Margaret Thatcher, Dilma Rousseff, & Angela Merkel: The Impact of Female World Leaders through Collaborative Negotiation

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Margaret Thatcher, Dilma Rousseff, & Angela Merkel: The Impact of Female World Leaders through Collaborative Negotiation

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in the Department of Government from The College of William and Mary

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Accepted for Honors (Honors)

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Introduction

There are currently 18 female world leaders and half of them are the first woman to hold their country’s highest office.¹ Most countries have never had a female leader, but as the number of women entering politics around the world grows, this will likely change for many countries. Women in world leadership are not unheard of historically, but it has always been rare. A growing belief in gender equality marks a significant departure from traditional definitions of citizenship and eligibility to run for public office. In this modern world, a woman is more able to be a president, prime minister, or chancellor than ever.

This research is in the fields of political science and gender studies. While gender studies applies to the study of both men and women, this research focuses on women because there is a need for systematical knowledge about women in world politics, as they are understudied and pose puzzles for the existing scholarship, which has focused on men. Traditionally, men have been the subjects of political science research. Political science in general has usually lacked gender analyses, so it is unclear how well existing scholarship applies to women.² This research aims to contribute to the study of female heads of state and government, in part because it is important in itself, as a component of political science and gender equality, but also because so little research has been dedicated to this group. This gap in the literature is partly because there have been so few female heads of state and government, especially beyond temporary, ceremonial, or hereditary roles, and partly because most of the research on women in politics has

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¹ Lauren Kent. ‘Number of Women Leaders around the World Has Grown, but They’re Still a
focused on elected women in parliaments or other elected bodies. For this reason, this paper studies only female cases.

This paper seeks to address the question, “How do women negotiate international crisis and what are their outcomes?” To do this, I derive hypothesis from both the realist and feminist theories to test in three case studies of prominent women leaders in the 20th-21st centuries. I analyze qualitative case studies on Margaret Thatcher, Dilma Rousseff, and Angela Merkel, in which I test variation in negotiation style affecting outcomes. I find that Merkel and Rousseff embraced collaborative approaches, while Thatcher consistently used a confrontational approach. I also find that collaborative approaches tend to result in better outcomes for all parties, while a confrontational approach creates winners and losers. Overall, this offers more support for feminist theory than realist theory.

I begin this analysis by reviewing the existing literature on realism, feminist theory in political science, and negotiation styles. Second, I explain the methodology and case selection for analyzing three female world leaders—Margaret Thatcher, Dilma Rousseff, and Angela Merkel. In these in-depth case studies, I assess their overall negotiation style by looking at the psychology of their early influences and their international reputations. Then I select a crisis negotiation and assess whether these women used collaborative or confrontational negotiation styles in a crisis negotiation. The specific negotiations within the cases are Margaret Thatcher over the Falklands, Dilma Rousseff over the NSA spying scandal, and Angela Merkel over the Ukraine Crisis. Finally, I address implications of the study, identify areas of future study, and draw conclusions.

3 Skard 3.
Literature Review

Where did male dominance come from?

Anthropologists have come to a consensus that, “In all known human societies, gender provides the basis for a fundamental division of social functions”, although the degree to which this led to subordination of women varies greatly. Rosaldo and Lermphere conclude that no anthropologists have observed a society in which the power and authority of women was recognized to surpass that of the men. Skard notes that, “Everywhere, we find that women are excluded from certain crucial economic and political activities, that their roles as wives and mothers are associated with fewer powers and prerogatives than are the roles of men”. Rosaldo and Lermphere concur that “sexual asymmetry is presently a universal fact of human social life” although, Skard notes that this asymmetry is a “cultural product” that can change. In short, cultures in every continent and across all time have tended to subordinate women to men, especially in terms of political power.

Despite this pervasive subordination, throughout history there have been women who ruled, exerted considerable power and influence, and held positions of veneration in their societies. The majority of recorded female rulers were in Europe. There were at least 150 Egyptian queens and Egyptian women enjoyed a period of high status that lasted thousands of years. Many ethnic groups in Central and West Africa had female chiefs or leaders and many women fought in wars against colonialists. China has a

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5 Skard 56.
6 Ibid.
history of some very strong Empresses and concubines and in the Islamic world there were periods of females inheriting their rule.

Colonialization, and the imposition of patriarchal European hierarchy across the globe weakened the rights and societal position of women. Unfortunately, this especially applied to regions where women had particularly high positions, and women were further subordinated. Since this colonial era, women’s resistance movements have grown, especially in the struggle for suffrage.

Since then, the world has experienced three “waves” of feminism. The first aimed to achieve recognition of equal rights, with a focus on suffrage. The second wave further demanded equal rights and treatment, and was marked by the emergence of the study of gender as a social construct. Skard notes that, “Many women’s activists stressed that personality characteristics and the behavior of women and men were little, if at all, constrained by biology. ‘Gender’, as distinct from biological sex, was defined as the set of social meanings attached to the categories of male and female”. Additionally, a focus on changing the patriarchy developed. Progress was made in the United Nations, which adopted a World Plan of Action to support women’s advancement. Third wave feminism saw the breakdown of gender categories, as the understanding of gender has become more fluid leading to the rise of multiperspectivism, inclusivity, and intersectionality. The feminist movement has grown globally and although there is no single definition of feminism, the common elements are a belief in the equality of women and men, a commitment to ending gender-based discrimination, subordination, and injustices.

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7 Skard 58.
The feminist movement has had a noticeable impact on the role of the state. Skard notes that, “Women’s movements challenged the conventional notions of ‘politics’ as first and foremost the management of the state and the economy” because many of the pressing issues for women were more intimate and about power-relations. Feminism has essentially helped extend the role of the state into social issues. For example, feminism has raised issues of reproductive rights, sexual orientation, and gender-based violence in the political sphere.

*Political Theory and Gender*

Research into gender differences in political science has centered over the ‘nature vs. nurture’ debate. Traditionally, theorists have argued that biological differences make women better suited to domestic roles to create a justification for excluding women from public life. This argument is as old as political theory itself. Liz Sperling notes that the “characteristic of all the states that Plato and Aristotle perceived as in some way better than others, is that they were all ruled by males”. She notes that Plato uses female gendered language for undesirable qualities in political leadership and that Aristotle “unashamedly assigns women a supporting role”. Sperling argues, “Just as Aristotle noted that women can only ever belong to the part of society which is ruled, the 17th century, patriarchal family in which women were permanently ruled, was effectively construed as a ‘natural hierarchy’ by Hobbes and Locke” in order to solidify the logic of a social contract to the hierarchy of the monarchy. Furthermore, Rousseau argues in his

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9 Skard 67.
10 Sperling 81.
11 Sperling 82.
12 Sperling 100.
treatise on education that, “Only men could learn to control their natures and to reason universally in order to contribute to the sovereign general will; women, due to their innate nature, could not be educated sufficiently to permit them the responsibility of citizenship, or trained to apply their skills and abilities to anything beyond their own purview”. He allows that women can be educated to provide for the wellbeing of children in the state. These political philosophers are the foundation for modern political science and their misogynistic visions of the state continue to influence political theory. As Chris Corrin notes, “Ideas and ideologies about women have been manufactured by male theorists in support of supposedly ‘neutral’ arguments about why women should remain subservient and not become full citizens exercising power”.13

Gender Stereotypes

Skard furthers this argument. She argues that the creation of gender stereotypes is also used as a justification for ideologies that “systematically support the allocation of unequal states, resources, and power to the two genders”.14 This creates a reinforcing cycle that socializes gender stereotypes in order to “facilitate men’s access to power”, while hindering women’s access. By assigning traits associated with nurturing to women and traits associated with power to men, a division of labor is created that places men at the apex of power, as well as in the “productive sector”, while women have a harder time reaching top positions and are generally clustered in the “social sector” of government.15 In practice this means that there are fewer women at top leadership levels in government

13 Corrin 3.
14 Skard 69.
15 Ibid.
and across levels of the hierarchy, women are less likely to be found in positions of national security, the economy, and so on.

One persistent example of this type of division of labor is the debate over women in military roles. Cynthia Enloe argues that those involved in militarizing a society (military leaders) care about controlling women and their roles because, “Militarizers seem to believe that if women cannot be controlled effectively, men’s participation in the militarizing enterprise cannot be guaranteed”.

This belief leads military leaders to create policies that are designed to promote soldiered masculinity. This means defining female roles to facilitate an unquestioned hierarchy based on masculinity. For example, during World War II, the Imperial Japanese Army forced Japanese women and girls into sexual slavery as “comfort women” as a means to prevent discontent soldiers from revolting.

American officials in World War II also engaged in efforts to create “racialized, military prostitution systems” by organizing segregated brothels in Hawaii, Germany, Korea, Japan, and even France, which American soldiers were liberating from Nazi rule. Enloe argues that all housing, curfew, civilian hiring, commercial, prostitution, STD medical, marriage, sexuality, and race policies of militaries need to be examined for their gendered intents and consequences, especially in areas that are integral to international security politics where military leaders are more willing to make sacrifices in the name of security.

One of the reasons that there are so few women who reach the rank of president, prime minister, or the equivalent is because the recruitment systems are set up to favor

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17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
men. Separate studies by Tripp, Genovese, and Jalalzai all show that women tend to take different paths to executive power, such as through inheriting power, as outsiders who had not participated rise from inside the political system, or as women who rose at times when political and social institutions were weakened by unusual circumstances. In other words, of female chief executives, fewer are political insiders than of male leaders, meaning they generally come to power outside of the traditional recruitment system.

The recruitment system that best excludes women is the one that is most based on gender stereotypes. Feminists, such as Ann Tickner, argue that the debate over whether women are more peaceful than men actually leads to rationalizing the oppression of women and their exclusion from political rights and leadership. The biological arguments in international relations scholarship can dangerously lead prejudiced justifications for excluding women. Francis Fukuyama’s article, “Women and the Evolution of World Politics”, theorizes a future world run by women, where aggressive male instincts are tamed to promote liberal democracy, based on biological evidence of male chimpanzees as more violent and aggressive. Tickner critiques Fukuyama arguing that, “Fukuyama tells us that no matter how attractive it may seem, we should not move further toward this feminized world; instead, we must keep things the way they are—with strong men at the helm. He argues that women are not able to deal with today’s threats

that come from violent leaders, such as Slobodan Milosevic, Saddam Hussein, and Mobutu Sese Seko”. For this reason, Tickner argues that, “Preferred futures are not feminized, but ones in which women and men participate in reducing damaging and unequal hierarchical social structure, such as gender and race”. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between oversimplifying gender stereotypes and ways in which men and women can both contribute to making the world a more peaceful place.

Impact of Women

This all leads to the question of whether the differences between men and women matter in international politics. While there has been less research on world leaders, the impact of women in organizations, whether elected political bodies or business corporations, can be assessed. In a 1977 breakthrough study, Rosabeth Moss Kanter found that in business corporations a critical mass of approximately 35% representation of women in a group or organization was needed for women to make an impact on the culture and be able to organize amongst themselves as a social force. In corporations, groups, and organizations with less than 35%, women became “tokens” that were identified within a gender stereotype, such as “mother”, “iron maiden”, “seductress”, or “pet”, and they were treated differently than the men.

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Institutions & Behavior

Skard argues that institutions play a large role in influencing the political behavior of early entrants to the political system, but this raises the question of whether institutions or behavior comes first. Skard argues:

If women politicians want to succeed in male-dominated political institutions and have a career, they are usually obliged to accept the dominant male culture and become ‘one of the boys’. In particular, the first women to enter such institutions have to adjust their behavior to that of the majority.\footnote{Skard 79.}

Female politicians assimilate to a male culture in order to succeed. In many cases, for the first women, the institutions may change them before they can change the institution. They adopt the dominant male language, way of thinking, and priorities. One critique of this view is that early female entrants to a male-dominated system are the “type” of woman who self-selects into the male dominant culture. Therefore, it is not the institutions that shape their political behavior, but rather that these women are more willing to accept the existing way of doing things because it attracted them in the first place. One area in which both perspectives agree is that women who enter the political system earlier are usually more aligned with the traditional political culture and priorities, while women who come later tend to diverge from the traditional male culture.

However, some scholars have argued that these socialized or biological gender differences can be transformative for the state. In her critique of Morgenthau’s “Principles of Political Realism”, Ann Tickner observed that women “are rarely to be found in positions of military leadership or at the top of the foreign policy
establishment”. However, this may not be optimal for the state because Tickner explains by using Carol Gilligan’s critique of Lawrence Kohlberg’s stages of morality that men tend to think in terms of the abstract and women tend to think in a contextual and narrative mode. According to Tickner, in international security, the abstract way of thinking about morality detracts from our ability to tolerate cultural differences and to seek potential for building community in spite of these differences. Tickner argues that this means that men tend to think abstractly about pursuing state power and interests, which may justify more aggressive behavior, while women might think more contextually and tolerate differences more, leading to more peaceful behavior.

**Causes of War and Gender**

Throughout the history of International Relations academia, scholars have desired to understand the causes of war. Many have argued that conflict has roots in human nature and it is therefore impossible to prevent our aggressive instincts from resulting in conflict. The original argument for this came from the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes in his 1651 book, *Leviathan*, which continues to have a major legacy for the study of conflict. In the Hobbesian construction of human nature, people are initially stuck in the “state of nature” in which life is “nasty, brutish, and short” because men must use violence to protect and advance themselves. People escape this state by covenanting to create Leviathan, or a State to govern, reward, punish, and restrict its

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subjects from violence against each other. Implicit in this argument is that aggression is both natural and inevitable because the State exists to minimize violence. More recently, research has progressed to study the mind and the body, and academics continue to point to human nature as aggressive.

In 1961, Sigmund Freud made a very influential argument in his psychoanalysis theory about sex and aggression. Freud argues that within a person, the ego seeks to restrain the id because its demands are naturally narcissistic and aggressive. He states that, “In circumstances that are favorable to [aggression], when the mental counter-forces (ego) which ordinarily inhibit it are out of action, it also manifests itself spontaneously and reveals man as a savage beast” (Freud/Bender 37). He suggests that group conflict also results from this failure to control our natural id urges once we have formed groups. In Freud’s opinion this is a natural outcome because, “The advantage which a comparatively small cultural group offers of allowing this instinct an outlet in the form of hostility against intruders is not to be despised. It is always possible to bind together a considerable number of people in love, so long as there are other people left over to receive the manifestations of their aggressiveness” (Freud/Bender 40).

In 1968, Anthony Storr similarly argued that human aggression must result from internal, physiological causes in the same way as hunger. He states, “There can be no doubt that men enjoy the enlivening effect of being angry when they can justify it, and that they seek out opponents whom they can attack” (Storr/Bender 20). Storr suggests that anger is a physiological drive that requires expression, much in the same way as sexual drives. After all, he argues that, “No other vertebrate habitually destroys members of his own species” (Storr/Bender 17). The research into physiology, biology, and
genetics has progressed to such an extent in the almost 50 years since Freud and Storr’s argument, that some scientists actually believe that war can be eradicated by removing certain genes from our DNA.

Tellingly, whenever these scholars argue for the innate instinct of aggression in human nature, they only write that “man” or “men” are naturally aggressive and violent. It almost appears as if they do not remember that women’s physiology should be included in discussions of human nature if the goal is an accurate and valid theory.

**Realist & Feminist Theories**

These viewpoints of aggression as natural have tended to converge in the realism school of thought. Realists assert that objective laws that result from an immutable human nature govern international security. Hans Morgenthau popularized realism, which came to be the dominant theory among international relations scholars in the inter-war years. One area of particular interest in realism literature is the importance given to the definition and pursuit of power. The traditional view in realism is that states will pursue their “interest defined by power”, where these interests are objective and universally valid. Morgenthau argues that these interests “infuse rational order” into politics, making it possible to have a theoretical understanding of politics based on rational, objective, and unemotional thinking. The outcome of this way of thinking is the belief that all states will pursue their interests in order to maximize their relative power in all favorable situations. Although not explicitly stated, this is implies that all states are innately aggressive, and use this aggression to strategically gain more power.
In response to Morgenthau, Ann Tickner addressed how the premises of realism assume male actors operating in a male-only international system. Tickner examines Morgenthau’s six principles of realism, which are generally regarded as the foundation of international relations from a critical feminist perspective. Morgenthau’s six principles are:

1. Objective laws that have their roots in human nature govern politics.
2. Interest is defined in terms of power.
3. Interest defined as power is an objective category, which is universally valid, but not fixed.
4. Universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states abstractly.
5. The moral laws that govern the universe are distinct from, and do not govern, the state.
6. The difference between political realism and other schools is real and profound.  

Tickner reformulates these principles from a feminist perspective:

1. Objective laws of human nature are based on a partial, masculine view when in reality human nature contains elements of social reproduction & development along with political domination. This view is called dynamic objectivity, which is more connected and has less potential for domination.
2. National interest is multidimensional and contextually contingent, rather than defined solely by power. It demands cooperative rather than zero sum solutions to problems like nuclear war, economic wellbeing, and the environment.
3. Power cannot have a universally valid meaning. Power defined by domination ignores collective empowerment.
4. Moral command cannot be separated from political action. All political action has moral consequences.
5. Seek to find common moral elements in human aspirations that could become the basis for deescalating international conflict and building international community.
6. The “autonomy” of the political posited by Morgenthau is rejected because it is associated with a masculine view in western culture. Efforts to construct a worldview should rest on a pluralistic conception of human nature that encompasses the masculine and feminine. This ensures that contributions of women can be included.

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According to Tickner, these differences have significant implications for the modern understanding of the international system and realism. For example, accounting for dynamic objectivity, contextual and perceived national interests, opportunities for collective empowerment rather than domination, and a more inclusive understanding of morality in international politics, from both the male and female perspectives, can better allow scholars to understand world leaders and their approaches to international relations. Tickner’s feminist additions provide a real opportunity to determine whether gender differences in conflict negotiation, based around collective empowerment, lead to better outcomes for all parties involved. This would be a significant departure from Morgenthau’s realism, which would predict that leaders’ pursuits of power and national interests will create winners and losers.

**Negotiation**

Much research has focused on gender differences in negotiation, especially in the corporate sector. In a meta-analysis of gender differences in negotiation, Stuhlmacher and Waters find that men tend to negotiate better outcomes for themselves and tend to negotiate more frequently than women. Babcock et al. find that women tend to avoid negotiations, which leads to less frequent advancement. Stuhlmacher and Waters identify three explanations for these gender differences in negotiation; women are socialized to focus on the needs of others rather than promote their own, companies may inadvertently penalize women who do negotiate, dissuading others, and when women get

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a better offer, they’re more likely to quit rather than leverage it in a salary negotiation.\textsuperscript{35} Hannah Bowles adds that women tend to get “stuck in a double bind” if they initiate negotiations because they are perceived as “overly demanding”, while their male counterparts are not.\textsuperscript{36}

Bowles also finds that women negotiate better when gender stereotypes about negotiations, such as men being assertive and women being communal, are removed from the context and when women negotiate on behalf of others.\textsuperscript{37} Recent research furthered these findings and shown that women tend to take a more collaborative approach to negotiating and tend to be perceived as more collaborative.\textsuperscript{38} This approach involves making a stronger effort to listen and understand the needs of all parties involved, rather than a focus on trying to “win” the negotiation. For example, Ifat Maoz conducted an experiment testing whether subjects would value compromises proposed by a female opponent more than the same proposal from a male opponent and whether subjects would perceive females as more warm and trustworthy.\textsuperscript{39} Maoz found support for this “women and peace hypothesis”, suggesting that women are expected to be more peace-oriented.

\textsuperscript{35} Stuhlmacher and Waters. ‘Gender Differences in Negotiation Outcome: A Meta-Analysis’. \textit{Personnel Psychology} 52, no. 3 (September 1999): 653–77.
Negotiating styles are divided into five general categories: value claiming, value creating, accommodating, compromising, and withdraw. These categories are general in the sense that it is possible to use multiple styles within one negotiation. Value claiming is known as a “win-lose” strategy in which the negotiators attempt to get as much as possible and give up as little as possible. Accommodating is the flip side of value claiming. When a party adopts an accommodating strategy, they concede to the other party or parties and accept a lose-win outcome. Negotiators may be forced to use this strategy when they possess no leverage and do not believe they can impact the situation or persuade their opponent.

Value creative negotiation, which I term “collaborative negotiation”, seeks to create a “win-win” outcome that adds value to both parties. This does not mean that neither party makes concessions, but rather that the overall outcome for each is positive, fair, and acceptable. This is more commonly seen when parties work together to help each other because they care about the long-term relationship and have established trust. Next, negotiators use a compromising strategy when they are prepared to make some concessions in exchange for some gains. This is similar, but different than value creating/collaborative strategies because the negotiator does not necessarily care about working together, but views the negotiation as an exchange.

The essential portion of the case study is the qualitative analysis of female negotiation styles. Therefore, the criteria for identifying these strategies must be clear and reasonably observable given the available information. To identify value claiming

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negotiation approaches, I use criteria developed by Brian Rathbun.\textsuperscript{41} The value-claiming negotiator will:

- **Demonstrate Pessimism.** Value-claiming negotiators will be pessimistic about the other party, overstating differences and obstacles between the two in order to drive a harder bargain. This also has the effect of pressuring the other party to offer concessions first.

- **Act Coercively:** This may mean leveraging their position to extract greater concessions from the other party, demanding concessions before the negotiation begins, insisting the opponent concede first so as to have greater power, or holding an issue hostage as a bargaining chip.

- **Restrict Shared Information:** The withholding of relevant information very commonly marks these negotiations. Negotiators may lie or mislead the other party about their ability to concede or what they will accept so that the other party will believe they need to give more. This may result in brinkmanship plays, in which the negotiators threaten to walk-out, or in drawing “red lines” that are not reflective of their true positions.

The accommodating negotiator will:

- **Negotiate from weakness**

- **Concede first**

Value creating negotiators will:

\textsuperscript{41} Brian Rathbun, *Diplomacy’s Value: Creating Security in 1920s Europe and the Contemporary Middle East* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2014).
• View each other as partners: In order to negotiate as partners, value-creating parties will signal optimism, resolve, and empathy. Signals can be private or public, but public signals are stronger.

• Share information: They will generally be honest about their preferences because they trust each other.

• Refrain from coercive methods: The absence of coercive negotiating tactics purposefully demonstrates earnestness and trust to the other party.

• Maintain flexibility: Collaborative negotiators will not draw “red lines”, give ultimatums, or demand initial concessions because they make agreeing on trade-offs harder. Instead, they keep viable options available and on the table.

The compromising negotiator will:

• “Split the Difference”: Compromisers tend to see the fair solution as the one halfway between the two positions. This can mean haggling over what is fair through reason and debate.

• Take extreme positions: Sometimes negotiators will take a more extreme position in order to mislead the other party and get a more favorable outcome by “splitting the difference”

Withdraw approaches are not truly an approach because the negotiator simply leaves the negotiation. This criteria provides a consistent method with which to identify each woman’s negotiating style
**Variables & Hypotheses**

Based on the preceding analysis, I developed two hypotheses based on the realist and feminist traditions that will be evaluated based on the above criteria. Both identify negotiation style as the independent variable and negotiation outcomes as the dependent variable. Gender is an antecedent variable that influences the independent variable. Gender is not the independent variable because the phenomena being studied is the impact of collaborative negotiation styles, so gender fits better as an antecedent variable that influences the likelihood an individual has a collaborative style and because the outcome is *directly* influenced by negotiation style, and only indirectly by gender.

In hypothesis 1, Realism predicts that, ‘Women and men in the international system are governed by the same objective laws, human nature, and pursuit of interests, so confrontational negotiation styles will dominate conflict negotiations, leading to the creation of winners and losers after a crisis’.

Hypothesis 2, based on feminist theory predicts that, ‘Women in world leadership tend to use more collaborative negotiation styles, resulting in a higher likelihood of mutually beneficial outcomes’.

**Methodology**

One way of understanding the role that women play in international politics would be to test effect of gender on decision-making would be a quantitative analysis of a large data set of all female and male leaders. With accurate data, this would theoretically allow us to detect gender differences in negotiation and draw implications for the international system. It would be possible to determine leaders’ negotiation styles and
their outcomes. Ideally, this analysis could control for variance across time, political affiliation, location, and regime type, among many other variables. Unfortunately, this research design is difficult to accomplish. It is hard to analyze the population of female leaders because there are so few. According to the Pew Research Center’s analysis of United Nations data, there are only 18 female world leaders right now. They also note that:

Even while the number of female leaders has more than doubled since 2005, a woman in power is hardly the norm around the world. 63 of 142 nations studied by the World Economic Forum have had a female head of government or state at some point in the 50 years up to 2014, but in nearly two-thirds of those nations a woman was in power for less than four of the 50 years – including 11 countries (17%) where a woman led for less than a year.42

There simply is not a large enough population to study with any real meaningfulness, since most of the women who have come to power have served very short terms. This type of research cannot be done until there is substantial data that is large enough to yield representative results from the population. Most importantly for the purposes of this project, however, is that to this author’s knowledge, there is not a dataset of negotiation styles of leaders.

Creating such a dataset would require robust discursive markers for male and female leaders across time and space. This would include using existing information to conduct a content analysis of speeches, negotiations, meeting minutes, and so forth, in order to determine negotiation styles and analyze outcomes.

While it is difficult and time-consuming to create such a dataset, we can take similar steps on a smaller scale by analyzing the discourse and decision-making of individual leaders through qualitative, case study analyses.

42 ‘Number of Women Leaders around the World Has Grown, but They’re Still a Small Group’, Pew Research Center, July 30, 2015.
To study the impact of female leadership on international politics, I will analyze case studies from the realist and feminist perspectives. This research design cannot constitute a hypothesis test, but it can illustrate whether female leadership fits into the existing mindset of realism, or if changes need to be made to the realist theory as more women rise to world leadership. Finally, this will result in greater understanding of gender differences in conflict negotiation. I will then address suggestions for further research on the topic.

The case studies are Margaret Thatcher, Dilma Rousseff, and Angela Merkel. These were chosen to assess a range of leadership styles. I attempted to select three cases along the spectrum of confrontational to collaborative reputations, which meant selecting a leader known for being cooperative, a leader known for being stubborn and aggressive, and a leader known for neither extreme to be the middle of the spectrum. I chose not to analyze cases of male world leaders because there is a gap in the literature on female world leaders, while male world leaders have been the study of much research. The female cases can be compared to realist theory, which resulted from men studying male leaders in international relations, therefore representing the male case.

Merkel and Thatcher were chosen because they represent the extremes, while Rousseff seems to be near the middle of the spectrum. News media and scholars frequently cite Merkel as a collaborative, quiet, and uncharismatic leader, which is quite the opposite of most great power leaders. Attempting to determine the impact of Merkel’s leadership style is worthwhile just because of her influence as a leader in Germany, the European Union, and the world, even if we cannot prove that it will apply for all female leaders. The popular perception of Margaret Thatcher as the “Iron lady”
and her mixed legacy over the Falklands makes her a good subject for the confrontational end of the spectrum. Dilma Rousseff of Brazil has also been called an “Iron Lady”, but her reputation is mixed and her calls for international, peaceful cooperation provide a worthwhile middle case. These three cases provide a variety of examples through which the feminist and realist hypotheses can be assessed.

It is important to hold the assessment criteria constant across the three cases in order to have a similar estimation of each leader. First, I assess how each rose to power. Knowing how a politician rises to power and from where she comes is important because it elucidates her psychology and outlook on political life. It also helps to understand her actions once she becomes a world leader. Second, I assess their overall negotiation style based on the public record of negotiations with other nations across different issue areas, including trade and conflict. Finally, I assess one major conflict negotiation that each woman spearheaded on behalf of their country during their time as a leader. This point is important because one cannot truly judge a negotiation under the direction of another actor. For example, many people have suggested studying Hillary Clinton’s term as Secretary of State as a case. However, because she worked in President Obama’s cabinet, her actions were at his direction at least some of the time. While it may be useful to analyze her tenure in this position to estimate how she would operate as president, it is impossible to know which actions belong to her or to President Obama in this type of scenario. Studying only women who have negotiated autonomously on the world stage helps to control for negotiation style as the independent variable. In each case, I make an informed judgment about the woman’s negotiation style and its outcomes.
In the following sections I use the negotiating criteria from the literature review to test the realist and feminist hypotheses. I begin by assessing the general negotiation styles of the three women and the negotiation approach used in each specific negotiation case. I apply a consistent, rigorous measure by using the same negotiating criteria in each case. This method to determine whether the leader prefers a collaborative or confrontational style helps control for bias. The cases are structured to assess early influences on negotiating style, international negotiation reputation, and an in-depth negotiation case. Within each negotiation case, I apply Rathbun’s criteria to determine the approach by asking whether each woman approached the crisis negotiations with pessimism, drew red lines, and demonstrated collaborative techniques while refraining from confrontational tactics. In Merkel’s case, I add a separate section on sharing information because her communication effort was highly significant to the particular case.

I. Margaret Thatcher

This case study is important for a number of reasons. First, Thatcher was one of the first female leaders in the Western world and therefore provides an illustrative example of a woman operating in a male dominated system. Second, she is viewed as the antithesis of a collaborative leader because of her reputation for thriving in confrontation. Finally, as Tickner notes, “Critics [of feminist theory] will support their challenges by reference to female policymakers, such as Margaret Thatcher, Golda Meir, or Indira Gandhi, who, they claim, behaved exactly like men”. Therefore, the Thatcher case

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study directly addresses the objections of critics of feminist theory. Thatcher will be collaborative if she approaches the negotiation without pessimism, shares information in good faith, refrains from drawing red lines, and attempts to build a mutually beneficial solution. A confrontational negotiator will not demonstrate these behaviors.

*Early Influences*

Margaret Thatcher’s background and rise to power provide an excellent starting point for analyzing her negotiation style, which tends to be confrontational. She was born the second daughter of a middle class family and was profoundly influenced by her father, Alfred Roberts. Her father instilled in her a love for reading nonfiction, a strict adherence to Methodist principles, and a deep sense of exceptionalism. Thatcher herself references his words, “Never do things just because other people do them. Make up your own mind what you are going to do and persuade people to go your way”\(^44\). This self-conviction became an integral part of Thatcher’s political style. Campbell states that:

> Alfred gave his daughter… an exceptionally powerful moral sense. More than anything else in her political make-up, it was her fierce confidence that she knew right from wrong…. She believed absolutely in her own integrity and habitually disparaged the motives of those who disagreed with her. This rare moral certainty and unreflective self-righteousness was her greatest political strength in the muddy world of political expediency and compromise; it was also her greatest weakness”

Furthermore, her Oxford education in Chemistry allowed her to hone her work ethic, but failed to challenge her worldview. Her education was dominated by scientific education, which gave her a “practicality of thought”, but by exclusively focusing on the sciences, her education lacked the training to understand other perspectives and resulted in “a lack of imaginative sympathy with other views and life-experiences which ultimately

\(^{44}\) Campbell 6, Thatcher Path to Power 6
restricted her ability to command support.” In short, she did not develop an ability to critically question her own beliefs or empathize with other perspectives and by limiting her education to the hard sciences, Thatcher’s confidence in her reasoning as infallible remained unquestioned. At University, she did encounter liberal instructors and peers with opposing viewpoints, but she felt they were snobbish and ridiculous, which served to “confirmed her certainty that they were all wrong and reinforced her righteous sense of persecution.” Thatcher’s self-righteous belief in herself and her indomitable drive to realize her world vision laid the foundation for her “Iron Lady” reputation. This approach to life was evident in her politics and especially in her negotiation style.

*International Negotiation Style*

Thatcher’s approach to negotiation is mostly confrontational, but occasionally compromising. An early example of this conflict negotiation style is Thatcher’s response to the Iranian members of the Democratic Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Arabistan (DRFLA) who attacked the Iranian embassy in London and took hostages was resolute. After the men took over the embassy, diplomatic channels were initiated between Tehran and London. Although the Home Secretary, Willie Whitelaw, had official charge of the hostage situation and police actions, Thatcher stepped in. While many leaders may have chosen to pursue a negotiation strategy pursuing a peaceful resolution, Thatcher immediately adopted a hard line approach. She set a clear expectation to not negotiate with terrorists’ demands for safe passage out of Britain and

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45 Campbell 15
46 Campbell 13
sent a Special Air Force unit of the British Army into the Embassy to end the conflict through force.

This approach is characteristic of Thatcher’s confrontational negotiation style that results from her black and white outlook. She also used confrontational negotiation during the Coal Miners’ strike and the European Union Rebate debate, solidifying her international reputation for resolve and hardliner negotiating tactics. The win-lose outcome from Thatcher’s confrontational negotiation strategy favored her in these cases, but sometimes the circumstances forced her to employ an accommodating strategy. For example, her famous negotiation with Deng Xiaoping over the return of Hong Kong to the Chinese government resulted in the loss of British colonial control without the establishment of an independent Hong Kong. Thatcher simply could not employ a confrontational approach because her electorate would not have supported a military conflict with China over Hong Kong and because the Chinese felt very strongly about regaining Hong Kong. Therefore, she negotiated from an accommodating standpoint in order to maintain good relations with the rising economic power, which resulted in the “One Country, Two Systems” agreement that returned Hong Kong to China, while maintaining its free market and liberalist principles. In retrospect, Thatcher expressed regret over the outcome. This example serves to illustrate the pattern that when Thatcher could not employ a confrontational, win-lose approach, she begrudgingly accepted an accommodating, lose-win approach to negotiating, rather than considering a collaborative approach. An accommodating strategy, which results in a lose-win outcome, is different from a confrontational approach, which results in win-lose, because a confrontational negotiator will seek to extract as much as they can from the other party, while an
accommodating negotiator will agree to concessions without gaining much in return. Thatcher’s choice to be an accommodating negotiator in this example suggests that she only perceived an outcome in which one party win and another loses. Arguably, Thatcher may have missed out on more optimal outcomes by using such a dichotomous approach. In order to better make that assessment, it is necessary to do an in-depth case study on one particular international conflict negotiation.

The greatest challenge to Thatcher’s reputation as a coercive negotiator is the special relationship she inherited and then cultivated with the United States. It is difficult to reconcile Thatcher’s “Iron Lady” reputation with the accusations of “dancing to Washington’s tune” and being “Reagan’s poodle”⁴⁷. Thatcher’s relationship with Reagan is the greatest challenge to the categorization of Thatcher as a confrontational negotiator because they worked together on many issues, both domestic and international. If she demonstrated a true and consistent collaborative approach with the United States, or something close to it, then the assertion of Thatcher as a wholly confrontational negotiator would be seriously called into question.

To examine this exception, I chose the Falklands case to study Thatcher because it contains numerous important elements. First, it is an international security conflict negotiation, so it is a better example of a crisis negotiation with the potential to escalate to military conflict than trade or European Union debates. Second, while the conflict is between the United Kingdom and Argentina on the Falklands, Thatcher also negotiates with President Reagan, which allows analysis of the “special relationship”. This is important because the Thatcher-Reagan relationship is the greatest challenge to Thatcher’s confrontational style. By studying the Falklands case, we can determine if the

⁴⁷ Sharp 105.
special relationship tempered Thatcher’s response in any way. Third, it is a case in which Thatcher had many possible options for response, so we can analyze her choices within the international context.48

The Falklands Case:

On Friday April 2nd, 1982 the Argentine Junta led by Leopoldo Galtieri invaded the UK-controlled Falkland Islands. Amy Oakes argues that the invasion was a diversionary war meant to unite the Argentinian people under the military junta, which was struggling with opposition and dissent49. Oakes says that Galtieri hoped to take advantage of the “widespread support” for retaking the islands on cultural and historical grounds, in order to stabilize the government, which had been suffering domestically because of its inability to end the devastating economic stagnation50. She uses the Policy Substitutability model to argue that circumstances eliminated other options for Galtieri, such as repression and economic reform, making his best choice a diversionary spectacle51. Oakes also convincingly argues that Galtieri exhibited psychological biases, convincing himself that the diversionary attack on the Falklands would succeed because the United States would prevent the United Kingdom from taking military action52.

48 I do not attempt to argue that Thatcher’s response was right or wrong, but rather that it was confrontational. It is entirely possible that the response was perfect for the circumstances, or completely unnecessary, but the purpose of this investigation is to determine to what extent her response was confrontational or collaborative.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
**How did Thatcher approach the negotiation?** Even before the invasion, Thatcher was suspicious of the Argentinian Junta and demonstrated pessimism in the ongoing negotiations. The United Kingdom had been negotiating on and off with the Argentinians on the Falklands issue since its settlement in 1764\(^53\). Galtieri became President of Argentina in 1981 and hinted at a possible invasion of the Falklands, but the British did not take it seriously. Thatcher described the negotiations with Galtieri’s regime prior to the invasion by saying, “Cynically, the new Junta (Galtieri) continued negotiations for a few months”\(^54\). Thatcher doubted that the junta would invade, but also distrusted their resolve in the negotiations. Thatcher certainly approached the negotiations with little expectation of a positive outcome. She stated that, “Diplomacy was becoming increasingly difficult. The Argentinians had shown they were not above taking direct action”\(^55\) (referencing their military presence on another island). Thatcher's suspicions of the regime led her to react extremely negatively to the invasion.

Additionally, Thatcher sent many signals of her distrust of Galtieri’s regime. On April 3\(^\text{rd}\), the day after the invasion, Thatcher addressed the House of Commons saying, “I must tell the House that the Falkland Islands and their dependencies remain British territory. No aggression and no invasion can alter that simple fact. It is the Government's objective to see that the islands are freed from occupation and are returned to British administration at the earliest possible moment.”\(^56\) She essentially signaled to the international community and to Galtieri that she had no intent to pursue diplomatic efforts. Her speech also denounces Argentina as a violent aggressor violating


\(^{54}\) Margaret Thatcher. *The Downing Street Years*. 176.


\(^{56}\) Thatcher, Margaret. 1982. ‘House of Commons Speech: Falkland Islands’. *Margaret Thatcher Foundation*. 
international law that should be punished, effectively eliminating any doubt that she believed negotiations were viable. By signaling to the opponent, the public, and the international community that she was pessimistic towards the negotiations and distrustful of the regime, she further limited the potential of negotiations.

After negotiations broke down, Thatcher did not expect the invasion, but her immediate instinct was the use of force. Thatcher admits that her public commitment to avoiding the use of force until all diplomatic options were exhausted was superficial. She describes her “short term diplomatic objective” as the need “to win our case against Argentina in the UN Security Council and to secure a resolution denouncing their aggression and demanding withdrawal.”  

It is important to note that her long-term goal was to keep the issue out of the United Nations as much as possible. This reveals that she used diplomatic and liberal rhetoric to secure legitimacy and legality for the military campaign, but was not committed to a long-term diplomatic strategy. In her autobiography, she reflected on the diplomatic efforts saying, “Yet I could never afford to ignore the diplomatic effort because on its successful conduct rested our hard-won position of UN Security Council support for Resolution 502”, which clearly shows that the pursuit of diplomacy was superficial.

When the task force was assembled and dispatched to the Falklands, Thatcher was deliberately ambiguous about how much she intended to use force. She states:

Some saw the task force as a purely diplomatic armada that would get the Argentinians back to the negotiating table. They never intended that it should actually fight. I needed their support for as long as possible, for we needed to demonstrate a united national will both to the enemy and to our allies. But I felt in my bones that the Argentinians would never withdraw without a fight and

anything less than withdrawal was unacceptable to the country and certainly to me.\textsuperscript{59}

She allowed her allies to assume the task force was a coercive diplomatic tool, perhaps for a blockade or a signal of determination to shake the Argentinians’ resolve, which would fall short of using force, but Thatcher fully intended to use it. In fact, she outright preferred the use of force to the negotiating table. She summarized her feelings on negotiation in \textit{The Downing Street Years}:

\begin{quote}
I was under an almost intolerable pressure to negotiate for the sake of negotiation and because so many politicians were desperately anxious to avoid the use of force – as if the Argentinians had not already used force by invading in the first place. At such a time almost everything and everyone seems to combine to deflect you from what you know has to be done.\textsuperscript{60}
\end{quote}

This is a telling quote because it reveals that Thatcher truly never considered that the conflict could be resolved peacefully. From the beginning, she was convinced that the only acceptable approach was military confrontation. With these opinions, we can safely conclude that Thatcher had an overwhelmingly pessimistic view of the diplomatic negotiations with Argentina and the United States mediating through Reagan.

\textbf{Did Thatcher use confrontational tactics?} While it is not clear that Thatcher drew red lines after the Argentine invasion, she did make a minimum requirement that Argentina withdraw from the islands under the threat of force. Thatcher ended her address to the House of Commons stating:

\begin{quote}
The people of the Falkland Islands, like the people of the United Kingdom, are an island race. Their way of life is British; their allegiance is to the Crown. They are few in number, but they have the right to live in peace, to choose their own way of life and to determine their own allegiance. Their way of life is British; their allegiance is to the Crown. It is the wish of the British people and the duty of Her
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{59} Margaret Thatcher. \textit{The Downing Street Years}. 183.

\textsuperscript{60} Margaret Thatcher. \textit{The Downing Street Years}. 213.
Majesty's Government to do everything that we can to uphold that right. That will be our hope and our endeavour and, I believe, the resolve of every Member of the House.

By reinforcing her belief in the “British-ness” of the Falklands people and stating that her government will “do everything that we can” to protect, Thatcher signals to the Argentine Junta that she views the Falklands as part of the homeland. The logical induction from this statement is that Thatcher intends to treat the Falklands as she would the home island of Britain, and not as a distant, unimportant island. This is clearly a coercive tactic because she publicly states her commitment to retaking the islands. This adds to the credibility of her threat by making her accountable to the press if she failed to follow through and protect the Falklands’ “right” to be British.

**Was Thatcher collaborative?** To be a collaborative negotiation, Thatcher would have had to attempt to remain flexible by keeping options open and sharing information about acceptable outcomes. After the Argentinians invaded Thatcher could have chosen from numerous responses. To name a few, she could give up the Falklands, open diplomatic negotiations, contact Galtieri personally, send military forces, initiate a blockade, attack Argentina, re-conquer the Falklands, or attempt to organize a multilateral response through the United Nations or the European Community. However, Thatcher made her decision instantly and refused to budge. Upon hearing that the Argentinian invasion was imminent, she said, “I could not believe it: These were our people, our lands. I said instantly: ‘If they are invaded, we have got to get them back’.”

She immediately authorized organizing a fleet to send to the Falklands and looking back in later years said, “It was my job as Prime Minister to see that [the fleet] got the political

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61 Margaret Thatcher. *The Downing Street Years*. 179.
support they needed”. Rather than reaching out to Galtieri to attempt to prevent the invasion, Thatcher asked Reagan to implore Galtieri to reconsider and to make clear that the United States would not support Argentina. When Galtieri failed to be available to the president for four hours, Thatcher concluded, “He deigned to speak to the President only when it was too late to stop the invasion. I was told of this outcome in the early hours of Friday morning and I knew then that our last hope had now gone”. She also said in a speech to the Commons that Reagan’s words “fell on deaf ears”, suggesting that Galtieri could not be deterred. Thatcher had made up her mind about the invasion and what her response would be before it even took place.

President Reagan attempted to mediate the conflict in the hopes of avoiding the use of force, but Margaret Thatcher would not budge. Reagan wrote in his diary, “The Royal Navy is sailing toward the Falkland Islands to oust Argentina… We have to find some way to get them to back off”. Reagan made a personal appeal to over the phone and reflected that, “Margaret heard me out, but, demonstrating the iron will for which she is famous, she stood firm. I couldn’t persuade her to make a commitment not to invade.” Wapshott notes that, “The use of the word ‘invade’ rather than ‘reconquer’ was a revealing slip” Additionally, Thatcher demonstrates here that she had chosen to accept only one possible outcome from the crisis. Reagan then sent Secretary of State Al

62 Margaret Thatcher. *The Downing Street Years*. 179.
63 Ibid.
64 Margaret Thatcher. *The Downing Street Years*. 180.
68 Wapshott 169.
69 Ibid.
Haig to try to broker a peace between Argentina and the United Kingdom. In his correspondence with Reagan, Haig assesses the likelihood of diplomatic outcomes, writing, “All in all, we got no give in the basic British position, and only the glimmering of some possibilities, and that only after much effort by me with considerable help not appreciated by Mrs. Thatcher from Pym. It is clear that they had not thought much about diplomatic possibilities.”

Thatcher was not negotiating collaboratively and does not attempt to maintain flexibility because she did demanded only one acceptable outcome throughout the entire crisis.

The negotiations strained the friendship between Reagan and Thatcher because they could not agree on an approach, which further illustrates Thatcher’s iron negotiation style. Wapshott summarized the relationship during the tense negotiation saying, “Reagan accepted her often sharp verbal assaults with equanimity, whereas Thatcher would brood for days upon the president’s words of caution, recklessly complaining to colleagues how she felt betrayed by him or how ‘ungrateful’ the president had been to ask her to compromise.”

It is also important to note that Thatcher made her decision without consulting the U.S. president and did not “seek his approval or consent before making her decision to retake the Falklands by military force”. She had already decided to use force to retake the islands and would not even consider any other strategies. This shows that she clearly did not even attempt to maintain flexibility in the conflict negotiations. Her immediate instinct was to use force and she did not question her own decision throughout the 28 days between the invasion and the arrival of the task force to retake the islands.

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70 Wapshott 169-170.
71 Wapshott 173-3.
72 Wapshott 161.
Thatcher’s government attempted to talk her out of using force, but she would not be swayed. She summed up their arguments and her response:

It was also on Friday 2 April that I received advice from the Foreign Office, which summed up the flexibility of principle characteristic of that department. I was presented with the dangers of a backlash against the British expatriates in Argentina, problems about getting support in the UN Security Council, the lack of reliance we could place on the European Community or the United States, the risk of the Soviets becoming involved, the disadvantage of being looked at as a colonial power. All these considerations were fair enough. But when you are at war you cannot allow the difficulties to dominate your thinking: you have to set out with an iron will to overcome them. And anyway what was the alternative? That a common or garden dictator should rule over the Queen’s subjects and prevail by fraud and violence? Not while I was Prime Minister.\footnote{Margaret Thatcher. \textit{The Downing Street Years}. London: HarperPress, 2012. 181.}

This statement shows her complete dismissal of other options and her black and white thinking about responding to Argentinian aggression. Despite pressure from her Foreign Office, the United States, and the international community, Thatcher refused to remain flexible and only superficially pursued diplomacy.

In the Falklands case, Thatcher clearly uses coercive tactics, indicating a confrontational negotiating strategy. She was intent on retaking the islands and the only acceptable outcome that would prevent the use of force was a full Argentine withdrawal. This is a clear example of demanding concessions before even entering negotiation. Furthermore, she demonstrates extreme pessimism about Galtieri’s intentions and never truly considers diplomacy or more collaborative approaches. Nothing in Thatcher’s memoirs, autobiographies, or statements at the time indicates any sort of empathetic thinking towards Galtieri, but rather a black and white approach casting Argentina as the villain. Additionally, Thatcher’s immediate decision to use force effectively limited any chance of a peaceful conflict resolution and undermined diplomatic negotiation.
In this section, I addressed a female world leader with a confrontational reputation. In the following section, I address a case that is situated between collaborative and confrontational, with some elements of both.

II. Dilma Rousseff

I chose the Dilma Rousseff case study expecting it to be an example of a leader that falls somewhere in between collaborative and confrontational. In this case, I assess whether Rousseff tends to use a collaborative or confrontational approach by using the same criteria as in the Thatcher case. Rousseff will be collaborative if she approaches the negotiation without pessimism, shares information in good faith, refrains from drawing red lines, and attempts to build a mutually beneficial solution.

*Early Influences*

Born to a Brazilian schoolteacher mother and an ex-communist Bulgarian, immigrant lawyer-entrepreneur father, Dilma Rousseff grew up as the second of four children in a household heavily influenced by European habits and marked by privilege. Rousseff’s father, Pedro Rousseff, changed his name from Petar Rúsev to adapt to Brazilian society, but initially faced discrimination as a foreigner. Pedro Rousseff built a successful real estate company and provided his children with elite classical educations. Although there is mystery surrounding Pedro Rousseff, he was well connected in Bulgaria and likely fled Bulgaria for France and then Brazil because of his leftist political beliefs. He left behind another family in Bulgaria without explanation and created a new life in Brazil, all the while maintaining a close relationship with famed Bulgarian poetess
Elisaveta Bagryana, a connection of immense pride and social implications for Dilma’s family. The Rousseff family was privileged, upper middle class with access to elite society and elite schooling. Two years after her father’s death in 1962, Dilma switched to a public high school at the age of 17.

Upon leaving this environment, Rousseff experienced a political awakening. According to recollections, she “quickly discovered that the world had no place for debutantes”. Apolo Heringer, Rousseff’s high school teacher, taught her about Marxism and founded COLINA, recruiting young people to fight against the military junta that had overthrown a democratically elected president. The public high school introduced her to radical ideas and subversion, which she chose to embrace by becoming a guerilla activist, which was a bold move for the daughter of a wealthy family. She chose to join COLINA (Comando de Libertação Nacional), after reading the influential Revolution inside the Revolution by Régis Debray. COLINA was a guerilla group intent on implementing socialism through armed struggle, although it is unclear if Rousseff ever engaged in violence. Rousseff joined the cause and became a “leading figure in VAR Palmares, a political-military organization of Marxist-Leninist partisan orientation”. When she was prosecuted for her involvement, the prosecuting attorney nicknamed her “Joan of Arc of Subversion” while claiming that she masterminded the robbery of 2.5 million USD from the governor of Sao Paulo. She was captured in 1970 and held for 3 years, during which she was reportedly tortured. Upon her release, she moved to Porto Alegre where she joined her guerilla husband, attained a degree in economics, and gave

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74 De Moura, Helena. 2010. ‘Dilma Rousseff: From Fugitive Guerrilla to Brazil’s New President.’ CNN. (March 18, 2016).
76 Ibid.
birth to her only daughter. Rousseff entered into the state of Rio Grande do Sul government five years after democracy was restored and rose quickly.

*International Negotiation Style*

Rousseff has demonstrated a collaborative negotiation style as President. Although Rousseff never held elected office until she was elected president in 2011, she has defied expectations that her inexperience would be a problem. During her campaign, Rousseff was criticized for lacking experience and many critics assumed that she also lacked the “political and negotiating skills necessary to work successfully with Brazil’s Congress, comprised of a coalition of 10 parties.” However, since then she has demonstrated a direct leadership style and a collaborative political style. Rousseff has taken a no-nonsense approach to traditionally accepted corruption practices, firing six ministers within her first year in office, while also easing party tensions with rivals, reaching across party lines, and passing controversial environmental laws. These actions reveal her action-oriented, direct approach, while also demonstrating a preference for calculated collaborative politics.

As president, she has developed a mixed reputation. Brazilians have nicknamed her the “Iron Lady” of Brazil due to her Guerilla past, but she has also cultivated an image as “Mother of the Poor” by introducing economic reforms to bring millions out of poverty. Publicly, Rousseff is often compared to her predecessor because she lacks

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78 Ibid.
80 Symington, A. (1999) *The Chosen One: Lula’s support for Dilma Rousseff has made her ascent inevitable.*
his charisma and charming background story. Additionally, “She is known for her brusque nature and has a reputation for publicly dressing down ministers”, which has earned her a formidable reputation.\textsuperscript{81}

However, rather than fully embracing an “iron” reputation, Rousseff attempted to soften her image. At the beginning of her presidential campaign, the Brazilian news media noted that, “Ms. Rousseff has made some attempts to soften her image, replacing glasses with contact lenses, undergoing plastic surgery to her face, and adopting a different hairstyle”. Her battle with lymphatic cancer also softened her image by generating sympathy. This attempt to soften her image through physical changes is unusual and suggests that she does not desire a one-dimensional “iron”, or aggressive, reputation.

On the international scene, Rousseff’s statements establish a strong preference for multilateralism, cooperation, and collaborative negotiations. At the opening of the 69\textsuperscript{th} UN General Assembly Debate, Rousseff made a number of statements suggesting her approach to international conflict. She flatly condemned the use of force to resolve conflicts, stating:

\begin{quote}
The use of force is incapable of eliminating the underlying causes of conflict. This is made clear by the persistence of the Question of Palestine; the systematic massacre of the Syrian people; the tragic national destructuring of Iraq; the serious insecurity in Libya; the conflicts in the Sahel; and the clashes in Ukraine. Each military intervention leads not to peace, but to the deterioration of these conflicts.\textsuperscript{82}
\end{quote}


In reference to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Rousseff said, “This conflict must be resolved, not precariously managed, as has been the case. Effective negotiations between the parties must lead to a two-State solution, with Palestine and Israel living side by side, in security and within internationally recognized borders”\textsuperscript{83}. She also said that when it comes to the Syrian conflict, “There is no military solution. The only solution is negotiation, dialogue, and agreement”.\textsuperscript{84} Rousseff has continually stressed the importance of diplomatic negotiation and has consistently condemned the use of force to settle international disputes. Miriam Saraiva argues that Rousseff is continuing the “Brazilian soft power tradition” of using persuasion rather than coercion to build international influence, which explains her focus on diplomacy and negotiation, and her avoidance of displays of hard power.

This pattern suggests that while Rousseff is known for being tough and direct, she holds a core value of peaceful international resolution. While this may seem to conflict with her guerilla history, it is important to note that her guerilla activities were in resistance to a violent military junta, so her desire to support a norm of peaceful conflict resolution is consistent with her early life. In the following negotiation case, Rousseff demonstrates a peaceful and collaborative approach, leading to a mutually beneficial outcome for both parties.

\textit{Brazil—United States Surveillance Negotiation}

In September 2013, Edward Snowden revealed that the U.S. National Security Agency actively spies on foreign nations and their leaders, triggering a diplomatic crisis

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid
\textsuperscript{84} Macedo, D. (2013) \textit{Rousseff says negotiations are the only solution for Syria}. (Accessed: 25 March 2016).
between President Obama and President Rousseff. Snowden revealed that the NSA had accessed Rousseff’s emails and data collected by what Rousseff called a “global electronic spying network”. Essentially, the NSA was accessing data from companies, like Google and Facebook that store their data on Brazil within the United States, as well as monitoring world leaders’ personal devices. President Rousseff met with President Obama in Panama City, Panama on April 11, 2015 to negotiate a resolution to the diplomatic crisis.

How did Rousseff approach the negotiation? The public revelation that the United States was spying on Brazil undermined Rousseff’s image domestically and internationally, and she initially reacted negatively. She called for the United States to issue an apology and cease surveillance on all its allies. She also canceled her upcoming state visit to Washington, D.C. During her opening speech at the United Nations, she attacked the NSA surveillance programs saying:

Meddling this way in the lives of other countries violates international law and is an affront to the principles that should govern relations among nations, especially allies…. The security of one country’s citizens can never be guaranteed by violating the fundamental human and civic rights of citizens in other countries. We have informed the U.S. government of our protest, demanding explanations, apology, and guarantees that these actions will not be repeated. 

This is a significant condemnation of the United States, since it was not only an official statement, but also a statement made by the Brazilian president herself with essentially the entire world in the audience at the UN General Assembly. Rousseff clearly sent a signal that the U.S. surveillance was not just a slip-up, but was a diplomatic crisis.

Furthermore, Rousseff oversaw domestic and international proposals designed to prevent U.S. surveillance through her party. Her domestic political allies introduced legislation that would limit the NSA’s ability to collect data by forcing major Internet companies to store Brazilian data within Brazil. This provision was dropped from the final version but sent a strong signal to U.S. business interests. In April 2014, Brazil hosted the Net Mundial Conference on the “future of Internet governance”, which resulted in Brazil and Germany (another angered ally targeted by U.S. surveillance) proposed and passed the U.N. Resolution on online privacy, which says “that the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online”. These actions and statements suggest that Rousseff felt a strong distrust of the United States, even though it is an ally.

While Rousseff did not escalate the diplomatic crisis, she did keep Brazilian-U.S. relations “on ice” until 2014. This created leverage because Brazil is an important regional ally and trade partner to the United States. According to Peter Meyer of the Congressional Research Service, “The United States and Brazil have traditionally enjoyed robust political and economic relations” and cooperation on issues such as security, racial inequality, trade, energy, and climate change. However, Meyer notes that international efforts to “punish” other nations have been an area of tension between Brazil and the United States because “[Brazil’s] aversion to sanctions and preference for

86 Bevins, Vincent. ‘Why Did Brazil’s President Change Her Tune on Spying?’. Foreign Policy. n.p.: Foreign Policy, 2015.
dialogue have led it to approach the issues much differently than the United States”.

Despite her harsh criticisms at the UN, Rousseff approved a memorandum resolving a cotton trade dispute with the United States in October 2014, appointed her former ambassador to the United States as the Foreign Minister, and stated in her January 2015 inaugural address that “It is of great importance that we improve our relationship with the United States”. Shortly after her reelection, she rescheduled the state visit to Washington, D.C., which she had canceled after the NSA leaks. These actions suggest that President Rousseff and President Obama have been able to work together despite the diplomatic crisis. While it is unclear whether Rousseff was pessimistic initially, it did not persist throughout the negotiation.

Did Rousseff use confrontational tactics? Rousseff decidedly did not draw any red lines, but kept her options open. Rousseff strongly condemned the NSA practices as an attack on democracy, asserting that, “In the absence of the right to privacy, there can be no true freedom of expression and opinion, and therefore no effective democracy”. She also said, “Friendly governments and societies that seek to build a true strategic partnership ... cannot allow recurring illegal actions to take place as if they were normal. They are unacceptable”. While these statements are strong condemnations of U.S. actions, she does not demand any initial concessions or make any threats. Rousseff

89 Meyer. 10.
90 Meyer. 11.
92 Rousseff, Dilma. *Statement By H.E. Dilma Rousseff, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, At the Opening of the General DEbate of the 69th Session of the United Nations General Assembly*. 
purposefully leaves her options open, which maintains her flexibility. She could have broken off diplomatic contact, or demanded that the United States make a major trade concession, before Brazil would return to the negotiating table. It is important to note that there have been many ongoing trade disputes between Brazil and the United States, such as the current ban on importing Brazilian beef, and Rousseff could have easily demanded an end to the ban. Additionally, at the UN speech she said, “We have informed the U.S. government of our protest, demanding explanations, apology, and guarantees that these actions will not be repeated”. Rousseff returned to the negotiation table without a formal apology, although the White House did acknowledge their “regret”.

Was Rousseff collaborative? The absence of red lines suggests a more collaborative approach in a tough diplomatic negotiation, but how does Rousseff fare under the collaborative criteria? This criterion includes sharing information, refraining from coercive action, maintaining flexibility, and viewing each other as partners. In an exclusive CNN interview with Christiane Amanpour, Rousseff explained the diplomatic back and forth between the two nations after the documents were leaked:

So we of course we voiced that concern to President Obama at the time. What we told him was that every reciprocal act between Brazil and the U.S., which are major strategic partners; every such act would be impaired by information that we were not aware of was circulating out there. We wanted two things from them. We wanted a guarantee that it would be discontinued and it would not happen again. And thus of course someone would have to be held accountable. Someone would have to come before us and tell us it would not happen again.

At that point in time, the Obama administration was in the process of squaring the circle, if you will, around the issue of international spying activity. And they were not in a position to provide us with an answer at the time. And the guilty were not

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93 Ibid.
in a position to provide us with an acceptable response at the time. We decided to
discontinue the plans we had for the state visit of mine to the U.S. That of course
did not mean that we broke ties with the Obama administration, no. It only meant
that we were placing all cards on the table very clearly. And say, hey, the way it
is, it is impossible if it remains the way it is. I think today, in hindsight, I think
we have made quite a few steps.\textsuperscript{94}

Rousseff’s summary of the diplomatic back and forth between her administration and
Obama’s reveals that Rousseff did act collaboratively. She states that she placed “all
cards on the table very clearly” because it would be “impossible” to repair the diplomatic
relationship if the NSA surveillance continued. This is a clear demonstration that
Rousseff shared her preferences and bottom-line with administration while maintaining
flexibility on what response she would accept. This area is gray because she did initially
demand an apology, which could be interpreted as a coercive demand for initial
concessions. However, the statement above shows that in private discussions, she and
Obama shared information on what was internally feasible for each and found a mutually
acceptable middle ground. Rousseff recognized that “they were not in a position to
provide us with an answer at that time”, which shows awareness of the U.S. domestic
situation and willingness to be flexible so that both countries have a positive outcome.
Rousseff has demonstrated information and preference sharing, as well as remaining
flexible.

Rousseff and Obama also viewed each other as partners, rather than opponents,
which shows a mutual collaborative approach to the negotiation. Some might argue that
since Rousseff did not receive a public apology or public guarantee that NSA
surveillance would cease, she conceded to a stronger United States. However, this
ignores the private nature of top-level international negotiations. \textit{Foreign Policy} quoted a

\textsuperscript{94} Rousseff, Dilma. ‘CNN’s Amanpour: Brazilian President Interview’. \textit{Brazilian President
“well-placed official in the Brazilian government” who said that the “Rousseff-Obama rapprochement involved concessions from Washington” despite the appearance of Rousseff backing down because, ““The American government’s posture did change. The [U.S.] president made it clear in his last conversation with Rousseff...that if he wanted to know something about Brazil or the president, he will call her and not use other means”.”95 Additionally, President Obama has introduced a modest intelligence reform agenda, reformed agricultural agreements with Brazil, and initiated cooperation on numerous issues, such as education, social security, climate change, and nonproliferation.96 After their meeting in Panama, Obama stated that Brazil “is a global leader”, and since then Obama has globally recognized Brazil as a partner through many bilateral and multilateral agreements.97 Obama and Rousseff viewed each other as partners during the Panama City negotiation, which helped lead to a mutually beneficial outcome.

After the negotiation, both President Rousseff and President Obama benefitted. President Rousseff attained many new bilateral agreements with the United States, modest intelligence reform, an international image bolstered from the high profile negotiations, and a strengthened partnership with the United States. President Obama repaired relations with Brazil without appearing weak to his domestic audience and ensured continued partnership with its main regional ally. This mutually beneficial

95 Bevins, Vincent. ‘Why Did Brazil’s President Change Her Tune on Spying?’. Foreign Policy. n.p.: Foreign Policy, 2015.
outcome is the result of collaborative negotiation approaches that created value for both parties.

This section focused on a case that was selected based on being in the middle of collaborative and confrontational. However, I found that Rousseff’s negotiation style was actually very collaborative, despite some elements of confrontational rhetoric. In the next section, I address the case of Chancellor Angela Merkel, who is world renowned as a consensus builder. I will use the same criteria as in the two previous cases to determine Merkel’s negotiation style.

III. Angela Merkel

Angela Merkel, the Chancellor of Germany, is the third case because she embodies the collaborative approach. I chose this case to illustrate collaborative negotiation as the independent variable and mutually beneficial outcomes as the dependent variable. Because Merkel is the de facto leader of the European Union, her negotiations are high profile and have wide-reaching implications. Therefore, a collaborative negotiation style will have consequences for European integration, the United States, and the international order in general. Additionally, this case is important because it is the most likely to pose a challenge to the traditional realist view of power-maximizing realpolitik.

In this case, I use the same criteria to determine Merkel’s negotiation style as in the other two cases. I assess Merkel’s early influences, overall negotiating style, international reputation, and the negotiation style used in the Ukraine Crisis negotiation. The Ukraine Crisis tests Merkel’s collaborative reputation because she may be less
inclined to collaborate with President Vladimir Putin, who epitomizes confrontation. Merkel’s negotiation approach in the Ukraine Crisis negotiation will be collaborative if she approaches the negotiation without pessimism, shares information in good faith, refrains from drawing red lines, and attempts to build a mutually beneficial solution.

*Early Influences*

In her early life, Merkel’s father and the East German political structure in which she grew up heavily influenced her. When Merkel was an infant, Horst Kasner, her father, moved the family into East Germany because of his profound sense of duty as a Lutheran pastor. Kasner was known for his strong moral code, an emphasis on personal responsibility, and Protestantism, which he passed on to his daughter. According to the BBC documentary “The Making of Merkel”, “Merkel's Socialist father held politically charged gatherings at his seminary and as she grew up, vigorous debates rang around the dinner table”. Merkel grew up debating morality, spirituality, and the role of government in the individual’s life.

However, her father’s religious life put her in danger. Merkel was vulnerable to suspicion because of her family’s background and her father subsequently encouraged her to join the Free German Youth program in order to deflect discrimination. Merkel’s father and his choices effectively made Merkel an outsider and alienated her from her peers. This sense of differentness is essential to understanding her character. Remarkably, Merkel did not resent this. In fact, she said, “I have been shaped by my

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99 Ibid
100 Ibid
parents and I am proud of that." Differentness was an integral part of Merkel’s early years and was also imposed upon her by the East Germany social and political structure.

This sense of differentness grew because the communist rule in East Germany caused Merkel to develop a guarded and quiet personality. As a child she preferred solitude, her teachers described her as, “Plain, quiet, and extraordinarily intelligent”, and she rarely took risks, instead preferring to stick to her routine. According to a peer, her nickname was “gray mouse” because of her quiet, unassuming nature. The German Democratic Republic had a compounding effect on this introverted feature of her personality because of the danger of being identified as a political dissenter. In a 1991 speech, Merkel described how “the ability to read between the lines” had been crucial. She also understood the necessity of, and even excelled at, “keeping her cards close” in the oppressive environment. Merkel therefore grew up living a double identity. One that accepted the regime’s ideology and lived unassumingly without political aspirations, and another that debated politics in secret, held western values of freedom, openness, and democracy, and desired to be an instrument of change for Germany. Merkel’s introverted nature allowed her to have these two identities and deflect suspicion.

To understand Merkel’s negotiation style, one must understand her introverted personality. Introversion is thought to be a spectrum largely determined by genetic makeup. In fact, Jerome Kagan was able to predict introversion and extroversion of 4 month-old babies by predicting that those who were highly reactive to stimuli were

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102 Marr. “The Making of Merkel
introverts and those who were low reactive were extroverts.\textsuperscript{104} When he studied the same subjects later in their life, this theory held up and the introverted subjects matched well with Carl Jung’s theory that an, “Introverted Attitude is characterized by an inward flowing of personal energy—a withdrawal concentrating on subjective factors. The introvert is usually happy alone with a rich imagination and prefers reflection to activity”.\textsuperscript{105} More recent science suggests that this is because, “Our preferences are shaped by the way our brains respond (with dopamine) to the world”, and introverts respond more, but less positively to social stimuli.\textsuperscript{106}

Introversion guides Merkel’s approach to international negotiation. As a leader, Merkel is known to take sometimes excessively long periods of time to make decisions, meticulously consider all the facts, and painstakingly educates herself on a topic before taking a position. This approach is characteristic of introverts, who prefer to make decisions alone and take more time contemplating options.\textsuperscript{107} Crawford and Czuczka state, “She is not given to snap, intuitive decisions, but is rather very deliberate in the way she reaches her conclusions”.\textsuperscript{108} This method fits Susan Cain’s description of an introvert’s complex problem solving when she concludes that, “Introverts think before they act, digest information thoroughly, stay on task longer, give up less easily, and work

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{106} http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20130717-what-makes-someone-an-extrovert
\item \textsuperscript{107} Cain, Susan. "Quiet: The Power of Introverts in a World That Can't Stop Talking." \textit{The Power of Introverts RSS}. Susan Cain, n.d.
\item \textsuperscript{108} Crawford and Czuczka. 153.
\end{itemize}
more accurately”.\textsuperscript{109} Cain also notes that introverts tend to achieve better outcomes at complex problem solving, which means that Merkel’s decision-making is a strength in long-term problems, but that she may seem slow to action in a crisis. She has also developed a leadership style that centers on cooperation, consensus building, and partnership. An example is her negotiations with the former French President, Nicolas Sarkozy. Initially Sarkozy would “Brandish any concession he had won from her, as she kept quiet”, but then he “realized he was making it more difficult for her to agree to crisis-fighting measures and revised his approach”.\textsuperscript{110}

Whereas Dilma Rousseff attempted to soften her “iron” image with physical changes, Merkel has embraced her quiet persona. Merkel often wears the same outfit in different colors, and in general, usually looks the same. She has had the same haircut, relatively, for her entire career. She actually chose her signature diamond-shaped manner of holding her hands because she felt awkward in the public eye and did not know how to carry herself. It is a neutral gesture and fits well with her “no frills” personality. Like Rousseff, she lacks charisma, although for Merkel it is because of her introversion. Initially, she struggled with public speaking, felt awkward with her gestures, and preferred to remain out of the spotlight. But as her career progressed, she overcame these problems by employing the “desensitization” method. Susan Cain explains desensitization as tackling your fear or anxiety “one step at a time” and in low-stimulation environments.\textsuperscript{111} This method requires a lot of preparation and practice,


\textsuperscript{110} Crawford and Czuczka. 156.

\textsuperscript{111} Cain. Page 126
which Merkel still uses before all of her speeches.\textsuperscript{112} Despite overcoming her fear of public speaking, Merkel still demonstrates introversion through her quiet public persona that avoids attention as much as possible.

These presentations of herself reinforce her quieter, introverted power. In a 2013 article, Cameron Abadi argues that, “Angry protesters in Greece and Spain have tried to paint Merkel as a Nazi, but the Hitler moustache doesn’t quite stick; mostly they’ve directed their anger at their own governments. In some sense, Merkel has maximized her power by minimizing the appearance of it.”\textsuperscript{113} Much of his evidence is that she refrains from loud rhetoric and the appearance of pushing reforms on other Euro countries, and instead prefers to make decisions “behind the scenes” and with the other leaders.\textsuperscript{114} An anonymous longtime political associate said:

She is a master of listening. She gives everybody the feeling ‘I want to hear what you have to say,’ but the truth is that her judgment is made within three minutes, and sometimes she thinks another eighteen minutes are wasted time. She is like a computer—‘Is this possible, what this man proposes?’ She’s able in a very quick time to realize if it’s fantasy.\textsuperscript{115}

By listening and analyzing other people and their ideas, Merkel gains the advantage of understanding the other person and critically assessing the objective merits of whatever they are proposing. This is just one example of Merkel’s calculating political prowess.

She also uses her unassuming body language to contrast herself against the machismo and charisma of leaders like President Obama or President Putin, who give rousing speeches with bold claims. Her desire to stay out of the spotlight actually gives her power to build consensus and deflect responsibility for unpopular decisions. Merkel

\textsuperscript{112} Crawford and Czuczka. Page 152
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid
\textsuperscript{115} Packer, George. The Quiet German. (The New Yorker), December 1, 2014.
has described her style saying, “I am regarded as a permanent delayer sometimes, but I think it is essential and extremely important to take people along and really listen to them in political talks”. Rather than attempt to mold herself into the traditional image of leadership and power, she has found a way to use her introverted, quiet nature to her advantage by being a consensus-builder.

*International Negotiation Style*

In the international community, this method has earned Merkel a very collaborative reputation. This reputation is certainly in part because of the nature of German politics. The German parliamentary system is coalition-based, and the political culture values consensus and pragmatism. Merkel must build consensus among her own party, the Christian Democratic Union party, and her coalition partners, the Social Democratic Party, on a regular basis. Additionally, the electorate in Germany prefers a unifying, cautious, collaborative leader, which constrains Merkel from bold, assertive leadership. She uses this same approach as the de facto leader of the European Union. For example, during the Greek economic crisis, Merkel worked to create a mutually acceptable solution to Greece’s debt problem that involved building consensus between the German politicians calling for Greece to exit the Eurozone and Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and his ruling coalition, which was elected on an anti-austerity platform. Despite the conflicting calls for bailouts, more austerity, Greek exit, and debt forgiveness, Merkel managed to reach a third bailout agreement to avoid a Greek exit from the Eurozone. Marcel Fratscher, president of the D.I.W. Berlin think tank commented on Merkel’s

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handling of the crisis, saying, “You couldn’t find her saying a bad word about Greece or anything populist, and even though German public opinion was very strongly in favor of a Grexit and no bailout deal. They secured a deal with no Grexit.” Merkel’s managed a very dangerous crisis that had the potential to undermine the Eurozone with extreme caution. As a consequence, Greece has remained part of Europe and seems to be on the recovery road, while Merkel avoided a full-scale bailout, maintained high approval ratings (65-70%), and gained a reputation for crisis management.\(^{119}\)

**Ukraine Crisis—Merkel-Putin Negotiations**

I chose Merkel’s ongoing negotiations with President Vladimir Putin of Russia because they provide a harder test of Merkel’s reputation for collaborative negotiation. A skeptic might argue that it is easy and only natural for Merkel to be collaborative with her European partners, so this reputation is untested. Therefore, studying how Merkel negotiates with the notoriously difficult Putin can address these critiques. Additionally, this is a clear example of crisis conflict negotiating, since Putin’s invasion of Crimea surprised the international community and constitutes a militarized dispute. Finally, it is the single example of Merkel taking the lead in negotiating a crisis outside of the EU.

Other world leaders, such as President George W. Bush and President Obama, have been somewhat mystified by Putin’s actions. After meeting Putin for the first time, Bush said, “I looked the man in the eye. I was able to get a sense of his soul”.\(^{120}\) Yet relations deteriorated over U.S. perceptions of belligerent Russian foreign policy and

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Russia’s control over oil reserves. In fact they deteriorated so much so that President Obama made a campaign promise to reset relations with Russia. Merkel, on the other hand, is uniquely positioned to understand Putin. Noah Barkin explains:

The German chancellor has never harbored any illusions about the former Soviet agent, nor hopes that she might change him. It is this hard-nosed realism, born of Merkel's own experience growing up in a Soviet garrison town in East Germany and reinforced over a turbulent 14-year relationship with Putin, that has earned her respect in the Kremlin and thrust her into the potentially risky role of chief mediator in the Ukraine crisis.

Merkel understands that she is dealing with a difficult negotiator who holds a worldview that is diametrically opposed to hers. She also has no illusions of being able to control Putin. However she still takes a collaborative approach, avoids escalation, and grinds the negotiation to reach a mutual outcome.

The Crimea negotiations did not take place in a vacuum, but rather many years into a somewhat tumultuous relationship between Merkel and Putin. Merkel became the German Chancellor in 2005, but reports suggest that Putin and Merkel met as early as 2002. The first official meeting between Merkel and Putin was in 2007 at Putin’s Sochi residence, and it provides a perfect example of the 14-year relationship. Putin attempted to fluster and intimidate her during the meeting by unexpectedly bringing in his large, black dog “Konnie”. It is well known that Merkel has a fear of dogs after being bitten by one in childhood; however, she adapted quickly and turned the tactic against him. She stated to the press afterwards, "I understand why he has to do this — to prove he's a man. He's afraid of his own weakness. Russia has nothing, no successful politics or economy.

All they have is this”.\textsuperscript{123} Despite this provocative and overtly offensive tactic, Merkel remained unemotional and pragmatic about the necessity for diplomatic relations. While their relationship has had obstacles, they have been able to work together.

Merkel is actually one of the only Western leaders that managed to maintain a working relationship with Putin. Arguably, her collaborative approach to dealing with him is likely the reason the two have been able to maintain a relationship, while other leaders, who reacted to Putin’s belligerence with aggression, have experienced worsening relations with Russia. For example, relations under George W. Bush suffered due to Bush’s neoliberal foreign policy to remain the strongest military power and promote democracy, even through the use of force, in Russia’s geographic region.

\textbf{How did Merkel approach the negotiation?} Merkel was essentially thrust into the role of moderator between Russia and the United States due to Germany’s geopolitical position and because of her closer relationship with Putin. She approached the negotiation fairly optimistically. In initial September 2014 negotiations, Merkel took up the primary negotiating role with Putin, and the role of moderator between the West and Russia, with hopes of finding a diplomatic solution. The crisis continued on and worsened with fighting breaking out after the first cease-fire (Minsk I) deal was signed and accusations that Putin was further provoking violence. For example, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden publicly stated, “Too many times, President Putin has promised peace and delivered tanks” when asked about possible military responses to Russian

involvement in Ukraine.\textsuperscript{124} Despite the chaos, Merkel pursued a multilateral approach to negotiations. Then, in the weeks leading up to the February 2015 negotiations, many U.S. politicians and even NATO’s top military commander, General Philip Breedlove, were calling to send arms and ammunition to the Ukrainian troops to better fight the pro-Russian separatists.\textsuperscript{125} Merkel responded to these calls by denouncing military options and saying, “I cannot imagine any situation in which improved equipment for the Ukrainian army leads to President Putin being so impressed that he believes he will lose militarily. I have to put it that bluntly”.\textsuperscript{126} Here she not only denounces trying to threaten Russia, but also reaffirms her belief in reasoning diplomatically with Putin. Instead of sending weapons, Merkel spent over 17 hours in negotiations that continued overnight with Russia and France in order to reach a cease-fire deal.\textsuperscript{127} Merkel managed to reach a cease-fire deal that prevented possible escalation between the United States and Russia, even if it was not an ideal agreement.

**Did Merkel use confrontational tactics?** Throughout the conflict, Merkel has been in consistent communication with Putin and the West. Merkel has very clearly laid out her bottom-line position. She flatly ruled out military options as a response to Russian actions in Crimea.\textsuperscript{128} This is a very important point, because by taking military options off the table, she reveals her position that despite the illegality of Russian military action, she will not support an escalation. This is unusual in a militarized conflict

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{126} Parfitt, Tom.
\textsuperscript{128} Packer, George. *The Quiet German*. (The New Yorker), December 1, 2014.
negotiation because the threat of force is commonly used to deter or intimidate an opponent from a course of action. Merkel did not entertain the idea of using force, but very clearly explained that Russia’s actions would not be tolerated without consequence. Her transparent approach made it clear to all the nations involved that there would be no military escalation, but that Europe would not accept a Russia that would not adhere to international law. Merkel clearly communicated the position that aggression would be met with sanctions to President Putin on numerous occasions, in person, and over the phone.\textsuperscript{129}

These are collaborative techniques, rather than extractive tactics, because they are used to communicate Germany’s true position. Merkel is not drawing dishonest red lines in order to extract more from Putin in the negotiations, but rather she is unambiguously sharing her bottom-line, making this a clear example of honest information sharing. Furthermore, Merkel has made a point of maintaining flexibility. She has kept channels of communication open throughout the crisis, rather than demanding initial promises or concessions from Putin before going to the bargaining table. Additionally, by avoiding making grandiose public statements about the crisis and by keeping most of the negotiations’ content private, Merkel has maintained her flexibility. According to a BBC report, “The fact that few details have been made public is probably positive. It suggests this is an attempt to negotiate seriously, without rhetoric and out of the public eye”.\textsuperscript{130} This allows Merkel to keep more options on the table as negotiations progress, rather than trying to assert the outcome by eliminating options, which is a demonstration of collaborative negotiation.

\textsuperscript{129} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{130} BBC. ‘Ukraine Crisis: Leaders Upbeat after Moscow Talks’. \textit{BBC Europe} (BBC News), February 7, 2015.
Chancellor Merkel responded to a difficult opponent with caution, while avoiding confrontational tactics, like drawing red lines. One of the biggest challenges Merkel has encountered in this crisis negotiation with Putin is the allegation from the United States that Putin encouraged the separatists to break the cease-fire agreement. Many commentators, especially in the United States, saw this as evidence that Putin was enacting an increasingly belligerent and aggressive foreign policy. Merkel responded without fear or promises of punishment, and she definitively avoided drawing red lines. Instead, she was purposeful and chose a balanced response, which she believed would be more likely to result in a positive outcome. Merkel met with Putin in May 2015 and was careful to pay respect to the anniversary of mass Soviet losses in World War II. Reports say that, “She joined Mr. Putin at a military wreath-laying ceremony at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier outside the Kremlin wall, walking behind slow-marching Russian soldiers”. However, she was careful to balance this imagery with a thoughtful statement about the Ukraine crisis by saying, “We have sought more and more cooperation in recent years. The criminal and illegal annexation of Crimea and the warfare in eastern Ukraine has led to a serious setback for this cooperation”.

**Was Merkel collaborative?** Frankly, there is no better word to describe Merkel’s approach to even this highly contentious negotiation. Merkel’s most consistent method in navigating the crisis has been partnership. Building on an effort that originated during President George H. W. Bush’s administration, Merkel and Obama have cultivated a highly cooperative partnership. The United States has encouraged

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132 Trojanovski, Anton.
German leadership in this crisis and Merkel has been “careful to keep the American and the European positions close”. US-German relations are close, but have been plagued by the NSA spying scandal, in which it was revealed that the NSA had been recording Merkel’s phone calls for over a decade. However, Merkel has largely ignored the scandal, in favor of pursuing closer partnership with the United States, which she views as essential to the present Ukraine crisis and to the future in general. Merkel has worked tirelessly to collaborate with the rest of Europe as well. Packer notes that she has been, “Staying in close touch with twenty-seven other leaders and understanding each one’s constraints. For sanctions to bite, Europe had to remain united”. Merkel’s way through the crisis is not to escalate rhetoric or further militarize the conflict, but to implement sanctions in order to put pressure on Russia and wait for her opponent to fail. Even after approving sanctions against Russia, Merkel has made it a point to maintain open channels of communication with Putin. Throughout the crisis “she remained careful to balance European unity, the alliance with America, German business interests, and continued engagement with Russia”.

Despite the stubborn difficulty that Putin has presented to Merkel, she is careful to make every effort to find a mutually beneficial outcome. A senior official in Merkel’s government described the ongoing talks; “Merkel can be tough to the point of unpleasantness, while offering Putin ways out of his own mess. Above all, she tries to

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134 Packer, George.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid.
137 Packer, George. The Quiet German. (The New Yorker), December 1, 2014.
138 Ibid.
understand how he thinks”. This account depicts an intense effort to listen, understand, and find pragmatic solutions to resolve the conflict peacefully.

With Russia now, when one feels very angry I force myself to talk regardless of my feelings, and every time I do this I am surprised at how many other views you can have on a matter, which I find totally clear. Then I have to deal with those views, and this can also trigger something new. Merkel carefully navigated the tensions with Putin by empathizing with his worldview, rather than trying to manipulate or control him. This is a clear demonstration of collaborative techniques, even in the face of a difficult opponent.

The outcome of these crisis negotiations is yet to be determined, but it is fair to say that Merkel has avoided military escalation and moved the negotiations to focus on diplomatic and economic solutions. She was able to minimize the impact of worsening U.S.-Russian tensions by playing moderator, while uniting the European Union behind her approach. This resulted in two Minsk agreements (September 2014 and February 2015). In combination with these agreements, Merkel led the West to implement sanctions with the goal of limiting Putin’s options in Ukraine by causing a domestic economic crisis, while falling short of threatening Putin’s legitimacy as president. Additionally, Russian-controlled troops in Eastern Ukraine have ceased advancing and, “Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny has argued that without the sanctions, the Russian army would have invaded the southern part of Ukraine as far as Odessa”.

While Merkel’s approach has not entirely resolved the conflict at present, she has deftly managed the crisis with caution and pragmatism, while seeking to create a mutually

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139 Ibid.
140 Ibid.
141 Speck, Ulrich.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
acceptable solution for Germany, Russia, the United States, Ukraine, and the entirety of the European Union.

**Implications & Future Study**

After conducting three in-depth case studies of female world leaders, there are several implications. I found that Thatcher is a confrontational negotiator, while Rousseff and Merkel are distinctively collaborative negotiators. These findings pose a challenge to traditional realist theory. Realism predicted in Hypothesis 1 that, ‘Women and men in the international system are governed by the same objective laws, human nature, and pursuit of interests, so confrontational negotiation styles will dominate conflict negotiations, leading to the creation of winners and losers after a crisis’. Although this was the case for Margaret Thatcher, Rousseff and Merkel did not fit into the realist mold. For Rousseff and Merkel, Hypothesis 2 was a better fit. Feminist theory predicted in Hypothesis 2 that, ‘Women in world leadership tend to use more collaborative negotiation styles, resulting in a higher likelihood of mutually beneficial outcomes’. Thatcher does not fit into Hypothesis 2, but it is important to note that feminist theory predicts a tendency, not an absolute pattern. While proponents of realism may argue that it also predicts tendencies, Merkel and Rousseff pose a significant challenge to the realist perspective, suggesting that realism fails to account for differing perceptions of “interests”, human nature, and power as an objective category.

The case studies suggest that realism fails to account for gender differences. The Merkel case especially illustrates this. Merkel does not only use a collaborative approach when dealing with routine negotiations or allies, but employs collaborative negotiation
even when dealing with Putin, who is widely regarded as a belligerent, aggressive actor in the international system. This behavior directly contradicts realist expectations, based on Morgenthau’s principles, because Merkel is not pursuing interests in terms of power, or behaving in the way Morgenthau’s assessment of human nature predicts. Therefore, Merkel exemplifies how different negotiation styles can have different outcomes.

Another implication is that as more women enter politics and rise to the top leadership positions, a shift towards collaborative negotiation is likely to intensify. However, more information and research is necessary on the subject. One area for future study would be researching the timing of entering a political system. While Thatcher, Rousseff, and Merkel all rose up in male-dominated domestic political systems, Thatcher was much earlier than the other two and likely experienced a more male-dominated international system than Rousseff or Merkel currently do. The timing variable could provide a possible explanation for the vast difference in negotiating styles. Another alternative explanation could be that a growing trend towards international integration and cooperation results in the selection of more collaborative leaders.

It would also be worthwhile to study the impact of domestic political institutions on collaborative and confrontational approaches to international relations. An argument could be made that Putin benefits domestically from an aggressive international stance, while Merkel benefits from being the consensus-builder, so an important future step for the study of gender differences would be a study that accounts for the two-level interaction of domestic and international politics.

One limitation of my study is that negotiation approaches can differ based on the situation. For this reason, I assessed the overall negotiation style of each leader before
each in-depth negotiation case. However, there is the possibility that another negotiation case would have yielded different conclusions about each woman, so it is necessary to recognize the situational influences. Furthermore, negotiation approaches and styles are learned and leaders can adapt and change. Since Merkel and Rousseff are both current leaders, their styles may change in the future.

**Conclusion**

While this research cannot draw decisive conclusions about the impact of women as world leaders in crisis negotiations, it contributes important insights into the changing international political system and the value of collaborative negotiation. While gender differences play a role in determining aggregate differences in negotiation styles, it is essential to note that a collaborative negotiation style tends to lead to better outcomes than confrontational styles, for all involved in a crisis negotiation. For example, Prime Minister Thatcher confrontational style strained her relationship with President Reagan by weakening his influence in Latin America, and her military defeat of Argentina in the Falklands resulted in President Galtieri being removed from power. On the other hand, Chancellor Merkel’s collaborative management of the Ukraine Crisis has managed to avoid stand offs and Merkel, Obama, and Putin have all remained in power. In short, collaborative negotiation styles result in creating value through collective empowerment for all parties involved, and therefore deserve more emphasis in the field of international relations.
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