognized the importance of academic work.
Specifically, Rees directed commanders to “reduce to a minimum such detail of individual soldiers as interferes with their academic studies.” Since the colleges were under contract to provide rations, Rees directed that commanders use soldiers for kitchen police in emergencies. He also directed that commanders only use guard details when and where absolutely necessary. If guard details were for the purposes of training, as opposed to an operational requirement, the time for the detail should come from the eleven hours allotted each week for military training. If soldiers were to miss class due to military duties, commanders were to notify the professor beforehand and provide an explanation. Commanders were to include a description of all such conflicts in their bi-weekly report to headquarters. Finally, Rees reminded commanders of the requirements established in Special Regulations Aa-1 that they work within the normal rules, or general usages, of the institution. 393

Athletics and Leisure Activities

The Alumni News at the University of Virginia lamented, “The free and colorful life of Virginia is gone, because the military discipline and the altered schedules will absolutely supplant it.” 394 Supplant it they did. Little of the pre-war way of life was left untouched by the arrival of the SATC. Another major change to collegiate life resulted from the decision to prohibit intercollegiate athletic events as “inconsistent with the soldiers’ program of drill and study.” 395

Two principle concerns impacted the short-lived decision to ban intercollegiate athletics. First, with the nation at war, some thought the idea of athletic pursuits frivolous. The second concern was that some major trips taken by athletic teams would result in the
extended absence of soldier/student-athletes. These absences would result in the soldier missing valuable military training.

On the surface, athletic contests were a means toward creating strong minds and bodies. They certainly contributed to developing teamwork within the teams and their fans. On the other hand, athletic teams require practice and travel, which would reduce the time available for military related duties. The schedule published by the War Department called for forty-two academic hours and eleven hours of military drill each week leaving little time for other activities.

On October 3, the War Department sent a memorandum to Commanders of SATC units providing guidance concerning athletic activities. The memorandum affirmed the benefits of athletic pursuits. However, the war department limited the amount of time available for practice to one and one-half hours each day. Additionally, no teams could be away from their campus after taps on Saturday (approximately 10 p.m.) through October. In November, this restriction of eased to allow two trips from retreat on Friday (approximately 5 p.m.) until taps on Sunday.396

Group singing was another popular form of entertainment among the SATC soldiers. With many normal college activities curtailed or cancelled due the changed circumstances caused by the creation of the SATC, the War Department sought to fill the void with suitable activities. Group singing was one activity that received War Department level support. According to Major General Leonard Wood, "I have seen men toiling for hours thru the mud and rain, every one of them dejected, spiritless, tired and cold, wet, and forlorn, cursing the day they entered the army, transformed into a happy,
devil-may-care frame of mind thru a song. Their heads pop up in the air, their eyes sparkle, and the spring comes back to their step." 397

Consequently, singing was a major form of entertainment for members of the SATC. This activity continued even during demobilization, with men who possessed good voices provided lessons and the opportunity to lead other men. On December 5, for example, the Battalion at the University of Virginia formed at 3:15 p.m. to march to Cabell Hall for mass singing. 398

As one might expect of larger groups of young men, singing was not the only activity that occupied the minds of the SATC soldiers. Not surprisingly, the men were interested in meeting women. In some instances, meetings occurred in socially acceptable settings, such as the YMCA or at a church function. At William and Mary, with women now admitted, the men displayed little interest in their classmates. According to Y.O. Kent, the men of William and Mary were more interested in the girls in town, “There was a powder plant out at Penniman, and a lot of girls were working out there. And we’d go out there and get those girls. We didn’t pay any attention to the students.... They had so many regulations, you know, that they had to go by and the other girls didn’t have any regulations at all.” 399

To counter the effects of the soldier’s natural inclinations, Dr. Winfield Scott Hall traveled to different SATC schools around the country to deliver a series of lectures titled “Military Efficiency as Related to Manhood” to the soldiers of the SATC. The lectures began on November 10 at the University of Virginia with the intended purpose of reducing the rate of venereal infection. Hall also delivered lectures at William and Mary, though there the topic was dealt with less euphemistically than in the lecture’s official
title. According to the letter of notification, Hall’s “lectures constitute a part of the Surgeon General’s educational program for combating venereal disease.”

_The Question of Race_

Despite unfair treatment Black soldiers have served the United States with dignity, honor, and courage since the Revolutionary War. The vexing question of race continued to face the Amy as it established the SATC in 1918. The United States was divided between areas in which segregation was the law and areas where it existed _de facto_. The Army did not have integrated units; these would not arrive until 1950.

Yet, in an October 5 telegram transmitted to the commander of the SATC units, the CEST provided guidance to ignore race where ever and when ever possible in making personnel decision:

No color line will be drawn in inducting men into Section A. Colored men eligible for induction … can be inducted at institutions which [would normally accept them] and will not be required to travel to other institutions. Use tact … in providing mess and quarters for colored men and arrange such segregation as may be necessary and in all conditions cooperate with college authorities.

While vexing to society at large, universities in Virginia did not have any problems on the surface with regard to race. Segregation was the law in the state as it was throughout the South during the World War I period. And the law in Virginia as it was throughout the South was clearly in the hands of the white majority. Because of the federal policy, the Virginia universities were going to have to deal with the question on some level.

On October 8, 1918, President Eggleston, of Virginia Polytechnic Institute, wrote to President Alderman, of the University of Virginia, asking his opinion concerning the telegram and methods of handling call for the admission of Black students into their
schools. Eggleston wrote, “If this telegram is sent out by the Committee on Education
simply to save its face, with no intention ... to force the issue, the telegram may be
ignored. If ... there is the possibility that some sublime fool in Washington may attempt
a mix up, there should be concerted action on the part of every institution south of Mason
and Dixon Line.”

Leaving aside the issue of segregation, Alderman’s response reflects a calm,
thoughtful awareness of the environment and his position in it. Alderman responded that
the War Department was free to do as it wished, but since “colored” students could not,
attend either school by law, there was no chance that they would face admission of Black
soldiers as students. On October 10, Alderman responded to Eggleston.

The Commanding Officer of this Unit has received a telegram.... Until I received
your copy, I did not know that such an order had been issued to him.... the matter
is perfectly simple. The Commanding Officer cannot induct ... any man who has
not previously registered in the University. The laws of Virginia prohibit our
registering any men in the University of Virginia except white men. Therefore, no
colored men will ever reach the Commandant for induction.... If the War
Department were to insist ... then we would simply have to give up the contract
for the ... S.A.T.C. 403

Alderman provided Eggleston with an analysis of the racial situation in the state
of Virginia and the likelihood of the Army assigning any Black soldiers to any of the
state’s colleges.

We are prevented from registering colored men by the statute of Virginia. That is
the cold legal status of this matter... [and makes] it impossible for any such stupid
mix-up to materialize concretely.... Even were there no statute law... the
authorities ... may refuse to do so, and the government cannot ... enforce them to
do it.... In essence, the thing will only have meaning to those institutions that
receive colored men. To those of us who do not receive them, it has no practical
meaning. 404

Alderman closed with an admonition not to enter into the discussion. “In my
judgment, the Presidents of Institutions should say nothing to Washington. Washington
has said nothing to them but only to the Commanding Officers. The SATC demobilized too quickly for the question of race to emerge as a truly difficult issue within the context of the program.

_Hurry Up and Wait – Delays in the Implementation Process_

Delays in inducting soldiers caused additional difficulties for both the War Department and the colleges. The War Department expected to begin the SATC across the country on October 1, 1918 with induction of all soldiers occurring at that time. Unfortunately, not all schools could be ready on such short notice. As noted, William and Mary completed only half of the required physical examinations to October 1. Delays in induction created a payment and funding gap.

The colleges charged students with tuition and fees from the opening of the semester until October 1. They were to charge the War Department from the date of induction onward. If induction was delayed for a week, for instance, the colleges would either assume the responsibility themselves or charge the students, as the War Department could not assume the burden. Lieutenant Van Dusen, the commander at William and Mary, inquired concerning this situation receiving the following telegram from the Business Director of the CEST:

Regret delay in induction appreciate and thoroughly sympathize your difficulty. Unfortunately law does not permit payments housing and subsistence except for soldiers on active duty status. Losses unavoidably incurred by institutions through delayed induction will be taken up for consideration by this department as soon as practicable in the hope that means may be found for their equitable adjustment. Expect to find way to reimburse institutions for housing subsisting and instructing man from time he signs and accepts competent order two thousand seven but cannot absolutely guarantee at present time. As a further precaution we suggest that you have the students pay their subsistence and other expenses until matters are definitely decided.
Doubtless, this response provided little support to the school and the SATC commander. The issue at hand was that students arrived at the school and were being treated as soldiers, in anticipation of their ultimate induction. The students had submitted themselves to military order and discipline; yet, because of difficulties beyond their control, they were not under contract to the government. While bureaucratic and unsatisfactory from the standpoint of the school, the SATC unit, and the student, the suggestion that students pay for their subsistence and housing until matters were resolved was the only suggestion available to the staffers at CEST. The situation existed at more than one institution and the CEST would have to apply the same solution across the nation.

The Spanish Influenza Epidemic

Historically, many more soldiers succumb to disease, either communicable or resulting from their injuries, than die as a direct result of contact with enemy weapons and their effects. In World War I, 50,510 died battle related deaths. An additional 51,477 died as a result of disease. Resulting from the improvements in preventive medicine, health care, and the discovery of penicillin, the rate of death from disease in World War I was fourteen per 1,000 soldiers, a vast improvement of the twenty-five per 1,000 in the Spanish-American War only twenty years earlier. One of the principle causes of disease deaths during this World War I was a world-wide influenza epidemic.

Personnel and equipment problems were relatively simple issues to handle when compared to the sickness that struck the Army and the nation during 1918. Influenza created an environment in which men were unable to function. In addition to disease it spread panic and fear which were nearly as difficult to manage. The reach of the disease
extended around the globe, stretching from its Kansas origins to Europe and Asia. It reached college campuses in earnest as classes began and the SATC activated during the fall semester of 1918.

Influenza pandemics generally affect from 15-40 percent of a population. Influenza normally attacks the very young with no immunities and the very old with reduced immunity to the disease. This strain was different. It attacked the weak and feeble, but it was devastating among the strongest.\textsuperscript{409}

Many epidemiologists believe that a previously unknown influenza virus originated in Haskell County, Kansas in early 1918. Haskell County is a rural farming community in the southwestern part of the state. Epidemiologists trace the path of the virus from Haskell to Fort Riley outside Manhattan, approximately three hundred miles to the northeast. Dean Nelson, a soldier training at Camp Funston on the Fort Riley complex, returned to the community of Jean in Haskell County during the initial outbreak in early 1918. Several other soldiers and family members traveled between the two locations during the same period. The virus traveled with them and passed throughout the camp. From there it was easy; soldiers reassigned from training at Fort Riley took the virus with them throughout the United States and Europe.\textsuperscript{410}

The phenomenal growth required to provide daily services to an Army of the size demanded by the war and requested by General Pershing affected life at Camp Funston and Fort Riley. Consequently, in violation of regulations more men resided in barracks than the allowed. With barracks filled to capacity and beyond, some men slept in tents. Barracks and tents received inadequate heat and, because of the rapid growth of the Army, blankets and winter clothing were in short supply. To make matters worse, the
winter of 1918 was especially cold, causing men to huddle around stoves for warmth. And, in a final twist of chance, hospitals were the last buildings constructed by the rapidly expanding Army.411

It was not a long jump from the Army camps to the population as a whole. Once in the general population, influenza found easy targets on college campuses. Campuses, like Army posts, are places where a large number of people live and work in close proximity to each other. A communicable, airborne disease can devastate such an area. The influenza arrived on campus shortly after the SATC activation.

On October 2, Major Stone sent a telegram to the CEST stating that there were no new cases of influenza on that date and his belief that the epidemic was under control.412 In a second telegram dated the same day, Major Stone requested that the CEST ship cots and blankets required dealing with the influenza epidemic to William and Mary by the most expeditious means available.413 Three days later the CEST responded that due to overseas requirements, the quartermaster has cancelled the undelivered shipment of blankets to SATC units. The CEST authorized commanders locally procure required blankets and cots. Additionally, students could wear and use personal civilian clothing and bedding if the health and weather situations required it.414

Throughout Virginia more than three hundred thousand cases of influenza occurred. Doctors could not handle the requirements placed upon them; there were simply too many sick and too few doctors. Communities in the Shenandoah Valley area were hard hit. Roanoke, suffered ninety-one deaths; Lynchburg suffered more than ten thousand cases of influenza and two hundred deaths.415
The University of Virginia pressed third and fourth year students at the Medical College of Virginia into service as medical staff. To alleviate the shortage of nurses, they used second-year students as medical attendants.\textsuperscript{416} On October 14, 1918, President Alderman received a request from a Dr. Plecker, of Richmond, for medical support. Alderman responded that he was unable to supply any more than the university had already done. The need at the school was too great to assist off campus.\textsuperscript{417}

At the University of Virginia blankets became an issue. A memorandum went to commanders authorizing hospitalized students to take their blankets with them. A subsequent memo, issued in mid-November 1918, ordered commanders to account for the blankets assigned to their command and to determine the number that were still at the hospital. In case there was any doubt, the memo informed commanders that Army blankets could be identified by the rectangular inspectors slip sewed to one corner.\textsuperscript{418}

The University of Virginia the detachment Surgeon provided guidance to soldiers and students seeking to avoid influenza. It reflects what they knew and what they supposed about the virus. Most of the recommendations are simply good hygiene while one, take a cathartic (laxative) reflect a complete lack of understanding concerning the disease. His seven guidelines for avoiding infection were:\textsuperscript{419}

Table 7. Influenza Prevention Guidance from the University of Virginia Surgeon
1. Do not cough or expectorate any secretions from nose and throat upon the ground or floors.
2. Men will provide themselves with waste cloths or toilet paper, and any secretions from nose and throat will be expelled there and be promptly burned.
3. Cough or sneeze in to a handkerchief instead of into the air.
4. Use your own toilet articles, towels, etc.
5. Use your own mess kit and see that it is washed clean in hot water after using.
6. Do not crowd together. Keep in the open air and sun and breathe deeply.
7. Take a cathartic.
In recognition of the rising tide of influenza cases, the Eastern Department Headquarters sent a memorandum to the Commander of the SATC at William and Mary on October 9. The memorandum ordered “the commanding officers of camps posts and stations not quarantined but in which influenza is prevalent will suspend all individual furloughs for enlisted men and leaves of absence to officers except where exceptional circumstances of great weight render such furlough very necessary.”\textsuperscript{420}

On October 18, Alderman responded to a letter from Mr. J.P. Phillips regarding his son’s induction into the Army. The son, unfortunately, was stricken with influenza and died prior to the completion of the paperwork. Alderman’s response to the father suggests the extreme difficulty that all the schools were having with the combination of influenza and SATC inductions. Alderman explained that students first enrolled in the college and then volunteered for enlistment at which time the Army initiated induction procedures.\textsuperscript{421}

We have not yet finished our induction of over eight hundred men, simply because their papers and the routine could not be completed with a big staff daily at work. It seems that your boy fell ill before he had completed this process, and as the government does not count any man a soldier until after the formal induction, he failed to get into the army formally. This is greatly to be regretted; but I cannot see how it could have been prevented.

The Virginia Database of Military Dead (Table 8) lists sixteen members of the SATC who died during October-December period. Most died from influenza or a related case of pneumonia. Additionally, the list includes a Sergeant Roger Millhiser of Sussex County died in the Yale University Infirmary while associated with the SATC there.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>County or City</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Date of Death</th>
<th>School</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allen, Francis A</td>
<td>Prince Edward</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>10/19/1918</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Callison, Marshall McClure</td>
<td>Augusta</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>12/12/1918</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The CEST reacted fairly swiftly to the new situation created by the Armistice. On November 14, 1918 and again on November 16, telegrams the CEST sent to presidents of SATC institutions advising that they could revise academic schedules now that the emergency was over. The CEST directed commanders of the SATC units to confer with university officials about possible schedule revisions. Military instruction was now limited to no more than eleven hours per week. Additionally, the CEST directed commanders to ensure that details and special duties were “so arranged as not to interfere in any way the education of any man.”

This was a far cry from the situation only two weeks before and further recognition of the curtailment of the academic side of the SATC soldier’s day by additional duties.

The CEST issued guidance concerning curricula to the District Inspectors on November 14, 1918. “In view of the changed conditions, instruction in the following
subjects may be discontinued either immediately or at the end of the current term December 21." The subjects pertained to the military but had less application within the civilian sector: Military Law, Surveying and Map Making, Map Reading and Navigation, and Modern Ordnance. Based upon the local situation the War Department gave colleges latitude in determining whether to discontinue these courses immediately or wait until the conclusion of the current term. Should they discontinue the courses immediately, colleges were free to use the time for other work, as they desired.

Just after the signing of the Armistice, decisions concerning the continuation of the SATC were forthcoming. The uncertainty of the future of the SATC was highlighted by the additional guidance that "It is probable that no program of academic work will be prescribed after the end of the current term ... except that nine hours will be reserved for a course in War Issues.... Military instruction will continue as at present described being strictly confined to eleven hours." Obviously, the CEST was not certain the War Department would discontinue the SATC and was planning for future campus operations.

In recognition that conflicts between military and academic requirement continued a telegram from the CEST notified the District Inspectors that "All military details conflicting with academic exercises will be eliminated." The guidance reducing course requirements led to the question of what was supposed to fill the time. The CEST provided additional guidance on November 16, 1918, allowing a reduction of class time to thirty-six hours per week. This reduction in the forty-two hours of academic work expected in the SATC freed time for other student activities. On November 19, the CEST amplified this guidance in a second memorandum. It directed that "the time freed by discontinuance of hitherto prescribed studies need not be wholly devoted to new courses
by may be utilized within reasonable limits for additional study hours. Institutions may, if
they so desire, reduce the total of forty-two hours academic work per week to not less
than thirty-six hours.”

The Armistice changed the circumstance of the SATC units. Prior to November 11, 1918, men were clamoring to enter the SATC. With the signing of the Armistice, this
was no longer the case. SATC units consisted of men who had completed enlistment and
were soldiers as well as men who enrolled but awaited the finalization of their
enlistments. Several of the men whose enlistments were not complete wished to leave the
SATC and drop the War Aims course. Since the Army curtailed enlistments they saw
little purpose in continuing the course.

The enrolled but not enlisted men created a particular difficulty for the unit since
they were under no legal obligation to either remain with the unit or obey the Army’s
rules and regulations. Lieutenant Colonel Cole sent a letter to the CEST on November 15
seeking guidance concerning the enrolled men. Cole wrote, “I know of no way of
enforcing a continuance of their performance of military duty and consider them as being
inherently a constant possible center of discontent and resistance to military authority, as
their good conduct depends upon their good will, which cannot be predicted with
certainty.” Cole continued that he had asked the enrolled men to sign an agreement to
obey Army regulations, but he recognized that this was only binding on those who
wished it to be binding. Ultimately, Cole felt, “The mere presence among enlisted men of
a group that can divest itself of its obligations at any moment is bad for discipline. These
men have no expectation now of entering the S.A.T.C. and no desire as well.”
Major Munro, of the CEST, responded to Cole’s November 15 memorandum on November 22. In his response, Munro informed Cole that the decision was one that Cole could make in coordination with university authorities. Munro wrote, “The conditions under which students at educational institutions who are not eligible for induction into the S.A.T.C. may be given military instruction, are wholly within the jurisdiction of the Commanding Officer in consultation with the head of the institution.” Munro also stated the CEST had no requirements concerning the instruction of non-inducted men, “All conditions relating to their academic studies are within the jurisdiction of the college authorities and whether they should be permitted to drop War Issues or any other courses is a question to be determined by the academic authorities in accordance with their own regulations and practice.432

The War Department suspended enlistment in the SATC on November 14, 1918.433 In late November, the CEST sent instructions to the schools to begin the demobilization of SATC units. The instructions ordered that the discharging of soldiers commence the week of December 1 and end no later than December 21.434

Demobilization came so quickly on the heals of the massive buildup that there was little opportunity for the War Department to develop coherent plans. Once again, the War Department executed a plan nearly as it was developed. On November 29, 1918, the CEST issued Administrative Memorandum No. 58 directing commanders to begin demobilization and discharge of SATC-B soldiers on December 2 and SATC-A soldiers on December 4. Priority was to go to men who did not wish to or intend to remain in college. Officers assigned to the SATC were to begin discharge proceedings on
December 10, unless the officer wished to remain on active duty. Determination of which officers to retain would take the Army additional time.

General rules for discharging men included guidance against discharging any soldier when in poorer health than at enlistment and that “curable venereals should not be discharged until cured and incurables should not be discharged until danger of carrying infection is eliminated.” The Army would hold on active duty those soldiers who desired to remain in the service while the Department determined how many men it would need and Congress would authorize.\footnote{435}

As a public relations measure, the Army decided to allow discharged soldiers to retain and wear their uniform home, provided they agreed to return it to the government within four months. The men, additionally, were allowed to keep their socks, and underclothing. Commanders were told to remind the men that even though they were discharged while wearing the uniform their actions reflected upon the Army and they were expected to behave accordingly.\footnote{436}

On November 26, the CEST sent a memorandum to college presidents concerning the reestablishment of ROTC. The plan, as it was originally announced, was reiterated: that the creation of a SATC unit would not impair the reestablishment of a current ROTC program or defer the creation of a requested unit. The War Department announced January 1, 1919 as the date for the beginning of the new ROTC programs.\footnote{437}

In the new ROTC regulations, the Army sought to assuage the concerns of administration and faculty who were not pleased by the performance of the SATC. The Army planned to do this by establishing a three-tiered system of participation in the revised ROTC. The first category consisted of military schools, like the Virginia Military
Institute. The second category consisted of schools in which students wore a uniform to participate in drill periods two or three times per week but who otherwise dressed and acted as the rest of the campus did. The final category consisted of schools in which students did not wear uniforms during the academic year but received the preponderance of their training during summer camps. In all instances, the students were to receive classroom instruction covering military theory in a schedule designed to fit within the academic traditions and expectations of the individual institutions.\textsuperscript{438}

It took several months of staff work to close the accounts on the five hundred schools that participated in the SATC. On July 1, 1919, Secretary of War Newton Baker closed the chapter on the SATC in a letter to the presidents of the institutions that participated.

The abrupt termination of the S.A.T.C. before sufficient time had elapsed for its complete development, the interruption due to the influenza epidemic and to other conditions incident to the early stages of an organization, created difficulties which could not fail to seriously disturb the order of academic life. I am, therefore, glad of this opportunity to express to you my recognition of the patience, devotion, and skill with which both teachers and executives played the parts which they were asked to play.\textsuperscript{439}

\begin{flushright}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{336} Memorandum, CEST to College presidents and Commanding Officers, Subject: Length of course and assignment of Students' Army training Corps soldiers, dtd 28 Sep 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.
\item \textsuperscript{337} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{338} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{339} Memorandum, Rees to Commanding Officers of SATC units and College Presidents of SATC institutions, dtd 28 Sep 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.
\item \textsuperscript{340} The Army publishes regulations that provide guidance for operations. For instance there are regulations that cover officer personnel assignments, enlisted assignments, and supply accountability procedures. In today's Army, the number of different regulations runs into the hundreds. These may run in length from a few pages to several hundred pages depending upon the complexity of the issue. MAJ Stone's complaint was that he had only received two regulations of the total number he felt he required to organize his unit.
\item \textsuperscript{341} Temple, \textit{Bugle's Echo}.
\item \textsuperscript{342} Telegram, CEST to Commanding Officer, William and Mary SATC, dtd 25 Sep 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.
\end{itemize}
\end{flushright}
1. The 1903 Springfield was a .30 caliber, bolt fed rifle. It was significant in World War I and World War II. It continued in use, on a very limited basis, into the Vietnam War.

2. Letter Nichols to Alderman dated 3 Dec 1917, UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 3 of 7.

3. Ibid.

4. Memorandum, District Headquarters to C.O. S.A.T.C. William and Mary College, dated 12 Nov 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 682 (WM).


6. Despite the more common usage of “endorsement” for such actions, the Army used the term “indorsement” well into the 1990s. As paperwork traveled up the chain of command, higher commanders indorsed the requests of subordinates, on the original document if space was available. If not, a short memorandum was added to the front of a request. This process continued until the use of computers and electronic mail superseded the submission of traditional paper documents. Memorandum Stone to CEST, subject: Office Equipment, dated 17 Sep 1918 National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 682(WM); and Stone to CEST, subject: Personnel, dated 17 Sep 1918 National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.

7. Memoranda Quartermaster General to President, UVA, dated 17 May 1918, Subject: Bond, UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 6 Files M/Mc/1 of 7.

8. Memorandum, Perry to Presidents of SATC Institutions, dated 11 Dec 1918, Subject: Reports for historical record. Discontinuance of Students' Army Training Corps, UVA Archives RG 2/1/4.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 6 of 7.

9. Memorandum, CEST to College presidents and Commanding Officers, Subject: Length of course and assignment of Students' Army training Corps soldiers, dated 28 Sep 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.


11. Memorandum, CEST to College presidents and Commanding Officers, Subject: Length of course and assignment of Students' Army training Corps soldiers, dated 28 Sep 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.

12. Memorandum, CEST to College presidents and Commanding Officers, Subject: Length of course and assignment of Students' Army training Corps soldiers, dated 28 Sep 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.

13. Memorandum, CEST to College presidents and Commanding Officers, Subject: Length of course and assignment of Students' Army training Corps soldiers, dated 28 Sep 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.

14. Memorandum, CEST to College presidents and Commanding Officers, Subject: Length of course and assignment of Students' Army training Corps soldiers, dated 28 Sep 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.


17. One must recall that the first women were admitted to the University of Virginia in 1971. The only male students available for courses were those who were too young or physically unfit for military service.

18. Bruce, *UVA; Goodson, “The Tyler Era.”*


20. Ibid.


23. Mann, *Committee on Education and Special Training (CEST).*


Memorandum, CEST to Institutions where Units of the SATC are located, dtd 27 Aug 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681

Aydelotte, War Issues Course, p.12.


Hawkes, “A College Course on Peace Issues,

Heckel, “The War Aims Course,” 22

Gruber, Mars and Minerva, p. 243.

The UVA and the War, Council on Military Service, 11 April 1917, UVA Archives RG 2-1-2.472 Subseries III Box 6 Files M/Mc 1 of 7.

Goodson, “The Tyler Era.”

SATC Special Regulations, undated, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.

Kolbe, The Colleges in War Time; Gruber, Mars and Minerva.

Memorandum Pullen to VanDusen, dtd 12 Oct 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 682 (WM).

General Orders No. 6, SATC College of William and Mary, dtd 23 Oct 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.

Kolbe, The Colleges in War Time; Gruber, Mars and Minerva.

Special Orders No. 3, dtd 11 Nov 1918, Subject: Class Room Regulations, College of William and Mary Archives.

Patton, “UVA in WWI.”

Memorandum, Rees to Commanding Officers of SATC units and College Presidents of SATC institutions, dtd 28 Sep 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.

Memorandum, CEST Administrative Memo No. 20, dtd 15 Oct 1918, UVA Archives RG 2-1-2.472 Subseries III Box 7 File SATC 2 of 2.

Patton, “UVA in WWI.” Patton was the university librarian. President Alderman requested that he write a response to a request for a newspaper article concerning university activities supporting the war effort. Following the war, that article grew into the longer paper cited here.

Kolbe, The Colleges in War Time; Mann, Committee on Education and Special Training (CEST); Gruber, Mars and Minerva.

Memorandum Towner to Commanding Officers, dtd 2 Nov 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.

Memorandum Rees to Commanding Officers, District Inspectors, District Educational Directors, and Heads of SATC Institutions, dtd 5 Nov 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.

Ibid.

UVA Alumni News, dtd Sep 1918, p. 6

Memorandum , CEST to The Commanding Officers, Students’ Army Training Corps, Subject: Athletics dtd 26 Sep 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.

Memorandum Rees to Commanding Officers of SATC, dtd 3 Oct 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.

Aim of Singing in SATC. Undated, UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 3 of 7.

Memos Mulhern to Company Commanders 5 Dec 1918 UVA Archives RG 23-5 SATC Records Box 5.

Oral history, Y. O. and Elizabeth Kent, 9 Jun 1975, William and Mary Archives.

Memorandum, Fosdick to C.O. S.A.T.C. at William and Mary College, dtd 9 Nov 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 683.

Telegram, CEST to Commanding Officer William and Mary College, dtd 5 Oct 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.

Letter Eggleston to Alderman, dtd 8 Oct 1918, UVA Archives RG 2/1/4.472 Subseries III Box 7 File SATC 2 of 2.


Ibid.

Ibid.
The disease did not strike only American soldiers. Soldiers deploying to France took the virus with them, spreading it first to the European Allies and then to the German forces. In a story of unknown origin, the influenza became the Spanish Influenza because the combatant armies censored the fact that their soldiers were sick to avoid giving the enemy an advantage. Since Spain was not involved in the war, Spanish newspapers reported the illness. As the only nation reporting sickness, Spain received the ignominious honor of the name.

To ensure that the CEST staffer was not influenced by a lack of knowledge concerning the geography of the area, Stone included mention of the fact that vehicles enroute to Camp Eustis in Newport News drove through Williamsburg and directly past the campus.

Telegram, CEST to William and Mary College, dtd 5 Oct 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681

Temple, Bugle's Echo.

Letter Alderman to Plecker dtd 14 Oct 1918 UVA Archives RG 2-1-2.472 Subseries III Box 6 Files M/Mc 1 of 7.

Letter to Company Commanders dtd 10 Oct 1918 and Mulhern to Company Commanders dtd 16 Nov 1918 both located in UVA Archives RG 23-5 SATC Records Box 5.

Notice, Nicholson, undated, UVA Archives RG 23-5 SATC Records Box 5.

Memorandum Adjutant, HQ, Eastern Department to Senior Army Officer, SATC William and Mary, dtd 9 Oct 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.

Letter Alderman to Phillips 18 Oct 1918, UVA Archives RG 2-1-2.472 Subseries III Box 6 Files M/Mc 1 of 7.

Memorandum District Military Inspector to Commanding Officer, dtd 18 Nov 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 682 (WM).

Memorandum, Daggett to Heads of Educational Institutions with SATC units, dtd 15 Nov 1918, Subject: Curricula Changes, UVA Archives RG 2/1/4.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 5 of 7.

Memorandum, Commanding Officer, SATC UVA to CEST, dtd 15 Nov 1918, Subject: Enrolled Students, UVA Archives RG 2/1/4.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 5 of 7.

Memorandum, Commanding Officer, SATC UVA to CEST, dtd 22 Nov 1918, Subject: Non-Inducted Students, UVA Archives RG 2/1/4.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 5 of 7.

Telegram CEST to Commanding Officer, SATC UVA, dtd 22 Nov 1918, Subject: Non-Inducted Students, UVA Archives RG 2/1/4.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 5 of 7.

Telegram, CEST to President, William and Mary College, undated, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 682 (WM).
432 Memo District Inspecting Officer to Commanding Officer, University of Virginia dtd 4 Dec 1918 UVA Archives RG 23-5 SATC Records Box 5.
436 Memos Mulhern to Company Commanders dtd 6 Dec 1918 and 7 Dec 1918 UVA Archives RG 23-5 SATC Records Box 5.
437 Memorandum CEST to Presidents of Institutions Maintaining ROTC in 1917-1917, Subject: Re-establishment of Units of Reserve Officer Training Corps January 1, 1918, UVA Archives RG 2/1/4.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 5 of 7.
438 Memoranda, CEST to President, UVA, dtd 7 Feb 1919 UVA Archives RG2/1/4.472 Subseries III Box 7 file 7 of 7.
439 Memorandum, Baker to Presidents of Institutions having units of the SATC, dtd 1 July 1919, William and Mary Archives.
Chapter 6

Development of the SATC at the University of Virginia

The extremely difficult and divisive decision to allow the military on campus preceded the decision to participate in ROTC and later in the SATC. This decision was not taken lightly by the universities. As discussed previously, a general consensus for preparedness and military training only developed following President Wilson’s support of preparedness in 1916. In Virginia, the Boards of Visitors and faculties were concerned with the potential loss of the individual character of their institutions. The Commonwealth had the Virginia Military Institute and the land grant with its military program at Virginia Tech. The Boards and faculties of strictly civilian schools did not want to replicate either of those institutions.

Consequently, at both the College of William and Mary and the University of Virginia college officials agonized over the decision. In October 1916, the faculty of University of Virginia debated the merits of including military training in the curriculum. A committee studied the issue recommended the creation of one or more units of the Reserve Officers Training Corps. As early as January 1917, Armistead C. Gordon, the Rector of the University of Virginia, stated his opposition to including any military training at the university. He wrote that his extensive knowledge of the university “leads [him] to the conclusion that military education there is inconsistent with the spirit, the life, and the purposes of the institution; and that if adopted, it will prove inadequate, inefficient, and futile.”

On March 19, 1917, the Board of Visitors at University of Virginia considered the matter of requesting the creation of a ROTC detachment and adjourned without reaching
Figure 4: Dr. Edwin A. Alderman circa 1918
Courtesy: Holsinger Studio Collection, Special Collections, University of Virginia Library

Figure 5: Lieutenant Colonel James A. Cole
Courtesy: Holsinger Studio Collection, Special Collections, University of Virginia Library
a decision. According to Professor Echols, Chairman of the Committee on Military Organizations, the Board felt that they lacked sufficient information. The Board was cognizant of its leading position among southern universities and wanted to ensure it set the proper example. Echols wrote to the War Department “this University is perhaps the leading one in the south, and...it is believed that an active organization [ROTC] here will be followed by such throughout the South.” Additionally, at the behest of the Board, academic deans established committees for the purpose of making the resources of the respective departments more useful to the nation.

While the Board debated including the military on campus, President Alderman sought the counsel of other university presidents. Three of these schools had already requested participation in this first iteration of the Reserve Officer Training Corps. Cornell, as New York’s land grant institution, was required to offer military training to freshmen and sophomores. The University of Pennsylvania had an officer to provide military training, but they had not applied for an ROTC detachment because of a lack of a storage facility for equipment. Of schools contacted by Alderman, Columbia was the only one not offering some form of military training. In his reply, Frank Fackenthal, Secretary of the University at Columbia University, said, “The matter is under consideration, but has not been passed upon definitely. In the meantime, the students have formed a volunteer organization for drilling, and are now hard at work.”

The University of Virginia Board met to consider the requesting an ROTC detachment on March 23, 1917. The Board approved proposal in a seven to one vote. Presciently, the board stated, “nothing herein shall be construed as in any manner diminishing or impairing the authority and power vested in The Rector and Visitors of the
University of Virginia, to regulate and control the affairs of the University.\textsuperscript{448} The Board specifically wished to avoid turning University of Virginia into a military school, stating, “It is not the purpose of the governing Board to incorporate permanently in the life of the University a Department of Military Science, or to cause the institution to take on the character of a military school.”\textsuperscript{449}

However, the Board felt compelled to go beyond a simple show of support by providing a rhetorical flourish explaining its vote:

that the Rector and Board of Visitors of the University of Virginia recognizing that the United States is now in a state of war with a ruthless European power, hereby solemnly pledges to Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States the legal cooperation of his Alma Mater in the defense of that liberty, honor, and independence which George Washington and Thomas Jefferson did so much to establish and maintain.\textsuperscript{450}

Rector Gordon cast the sole dissenting vote. He stated three objections to the measure. First, the National Defense Act of 1916 authorized the War Department to detail an officer to the school, which Gordon felt was in contravention to the General Assembly’s\textsuperscript{451} guidance to the Board to appoint and approve faculty. Second, the Act authorized the War Department to issue equipment to the school for which the university must establish a bond. Again, Gordon felt this lay outside the purview of the Board’s authority. Finally, the Virginia Code did not include military science and tactics as subjects of instruction at the University of Virginia. Gordon believed that “in the absence of legislative enactment, the Board of Visitors of the University of Virginia [does not] have the power to alter the system of instruction...by the establishment of a school of military science and tactics in the University.”\textsuperscript{452}
The Reserve Officer Training Corps

Gordon's view did not sway his fellow Board members. The University of Virginia submitted the official request to establish a ROTC detachment to the War Department on March 27, 1917. In his letter, Alderman specifically requested that the War Department assign a graduate of West Point to serve as the instructor. Alderman desired an officer of substance and experience to guide the program. This request would pay future dividends when the War Department created the SATC.⁴⁵³

Six weeks after submitting the application, President Alderman received a letter from the War Department stating that the War Department had received the university's application to establish ROTC on campus and the report of campus inspection.⁴⁵⁴ Unfortunately, the university failed to state whether they intended to establish a compulsory or an elective course of military study. The War Department returned the entire packet so the university could make the appropriate annotation on the form. Time was short as the War Department decided in April that it would not consider applications received after June 1st for creation of units during the fall semester of 1917. Fortunately, mail could cover the 115 miles between Washington and Charlottesville with relative ease.

The University decided not to wait for official notification of the acceptance by the War Department. Registration for the ROTC program at UVA began on April 4, 1917, two days before the declaration of war and well before hearing anything from Washington.⁴⁵⁵ Drilling began on April 9th and by April 11th more than 760 students had enrolled in the nascent ROTC program that University of Virginia. Thirty faculty members entered ROTC as a faculty squad and drilled with the students.⁴⁵⁶
In response to Alderman’s request for an instructor, the War Department assigned a retired Lieutenant Colonel, James A. Cole, to serve as the Professor of Military Science and Tactics at the University of Virginia. Cole, a resident of Charlottesville, was a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point and a veteran of the Indian, Spanish, and Philippine wars. He was precisely the type of officer that Alderman hoped to receive.

The Committee on National Service immediately voted Cole membership on the committee and recommend that the President nominate him to the Board of Visitors as a member of the faculty. On 19 April, upon Alderman’s recommendation, the Board of Visitors elected Cole Professor of Military Science and Tactics. During the same meeting, the Board authorized the Rector to execute a bond in the amount of $5,420 to serve as security for the value of the military equipment expected at the school. The Board also voted to end the spring 1917 session on May 31 to allow students participating in the Plattsburg camp sufficient time to travel for its June 2 opening.

In this single board meeting, the Board of Visitors rejected each of the three points that Rector Gordon raised against the military. It allowed the War Department to select and assign an officer to the school, provided a bond to secure military equipment against loss, and endorsed the teaching of military subjects without specific approval of the General Assembly by electing Lieutenant Colonel Cole to the faculty.

In early June 1917, the University of Virginia, finally, received the formal order from the War Department establishing the ROTC detachment that was already functioning on campus. Lieutenant Colonel Cole was training a group that included the vast majority of the available student body, more than half of the faculty members, and
alumni.\textsuperscript{460} Due to the War Department policy requiring men attending officer training camps to have prior military experience or training, alumni returned to the university to participate in the training, joining the student body and faculty.\textsuperscript{461}

The fifteen months intervening between the formal creation of the ROTC program and the creation of the SATC saw a progression of military involvement on the campus of the University of Virginia. First, War Department approached the school about the possibility of creating a school of aeronautics.\textsuperscript{462} Next, the War Department sought support in teaching a wide variety of trades to soldiers, looking to schools of engineering as the most capable locations.\textsuperscript{463} Third, as the CEST emerged and combined programs, it approached the university to create the National Army Training Detachments (NATD) to train enlisted soldiers.\textsuperscript{464}

Significant changes occurred during this period; however, because the university established the ROTC program shortly after the declaration of war and prior to the creation of the SATC, it had time to blend the military into campus life more slowly than some other institutions. On September 16, 1918, R.T. Irvine, the Rector of the University of Virginia, signed a contract on behalf of the university requesting the establishment of a SATC unit and the assignment of soldiers to it. The contract requested the assignment of one thousand to fifteen hundred soldiers.\textsuperscript{465}

As a result of the war, the all-male student population at the university declined steadily from slightly more than one thousand before the war to only 313 in 1917-1918.\textsuperscript{466} The administration obviously saw the SATC as a means to restore the student population to its pre-war level. Seeking to create interest in the new program, the University of Virginia \textit{News Letter} published an announcement concerning the
establishment of the SATC in its September 1918 issue. The announcement "of great importance to all young men over eighteen-years old" detailed the requirements for membership, which included graduation from a "standard four year secondary school" and thirteen units of secondary school work (or the number required for admission on a conditional status to the state university).467

As the University of Virginia began final preparations for the activation of the SATC and the arrival of the new soldiers, President Alderman sent a letter to Lieutenant Colonel Cole concerning the impending transition. Alderman praised Cole's previous efforts with the ROTC, calling him a co-operative man, a "gentleman to the bone," and a hard and conscientious worker. Alderman had great concern, however, about the ultimate success of the program and the requirements placed upon Cole by the Army. He wrote:

This is a great administrative task. As I said to you, I do not know whether you are, or are not a great administrator. I do know that you are a splendid soldier, and that you have many qualities that ought to make you and ideal Commanding Officer. The success of this matter, however, will hinge upon your success in administration. I must rely upon you to care completely and efficiently, for the military side of this great undertaking, in which all American colleges are involved, and with which we have been entrusted by the War Department. It will give me happiness to give you credit for every bit of achievement in the great undertaking. If you are successful, as I believe you will be and as I desire to help you to be, I shall be very happy. If things do not go right, I shall be equally frank in saying so for they must go right, the essential thing is that we carry to a successful completion this tremendous challenge and opportunity.468

Alderman foresaw the most difficult aspects of running the SATC. Implementing a completely new set of administrative procedures using barely trained subordinate leaders and managers would challenge the most experienced leader. Further, one cannot overlook the implication that the military must work with, not around, the college administration. Alderman saw the endeavor as a partnership and wanted to establish ground rules before SATC operations actually began.
Activation of the SATC

The SATC at the University of Virginia began with all the pomp and circumstance appropriate to the occasion that a career Army officer could muster. Standing on the steps of the historic rotunda, facing the long green lawn about which the campus is arrayed, President Alderman gave a brief address:

Through many generations of war and peace this green lawn upon which you stand has been a ... symbol of peace and dignity.... To-day for the first time it is a parade ground..., and a symbol of the nation to pledge its last man to win this war of civilization. 469

Alderman echoed the messianic tone used by President Wilson as he praised the soldiers for their service, having heard “the call of the murdered dead,” and exhorted them on to end “the threat of the German menace to liberty and self government.” 470 Following the address by Alderman, Lieutenant Colonel Cole read messages from President Wilson and Secretary of War Baker. He then administered the oath of office to the soldiers and led them in the pledge of allegiance.

Immediately after the induction ceremonies, life on the campus of the University of Virginia began to change. As President Alderman had said in his speech the campus was now “a military encampment.” 471 A memorandum from Lieutenant Colonel Cole prescribed the uniform at the University of Virginia. Henceforward, the campus would be awash in khaki and olive drab as the soldiers would wear a uniform at all times. 472 The memorandum highlights how quickly and how completely the military injected itself into campus life. One would expect the prescribed uniform on an Army camp. It is not what one would expect to see on a university campus at the height of fall activities. Perhaps more telling is Cole’s final paragraph in which he states “No one will be permitted on the post wearing any or all of the above equipment unless he is actually enlisted in the U.S.
Freedom to choose items of attire was restricted and only those actually in the Army could wear items of the uniform. More importantly, the terminology in this single sentence summarized the rapid change underway. In his memorandum, Cole called the university post, the traditional Army term for a permanent installation, placing it on equal status with other military installations. Open access to the campus was a thing of the past, as entry and exit now came under military control and restrictions.

The creation of the SATC forced certain elements of military life that do not normally intrude upon the civilian thought process into the forefront on campus. Shortly after the activation, the adjutant, or the commander's assistant for personnel matter, of the SATC-B published orders prescribing rules for cleanliness during the influenza epidemic, establishing the requirement to read the bulletin board on a daily, establishing sick call hours, detailing a latrine for those suffering from venereal disease, restricting food in the barracks, and issuing laundry instructions. He also established the procedures soldiers would follow to arrange a meeting with officers. Finally, for good order and discipline, he ordered all men to take a minimum of two baths per week. Clearly, the campus was rapidly losing its genteel charm and becoming more like a true Army installation.

When soldiers were not cleaning and maintaining the buildings on the campus, they often spent time on guard duty. The Army regularly uses several different types of guards. Some guards perform duties to control access, such as a sentry at an entry gate. Other guards perform duties designed to ensure safety. One of these latter duties was fire guard. Providing heat for men living in tents and barracks has always presented a problem for the Army. In modern times, such issues do not arise regularly unless a unit is conducting winter field operations. In the early twentieth century, wood and coal burning
stoves were often the only heat available for a barracks. These stoves require large amounts of fuel and present a tremendous fire hazard – one which the command took very seriously. A nightly detail serves as fire guard in each barracks. Normally a squad of ten men takes turns walking the halls for a night, splitting the night so that all got the opportunity to sleep. To prevent fires and to take proactive prevention measures, every commander publishes letters providing guidance concerning the care and use of stoves.\textsuperscript{475}

Not every order that a unit publishes makes sense. In a bit of oxymoronic military logic, Second Lieutenant Smith, the Adjutant of the SATC-B, published a memoranda warning that, “If the boxes for trash are not kept cleaner and emptied more often, they will have to be removed and burned.”\textsuperscript{476} It does cause one to wonder what the appropriate use of trash receptacles is if not for the deposit of garbage and what Second Lieutenant Smith would suggest as a solution to the trash problem once he removed and burned the receptacles.

Later another memorandum from the Adjutant provided instruction to commanders concerning the use of coal to heat the barracks. The soldiers were using too much coal. The memo recommended the use of one half of one G.I. can per day per heater. Smith did include an important safety note in stating the allowing the heaters to become red hot was a waste, not to mention the fire hazard against which previous memos warned.\textsuperscript{477}

Often, when circumstance places a large number of people together difficulties ensue. Verbal and physical altercations and theft are two standards in such settings. Surprisingly, records of few such instances survive. In one such instance, the father of Brady Badgett, requested assistance in locating his son’s watch and pocket-book. The
younger Badgett had enrolled in the SATC but his enlistment paperwork was not complete. He became ill during the influenza epidemic and died on campus. No record of finding his belongings survives.\textsuperscript{478}

In December, a thief stole a sergeant uniform, valued at $40.00 that belonged to Private Webb. The command at the University of Virginia locked the campus down while officers and NCOs searched for the uniform. They posted extra guards around the campus to prevent anyone from leaving the grounds.\textsuperscript{479} The next day, the search for stolen uniform continued. The junior officer and the First Sergeant of each company were excused from the morning formation for the purpose of searching the company barracks and area. Reports from the officers indicate that one pair of stolen puttees was located.\textsuperscript{480} The missing uniform was not located.

Disagreements and teasing between men living in close quarters are commonplace. On December 3, 1918, a memo between company commanders at the University of Virginia suggests that was the case. It also suggests that an unofficial behavioral code existed among the men of the SATC.

It is very evident from Caplan's manner that he is unable to stand up for himself and act like a man and real soldier should act.... If he can't stand the jokes of the men in his company you will have to see to it that the men leave him absolutely alone and that they have nothing to do with him in any way.\textsuperscript{481}

This memorandum also points out the leadership dilemma Lieutenant Colonel Cole faced. Suggesting that a man was weak because he did not stand up for himself may or may not have reflected the truth of the situation. Telling a leader to ostracize the man within his own unit fails on many levels of effective leadership. It is a reflection of inexperience. In addition to managing a new program, coordinating with a school
administration, training brand new soldiers, Cole had to rely upon inexperienced subordinate leaders.

The creation of the SATC turned the campus of the University of Virginia into an Army post. The SATC brought many students who would not normally have attended college onto the campus and exposed them, however ineffectively to college-level academic material. It was not a smooth process and the Army was not the root of all the ills. Elements of the Army life brought by the SATC were wholly new the campus and required the efforts of soldier and academic, student and teacher to make them work.

Equipping the SATC

The quest for equipment to support the military on campus began with the decision to apply for a ROTC unit. President Alderman requested the assignment of equipment to support the ROTC program that was developing at University of Virginia under Lieutenant Colonel Cole. The Office of the Quartermaster General notified him that the Secretary of War Baker suspended providing arms and equipment to educational institutions.482

The University’s Committee on National Service, thinking that he might have some military contacts who could help, asked Lieutenant Colonel Cole to attempt to obtain military equipment for the university.483 Secretary Baker’s decision stymied Cole, too. Still, not quite two months after establishing the ROTC program on campus, the Board of Visitors appointed the Bursar to provide the War Department with an accounting of expenses related to military training. The university submitted a bill for $1,134 to the War Department.484
At the same time, President Alderman began a campaign to gain rifles for use in military training. The War Department notified President Alderman that rifles were not available for the University of Virginia ROTC. The Secretary of War suspended issuing arms, equipments, and other government property to educational institutions during the war.\(^{485}\) Although the need to equip deployed troops is paramount, the War Department, on one hand, was working feverishly to establish ROTC detachments at universities around the country and, on the other hand, was denying cooperating institutions the equipment required to create effective units. The only success Alderman had was in getting the Quartermaster General to affirm that the War Department held a bond for $5,420 to insure the safety of government weapons and equipment on campus, whether the weapons and equipment could be provided or not.\(^{486}\)

Having no success on his own, Alderman attempted to enlist the support of the State's Congressional delegation. He wrote to Senator Thomas A. Martin requesting his support in the effort to obtain rifles. According to Alderman, the entire success of ROTC at University of Virginia was dependent upon receipt of rifles.\(^{487}\) Martin lent his support, and in November he replied that he had discussed the matter of weapons for the school with Secretary of War Baker. Martin stated that he was unable to obtain the required weapons; however, he was able to gain a promise that they would be provided as soon as possible, perhaps even as early as January 1918.\(^{488}\) The United States entered the war in April 1917. The initial requirement to outfit the American Expeditionary Force had passed. By telling Martin that weapons might be available by January, Baker implied the worst of the initial logistics crunch was over and that he should have greater freedom of action soon.
The University of Virginia was not the only school having difficulty obtaining suitable weapons and equipment for military training. Writing from the Virginia Military Institute, Superintendent Nichols told President Alderman that he had similar troubles. Nichols said he approached Baker as well. Due to Virginia Military Institute's differing mission, it had weapons the War Department wanted. Virginia Military Institute was equipped with the 1903 Model Springfield rifle. The War Department promised Virginia Military Institute either older Springfield rifles or a Canadian rifle as replacement. Nichols, too, was in contact with Virginia’s Senators Flood and Martin seeking support.489

LTC Cole again took up the fight for weapons with a letter to Senator Martin in early February, 1918. Some relief of the situation had occurred since the previous fall, however, Cole wrote, “It is discouraging and demoralizing for a lot of boys to have to fit into a make-shift arrangement of 150 rifles to 400 men.”490 Shortly thereafter, President Alderman’s quest for training rifles continued. He wrote to General Charles B, Wheeler, the Acting Chief of Ordnance, seeking 250 rifles for use by the ROTC detachment. He again cited the need of rifles to ensure the proper training of the students. On April 3, 1918, the efforts of Alderman and Virginia’s Senators and Congressmen paid off. The university received notice of the pending shipment of 250 rifles from the Watervilet Arsenal to the college. The rifles were not suitable for target practice but the soldiers could carry them to practice the manual of arms.491

Alderman did not stop with gaining rifles for the school’s soldiers. He knew that machine guns were the latest firearm available. In his continuing effort to gain weapons for military training, Alderman contacted Colonel (Retired) Isaac N. Lewis, creator of the
Lewis gun, a machine gun he developed in 1911. Lewis responded that the government
had taken over the production of the weapons and that Alderman would need to channel
the request through the War Department. Lewis did offer to pay for the weapon and
ammunition were Alderman able to obtain the required authorizations. Alderman wrote to
the Chief of Ordnance requesting authorization. No reply is available. Since the
university did not receive a Lewis gun the Chief of Ordnance must have denied the
request.492

The long-sought rifles finally arrived sometime in late May or early June.493 Some
arrived incomplete, as indicated by the order to company commanders to report the
number of rifles without bolts in their command.494 After the struggle of nearly two years
to obtain weapons for the students then soldiers at the University of Virginia, they
remained on campus fewer than six months. On December 18, 1918, Lieutenant
Wilkinson, of Company B, oversaw the process of packaging the rifles and transporting
them to the local armory for storage, as ordered by the War Department.495

Weapons were not the only equipment requirement of the SATC. The question of
providing uniforms and equipment to ROTC detachments on campuses continued to vex
university presidents. Again, because of the need to outfit troops in training camps for
assignment to Europe, enough uniforms to outfit the 175,000 students in the SATC all at
once were just not available. SATC troops drilled in civilian clothes. In some instances,
the universities, using school and federal funds, purchased uniforms locally. Alderman
exchanged letters with the Office of the Adjutant General to determine the disposition of
uniforms if students left the college, since both the student and the university had assisted
in the purchase. The Adjutant General responded, stating that Army policy allowed
students to keep the uniforms provided they were leaving school for continued military service. If they were leaving school for any other purpose, all uniforms in which the government had any financial interest must remain at the school. 496

The supply system was slow and ill-prepared for the requirements caused by the hurried activation of the SATC, but it eventually ground into action. By demobilization, the University of Virginia had a considerable amount of government property on hand. A full inventory does not exist, but the property in Company C included 591 blankets, 211 bed sacks, 189 iron cots, five canvas cots, 188 mess kits that were missing twelve teaspoons, eleven tablespoons, and four forks. 497 The system was slow, but could account for every spoon.

Unfortunately, the supply system never caught up to the uniform requirements generated by the activation of the SATC, as a letter sent to President Alderman by Mrs. M. B. Young, concerning the status of her son’s uniforms indicates. Her son, Marion, entered University of Virginia on September 24, 1918 and the SATC inducted him into the Army on October 2, with the understanding that the government would furnish tuition, books, and clothing. Reflecting the difficulties of the Army supply system the Army did not issue Marion uniforms before demobilization and his mother wanted a reason. Mrs. Young also wanted to know who would pay for Marion’s next semester in college. 498

Alderman responded to Mrs. Young on November 26, explaining that the government had had greater responsibilities that clothing the SATC soldiers. “Their first duty, apparently, was to uniform the men in the camps and in France.” Those uniforms that the quartermaster sent to the school were generally too large. Consequently, only
three quarters of the SATC wore uniforms. Alderman continued, explaining that if the SATC demobilized and the soldiers mustered out, it was unlikely that Marion would receive uniforms. He also explained that the Young's would be responsible for future expenses should Marion continue at University of Virginia.499

Providing the facilities for the SATC presented another challenge for the college administrators and military. The University of Virginia assuredly had space available. With enrollment down from more than one thousand to the vicinity of three hundred, the university had living and classroom space available for the SATC to use. In fact, Dean Page projected dormitory occupancy at 33 percent.500 However, the available space to meet military standards was yet to be satisfied.

One problem arose when the CEST sent President Alderman a telegram concerning quarters that leaked during heavy rain. The CEST required the university to make the needed repairs. Alderman replied, notifying the committee that he had referred the matter to Professor Newcomb who was responsible for quarters. Surprisingly, this instance is one of the rare times of the CEST interjecting itself between the SATC unit leadership on campus and the administration. The relationship between the military and the administration was cooperative and mutually supportive. As shall be discussed in the next chapter, such relationships did not exist on all campuses. The University of Virginia was fortunate to have both the civilian and military leadership that it had.

Despite the excess space and all the activity surrounding the establishment of military training on the campus of University of Virginia, two spatial issues emerged. Finding a suitable location for the unit was the major problem. Among the requirements, the SATC required dedicated office space, storage for supplies, and meeting rooms for
subordinate organizations. If the requested rifles were to arrive, the university required an
armory in which to store them. The university certainly did not have a predesignated
space suitable for storing and safeguarding a large number of rifles. Early in the
development of the ROTC unit it became obvious that additional space was required for
assembly formations and drill. The university formed a committee consisting of
Lieutenant Colonel Cole and several faculty members to find the proper facilities.

The logistics of running a college became infinitely more complex following the
American entry into the war. Sitting only a few hundred miles from the coal fields of
West Virginia and eastern Pennsylvania, fuel was not normally in short supply. The war
shifted the importance of coal away from being a local resource. The university
contracted with a West Virginia mining company to provide coal; however, shortly after
agreeing to this contract, President Wilson issued national price guidelines for coal—at
significantly reduced rates. In July 1917, President Wilson set a fixed price for coal at
two dollars per ton.\(^501\)

In November, President Alderman questioned the President of the Office of Fuel
Administration for guidance concerning the pricing and availability of coal because of the
difference between the price Wilson set and the contract price. Wage increases for miners
actually caused the rate to rise thirty-four cents per ton over the price in the University of
Virginia's contract. The coal company was operating within the law since the increases
were in the wages of the miners. In the end, the UVA was obliged to honor the contract
with the coal company, paying the additional rate.\(^502\)

Complicating Alderman's efforts concerning coal was a different order by the
Office of the Fuel Administration in late November 1917. The federal government
ordered the university's supplier to ship all coal elsewhere, to support the national war effort. In his request for relief, Alderman stated, "I want to bring to your attention that the University is now essentially a military post. Practically the entire student body is under government training for military service, and unless you permit these gentlemen to ship is coal, we shall be forced to close the University and send these seven hundred young soldiers to their homes." The reference to the military camp provided the necessary reason to cancel the order. In December 1917, the university received notification of modification to the orders affecting the university allowing delivery.

*Manning the SATC*

Manning the SATC had three related aspects. First, the organization required cadre to provide the structure needed and to conduct the training it was to provide. The cadre would consist of a sufficient number of officers and sergeants to provide leadership and training to the organization. Second, the premise of the entire program relied upon the availability and capabilities of the college faculty. Finally, the organization needed soldiers to train.

Lieutenant Colonel Cole and President Alderman both made efforts to secure additional servicemen to assist in running first the ROTC then the SATC. Early in his assignment, Cole requested the assignment of three noncommissioned officers to support running the ROTC program. At the time, the NATD with its cadre of officers was on campus and Cole was running a growing ROTC program. As the senior officer on campus, he was supporting the NATD unit as well. The Adjutant General approved Cole’s request; however, in the spring of 1917 all available noncommissioned officers were preparing to deploy to Europe. No sergeants were available an assignment to a
The University Council on National Service also requested that President Alderman contact the War Department with a request to assign additional officer on campus. This form of cooperative effort again highlights the sound relationship between military and faculty at the university.

A few months later, in October 1918, Alderman wrote to the War Department seeking the assignment of ten African American soldiers. Given Alderman's previous correspondence with President Eggleston one might wonder about his motives for wanting to bring Black troops to the campus. The "colored" troops were needed "for the work of firing furnaces, janitors, scavengers, scrubbing, cart driving, and orderlies in the hospital." Alderman wrote that the school's status as "practically a war camp" and the general labor shortage brought on by the war resulted in the school's inability to hire laborers to provide basic services. The War Department denied the request.

As seen earlier, faculty members, with a few exceptions, were ready and willing to support the effort. Many of the younger, pre-war faculty members were already in some form of government service. Those that remained wanted to perform some service that contributed to the war effort. A few, like Professors Lewis and Kepner, conducted experiments or other research for the military. For others, participation in the instruction to SATC soldiers was the only tangible manner in which they could serve the country. Their desire to participate must account for some of the popularity of the War Issues course amongst the faculty. It is not often that a Professor of English Literature can modify such a specialty to a militarized purpose.

Finding students with an interest the SATC was not a problem at the University of Virginia. Completing all the paperwork required to get the interested students enlisted in
the Army was another matter entirely. In a November 1918 memorandum to Lieutenant Colonel Cole, Second Lieutenant Balz, the University of Virginia personnel officer, detailed the difficulties in completing the enlistment paperwork for men enlisting in the unit. First and foremost, the influenza epidemic had slowed the ability to process paperwork. Men were either too sick to complete the required papers or became sick after filling them out and were unavailable for continued processing. Second, local draft boards, through a series of administrative errors, also slowed the processing of the men. Draft boards, if they provided paperwork at all, would improperly fill out or stamp the papers. In some instances, they sent the paperwork that should have gone to the Charlottesville Board to another office.  

In total, the University of Virginia did not have major problems in the area of manning. The faculty, with one notable exception, was consistently behind the war effort. President Alderman, as shown in his several speeches and efforts to obtain rifles, fully believed in the need to support the war against Germany. Those difficulties that did exist in manning were not so severe that the university and the military could not arrange expedient alternatives.

*Academic Issues*

From the moment the Board of Visitors authorized application for the creation of an ROTC unit, the faculty at the University of Virginia took action to make the process work and to make the military’s representatives on campus feel welcome. They treated the senior member of the military as a respected faculty member. They modified the curriculum to reflect the needs of the war effort and the Army in general. The University of Virginia wanted the experiment to work.
Having committed to establish an ROTC detachment, the Board of Visitors began appropriating funds to secure the material, supplies, and instructors required. One of the first appropriations was for $559.00 to the Modern Language Department for the purchase of the record players, records, and supplies for language instruction.\textsuperscript{511}

The faculty also moved, early on, to support military training by taking several measures. First, they created room for military training in the curriculum. James M. Page, Dean of the College, approved a policy early in the spring semester of 1916-1917 allowing undergraduate students to substitute the new course in military training for any three-hour course in which they were currently enrolled. The Graduate College allowed its students the same option, with some limitations based upon degree or field of study.\textsuperscript{512}

In creating the ROTC unit, the university agreed to establish a two-year elective course on military training and tactics with two additional years of instruction available to upper classmen.

This curriculum allowed an average of three hours per week for military training and instruction during the first two years and five hours of weekly instruction in following years for ROTC students.\textsuperscript{513} To accommodate alumni seeking the military training required to apply for officer training camps, the university instituted special fee rates for alumni participating in ROTC. The student body reacted favorably to these changes enrolling in large numbers in the new offerings. Nearly all eligible students joined the ROTC, thirty students enrolled in wireless communications instruction, and thirty-two chemistry majors enrolled in the Enlisted Reserve Corps.\textsuperscript{514}

Second, the university faculty established a Committee on Special Courses to evaluate new offerings in support of the war effort. The committee recommended
purchasing the material and equipment required to teach the technical courses the Army sought. These requirements included purchasing and shipping of wood for use in teaching the handling of timber, purchasing a second-hand automobile for use in teaching a course in automobile engines, and purchasing phonographs for teaching conversational German. They also recommended hiring assistant teachers for telegraphy.\textsuperscript{515} The Board of Visitors approved these offerings during their May 1917 meeting.\textsuperscript{516}

Third, the Committee on National Service immediately voted Lieutenant Colonel Cole membership on the committee and recommend that the President nominate him as a member of the faculty to the Board of Visitors. There is probably no firmer acceptance by the faculty of a university than recognition as a member of it. More than any other action taken by the faculty and administration, this action shows the degree of support the military received on the University of Virginia campus.

In preparation for the 1917-1918 academic year, the University of Virginia again revised its curriculum to prepare students for federal service. Under supervision of several professors and Lieutenant Colonel Cole the faculty designed and offered courses in meteorology, oceanography, electrical engineering, telephony, telegraphy and signaling, navigation, astronomy, automobiles, Spanish, geography, international law and diplomacy, engineering, surveying, topographical cartography, and military tactics.\textsuperscript{517} These course offerings supported the skills the Army desired in men coming out of college.

The medical department, not surprisingly, increased in popularity. Students seeking an opportunity to serve their country sought entrance. However, cost of materials for the laboratory increased significantly. Further, the laboratory assistants needed to
support student learning entered the service with no replacements available making instruction more difficult to manage. The War Department offered to provide a medical officer to the university to teach an optional course in Military Medicine and Surgery. Due to the late timing of the offer, the university could not offer the course for credit, yet every fourth year student volunteered to enroll.\(^{518}\) Medical students in their first, second, and third years offered to forego summer breaks in 1917 and 1918 to hasten their graduation and availability for service.\(^{519}\)

Additional curricular changes were required to support the aviation training. The university provided instruction in aeronautical engines, theory of flight, cross country and general flying, aerial observation, gunnery, signaling and wireless, and military regulations. The University of Virginia University Council on National Service voted to pursue the development of the School of Aeronautics in early July 1917, believing that the school would benefit the university and that the proposed financial arrangements were satisfactory.\(^{520}\) Ultimately, the School of Aeronautics did not materialize. However, a School of Truck Drivers did.

In April 1918, the War Department contracted with the University of Virginia School for the bi-monthly training of 600 truck drivers. This School of Truck Drivers was under the command of Captain Budgell. UVA agreed to provide barracks, dining facilities, and facilities for the training. The citizens of Charlottesville provided a bond to secure the university against loss in the endeavor. The university placed Professor Newcomb in charge of coordinating its efforts to support the soldiers.\(^{521}\) The school was very successful, training more than 1,800 men between April and December 1918. The assignment of a professor to the responsibilities of ensuring adequate support to military
requirements is another indication of and reason for the ease of transition at the
University of Virginia.

The loss of students and faculty did affect the curriculum at University of
Virginia. Enrollment was considerably lower in many departments, but the drop in law,
biology, economics, engineering, and geology was most noticeable. Lack of enrollment
relegated one professor who normally taught astronomy to teaching navigation and field
astronomy. These topics were popular and practical to future soldiers but far different
than the pure astronomy he normally taught.\textsuperscript{522} Certain subjects, though, retained or
increased their actually increased their enrolment. The war and the prospect of European
duty increased student interest in French and the other romance languages. Latin and
Greek continued to attract students, as did English and English Literature, which due to
the inclusion of war poetry and other literary aspects of conflict saw an increase in
enrollment. Navigation and astronomy increased in popularity. Surprisingly, economics,
so closely tied to the start of this and the next world war, decreased.\textsuperscript{523}

The University of Virginia added a course in practical German to curriculum in
1917.\textsuperscript{524} This particular offering ran against the general tenor around the nation.
Significant debate occurred on both college and high school campuses concerning the
efficacy and patriotism of continuing to teach German in American schools. Around the
nation several universities and secondary school districts discontinued teaching the
language in the belief that teaching the subject was unpatriotic and hindered the war
effort.\textsuperscript{525}

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace provided $500.00 to University
of Virginia for the development and instruction of a course in International Relations.
The gift provided salaries for the instructor, an assistant, and required supplies. Additionally, the entire Engineering Department recast its curriculum to suit the War Department. They reduced the normal four-year course of study with three terms to a two-year course with four terms by eliminating vacation time. One result was that engineering student contact with the instructional staff was reduced from 36 months overall to a mere 24 months. Accomplishing this reduction caused the Engineering Department to eliminate some subject matter and compress the work in others.

Even the nation being at war could not prevent college students from acting like college students. The University of Virginia Military Council met in November 1917 to discuss means of increasing efficiency and attendance at drill periods. They selected the carrot and stick approach. First, the carrot, the Council would ask a local women’s organization to make a set of colors for presentation to the most outstanding unit in the Corps. Second, the stick, would subject any student missing three or more drills or lectures in any term to a hearing in front of a Committee on Military Discipline, which had the authority to dismiss the student from the university. These efforts were not entirely successful.

In February 1918, President Alderman sent Lieutenant Colonel Cole a series of recommended changes to the course of military instruction at the University of Virginia. Some of the approved changes included modifications to the existing program while others reflected the expectation of incorporating the National Army Training Detachment into campus life in the near future. Among the approved changes were a recommended increase in staff size for the military department, modification of instruction to incorporate additional military skills (such as bayonet work, signaling, bombing and
grenade work, and trench construction), the addition of the enlisted skills instruction under the NATD, and the introduction of additional competition with the ROTC to develop unit cohesion and esprit.

Hands-on training and inter- and intra-unit competition have long been hallmarks of military training. By establishing competition within the ROTC and then the SATC, the military leadership and university administration were working together to invigorate students and to bring peer pressure to bear on the recalcitrant. The administration offered to fund a fact-finding trip to Camp Lee, one hundred miles away, so Lieutenant Colonel Cole and the ROTC staff could review current military training procedures. The changes to training and funding the trip both display, again, the cooperative attitude the administration had for the military.

Issues did occur between military duties and academic expectations at the University of Virginia. Multiple bugle calls sounded during the day, which must have been a trial for college professors used to a quiet existence on the University of Virginia campus. The schedule for SATC-B students began with a first call at 5:45 A.M. and continued until Taps sounded at 10:00 P.M.

Classroom attendance and attention to studies were another issue that developed after the creation of the SATC. On November 5, 1918, President Alderman wrote a letter to Lieutenant Colonel Cole concerning the use of men for kitchen police duties. Alderman, after suggesting that he did possess the expertise to make a judgment himself asked, “if it would not be possible, in the interests of academic instruction here to reduce the number of men on Kitchen Police from twenty-four to, say, fifteen per day.” The following day, Alderman wrote a second letter requesting reduction of the eighty men
required for military work each day. Alderman requested that Cole ensure that these requirements be spread between the military and the academic training time periods stating, "For we are as responsible for their academic training as the military is for their military training."

Cole responded that he was making every effort to ensure that military duties did not conflict with academic responsibilities. He had need for a small guard force that he was willing to curtail if the university was willing to assume responsibility for the government’s property and equipment. Other men were required for the maintenance of buildings.

However, the largest need for manpower resulted from the continuing SATC start up. The time required to prepare the enlistment paperwork necessitated infringing on academic time. Cole reminded Alderman that the paperwork and the time expended for it were actually beneficial to the university, since the government paid the school based upon completed enlistments in the Army. Alderman responded by preparing a revised schedule, allowing a make-up test for students who were excused from the regularly scheduled test due to other commitments.

Attendance continued to be a problem, as did reporting of absences to the military leadership. In another instance of cooperative effort, President Alderman using a military approach detailed a new method for taking attendance in the classroom rather than having the order issued by the military staff. The order, blending military and academic, required professors to seat students according to their company. The senior member of each company in the class would provide a list of absences from his unit to the instructor on a
daily basis. The senior student in the group was responsible for reporting unexcused absences to the company on a weekly basis.\textsuperscript{534}

Despite the general success of the implantation of the military at the University of Virginia, the overall impact of these changes had “been to deteriorate the spirit of scholarship by weakening the attention and diminishing the assiduity of the students.”\textsuperscript{535} Average grades fell from 85 percent in 1914-1915 to 76.4 percent in 1917-1918. Recognizing that many of the students brought to the university by the SATC would not attend any college without the program, it is not surprising that grades fell.

As the SATC disbanded, it was apparent to the administration that the university required some drastic action to adjust the academic results of the fall semester. Due to the additional requirements of the SATC, few students excelled academically. In response to a query from Dr. V. T. Churchman, of Richmond, VA, a parent of a University of Virginia student and a member of the SATC soldier, President Alderman described the changes that would occur after the demobilization,

\begin{quote}
On January 1\textsuperscript{st}, all courses will begin as if the session were beginning anew. That is to say, beginning at the beginning of the subjects and running through June 30. The work will be re-arranged somewhat and condensed. The young man who successfully does the work of those two terms will get credit for the entire year, including, of course, the time spent in the training school.\textsuperscript{536}
\end{quote}

In other words, the entire period between September and December did not happen, academically at least. In fact, by June of 1919, it would be as if the SATC never happened.

\textit{Relationship with Administration and Faculty}

As the University of Virginia Board moved toward increased military presence on campus, they resolved that the president should nominate the officer detailed for military
instruction as a member of the university faculty. According to Birnbaum, “university executives and faculty form separate and isolated conclaves in which they are likely to communicate only with people similar to themselves.” The SATC attempted to blend to types of organizations, similar in composition and action, yet quite dissimilar in perspective.

The qualities of professors and army officers are similar. Both groups are highly trained in a specialized field. Both groups are used and expected to exercise independent thought and judgment. Both groups are used to working without close supervision. For all this, however, there are distinct cultural differences. Professors live in a world of ideas where every idea is subject questioning. Army officers live in a world of action where discussion occurs until a decision is made at which point all move in a common direction. With the SATC the War Department sought to overlay its system and philosophy atop the traditional university culture.

Military duties frustrated the faculty. According to Patton the officers of the SATC “frittered away” the time available to the students with useless activities, “the routine tasks of the camp and the barracks,” not bearing appreciably on the organizational mission. Leaders did not allow students time for reflection and study of the day’s lessons or for preparation for the lesson’s of the next day. As a result, “The most ardent student learned nothing, except in the hours spent in lecture room and laboratory. The less earnest and less intelligent learned nothing at any time.”

Despite this harsh assessment, the overall relationship between the university and the military at the University of Virginia was good. No doubt, as President Alderman displayed in his speeches, this reflected the patriotic feelings of some of the
administration and faculty. Others may have disagreed but been afraid to state their opinions, having observed the fate of Professor Whipple who found in November 1917 that expressing a differing opinion was unwise.

The United States Congress passed the Espionage Act on June 15, 1917. The act was designed to provide a means to punish those engaged in espionage against the United States and its allies. Section 3 of the act, however, was more far-reaching in that it curtailed free speech and criticism of the “Progressive” Wilson Administration.

Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully ... promote the success of its enemies and whoever when the United States is at war, shall willfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the United States, or shall willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States, to the injury of the service or of the United States, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both. 539

The Wilson Administration used the Espionage Act to curtail speech by restricting the postal distribution of German language newspapers and restricting the assembly of potential adversaries. 540 With the Espionage Act setting the stage and a general feeling that any suggestion of discontent with the policies of the Wilson Administration was treasonous, debate concerning administration policies was circumspect at best.

The Current Events Club at Sweet Briar Female College, located in Sweet Briar, Virginia, approximately 45 miles south of the University of Virginia invited Professor Whipple, of the Journalism Department, to speak. He chose The Meaning of Pacifism as his topic. Whipple, choosing to make the talk a free speech issue, sent copies of his talk to several newspapers prior to giving it. The speech, which contained inflammatory comments, sent shockwaves through the university and the state following its publication. Whipple said,
I believe we can still make this United States glorious by its stand for peace, despite the fact that the nation sacrificed its grandest opportunity when it entered the war.... Russia has had courage and vision we failed to reveal.... Every time I send a word of love by mail to my mother, I give an extra cent to help kill some other mother’s sons. 541

If Whipple sought publicity, he certainly did not seek the long-term impact of his talk. Several newspapers in Virginia printed portions of the talk. President Alderman declared, 542 “Whipple can no longer properly discharge the duties of a professor in this University, which is committed to the necessity and righteousness of this war and is proudly sending its sons, graduate and undergraduate, to the battle line.” 543

The University of Virginia faculty was not slow to follow the lead of the President, unanimously endorsing a statement two days later, “We consider such sentiments disloyal to our national policy and deserving of condemnation by all patriotic citizens.” 544 The faculty was particularly upset because he provided advance copies of the speech to the press “with the intention of disseminating these disloyal opinions among the people, opinions the more readily made current when uttered by a professor of the state university.” 545 They believed Whipple abused academic freedom and they found Whipple’s views “to be discreditable to a teacher of an institution which had consistently sought, since the inception of the war, to instill into her sons, graduate and undergraduate the spirit of loyalty to the Government, and the determination to present an undivided front to the enemy.” 546

The Board of Visitors considered the issue at its next meeting, hearing Whipple’s defense. The Board adopted a resolution at the recommendation of President Alderman to rescind Whipple’s appointment as an adjunct professor stating,

That although fully committed both in theory and practice to the freedom of academic thought and expression on the part of members of the faculty, the
Rector and Board of Visitors of the University of Virginia do regard these utterances as a gross abuse of the freedom of speech, and do hereby place on record their condemnation of this propaganda.  

With the Whipple affair as a backdrop, could any member of the administration or faculty express anything less than wholehearted support for all things military? The Board of Visitors and the President left no question where they stood on the issue. They displayed willingness to administer swift judgment if professors crossed lines of patriotic duty. Assuming this, it is hard to know how much of the support the military received was true feeling and how much was for self-preservation.

The Spanish Influenza

In central Virginia, the influenza epidemic of 1918 began as a trickle of cases. By the end, however, it was a flood. Virginians reported more than 300,000 cases, far more than the medical community could handle. Advanced students at Richmond’s Medical College of Virginia and the University of Virginia served as medical staff. Junior students served as medical attendants. As previously discussed, communities around Charlottesville were hard hit by the disease.

The university medical and hospital staff was ill-equipped for the magnitude of the epidemic. Nationally, the epidemic spurred significant and rapid research into the causes of influenza. The knowledge resulting from this research was not available to the doctors treating the victims. Guidance to the community resulted in a few parts hygiene, a few parts common sense, and a few parts ignorance. The Surgeon at the University of Virginia, for instance, told soldiers not to spit on the floor, not to share toilet articles, and to take a laxative. The reality was that medicine had yet to advance
sufficiently to provide the answers required. It had advanced though to the point that the right questions could now be asked and the search for answers begun.\textsuperscript{552}

By October 10\textsuperscript{th}, the situation at the University of Virginia was so severe that the hospital ran out of blankets for patients. Commanders, who normally loathe allowing equipment for which they are responsible out of their sight, received direction to allow hospitalized soldiers to take their blankets with them. Naturally, a month later, commanders received direction to account for all blankets to determine if any remained in the university hospital. In case there was any doubt as to blanket ownership, the memo informed commanders that Army blankets could be identified by the rectangular inspectors slip sewed to one corner.\textsuperscript{553}

The situation in the surrounding communities was growing severe as well. On October 14, 1918, President Alderman received a request from a Dr. Plecker of Richmond for medical support. Some medical students were already providing assistance in Richmond. Plecker hoped that the university medical school might spare some additional students. Alderman responded that he was unable to supply any more than those already there. The need at the University of Virginia was too great to assist others off campus.\textsuperscript{554}

The Army took several steps in addition to allowing the use of its blankets in the hospital. The SATC unit required all men to wear surgical masks "at all times" to slow the spread of the disease and appointed noncommissioned officers to ensure soldiers followed the guidance.\textsuperscript{555}

The SATC provided support to the hospital because the staff could not keep up with the flood of sick students. The command ordered each of the three companies in the
SATC-B at University of Virginia to provide a detail of twelve men to work as nurses and orderlies. Each company was responsible for support for a day with the schedule repeating until the need for the detail ended. The men, in teams of four, work eight-hour shifts assisting the medical staff. Some SATC barracks facilities became makeshift hospital wards. Each company provided a detail to scrub and sanitize barracks rooms used as temporary hospital facilities. Once the worst of the epidemic passed, each company also provided a permanent detail to take the place of third- and fourth-year medical students who were going to resume their studies.556

Throughout the ordeal, the command restricted soldiers to the campus. On November 2, the cadre received weekend passes with direction to proceed directly to the train station and not to stop anywhere else in Charlottesville. At the same time, the command prevented visitors from entering the campus grounds. On November 4, Lieutenant Colonel Cole ordered subordinate commanders to enforce an “ironclad quarantine” with all passes of any kind revoked.557 The quarantine stood until November 14 when the command removed it without restriction.558 The worst of the epidemic had passed and life began to return to normal.

The Armistice and Beyond

With the announcement of the Armistice on November 11, 1918, life in the SATC immediately began to change. Despite the Armistice, universities remained military posts, and the SATC members remained soldiers first, students second. From the time of Roman Triumphs, victorious armies have paraded past adoring citizens. The SATC was no different. The SATC of University of Virginia stood in formation at 3:15 P.M. ready to participate in a parade through Charlottesville.559
Once the parades were finished, life settled back into what passed for a routine in the SATC while the leaders in Washington determined how to proceed. On November 16, 1918 the University of Virginia SATC inducted sixteen additional men into the Army. Shortly after this, the CEST issued the order to cease induction of men into the Army.

Because of the difficulties implementing the program and the problems created by the influenza epidemic, some students had been living and training as members of the SATC but had not actually finished the enlistment process. As previously discussed, Lieutenant Colonel Cole was uncertain what to do with men and queried the CEST District Office for guidance. Cole’s concern was that the attitude of men not fully inducted would reduce the morale of those fully enlisted. The District Officer’s responded that since the men were not actually in the Army, the matter belonged to the school. He directed Cole to work the issue with the administration of the university.

Deactivation began on December 2, two months and one day after the grand ceremony beginning the program. The leadership reminded soldiers that their men that release under honorable conditions depended upon good behavior. The SATC at the University of Virginia established the following sequence of discharge: 1) Married men with important business requiring early attention; 2) all other married men; 3) single men with important business requiring early attention; 4) all other men. The definition of important business was nebulous. Basically, a man simply needed to convince the officer-in-charge that his business required immediate attention.

As demobilization and discharge approached and the soldiers prepared to leave the Army all equipment and facilities required cleaning, normally to a state of cleanliness
beyond its state at issuance. Soldiers received warnings that attempts to turn in dirty
equipment would result in their dropping to the rear of the discharge list.\textsuperscript{566} Discharges
from the University of Virginia SATC began on December 9 at a rate of approximately
thirty men per day for the first four days and at a rate of approximately sixty per day
thereafter.\textsuperscript{567} Closing the SATC was, perhaps, more difficult than getting it started.
Innumerable issues required attention. At the end of November President Alderman
reported to the Board of Visitors that he intended to prepare a budget memorandum to
present to the meeting, but since the SATC was in such a state of flux, he would need to
defer the report to a subsequent meeting.\textsuperscript{568} The Board established a committee to
determine how to deal with the issue of furniture rented to support the SATC and how to
furnish the dormitories for the remainder of the year, now that they were no longer
barracks.\textsuperscript{569} During the same meeting the Board agreed with a proposal by President
Alderman that the university should pay in full to the recipients all scholarships held in
abeyance during the period of the SATC, thereby ensuring their ability to continue
studies.\textsuperscript{570} The enrollment numbers President Alderman presented to the Board of Visitors
on November 26, 1918, indicating the depth of military involvement on the campus and
were a far cry from the enrollment expected in July. Alderman reported that the
University had a total of 971 students. Of this number 592 were soldiers of the SATC;
another seventy-nine students had enrolled in the SATC and awaited induction into the
Army. An additional eighty-eight soldiers had received orders to other duty stations since
they enlisted.\textsuperscript{571}
During the demobilization of the SATC at the University of Virginia an exchange of letters between President Alderman and Lieutenant Colonel Cole displayed the mutual respect and appreciation that allowed the success that the program experienced.

As you are about to arrange the process of demobilization for the Corps, and before you begin that process, I have the desire to send you this word of appreciation of the work of yourself and the staff of officers under you during the difficult period in the life of this great educational experiment. In so far as energy and devotion to duty and skillful service could make this experiment a success, you and your staff have done all that one could ask. The whole adventure in education has been attended with ill luck for which no one is responsible. Personally, I am very sorry that better fortune did not attend it, for I think it contained elements of great helpfulness to the whole educational idea. I believe the proposal by the government and its acceptance by the Institution and the way in which it was carried forward under difficulties will long be remembered as an instance of patriotism and adaptability to service.

It is a pleasure to me to believe that the undertaking has progressed without friction and with the entire co-operation and understanding of the civilian and military aspects of the problem.

I hope you will communicate to your officers and accept for yourself my kindest good will and appreciation.\textsuperscript{572}

Responding the next day, Cole was gracious in accepting Alderman's accolades. Cole wrote, "My associates and I can well be proud of your commendation for it gives us full credit for our intentions and is kind to our performance."\textsuperscript{573} Cole continued, stating that the demobilization of the SATC could occur without apology. He continued, praising the students of University of Virginia,

For the way the men of this University assumed their duties as soldiers I can have only words of praise. They plunged at once into a rigorous and onerous routine and stood up to it the more manfully for its being a contradiction of every tradition to this historic institution, with the Spartan hour of reveille, exacting supervision, complete surrender of individual freedom, and frequent performance of very homely tasks, to say nothing of the curriculum to be followed. I am sorry that they have experienced the discomfort of soldier—life without having had enough of it to supply the iron that makes it sit lightly."\textsuperscript{574}
On January 24, 1919, the War Department published orders relieving Lieutenant Colonel James Cole from his duties at the University of Virginia and returning him to the retired ranks upon his arrival at his home.575

Even after the soldiers were gone, issues remained. In its March 4, 1919 meeting, the Board of Visitors resolved to settle accounts with the War Department in accordance with the contracts while retaining the buildings.576 Finally, not until June 18, 1919 did E.K. Hall, the Business Director of the CEST report settlement of SATC accounts to President Alderman.

Return of the ROTC

Planning for the future of the military on college campuses began with the armistice. It took time, however, for the War Department to make the shift from the SATC back to the pre-war ROTC detachments around the country. When the Army announced the SATC it said schools could maintain a ROTC and a SATC unit simultaneously. It also assured schools that their opting for SATC would not affect eligibility for ROTC in the future. The hope of the War Department was that the vast majority of schools that participated in the SATC would continue as members of the ROTC community.

The structure of ROTC differed from the structure known today. In the early models of the program, each school selected a branch, like field artillery, in which it wanted to participate. A small school might only associate with one branch; a larger school might associate with several branches. Each branch, after reaching agreement with the college, provided specialized equipment required for training. These early versions of the ROTC program called for instruction similar to the current basic and advanced
programs. Unlike modern ROTC, however, all qualified students were required to enroll in the first two years of the program, in which five hours of time were required. Students could opt out of the last two years, which required a commitment of more than ten hours each week. 577

Different War Department offices mailed letters concerning the establishment of ROTC detachments at University of Virginia to President Alderman on February 5, 1919. The first was a general letter sent by the CEST describing the options available to the university and generally extolling the virtues of continued military training. The second was a more personal letter from the office of the Chief of Field Artillery. This letter notes that the regulations governing the pre-war ROTC were unsatisfactory and were under revision. Both letters requested that the University of Virginia participate in the program. 578

Although the University of Virginia enjoyed a successful SATC program in which military and academic staff cooperated with reasonable effectiveness and mutual respect, the flavor of university life in Charlottesville changed substantially due to the experience. With the return of peace many wanted to return to the lifestyle they had known before the war. The War Department, having made inroads into academic institutions since the passing of the National Defense Act of 1916 wanted to maintain a campus presence. Integrating the military into the campus life in a relatively unobtrusive manner was the problem with which Alderman struggled.

President Alderman experienced tremendous difficulty in determining the correct course in creating a new ROTC unit at University of Virginia. The Army wanted to begin training during the semester following January 1, 1919. Alderman felt that the Army's
request, written on December 3rd, did not give him sufficient time to consult with those in the university community to whom he felt he should speak. Additionally, he wrote of the same phenomenon observed by Brooks, seeing that those who only weeks before worshiped the military were now ambivalent at best. Though he personally favored the renewal of the ROTC at the University of Virginia, Alderman wrote to the CEST asking to delay the decision. He felt that with additional time the emotional pendulum would return to the center and the civilian view of the military would stabilize.

I believe it would be better not to attempt to settle this question until September of the year 1919. Through some curious psychology, the coming of peace, a great many men hitherto most earnest in the idea of military training and universal military training, are lukewarm about it, indeed, seem to have reactions against it, which I am sure a wider and clearer view will dispel. The same is true of the students, eager and strong as they were for the S.A.T.C. as long as the war lasted. I believe all this will clear up in the coming months, and the faculty, students, and governing bodies will be able to see this big problem in a clearer light. I simply believe if settled now in many quarters it will be settled in a way that the Institutions might regret. 579

Receiving instructions from the CEST to contact President Alderman, Major Towner, the District Inspecting Officer, wrote on December 9, to apply additional pressure on the university president. Towner began with explanation, “I have been directed to ascertain immediately, whether your institution desires to organize a Reserve Officer Training Corps unit.” By way of inducement, he included the application form and explained that Army would allow applicant institutions to keep SATC equipment rather than turn it in. But he also implied that the school would have to turn in equipment quickly if it did not apply for the ROTC. 580

Alderman replied two days later, asking three questions. First, could he delay the resumption of ROTC instruction until the beginning of the next academic year in September 1919? Second, would the students entering into the ROTC program be
required to participate for two or four years? Third, would the university administration have a say in the selection of an officer to lead the ROTC unit?  

Although no response to Alderman’s letter of exists, the answers were obviously not positive. On 20 December 1918, Alderman wrote to Brigadier General Rees, Chair of the CEST, to request temporary withdrawal of the University of Virginia from the ROTC program. As he reiterated his personal support for the program, the tone of Alderman’s letter suggests the frustration he must have felt at having to write it and the angst in the expectation that the reaction would not be positive. He again reflected the dichotomy with which American’s view of the military.

I hereby make application for the withdrawal from ... the R.O.T.C.... The situation here with reference to the readjustment of the Institution to its peace responsibilities coupled with the present feelings of the students and of the faculty is such that I gravely fear the renewal of the R.O.T.C. Unit here in January would not prove a success for the remaining period of the session 1918-1919. A vote taken by the students indicates that many of them do not wish to take this work at this time, and there is a sort of reaction about the whole matter which I believe to be natural under the circumstances but not the result of genuine reflection. There is no time to take proper conference with the governing authorities of the University on the matter.... I propose...a new application for the Unit beginning with ... 1919-‘20.... I assure you of the desire of the University of Virginia to co-operate with the War Department in affording suitable military instruction to young men in American colleges. After the year of hard work Alderman could not let the 350 rifles obtained with such effort go back to the Army without a fight. He continued his letter to General Rees with a request to maintain the rifles until the ROTC unit was again operational. This affirmed Alderman’s desire to reestablish the ROTC program at the earliest practicable time.  

On January 31, 1919 the CEST again requested that the University of Virginia consider establishing a Coast Artillery ROTC unit on campus. The letter, signed by Major Tolbert, extolled the benefits to the college from the early creation of the unit.
Additionally, the Army also learned from the SATC experience. The new ROTC units would seek to take better advantage of the technical subjects already trained in universities by teaching military subjects in a manner complementing rather than supplanting regular academic work. Minimal military training would occur during the school year, and the course would maintain flexibility to allow adaptation to peculiar university requirements. 584

The decision whether to apply for an ROTC detachment or not continued to weigh heavily on Alderman’s mind. He maintained a correspondence with Lieutenant Colonel Abney Payne, an alumnus, serving in the Coast Artillery. Payne and Alderman discussed the ROTC as far back as 1916, when the initial programs began. Payne, despite being a career soldier, advised against participating in the early programs thinking them incompatible with the university character. As the post-war ROTC structure began to emerge Payne changed his mind and recommended to Alderman that the University of Virginia participate. “It is only because I believe the University of Virginia can undertake military training, as it will be carried out in the future, without losing its essential characteristics that I suggest favorable consideration of the War Department’s proposal. 585

Alderman replied to Payne the next day. He was glad to see the changes to the governing regulations that the Army was preparing and expected to discuss establishing a program with the faculty. Alderman believed, “There is no reason why military science and art should not be offered as a subject of study as much as chemical science or industry, if this can be done without militarizing the academic atmosphere or attempting to mix the unmixable.” 586 Just what the unmixable elements might be, Alderman did not
state. One can surmise, however, that his concerns ran to the recent SATC experience as a model for what should not happen.

Another officer, Lieutenant Colonel A.L. Pendleton, contacted Alderman concerning the creation of a Coast Artillery ROTC unit at University of Virginia on February 11, 1919. Pendleton visited the campus to recruit the school into the program; he suggested that the number of interested students and the current attitude of students should not be major factors in making the decision. Pendleton wrote, “Don’t worry about the number of students; they’ll come along like little Bo Peep’s sheep just as soon as they see what we are going to give the university in the way of a unit or units.”

On March 4, 1919, the University of Virginia Board of Visitors adopted a resolution to seek the establishment of one or more units of the Reserve Officer Training Corps on the campus. The Board appointed a committee to study the various options available. Two days later the committee recommended requesting the creation of a Coast Artillery ROTC organization on the campus. On March 6, 1919, Alderman wrote to Lieutenant Colonel Pendleton to determine the procedures required to create an ROTC program.

The Army assigned Lieutenant Colonel Abney Payne as the new instructor for the ROTC detachment. This assignment was not without some controversy. Alderman, early on, discussed the need for the university to have input in the selection and assignment of an officer to the school. Yet, on the day the Board voted to request the creation of the ROTC unit, Alderman received notification of Payne’s assignment. This decision resulted in Alderman requesting information as a matter of principle, since he had already determined that he was going to request the assignment of Payne. In the end, Lieutenant
Colonel Pendleton apologized for jumping the gun. Based upon his visit and the 
exchange of letters, Pendleton assumed that Payne was Alderman’s selection and sent a 
memorandum to the Chief of the Coast Artillery to determine Payne’s availability for 
assignment. The personnel officer mistook the request for information as a request for 
orders and issued orders for Payne’s assignment.\textsuperscript{589}  

Having learned from the SATC experience, the University of Virginia elected to 
work with Coast Artillery because its curriculum, while sufficiently scientific to appeal to 
the university’s students did not require any restructuring of the normal college course. 
Additionally, most of the Coast Artillery planned to conduct most of its training during 
summer sessions which would not impact university life at all. Dr. John Luck, 
representing the University of Virginia faculty had attended the eight-week Coast 
Artillery Basic Officer course during the summer of 1918, which provided the Board with 
a first-hand account of the desires of the Coast Artillery.\textsuperscript{590}  

In their meeting on June 10, 1919, the University of Virginia Board of Visitors 
cleaned up several loose ends from the SATC period. It resolved to allow up to six hours 
of academic credit for military training received during the war; to allow the faculty to 
make minor adjustments in granting degree credits based upon wartime conditions; and to 
equate the sessions between January 1919 and June 1919 to a normal academic year.\textsuperscript{591}  

It is hard to imagine that any three-month period could be as tumultuous for a 
university as the fall of 1918. President Alderman unknowingly prepared the University 
of Virginia for success with two early decisions. By disagreeing with the Chair of the 
Board of Visitors, Alderman permitted the creation of a ROTC unit on the campus during
the spring of 1917. Second, Alderman requested that the Army assign a specific type of officer to the university.

As a result of these two decisions, the University of Virginia had a veteran Army officer on hand when the War Department established the SATC. The relationship between the administration of the university and the military on campus was a result of the mutual respect each party had for the other. President Alderman saw, in Lieutenant Colonel Cole a man who knew his profession and acted accordingly. Cole, for his part, had the professional self confidence to fit his program into the university. More than anything else, the success experienced in the University of Virginia SATC resulted from the relationship that Alderman and Cole established.

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441 UVa BOV minutes 23 Mar 1917, UVa Archives BOV Minutes Box IX File 2/3 of 8.

442 When the Reserve Officers Training Corps was established in accordance with the National Defense Act of 1916, each Army Corps could establish a ROTC unit on the campus. Within the overall umbrella of ROTC, a single campus might have units training for several different corps. In ROTC today, students compose a single organization and are separated for specialized training at commissioning.

443 Letter Gordon to John Skelton Williams, dtd 15 Jan 1917, UVa Archives MSS 38-145 Gordon Papers.

444 Letter Echols to War Department, 19 Mar 17, UVa Archives RG 2-1-2.472 Subseries III Box 6 Files M/Mc 1 of 7.

445 Bruce, *UVA*.

446 Alderman exchanged correspondence with the Presidents at Columbia, Princeton, Johns Hopkins, the University of Pennsylvania, and Cornell. Letter Fackenthal (Secretary of Columbia University) to Alderman, 21 Mar 1917; Letter Hibbens to Alderman, 21 Mar 1917; Letter Goodnow (Pres, Johns Hopkins) to Alderman 22 Mar 1917; Letter Schurman (Pres Cornell) to Alderman, 22 Mar 1917; Letter Kelly (Prof of Mil Sci, UPenn) to Alderman, 23 Mar 1917, UVa Archives RG 2-1-2.472 Subseries III Box 6 Files M/Mc 1 of 7.

447 Letter Fackenthal (Secretary of Columbia University) to Alderman, 21 Mar 1917, UVa Archives RG 2-1-2.472 Subseries III Box 6 Files M/Mc 1 of 7.

448 UVa BOV minutes 23 Mar 1917 UVa Archives BOV Minutes Box IX File 2/3 of 8.

449 Ibid.

450 Ibid. The United States did not declare war on Germany until 6 April 1917. That the resolution is recorded having been passed two weeks before the declaration can only be explained by supposition.

451 In Virginia the state legislature is known as the General Assembly. It is divided into an upper house, the Senate, and a lower house, the House of Delegates.

452 UVa BOV minutes 23 Mar 1917, UVa Archives BOV Minutes Box IX File 2/3 of 8.

453 Bruce, *UVA*.

454 Letter, Johnston to Alderman, dtd 16 May 1917, UVa Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 6 Files M/Mc 1 of 7.
Patton, “UVA in the W.W.I.”

The UVA and the War, Council on Military Service, 11 April 1917, UVA Archives RG 2/1-2.472
Subseries III Box 6 Files M/Mc 1 of 7.

Letter, Alderman to McCain, dtd 5 May 1917, UVA Archives RG 2/1-2.472 Subseries III Box 6 Files M/Mc/1 of 7.

Bruce, UVA.

Minutes UVA Board of Visitor Minutes, dtd 19 Apr 1917, p. 114, UVA Archives Board of Visitor Minutes Box IX Files 2 and 3 of 8.

Bruce, UVA.

Letter Weems to Alderman, dtd 18 Oct 1917, UVA Archives RG 2/1-2.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 3 of 7.

Letter Page to Alderman, dtd 18 Jun 1917, UVA Archives RG 2/1-2.472 Subseries III Box 6 File 2 of 7.

War Department Survey dtd 10 Jan 1918 UVA Archives RG 2/1-2.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 4 of 7.

Capen, “The Effects of the World War.”

Minutes, UVA Board of Visitors, dtd 26 Nov 1918 UVA Archives Board of Visitors Minutes Box IX Files 2 and 3 of 8.

Bruce, UVA.

UVA Newsletter dtd 17 Sep 1918 UVA Archives RG 2/1-2.472 Subseries III Box 6 Files M/Mc 1 of 7.

Letter Alderman to Cole, dtd 12 Sep 1918, UVA Archives RG 2-1-2.472 Subseries III Box 7 File SATC 1 of 2.

Alumni News, “Alderman Speaks”, p. 34.

Ibid., p. 34.

Ibid., p. 34.

Memorandum Smith to All Concerned 7 Oct 1918 UVA Archives RG 23-5 SATC Records Box 5. The uniform consisted of: Overcoat, O.D., a Hat, Service, a Hat Cord, Green, a Pair Breeches, Cotton or Wool, O.D., Pair Leggings, Canvas, Pair Shoes, Russet, Field, Coat, Cotton, or Wool O.D., Shirt, Flannel, O.D.

Memorandum Smith to All Concerned 7 Oct 1918 UVA Archives RG 23-5 SATC Records Box 5.

Memo Smith to Command dtd 16 Oct 1918, UVA Archives RG 23-5 SATC Records Box 5.

Memo Smith to Commanders dtd 20 Oct 1918, Smith to Commanders 26 Oct 1918, Mulhern to Commander Company A, undated, Lee to Commander, Company B, dtd 14 Nov 1918, Mulhern to Commanders, dtd 15 Nov 1918, and Mulhern to Commanders dtd 20 Nov 1918 All contained in UVA Archives RG 23-5 SATC Records Box 5.

Memo Smith to Commanders dtd 26 Oct 1918, UVA Archives RG 23-5 SATC Records Box 5.

Memo Mulhern to Company Commanders dtd 4 Dec 1918 UVA Archives RG 23-5 SATC Records Box 5. I am uncertain what size can this actually refers to, though I assume it is a standard #10 can, which holds approximately one half gallon of liquid.

Memo Mulhern to Commander, Company C dtd 29 Nov 1918 UVA Archives RG 23-5 SATC Records Box 5.

Memo Mulhern to Company Commanders dtd 4 Dec 1918 UVA Archives RG 23-5 SATC Records Box 5. Two memoranda with the same date seem to deal with this situation. The first directs a lock down because of the stolen uniform. The second orders additional guards and establishes their post.

Memo Mulhern to Company Commanders dtd 5 Dec 1918; Wilkinson to C.O. Section B dtd 5 Dec 1918; White to C.O. Section B; and Boteler to C.O. Section B. The first is the memo ordering the search. The others are the reports from the junior officers concerning the findings. UVA Archives RG 23-5 SATC Records Box 5.

Memo Budgell to C.O. B Company dtd 3 Dec 1918, UVA Archives RG 23-5 SATC Records Box 5.

Quartermaster General to President, UVA, dtd 17 May 1917, UVA Archives RG 2/1-2.472 Subseries III Box 6 Files M/Mc/1 of 7.

Minutes of the Committee on National Service, 1 Apr 1917, UVA Archives RG 2-1-2.472 Subseries III Box 6 File 2 of 7.

UVA Board of Visitor Minutes 31 May 1917, UVA Archives, Board of Visitor Minutes, Box IX, File 2 and 3 of 8. The expenses submitted were $200 for engineering assistants, $250 or the American University Union in Paris, France, $559 for equipment and personnel in the Modern Language Department, and $125 an assistant in wireless telegraphy.

Letter Baker to Alderman, UVA Archives, RG2/1-2.472 Subseries III Box 6 File 2 of 7.
517 Bruce, *UVA*, p. 364.
518 Letter Hough to Alderman, dtd 10 Apr 1917, UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 6 Files M/Mc/1 of 7.
519 Hughes to Alderman, 10 April 1917, UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 6 Files M/Mc/1 of 7.
520 Letter Page to Alderman dtd 9 July 1917 UVA Archives RG2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 6 File 2 of 7.
521 Patton, “UVA in WWI”.
522 Bruce, *UVA*.
523 Bruce, *UVA*; UVA Archives, “The Special War Courses” RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 5 of 7.
524 UVA Archives, “The Special War Courses” RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 5 of 7.
525 Schlesinger, A. *Political and Social Growth*.
526 Bruce, *UVA*; UVA Board of Visitor Minutes 31 May 1917, UVA Archives, Board of Visitor Minutes, Box IX, File 2 and 3 of 8.
527 Patton, “UVA in WWI”.
528 Minutes of the Military Council dtd 19 Nov 1917, UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 3 of 7.
529 Minutes UVA Military Council dtd 1 Feb 1918 UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 4 of 7.
530 Memo Smith to Company Commanders dtd 18 Oct 1918, UVA Archives RG 23-5 SATC Records Box 5.
531 Letter Alderman to Cole, dtd 5 Nov 1918, Subject:: Number of Kitchen Police, UVA Archives RG 2/1/4.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 5 of 7.
532 Letter Alderman to Cole, dtd 6 Nov 1918, UVA Archives RG 2/1/4.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 5 of 7.
533 Memorandum, Cole to Alderman, dtd 8 Nov 1918 and Alderman to All Instructors of SATC courses at UVA, dtd 8 Nov 1918, Subject Special Monthly Tests both located in UVA Archives RG 2/1/4.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 5 of 7.
534 Letter Alderman to SATC Instructors, dtd 8 Nov 1918, Subject: Attendance of Members of SATC in Collegiate Classes UVA Archives RG 2/1/4.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 5 of 7.
535 Bruce, *UVA*, p. 370.
536 Letter Alderman to Churchman, dtd 27 Nov 1918, UVA Archives RG 2/1/4.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 5 of 7.
540 Millis, *Road to War*.
541 Minutes UVA Board of Visitor Minutes, dtd 27 November 1917, p. 114, UVA Archives Board of Visitor Minutes Box IX Files 2 and 3 of 8.
542 Bruce, *UVA*, p. 365.
543 Minutes UVA Board of Visitor Minutes, dtd 27 November 1917, p. 114, UVA Archives Board of Visitor Minutes Box IX Files 2 and 3 of 8.
544 Bruce, *UVA*, p. 365.
545 Ibid. p. 365.
546 Ibid. p. 366.
547 Minutes UVA Board of Visitor Minutes, dtd 27 November 1917, p. 114, UVA Archives Board of Visitor Minutes Box IX Files 2 and 3 of 8.
548 Temple, *Bugle’s Echo*.
549 Ibid.
550 Barry, *The Great Influenza*.
551 Notice, Nicholson, undated, UVA Archives RG 23-5 SATC Records Box 5.
552 Barry, *The Great Influenza*.
553 Letter Smith to Company Commanders dtd 10 Oct 1918 and Mulhern to Company Commanders dtd 16 Nov 1918 both located in UVA Archives RG 23-5 SATC Records Box 5.
554 Letter Alderman to Plecker dtd 14 Oct 1918 UVA Archives RG 2-1-2.472 Subseries III Box 6 Files M/Mc 1 of 7.
555 Memorandum, Smith to Commanders dtd 21 Oct 1918 UVA Archives RG 23-5 SATC Records Box 5.
Memorandum, Smith to Commanders dtd 23 Oct 1918, Memo Smith to commanders dtd 27 Oct 1918, and memo Smith to Commanders dtd 27 Oct 1918 UVA Archives RG 23-5 SATC Records Box 5.

Memorandum, Smith to Commanders dtd 2 Nov 1918 and Smith to Commanders dtd 4 Nov 1918 UVA Archives RG 23-5 SATC Records Box 5.

Memorandum, Lee to Commanders dtd 14 Nov 1918 UVA Archives RG 23-5 SATC Records Box 5.

Memorandum, Smith to Commanders dtd 11 Nov 1918 UVA Archives RG 23-5 SATC Records Box 5.

Memorandum, Rodman to SATC Commander dtd 15 Nov 1918 and Memo Mulhern to Commander, Company A dtd 16 Nov 1918 UVA Archives RG 23-5 SATC Records Box 5.

Mann, Committee on Education and Special Training (CEST); Telegram Towner to C.O. S.A.T.C. William and Mary College, dtd 12 Nov 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 682 (WM).

Memorandum, Commanding Officer, SATC UVA to CEST, dtd 15 Nov 1918, Subject: Enrolled Students, UVA Archives RG 2/1/4.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 5 of 7.

Memorandum CEST to Commanding Officer, SATC UVA, dtd 22 Nov 1918, Subject: Non-Inducted Students, UVA Archives RG 2/1/4.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 5 of 7.

Memorandum, Mulhern to Company Commanders dtd 27 Nov 1918 UVA Archives RG 23-5 SATC Records Box 5.

Minutes, UVA Board of Visitors, dtd 26 Nov 1918 UVA Archives Board of Visitors Minutes Box IX File 2 and 3 of 8.

Minutes, UVA Board of Visitors, dtd 26 Nov 1918 UVA Archives Board of Visitors Minutes Box IX File 2 and 3 of 8.

Minutes, UVA Board of Visitors, dtd 26 Nov 1918 UVA Archives Board of Visitors Minutes Box IX File 2 and 3 of 8.

Minutes, UVA Board of Visitors, dtd 26 Nov 1918 UVA Archives Board of Visitors Minutes Box IX File 2 and 3 of 8.

Letter Alderman to Cole, dtd 4 Dec 1918, UVA Archives RG 2/1/4.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 6 of 7.

Letter Cole to Alderman, dtd 5 Dec 1918, UVA Archives RG 2/1/4.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 6 of 7.


Minutes, UVA Board of Visitors dtd 4 Mar 1919 UVA Archives Board of Visitors Minutes Box IX File 2 and 3 of 8.

Memoranda, CEST to President, UVA, subject: Establishment of Field Artillery ROTC at UVA, dtd 5 Feb 1919 and Office of the Chief of Field Artillery to President, UVA dtd 5 Feb 1919 both located UVA Archives RG2/1/4.472 Subseries III Box 7 file 7 of 7.

Memoranda, CEST to President, UVA, subject: Establishment of Field Artillery ROTC at UVA, dtd 5 Feb 1919 and Office of the Chief of Field Artillery to President, UVA dtd 5 Feb 1919 both located UVA Archives RG2/1/4.472 Subseries III Box 7 file 7 of 7.

Memorandum, Twoner to Alderman, dtd 9 Dec 1918, Subject: Reserve Officers’ Training Corps, UVA Archives RG 2/1/4.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 6 of 7.

Letter Cole to Alderman, dtd 5 Dec 1918, UVA Archives RG 2/1/4.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 6 of 7.

Letter Alderman to Towner, dtd 11 Dec 1918, Subject: Reserve Officers’ Training Corps, UVA Archives RG 2/1/4.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 6 of 7.

Memorandum Alderman to Rees, dtd 20 Dec 1918, Subject: Temporary Withdrawal of R.O.T.C., UVA Archives RG 2/1/4.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 6 of 7.

Memorandum Alderman to Rees, dtd 20 Dec 1918, Subject: Temporary Withdrawal of R.O.T.C., UVA Archives RG 2/1/4.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 6 of 7.

Memorandum, CEST to President, UVA, dtd 31 Jan 1919, Subject: Coast Artillery Units of the ROTC, UVA Archives RG 2/1/4.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 6 of 7.
The ROTC program at the end of WWI reflected the continuing disjointed structure of Army branches. Each continued to operate independently of the other. Over time, university ROTC programs became associated with a single branch and all students from a particular school were commissioned in that branch. It was not until the 1970s that programs became branch independent, allowing students to request branch assignment based upon preference (and needs of the army, of course).
Figure 6: University of Virginia Rotunda circa 1918
Courtesy: Holsinger Studio Collection, Special Collections, University of Virginia Library

Figure 7: Formation of SATC Soldier on the Lawn at the University of Virginia
Courtesy: Holsinger Studio Collection, Special Collections, University of Virginia Library
Figure 8: Victory Celebration in Charlottesville, Virginia Nov 1918
Courtesy: Holsinger Studio Collection, Special Collections, University of Virginia Library

Figure 9: Victory Celebration in Charlottesville, Virginia Nov 1918
Courtesy: Holsinger Studio Collection, Special Collections, University of Virginia Library
Figure 10: Victory Celebration in Charlottesville, Virginia Nov 1918
Courtesy: Holsinger Studio Collection, Special Collections, University of Virginia Library

Figure 11: University of Virginia SATC Junior Officers
Courtesy: Holsinger Studio Collection, Special Collections, University of Virginia Library
The military did not have an easy time establishing a foothold on the campus of the College of William and Mary. Prior to the declaration of war, the administration and faculty did not muster much interest for such a step. The student body displayed some attention, but it was insufficient to stimulate action. Thus, the college did not apply to participate in the ROTC program following the passage of the National Security Act of 1916.

In 1915, the Rector of William and Mary, Robert Morton Hughes, suggested organizing a military company, but the faculty would only allow the creation of a rifle club. The Board of Visitor’s Executive Committee did, however, set out to determine the process to develop a military company. The idea did not reach fruition, and the college did not establish a company, despite the fact the President Wilson had crossed over to the preparedness camp by 1916.

In December 1915, Dr. Draper, the Director of Physical Training, presented a plan to introduce military training on the campus of William and Mary. At the request of the Board of Visitors, Draper sought to gauge the campus interest in such training. The students voted in support by approximately four to one, despite the existing requirement that military training be compulsory for the first two years and optional for the second two.

Later that month, campus journalists in a Flat Hat editorial suggested that William and Mary men would benefit from participating in military training. Military training, they wrote, would be a far more interesting means of physical activity than those in
Figure 12: Dr. Lyon G. Tyler
Courtesy: SCRC, Swem Library, College of William and Mary

Figure 13: First Lieutenant Dana B. Van Dusen
Courtesy: SCRC, Swem Library, College of William and Mary
which the students currently participated. The authors also presumed that military
training would generate *esprit de corps* that would filter into other campus activities. 594

In a letter to Senator Martin, Tyler described his feelings as the country debated
preparedness using his father’s experience a century earlier as an example.

I regret the country embarking on the high road to militarism. It is all well to talk
of “defensive” preparedness, but that is exactly the way in which the tariff men
talked in 1816. My father made the opening speech in the House of
Representatives and predicted what it would come to. 595

Despite the overwhelming support of the student body and support from some
members of the faculty, the administration took no action to integrate military training
into the college’s life. Prior to the declaration of war in April 1917, little more than
oration was attempted or accomplished on the Williamsburg campus. Of course,
President Tyler’s focus was on his efforts in the General Assembly to gain support for
enrolling women in the college.

*Pre-SATC Efforts and Actions*

Everything changed on April 6, 1917 when Congress declared war on Germany.
The actual declaration removed the possibility of allowing any other issues to gain
superiority over military training on the campus. Students and faculty held a mass
meeting to show support for the war on the evening of the 6th. At that point, President
Tyler and Rector Hughes took action.

Within a few days President Tyler and Rector Hughes engaged the services of
Captain W.G. Puller to serve as the military instructor at the school for the remainder of
the term. 596 Puller was a reserve officer and a member of the Richmond Blues, a militia
unit tracing its roots to the Confederacy. *The Flat Hat* hailed the arrival of Puller stating,
"A dark cloud hovered over our campus as long as there was uncertainty in getting a capable leader."\textsuperscript{597}

Captain Puller immediately assumed control of the student unit, creating the William and Mary Battalion. One of his first actions after assuming control was to require all student participants to sign a pledge of sincere support for the organization. The tenor of the times was such that most students agreed and signed.

As part of the training, Puller instituted a form of military discipline through the use of drill, ceremonies, and military courtesy. Offenses were punishable through issuance of demerits that could result in a reduction of the student’s grade for military training. This demerit system indicates the acceptance of the military presence and the depth of faculty support for the effort.\textsuperscript{598}

Additionally, the faculty at William and Mary exhibited support by agreeing to shorten classes to allow for drill time. In an effort to prevent students from enlisting, the faculty authorized granting two credits per term for military instruction. Enrollment, however, continued to fall, dropping to 140. Faculty also agreed to give academic credit for work done by students who enlisted or left school to engage in war-related work.\textsuperscript{599}

The program expanded to include a larger percentage of the student body in the fall term. As a result, the War Department recognized this by assigning an officer to conduct military training during the fall semester of 1917. Captain Taylor, whose previous assignment had been at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, arrived in time to begin training in the fall.\textsuperscript{600} Taylor instituted a more rigorous training schedule and worked to secure uniforms for the unit.\textsuperscript{601}
The *Flat Hat* described the benefits of military training in much the way the proponents of the preparedness movement had extolled the virtues of such training. The author proposed several reasons to support military training on campus. First, it was patriotic. Second, it was a beneficial mode of training and development. Third, military training taught discipline. Finally, participants derived physical benefits from the training.\(^{602}\)

As the country moved into the spring of 1918, the students at William and Mary experienced the same draw toward the military that was felt by students at the University of Virginia. Many chose to enlist in the service. The administration and faculty continued efforts to make college life more meaningful by incorporating military instruction more fully.

Amid all the excitement of the growing war effort in May 1918, the army called upon the battalion at William and Mary to conduct a real world mission guarding a military aircraft. A pilot flying from Langley field, approximately twenty miles southeast of Williamsburg, experienced a mechanical malfunction in his aircraft forcing him to make an emergency landing in an open field near the local train station. The landing, which further damaged the aircraft, occurred about one half mile away from the campus. Naturally, a crowd gathered and several of the more brazen attempted to take pieces of the plane as souvenirs of the event. Major Taylor\(^{603}\) took charge, and, using members of the battalion, posted guards to keep the crowd away from the plane. The students continued to guard the plane until members of the Army Air Corps arrived to take charge of the aircraft.\(^{604}\)
Shortly after the battalion protected the aircraft, the Board of Visitors authorized President Tyler to apply “to participate in the government aid” created under the National Defense Act of 1916. The only available record is a letter from the Headquarters Eastern Region Adjutant’s Office, in response to a letter from Tyler. The letter directed Tyler’s attention to an enclosed document detailing the Secretary of War’s policy decision to stop providing personnel, arms, and equipment to colleges. This was the same policy cited to the University of Virginia when President Alderman requested weapons for training.

Following the 1917-1918 academic year, Major Taylor received a new assignment from the War Department and departed Williamsburg. The Army assigned Major William P. Stone, also formerly of Virginia Polytechnic Institute, as the head of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps. Stone received assignment orders because President Eggleston of Virginia Polytechnic Institute wanted a younger more active officer assigned and requested such from the War Department. In the summer of 1918, the War Department transferred Stone to William and Mary. In September, Stone requested reassignment.

Activation of the SATC

On August 17, 1918, the War Department notified William and Mary of its selection as a SATC unit location. On the 19th, the college received a second telegram from the CEST. The CEST raised the possibility of combining the SATC Unit at William and Mary with a neighboring institution should enrollment not reach the required threshold of 100 able bodied men. Surprisingly, no record of Tyler seeking the approval of the Board of Visitors to participate in the SATC seems to exist. The Board
voted in June 1918 to seek an ROTC unit, and Tyler, apparently, used this guidance when he applied for the SATC.609

Just four days prior to the scheduled activation of the SATC, on September 26th, Major Stone notified the CEST that First Lieutenant Van Dusen and Second Lieutenants Hetzer and Taylor had reported for duty. Shortly thereafter, Stone requested that the War Department relieve him from duty at William and Mary, as the command was not large enough to require an officer more senior than a first lieutenant. Stone suggested that the War Department assign him to Richmond College or to the Richmond City high school system, which had larger programs and required a field grade officer.610 The War Department approved Major Stone’s transfer quickly. By the time of SATC activation, First Lieutenant Van Dusen was the commander.

On September 29th, the college had seventy-nine of the required one hundred young men enrolled in the SATC. The new “enlisted” men required physical examinations. The Army physician conducted physicals in two groups. Forty-five of the first forty-seven examined passed and were deemed fit for service. The other thirty-two awaited examination. As October 1st approached, it did not appear that the college would have a sufficient number of young men enrolled to meet the guidance of one hundred.

In his memorandum to the CEST requesting his reassignment, Major Stone stated that he thought that First Lieutenant Van Dusen possessed the “training, experience, and probably tact required in efficient command to the unit and maintenance of proper relations with the college authorities.”611 In this judgment, Stone was most certainly incorrect. Through the term, Van Dusen displayed a lack of respect for the college
authorities and a distinct lack of tact in his correspondence with them. Van Dusen had similar difficulties with his military superiors in the District Inspector's office.

Van Dusen's prickly personality emerges in a letter to Lieutenant Bump at the University of North Carolina. Unable to determine the answer to a question concerning reporting requirements, Van Dusen called upon Bump for advice. Following his questions, Van Dusen wrote: "Though I realize it is my duty to analyze memorandums to obtain this information, I have been left in doubt and uncertainty because of the failure to receive a large number of the Committee's [CEST] memorandums. You promised me personally that I might impose on your good nature for answers to questions such as the present ones."\textsuperscript{612} In the general give and take between peers, such a declaration of need and reminder of an offer of assistance is not a normal part of conversation – unless one is unsure of oneself.

Van Dusen had ideas about improving the national efficiency of the SATC. He wrote to the CEST on October 29, 1918, suggesting the creation of a monthly bulletin containing information of value to SATC commanders and college officials.

Although it is hardly within the duties or privileges of my post, I wish to offer suggestion that the Committee on Education publish a Monthly Bulletin containing, statistics, articles on conditions which must be overcome, the solution of various problems as worked out in practice at various institutions, methods of organization, regulations in effect, equipment employed.... This would be of benefit to commanding officers and college officials.... I have very clearly, definite ideas of how this could be done. If the Committee has already considered, and either rejected or adopted this plan, I must apologize for writing this letter.\textsuperscript{613}

The idea, itself, has merit; the method of presentation however combines self deprecation and haughtiness. His opening and closing apologies for writing the letter, sandwich the declaration that he knows how to publish a bulletin if the CEST does not.
Van Dusen's complaints were far reaching and in some instances reasonable. He complained to the telegraph company concerning the condition of the telegrams he received. Van Dusen was concerned that the telegrams were illegible and contained incorrect spellings. The Regional Superintendent replied, explaining that the Williamsburg office was too small and infrequently used to allow for all messages to be typewritten as they were in larger offices.\(^{614}\)

As the SATC developed, Van Dusen's personality set the tone for the entire organization. Nicknamed, "The Little Rooster" by the SATC soldiers, the image Van Dusen presented appears punctilious and superficially strict, in other words, a martinet.\(^{615}\) As the senior military man on the campus, students knew who he was. His nickname indicates he was not a popular figure on the campus. Several oral history interviews relate an incident in which a regular student or group of students caused Van Dusen to become soaked with water. Yelverton O. Kent, a SATC student, related the incident.

A fellow named Simons from Norfolk who was not in the S.A.T.C., so he got himself about a twenty-pound bag of water and the captain used to stand right under the window there next to old Ewell [Hall] and he dropped this bag of water right on the captain’s head and knocked him right flat. I can hear him now, hollering, "Corporal of the guard, get that man." And he did and took him up before the president. They march us all down, and we marched old Simons down to the train, put him on the train, and sent him home.\(^{616}\)

Another student present at the time, Mr. Kimbrough, remembered the incident slightly differently. Following the water falling on Van Dusen,

They took a small group of their SATC under orders and went in and searched the dormitory and arrested the young man they felt had done the thing. Of course, it was poorly managed. There should have been better cooperation—but they didn’t appeal to the college authorities at all. They just marched the young man down to the train and put him on the train and sent away. In the meantime, the faculty had gotten together and had a faculty meeting, and they rushed down to the train station. The military put him on one end of the car and the faculty took him off the other end.\(^{617}\)
A third student, Martha Barksdale, recorded the incident in her diary with a slightly different perspective.

One event that has amused me very much and annoyed me at the same time was the water throwing affair. Mr. Simmons, Mr. Elliott, and Mr. Lyons are seniors here. They decided to calm some ducks (freshmen) who were singing under their windows so they threw out a bag of water. The bag hit the fire escape and drenched the all important Capt Van Dusen and Lieutenant Taylor. They were furiously angry and stirred up quite a commotion over it. A few days later the whole S.A.T.C. lined up and marched Lyons and Simmons to the depot to ship them. Dr. Clark, Prof. Keeble, and other succeeded in making Capt. Van Dusen have them brought back.¹⁶¹

The water incident, viewed from the perspectives of three different types of students, testifies to the students' view of Van Dusen. Kent, a member of the SATC, relays the incident in a very matter of fact tone, providing only the facts as he recalls them. Kimbrough, a regular student, provides essentially the same details concerning the incident, but adds that the SATC officials managed the incident poorly. Barksdale provides the only contemporaneous account of the incident.¹⁶² For pure detail, her recounting is probably the most accurate, since it does not rely on a memory several decades old.

The common feature among all three versions is that Van Dusen felt that he possessed the authority to discipline a regular student through expulsion. Whether the SATC put Simmons on one side of the train and the faculty took him off the other or not, the conflict between the faculty and the SATC is clearly evident in the handling of the guilty students. As one might imagine from his response to the water incident, Van Dusen was a strict disciplinarian. The patriotic outpouring that led to participation in the SATC did not prepare students for the military way of life. Some had difficulty adjusting.
Whether this resulted from youthful exuberance or became exacerbated by the fact that their surroundings were so distinctly unmilitary is unknown.

At William and Mary, Sergeant Brooks maintained a notebook of infractions for future entry in unit records. His notebook begins on November 10, 1918. The final entry is December 3, 1918. In this two week period, Sergeant Brooks found 114 infractions worthy of recording. Many of these infractions are mundane, such as leaving a hat on a dresser. Some infractions are down right silly: one student Brooks cited on November 13 for “general ignorance.” Other infractions are of a more serious nature, such as the six soldiers cited on November 26 for sleeping while serving as charge-of-quarters.

Students who became soldiers found themselves in a new and completely different world, where seemingly normal interpersonal interaction was subject to punishment. One soldier, Private McDonald, received confinement to his quarters for impudence to a noncommissioned officer. The confinement limited his activities to class, drill, and other duties. Additionally, he also received one week duty as kitchen police. No record of the nature of the impudence exists.

Two incidents involved a Corporal Dahnke and illustrate the leadership difficulties that Van Dusen faced. In the first incident, Dahnke was supervising some soldiers given extra duty as punishment, some for having their lights on after taps. According to Dahnke the soldiers were,

Instructed to carry as many beds as possible to the guard house. On the second trip back to the Ewell Building...the men were given double time.... I led the way past the iron pipe sticking up in the ground ... [and] Private Parrish, by his own confession, jumped it. Private Winniger tried to follow him, and running against the post, tore his trousers down the inseam. Private Cox ... unaware of the post, ran against it, and bruised himself in the crotch.... I immediately reported
the affair to the first sergeant. He sent the injured men to their quarters, and placed
the others under Sergeant Pullen. 623

Corporal Dahnke simply did not have a good day on October 12. Dahnke was the
corporal who spoke to Dr. Davis in a disrespectful manner. 624 In a report concerning his
conduct, Sergeant Pullen reported that Dahnke had insulted Dr. Davis, a member of the
faculty. On October 14, First Lieutenant Van Dusen issued Special Order Number 5 in
which he states that the injuries to men while under the supervision of Corporal Dahnke
were accidental. However, Dahnke was “unnecessarily severe in the enforcement of his
orders.” As a consequence, Dahnke received a reprimand and a notation of the reprimand
in his official personnel file. In Special Orders Number 8 signed on October 22, 1918,
Van Dusen reduced Dahnke in rank from corporal to private. 625

These three incidents, the water incident, the injury to soldiers, and disrespect to
faculty, give a picture of the SATC on the campus of William and Mary. Elements of the
SATC were obviously unpopular. Military discipline did not always sit easily with the
student body and faculty. Further, an officer who neither students nor faculty respected
led it. Given the patriotic nature of the times, one can surmise that the cause of the
unpopularity was personality rather than disagreement with the program or its goals.

These incidents also indicate the difficulty an inexperienced leader faced in the
SATC. The Army activated Van Dusen, a reserve officer, in May and he received ninety
days of training at FT Sheridan, Illinois prior to arriving at William and Mary. 626 The
assignment thrust Van Dusen into a situation for which he had little experience and even
less disposition. As the senior officer present, he set the tone of the organization. It was a
tone that did not resound well in Williamsburg.
Equipping the SATC

The College of William and Mary experienced the same supply issues that plagued the University of Virginia. The SATC at the college issued uniforms on November 27th, nearly two months after the activation of the unit, two and one-half weeks following the armistice and only five days before deactivation was set to begin. Uniforms were a problem at the college from the beginning of military training through the SATC period.

It is difficult to say with any specificity what uniforms were on hand at William and Mary because no records are available. When military training began under Captain Puller in April 1917, no uniforms were on hand. Since ROTC was not established prior to the war, the equipment supplied by the War Department would have been limited. Undoubtedly, some students purchased uniforms using personal funds.

For some parents concern about military training and uniforms took a prosaic turn. During the early period of military training on the campus, one parent wrote to the William and Mary Registrar wondering when the college became a military academy, since it had not advertised itself as such in the 1917-1918 catalog. This parent, a farmer, was concerned about the additional expense uniforms would create for his two sons. He felt that his sons received sufficient physical training at home on the farm. He sent his sons to school for mental not physical training. He asked that the college send his boys home if the purchase of uniforms became a requirement. In a note at the bottom of the letter the President Tyler wrote, “Excuse this gentleman’s sons from uniform.”

At the time, a mix of uniformed and civilian clad students participated in military training. Four months after this in April 1918, Major Taylor decided to exclude men who
had not purchased a uniform from participation in the battalion drills. Taylor considered this step for some time before announcing it. He delayed making the announcement because he knew it would create financial hardship for some students; he did not want to exclude students from the academic credits earned in drill; and, finally, he thought excluding men without uniforms discriminatory. According to the *Flat Hat* the new appearance was much more dignified. The inference from the decision of Major Taylor to exclude students who had not purchased uniforms is that the War Department provided, few, if any. Since the only known date is a single reference to the uniform issue on November 27, it is unlikely that many students wore government provided clothing prior to that.

Since it was moving into existing facilities on college campuses, the Army did not need to construct barracks and other buildings. The Army provided detailed guidance concerning the living arrangements expected in the barracks. Soldiers were to have forty-five square feet of floor space and five hundred cubic feet of air space. Regulations also established minimum expectations for the number of toilets, wash basins, and showers. The Army conducted inspections prior to activating the SATC providing schools with a list of required changes, improvement or repairs. The Army required each school to supply the kitchen space and equipment required to support the SATC at the institution. As the War Department moved to include William and Mary as an SATC institution in September 1918, an inspection of the campus found that the number of shower and toilet facilities available was sufficient for the number of men on hand but would be insufficient if the college reached the full complement of men. Major Stone wrote to the
District Office with the recommendation that the Army build a shower facility near the dormitory to alleviate the potential crowding.\textsuperscript{631}

In his memorandum, Stone foolishly noted that the facilities used by the college were “inconveniently placed and are very untidy in appearance…. It would be advisable to altogether discontinue their use.” The CEST District Inspector, Major Towner, responded quickly, telling Stone that he did not have authorization to build a new facility. Since Stone raised the issue of cleanliness, Towner responded in the only way he could ordering that “If these toilets are in an untidy condition, they should be cleaned immediately, painted and put in a sanitary condition.” Since headquarters was now aware of the issue, it required a follow-up. Towner continued, “This you will see to at once, and as soon as this work is completed, a report will be made to this office.”\textsuperscript{632}

Returning for a moment to the issue of facilities and cleanliness one can see the most punctilious of the officer corps measuring floor space and cubic air space and sending complaint after complaint to a harried university president. As it played out, this appears to be the type of relationship established at the College of William and Mary between President Tyler and First Lieutenant Van Dusen. On October 25, Van Dusen sent memorandum to the District Headquarters detailing delinquent repairs for which the college was responsible without providing a copy of the letter to Tyler. Van Dusen stated that “No substantial attempt was made by the college authorities before the opening of college to prepare for the reception of the Students Army Training Corps.” Among the requested repairs were thirty-five window panes, four defective window frames, two radiator taps, three door knobs, one leaky radiator, two knobs for showers, one shower curtain, telephone for the orderly room, repairs to fire escapes, fire buckets, and a host of
other items including cleaning supplies. Obviously, some of these repairs were required for the safety of all university personnel.

Van Dusen’s memorandum detailing the repairs that the university had not made drew a quick response from the District Inspector, Major Towner. Towner wrote to President Tyler notifying him that the District Headquarters received a complaint and that an inspector would arrive the following week to review progress. Towner wrote, “The establishment and permanency of the Unit at your College depends upon your compliance with regulations, and it will be expected that the necessary regulations be complied with at once.” Unlike Van Dusen, Towner had the experience and tact to offer Tyler a face saving means to conclude the situation by closing with, “The writer will be pleased to hear from you in regard to the above as he feels sure that there has been some misunderstanding and no intentional neglect of instructions.”

Towner also wrote to First Lieutenant Van Dusen, displaying the frustration that he was beginning to feel with the Van Dusen’s handling of the situation at William and Mary.

It will be your duty to report to this office as to just what action will be taken in the next few days. You will be held responsible for the condition of your Unit and it is advisable that you see that instructions are carried out as that is your duty as Commanding Officer.

Following receipt of instructions from Major Towner, First Lieutenant Van Dusen wrote to President Tyler requesting that the school provide cleaning supplies and make a variety of repairs to the SATC facilities. Van Dusen requested also that the university install a telephone in the orderly room, “largely for the purpose of obtaining correct time from the Western Union Telegraph Operator at the depot.”
President Tyler displayed restraint in responding to Major Towner’s letter on October 30. Tyler wrote, “I beg to say that very little remains to be done in the nature of repairs at this Institution brought in any way to my notice.” Tyler noted that some delays occurred because of a shortage of laborers in the area. The ammunition plant at Penniman had hired most of the available labor. Surprisingly, given that Van Dusen apparently did not provide him notice of submitting a poor report to his higher headquarters, Tyler praised his efforts writing, “Lieutenant Van Dusen…is an active and efficient officer, and he has our unit in excellent trim considering the lack of uniforms and the many difficulties to be dealt with.”

On October 31, Van Dusen provided the required reply to the District Inspector’s office, stating that many repairs were completed and others were well on the way. He requested that the inspector arrive as soon as possible to view the repairs. But Van Dusen could not leave well enough alone. He also noted that he never received the inspection report referred to in Major Towner’s letter, and it was not on file at the college. To make matters worse, Van Dusen downplayed the efforts associated with the SATC at William and Mary by concluding his memorandum with the proviso that, “The entire condition when I assumed command here, is described by the word – chaos.” This statement is made even less understandable when one considers that Major Stone, Van Dusen’s predecessor, was an experienced officer whose previous assignment had been as the ROTC instructor at VPI and that Van Dusen, himself, had been assigned to William and Mary prior to Stone’s reassignment.

Apparently learning that working with the administration was better than appearing inept to his military superiors, First Lieutenant Van Dusen sent President Tyler
a list of repairs required in the mess hall on October 31. The repairs were necessary, Van Dusen considered, to the “efficient management” of the mess facility. They included a shelf on the sink, new strips for dish baskets, overhauling of all steam cookers, repacking of valves, packing of sink faucet, repairing the dishwasher, and many more. Of course, the contract between the War Department and the college included the provision of meals to the SATC, so the dining facility/mess hall should not have been part of Van Dusen’s responsibilities.

The picture that emerges concerning the equipment and facilities at William and Mary is one of shortage and age. Using uniforms as a gauge, it is apparent that few issued uniforms were on hand until the known issue date of November 27. References to the lack of uniforms occur as late as Tyler’s letter to the District Office on October 30. The facilities issue is more difficult to evaluate. Van Dusen, obviously felt that the campus was in great need of repair. In this, Van Dusen may have been correct. The inspection that both Towner and Van Dusen refer to when discussing the deficiencies no longer exists. The financial difficulties that William and Mary experienced prior to World War I may have resulted in some degradation of the college’s physical plant.

The other element that begins to emerge in analyzing this correspondence is the poor relationships established by Van Dusen with Major Towner, the District Officer, and university officials. Towner’s letter of October 28, reminding Van Dusen of his responsibilities was a rebuke. The impact of Van Dusen’s personality is seen in his willingness to report deficiencies to headquarters without sending them through university officials, his request for a telephone for time keeping, and his denigration of the efforts put forth by others to develop the SATC at William and Mary.
Manning the SATC

Major Stone and First Lieutenant Van Dusen arrived in Williamsburg during the summer of 1918. Additional officers arrived to provide additional cadre for the unit. On October 1, Major Stone sent a telegram to the CEST stating that he had fifty-three students who had passed the physical and were ready for induction. He wanted to know if he should proceed and requested that the CEST wire an answer back to him. 643

Stone also developed a novel approach to rounding out the roster of the SATC suggesting to President Tyler that he request the assignment of twenty active duty enlisted men to William and Mary. Stone’s idea was that the Army could evaluate enlisted soldiers who had displayed the potential for greater responsibility through an assignment to the SATC. Tyler wrote the suggested request stating that it would be “an excellent opportunity to send otherwise good officer material for further needed academic instruction.” The War Department denied the request. 644

Recognizing the need to attract more students, President Tyler initiated during the first days of October a multi-state advertising campaign, placing ads in newspapers as far away as New York City. 645 He received several responses to these advertisements, as students sought entry into the SATC and, perhaps, did not realize that the same opportunities existed at local institutions. Because the War Department established the SATC around the country, it preferred that students either attend the school in which they were already enrolled or attend the closest school to their home.

As late as October 8, First Lieutenant Van Dusen was still trying to determine the parameters for enlisting soldiers into the SATC, once the prospective soldiers arrived on campus. He sent a telegram to the CEST asking if continuous enlistment and admission to
the program was acceptable. Two weeks later he received notification that the SATC should enlist soldiers on a continuous basis. 646 On November 1, 1918, Lieutenant Van Dusen sent a memorandum to Mr. Bridges, the Registrar at William and Mary notifying Bridges that the War Department had removed “all arbitrary requirements for the admission to the S.A.T.C.” 647 The only remaining requirement, according to Van Dusen, was that military and college officials agree that a man could do the work required. Further, Van Dusen requested that Bridges provide a list of current William and Mary students not previously qualified for the SATC who might qualify under the new guidance. Van Dusen also requested that the school conduct an advertising campaign to gain an additional forty students for the program.

The financial difficulties that led William and Mary to admit women in the fall of 1918 suggest that the school had difficulty attracting students in the best of times. The difficulties encountered attempting to begin and SATC unit suggest that the difficulties ran deep. Nearly 250 years of history was not enough to attract students and the Army was not a panacea. At best, the SATC provided a bit of breathing space for the administration.

*Academic Issues*

From the beginning, that is, shortly after the declaration of war, military instruction was immensely popular with the William and Mary student body, gaining nearly full support. The administration and faculty provided full support once they made the decision to provide military instruction. The William and Mary battalion began daily drills of two hours which the faculty senate supported by reducing class schedules. 648
They shortened lecture periods by ten minutes and the class day began thirty minutes earlier to allow additional time for military instruction.\textsuperscript{649}

However, the relationship between the administration and the military began to change with the creation of the SATC. From the beginning of military training the faculty had adjusted schedules and curriculum in accommodation of the military’s need. With the advent of the SATC, no longer was the faculty providing time out of a sense of patriotism duty, or any other emotion; the faculty lost control. The military now dictated what the schedule would be.

According to the U.S. Army Regulations published in 1910, “The commander of a post is responsible for its safety and defense, and for the discipline, drill, and instruction of his command, to which ends all other garrison duties will be made subservient.”\textsuperscript{650} It appears that First Lieutenant Van Dusen had difficulty balancing the need to fulfill the imperatives of the Army regulations, discipline, drill, and instruction, with the need to coexist with college administrators and faculty.

Van Dusen seems to have taken to heart the regulatory guidance in an effort to make everything on the William and Mary campus “subservient” to military requirements. Nothing in extant records suggests that he acted with malice. Rather the tone of his letters and orders suggests that he had a punctilious, exacting personality that led him to implement his instructions with precision. Beginning in late October, First Lieutenant Van Dusen began a series of actions designed to rearrange the schedule at William and Mary to better support his perception of military needs on campus. His efforts seem to have taken two forms. He tried to adjust the daily schedule and
curriculum to better fit military requirements. He also took actions as the unit commander that interfered with instruction.

The daily training schedule on campus discussed in Chapter 5, left little time for academic pursuits and almost none for after-class study and reflection. On October 25, Van Dusen wrote to the faculty committee on scheduling asking that the administration reschedule the exercise period for female students to allow the military the use of the gymnasium. Van Dusen wrote,

> Will you endeavor to so arrange the schedule that the exercise period for the young ladies will not interfere with the use of the Armory for the Students Army Training Corps during drill period and inclement weather? Some place for indoor drill must be provided during the winter months. The only place available, that I know of, is the gymnasium.

> I assume that it is impossible, but if it is not, advise that the schedule be arranged so as to provide for as many recitations in the morning as possible, and reserve the afternoon for study periods. The less cut-up the day is by successive periods of study and recitation, the easier will military drill and instruction be. 651

This memorandum displays Van Dusen's misunderstanding or lack of understanding on several levels. It appears from his use of armory and gymnasium to refer to the same facility in the same paragraph either that he was not comfortable with the relationship between college and military requirements or he was not attuned to the need to address college officials as civilians. Nor did he seem to have established an understanding with college officials concerning the use of individual facilities. Next, Van Dusen does not seem to comprehend that the "young ladies" whose exercise conflicts with his needs were paying customers of the university and entitled to the use of facilities as well. Finally, Van Dusen was one of the officers for whom the CEST would write later policy letters concerning the importance of the soldiers' academic work SATC
participants. Van Dusen appears to attempt to make "all other activities," including academic activities "subservient" at every turn, as the drill schedule indicated.

The drill schedule prepared by Lieutenant Van Dusen also drew interest from the District Inspector's Office. The increasing frustration of Major Towner can be heard throughout his memoranda to Van Dusen concerning the schedule. "It appears that you are only giving one hour per day of military drill... strictly in violation of instructions ... you will see that same is changed at once ... and the drill schedule is brought up to requirements." Van Dusen responded with a memorandum justifying his drill schedule and explaining Major Towner's misinterpretation of it. After several memoranda containing questions from the district and explanations from William and Mary, Towner told Van Dusen to prepare "a corrected schedule and in proper form, omitting long descriptions." Van Dusen consistently provided an excuse or justification for all his actions. Towner, presumably exasperated, finally told Van Dusen on November 3, "This office wants a drill schedule and not a letter."

Continuing his attempt to rearrange the academic schedule at William and Mary, Lieutenant Van Dusen, in a lengthy memorandum on November 7, 1918 to President Tyler, indicated how little respect he had for the academic officials at the school. Van Dusen's tone reflected the increasing pressure he felt from Major Towner, the District Inspector. Opening the memo with the same self-deprecation and self-righteousness seen in his earlier correspondence, Van Dusen wrote: "I am not certain how far my authority and responsibility justifies my calling your attention to schedule for class room instruction. But in view of the splendid results which could be reached by a revision of that schedule, I feel justified in urging a reconsideration of this question."
Van Dusen does not detail what the “splendid” results might be; he does, however, once again leave plain his desire to ensure the primacy of the military instruction on campus. He continued, noting “The schedule is so arranged that it seriously interferes with the efficiency of military instruction and military control.” Clearly, he had not yet understood that the CEST intended the soldiers of the SATC to participate in academic work. Van Dusen raised the issue of the gymnasium again writing, “the Non S.A.T.C. men and the feminine cortege wish to use the gymnasium at the same time that the men have their drill hour and need that building during bad weather for purpose of military instruction.” At least this time, Van Dusen recognized that the facility was a gymnasium and not an armory, as he referred to it the first time he addressed the topic. He does not suggest that the college award the SATC use of the facility during inclement weather. He simply desires to take it over during the appointed hours. First Lieutenant Van Dusen still failed to recognize the equal right of regular students to utilize campus facilities.

In his monthly report to the CEST, dated November 6, 1918, President Tyler detailed the attendance problem at William and Mary. By then, Tyler no longer offered praise for Van Dusen.

Owing to the influenza and numerous ... duties as soldiers in detail work, the attendance in class has been so far very poor. The professors have, therefore, adopted the work “X” where it is impossible to grade the student on account of absence or where he has been prevented by military duty from performing the lesson.

Classroom attendance was an increasing problem as the semester progressed. Conflicts between academics and military duties was one of the problems that reduced faculty
support for the military either, having adopted a grading scale that allowed for incomplete work where military duties interfered with the classroom.

Van Dusen’s next scheduling suggestion recommended the elimination of classes not desired by the War Department as a means of freeing the time he required for additional drill and soldier duties.

The object is to concentrate lectures and recitations periods for soldiers into the morning hours, preserving as far as possible the entire afternoon and evening for drill and study. How this can be accomplished, I will not presume to suggest except to point out that the elimination of some of the courses not desired by the War Department, might well make it possible to have all classes attended by soldiers held during morning hours.658

Once again, Van Dusen delivered the message to President Tyler that academics held no importance. Van Dusen sent the initial message concerning the use of the armory to Tyler on the October 25. By the time of this message on November 7, Van Dusen had moved from deconflicting the use of a gymnasium to wholesale revision of the academic schedule and a reduction of classroom opportunity for soldiers to allow greater time for drill and other military instruction.

As previously seen, there was sufficient conflict surrounding academic requirements that, in mid-November, the CEST Chairman issued a directive emphasizing the importance of academics.659 Finally, Van Dusen understood that academics were a serious consideration and began taking action to compensate for his previous lack of attention to academics by disputing the appropriateness of reports of grades provided by the faculty. Van Dusen wrote to President Tyler,

I wish also to call your attention to the fact that a large number of absences from classes, which have resulted in the professors refusing to grade the majority of men have not been due to military drill.... The time which has been put in has been partly for necessary work and organization, but largely for work in repair and sanitation of college buildings, and I do not think it just for Faculty members
to blame the Military Department for the results arising out of the necessity for doing this non-military work. I hope that all members of the Faculty may understand this situation.660

Van Dusen closed his memorandum with a request that President Tyler respond in writing so that Van Dusen might have a record of the school’s response. Unfortunately, no such copy exists. Now that he understood the importance of the academic work, even if he did not personally agree, Van Dusen apparently wanted either artificially to raise the grades awarded to students or to obtain a document he could use to justify his actions.

Two weeks later after he received notification that some soldiers were so far behind that they could not earn a passing grade, Van Dusen again sent a memorandum to Tyler arguing that though grading was within the province of the professoriate, there were circumstances of which he would like to make them aware.

College opened this year under extraordinary circumstances.... The preparation of buildings and equipment to accommodate these men ... involved expenditure of much time and energy.... To these factors must be added the handicap resulting from attempting to apply the old schedule ... to the new order of things.661

In an Army unit, particularly one geographically separated from its higher headquarters, the commander sets the tone for nearly everything the unit does. The officers, sergeants, and soldiers all look to the commander to set the standards by which the unit will operate. Every sign Van Dusen gave his unit suggested that academics were not important, and he failed to ensure his soldiers paid attention to their academic work.

Van Dusen confided to the president that he believed that the circumstances at William and Mary were similar to those at other universities. He felt that the difficulties were “universal in all institutions constructing an efficient military organization.” He then suggested that his organization was not as efficient as he wanted others to think it was by stating, “It is true that, to an extent unknown to me, ‘military duties’ seem to have been
frequently offered to professors as excuses when such action was neither authorized nor necessary.” Van Dusen suggested that it would “seem a shame to punish these boys for an excess of zeal in patriotic service.” He appealed to the patriotism of the faculty and requested that professors show a “tolerant allowance for discrepancies in the past.” Van Dusen concluded the memorandum stating that “I have no direct interest in these matters myself, and I hope you will understand this communication in a disinterested spirit.”

Disinterested? Throughout the memorandum, Van Dusen stressed the supremacy of military requirement, however mundane, over the academic requirements of the college. The District Military Inspector, Major Towner had already corrected Van Dusen several times during the previous thirty days. President Tyler had already sent several letters directly to Towner, circumventing Van Dusen. Clearly, Van Dusen was a most interested party to the discussion. That the relationship between the SATC and college officials at William and Mary was no longer mutually supportive seems a result of the interaction between Van Dusen and the administration.

When he wrote this last memo, Van Dusen, as part of the post-armistice reduction of forces, had already requested to remain on active duty. He was perhaps trying to keep more bad news from reaching Towner in an effort to avoid proliferating more negative feedback. Towner wrote another letter chiding Van Dusen for his effort as a late report from the William and Mary SATC delayed submission of a collated report from The District Office to the CEST.

At the same time he was attempting to revise the academic schedule and ultimately the curriculum, First Lieutenant Van Dusen took actions as the commander
that restricted the soldiers’ ability to study and attend class. Whether it was an intentional effort to make academics “subservient” to the military or simply his interpretation of his duty Van Dusen continued hindering academics when he issued Special Orders No 9 on October 28. This order called for detailing a squad, normally ten men, as kitchen police each day. Reporting to the mess hall at 07:00 a.m., 12:45 p.m., and 5:45 p.m. the squad would remain for an hour after the completion of each meal. Needless to say, this contributed to the inability of some soldiers to accomplish their academic work and certainly increased the absentee rate in classrooms.665

In Special Orders Number 16, issued on November 11, 1918, Van Dusen responded to a memorandum from the Chairman of the CEST, Brigadier General Rees, to reduce military disruptions of the academic schedule by removing the requirement for kitchen police.666 Instead he ordered one squad to report each day to serve as waiters during the meal. For the first time, he specifically stated the duties were not to conflict with attending class. He also stated the soldiers would only wait upon tables at which soldiers sat. Two weeks later, before announcement of the decision to demobilize the SATC, Van Dusen issued Special Orders Number 21 which discontinued the practice of using soldiers as waiters during meal.667

Even after the guidance Rees concerning the importance of academic work, Van Dusen administered punishments for infractions at William and Mary that did not follow the guidelines. In one instance, Van Dusen punished Private J. S. Baddour with extra duty as kitchen police from Friday morning breakfast until Sunday supper for throwing refuse in a latrine.668 This duty would, doubtless, cause Baddour to miss all classes on Friday and have no time to make up missed work over the weekend.
Most incongruously on a university campus, First Lieutenant Van Dusen restricted soldiers' use of the library. According to Special Orders Number 14, issued October 30, 1918, soldiers could only use the library only for “diligent” study. They could not enter and exit the facility. Men could not leave the library for a cigarette and return for additional study. An orderly, posted within the library, ensured that men followed the rules. Most importantly, perhaps, “Soldiers will not be permitted to visit the young ladies at the Library.” In contrast, Yelverton Kent said that the SATC soldiers preferred dating the women who worked at the Penniman ammunition plant because they had fewer restrictions, there may have been some legitimate need to restrict fraternization. This was the first semester that women attended William and Mary.

In addition to attempting to control the schedule and the use of facilities, Lieutenant Van Dusen expected proper behavior in the classroom. He issued Special Orders Number 3, titled Class Room Regulations. He wrote, “Soldiers are subject to military discipline while in classrooms.... Upon entrance of a faculty member, or army officer, into the classroom, they will stand at attention, and remain so standing until told to be seated. They will maintain correct and alert posture at their desks.” He required faculty members to report infractions of the order. The order forbade defacing classroom furniture and told students to carry books in their left hand, to leave right hand free to render a salute when encountering an officer. When called upon for recitation,

They will do so in a clear tone (enunciating distinctly and employing correct and succinct English) ... FORMALLY ... they will rise and stand at attention while reciting ... INFORMALLY ... this will not be necessary; soldiers are instructed to make a sensible endeavor to distinguish between formal and informal recitations according to the desires of the particular faculty member to whom they may be reciting.
Perhaps the classroom demeanor was the most telling aspect of the military presence to the faculty. Military training arrived at William and Mary immediately following the declaration of war. Since no active officers were immediately available, the college hired a reserve officer from Richmond. The faculty willingly made curricular changes to incorporate the military training and provide credit for it. After the activation of the SATC this goodwill began to change to animosity. Lieutenant Van Dusen’s efforts to modify the academic schedule, restrict the courses taught, and consistent efforts to increase the importance of military instruction created friction between the administration and the military.

As at the University of Virginia, the academic results of the soldiers at William and Mary were poor. By virtue of absences caused by the influenza epidemic and those caused by military duty, students missed too many classes to be successful. The faculty warned Lieutenant Van Dusen of this result in November, but by the time he took action the academics of the semester were not salvageable. As at the University of Virginia, the administration decided to repeat the fall semester during the spring of 1919.

*Relationship with Administration and Faculty*

As the SATC demobilized in December 1918, the members of the unit at William and Mary published “Taps: The Students Army Training Corps at William and Mary College.” This fifty-four page booklet, written by the soldiers, was a yearbook style publication celebrating the unit. It contained the script to a skit titled “A Comedy in One Act” that neatly summarizes the relationship between the administration and the military.

The skit begins with President Tyler in his office. An assistant informs that Captain Van Dusen is too busy to come to see him as requested. President Tyler decides
to go to Van Dusen’s. He enters and goes unnoticed for several moments. Finally, Van Dusen, engaged in a flurry of activity and paperwork, sees Tyler standing there.

Van Dusen: (looking up) “Why good morning, Doctor. Have a seat. Anything I can do for you this A.M.?”
Tyler: “Well, I came over to see if the boys can’t have more time for their studies. I want something done. I see I must take a hand in this affair.”
Van Dusen: “What would you suggest, Doctor?”
Tyler: “The boys should have three-quarters of their time for studying. There is too much time spent on non-essential work.”
Van Dusen: “Non-essential? What do consider non-essential?”
Tyler: “Why, so much cleaning up and er --- like stuff. The fact is that I demand an instant change.”
Van Dusen: “Doctor, do you realize that the SATC system is a new thing, an experiment with the government? Do you take into consideration the temporary unavoidable confusion of organization? I suppose you still consider the cleaning up that has been done by the boys non-essential when you realize that it is the first real cleaning the dormitories have had for twenty years or more. If you would stop and think a minute of what a tremendous task it was, and still is, you would give your unstinted aid and not be a drawback. Have a cigar.”
Tyler: “Why, oh er ---well, have your way. I reckon our sweet Co-Eds are the only ones who are supposed to study, anyway.”

That the relationship between the administration and the military had degraded to the point that soldiers not only saw it but felt comfortable publishing a skit memorializing it speaks volumes. From this skit, it is obvious that the soldiers understood that in the eyes of their commander, academics were of no importance. It shows how deeply the idea of military superiority had become ingrained on the campus. That the military leadership would allow the publication of a skit that so denigrated the college president says even more.

Other events and reactions to them suggest that the skit represents the true state of the military-academic relationship at William and Mary. The water incident described earlier is but one instance of the faculty and the military authorities finding themselves at
odds with each other. Mr. Kimbrough, a regular student, discussed the use of bells and bugles on the campus, another point of contention.

We had bugles blown at the end of each class period, and the members of the SATC had to get up and march out.... The bugles were not completely in tune with the college bell, and the professors for the most part ignored the bugles and went by the bell, and if the bell rang a little early, that was all right, but if the bell was a little later than the bugle, that was very upsetting because the army people were furious if the students didn't get right up with the bugle and march out and the professors were very much upset if they did.673

While not addressed directly at the faculty and administration, in late October, First Lieutenant Van Dusen began issuing a series of memoranda and orders concerning the organization of SATC students at meals. In General Order Number 6, he provided for two non-SATC students to sit at each table along with students in the SATC. He also provided guidance concerning decorum (no clattering of dishes, loud talking, or laughing) and food waste (advising soldiers to only serve themselves what they could eat and to leave nothing on their plates.)674 In attempting to regulate the actions of non-SATC students, Van Dusen, again, appears to overstep his bounds.

Since he really could not control the non-SATC student population, within two weeks, Van Dusen felt the need to modify his instructions concerning meals. Special Orders No. 11 increased the structure of the SATC soldiers as they entered the mess hall and further removed the SATC from the student body at William and Mary.

All soldiers will eat at tables separate from students ... seated one squad at a table, commencing at the west end of the mess hall on the south side and filling up the tables down to the center of the room: they will then fill up the tables on the north side of the mess hall, beginning at the west end down to the center of the hall; they will then fill up the tables on the south side of the mess hall beginning at the center and extending to the east end. They will then fill up the tables on the north side beginning at the center and extending to the east end as far as necessary. One table will be assigned to each squad. Three extra tables will be required. Corporals will sit at the head of the tables as formerly. The extra tables
will be placed at the west end of the hall. Sergeants will arrange among
themselves so that one sergeant inspects plates and tables after every meal.\footnote{675}

Again, the domineering nature of the edict was bound to cause consternation among the
administration and faculty. Prescribing how the unit entered the facility, where they sat,
and how they ate suggest a level of control bound to offend civilians.

The activity concerning the changes Van Dusen desired is recorded in a series of
memoranda with President Tyler. The signature block used by Lieutenant Van Dusen on
letters to the President suggests the nature of the problem he had with the administration
and faculty.\footnote{676} Van Dusen implied that he was in command of the entire university, as
suggested by the duty position in the signature block “Comdg., William and Mary.”\footnote{677}

Although the administration and faculty knew that Van Dusen was in charge of the SATC
and the military components of the school, he discounted the importance of the
administration by suggesting he commanded the college rather than the SATC. The
colleges participating in the SATC agreed to adjust their operations and curricula. They
agreed to meet the requirement of the Army. There were, however, other students on
campus. The schools did not cede ownership of campus facilities to the government. This
is an example of Van Dusen’s lack of political acuity.

In November, Van Dusen received an absence report that contained several
inaccuracies. A few entries reported students absent from classes for which they were not
registered. Typically, Van Dusen wrote to Tyler in a commanding tone, “I intend to
stamp out all improper absences from class in the future. To do this efficiently requires
that the reports received by me be correct. It appears necessary that the class rolls be
corrected throughout.”\footnote{678} Once again, rather than strike a conciliatory tone, Van Dusen
elected a commanding, directive tone. This was certainly in keeping with the relationship
later shown in the “Taps” skit, but it was not necessarily the most effective means of gaining Tyler’s support.

On the following day, November 19, 1918, Van Dusen forwarded top President Tyler an academic report submitted by Professor Davis concerning the status of several mathematics students. Davis reported that twenty-two students were so far behind that their presence in class hindered other students. He recommended that nineteen of these students drop out of mathematics and spend the final five weeks of the term on other activities. Davis also reported that eight students were doing excellent work. In his cover memorandum, Van Dusen suggested that he had no means of knowing a soldier’s academic standing until informed by university officials and that this notification came too late for him to react. Again, he suggested to the president that the university should make allowances by relaxing requirements.

Van Dusen was ineffective in his initial efforts to establish the SATC unit at William and Mary, nor did he understand the relationship between the college and the army. He did not place sufficient emphasis on the academic side of his responsibilities and he allowed his subordinates to use military duties as a reason to release soldiers from class. Once he received several memoranda from the CEST and the District Military Inspector affirming the importance of soldiers satisfactorily completing their coursework, Van Dusen attempted to make up lost ground by appealing military necessity to President Tyler and placing blame on the faculty for not informing him sooner instead of establishing programs that would ensure his soldiers attended class and completed their coursework.
The influenza epidemic reached Williamsburg in late September. Major Stone advised the CEST that the college was suffering an "epidemic of grippe." Despite his desire to see additional soldiers assigned to bolster the numbers at the school, he recommended that the CEST wait until the illness had run its course prior to additional assignments occurring. He noted that the disease was "violently contagious".  

The CEST sent a telegram to Stone advising him to "exercise judgment as to [the] health of men". The CEST also suggested allowing the men to wear their own warm clothing if that were healthier than wearing uniforms that the Army had provided. The CEST appears to have recognized that the health situation on the campuses was potentially serious since Army camps around the country were beginning to report serious levels of infection.

As the influenza epidemic grew in early October, Major Stone requested that the CEST ship cots and blankets required for the care of sick soldiers to the College by the most expeditious means available. To ensure that a CEST staffer was not influenced or confused by a lack of knowledge concerning the geography of the area, Stone included mention of the fact that vehicles enroute to Camp Eustis in Newport News drove through Williamsburg and directly past the campus. This might have also been a means of speeding the delivery of supplies by letting the staff officer know that trucks regularly went past the campus.

Three days later the CEST responded that due to overseas requirements, the quartermaster had cancelled the undelivered shipment of blankets to SATC units. The War Department authorized unit commanders to procure required blankets and cots
locally. Again highlighting the lack of uniforms on campus, the War Department further reminded commanders to allow soldiers to use civilian clothing and bedding if the health and weather situations required it.\textsuperscript{681}

On October 2, 1918, Major Stone informed the CEST by telegram that no new cases of influenza had erupted on that date and his belief that the epidemic was under control. He also stated the required enrollment of 100 men was "practically ensured," and that he would proceed with induction on October 3, 1918, unless directed otherwise.\textsuperscript{682} In recognition of the rising tide of influenza cases nationally, the Eastern Department Headquarters sent a memorandum six days later, ordering the suspension of furloughs and leaves except in "exceptional circumstances."\textsuperscript{683}

When the influenza epidemic grew to nearly 50 percent by early November, the need to transport sick soldiers caused Lieutenant Van Dusen to send a memorandum to the Manual Training Department of the college. He asked them to manufacture a stretcher for the military to use in moving soldiers to the hospital saying, "I need not suggest the method of construction...a simple thing will do, and we will feel much more secure as soon as this necessary article is delivered to us."\textsuperscript{684}

Many students were concerned about family members and their ability to withstand the outbreak of influenza. Some, like Private W. W. McCaslin left the school to return home and support sick family members. McCaslin sent a note to Lieutenant Van Dusen reporting that his mother was sick and that he was acting as an orderly at the Y.M.C.A. emergency hospital during the day.\textsuperscript{685}

Other students, like John Britt of Boykins, became sick themselves and were unable to return to school. Lieutenant Van Dusen sent a telegram to Britt's home seeking
information and received a lengthy reply from his doctor stating that "young Britt has had a pretty hard time of it." The failure of Britt to return to school would have created problems for Van Dusen, as Britt was an inducted member of the SATC and, therefore, an enlisted man in the Army. His physician told Van Dusen that Britt was not ready to return to his college work, which suggests a lack of understanding of Britt’s status as a soldier. The only other reference to Britt is on a registrar’s absence sheet on November 4. Unfortunately, there is no record of how Van Dusen handled the situation.686

The overall impact of the influenza epidemic on the SATC at William and Mary was limited. Approximately 50 percent of the student body became infected. Surprisingly, none of the female students became ill.687 There were fewer than eighty cases of influenza reported in the SATC, which would have amounted to approximately 80 percent infection. Fortunately, no deaths occurred.688 Nonetheless, the number of sick soldiers and the requirement to provide them care created a burden on the campus and for the military.

The Armistice and Beyond

As in many communities, the announcement of the Armistice was cause for joyous celebration. Williamsburg, like Charlottesville, 120 miles west, held a parade. The parade through town must have presented quite the sight. As the students recorded it in Taps,

Down the streets of Williamsburg ... marched the procession, headed by Captain Van Dusen on horse, torch bearers lighting his way on either side. Then came Uncle Sam in all his glory wearing boxing gloves, ready for a bout with the Kaiser, the greatest criminal of all ages. The Kaiser, guarded by two boys in khaki, slouched behind with a noose about his neck.689
With the announcement of the armistice on November 11, 1918, life in the SATC began to change. The CEST ordered that, “SATC units will continue military and academic work without interruption regardless of armistice. Plans have been prepared for the future of SATC under conditions brought about by armistice which will be sent you and college authorities as soon as authorized.”

The entire SATC experience occurred so quickly that the unit never inducted all its applicants. The rapid demobilization further confused the situation. Some students were unsure whether they had an obligation to the Army. On December 9, 1918, Raymond Pinchback wrote to Captain Van Dusen seeking information concerning his status. On December 13, Van Dusen replied that the War Department had returned Pinchback’s induction paperwork following the armistice. Consequently, Pinchback was under no obligation to the Army. Pinchback replied that he “liked military life fine” and was considering enlisting in the Marine Corps.

The difficulties between Major Towner, the District Inspector and Captain Van Dusen continued until the end. On December 18, 1918, Van Dusen sent a request for leave during the Christmas period to the Commanding General of the Eastern District, stating that the government’s work at William and Mary was unfinished and citing the fact that he required an operation prior to his discharge. Towner, as the intermediate headquarters, attached an indorsement stating that orders called for the rapid demobilization of the SATC. He recommended denying the leave request. The Eastern Department Commander ultimately approved the leave request.

With none of the drama attending the decision at the University of Virginia, the College of William and Mary applied for an ROTC detachment during the December
1918 period. This request allowed the school to maintain much of the equipment that it received during the SATC period for future use.

As one reads the official correspondence Van Dusen wrote and the notes he exchanged with members of the administration of William and Mary, it becomes clear that Major Stone erred in his judgment that Van Dusen possessed the experience and tact to manage the SATC program at the college. A series of conflicts between the administration and faculty clearly resulted from his lack of experience and his inability to recognize the whole picture of the SATC experience for the soldiers. Whatever respect for the other side may have existed at the beginning of the relationship was lost by the end. Tyler reported to the Board that, "The experience [SATC] was too brief to speak positively as to the essential merits of the [program]; the injection, however, into the college of a rigid military system was temporarily at least wholly unsatisfactory if regarded from the standpoint of study." 694

592 Godson, "The Tyler Era."
594 Ibid.
595 Letter, Tyler to Martin, dtd 7 Feb 1916, William and Mary Archives, Tyler Presidential Papers Box 15, File World War I.
596 Godson, "The Tyler Era."
598 "Military Training No in Operation at the College, The Flat Hat, Vol VI, No. 22, p.2, 24 Apr 1917..
599 Godson, "The Tyler Era."
600 Ibid.
603 Taylor was promoted to major while assigned to William and Mary.
605 Minutes, College of William and Mary Board of Visitors, dtd 25 Jun 1918, William and Mary Archives BOV Minutes 1902-1919.
606 Letter, Assistant Adjutant, HQ Eastern Region to Tyler, dtd 8 May 1917, William and Mary Archives, Tyler Presidential Papers, Box 15, File World War I. The exact sequence of actions concerning Tyler contacting the War Department is difficult to determine. The Board of Visitors authorized Tyler to request participation in the "aid" program in June 1918. There is no authorization for participation in ROTC prior to that. Yet, the response to Tyler cited here is dated a year earlier, in May 1917. Obviously, some correspondence occurred between Tyler and the War Department in the April-May 1917 period. No record
of this correspondence exists. Despite the dearth of records, the program at William and Mary had official sanction or the War Department would not have provided officers for training.

607 Temple, Bugle’s Echo.

608 Telegram CEST to College of William and Mary, dtd 17 Aug 1918; and Telegram, CEST to College of William and Mary, dtd 19 Aug 1918, William and Mary Archives.

609 Minutes, College of William and Mary Board of Visitors, dtd 25 Jun 1918, William and Mary Archives.

610 Memorandum Stone to CEST, subject: Personnel, dtd 29 Sep 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681. Officer ranks are broken into three groups based upon the size of the organization they command and the responsibilities they hold. Lieutenants and captains are company grade officers. Majors, Lieutenant Colonels, and Colonels are field grade officers. General officers comprise the third group.

611 Memorandum Stone to CEST, subject: Personnel, dtd 29 Sep 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.

612 Memorandum, Van Dusen to Lieutenant Bump, UNC, dtd 17 Oct 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.

613 Memorandum C.O. SATC William and Mary to Committee on Education and Special Training, dtd, 29 Oct 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.

614 Personal Correspondence Regional Superintendent to Van Dusen, dtd 8 Nov 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 682 (WM).

615 “Taps: The SATC at William and Mary”, dtd 6 Dec 1918, William and Mary Archives, College Papers.

616 Oral history, Yelverton O. Kent, William and Mary Archives.

617 Oral history, Kimbrough, 9 Jun 1975, William and Mary Archives.

618 Barksdale Diary, 1918-1919, William and Mary Archives, Martha Barksdale Papers, ACC 1985-54, Box 1.

619 Barksdale’s account comes from a diary she kept as a student. Kent and Kimbrough provided recollections as part of an oral history project at William and Mary. Their accounts were collected fifty odd years after the events.

620 Brooks notebook, NARA RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 683.

621 The Charge of Quarters is a rotating duty among sergeants, who serve as the commander’s representative in the unit area. The CQ is responsible for maintaining a command presence, particularly after duty hours. He has several soldiers assigned to assist in the duties.

622 Memorandum, Van Dusen dtd 7 Nov 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.

623 Letter, Dahnke to Van Dusen, dtd 13 Oct 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 683 (WM)

624 This incident was discussed in Chapter 5.

625 Special Orders No. 5, SATC College of William and Mary, dtd 14 Oct 1918, and Special Orders No. 8, dtd 22 Oct 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 683.

626 Special Orders No. 128, dtd 29 May 1918, National Archives, RG165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.

627 “Taps: The SATC at William and Mary”, dtd 6 Dec 1918, William and Mary Archives, College Papers.

628 Letter J.R. Hudson to W.L. Bridges dtd 22 Oct 17 William and Mary Archives, Tyler Presidential Papers, Box 15, File World War I.


630 Memorandum, CEST to The Colleges of the United States, Subject: Housing and Subsistence, dtd 31 Aug 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.

631 Memorandum Stone to District Inspector, dtd 26 Sep 1918 National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.

632 Memorandum Stone to District Inspector, dtd 26 Sep 1918 and District Inspector to C.O. S.A.T.C. William and Mary, dtd 28 Sep 1918. Both in National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.

633 Memorandum, Van Dusen to Towner, dtd 25 Oct 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.

634 Memorandum District Inspector to President of College of William and Mary, Dtd 28 Oct 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.

635 Memorandum District Inspector to Commanding Officer William and Mary College, dtd 28 Oct 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.
258

665 Special Orders No. 9, SATC College of William and Mary, dtd 28 Oct 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 683.
666 This issue was discussed more fully in Chapter 5 pages 135-136. Memorandum Rees to Commanding Officers, District Inspectors, District Educational Directors, and Heads of SATC Institutions, dtd 5 Nov 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.
667 Special Orders No. 16, SATC College of William and Mary, dtd 11 Nov 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 683 and Special Orders No. 21, SATC College of William and Mary, dtd 23 Nov 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 683.
668 Memorandum from Van Dusen, dtd 7 Nov 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 682.
669 Special Orders No. 14, SATC College of William and Mary, dtd 30 Oct 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 683.
670 Oral history, Yelverton O. Kent, William and Mary Archives.
671 Special Orders No. 3, dtd II Nov 1918, Subject: Class Room Regulations, College of William and Mary Archives.
672 "Taps: The Students Army Training Corps at William and Mary College" p. 7-8.
673 Oral history, Kimbrough, 9 Jun 1975, William and Mary Archives.
674 General Order No. 6, William and Mary, dtd 10 Oct 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 683.
675 Special Orders No. 11, William and Mary, dtd 23 Oct 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 683.
676 In military correspondence the sender’s signature is placed over a signature block. Most often the signature block is 3 lines containing the sender’s name, rank and branch of service, and duty position.
677 Memorandum Van Dusen to Tyler and Bridges, dtd 23 Oct 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 68.
678 Memorandum C.O. SATC, College of William and Mary to President Tyler, College of William and Mary, dtd 18 Nov 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 683.
679 Memorandum Stone to CEST, Subject: Personnel, dtd 26 Sep 1918 and 29 Sep 1918 and Tyler to CEST, dtd 23 Sep 1918, subject: Personnel. All found in National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.
680 Telegram, Stone to CEST, dtd 2 Oct 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.
681 Telegram, CEST to William and Mary College, dtd 5 Oct 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.
682 Telegram, Stone to CEST, dtd 2 Oct 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.
683 Memorandum Adjutant, HQ, Eastern Department to Senior Army Officer, SATC William and Mary, dtd 9 Oct 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 681.
684 Memorandum C.O. SATC William and Mary to Manual Training Dept, dtd, 3 Nov 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 683.
685 Personal Correspondence, McCaslin to Van Dusen, dtd 18 Oct 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 683.
686 Telegram Van Dusen to Britt, dtd 23 Oct 1918; Letter, Bland to Co, SATC, William and Mary, undated, telegram, Bland to Van Dusen, dtd 23 Oct 1918, contained in National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 682 (WM) and Registrar absence roster, dtd 4 Nov 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 683
687 Minutes, College of William and Mary Board of Visitors, dtd 25 Jun 1918, William and Mary Archives
688 "Taps: The SATC at William and Mary", dtd 6 Dec 1918, William and Mary Archives, College Papers.
689 "Taps: The Students Army Training Corps at William and Mary College" p. 33.
690 Telegram CEST to William and Mary College, dtd 11 Nov 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 682 (WM).
691 Van Dusen received promotion to captain in late November 1918.
692 Personal Correspondence Pinchbach to Van Dusen, dtd 9 Dec 1918 and Memorandum Van Dusen to Pinchback, Subject: Information, 13 Dec 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 682 (WM).
693 Memoranda C.O. SATC to CO, Eastern Department, Subject: Request for Leave of Absence, dtd 18 Dec 1918, and 1st Indorsement, dtd 20 Dec 1918, National Archives RG 165 NM-84 Entry 412 Box 683.
694 Minutes, College of William and Mary Board of Visitors, dt 25 Jun 1918, William and Mary Archives
BOV Minutes 1902-1919 p. 398.
Figure 14: William and Mary Campus circa 1918
"Taps" Tyler Presidential Papers, SCRC, Swem Library, College of William and Mary

Figure 15: SATC Formation at the College of William and Mary
"Taps" Tyler Presidential Papers, SCRC, Swem Library, College of William and Mary

Figure 16: Kitchen at the College of William and Mary
"Taps" Tyler Presidential Papers, SCRC, Swem Library, College of William and Mary
Figure 17: Post Exchange at the College of William and Mary
"Taps" Tyler Presidential Papers, SCRC, Swem Library, College of William and Mary

Figure 18: YMCA Activity Room and the College of William and Mary
"Taps" Tyler Presidential Papers, SCRC, Swem Library, College of William and Mary
Figure 19: SATC Depiction of Lieutenant Van Dusen as the “Little Rooster”
"Taps" Tyler Presidential Papers, SCRC, Swem Library, College of William and Mary

Figure 20: Depiction of Victory Celebration in Williamsburg
"Taps" Tyler Presidential Papers, SCRC, Swem Library, College of William and Mary

Figure 21: Cartoon of The Army Capturing the Kaiser
"Taps" Tyler Presidential Papers, SCRC, Swem Library, College of William and Mary
Figure 22: Soldier Cartoon Depicting Life in the SATC - Cleaning
"Taps" Tyler Presidential Papers, SCRC, Swem Library, College of William and Mary
- BUT -
THAT WAS BEFORE HE JOINED THE ARMY.

Maw, one thing I will never do is wash dishes.

Figure 23: Soldier Cartoon Depicting Life in the SATC – Kitchen Police
“Taps” Tyler Presidential Papers, SCRC, Swem Library, College of William and Mary
Chapter 8

Conclusion

Comparing the University of Virginia and the College of William and Mary on the issue of military training during the World War I era is truly a comparison of opposites. Their administrations took different approaches to incorporating military training on campus that impacted not only the overall integration but the effectiveness as well. The SATC programs, products of these approaches and reflections of the administrations and the officers in charge, operated very differently.

Geographically separated by a mere 120 miles, the University of Virginia and the College of William and Mary had vastly different histories. The University of Virginia was closing its first century of operations. A public institution from inception, it had the benefit of state support and the cachet of being Thomas Jefferson's creation. The College of William and Mary in Virginia received a royal charter as its founding document and though nearly 250 years old, the college was not a stable institution. Beset by financial difficulty for decades, William and Mary had recently become a public institution as well.

Reflecting these different histories, the attitudes of the two governing Boards of Visitors were different as well. The Board at the University of Virginia was an active participant in the decisions concerning military on campus. The Board at the College of William and Mary was much more hands off and appears to have been hardly involved in the decision-making process. The Board at the University of Virginia discussed and voted on nearly every major decision concerning the inclusion of military training on campus. The minutes of the Board at William and Mary record a single discussion during
which it passed a single resolution concerning entering ROTC, and after which President Tyler used to ease the college into the SATC, a far different program.

The Boards of Visitors may well have had different approaches due to their differing histories as governing bodies. The University of Virginia did not have a president at its creation. In fact, the design of the university called for the faculty to take direction directly from the Board of Visitors. President Alderman was the first president of the university, accepting the office in 1904. Given its historical involvement and influence on the educational process of the university, the University of Virginia Board of Visitors may simply have followed its normal procedures in conducting lengthy debates concerning the military involvement on campus.

The approaches of the two presidents differed as well. President Alderman at the University of Virginia made numerous speeches in which he supported not only military training for students but universal military service as well. Alderman was active in a variety of national committees seeking ways for the educational establishment to support the war effort. He took an active interest in military training, seeing to the university’s early application for ROTC and requesting a specific type of officer for the unit.

President Tyler, on the other hand, appears to have avoided the issue of military training until just before the declaration of war. He does not appear to have been active in any national movement toward preparedness. Tyler did not actively support military training on campus. He submitted the application for a ROTC unit at William and Mary in late June of 1918—too late for the unit to firmly establish itself prior to the creation of the SATC.
Alderman corresponded with university presidents around the country concerning military training, university preparations for war, continued payment of faculty members, and a host of other issues. He corresponded with President Eggleston at Virginia Polytechnic and with President Nichols at Virginia Military Institute. Interestingly, no correspondence appears to have occurred between Alderman and Tyler concerning military training or any aspect of preparations for the SATC.

The Army officers in charge of the two programs could not have been more dissimilar as well. At the University of Virginia, Lieutenant Colonel Cole was a West Point graduate and a veteran of combat going back to the Indian Wars on the Great Plains. Photographs show him ramrod straight with the hard look of a soldier in his eyes. First Lieutenant Van Dusen, on the other hand, was a reserve officer sent to William and Mary after three months of training. He was a small man, as indicated by nickname his soldiers gave him -- "The Little Rooster." The photograph of him in "Taps," shows a non-athletic young man.

As seen previously, these differences in the schools, their Boards, their presidents, and their senior military officers influenced the development of military training on the campuses and, ultimately, the level of success each program attained. Measures of success are illusory. Although the SATC might have developed into an effective program, its overall success was extremely limited. It did provide military training to young men and a few of these men were sent to officer training camps. The SATC did not exist long enough to prove that it was an effective means for the Army to collate and sort the young men of the nation. It did, in its brief existence, fail to provide the academic training that the Army hoped to obtain.
Activation of the SATC

The amount of preparatory work conducted by the military as well as the university administrations significantly affected the development of the SATC on both campuses. Several decisions laid the groundwork for success or failure. These decisions involved the participation in the ROTC program, selection of a senior officer, participation in the NATD, and active efforts to develop military style instruction. In each case, the University of Virginia chose a better course.

First, President Alderman and the University of Virginia Board of Visitors made an early request for admission into the ROTC program. Because they made the request only a few months after the passage of the National Defense Act of 1916, the university received immediate acceptance. Despite equipment shortages, acceptance enabled the university to obtain whatever equipment the War Department was willing to supply. It also put the university toward the head of the line among schools waiting for future equipment issue.

The willingness of the entire University of Virginia community to support the war effort may have predisposed the War Department to look with favor upon the school. As mentioned, the university received consideration for a variety of additional programs, like a school for aviators and a facility for recovering veterans. Though these programs did not come to fruition, consideration of the university may well have resulted from a favorable predisposition in Washington.

The College of William and Mary waited for more than a year longer than the University of Virginia to make its request. As a consequence, the War Department had already assigned the available personnel and equipment to schools. The college sought
support at the most inauspicious, resource-constrained time. By the summer of 1918, the War Department was deeply engaged in the development of the NATD and planning for the SATC. Colleges late to the game were sure to receive short-shrift as the War Department supported established programs as it developed new programs for the future.

Second, once taking the decision to participate in the ROTC program, the University of Virginia requested the assignment of a particular type of officer to the school. Whether President Alderman knew Lieutenant Colonel Cole, who resided in Charlottesville, prior to his assignment is unknown. It seems likely that he did since his request to the War Department included a desire to have an experienced officer and West Point graduate assigned to the school. It seems too coincidental that an officer, Cole, meeting Alderman’s criteria just happened to live in town.

President Tyler, at the College of William and Mary, did not aggressively pursue the assignment of any particular officer or type of officer. The college hired a reservist, Captain Puller, in April 1917 to conduct the initial military training provided on campus. Assignments of Captain Taylor, Major Stone, and First Lieutenant Van Dusen followed over the next eighteen months. Nothing exists to suggest that the college pursued the assignment of any of these officers. William and Mary, perhaps, lost its best chance for a successful SATC program with the departure of Major Stone. While supposition, it is likely that Stone, a veteran regular officer with university experience at Virginia Tech, may well have established and maintained a better relationship with the administration.

The impact of these differing preparatory processes was that a seasoned officer, who had undoubtedly, experienced many of the leadership challenges and issues presented by the SATC, led the University of Virginia program. An officer of Lieutenant
Colonel Cole’s experience in that day and age would be familiar with the arcane
dynamics of War Department systems. Lieutenant Colonel Cole and Major Towner, the
District Officer, appear not to have had difficulties within their correspondence. Cole did
not require constant advice nor did his paperwork call for additional supervision.
Additionally, Cole and Alderman were approximately the same age, which would have
made developing a relationship, if one did not already exist, much easier.

Lieutenant Van Dusen did not have the breadth of experience brought to the
SATC by Cole. Van Dusen. Limited by his lack of experience, he possessed less
knowledge of the Army’s personnel and supply systems. His correspondence with Major
Towner was composed of equal parts self deprecation and rationalization indicating his
lack of experience and his refusal to assume responsibility for his actions. A much
younger man than President Tyler, who was to retire the next year, it was probably more
difficult for Van Dusen to develop a functional relationship with the university president
than it was for Cole—even if he had the inclination.

Third, President Alderman aggressively pursued cooperation with the War
Department. The first step was the creation of the ROTC unit. Next, the university
engaged in discussions aimed at developing a school for aviators on the campus. Although the aviation school did not occur, a school for truck drivers opened in May
1918 bringing several hundred soldiers to the Charlottesville campus. Alderman’s early
and continued pursuit of military training culminated in the creation of the SATC on
campus.

William and Mary skipped the intermediate steps during which the administration
and faculty could adjust to the military and develop a relationship with the cadre. They
dove into the pool headfirst without really testing the water. Much of the frustration felt on campus resulted from the unmet expectations of both groups.

Finally, President Alderman was an activist for military training. His personal and aggressive pursuit first of rifles and then of a machine gun for training are examples. He was not content to write a single request. He wrote many. And recognizing the potential of soliciting assistance from high places, he enlisted the aid of the Virginia congressional delegation and sent Lieutenant Colonel Cole to Washington to enlist support among his friends and contacts.

President Tyler, taking a much less aggressive approach toward military training, did not prepare the administration and faculty for the monumental changes that the SATC represented. As a consequence, after an initial honeymoon period cracks appeared in support for the SATC. This conclusion is not to suggest that Tyler was inactive. The record does not indicate that he engaged in the level of correspondence and coordination with other university presidents and heads of government agencies that Alderman did. Local concerns, no doubt, occupied Tyler. He lobbied the General Assembly for a variety of programs to support William and Mary. He worked on the development of the normal school. His efforts led to the college’s acceptance as a state institution. Then he turned his attention to the admission of women. Tyler did not have the luxury of financial security so his attention had a different focus than that of Alderman.

*Equipping the SATC*

Both programs experienced similar difficulties in obtaining the equipment required to operate and train effectively. The Army’s supply system, hard pressed to provide for deployed troops, could not meet the demand presented by the SATC.
Consequently, for much of the SATC period of operations, weapons and uniforms were simply not available. Other supply shortages faced by the schools included office supplies and furniture, forms and regulations, and training products for the War Issues and other courses.\textsuperscript{712}

The greatest disparity between the two programs appears in the management of facilities. Other than the problems that the University of Virginia had with securing a coal supply, which was outside their control, there was but a single instance of the District Inspector becoming involved with a building problem on campus.\textsuperscript{713} Apparently, Alderman and Cole agreed that it made more sense for them to handle matters locally than to involve the CEST personnel.

Tyler and Van Dusen never reached such an arrangement. The stream of correspondence between Van Dusen and the District Officer was constant during the months of October and November. Van Dusen’s every effort seemed, most likely unwittingly, designed to antagonize and alienate his military seniors and the college administration. Based upon available records, Van Dusen never made a serious attempt to handle issues such as building cleanliness and repair locally, another mark of inexperience. A more senior officer, such as Cole, would relish the opportunity to work far from his headquarters, or “away from the flagpole”, as the military would say. Van Dusen’s efforts brought the flagpole much closer as the District Officer scrutinized the program at William and Mary.

\textit{Manning the SATC}

The greatest difference between manning schools results from size. The University of Virginia had a pre-war student body over one thousand students.\textsuperscript{714} The
College of William and Mary had pre-war student population under three hundred.\textsuperscript{715} As a consequence, the University of Virginia had several advantages. First and foremost, the University had many more empty dormitory rooms and more overall rooms available. Second, because it was a larger, more comprehensive school, the University of Virginia had an engineering department, a medical school, and a broader base of instructional staff across the board, which made it a better fit for early programs like the NATD. Sheer size gave the University of Virginia an advantage in recruiting.

At the time of SATC activation, having established military programs benefitted the University of Virginia. The NATD organization on campus brought a steady stream of soldiers through Charlottesville. By the end of the program, 1,800 soldiers had received two months of technical skills training through these programs.\textsuperscript{716} When the SATC activated, the military presence on campus had already become customary. The Administration and faculty developed expectations of the SATC based upon this prior experience.

\textit{Academic Issues}

According to one observer, the SATC did not shine academically at the University of Virginia. In fact, by some accounts it amounted to an abject failure.

All the existing testimony seems to demonstrate that, from an academic point of view, the work of the Students’ Army Training Corps was still more unsatisfactory [than in the recent pre-war period]. Indeed, there was no leisure allowed, and no facilities provided, for the maintenance of the old spirit of academic acquisitiveness. “The most ardent student,” it was said, “learned nothing except in the hours spent in the lecture-room and the laboratory. The less earnest student learned nothing on any occasion. Then came the armistice, and after that, academic chaos!”\textsuperscript{717}

James M. Page, Dean of the College Department, and President Alderman disagreed with that conclusion. They believed that the experiment had simply not had
sufficient opportunity to prove itself. The combination of short lifespan and the influenza epidemic prevented the SATC from gaining a firm foothold. Writing to R. C. Maclaurin of the CEST, President Alderman provided his assessment of the SATC.

I have been worried … that I remarked to you … that I considered that the S.A.T.C. had been a failure. I did not mean to say that at all, except in the most general sense…. It was a failure in … that it did not achieve what it was intended to achieve. This was made impossible by the coming of peace. Its achievement was further diminished by the bald misfortune in the shape of sickness and epidemic…. I believe that if it had been given an opportunity, it would have been one of the most fruitful experiences or adventures in education ever recorded in the history of any free country. 718

On the other hand, President Tyler, commenting to the William and Mary Board of Visitors, said the military was too “rigid” for the campus resulting in unsatisfactory study and learning presents an opposing view. Tyler did add a caveat: recognizing that the length of the experiment was short, “[t]here had to be much detail work for the soldiers that class work necessarily suffered. It is possible that in the long run, however, many of the difficulties would have been eliminated.” 719

In January 1919, writers in the Flat Hat laid blame for poor student performance squarely on the SATC.

One of the good features of the new term is the repetition of some first term courses, as well as the offering of some entirely new courses. Many courses are repeated in order that those students who failed to make their work last term, being prevented from doing so by the duties of the S.A.T.C., may have an opportunity of making it this term. This is certainly a splendid idea and gives many deserving students a chance to redeem themselves.” 720

That both schools repeated the fall semester and condensed the spring semester in 1919 suggests the failure of the SATC to provide a solid academic experience for the soldiers. 721
Both schools experienced similar problems with students being assigned to and performing military details and the requirements of getting the SATC started. It appears that once again, the experience of Lieutenant Colonel Cole was an important factor in smoothing the issues that arose at the University of Virginia. In the one instance on record that President Alderman chided Cole because soldiers were missing class, Cole explained that students were absent due to the need to complete enlistment paperwork and processing and further that speeding the process shortened the time to enlistment, at which point the school would begin receiving payment for additional soldiers.

In contrast, the “Comedy in One Act” written by the soldiers at William and Mary demonstrates an entirely different process. The skit shows the soldier’s view of President Tyler as a bumbling old man, unable to hold his own in a discussion with the young officer. The fact that the skit revolves around Tyler trying to obtain additional study time for the soldiers makes the skit even more telling. The skit is not the only indication of the difficulties at William and Mary, however. Lieutenant Van Dusen’s continuous efforts to restructure the daily schedule, redirect the use of facilities, and revise the list of course offerings suggest that he did not fully comprehend the purpose of the program. Van Dusen’s inexperience time and again forced the District Inspector to intervene to rectify the program’s operations at William and Mary.

Relationship with Administration and Faculty

The University of Virginia took several steps to include the military in faculty activities. The Faculty Senate voted to provide Lieutenant Colonel Cole full membership in their body. He became a valued member, serving on several committees working on military issues. The assignment of a professor to the responsibilities of ensuring
adequate support to military requirements indicates the acceptance of the program as well as its military leader by the faculty at the University of Virginia. 723

As previously noted Cole and President Alderman seemingly developed an understanding or working relationship that permitted them to keep issues in-house and to settle them locally. Undoubtedly disagreements occurred though neither the administration nor the military committed many to paper. The relationship clearly was mature.

The feelings between the military and the academics at William and Mary grew to be vitriolic. The "Comedy in One Act" exemplifies how dysfunctional the relationship between the administration and the military became at the college. Other incidents, such as the water incident and the attempted expulsion of the student without appropriate administrative input suggest that this was a long term feature of the relationship. The use of the District Officer as a go-between to manage basic coordination between the administration and the military, again, indicates substantial dysfunction.

The goodwill accompanying the program at the University of Virginia certainly made life more pleasant on the Charlottesville campus. It did not make the SATC any more successful at the University of Virginia that it was at the College of William and Mary. As mentioned, both programs failed to provide adequate educational opportunities to their soldier-students. The academic results of the SATC were so poor that both schools chose to repeat the fall semester during the spring of 1919.

The Armistice and Beyond

Following the demobilization of the SATC, writers in the Flat Hat viewed the SATC as an objectionable deviation from normal academic life: "The disorganizing
influence of the S.A.T.C. could be seen and felt in every phase of college life. So true was this, that in many colleges and at William and Mary in particular, there was no sign of college spirit or life."

Viewed in retrospect, its short lifespan limited the overall impact of the SATC; a lack of equipment marginalized it; academic-military conflicts tested it; and an influenza epidemic hampered it. No one knew or expected this discord in the spring and summer of 1918; no one knew what to expect. Academics and military both knew that the war begun four years earlier, in August 1914, continued to rage and now had swept Americans into the turmoil.

The war consumed millions of European youth, killing or wounding them in the never ending battles of trench warfare and chemical attacks. In the patriotic heat of the war’s outbreak, European youth had rushed from their universities to support the national cause. Many were lost, never to return to campus.

As the plans for the SATC were developed, university presidents were well aware of the war’s impact on their European counterparts and felt the growing impact on their own campuses. They saw full well the implications to their European brethren. More importantly, they saw the challenge to their highest ideals—teaching and learning—and they took action to safeguard them.

The University of Virginia, with some endowment and state support could survive. It might endure difficult times, but the university would survive. The College of William and Mary had neither the endowment nor the elongated history of state support to ensure its ultimate survival. For both schools the SATC presented a means to protect
their contribution to teaching and learning. It was an opportunity that they could not pass up.

Yet there were significant problems that prevent considering the SATC a success. According to Patton, "The SATC experiment was a costly and inexcusable educational failure." Patton viewed the program from the academic standpoint of teaching and learning. Teaching and learning was occurring; it just was not the type, level, or quality that Patton expected.

Differing expectations and value judgments concerning education were the crux of difficulties between the colleges and the military. The young men of the SATC were enlisted soldiers in the US Army. They were learning skills important to their future as soldiers. In turn, the Army was learning which of its young men had the intelligence and temperament to serve as an officer, possibly in combat. Unfortunately, what was important to the Army was not necessarily known or understood by the administration and faculty of the institutions.

Preserving traditional educational ideals may have been the objective of the university faculty, but it was not the objective of the Army. Preparation for war was its objective. That the war ended before the majority of SATC students could see combat was the students' good fortune. That Lieutenant Colonel Cole was able to accomplish this training at the University of Virginia while maintaining the goodwill of the administration and faculty member is a testament to his skills as a leader and the desire of the university personnel to support the war effort.

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695 Bruce, *UVA*; Dabney, *Mr. Jefferson’s University*.
696 Goodson, “The Tyler Era.”
697 Minutes UVA Board of Visitors, UVA Archives Board of Visitior Minutes Box IX Files 2 and 3 of 8.
698 Minutes, Board of Visitors, College of William and Mary, College of William and Mary Archives.
Bruce, *UVA; Dabney, *Mr. Jefferson's University.*

Minutes, College of William and Mary Board of Visitors, dtd 25 Jun 1918, William and Mary Archives BOV Minutes 1902-1919.

Denny to Alderman, dtd 19 Apr 1917; James to Alderman, dtd 27 Apr 1917; Thompson to Alderman, dtd 23 Apr 1917; Powers to Alderman, dtd 26 Apr 1917; Hadley to Alderman, dtd 25 Apr 1917; Hunniwell to Alderman, dtd 25 Apr 1917; Hickok to Alderman, 25 Apr 1917. All located in UVA Archives RG 2-1-2.472 Subseries III Box 6 Files M/Mc/1 of 7.

Letter, Alderman to Eggleston, dtd 10 Oct 1918, UVA Archives RG 2/1/4.472 Subseries III Box 7 File SATC 2 of 2; Letter Nichols to Alderman dtd 3 Dec 1917, UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 3 of 7.

Bruce, *UVA; Photograph, UVA Archives, File SATC.*

“Taps: The SATC at William and Mary”, dtd 6 Dec 1918, William and Mary Archives, College Papers.

UVA BOV minutes 23 Mar 1917 UVA Archives BOV Minutes Box IX File 2/3 of 8.

Quartermaster Gerneral to President, UVA, dtd 17 May 1917, UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 6 Files M/Mc/1 of 7

Minutes, College of William and Mary Board of Visitors, dtd 25 Jun 1918, William and Mary Archives BOV Minutes 1902-1919.

Bruce, *UVA; Patton, "UVA in the WWI".*

Letter Dean to Alderman, dtd 9 July 1917, UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 6 File 2 of 7.

Letter Newcomb to Prosser dtd 14 Jan 1918 UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 4 of 7.

Aydelotte, *War Issues Course.*

Telegram CEST to Alderman, dtd 5 Jun 1918 and Letter, Alderman to CEST, DTD 5 Jun 1918. Both in UVA Archives RG 2/1/4.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 5 of 7.

Bruce, *UVA.*

Goodson, “The Tyler Era.”

Patton, *UVA in WWI.*

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Epilogue

Viewed from the early stages of the twenty-first century, ninety years after the development and demise of the SATC, Americans may find it difficult to understand the depth of support for the war found around the country. It is particularly difficult to understand when viewed with the current debate concerning the global war against terror as a backdrop. As much as the world has changed in the last century, in some things it seems not to have changed at all.

A century ago, Americans were in much the same situation that exists today. The country was experiencing a technological revolution in which tools little dreamed of even fifty years before were commonplace. An America with an expanding world reach was engaged in a war that it preferred not to be and was far from its home shores. The realities of global reach and impact were new and baffling to Americans eighty years ago, and they continue to challenge and, at times, baffle us today.

Universities struggled to support the patriotic feelings most members of their administration, faculties, and student bodies felt. In addition to their personal feelings, the administrators had the additional challenge of ensuring the survival of the school. Writing to some alumni of the university serving in the Army, University of Virginia President Alderman stated, “Science must live, and universities must exist for the nation’s sake not for their own sake.”

In mid-December, 1918, Ralph Barton Perry, a professor turned Army major for the war and the Secretary to the CEST, described the impact of the SATC to the Presidents of SATC institutions. The SATC Section-B, originally the NATD, trained nearly 95,000 men, of whom approximately 70,000 saw duty in France. An additional
35,000 men were in training at the time of the armistice. Approximately 140 schools participated in the NATD. Perry wrote, "Broadly speaking, this work has been wholly successful...the value of the vocational training under a military regime was fully demonstrated.... The results were accomplished by a remarkable degree of co-operation between the civilian and military agencies. Institutions...made a direct and important contribution to the defeat of the enemy." The success of the SATC Section-A was not as pronounced, according to Perry.

"Its period of existence was too short to permit of all difficulties being met. It was anticipated that under the best conditions a number of months would be required to perfect the organization in view of the complexity and size of the problem."

Perry also addressed the integration of the SATC into the academic institutions writing,

In the great majority of cases the units were functioning satisfactorily and conditions were improving from day to day at the time of the armistice.... Although a great majority of the institutions concerned have expressed themselves as satisfied with the results of the military training in their institutions...it is not felt that a final and conclusive experiment in the combination of military and academic training in colleges has been made.

Perhaps no two personalities illustrate the good and the bad of the SATC as well as that of Lieutenant Colonel Cole at the University of Virginia and First Lieutenant Van Dusen at William and Mary. Perhaps it was the difference in age, Cole being far older. Perhaps it was the difference between a retired officer with years of experience including several campaigns and a junior, reserve officer only recently entering active service. Perhaps it was only personality.

Whatever the reason, one can easily see the differences between the two by reading the correspondence between them and the presidents of their universities. Where
Cole's letters were always respectful, Van Dusen's were condescending. Where Cole made requests, Van Dusen made demands. Where Cole appeared a part of the university team, Van Dusen remained an outsider. Time may have mitigated these differences, but that is a question that will remain open to historical discussion. We can never know what would have occurred had—the SATC existed for a longer period. Nonetheless, we are left with the contemporary and strident verdict of Patton that the SATC was an, "inexcusable educational failure."\(^{730}\)

The SATC did draw a great many young men into the Army. For many, it was the only military experience they were to have. It also exposed many students who would otherwise not have had the resources to attend college to a moment of academic life. The expectation was that 1 October would become a date "which will be remembered in American history."\(^{731}\)

Viewed in retrospect, the SATC had no such impact. When officers stood in front of their formations on October 1, 1918, none knew that the German war effort would collapse in little more than a month. Had the war continued into 1919 and beyond as many expected, the SATC might have matured and become the standard for military-academic cooperation, preserving the ideals of education. "If colleges and universities should be crippled and devitalized, the resultant loss would be far greater than the loss of a campaign, for learning must live, and we who direct its work must take care that it lives."\(^{732}\)

The university presidents, Alderman and Tyler, did not sell their universities and their ideals to the highest bidder. On the contrary, they did the best they could to protect the ideals they held dearest. While it was an era of intense patriotism, to these
academics, the highest ideal was that learning live and those places of learning remain a vibrant opportunity of the youth of the nation.

The SATC was destined to have a short, tumultuous history. The war ended and the Army, following historical pattern, rapidly demobilized. The SATC, in fact, turned out to be little more than a short-term anomaly on the American educational landscape, more significant for what it did not accomplish than for what it did.

726 Letter Alderman to Christian dtd 3 Dec 1917, UVA Archives RG 2/1/2.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 3 of 7. This letter was written prior to the reduction in draft age from 21 years to 18 years.
727 Memorandum, Perry to Presidents of SATC Institutions, dtd 11 Dec 1918, Subject: Reports for historical record. Discontinuance of Students' Army Training Corps. UVA Archives RG 2/1/4.472 Subseries III Box 7 File 6 of 7.
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