Facilitating Conflict: The Effect of Non-state Material Aid to Insurgencies

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Facilitating Conflict: The Effect of Non-state Material Aid to Insurgencies

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in Government from The College of William and Mary

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The year 2009 marked an interesting time for insurgencies. Many Americans had grown tired of the word, which appeared frequently in news broadcasts about Iraq. In February, President Obama announced his plan to remove most American troops from the battlegrounds of Iraq, signaling an end to one of the most controversial conflicts in the country’s history. This conflict, which resulted in “tens of thousands of civilian deaths,” had been prolonged by the Iraqi insurgency. As American troops depart, the Iraqi state continues to face the threat posed by this force.

Across the globe, Sri Lankans wearily celebrated the end of a decades-long nightmare. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, or LTTE, was defeated in May of 2009. Conflict between this insurgency and the state, based upon ethnic differences, claimed over 90,000 lives and sparked an immense exodus from Sri Lanka, particularly of ethnic Tamils. Even now many families have been unable to return to Sri Lanka, while those living within face continued problems with infrastructure resulting from a lack or development during the war.

These two strikingly different examples illustrate that insurgencies are a significant global phenomenon. They have shaped the way conflict is considered today, but a number of puzzles about their existence, capabilities, and successes remain. This thesis tackles one such puzzle.

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INSURGENCIES: AN IMPORTANT ACADEMIC AND POLICYMAKING PUZZLE

The study of violent non-state groups, including guerillas, rebel armies, terrorist groups, and insurgencies is critically important for both policymakers and academics. The frequency of internal conflicts has now eclipsed traditional wars between great powers, with 29 intrastate wars and no interstate conflicts occurring in 2009. 3 Though usually lower in intensity (i.e., causing fewer total deaths) than interstate wars, intrastate conflicts have grave consequences for civilian populations, state development, and diplomacy. Insurgent armies and the states combatting them are frequently condemned for grave human rights violations, ranging from kidnapping and murder of civilians to the use of child soldiers. 4 And insurgency-driven conflicts are among some of the longest lasting. For example, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has threatened Colombian society 47 years, while the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was decimated in 2009 only after 34 years of unrest. The prevalence of insurgency-state conflicts in the last 50 years and the scope of destruction and chaos resulting from them make it essential to produce policy recommendations and bring them to an end. At the most basic level, this pursuit should be undertaken to limit the grave consequences for civilian populations.

The number of these conflicts and the diversity of circumstances in which they occur have generated a vast amount of literature seeking to explain their origin, longevity, the motivations of the combatants, and their termination. The characteristics that make insurgencies interesting are precisely what make them difficult to explain. They are not

3 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, April 7, 2011, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/
4 An extreme example of an insurgency condemned for violating human rights is the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, the leaders of which remain at large despite International Criminal Court arrest warrants for acts such as murder of civilians, forced sexual enslavement and forced recruitment of children. “Warrant of Arrest Unsealed Against Five LRA Commanders,” International Criminal Court, last modified October 13, 2005, accessed April 7, 2011.
limited to a specific geographical area, continent, or type of state. They can be fueled by
ethnic or religious tension, political ideology, or greed. They differ in number of supporters,
how the insurgents fight the state, or their rate of success. Due to these almost infinite
variations, any findings are unlikely to be universally applicable. Significant numbers of
research programs and individual studies have emerged to explain each aspect of
insurgencies.

This thesis examines one possible explanation for why some insurgencies succeed,
while others fail. In particular, I examine the role played by third-party material support in
increasing insurgency capabilities. External assistance—from money and arms to the
 provision of safe haven, intelligence, diplomatic aid, and training—is an under-studied
phenomenon despite its importance both within the state involved and for international
actors.

EXTERNAL AID: CATALOGUING WHO AND HOW

Twenty years ago, policies regarding external assistance to insurgencies were entirely
different as states were generally the sole providers of material aid that had the potential to
affect the results of an intrastate conflict. While states continue to intervene on behalf of
insurgencies, the Cold-War era assumption that they are the only actors to do so is now
obsolete. Diasporas, other insurgencies or violent groups, international criminal
organizations, such as the drug or arms trades, and NGOs are now all recognized as possible
sources of material support. The widening range of providers requires further analysis before
their effect upon insurgency-state conflicts themselves can be understood. The need for
policy innovation to combat global terrorism has recently motivated increased awareness of previously unconsidered actors.

The events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent ‘war on terror’ have generated fresh interest in the global implications of non-state violence. This has led to new research on cooperation among terrorist groups but not on how terrorist organizations might aid insurgencies in based in other states, and certainly not on other connections insurgencies might seek. For example, the FARC is believed to have cooperated with the Basque terrorist group ETA. This odd alliance received considerable coverage by international news sources. However, the media took an interest mainly in whether their collaboration magnified the international terrorist threat, rather than whether FARC benefited. As this example suggests, external support for insurgencies from non-state actors occurs, may be important, and deserves closer study.

DIFFERENT ACTORS, DIFFERENT EFFECTS: AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION

There are a few analyses of how external support might strengthen insurgencies—but relatively little research on the implication of receiving assistance from non-state actors. Yet, receipt of material aid from states has been shown to alter the course of an insurgency in a variety of significant ways. As Daniel Byman and his co-authors state: “Both state and non-state support for an insurgency can make a movement far more effective, prolong the

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6 Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan, Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements, (Santa Monica: RAND Publishers, 2001), 4. The authors assert that only a “scant” amount attention has been paid to external support in recent years.
war, increase the scale and lethality of its struggle, and may even transform a civil conflict into an international war…the effects can be both positive and negative, they are also often unpredictable.”

The need to understand the relationship between material aid from non-state actors and insurgency capabilities motivates my thesis. I contribute to the understanding of external support by taking a different approach to the puzzle of material support. This thesis will bridge the gap of understanding between the source of support and how the insurgency’s capabilities increase as a result of each provider’s involvement. Based on the conclusions of my hypotheses, policymakers should be able to better understand whether and why insurgencies benefit from certain types of external aid, potentially pursuing better counterinsurgency policies. With further study, perhaps the consequences of non-state aid need not be perceived as entirely ‘unpredictable.’

This thesis studies how different providers of material aid, in particular, the narcotics trade, other violent groups, and diasporas, affect insurgency capabilities. I generate three hypotheses about the effects of material aid provided by each source. First, I suggest that involvement with the drug trade gives an insurgency the capacity to expand its entire scope. Second, I propose that diaspora support amplifies the insurgency’s ability to confront the state and facilitates an increase in popular support. My final hypothesis states that support from another violent, non-state group will provide the insurgency with new tactics or technologies.

These hypotheses are tested on two case studies: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Ultimately, I find that the FARC experienced widespread growth by tapping into narcotics income, and they later

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7 Byman and others, Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements, 3.
boosted their tactics and were able to engage in urban terrorism as a result of training provided by a third party. In the case of the LTTE, their access to funding from the Tamil diaspora increased their capacity to confront rather than just evade the state, while the diaspora’s aid in disseminating pro-LTTE propaganda—both directly to the Tamil community and to the governments of their host states—helped them to create an international support structure. My analysis of these case studies produces opportunities for future research and new suggestions for policy direction based on the overall conclusion that different non-state providers of material aid do influence an insurgency by expanding its capabilities in different ways.

OUTLINE OF THE THESIS

This thesis has four additional chapters. The next chapter reviews the literature on insurgencies. It 1) defines important terms, 2) analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the extant literature, and 3) presents alternative hypotheses for insurgency success. In this chapter, I also present my three hypotheses for how cooperation with the narcotics trade, another violent group, and diasporas affect insurgency capabilities and outline the methodology I use to test them. The third chapter presents my first case study, the FARC, analyzing the effects of the insurgency’s participation in the narcotics trade and their cooperation with the Irish Republican Army, a terrorist group based in the United Kingdom and Ireland. I argue that these two interactions affected the insurgency in different ways, manifesting themselves as 1) a vast increase in scope and 2) participation in a new type of violent resistance via urban terrorism, respectively. The fourth chapter analyzes the whether diaspora aid strengthened the Sri Lankan LTTE, finding that cultivating a strong connection
with the diaspora provided indispensable funding in addition to positive representation in key Western states. The final chapter summarizes my results and offers suggestions for policymaking and future research.
INTRODUCTION

The problem of insurgency-state conflict is hardly a new one, as insurgencies across the globe have been a threat since even before the creation of the modern state. But investigation of the factors leading to insurgency success or growth is constantly evolving, as this chapter’s literature review will suggest. One developing factor is that of external support, that is, material or diplomatic assistance originating outside of the insurgency’s home state. With current trends in globalization and technology, external support may increasingly affect the outcome of insurgency-state conflict. The literature sparingly examines this interaction of support and insurgencies, but requires more focused study. My research on material aid provided by a non-state source helps to fill this need.

This chapter has seven sections. First, I present my definition of insurgency. Second, I review the existing literature on the conditions that enable insurgencies to achieve their objectives, noting that material support is viewed as necessary for success but is understudied. In particular, I argue that mere acknowledgement that non-state actors can provide material support is insufficient, and that further study is needed to understand how their involvement affects insurgency capabilities. Finally, I present three hypotheses on how different non-state actors, specifically the narcotics trade, another violent group, and a diaspora increase an insurgency’s ability to meet its goals.
WHY ‘INSURGENCY’?

The literature uses several terms to describe domestic opposition movements such as violent non-state actors, non-state armed groups, terrorists, and guerrillas, among others. This research, however, examines insurgencies. Insurgencies exhibit several characteristics. First, each has a shared group identity, which is used to recruit active members and maintain wider popular support. Second, unlike terrorist groups or guerilla armies, insurgencies use a wide range of tactics to achieve their goals, from presenting and disseminating propaganda to engaging in terrorism. Finally, insurgencies have political goals directed mainly against the

8 Klejda Mulaj, introduction to Violent Non-State Actors in World Politics, ed. Klejda Mulaj. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 3-4. and Belgin San Acka, "Supporting Non-State Armed Groups: A Resort to Illegality?" Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 4, (2009): 590. The desire to better understand and evaluate the behavior of non-state violence has led to the coining of multiple terms to define the actors. The broadest of these designations is likely that of VNSA or ‘Violent Non-State Actors.’ Klejda Mulaj includes liberation movements, guerilla insurgents, terrorists, militants, and even mercenary militias within this designation, recognizing that overlap in strategies and goals is likely to occur. Similar to this acronym, ‘NAG’ or Non-state Armed Group can also be broadly applicable. For Belgin San Acka, a NAG is any organized group which resorts to violence, has a political goal (rather than random acts of violence), and does not utilize state forces. Although these two distinctions are both applicable to this research, I have found them unnecessarily wide-ranging. Literature making use of these acronyms is still useful, however, as the type of group this research will examine still falls within their scope.

9 Lincoln B. Krause, "Playing for the Breaks: Insurgent Mistakes," Parameters: US Army War College, 39, no. 3, (2009):55. and Brian Reed, "A Social Network Approach to Understanding an Insurgency," Parameters: US Army War College, 37, no.2 (2007): 24. For most authors, the identity of the insurgency forms the basis of their goals and actions. Brian Reed states that they have “pre-existing ties” through “religion, family or tribe that are adopted to fit insurgent warfare.” Although these are certainly three possible bases for group identity, they are not the only ones. The identity of an insurgency can shape where it seeks support (what other groups it reaches out to or what funding it seeks, for example) as well as how it chooses its actions. Krause discusses that decisions such as taking advantage of funding from criminal activities like drug smuggling can erode an insurgency’s basic identity and negatively affect the popular support and therefore momentum of the insurgency.

central government. They aim to change the policies of a government or the regime itself.\textsuperscript{11}

Many authors link this to controlling territory within the state.\textsuperscript{12}

A FOCUS ON COUNTERINSURGENCY

Much of the literature focuses on how to defeat insurgencies. It primarily discusses either successful counterinsurgency campaigns or failed insurgencies, highlighting their inability to organize, find adequate funding, or generate a supportive domestic environment. Although this research emphasizes that each case is unique, scholars agree upon several counterinsurgency strategies that tend to increase a government’s chances of quashing these groups. For example, states should provide outlets such as valid elections or referendums and an accessible process of decision making so that minority groups can express their grievances against the state. In addition, governments should improve services to rural and urban communities so that insurgents cannot fill that void and gain popular support.\textsuperscript{13} That said, these basic policies are best suited to combating weak insurgencies, as opposed to those able increasing insurgency control and legitimacy.” Metz notes the increased use of terrorism in insurgencies operating in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. Ballentine and Sherman state that insurgencies also engage in various forms of self-financing, sometimes becoming a factor in the local economy. Finally, O’Leary and Tirman discuss the use of violence specifically against civilians as a strategy typical to insurgencies.

\textsuperscript{11} Reed, “A Social Network Approach to Understanding an Insurgency,” 24.

\textsuperscript{12} Daniel Byman. “Understanding Proto-Insurgencies,” 170; Byman and others, Trends in Outside Support to Insurgent Movements. The CIA pamphlet is also referenced on this subject: “Insurgency is a protracted-political military activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations.”

\textsuperscript{13} Byman, and others, Trends In Outside Support to Insurgent Movements; Krause, “Playing for the Breaks, Insurgent Mistakes”; Metz, "New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21st Century Insurgency"; Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III. "Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars," International Organization 63 no. 1 (2009); Mulaj, Violent Non-State Actors in World Politics, 22; Kalev Sepp, "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency," Military Review (2006): 9-11.; William Rosenau, "Counterinsurgency," Harvard International Review, 31, no. 1 (2009). Metz discusses the need for different counterinsurgency strategies and a flexibility for understanding the insurgency. Mulaj takes this analysis a step further in saying that counterinsurgencies should be keen not to alienate the local population. Sepp forms a list of successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgency efforts, based upon roughly 50 insurgencies from around the world. Many authors, such as Rosenau, are reformulating their counterinsurgency discussions to reflect modern ‘COIN’ operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
to present themselves to marginalized groups as a political or economic alternative or can compete militarily with the state.¹⁴

Because the literature focuses on counterinsurgency strategy, less is known about the conditions that enable insurgencies to succeed, by which I mean to force a compromise with the state or eliminate the state as a rival entirely. There are, however, some implicit arguments in the extant research.¹⁵

Insurgencies are more likely to make inroads against the government if they can: (1) maintain an organizational structure, (2) market and promote their goals, not just their ethnic, religious, or ideological identity, (3) connect to the domestic populace, frequently by providing services, (4) gain some kind of territory or base, and (5) gain support, which ranges from domestic tolerance of the insurgency’s activities to material aid provided by external actors. I will discuss each in turn.

First, an insurgency can make gains if it has a tightly monitored and cohesive organization, capable of efficiently controlling its supporters and fighters.¹⁶ A successful insurgency must be able to coordinate various actions of the group such as military efforts and the spread of propaganda. Second, a successful insurgency must have a cause or unifying goal to which individuals or supporting entities can attach themselves. Daniel Byman and his co-authors view this as critical, stressing that a successful insurgency can present a politically

¹⁴ Reed, “A Social Network Approach to Understanding an Insurgency,” 23. More specific strategies suggested in the literature to combat actions taken by insurgents are typically found in studies of U.S. counterinsurgency methods in the global War on Terror. For example, although Reed’s article provides a different and engaging way to study these groups’ external connections, his 21st century examples encompass “Iraq and others” of a similar mold. Precise counterinsurgency literature that addresses insurgencies other than those the United States is working against is more difficult to encounter.

¹⁵ Byman, “Understanding Proto-Insurgencies,” 181. Some of the literature focuses on how insurgencies begin, rather than their success once established. In Byman’s article, he explicitly gives five steps proto-insurgencies must take to mature into full insurgent movements: create a “politically relevant identity,” join the identity to a cause that has enough appeal, deal with rivals, find a sanctuary (territory), and address the need for external support.

salient goal against the state, which implies that the goal is both reasonable and important to others.\textsuperscript{17} Third, successful insurgents may provide services to civilians to widen their support base.\textsuperscript{18} Fourth, if an insurgency can establish territorial holdings, they can increase their ability to wage war against the state and their visible presence.\textsuperscript{19} Finally, no insurgency can succeed without support.\textsuperscript{20}

The concept of ‘support’ is vaguely defined in the literature. Some authors interpret support as domestic ideological backing, signifying tacit agreement with the insurgency’s goals or connection with their identity, while others mean international material aid. The literature does not identify which type of support is most important, nor does it fully explain how the provision of support allows the insurgency to make gains. The question of whether and how domestic and international support for insurgencies enables these movements to grow and increase their legitimacy relative to the state remains inadequately answered. The state of this literature is further discussed in the next section.

\textbf{WHAT IS THE ROLE OF SUPPORT?}

The existing literature on support for insurgencies is divided into two groups. First, some scholars focus on how supporters fulfill the material and political needs of insurgencies. Material needs are those limiting the combative capacity of the insurgency, while political needs limit the perception of the insurgency as legitimate. Byman, Chalk, Hoffman, Rosenau, and Brannan’s book \textit{Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements},

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{17} Byman and others, \textit{Trends in Outside Support to Insurgent Movements}, 89.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} John Robb, \textit{Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and The End of Globalization}, (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons Inc, 2007).
  \item \textsuperscript{20} Mulaj, \textit{Violent Non-State Actors in World Politics}, 18.
\end{itemize}
for example, suggests that third parties provide crucial support in the form of safe haven or transit, financial assistance, political support and propaganda, and direct military support.\textsuperscript{21} Paul similarly argues that they provide for the needs of insurgents, such as manpower, funding, materiel, intelligence, sanctuary, and ‘tolerance of activity,’ which includes a refusal to actively aide the state or allowing the insurgency to operate on their territory.\textsuperscript{22}

The second category of literature seeks to identify the main sources of support for insurgencies, focusing upon states but making mention of non-state providers. Historically, only states were viewed as able to step into this role.\textsuperscript{23} For example, during the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union supported insurgencies as a means to create future allies and disseminate their political ideologies. Surprisingly, non-state providers of external support, namely diasporas, other insurgencies or violent groups, NGOs, and actors engaging in international crime such as the arms or drug trade have been largely neglected in the analysis of success.

Through these two methods, most scholars argue that some form of support—either domestic or international—is necessary for an insurgency’s survival and crucial for even marginal gains. However, as Christopher Paul notes in his article on why individuals or organizations support an insurgency or terrorist group: “Where support for terrorism is addressed in the existing literature, the focus is typically limited to state support, financial support, or expressions of support as captured in public opinion polls. More often, support is

\textsuperscript{21} Byman and others, \textit{Trends in Outside Support to Insurgent Movements}.


simply assumed as authors address other questions.” As a result, there is the sense that support is central to success but little consensus on what type of support, from what actors, and at what level, is most important and why. Further, material support from a third party is mentioned as a possible catalyst for achievement, but the literature does not identify the process through which an insurgency converts this aid into a defeat of the state.

Diasporas, NGOs, and illegal dealings are mentioned in the literature, but their ability to provide support is assumed to be limited, restricted largely to financial support or indirect support such as propaganda. These activities are seen as incidental to an insurgency’s strategy, rather than a driving factor behind an insurgency’s growth or increasing achievements. It is assumed that more substantive forms of support such as provision of safe haven, intelligence, or training are provided by a neighboring state. Where mention of non-state support occurs, it is incomprehensive and fails to cover all possible non-state providers. Additionally, the literature does not explain the connection between an application of non-state aid and the resulting increase in capacity or capabilities to the extent that state support is examined. Finally, the possibility that specific capability increases may correspond to the involvement of different non-state sources is not acknowledged.

These oversights are problematic as support from states has waned following the Cold War and non-state actors are increasingly playing a role in these conflicts. Indeed, in the most recent counterinsurgency literature, scholars suggest that insurgencies should no longer rely only upon state assistance. As Lincoln Krause observes: “If an insurgent movement fails

24 Paul, “As a Fish Swims in the Sea: Relationships between Factors Contributing to Support for Terrorist or Insurgent Groups,” 489.
25 Byman and others, Trends in Support for Insurgent Movements and Reed, “A Social Network Approach to Understanding an Insurgency.”
to diversify its sources of support—for example, by drawing on diasporas, other non-state groups, and indigenous sources—it may become vulnerable to any rapid withdrawal of state support.”

Consequently, a successful one will seek support from a wider range of actors.

An exception to the overall state of the literature is the aforementioned text presented by Daniel Byman and his coauthors. In this book, the authors discuss both state support and assistance from non-state sources such as refugees and diasporas. However, even in this exceptional research, greater attention is given to the motivations of different supporting actors and the types of aid given, rather than how insurgencies convert this support into greater capabilities.

Although the literature tips its hat to the role played by these third parties, a thorough discussion of support by non-state actors such as foreign terrorist groups or insurgencies in particular is lacking. Regarding assistance from violent groups, there is some analysis of ‘networks’ of insurgencies in the Middle East. This type of literature emerged following the U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq and the growing concern with isolating groups from other, like-minded actors that might share tactics or technology. But the possibility that other types of foreign non-state actors may provide support to other groups, even if political goals are dissimilar, is insufficiently explored.

WHAT IS MEANT BY ‘CAPABILITIES’ AND ‘SUCCESS’?

This research will assess the changes in an insurgency’s capabilities, as they influence the insurgency’s likelihood of complete or partial success. Specifically, three dimensions of

28 Reed, “A Social Network Approach to Understanding an Insurgency.”
capabilities will be discussed: scope, tactics, and popular approval. An increase in scope implies increases in number of combatants, the amount of territory held, and military competency demonstrated by available weapons or the number of offensive attacks.

Proliferation of tactics signifies the presence of a specific form of violent confrontation not previously possible for the insurgency, such as the development of urban terrorism.

Amplified popular approval can be seen at both the international and domestic levels through greater tolerance of the insurgency. Tolerance encompasses inactive support such as other states’ unwillingness to condemn the insurgency or domestic communities’ acceptance of the group’s presence. Measurements of more active support, namely number of combatants, will be distinguished from popular approval and remain a component of scope. The analysis of these three dimensions should provide an accurate image of the development of an insurgency’s capability to oppose the state resulting from material aid. Any increase in each dimension implies an increase in capability, which negates the need to establish requirements for partial or complete success such as a specific amount of territory or number of troops gained.

I will examine insurgency capabilities because they exert a strong influence on the likelihood of success. The insurgency literature rarely defines success explicitly. Because most of the extant research is counterinsurgency-focused, for these studies ‘success’ means defeating the insurgency. However, insurgencies have goals for political change, such as controlling territory or replacing the government. Thus, the most basic definition of success

29 Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III. "Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars," 71-72. A scale of success is present in Lyall and Wilson’s research, although they measure success from the state’s viewpoint. In an armed conflict, a loss therefore means conceding entirely to the insurgency, a draw suggests compromise, and a win signifies that the state has not made any concessions to the insurgency and the insurgency is destroyed. This definition is useful for insurgencies actively engaged in guerilla warfare with the state when the viewpoint is reversed. However, this research will not use the terms ‘win, lose and draw’ as they suggest only the results of armed conflict without the inclusion of political influence or popular support.
is whether the insurgency achieves its primary goal. Restricting success to this high threshold implies that the insurgency is failing until it achieves all of its aims, which rarely occurs with actual insurgencies. While total success such as this is indeed possible, it should not be the only form of achievement recognized for an insurgency.

Success instead should be divided into ‘complete’ and ‘partial’ success. I define partial success as 1) any situation in which insurgency experiences notable growth despite state opposition or 2) the state is forced to compromise with the insurgency, whether through some loss of territory or political control. This success can occur off of the battlefield. Examining gains made by insurgencies only in armed clashes excludes dimensions such as increased legitimacy. As Mulaj states, the insurgencies’ goals are ultimately to achieve “political objectives and influence.”³⁰ Achieving a political objective is simple enough to measure, but the scope of an insurgency’s influence may include varying factors such as its capabilities on the battlefield or its perception by external actors.

HYPOTHESES ON ASSISTANCE FROM NON-STATE ACTORS

This research examines whether external support from non-state actors to insurgencies is a key factor leading to increased capabilities. The type of external sponsor varies, and we can expect that some types are more likely to improve the insurgency’s odds than others. Non-state providers of support include states, diasporas, narco-traffickers, and other insurgencies or NAGs.³¹

In particular, I focus on the provision of material aid by non-state actors, including safe haven, funding, intelligence, materiel, technology, training, creation and dissemination

³⁰ Mulaj, Violent Non-State Actors in World Politics, 2.
³¹ San Acka, "Supporting Non-State Armed Groups: A Resort to Illegality?" 590.
of propaganda, and/or soldiers. Although intelligence and training are difficult to perceive as ‘materials,’ this support still represents a third party commitment to the political aims of the insurgency.

Material support from non-state groups has several advantages. First, it is more difficult to monitor than state support, and as such, is easier to send and to receive without detection by the international community. Second, the conditions a state may place upon aid, such as economic or military alliances following insurgency success, are absent from non-state aid. Finally, providers of this support need not be a neighboring entity, and as such this creates a wider network of support for the insurgency.

Naturally, each type of non-state benefactor may help an insurgency to counteract the state in different ways. One way for an insurgency to acquire external support, predominantly in the form of monetary compensation, is by participating in the narcotics trade. Earnings from the cultivation, refinement, or trade of drugs provide support without conditions from the providers. These funds can then be tailored to advance and increase the numbers of active fighters or finance the occupation of more territory. The greater income could also supplement the purchase of more or more efficient weapons and increase the effectiveness of military operations against the state.

Participation in this illegal trade will not increase the positive perception of the insurgency resulting in greater popular approval. Groups accepting this involvement are clearly concerned with supplementing their capabilities on the battlefield and emerging as a counterpoint to the state forces opposing them. The primary way to do so is increase the number of individuals engaged in fighting, the amount of territory available for training, housing, and preparing attacks, and the availability of tools and weapons to increase attacks’
effectiveness. This particular source of aid are unlikely to directly result in new tactics as the lack of training or conditions implies that the only possible application will be to augment the familiar approaches used by the insurgency. This trifold increase in scope provides sustainable channels for substantial, prolonged support, building both fighting capacity and the physical presence of the insurgency itself.

H₁: Material support, such as increased income from narcotics trafficking, allows the insurgency to expand the scope of their operations, specifically through increased territory, combatants, or available weapons, thus becoming a better military counterpoint to the state.

Another source of non-state external support are diasporas or communities living outside of their state of origin—most likely the one in which the insurgency is operating. These groups, through their connection and commitment to the insurgency, provide the movement with financial assistance. They may even organize business ventures for the explicit purpose of supplying an insurgency with monetary support. This support in particular is used, similar to support from the drug trade, to increase the capacity to combat the state. However, the diaspora’s provision of such funding is accompanied by the expectation of victories over the state. As such, while drug funding is used to increase the scope of the insurgency itself, diaspora funding can be expected to increase the scale and gravity of attacks against the state. The insurgency will most likely augment their fighting forces in similar ways to do so, but with less concern for sustaining the growth of the insurgency itself.

32 Sarah Wayland, “Ethnonationalist networks and transnational opportunities: the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora,” Review of International Studies, 30 (2004): 408. Sarah Wayland defines a diaspora in the context of insurgency support as “a type of transnational community that has been dispersed from its homeland, whose members permanently reside in one or more ‘host’ countries and possess a collective, sometimes idealised, myth of the homeland and will to return.”
Support from a diaspora may allow the group to accumulate funding without being held accountable for how it is used to increase victories over the state. However, because the diaspora also has a strong interest in the trajectory and goals of the insurgency itself, the funding or support provided may be limited at times by their concerns or desires. Limitations imposed may affect the types of attacks used or targets, or conditions regarding the treatment of local populations. Additionally, some authors have examined the role of diasporas in both prolonging and terminating conflicts. This suggests that internationally condemned behavior such as violation of human rights may lead a diaspora to withhold funding in the hopes of reforming insurgency action.

Finally, diasporas are crucial for generating public interest in the insurgency through propaganda or bringing attention to the movement’s plight in foreign channels of policymaking. This support can have an important effect upon the host states’ policies toward the insurgency, as well as its overall perception in both the host state and the diaspora’s state of origin. Yet another function of diasporas may be the provision of safe haven among the community for certain members of the insurgency itself. The possibility of safe haven provided by a diaspora may seem counterintuitive, but it is sometimes an option for the leadership or certain key members of an insurgency.

H2: Material support, especially financial backing, from diasporas allows the insurgency to increase the scale of their attacks against the state, although these attacks may be limited to certain sites, individuals, or tactics if the diaspora exercises such control. In addition, diaspora support via approval and dissemination of the group’s mission should lead to an increase in wider popular approval for the movement.

Lastly, insurgencies may receive training and support from other armed groups, namely a terrorist group or another insurgency, which can open new doors in an armed struggle. For example, communication with other violent groups may expand the range of tactics in the insurgency’s repertoire. This change in methods allows the insurgency to combat the state in new and unexpected ways, such as a rural guerilla group engaging in urban terrorism. Engaging with other combative groups may also lead to shared sources of and greater access to arms at the international level. Particularly when an insurgency receives training for specific types of weapons previously unusable due to lack of familiarity, the trainer may advise the trainee in where to obtain these weapons, perhaps facilitating an exchange. The adoption of tactics previously unavailable to the insurgency provides an opportunity to shock and draw attention, possibly resulting in concessions from the state. This increased attention may be generated by fear from civilian populations based on the new unpredictability of the insurgency’s actions.

H3: Material support, specifically training, from other violent armed groups should allow the insurgency to employ new types of tactics, resulting in increased attention or concessions from the state.

ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES

There are four alternative hypotheses regarding the determinates of insurgency success in the literature. The most prevalent is that a weak central state increases the likelihood of insurgency success. Fearon and Laitin discuss how weak states enable insurgencies to flourish.\(^{34}\) They argue that new states, poorly organized states, those that are

\(^{34}\) Although Fearon and Laitin’s article outlines the factors leading to civil war, these same factors lead an insurgency to gain strength and challenge the state.
unstable at the center, and those that are physically disconnected from its populace are all hospitable environments for insurgency growth.\textsuperscript{35}

Weak states can foster insurgency success in two ways. First, they provide opportunities for an insurgency to build its domestic support base through their inability to counter military or political advances. Insurgencies have a particular advantage when the state is unable to provide security and services to the population. In this case, they are able to act as a proto-state and, as the citizenry is dependent upon them for these basic needs, they attract supporters.\textsuperscript{36} Robb discusses groups that were able to provide services as extensive as health care and social activities for youth.\textsuperscript{37} The provision of such services also provides a veneer of legitimacy to the movement. Second, weak states may be unable to defeat the insurgency in the event of a conflict.\textsuperscript{38} Although the state may still be stronger in terms of military strength than the insurgency, a lack of organization or commitment allows insurgencies to capitalize upon the opportunity for civil war and can enable them to succeed by taking over the government of the state.

\textbf{$H_{A1}$: A weak central state increases the probability of insurgency success.}

The second alternative hypothesis is that the attractiveness of an insurgency’s goals is the primary cause for success. These goals are frequently connected to the identity of the group, and may be economic, political, or social in nature. For domestic supporters, the insurgency’s appeal may be based in its identity and pre-existing ethnic or socioeconomic ties.\textsuperscript{39} The identity and mission of the insurgency are crucial to success once again because

\textsuperscript{35} Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 80.
\textsuperscript{36} Reed, “A Social Network Approach to Understanding an Insurgency,” 24, and Byman, “Understanding Proto-Insurgencies.”
\textsuperscript{37} Robb, \textit{Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and The End of Globalization}, 147. His work here focuses upon terrorist groups (especially Hamas) but can be applied to insurgencies as well.
\textsuperscript{38} Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 80.
\textsuperscript{39} Reed, “A Social Network Approach to Understanding an Insurgency,” (24)
they increase the available support base. For example, Byman cites nationalism as a particularly important motivating cause for domestic supporters.\(^\text{40}\) Not only do insurgencies win support from the public through their movement’s mission but they may also gain a safe haven, which many authors view as extremely important to avoid detection, and generate additional manpower.\(^\text{41}\) Individuals who sympathize with the aims of an insurgency may also provide other physical forms of support, such as money or materiel. The identity of an insurgency can also influence how external actors perceive its legitimacy and superiority as compared to the state.\(^\text{42}\)

\[H_{A2}: \text{When the insurgency’s economic, political or social goals represent the interests of a sufficient part of the state’s population, the insurgency will be more successful.}\]

The third hypothesis emphasizes the environment in which the insurgency operates. If the terrain is friendly to the movement’s capabilities and tactics, they are more likely to succeed. If the terrain itself is mountainous or difficult, the insurgency usually has the advantage due to their use of guerrilla warfare. Mountainous terrain prevents states from eradicating the insurgency by providing the rebels with better concealment.\(^\text{43}\) The insurgents may also be more familiar with the territory than the state.\(^\text{44}\) A second benefit of friendly terrain is the effect it can have upon insurgency-population relations. If there is a rural, isolated population base, the insurgency can exploit them for material needs such as food, as well as for soldiers or physical support without having to compete with the state.\(^\text{45}\) This

\(^{40}\) Byman, “Understanding Proto-Insurgencies,” 186.
\(^{41}\) Ibid.
\(^{42}\) Mulaj, \textit{Violent Non-State Actors in World Politics}, 16.
\(^{44}\) Ibid
influence upon the population once again prevents the insurgency from being detected and allows them to grow, raising the probability of success.

\[ H_{A3}: \] A terrain friendly to the insurgency’s capabilities increases the probability of success.

The fourth hypothesis states that success depends upon the external support an insurgency receives from other states. This support can come in the form of direct, material assistance, such as funding, provision of soldiers or arms, or the creation of an area of safe haven or less explicit support via diplomatic channels.\[46\] This diplomatic backing ranges from a refusal to condemn the insurgency or its methods to direct conflict with the home state of the insurgency. Scholars note that in an increasingly globalized society, insurgencies struggle to be perceived by other states, not only neighboring ones, as a legitimate alternative to the government in power.\[47\] This means that although state support can be of great assistance to the groups, it may also come with conditions for changes in tactics or the promise of a future partnership. In exchange for material support, which amplifies the resources available to the insurgency, the states may demand political concessions.

\[ H_{A4}: \] State support, both material and diplomatic, provides resources and legitimacy which results in a higher probability of insurgency success.

**RESEARCH DESIGN**

This study evaluates the importance of material aid from three types of non-state actors. To test the hypotheses I have presented, this research will examine two case studies in depth. Studying the effects of third party aid to two insurgent groups will allow me to examine the strength of the movement prior to, during, and following the receipt of support.

\[46\] San Acka, "Supporting Non-State Armed Groups: A Resort to Illegality?" 598, and Byman, “Understanding Proto-Insurgencies,” 188.

\[47\] Mulaj, *Violent Non-State Actors in World Politics*, 16,18.
To isolate the effect of external aid, I choose cases with which I can hold constant other contributing factors, specifically those discussed in the alternative hypotheses section above. As such, the case studies allow me to investigate the difference in an insurgency’s size, territorial holdings, or other capabilities resulting from an injection of material support from non-state actors.

This research focuses on the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. Both of these groups meet the definition of insurgency detailed above, as each waged a protracted battle against the state through the means of violence, with goals of gaining territory and reaching a political compromise or taking political control. These case studies, in particular, are useful for answering the question of how different sources of material aid take effect because the variables identified in the extant literature as influencing insurgency success do not vary across the time frame studied.

First, both insurgencies combated a moderately weak state during the entire period studied. Although in each case the state’s policy towards the insurgency fluctuated due to administration changes, the state’s strength did not change. In neither situation did the state’s growing weakness provide a window of opportunity for the insurgency to make gains.

Second, the FARC’s initial Marxist goals had less initial appeal among Colombians than did the LTTE’s proposed creation of an ethnically separate state among the Tamil population. However, in the primary period of LTTE action, many Tamils grew tired of the insurgency’s goals, indicating that for both, the mission of the insurgency did not generate significant aid.

48 CIA. *Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency.*
Third, both groups benefited from friendly terrain. The FARC made use of the difficult jungle and rural areas of Colombia, while the LTTE maintained a specific area based upon the Tamil ‘homeland,’ in which they could exploit the population due to community contacts and their isolation from state services.\(^{49}\)

Fourth, although the Indian government may have supported the LTTE in its formative years, this backing waned quickly and was not revitalized during the period in which the diaspora became the primary provider of aid.\(^{50}\) In the case of the FARC, other states were unwilling to support the insurgency’s efforts in any substantial way.

Because these variables are be held constant across time, it can be assumed that any change in insurgency strength following the provision of external material aid should be considered a consequence of this assistance. As such, I will analyze capabilities prior to, during, and following the provision of support.

The FARC received material support from two types of non-state actors: the narcotics trade and a terrorist group, the IRA. The insurgency’s strength will be measured in the early 1980s, before its involvement with the drug trade, through the 1990s and again in the 2000s to determine the effect of aiding drug cultivation as well as entering the international trade. If narcotics funding allowed the insurgency to finance larger-scale attacks, supply more fighters, and hold more territory, as suggested by my hypothesis, these effects should be observable over this time. And should there be no change in tactics or growth resulting from narcotics income, material aid provided by these sources can be presumed to have a different effect—or lack thereof—than those suggested.

\(^{49}\) Wayland, “Ethnonationalist networks and transnational opportunities: the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora,” 413.

\(^{50}\) Swamy, The Tiger Vanquished: LTTE’s story, 132.
In addition, I will examine the FARC’s capabilities prior to and following their connection with the IRA in 2001. The hypothesis holds that after training with the IRA, the FARC would use new tactics against the state.

I will scrutinize the capabilities of the LTTE before, during, and after the period over which the insurgency began to receive substantial assistance from the Tamil diaspora. I expect to see that the LTTE increased the scale of their attacks and saw an upsurge in popular approval after receiving this support. A decrease in the intensity of their efforts or a decline in domestic and international approval would imply that the influence of the diaspora is negligible.

This analysis should reveal whether and how material support from a non-state actor enables an insurgency to increase their capabilities. An examination of the changes in these two case studies should prompt further questions about other insurgencies and the role of various non-state sources of material support. The next chapter begins this investigation with a discussion of the FARC.
INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of its long and bloody history, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) could boast little promise in becoming the greatest guerilla threat in the state, much less an internationally feared organization. The infamy of the group continues even now, despite a decrease in effectiveness in the past several years. In February 2011, the FARC appeared in international news for their release of long-held hostages\(^{51}\) in addition to several other situations involving kidnapping and illegal crime. While most have seen these types of actions as indicators of the

FARC’s modern-day weakness, the government of Colombia is insistent that the organization renounce “terrorism, kidnapping, drug trafficking and extortion” before they conduct any further negotiations. The FARC remains a difficult and dangerous organization, despite fluctuations and the eventual decrease in their perception as a viable political alternative to state power.

My analysis of the FARC will focus upon their interaction with two sources of support: the drug trade and a terrorist organization, Irish Republican Army or IRA. I argue that support provided by each influenced the insurgency’s capabilities differently, specifically that drug profits increased their overall scope while the IRA’s training increased their proficiency with different tactics. To examine the validity of these hypotheses I describe the nature of both actors’ support and evaluate the FARC’s strength over the periods in which the aid was provided.

This chapter is composed of three main sections. First, I discuss the FARC and the drug trade and second, the FARC and the IRA. For each of the first two sections, I will, in sub-sections, 1) reiterate my hypotheses, 2) explain the history of the insurgency’s interaction with the narcotics trade and violent group respectively, and 3) analyze the results of these interactions. In the third main section, I synthesize the overall effect of this aid on the insurgency and conclude.

THE FARC AND THE DRUG TRADE

Particularly in the last decade, rarely does the FARC appear in any news or academic article without condemnation of the insurgency’s participation in the growth and trading of narcotics. While this connection alone is concerning, the effect the profits have had upon the

52 Ibid
growth of the FARC merits substantial analysis. In the coming subsections, I will test the hypothesis that material aid from narcotics trafficking, in the form of increased funding, implies greater scope as measured through gains in territory, combatants, and weapons.

After comparing the situation of the insurgency prior to and following the application of this support, the marked ways in which the FARC benefited from narcotics trafficking become evident. As proposed by the hypothesis, this increased income transformed the FARC into a truly formidable force against the Colombian state. To situate the reader and provide a full understanding of the insurgency’s progress with this particular support, I will begin with a brief history of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia.

_Humble Origins_

The FARC began as one of many groups resulting from an already extensive period of violence. The background of its formation stretches back even further than this time, known as La Violencia, to a classic liberal and conservative power struggle in the 1920s and 30s. The major issue was land ownership and laws, which affected the rural peasantry’s ability to work and gain profits. This led groups of rural workers to organize in protest and in the hopes of protecting their access to their livelihoods. An additional consequence was the spread of leftist and communist ideology, which ran parallel to the demands for popular land ownership.53 These groups then solidified in the period of civil war, becoming more like guerilla groups willing to engage in violence against the elites and the state. According to

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Hoehn and Weiss, “Guerilla violence has been a feature of Colombian life since civil war left tens of thousands dead in the late 1940s and early 1950s.”

Although the conflict was officially resolved through a power-sharing agreement that created the Frente Nacional (National Front), the continued exclusion of rural peasants allowed the guerilla groups to emerge even stronger than before. In addition to the FARC, the 1960s saw the official creation of groups such as the M-19, ELN, and EPL. In the case of the FARC, its two original leaders, Pedro Antonio Marin (also known as Manuel Marulanda or Tirofijo) and Jacobo Arenas, both fought as guerillas prior to their decision to found the FARC. Their decision that the concerns and ideology of the peasant bands could become a basis to gain actual political power led to the creation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia in the rural area of Cauca in 1964. Therefore, although much of the organization’s connection to their ideology appears to be lost in their later actions, the FARC was originally connected to the campesino (rural farmer) population at their inception.

Authors examining the impact of U.S. drug policy on guerilla violence today are keen to remember these origins, separating the initial goals of the FARC from the actions they later took. In the spirit of representing the peasants, the FARC originally sought to expand their overall support base, probably so that they could also function in competition with other insurgent groups. Through the 1970s, they allied themselves further with the Communist

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57 Mark Peceny and Michael Durnan, “The FARC’s Best Friend: U.S. Antidrug Policies and the Deepening of Colombia's Civil War in the 1990s,” Latin American Politics & Society, 48, no. 2, (2006): 100. Specifically, Peceny and Durnan discuss that ‘narcoguerrilla’ motivations of coca profit cannot account for the origins of the FARC. They discuss that a certain amount of their support should still be attributed to those that remain faithful to the original leftist ideology and goals of the FARC, despite the overall departure from the political pathway to these goals.
party in Colombia and reached out to other peasant guerillas to amass notoriety and physical support.\textsuperscript{58} However, these efforts toward expansion were not as successful as hoped. It was at this point, in the close of the 1970s, when the FARC began to consider the drug trade.

In the late 1970s—before establishing links with the drug trade—the FARC’s number of supporters remained small (in the hundreds) and the amount of territory they controlled and the scale of attacks they were able to conduct against the state were negligible.\textsuperscript{59} Their activities were funded primarily through extortion. As Felbab-Brown puts it, “the 1960s and early 1970s were years of survival for the FARC, not expansion.”\textsuperscript{60} Specifically, the low numbers of supporters and actual fighters meant that insurgency was unable to confront the government in any meaningful way and was confined to the deep jungles to avoid detection and eradication. However, other sources do note some increase through the 1970s, with increased hierarchical organization and achievements toward training and political planning.\textsuperscript{61} Despite gains, the first 15 years of the FARC’s history were clearly fledgling years, in which the insurgency struggled to find both direction and the means to achieve their goals. Geographically speaking, in 1979, the FARC had isolated control in eight departments (the Colombian equivalent of U.S. states.)\textsuperscript{62} A common indicator of strength found in the literature is that of ‘frentes’ or the number of active fronts through which the insurgency is

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{58} Vargas, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Illicit Drug Trade.”
\item \textsuperscript{59} Molano and Vargas use 500 for the number of FARC supporters in the 1970s, while Felbab-Brown states “low hundreds.”
\item \textsuperscript{60} Felbab-Brown, \textit{Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs}, 78.
\item \textsuperscript{61} Molano, “The Evolution of the FARC: A Guerilla Group’s Long History.” Molano notes the insurgency’s achievements, saying, “Between 1970 and 1982, the FARC grew from a movement of only about 500 people to a small army of 3,000, with a centralized hierarchical structure, a general staff, military code, training school and political program.”
\item \textsuperscript{62} Felbab-Brown, \textit{Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs}, 81. Huila, Cauca, Tolima, Putumayo, Caquetá, Antioquia and Córdoba, and the Magdalena Medio region are the 8 areas listed.
\end{itemize}
fighting the state. At the close of the 1970s, the FARC was (barely) organized into nine fronts.\textsuperscript{63}

\textit{The Drug Trade, early 1980s}

The growth of coca had been fully introduced into rural areas of Colombia by the close of the 1970s, and the FARC in particular came into contact with drug production in the department of Caquetá.\textsuperscript{64} The profits gained by traders in comparison to the FARC’s previous means of financing (kidnapping and extortion, primarily) were noticeable, but ideologically speaking, the insurgency opposed drug production and dependency for several reasons. Coca was a double-edged sword. A great deal of money could be made, but the same reasons that made it so lucrative also made it unappealing for a Marxist group keen to avoid capitalist forces that would encourage the peasant base to focus upon making money.\textsuperscript{65} However, coca and its cultivation had been conclusively introduced, and the FARC found itself cornered into a situation in which their opposition to the trade would erode their support base among the peasants, who feared the loss of their livelihoods. Driven by this threat of abandonment and the positive motivation of greater profit, the FARC officially reversed their stance on the drug economy in 1982.\textsuperscript{66} This decision was reflected by the conclusions of the organization’s Seventh National Conference, in which the FARC decided to focus upon building and reorganizing the frentes to address drug-producing departments, set up appropriate taxation, and fold in membership from lower level producers.\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{63} Vargas, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Illicit Drug Trade.”
\textsuperscript{64} Felbab-Brown, \textit{Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs}, 79.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid and Molano, “The Evolution of the FARC: A Guerilla Group’s Long History,”
\textsuperscript{66} Felbab-Brown, \textit{Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs}, 79.
\textsuperscript{67} Felbab-Brown, \textit{Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs}, 79 and Alain Labrousse and Laura Garcés, “The FARC and the Taliban’s Connection to Drugs,” \textit{Journal of Drug Issues}, 35, no. 1 (2005): 177. Labrousse and Garcés discuss the reorganization of fronts to correspond to different drug producing areas, while
When the FARC reversed this decision to participate in the narcotics trade, they secured for themselves a reputation not only as one of the longest-standing guerilla groups, but also one of the largest and most infamous. By gradually increasing their control over the trade, the FARC was able to finance the sort of attacks that would later force the Colombian state into peace negotiations and allow them to be a territorially widespread and powerful insurgency with a wide base of youthful, well-trained supporters and various fronts. While the FARC may have reluctantly entered the trade, their commitment to it essentially defined their later capabilities and ensured a great deal of their success.

By the early 1980s, corresponding with the entrance into the drug trade, the insurgency boasted roughly 2,000 to 3,000 fighters.68 In 1983, the FARC enjoyed high levels of popular ideological support—in the mid-1980s, the guerilla group was seen as a more viable political solution—but nowhere near the sort of strength in numbers it would have in the 1990s.

Expanding Role in the Drug Trade, 1985-2000

The arrival of coca to Colombia should be seen as a monumental event for the FARC’s history. This drug in particular is of use to an insurgency given its relative ease to harvest and transport without detection. It also has high monetary value on the global market due to its illegality and enhanced, in this period, by early US drug eradication policies, particularly in Latin America.69 The FARC began their foray into this relative goldmine

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through taxation or ‘gramaje.’ In keeping with their goals of representing and supporting the rural peasant class, the insurgency expanded into the coca trade in ways that also allowed them to be seen as a protecting force. Their first move was to invoke a ‘revolutionary tax’ of 15 percent on the coca farmers. By collecting this sort of ‘rent’ upon the landholding farmers, the FARC could still be seen as a middleman between the traffickers and the cocaleros (coca workers), while establishing close links and dependency of the traffickers themselves. Through the 1980s, this tax would gradually replace revenue gained from kidnapping or extortion as the primary means of funding.

However, the insurgency quickly made the transition into other forms of investment as well. Not only could they tax, but also charge for the use of airstrips on their land (and trafficking through their land in general), and levy taxes on refinement of coca product. To further increase profits, the FARC built more airstrips and factories for coca paste on their expanding territory. Soon, the FARC encouraged and controlled coca cultivation itself on their territory, moving into the actual growing stage of the drug. In part, the timing of this transition was a result of the collapse of the Medellin and Cali drug cartels, which allowed the FARC to truly take over the coca industry. As stated by Labrousse and Garcés, “Over time, the FARC has revealed an undeniable tendency to increasingly implicate themselves in activities linked to drug trafficking and not to be content with simply collecting taxes at different levels of production and traffic.” The transition to growing coca on their lands and processing the paste in FARC-owned factories occurred by the early 1990s, after which the FARC expanded even further to taxation of other drugs such as heroin and opium, even

70 Felbab-Brown, *Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs*, 79.
72 Labrousse and Garcés, “The FARC and the Taliban’s Connection to Drugs,” 178.
73 Felbab-Brown, *Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs*, 79.
moving their fronts to control poppy fields. The insurgents’ final domestic step was to eliminate the middlemen of drug trafficking groups, known as the chichipatos, to control even this last money earning area in 1998 to 1999.

**Developments Post-2000**

The precise role taken by the FARC in the international narcotics trade at the beginning of the new millennium is somewhat speculative. Some authors draw upon statements made by the DEA in 2001, in which they assert that the FARC does not have any known connections in the United States or Europe—essentially, outside of Latin America. However, this does not mean that the insurgency cannot benefit directly from links with individuals or cartels outside of Colombia. Several accounts note the connection between the FARC and a Brazilian drug lord before his arrest in 2001, which also apparently gave the FARC access to a substantial shipment of weapons. Without a doubt, the insurgency has been increasingly involved in the multiple steps and levels of the trade, and as a result has cooperated more extensively in the last decade with the paramilitaries and drug cartels themselves to gain income on the exportation of drugs. With this increased codependence, however, has come an even more noticeable drift away from their original mission of representing the rural poor. As such, despite an increase in income the sort of political capital gained in the early years of simple taxation has diminished as the leadership concentrates on appeasing its business partners rather than its initial peasant supporters.

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74 Ibid and Labrousse and Garcés, “The FARC and the Taliban’s Connection to Drugs,” 178.
75 Labrousse and Garcés, “The FARC and the Taliban’s Connection to Drugs,” 178.
76 Labrousse and Garcés, “The FARC and the Taliban’s Connection to Drugs,” 180.
77 Ibid. The authors give a concise description of how working with Luis Fernando da Costa provided the FARC a shipment of “10,000 Kalashnikovs” directly into territory controlled by them.
78 Labrousse and Garcés, “The FARC and the Taliban’s Connection to Drugs,” 179. The authors say that “Several estimates place drug-related FARC annual revenues in the first years of the current decade at around $300 million.”
Benefits: Income, Territory, and Military Capacity

In this section, I will test the hypothesis that such widespread involvement with the production and trade of drugs has allowed the FARC a distinctive increase in scope. The insurgency’s history with drugs is extensive, easily encompassing a greater window of time than many insurgencies’ total years of existence. However, the greatest change in the scope of the insurgency resulting from this investment occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. During these decades, the benefits of drug money can be seen specifically in three ways: first, a larger number of active supporters and fronts; second, an ability to hold more territory; and finally in the number and intensity of their attacks, each of which will be discussed in this section.

Overall, the most apparent benefit of the drug trade for the FARC was the huge increase in income. Even in the earlier years of the 1980s, the insurgency was gaining roughly $3.8 million per month ($45.6 million per year), which increased to between $60 and $100 million with the added investments in the 1990s. While the monetary increase is important, ultimately the benefits to an insurgency such as the FARC should reveal themselves in gains in capabilities. The primary indicator given throughout literature about the FARC is the size of the organization, provided in overall numbers and the number of fronts or geographical divisions of fighters. An early estimate for 1986 already shows an increase with 3,600 members organized into 32 fronts. However, less than a decade later,

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79 Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs, 81.
these 32 fronts had jumped to 60, while the number of active supporters doubled to 7,000.\textsuperscript{81} Some authors have attributed the jump in participation in the 1990s to the collapse of paramilitary organizations funded by drug cartels, which led the FARC to absorb middlemen and traffickers, as most were willing to simply change employers and continue in the same ‘career.’\textsuperscript{82} Otherwise, the increased notoriety and territorial control of the insurgency also brought in other youths and individuals to the struggle or, more accurately, to an organization that could afford to feed them. In total, Metelits says: “The FARC’s involvement in the coca-producing and trafficking industry facilitated a huge growth in its forces… to more than 18,000 by 2001.”\textsuperscript{83} These individuals were organized into seventy frentes, implying that the strength of each fighting front also increased dramatically.\textsuperscript{84}

The second indication of increased strength is the greater amount of territory the FARC was able to control and exploit for their purposes. This progression was gradual, but on the whole drastic, just as was the case with the available supporters. In the mid 1980s, the FARC could boast control of more than 13 percent of the country’s total in 173 municipalities. By 1998, this figure had risen to 622 municipalities, which meant that the FARC could operate across 40 to 60 percent of the Colombian state.\textsuperscript{85} The amount of territory held was both affected by and affected the coca trade, as gaining more land in certain departments allowed for more coca cultivation, or easier routes for exportation in others. Another consequence of controlling such vast amounts of territory was the cultivation

\textsuperscript{81} Vargas, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Illicit Drug Trade.” and Peceny and Durnan, “The FARC's Best Friend: U.S. Antidrug Policies and the Deepening of Colombia's Civil War in the 1990s,” 104. (analyzing the difference between 1986 and 1995)
\textsuperscript{82} Peceny and Durnan, “The FARC's Best Friend: U.S. Antidrug Policies and the Deepening of Colombia's Civil War in the 1990s,” 106. The authors assert that the former runners of the Cali cartel in particular were brought into the FARC’s web of supporters.
\textsuperscript{83} Metelits, Inside Insurgency, 100.
\textsuperscript{84} Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs 81. She says 15,000 to 20,000 fighters in total by 2000.
\textsuperscript{85} Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs, 82.
of political capital via the peasants working on the land. Cocaleros in areas under their control could boast protection from unfair wages and growing practices, as well as from the aerial eradication and counter-narcotics operations undertaken by the Colombian state. The latter protection was important in that it led peasants to actively support the FARC’s actions, although not the insurgency’s ideology, in the form of political protest. In addition, the FARC was sometimes able to use the funds created by the drug industry to provide infrastructure such as schools or hospitals. Therefore, not only did the number of active guerillas increase, but recognition of the organization as a main vehicle for anti-state resistance did, as well. This type of popular support should be distinguished from the popular approval generated by a diaspora because it resulted from the FARC’s control of the territory, rather than encouraged approval of the insurgency itself.

Finally, the insurgency’s involvement in the narcotics industry allowed for an impressive increase in military prowess. At the most basic level, the FARC was able to move from hiding in the jungle to 600 clashes with the Colombian state in the 1990s and more than 2000 by the year 2002. The attacks against the state were widespread and effective as compared to the survival techniques resorted to prior to the 1980s. The simple control of territory certainly had an effect on the waging of battles, as the insurgency was able to choose whether or not to defend a stronghold, depending upon its level of coca production, rather than consistently flee. Another important benefit of the narcotics trade was the connections created with other illicit activities such as arms trading, and the provision of the

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86 Peceny and Durnan, “The FARC's Best Friend: U.S. Antidrug Policies and the Deepening of Colombia's Civil War in the 1990s,” 109. The authors make note of a particular protest in 1996, in which many peasant farmers marched in support of the FARC’s control of various areas and against the government’s destruction of coca crop.

87 Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs, 84.

88 Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs, 85. Specifically, there were 94 armed clashes by 1985, which grew to the number given above.
means to participate in them. With drug profits, the FARC was able to arm its guerillas with large numbers of upgraded versions of their former weapons. Rather than the antiquated rifles used in the first 15 years of its existence, the organization could now purchase machine guns, assault rifles, mortars, grenade launchers, and explosives, among other types.\textsuperscript{89} The distinct advantage given by drug profits and advances is particularly evident when analyzed across departments. Those which contained fronts with the heaviest coca producers, Caquetá and Putumayo, were able to account for the greatest overall military advances against the Colombian state in the mid 1990s, even as they continued to provide monetary support to other fronts.\textsuperscript{90} A final, but crucially important factor is the overall confidence the improvements via the drug trade gave the insurgency. The Colombian state, through many administrations, attempted different peace negotiations with little success. According to Labrousse and Garcés, “Their economic power, which is also the source of their military potential, undoubtedly contributes to their obduracy during peace negotiations with the government.”\textsuperscript{91} Thus, the development of the FARC from a small band of outlaws to a full fledged, state-acknowledged threat, therefore, can largely be seen as a result of the drug trade.

OTHER VIOLENT, NON-STATE GROUP INTERACTION

The 2001 capture and later trial of three IRA members in Colombia produced international aftershocks of attention. At the time, it was almost inconceivable that two

\textsuperscript{89} Felbab-Brown, \textit{Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs}, 82. The author asserts that through the “illicit economy” the FARC was able to both acquire new weapons and streamline its processes of seeking and obtaining them. She states “Its participation in the narcotics economy directly facilitated its acquisition of weapons by introducing the FARC to international arms smuggling organizations.”

\textsuperscript{90} Labrousse and Garcés, “The FARC and the Taliban’s Connection to Drugs,” 179. This area, known as the southern bloc, was apparently producing an impressive 15 tons of coca per month in 1996-1998.

\textsuperscript{91} Ibid.
groups previously confined to action in the area or state they wished to affect would aspire to cooperate. The second section of this chapter will explain the influence of this cooperation: training received from a violent non-state group, here, a terrorist group. It will test the hypothesis that material support—training in particular—from another armed group will increase the insurgency’s capability to use new tactics, generating greater attention from the state.

An investigation of the aftermath of this training reveals precisely how the FARC, by collaborating with the IRA, was able to learn the practice of urban terrorism and greatly expand their use of explosives in particular. These new capabilities made the FARC much more deadly to both the Colombian army and, in certain circumstances, civilians. This ability to access completely new tactics did alter the perception of the FARC as a newly dangerous, violent organization.

It should be noted that at the time of this interaction, the FARC was also still profiting from the drug trade. Funds obtained from this source probably paid for the IRA cooperatives’ stay in Colombia—though this is not discussed in the literature and only speculated upon in news sources. Despite this speculated interaction between the two forms of aid, the effects of the collaboration with each type of source are distinct. As seen in the previous section, support in the form of drug funding increased the insurgency’s territory, number of fronts, and military capacity in guerilla warfare with the state. Drug funding did not increase the capability of the FARC to employ a new, distinct form of violent confrontation.

The effects of the IRA training, as will be demonstrated in this section, are less broad sweeping. The new tactics and explosives experience gained did not result in an increase in number of troops, nor did they increase their capacity to engage in guerilla warfare. Such
training did create the possibility of operating in an urban environment—something entirely inaccessible prior to this cooperation—but through isolated terrorist attacks rather than seizing territory or moving the guerilla struggle into the cities. These specific results occurred only immediately following the recorded interaction between the two violent groups. As such, aid provided from each of the two sources can be clearly distinguished and analyzed separately despite that both were benefiting the FARC at the same time.

*New Connections: IRA Support*

As the FARC expanded into the global market with its drug production, the insurgency also appears to have looked for other international connections. The insurgency was still searching for additional ways to threaten the Colombian state, beyond the armed clashes resulting from the materials purchased through the drug trade. In the close of the 1990s, the FARC could still be firmly defined as a rural guerilla force, making use of conventional weapons and operating out of the jungles and farmland strongholds. Although the insurgency might risk being seen as less legitimate if they engaged in more violent acts, the FARC had already been designated as a terrorist organization by the United States in 1997, and their criminal actions of kidnapping, extortion, and the drug trade increased this infamous reputation. The FARC had been hoping to move into urban warfare since its initial brush with drug profits, and its leadership was now able to plan to do so by cooperating with another internationally recognized terrorist group: the IRA or Irish Republican Army.

Naturally, little is known about the lead-up to this cooperation, as the involvement became known only following the arrest of three known IRA activists (one later to be revealed as a Sinn Fein representative) on Colombian soil. On August 11, 2001, Jim Monaghan, Niall Connolly and Martin McCauley were arrested while trying to leave
Colombia, traveling with false passports. Later, it was determined that they had traces of explosives on their clothing and luggage, and although the men claimed to be observing and assisting with the Colombian-armed groups peace process, it was soon believed that their actual role was most likely something more sinister. A former FARC guerilla solidified the accusations by identifying the men and asserting that they had, indeed, been working alongside the FARC in the demilitarized zone. They were eventually indicted in 2002 in Colombia on formal charges of training the FARC to use explosives and traveling on false passports. The possible connections between the two organizations were not in themselves alarming, as there is speculation that the IRA (and possibly other violent groups such as the Basque ETA) was in communication with the FARC since roughly 1998. Indeed, some reports list that at least five and possibly up to 15 IRA members had been to the FARC demilitarized zone in the years in which the three men who were arrested had conducted their visit. Although formal indictments were issued and the men were convicted in their trials, they managed to flee Colombia and most likely return to Ireland, prior to serving their 17-year sentences. Though the exact terms of an ‘exchange’ between the two groups are

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94 Ibid
95 Ibid
uncertain, the FARC was clearly hoping to gain access to new types of weapons and tactics, while the IRA appears to have been promised a substantial sum of money in return for their educational service.99


The changes in FARC capabilities through 2001 and 2002 were unmistakable. Just following the arrest of the three men, the Colombian authorities were concerned with the implications of the involvement in urban areas in particular. One report from just after their capture states that the FARC rebels received training in ‘Semtex,’ a particular kind of explosive, and that this development would allow them to better attack cities through terrorist attacks rather than confining themselves to armed military conflict.100 The first observed change was the use of a gas attack against a police station, which was an entirely new tactic for the FARC but not necessarily known as one used by IRA.101 The Commander in Chief of Colombia’s armed forces (General Tapias) made a statement suggesting that this new kind of attack may reflect the IRA training but it was not necessarily the culprit. However, in the coming year, more and more reports surfaced regarding the FARC’s new capabilities. In one report in April of 2002, an explosive killed 32 police members while they were attempting to enter a FARC stronghold.102 The most audacious act, however, was the detonation of explosives in the military school and presidential palace in 2002’s August inauguration of President Uribe. A first round of explosives went off hours before the inauguration, causing

99 “Summary of Investigation of IRA Links to FARC Narco-Terrorists in Colombia,” Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives. April 24, 2002. The report claims that the IRA may have been offered up to $2 million for their training in explosives and other technologies.
102 Wilson, Lapper and Burns, “Army sees guiding hand of IRA in Colombia FARC Rebels.”
injury but mostly serving as a distractor for the later round of mortars, which killed 20 civilians and injured 60 others.\footnote{Jeremy McDermott. “Colombian attacks ‘have hallmark of IRA,’” \textit{BBC News}, August 11, 2002, accessed February 9, 2011, \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2186244.stm}.} Following this attack, a Colombian general (Reynaldo Castellanos) and a British bomb authority both noted the similarity to previous IRA actions (in the way the bombs were detonated), while other advances such as the type of mortars used and the remote control detonation were also far above the capabilities of the FARC just months before. Previously, any explosives composed by the FARC were seen as primitive, but in this instance only 4 of the 16 mortars used actually detonated and the attack was still remarkably disruptive and deadly.

Later, in summing up the changes in the FARC’s tactics, U.S. sources would note the FARC’s frequent use of this type of diversionary tactic, which had been seen as an IRA specialty. Through the use of either similar long-range explosives or car bombs, the FARC began to frequently use secondary devices to attack individuals responding to the first ones. This served as a way to isolate and eliminate security forces and, in particular, bomb experts,\footnote{Mark Burgess, “Globalizing Terrorism: The FARC-IRA Connection,” \textit{Center for Defense Information}. June 5, 2002, accessed March 5, 2011, \url{http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/farc-ira-pr.cfm}.} a tactic that had been used frequently in the IRA’s most violent years.\footnote{Wilson, Lapper and Burns, “Army sees guiding hand of IRA in Colombia FARC Rebels.” The authors describe the phenomena, saying “This month 12 people were killed in the city of Villavicencio when the rebels used the tactic, well-known in Northern Ireland, of setting off a small device to attract a crowd of security forces in time for a bigger explosion.”}

Given the status of one of the individuals arrested in this terrorism connection, early reports speculated about the sort of technological or weapons diversification the FARC would take advantage of as well. James Monaghan earned himself the nickname of ‘Mortar Monaghan’ by working as a specialist with the explosives for the IRA. According to one article, he supposedly developed the specific type of mortar used by the IRA, which had a
much more specific targeting ability. In another article written about a year later, the authors state that Colombian authorities noticed this increase in accuracy in the mortars the FARC had begun using. The improvements in weaponry the FARC was now able to use, explosives in particular, were not limited only to mortars. According to Juan Forero, “Colombian military officials here have blamed the I.R.A. for having greatly improved the rebel group's bomb-making and the accuracy of its rockets. In recent months car bombs have killed scores, and bomb detonation experts have lost their lives trying to disarm intricately fabricated booby traps.” This article even downplays the number of deaths allotted to bomb detonation, which other authors described as 10 percent of the state’s bomb experts killed by car bombs in the 18 months following IRA involvement. In other figures, in the same 18 months, 400 army officials were killed through FARC attacks and 19 police officers in one department alone.

Overall, there was a definite increase in the FARC’s ability to engage in urban warfare, as the possibility was previously nonexistent. This was a result of both tactical developments and, more importantly, the ability to use explosives accurately and efficiently. Most articles use the term ‘urban terrorism,’ implying a completely different type of violence than rural guerilla attacks and citing the IRA training as its cause. While the primary targets were still police and army officials, some authors have speculated that the move into urban terrorism was an effort to scare the city population into supporting greater concessions to the

106 Burgess, “Globalizing Terrorism: The FARC-IRA Connection.”
107 Wilson, Lapper and Burns, “Army sees guiding hand of IRA in Colombia FARC Rebels.”
109 Burgess, “Globalizing Terrorism: The FARC-IRA Connection,” and the Summary of Investigations
110 Burgess, “Globalizing Terrorism: The FARC-IRA Connection.”
111 Summary of Investigations. The department mentioned was Narino department, which is mentioned as a “FARC stronghold”.

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FARC in the 2002 presidential term. In addition to civilian casualties, the explosives have affected infrastructure and democratic institutions, as the FARC has managed to take out “bridges, power lines, reservoirs, and other facilities” while killing the same police and officials that help to preserve Colombian democracy. As clarification that this new, more lethal FARC was a result of IRA training, neither United States investigators nor the Colombian officials were able seize upon any another explanation for the new tactics. The benefits of the IRA training continued to be evident even until 2005, when Colombia’s armed forces chief discussed the use of IRA-like grenades even in smaller towns in the southwest of the state.

Perhaps unfortunately for the FARC, the arrest of these IRA activists came just a month before the September 11 attacks. The United States had already been paying greater attention to the FARC as it became the provider of 90 percent of the US’s cocaine and 70 percent of the heroin, but now, as it was proven to have international links to terrorist organizations, one proven and others speculated, the FARC was suddenly seen as a possible real threat. As a result of decisions from both within Colombia and from the United States, engaging the FARC in negotiation was limited after the election of President Uribe in 2002. The move into urban terrorism as a scare tactic did have the effect of generating increased attention, but unfortunately also resulted in a military crackdown rather than concessions. Assisted by the United States, Uribe was able to substantially strengthen the Colombian

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112 Wilson, Lapper and Burns, “Army sees guiding hand of IRA in Colombia FARC Rebels.”
113 Summary of Investigations
114 McDermott, “IRA Influence’ In FARC attacks.”
115 Summary of Investigations
military, but the FARC continued as a strong and violent presence for several more years in particular. ¹¹⁶

CONCLUSIONS

The FARC has experienced significant transitions over its now 47-year history. What began as but one of many peasant movements countering a repressive and acquisitive state lingers today as a violent, criminal organization. The new millennium has been a time of international infamy for the FARC, despite its considerable weakness by the close of the decade. Colombia’s growing military strength and state capacity during this time, particularly as a result of U.S. input via Plan Colombia, have isolated the FARC from many of its active supporters gained in the 1990s and helped to make the original aims of the organization appear obsolete. However, the insurgency’s choices to seek funding through the lucrative drug trade and to reach out to other criminal organizations are part of what have allowed it to continue as a threat to the state. In 1982, the FARC’s leadership accepted that participation in the new drug economy would not only ensure its survival but also allow it to finance the type of opposition it had been hoping for since its inception. The money earned from drugs, first through taxation, then use of FARC lands and airstrips, and finally from coca production and refinement itself was an impressive improvement from what could be earned through limited kidnappings and business extortion. With this money the FARC could both promise a sort of livelihood to young idealists, drug traffickers and cocaleros and appear as a valid, powerful force. This change is clearly represented in the vast increase in numbers of combatants and numbers of bands or ‘frentes’ the FARC could sustain. The increase in

support was also cyclical, allowing them to take more land and produce more coca—and eventually poppies for heroin—which increased their geographical presence substantially as well. Finally, by providing both connections and financial backing, the drug trade enabled the FARC to upgrade the weapons used by the insurgency and adequately supply its forces. This threefold increase in numbers, territory, and weapons allowed the insurgency to combat the Colombian state in multiple armed clashes. This new potency meant that by the 1990s, each administration tried in some way to negotiate with the FARC and to offer various concessions such as the demilitarized zone. As Felbab-Brown puts it: “Before it (the FARC) began to participate in the cultivation of coca and the production of cocaine, the group was small and largely powerless; following its embrace of drugs, it emerged as a dangerous challenger to the Colombian state.”

With drugs, the FARC became a challenger. However, it was still a challenger in a specific, isolated way, as it practiced almost entirely rural guerilla warfare. The insurgency now had the funding in place to expand their strategy, and chose to do so by reaching out to the IRA (though many speculate that the IRA was not the only terrorist organization in cahoots with the FARC at this time). The influence of three explosive specialists on FARC tactics and capabilities was unmistakable even within 18 months of the experts’ arrest. While the insurgency had largely failed to use explosives before, they were now able to manufacture and use mortars and car bombs accurately. They also clearly learned specific tactics for using these explosives such as radio detonation and the diversionary approach mentioned. Overall, collaboration with another violent group allowed the FARC to participate effectively for the first time in urban terrorism, which certainly gained them both

117 Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs, 77.
Colombian and international attention. It was around this time that the FARC was perceived as most violent and dangerous, even as it was no longer popularly viewed as an alternative to the Colombian state.

Several discrepancies with the original hypotheses regarding the drug trade should be discussed. First, an increase in state concessions was predicted as a result of the IRA involvement, but the increase in scope from the drug trade actually had a more positive result for the insurgency. The move into urban terrorism certainly sparked attention, but had the negative consequence of more focused military attention, rather than the sort of concessions seen through these administrations’ attempts to negotiate. An additional, unforeseen consequence of the drug trade was the use of narcotics funds to provide services such as new hospitals to domestic populations. However, these efforts to present themselves as the peasants’ allies did not result in approval of the insurgency itself, but rather support and appreciation of the income generated by coca production, which was protected by the FARC at the time.

The FARC, therefore, provides an excellent case study to illustrate of the effects of material support in the forms of both funding from narcotics and training from other violent groups. As suggested in my first hypothesis, becoming narcotics producers and traders certainly increased the overall scope of the FARC, arguably turning it into an actual, credible insurgency. Training from the IRA provided the FARC with an entirely new urban battleground, which I suggested in my third hypothesis that involvement with a non-state violent group provides an insurgency new tactics. However, an additional and unforeseen consequence of this collaboration was the strong military onslaught on the FARC motivated by both domestic and international attention. After examining the insurgency’s path and
strength over the last half-century in Colombia, it becomes clear that these two forms of external, non-state material aid were distinct in shaping the FARC’s greatly increased capabilities.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM

INTRODUCTION

During a recent lecture, Dr. Pushpa Iyer\textsuperscript{118} had to remind herself to refer to the LTTE as a failed insurgency. Although the Sri Lankan army successfully destroyed the insurgency and killed its leader in 2009, their long-standing presence in the northeast of the country had seemed permanent. Upon their decimation in May of 2009, war between the LTTE and the state had claimed over 90,000 lives and left thousands of others wounded or displaced.\textsuperscript{119} As

\textsuperscript{118} Pushpa Iyer, “Non-State Armed Groups: Making War and Making Peace: A look at the LTTE (Sri Lanka), GAM (Aceh), MILF (Mindanao, Philippines) Kachin Group (Burma),” March 21, 2011. Dr. Iyer is a specialist in South Asia at the Monterey Institute of International Relations.

\textsuperscript{119} Swamy, The Tiger Vanquished: LTTE’s story.
late as August of 2010, up to 6,000 of those who fled the country, especially from high-conflict Tamil areas, have yet to return. Internationally, the LTTE or Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam were recognized as one of the world’s most violent and potent armed groups (designated as a terrorist organization in many states, including the U.S.). Although the Sri Lankan conflict itself attracted little international commitment apart from an effort toward peace mediation in the start of the last decade (2000, 2001), LTTE’s cohesive, leadership-centered structure and their capacity to carry out attacks—frequently through the use of suicide terrorism-generated interest and fear. Until very close to its demise, the LTTE was a strong insurgency still seen as an alternative to the Sri Lankan state by some Tamils and even more so by the Tamil diaspora. Now, diaspora communities are the only possibility for any Tiger resurgence, a concern that illustrates both their international breadth and former capacity to provide for the LTTE.

In this chapter I discuss the diaspora as a source of material aid, specifically funding and propaganda, for the LTTE. I posit that fundraising increased the scale of their attacks on the Sri Lankan state. In addition, the provision and spread of propaganda increased public approval both within Sri Lanka and in the diaspora’s host countries. To test the results of this hypothesis, I monitor the LTTE’s actions and strength through the 1990s, during which they experienced both substantial growth and important increases in capability.

This chapter has three main sections. The first details the history of the Sri Lankan conflict, providing background information for the period discussed in my hypothesis. The second examines the Tamil diaspora, with sub-sections that address 1) the characteristics of the diaspora communities, 2) the methods of fundraising employed and their usefulness, 3)

121 Swamy, The Tiger Vanquished: LTTE’s story, 145.
the benefits of diaspora monetary assistance, 4) the benefits of disseminating propaganda, and 5) the influence the Tamil diaspora has upon the LTTE in turn. The final section reviews and analyzes the ways substantial diaspora support affected the capabilities of the LTTE.

A BRIEF HISTORY: THE SRI LANKAN CONFLICT UNTIL 1990

The Sri Lankan conflict, like the violence in Colombia, was prolonged and complex. While the FARC’s peasant roots led to their formation and leftist ideology, the Tamil ethnicity and its historical role in Sri Lanka form the basis of the LTTE’s purpose. Sri Lanka itself, known as Ceylon until 1972,\footnote{Gamini Samaranyake, “Political Violence in Sri Lanka: A Diagnostic Approach,” \textit{Terrorism & Political Violence}, 9, no.2, (1997): 99.} was a British colony until 1948, but the armed conflict between ethnic Tamils based in the north and northeast and the majority Sinhalese began largely after independence. Tamils are predominantly Hindu, while the Sinhalese are Buddhist.\footnote{Wayland, “Ethnonationalist networks and transnational opportunities: the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora,” 412. Wayland asserts that the Tamil population, which was originally from India, encompasses 11% of the Sri Lankan population.} As the state developed through the 20th century, Tamils pursued higher-level jobs requiring education and frequently took places of authority even in the non-Tamil capitol, while the Sinhalese south capitalized on greater agricultural resources and thus provided related employment.

The election of the Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) in 1956 sparked a change in Sri Lankan politics. This party was built on a pro-Sinhalese/Buddhist platform, opposed to western ideas and somewhat resentful of the positions of public office Tamils had previously held.\footnote{Wayland, “Ethnonationalist networks and transnational opportunities: the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora,” 412. Naturally, this created tension with Tamil communities who were concerned about the level of oppression under the new government. The push for a separate state based in the
north and northeast territories of Sri Lanka developed over the next decade, emerging as an organized movement in the 1970s.\textsuperscript{125} The LTTE began as the Tamil Student’s Federation but changed its name to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam—Tamil Eelam meaning separate Tamil state—in 1975.\textsuperscript{126} At its onset, the group based their demands for a separate state on Marxist ideology, but redefined them after realizing that a mission grounded in Tamil ethnicity would have a broader support base.\textsuperscript{127} From the start, their leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, maintained strictly centralized control and was held in extremely high regard by the insurgency itself. The LTTE and the Sri Lankan separatist movement continued to grow in the 1970s, with Tamil political parties uniting under the Tamil United Liberation Front in 1976.

Alongside political processes, the LTTE and other, similar Tamil groups began to use violence to promote their aims. Their attacks were small in scale through the 1970s, focusing on police who were gathering intelligence against the LTTE and eventually on ethnic Sinhalese and others in these police forces.\textsuperscript{128} The number of casualties escalated and an attack on Sinhalese soldiers in 1983 triggered massive rioting, after which the northeast of Sri Lanka was thrown into civil war as Tamil student movements joined the militant efforts and the Sri Lankan government attempted to suppress them with violence in turn.\textsuperscript{129} This civil war marked the beginning of the prolonged Tamil exodus from the area and led to the widespread diasporas in western countries and neighboring India. India itself aided the Sri Lankan government from 1987 to 1990 by sending troops to occupy the Tamil areas of the

\textsuperscript{126} Wayland, “Ethnonationalist networks and transnational opportunities: the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora,” 413.
\textsuperscript{127} Iyer
\textsuperscript{128} Samaranayake, “Political Violence in Sri Lanka: A Diagnostic Approach,” 115.
\textsuperscript{129} Wayland, “Ethnonationalist networks and transnational opportunities: the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora,” 413.
country. These peacekeeping forces were unable to elicit any substantial compromise from the LTTE and when they left the area in 1990, the guerilla army claimed complete control of the northeast and the Jaffna peninsula.

THE DIASPORA: RAISING FUNDS, DISTRIBUTING PROPAGANDA

Although the LTTE was able to initiate violence in Sri Lanka prior to the formation and exploitation of Tamil diaspora communities, the massive influx of funds from these sources has undoubtedly been important for the insurgency’s capability to oppose the state. In the case of the LTTE, the extent of the diaspora was such that it was at times the main force keeping the insurgency alive. My hypothesis for the effect this essential aid had on the LTTE is that the material support—financial backing—from the diaspora resulted in greater scale attacks against the state. However, the diaspora may exercise some control over the nature of these attacks. I hypothesize that an additional function of the diaspora is to disseminate pro-insurgency propaganda, which increases popular approval.

For the LTTE, the most notable effects of diaspora support were stronger, more offensive attacks, by which I mean that they occurred at a greater frequency and allowed the insurgency to boast of more victories against the state through a variety of campaigns already in use by the Tigers. I evaluate the effect of the diaspora support over the period from 1990 to 2001, noting the diaspora’s decision to decrease funding after September 11, 2001. I will also analyze the function of the diaspora in creating a more favorable perception of the LTTE.

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130 Ibid.
131 This chapter uses Wayland’s definition of diaspora, found on page 408, “A diaspora is a type of transnational community that has been dispersed from its homeland, whose members permanently reside in one or more ‘host’ countries and possess a collective, sometimes idealised, myth of the homeland and will to return.”
internationally and within Tamil communities. In the next section, however, I present a description of the Tamil diaspora to illustrate its particular effectiveness.

**Scope of the Tamil Diaspora**

Perhaps one of the most noticeable characteristics of the LTTE is the extent of its international support in the form of the diaspora of ethnic Tamils.\(^{132}\) The exodus began in the early to mid-1980s, when there was widespread violence against Tamil families as a reaction to the formation of Tamil separatist groups, in cities such as Colombo and Jaffna in particular. More affluent families resettled in western countries, taking advantage of more liberal asylum laws, while some fled to the Tamil Nadu area of India.\(^{133}\) Although the diaspora is global in scale, Canada and the United Kingdom boast particularly large populations of Tamil immigrants in addition to organizations (the British Tamil Organization or UTO and the Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils) created specifically to promote ethnic unity and advertise the Tamil cause.\(^{134}\) These large, highly organized groups begin at the community level, where they solicit participation based upon their common ethnic and cultural heritage. Cultural events and holidays serve the double purpose of physically uniting the community and spreading news about the progression of battles and

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\(^{132}\) Peter Chalk, “Tigers Abroad: How the LTTE Diaspora Supports the Conflict in Sri Lanka,” *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, 9, no. 2, (2008): 98. Chalk says that the LTTE is ‘abnormal among insurgencies’ because it has access to this well established international network.


\(^{134}\) Chalk, “Tigers Abroad: How the LTTE Diaspora Supports the Conflict in Sri Lanka,” 98, and Wayland, “Ethnonationalist networks and transnational opportunities: the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora,” 419. Fair, “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements,” 140. Canada and the United Kingdom are singled out among Western countries for their importance despite that Tamil diasporas exist in the United States and other Western European countries such as France and Switzerland, first because of their size and second because legislation against any funding being funneled to the LTTE (later designated as a terrorist organization) occurred later in these countries than, for example, in the United States. Fair ties this concept to the importance on free speech, organization and representation in these states and the readiness of the refugee Tamil families to make use of them.
efforts within Sri Lanka. Because the vast majority of the Tamil diaspora are, in fact, refugees, these communities maintain a strong distrust of the Sri Lankan government and army due to family casualties and the terror of the civil war, and therefore passionately support the separatist cause as a viable solution to Tamil woes.

Numerical estimates of the size of the diaspora are varied. Estimates in the past ten years range from 450,000 to one million but tend to fall closer to 7-800,000. In 2001, the UN estimate for the global diaspora was 817,000. This number can be broken down into roughly 350,000 in Canada, 300,000 in the United Kingdom and 150,000 in India, with other states making up the remainder. Overall, the growing size and scope of the Tamil diaspora provided a substantial, sympathetic population from which the LTTE could elicit material aid in their fight for a separate Tamil state.

**Fundraising Strength**

The LTTE benefited greatly from the steady income provided through taxation of Tamil families abroad, donations, and business agreements with the various diaspora communities. Unlike other insurgencies, who may pull upon diaspora funding as a supplemental income, the LTTE gained a substantial part of their funds to sustain everyday operations and essential purchases from their fellow Tamils living abroad. As the amount of individuals living in diaspora increased, these communities were increasingly seen as a

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135 Chalk, “Tigers Abroad: How the LTTE Diaspora Supports the Conflict in Sri Lanka,” 100.

136 Camilla Orjuela, “Distant warriors, distant peace workers? Multiple diaspora roles in Sri Lanka’s violent conflict,” *Global Networks*, 8, no. 4 (2008): 440. Orueja states that this wide margin is roughly one quarter of the entire Sri Lankan Tamil population. Other estimates come from Chalk (600-800,000) and Fair (between 7 and 800,000).


source of steady income through various fundraising efforts undertaken by the international branches of the LTTE. In general, it seems that funds were appropriated through three methods: 1) direct taxation or donations from the community, 2) through front groups acting as NGOs or charitable organizations, and 3) through the use of legally owned businesses which both provided a share of their profits and frequently provided an avenue for weapons purchasing and shipping.\(^{139}\)

LTTE international members living and operating in different states were able to access funding directly from the diasporas. Main hotspots for diaspora funding existed in Canada and the United Kingdom or Western Europe, and the United States to some extent prior to the LTTE’s designation as a Foreign Terrorist organization in 1997. Though some of the donations are voluntary, part of the steady flow of money follows the structure of taxation by the insurgency that many families were accustomed to prior to their departure from Sri Lanka.\(^{140}\) This basic level fundraising can be leveraged in a monthly fee per family or in the form of a fee based upon a certain amount per individual.\(^{141}\) In addition to these, LTTE operatives demanded increased giving on days of importance for the separatist struggle such as their Martyr’s Day. While some families certainly gave to the cause willingly, others were reminded of the situation of family members still living in LTTE controlled areas, and that their safety required a certain level of fiscal participation.\(^{142}\) In some cases, LTTE structures


\(^{141}\) Gunaratna, “Sri Lanka: Feeding the Tamil Tigers,” 207 and 211, and Chalk, “Tigers Abroad: How the LTTE Diaspora Supports the Conflict in Sri Lanka,” 101. Chalk states that that, in Canada, there was a standardized tax of $240 to $646 USD per family each year.

offered protection from deportation or other penalties in the migrants’ new home countries, and levered this as a threat for giving.\textsuperscript{143} Wealthier donors provided additional funding, while overall donations fluctuated with the military success of the insurgency: increasing with battlefield successes and decreasing to encourage negotiations with the Sri Lankan army.\textsuperscript{144} The total scope of direct fundraising from the diaspora was extremely important for the LTTE, and contributed particularly to the procurement of arms.\textsuperscript{145}

The foundation of various organizations or agencies with the stated purpose of Tamil aid allowed the LTTE a very effective additional fundraising source. The Tamil Relief Organization or TRO was a particularly capable example of pulling in additional funding and accessing Tamil populations on a global scale.\textsuperscript{146} Though the organization did provide humanitarian relief to local populations, thus boosting their image and support in Sri Lanka, a part of the money was also used for the purchase of arms and better technology. By presenting this mission of providing relief or infrastructure development through other organizations, the insurgency is ultimately able to access funds from other NGOs, individuals, and occasionally even host government grants.\textsuperscript{147} Particularly in the early 1990s, these umbrella organizations gained a high level of interest by presenting abuses from the Sri Lankan state against the Tamil population. However, in the late 1990s and particularly following 2001, funding from LTTE related groups was increasingly difficult to generate due

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Both authors make note of the efficiency of the LTTE organization in accessing the members of the diaspora communities and keeping records of their locations and amounts given, in addition to their connections in Sri Lanka.\textsuperscript{143} Fair, “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements,” 141.

\textsuperscript{144} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{145} Gunaratna, “Sri Lanka: Feeding the Tamil Tigers,” 207. Gunaratna says that the combination of “voluntary and coerced contributions from individual members have formed the principal source of economic revenue for the LTTE’s procurement of military equipment.”

\textsuperscript{146} Gunaratna, “Sri Lanka: Feeding the Tamil Tigers,” 204.

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid and Chalk. “Tigers Abroad: How the LTTE Diaspora Supports the Conflict in Sri Lanka,” 101. According to Chalk, the extent of these funds (given to organizations but the majority used to fund LTTE military operations) can reach $2 million per month.
to national laws preventing fund raising for an organization now designated as a terrorist group.148

A third mechanism for fundraising involved the creation and use of Tamil-oriented businesses and industries. One method was for the LTTE—or more likely one of the aforementioned umbrella or front groups—to provide the start-up capital for a local, community level business and later split the profits with its actual, registered owners.149 This not only provides additional funding, but also gives a community based connection for the international wing to communicate with other Tamils. A second strategy was the creation of international-level businesses largely investing in Tamil cultural products such as music and movies to be marketed to the diaspora.150 While these businesses generated less income than other diaspora fund raising, they also created a legal front with which to pursue illegal connections to arms purchases and shipping.

These three sources generate a significant portion of the Tigers’ financial means. Some references make mention of even greater exploitation of the Tamil diaspora through harsher methods such as charging for relocation of Tamil migrants.151 One suggested total was that about $60 million USD yearly of the $100 million total budget came from the

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148 The United States designated the LTTE as a terrorist organization in 1997 and prohibited its largest fundraising sub-groups from operating soon afterward, while the UK did not do so until 2001, and the EU and Canada waited until 2006.
149 Wayland, “Ethnonationalist networks and transnational opportunities: the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora,” 422,423, Chalk, “Tigers Abroad: How the LTTE Diaspora Supports the Conflict in Sri Lanka,” 101, and Fair, “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements,”141. Fair says that the money earned from these start-up businesses can be over $1,000,000 per month. Chalk, meanwhile, cites a figure from Canada alone in 1998 to 1999 (although he states that actual data is relatively nonexistent due to ambiguity) of $6.5 million through business funding.
150 Gunaratna, “Sri Lanka: Feeding the Tamil Tigers,” 208, Specifically, in 1994 one LTTE front company was used to buy explosives, detonators, and other equipment from plants in the Ukraine.
151 Chalk, “Tigers Abroad: How the LTTE Diaspora Supports the Conflict in Sri Lanka,” 102. He mentions that the LTTE assists by trafficking individuals to western countries, charging in the range of $18,000 to $32,000 for each person.
diaspora and external network, but other figures imply a much higher total budget. The majority of these funds are used for arms procurement while the remainder keeps the basic functions and events of the insurgency functioning. This high percentage illustrates the vital nature of the diaspora for the LTTE’s survival. Several sources comment that dependence upon this international network only increased with time, particularly following losses of territory such as the commercial area of Jaffna in 1995. The importance of the diaspora’s financial support was also demonstrated by the concern expressed by the Sri Lankan government to other governments, seeking their aid in limiting diaspora funding in whatever way possible. In addition, when the United Kingdom declared the LTTE to be a terrorist organization in 2001, it was forecasted to be a “financial blow,” indicating that the new preventions against fundraising would greatly limit the LTTE’s capacity to purchase arms in particular. Through the 1990s, it became increasingly evident that, as Daniel Byman and his coauthors’ text stated, there was “little doubt that without this economic backing, the group’s ability to continue with the Tamil Eelam struggle would be significantly reduced.” Despite this source’s support of the importance of the diaspora for the LTTE insurgency, the authors do not fully explain how the capabilities of the LTTE were augmented, which I discuss in the next section.

153 Ibid, Fair, “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements,” 140. According to Gunaratna, a full 90% is used for arms. Fair suggests an annual budget of $82 million, but that a full 80% of this total comes from external operations.
155 “Hitting the Tigers in their pockets,” The Economist, March 8, 2001, accessed March 23, 2011. http://www.economist.com/node/529218. This article states: “The London ‘political wing’ controls branches in other European countries, the United States, Canada and Australia. Between them they raise money for the Tigers estimated at $450m-500m a year. Much of it is used to keep the Tigers supplied with arms.”
156 Byman and others, Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements, 54.
Fundraising Benefits: Arms, Troops, and Increased Attacks

While the benefits of the diaspora’s engagement with the LTTE were important, their effect upon the insurgency itself is subtler than the massive and marked growth in scope of the FARC as a result of drug profits. One explanation for this phenomenon is that the extremely centralized control around the leader of the insurgency and the secrecy he promoted about the functioning of the LTTE may be the cause of relatively low levels of information about the insurgency itself. However, the insurgency’s strength escalated primarily in the 1990s through an increased acquisition of weapons and capacity to maintain troops, which was used to engage in more aggressive confrontations, and encourage the growing perception of the insurgency as a true threat to the Sri Lankan state. The next several paragraphs discuss how these three developments enabled the LTTE to challenge the Sri Lankan state by increasing the scale of their attacks.

The most directly observable benefits of the diaspora funding are the weapons attained with it. As discussed in the previous section, a substantial portion of the funds provided for Tamil aid were actually allocated to the purchase of weapons from international sources.\(^\text{157}\) However, this capacity increased through the 1990s as the international fronts of the LTTE learned how best to organize and draw funds from the diaspora. Immediately following the Indian peacekeeping force’s departure from Sri Lanka, in 1988 and 1989 the LTTE essentially armed themselves through raids on the Sri Lankan army forces, which limited them to small arms.\(^\text{158}\) After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold


\(^{158}\) John Sislin and Frederic Pearson, “Arms and Escalation in Ethnic Conflicts: The Case of Sri Lanka”
war, the LTTE had amassed enough funding to benefit from the newly reinforced black market for weapons. In 1994, they were able to attain a large shipment of explosives.\(^{159}\) In the late 1990s, the LTTE made a push to increase their capacity by expanding their naval and aerial capabilities.\(^{160}\) The year 2000, before the events of 9/11 sharply increased attention to the global arms trade and violent groups, the insurgency invested heavily in howitzers, mortars and small arms.\(^{161}\)

The different nature of each of these purchases implies that the ample budget afforded an increase in arms for a variety of offensive campaigns. The LTTE is unusual in that its increasing offense against the state entailed a number of campaigns, including terrorism, naval, and aerial capabilities alongside guerilla warfare. The secrecy of the insurgency’s internal dealings prevents full understanding of how so many campaigns against the state were possible for the LTTE. However, as these efforts were developed in the insurgency’s formative years, they should not be seen as new, distinct tactics brought in as the conflict progressed.

Further budget increases allowed the LTTE to fund a vastly increased number of fighters, ranging from guerillas to their elite cadre of suicide bombers.\(^{162}\) One figure for the maintenance of the growing number of troops—10,000 to 14,000 cadres of according to one source, though information is scarce for much of the 1990s—was a required $7 million

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\(^{159}\) Sislin and Pearson, “Arms and Escalation in Ethnic Conflicts: The Case of Sri Lanka,” 152.

\(^{160}\) Ibid, the authors discuss an increase in naval capacity (even attempts to purchase a small submarine) and the purchase of small aircraft and missiles.


\(^{162}\) Cécile Van de Voorde, “Sri Lankan Terrorism: Assessing and Responding to the Threat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),” *Police Practice & Research*, 6, no. 2, (2005): 184. Van de Voorde states that the first terrorist attack carried out by the LTTE occurred just after its inception in 1978. This implies that the group was, in fact, one of the instigators of using terrorism—suicide terror in particular—for political goals, and is distinct in its maintenance of such an elite group for the purpose of suicide terror.
annually. By actually allocating some of the money destined for Tamil relief to infrastructure development and family aid, the LTTE solicited tolerance from the local communities and thus preserved their original havens and their recruitment bases. Many Tamils abroad also reaffirmed their commitment to Tamil Eelam and the Tigers, and encouraged this approval when writing or sending money home, which served as an additional boost to these efforts.

Through both the money gained and the networking capacity of such an international organization, the LTTE was able to develop from a small, poorly prepared fighting force of students to an insurgency that could directly engage with the Sri Lankan armed forces. The guerilla roots of the LTTE meant that it continued to make use of the jungle areas as a retreat and base when faced by losses of urban areas like that of Jaffna in 1995, and they continued to use lower-risk strategies such as the assassination of political leaders. However, a high number of both recruits and new weapons meant that the LTTE could expand their opposition in a number of ways, such as an unconventional navy, which was an effective counterweight against the actual Sri Lankan naval force. Through the 1990s, the LTTE instigated several strong offensives against army holdings and bases, leading to heavier military casualties and an increase of territory in some instances. In the late 1990s, the insurgency amped up their signature use of terrorism, specifically in the capital city of

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165 O’Duffy, “LTTE: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,” 274.
166 Sislin and Pearson, “Arms and Escalation in Ethnic Conflicts: The Case of Sri Lanka,” 151, 153, and Samaranyake, “Political Violence in Sri Lanka: A Diagnostic Approach,” 116-117. Both authors note the attacks on Elephant’s Pass and Mankulam in 1991. Sislin and Pearson discuss an additional important attack on an army garrison in 1996 and the complete takeover of Elephant’s pass in 2000. In both texts, the increase of army casualties is highlighted as an important factor, though Samaranyake also says that the insurgency gradually began to attack Sinhalese villages on the edges of their territory as well. To add to the LTTE’s naval victories, Samaranyake says that they frequently attacked ports and famously blew up two Sri Lankan naval ships in 1995.
Colombo, with attacks on oil complexes outside of the city in 1995, the Central Bank in 1996, the World Trade Centre in 1997, and a large-scale attack on the airport in 2001. The combination of naval attacks, stronger guerilla action against the armed forces, and terrorism implies a growing ability to take the offensive and frequently emerge victorious against the Sri Lankan forces and government. Guaratna in particular is clear that the funding and networking benefits from the diaspora were crucial in moving the LTTE’s struggle beyond perpetual small-arms battles in the jungle. He writes, “Economic support by the Tamil diaspora and migrant communities has enabled the LTTE to pursue a more direct and high-intensity campaign against the Sri Lankan state security forces.”

*Spreading Propaganda: an Additional Benefit*

Though the diaspora’s primary supporting function was their financial investment in the LTTE, they also served an important diplomatic and propaganda-spreading role. Particularly in the earlier years of the insurgency, these refugee community members were the primary Tamil voice, able to influence other, newly arrived Tamils, potential donors, and politicians or diplomats in their new homes. These communities made use of the oppressive image of the Sri Lankan forces in the conflict of the 1980s and the uncompromising administration of the early 1990s to drum up additional sympathy and legitimize the struggle for a Tamil state. The Eelam Political Administration, another LTTE international body, created a tailored, three part vision of the conflict used to promote the Tamil cause: that the

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167 O’Duffy “LTTE: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,” 275, and Samaranyake, “Political Violence in Sri Lanka: A Diagnostic Approach,” 117. Though the terrorist wing existed before this, these new actions were notable for their large scale and their location- in the capital city of Colombo, further from LTTE control.


169 Wayland, “Ethnonationalist networks and transnational opportunities: the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora,” 413, and Chalk, “Tigers Abroad: How the LTTE Diaspora Supports the Conflict in Sri Lanka,” 100. Chalk discusses the lingering consideration of the LTTE as a valid organization by some western states due to effective presentation of the conflict by the diaspora.
Tamils had been victimized, that an independent state was the only way to ensure their safety, and that the LTTE was the means by which to achieve this independence. Propaganda efforts included basic distribution of flyers and information, community events and marches, and directly lobbying government officials. This direct lobbying proved effective, particularly in states with large Tamil populations, as politicians were afraid of losing the community vote if they took a hard stance on the LTTE. The states with large, active diasporas (such as Canada and the UK) took legal steps against the LTTE and LTTE fundraising much later.

The active diaspora also helped to generate support within previously untapped Tamil diaspora communities and from Tamils in Sri Lanka itself. This encouragement of domestic popular approval helped preserve the LTTE’s community presence. Propaganda became highly technical, using easily accessible websites, emails, and social networking to keep the international community abreast of developments in the conflict and create the atmosphere of a worldwide effort.

These online sources made it easier for diaspora members to continue the function of urging LTTE approval from those in Sri Lanka, as well. Essentially, in addition to a greatly increased budget, the diaspora formed the foundations of a global network that both drummed up popular approval abroad and encouraged the Tamil population in the midst of the struggle to continue tolerating the presence and actions of the insurgency.

171 In one notable example, in 1998, between 5,000 and 20,000 people marched on the Ontario legislature as a protest against Sri Lankan treatment of Tamils. Wayland, “Ethnonationalist networks and transnational opportunities: the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora,” 420.
172 Chalk, “Tigers Abroad: How the LTTE Diaspora Supports the Conflict in Sri Lanka,” 100.
173 Ibid
Tradeoffs? Diaspora Influence on the LTTE

Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the world’s attention turned to limiting terrorist and illegal action. This, of course, affected the LTTE as it came under increased scrutiny from the United States, who originally listed it as a terrorist group in 1997, and the United Kingdom, where it gained this distinction for the first time. Overall, 2001 signaled a strong downturn in the insurgency’s perception and created additional setbacks as arms became more difficult and expensive to procure. Both as a result of newly enforced limitations and the diasporas’ unwillingness to support the now clearly-labeled terrorist organization, funding began to wane. Practices like suicide bombing and recruitment of child soldiers garnered increased attention as the conflict continued, but this failed to limit diaspora funding until close to the new millennium. 175 Though in 2001 Sri Lanka elected a more conciliatory government, many authors cite the waning diaspora support as a primary catalyst for the ceasefire the insurgency declared that December. This was accomplished both through a decrease in funding and the diaspora’s insistence that the LTTE consider political avenues toward independence or even autonomy—specifically the peace talks offered by Colombo at this time. 176 This change to a political approach, which followed a period of considerable military success, can be seen as an indicator of the diaspora’s influence and the importance of their support but does not fully correspond with my initial hypothesis.

My hypothesis proposed that the diaspora would be able to influence decisions regarding targets or strategies pursued by the LTTE. The Tamil diaspora does not appear to have expected or exercised this level of control. It was only due to mounting international pressure and a reassessment of the LTTE’s overall image that the diaspora began to withhold

175 Fair, “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements,” 145.
176 Ibid
funds, and frequently only after limitations were imposed by the host state. By doing so, they did encourage the insurgency to choose a temporary ceasefire, as the capability to attack the state was strongly dependent upon the diaspora’s funding. Because there was no change seen in the LTTE’s chosen targets or even practices in violation of human rights norms, my proposition that aid would result in a sort of policing role for the diaspora was not upheld by the case of the LTTE. The undeniable control exercised by the insurgency’s leader may account for this lack of external influence, but this question requires further study to explain the degree of involvement the Tamil diaspora had upon the conflict itself. It is undeniable, however, that united action such as withholding funds from the diaspora was a significant threat, and that the insurgency relied heavily upon their support.

The diaspora’s impact remains notable even following the LTTE’s dissolution in 2009. Although the insurgency itself was entirely crushed by the Sri Lankan army and their leader, Prabhakaran, had been killed, sources warned about the danger of the diaspora reawakening the civil war. One news article advised countries with substantial Tamil populations to closely monitor fundraising and community activity in an effort to “ensure that their territories will not be used to reignite LTTE’s failed but extraordinarily bloody terrorism.” 177 This ongoing consideration highlights the dependency of the LTTE upon their global network and its importance in turn throughout the insurgency’s history. 178

CONCLUSIONS

178 Fair, “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements,” 146-147. As Fair says, “the LTTE was from its inception thoroughly rooted to the diaspora and its various institutions and therefore dependent upon the structure afforded by the diaspora for revenue raising, public diplomacy, perception management and so forth.”
Though the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam is now a failed insurgency, its bloody memory lingers in the minds of conflict analysts and, of course, the Tamil people. Over its 26-year history as an armed insurgency, the LTTE grew from a small band of committed Tamil fighters to “a monstrous and mammoth entity that could rival the Al Qaeda if it wanted to.” As presented in this chapter, the ethnic Tamil diaspora, expelled from Sri Lanka as refugees in the mid-1980s, generated much of the support that made this increase in fighting capability possible. The diaspora generates both funds and propaganda for the LTTE. These funds, which may have reached into the $100 million per year range, were used to purchase more or more technologically advanced arms, increase the size of the various fighting units, and use an array of strategies, gaining an overall ‘offensive’ position. In accordance with my hypothesis, these developments allowed the LTTE to truly engage the state on a number of battlefields. In addition, by disseminating propaganda, the diaspora presented the LTTE as a viable opponent rather than a terrorist group in their host states, both delaying legal actions against the insurgency and encouraging popular approval from all Tamil families. As hypothesized, the diaspora did increase this approval, which included a lack of condemnation by several key Western states, by providing and circulating positive propaganda. The importance of the diaspora was such that it became the backbone of the insurgency’s prowess, providing a majority of their funding and fulfilling an even larger supportive role by naturally forming a global structure.

It was essential enough to change the insurgency’s course of action when such aid was revoked, but did not have the ability to make choices about targets or offensives, or to limit the conflict for humane concerns. This may have been based upon Prabhakaran’s complete control of the insurgency’s actions, or an unwillingness of the diaspora to support

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any reforms in a unified or substantial manner. The question of insurgency setbacks due to diaspora input should be further studied, as the hypothesis presented in this thesis was not supported by the case study of the LTTE. Additionally, due to the lack of information about the operations of the insurgency itself, it is difficult to identify an explanation for how the LTTE formed naval and aerial branches, though they were clearly supported financially by the diaspora and originated nearly alongside the LTTE itself as some of its first efforts against the state. Despite these limitations, the importance of the Tamil diaspora in increasing capabilities such as the scale of attacks against the state and the level of popular approval is undeniable. The Tamil diaspora provided the support to form the LTTE into a veritable monster of an insurgency.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Though many assert that the FARC no longer poses a threat to Colombia, the insurgency is not entirely eradicated: they continue to take hostages and exert control over parts of the Colombian state. Though it has proved more persistent than most, the terrible longevity of insurgencies is only exacerbated by access to a source of material aid. In the FARC’s case, this source has evidently been the drug trade. Other insurgencies endeavor to access different, sustainable connections to material support, which merits a thorough investigation into non-state sources. This thesis began that investigation in the hopes that it will be continued in the future.

This chapter has four sections. First, I assess the contribution this thesis has made to the extant literature. Second, I analyze the case studies and synthesize the results, noting the successes and failures of each hypothesis and further limitations of the research. Third, I make suggestions for policymakers to face the challenge of insurgency conflict based upon the results of this analysis. Finally, I suggest future investigation on the topic of material non-state aid and conclude.

CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE

In the second chapter, I presented three hypotheses about the role of certain sources of material support on an insurgency’s capabilities. First, narcotics trafficking should provide an insurgency with increased income, thereby affording them the possibility to expand the scope of the insurgency in several ways, such as the number of fighters or weapons. Second, diaspora support in the form of funding will result in an intensified campaign against the state, though diasporas may then attempt to influence decisions regarding targets or strategies
of attack. Diasporas can also be expected to encourage popular approval by circulating propaganda. Finally, training received from a fellow non-state armed group will allow an insurgency to add new, distinct tactics and constitute a greater threat, resulting in state attention or concessions. By testing each hypothesis, this thesis advanced the research on third party aid to insurgencies and served as a catalyst for future investigation.

The use of case studies to test each hypothesis has revealed much about how types of non-state actors assist insurgencies. By holding constant other variables that affect insurgency success, I have isolated the positive or negative effects of third-party aid upon an insurgency’s capabilities and capacity to rival the state. The analysis of these effects increases our understanding of several key factors: 1) the role of key non-state entities; namely the drug trade, diasporas, and other non-state violent groups in affecting insurgency capabilities, 2) the types of aid they provide; namely greater income, funding and propaganda, and training or distinct weapons, and 3) how the aid provided by these actors is applied by an insurgency to increase its capabilities.

The next section summarizes these three types of findings for the case studies of the FARC and the LTTE.

THE CASE STUDIES

To study the results of involvement with the narcotics trade and another violent group—here, a terrorist group—I assessed the FARC’s strength over two periods. The first, from 1982 to 2000, reflects the main period of benefit derived from the drug trade. The second, from 2001 onward, demonstrates changes in the insurgency’s actions after support from the IRA. Investment in the drug trade and collaboration with a non-state armed group
were analyzed separately, because they mainly occurred over different years and provided distinct types of material aid. As expected, the evident discrepancy between the two types of benefits created for the insurgency suggest that the FARC pursued distinct sources of support to combat the state in separate ways.

The insurgency’s role in the drug trade facilitated several important increases: in their income, territory, number of combatants, and military prowess. The first increase reflects the primary type of support available through the drug trade: an enormous amount of funds, particularly when compared to the budget prior to the 1982 decision to tax coca production. The FARC more than quadrupled its income over the first two decades of its participation in the trade, jumping from $45 million per year in the early 1980s to over $200 million per year at the close of the 20th century. While these impressive figures are important, they alone have no consequence upon the insurgency’s interaction with the state. However, the increase in troops, territory and weaponry afforded by the funding certainly did. Both the total number of active supporters or guerilla fighters and the number of fighting fronts the FARC could financially support grew remarkably. The number of FARC fighters expanded from about 3,000 in the mid-1980s to 18,000 by 2001. This six-fold increase created an army capable of matching the Colombian state’s and furthered the legitimacy of the organization. The territory seized for these forces to occupy grew in a similar manner over these years of newfound income. The process of territorial gain proceeded somewhat more rapidly, with the insurgency controlling nearly half of the country’s land in the final

181 Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs, 81.
years of the 1980s.\textsuperscript{183} In this situation, drug resources created a circular effect, simultaneously pulling in peasants’ property for cultivation and taxing the products of this land to afford the forcible capture of other territory. A final, but notable consequence of this lucrative source of support was the access to and purchase of large quantities of weapons and more sophisticated technologies. Individually, each of these observable effects of the monetary support provided by the narcotics trade would still have been a significant boon for the FARC. However, as proposed by my hypothesis, the combination of these improvements meant that the scope of the FARC impressively increased. The group grew markedly in terms of people and territory, and allocated these new resources to emerge as a military force that could truly counter the Colombian state. As expected, in the case of the FARC, funding from the drug trade produced a striking metamorphosis from a struggling band of guerillas to a threatening goliath of a fighting force.

The effects upon the FARC’s capabilities resulting from their collaboration with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in 2001 were less grandiose or far ranging. Instead, the training received provided specific innovations for what had become a capable insurgency employing a guerilla strategy. Unlike the gradual buildup of territory, troops, and military capability afforded by the drug trade, changes in the insurgency’s capabilities were evident almost immediately following their explosives training with IRA operatives. In the year after they received this support from the IRA, the FARC’s operations changed in one basic, but influential way: they could now engage in urban terrorism via the use of mortars—a previously inaccessible weapon due to their lack of training. Though the group was already notorious throughout Colombia and abroad, this new technical and tactical capability provided the chance to affect the lives of Colombia’s urban population and wreak havoc.

\textsuperscript{183} Felbab-Brown. \textit{Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs}, 82.
upon the Colombian police force. Though the immediate effect of IRA support was as predicted, the second part of my hypothesis is less conclusive. Urban crusades brought the FARC heightened media attention and increased state wariness, but did not result in any notable concessions. Instead, greater concessions such as the demilitarized zone were seen for the FARC through several administrations as a result of increased scope due to narcotics funding. Certainly, following IRA training, the FARC was at its most threatening to Colombia and its citizens, but it was precisely this threat and strength that prompted greater U.S. aid and a more severe Colombian military response. Hence, the way support from a non-state armed group manifested itself was as predicted, but the eventual result for the FARC’s success was, if anything, negative rather than positive.

A comparison of the first part of the FARC case with that of the LTTE demonstrates that the effects of diaspora funding resemble those of money obtained through the drug trade. Similar to the FARC, the LTTE was hardly a threat to the Sri Lankan state before it laid claim to the wages of Tamils fleeing from the conflict into Western countries. The insurgency, as expected, used their new level of income from tapping into this source to increase troop levels and their variety and amount of weapons, using each as a necessary component to increasing the scale of their attacks. However, unlike the FARC, the LTTE expanded their strength through a variety of offensive fronts against the state by relying on the support of the diaspora. The LTTE was perhaps the only insurgency to boast both a naval branch and an elite group of suicide bombers early in its progress, made possible by the rapid increase of diaspora funding. Once diaspora support became a common occurrence for

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the insurgency, they launched a full offensive campaign against Colombo, moving out of the jungles and onto the battlefield and even cities through terrorism.

An additional, evident benefit to the LTTE was the diaspora’s creation and dissemination of pro-Tamil propaganda among the Tamil communities abroad, in Sri Lanka and to the governments of their new home states. Through community events, websites, lobbying, and basic forms of communication with other Tamils, this support contributed directly and indirectly to the amount of funds given and the approval of the insurgency. Notably, states with the largest active diasporas were also those willing to tolerate their fundraising and delay legal condemnation of the LTTE—the United Kingdom and Canada, for example. As such, the diaspora’s advertising did have the effect of enhancing popular approval by increasing its own size and encouraging Tamil solidarity within Sri Lanka. However, delayed international condemnation of LTTE umbrella organizations was possibly a more important result, as it helped maintain the global fundraising structure. This was not anticipated by my hypothesis, but should be recognized as an important factor that prolonged the LTTE’s existence and increased its overall capabilities through popular approval.

The final component of my hypothesis regarding diaspora aid suggests that the diaspora itself may exercise some control over the choice of targets. Though I concluded that the Tamil diaspora encouraged the LTTE’s decision to sign a ceasefire by withholding funds, it appears that the diaspora had little to no awareness, much less control, of the group’s tactics and basic administration. Perhaps in an insurgency with a more open structure, this level of diaspora involvement would imply greater awareness and involvement in choosing targets or methods. In this situation, however, it should still be noted that the diaspora, when largely united in its choice to reduce funding, was able to influence the LTTE—primarily due
to their concern over international perception following 9/11 rather than the group’s specific choices of tactics.

Several limitations to these findings should be discussed. It can certainly be stated that increased support via the types of material aid studied results in increased capabilities for the insurgency. This thesis cannot, however, assert that source of support has a causal role upon insurgency success. None of the sources generated a conclusive, distinct success in the case studies, although each of the three—narcotics funding, diaspora funding, and IRA training—led to noticeably improved capabilities. In some ways, these sets of capabilities are easily distinguishable from each other. For example, the popular approval generated in the diaspora’s host countries is clearly not present in the case of the FARC. The effects of drug funding and diaspora funding are less easy to differentiate, suggesting that each increases the insurgency’s capabilities in a similar way. However, the element of diaspora approval led the LTTE to funnel these capabilities into battlefield victories, while the FARC increased the scope and presence of the insurgency itself. These limitations suggest that while different sources of non-state material aid may not predict different courses insurgency success, they do influence the increase in capabilities such as scope, tactics, and popular approval that should be expected.

RETHINKING POLICIES DEALING WITH EXTERNAL AID

The study of outside support for internal conflicts such as those driven by insurgencies has particularly interesting policy implications. Support from such actors adds a third component into dyadic conflicts frequently isolated to include just the insurgency and state. As seen in the above analysis of case studies, the provision of material support can
have a significant effect on the capabilities of an insurgency. Therefore, the findings of this thesis should have significant implications for policymakers as they seek to end conflicts. According to Daniel Byman and his co-authors, “Focusing specifically on outside support for insurgencies may prove particularly promising, as it offers a means through which policymakers can influence an insurgency’s progress without direct intervention in the country in question.”

First, the conclusions of each case study imply that policymakers should consider and carefully analyze the sources an insurgency taps for material aid. As interaction with all three types helped the insurgencies to expand and oppose the state in different ways, governments of host states and external states interested in the conflict would be wise to consider both the sources of external aid at the insurgency’s disposal and the goals the insurgency may have for increasing its capabilities. For example, the LTTE made careful use of the diaspora, a resource available to them through ethnic connections and shared experiences in the early years of the civil war, for the dual purpose assessed in the previous section. In this case, the leadership recognized the potential to gather funds and disseminate information. They therefore crafted international branches to manage and exploit their source in this manner. But in the case of IRA support of the FARC, it is likely that the FARC specifically sought assistance from a terrorist group to advance their struggle into urban environments, and the IRA was able to fulfill this need. This implies that policymakers must have an awareness of both readily available supporters and the battlefield or conflict goals of the insurgency.

From the results of the narcotics trade and diaspora analysis, this thesis can confirm that money is a crucial tool for any type of insurgency growth, and that access to the

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narcotics trade is the most lucrative endeavor available. The total intake of diaspora funding was less extreme, but undeniably important. Policy suggestions for limiting access to these immensely helpful sources are complicated. Put simply, any participation with the drug economy, regardless of the current size of the group, should be promptly halted, despite the difficulty in doing so. States with significant diaspora populations connected to an insurgency should cooperate with the insurgency’s home state to limit or ban fundraising. They should also take pains to monitor connected organizations that appear to be NGOs and note business trends within the community. Of course, these suggestions could also be applied with the intention of encouraging or aiding an insurgency if desired, or possibly used to assess a group’s strength. For example, policymakers in neighboring states in particular might monitor these channels of contribution to gauge its effect on insurgency capabilities when deciding the best side to back in a conflict.

Overall, the notable effects created by each source indicate that policymakers have the opportunity to affect conflicts away from the battlefield by paying attention to non-state providers of material aid. Breaking down such support structures is rarely considered as a primary choice for dealing with insurgencies, possibly because non-state aid is seen as largely irrelevant. The striking increases in capability resulting from these three source types should serve well to combat this oversight.

FUTURE RESEARCH

In the introductory chapter of my thesis, I noted that the many factors of insurgencies indicate that those studying them should never want for work. Providers of support to insurgencies are equally engaging. Substantial gaps remain in the scholarship on types of
actors, types of support, and the interaction between domestic and international support. This thesis prompts questions related to several of these gaps.

Perhaps the most obvious extension of this topic is increasing the amount of case studies or data used, thereby giving it a more global scope. Limited case studies were useful in my research to examine how the insurgencies converted aid into important capabilities. However, the topic should also be approached using data sets and statistical analysis or a much larger set of case studies to generate a more global, thorough understanding of non-state aid. Additional research will also have to take the alternative hypotheses listed in the second chapter into account. Ideally, future studies should include cases with diverse qualities to better define how different non-state providers of material aid lead to different increases in capability.

It would also be interesting to hypothesize in a similar way about the results of new sources’ involvement—such as that of refugees, NGOs, or other criminal trades like the arms trade. Do all actors shape insurgency capacity in unique ways? In addition, states should be reassessed in relation to non-state providers to serve as a comparison and offer an updated vision of the interactions each have with insurgencies.

A third direction for new research would be to change various factors to alter the focus of the research. For example, one might pursue the topic as it relates to counterinsurgency rather than to understanding the insurgencies themselves. To start, some of the policy suggestions made in the previous section could be further analyzed with case studies to gauge their effectiveness. Better research on state responses to insurgency receipt of material aid would tie the discussion of external support to the domestic situation. This could also be accomplished by comparing the effects of different sources of domestic support
on insurgencies. Finally, instances in which material support is accompanied by diplomatic, passive or indirect support should be better understood to understand if each form of support continues to increase insurgency capabilities.

Finally, the question of diaspora influence provides an interesting possibility for future study. The case of the LTTE demonstrated that any diaspora authority over the insurgency’s choices does not necessarily accompany diaspora funding. However, the Tamil diaspora did affect one major decision—that of the ceasefire. This discrepancy between major and minor choices should be better understood, as should the role of diaspora funding on other insurgencies functioning under different circumstances.

To conclude, my thesis has but grazed the surface of investigation into non-state material support for insurgencies. Based upon my findings, I assert that the type of source from which an insurgency obtains material support does matter; as the narcotics trade involvement, diaspora, and violent non-state group assessed each produced a distinguishable increase in capabilities for the insurgency in question. This alone has important policy implications for ending or alleviating insurgency-state conflict, but further analysis is necessary for a complete understanding of non-state aid. Bearing in mind the horrific consequences for civilians caught in the throes of such conflicts, this thesis has endeavored to investigate and encourage additional research on the role of non-state material support.
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