Emerging from Resistance: The Origins of the Virginia Technical College System

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Emerging From Resistance:
The Origins of the Virginia Technical College System

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Presented to
The Faculty of the School of Education
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctorate of Education

By
Richard Allen Hodges
May 2016
Emerging From Resistance:

The Origins of the Virginia Technical College System

by

Richard Allen Hodges

Approved May 2016

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Dedication

I would like to dedicate this dissertation to Dr. Dana B. Hamel, founding Director of the Virginia Department of Technical Education and founding Chancellor of the Virginia Community College System (VCCS). I can say without hesitation, this project would not have happened without Dana. As a result of my interviews with Dana, I discovered the complex and fascinating story of the early beginnings of the Virginia Technical College System. It has been my goal to tell this story as accurately as possible. Dana was there at the beginning and is still with us today at the age of 92.

I would like to dedicate this dissertation to the memory of my parents Thomas and Sally, my Grandmother Annie Lou Mitchel, and my friend and mentor Tallmadge Tenhet. They taught me to work hard, stay the course, and do the right thing. While they are no longer with us, I know they would be proud of this accomplishment.

I dedicate this dissertation to my loving wife, Lynn. She has been my inspiration throughout this journey. I feel like it is as much her achievement as it is my own. While friends and family members were overwhelmingly supportive, Lynn has witnessed the progress, disappointment, excitement, and discovery of research. She has also witnessed the mornings when I was up at 4 a.m. writing or reading. She has humored and sweet-talked me, while at the same time challenging me not to rely on speculation and assumption, but to pursue the sometimes hard to find information and answers, and to never compromise my standards.
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Acknowledgments

I have a photograph that was given to me many years ago by my Great Aunt Mildred Long. Mildred lived in Eupora, Mississippi, where she spent her entire life. The photo is of my Great Grandfather A.B. Hodges and his 10 sons. The photograph was taken sometime early in the 20th century prior to A.B.’s passing in 1925. A. B. was a farmer and I refer to him only by his initials because he was illiterate. As the story goes, he learned to write enough so he could make his mark by the printing of those two letters and periods. In reality, his full name was Malachi Abner Hodges. Neither Malachi nor any of his 10 sons and one daughter ever attended college; most became farmers, and I am not sure if any graduated high school. In following the line of heredity back some five generations, from my father Thomas to A. B.’s father, John, not one of them ever attended college. Mine was truly the first generation to attend college. My mother’s family was similar. When I look at a photograph of my Great Grandfather, John McCoy, I see a proud, determined disciplined man who spent his life as a sharecropping farmer in the Mississippi Delta.

I inherited from these generations of farmers and laborers a determination to work hard and accept nothing but the best from myself; a work ethic that has served me well. I owe my determination and persistence to those generations that came before me, and it is with the completion of this dissertation and degree that I recognize and thank them all.

I would like to thank my sister Patricia and my brother Thomas. I could not have done this without their cheerleading. I would like to thank Lynn’s children, Kevin Mendenko, and Jeannette Karé for their support and positive energy, and for allowing their mom to visit them on weekends so I could write. I want to thank my friends John
and Barbara Forconi, and John and Susan Enz for their enthusiasm and support as I have pursued the doctorate.

From the outset of this project my topic and involvement with Dr. Dana Hamel generated excitement and interest among colleagues at my place of employment, Thomas Nelson Community College. I would like to thank Dr. John T. Dever, President of the College, and Dr. Lonnie Schaffer, Vice President for Academic Affairs. Their counsel and encouragement has been heartfelt and extremely valuable to me.

I would like to thank the libraries and librarians of the Wolf Law Library at the School of Law at the College of William & Mary, Swem Library at the College of William & Mary, the Digital Library of George Mason University, the Law Library of Washington & Lee University, the Digital Library of The University of Virginia, the State Library of Virginia, and The Hathitrust Digital Library at the University of Michigan.

I would like to thank the members of my committee; Dr. Eddie Cole, Dr. John McGlennon and especially my advisor, Dr. Pamela Eddy. Pam’s advice was invaluable. Her attention to detail, and her persistent questioning helped me to view the progression of this document from various perspectives and vantage points.

When I was a young boy growing up in Mississippi I was fortunate to have a father who truly, and without knowing, carried on the Southern tradition of storytelling. Every evening was filled with stories of events that had happened during my father’s workday. No matter how mundane the subject, he always made it interesting. In telling the story of the Virginia Technical College System, it is my hope that I carry on the tradition handed down by my father.
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Timeline 1954-1964
Abstract

The purpose of this study was to explore factors leading to the founding of the Virginia Technical College System (VTCS). These factors are observed primarily within the timeframe of 1954-1966. The Virginia Community College System (VCCS) evolved from the Technical College System, and began in 1964. Classes started at the first technical colleges in September 1965. Despite the writings of two previous histories concerning the founding of the VCCS, one in 1977 and another in 1987, the events that led to the creation of the technical college system have never been documented, nor have the linkages between the technical college system and the Virginia’s business and industry community been investigated. Pointedly, the influence of the series of events, beginning with the Brown v. Board of Education ruling in 1954 and the subsequent Massive Resistance movement in Virginia, created a particular climate for the founding of the Department of Technical Education 10 years later. The research questions at the heart of this study sought to understand better the social, political, and economic circumstances under which the colleges were formed. This research used oral history methods and documentary research methods to create a historiographic overview of the founding of the VTCS. This research determined that the contested environment of massive resistance contributed to the founding of the VTCS.
Emerging from Resistance:

The Origins of the Virginia Technical College System
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 1964, Virginia Governor Albertis Harrison placed a telephone call that would alter the course of higher education in Virginia. The call was to Dr. Dana B. Hamel, then Director of the Roanoke Technical Institute in Roanoke, Virginia.

Governor Harrison was a staunch supporter of industrial development in Virginia, and his call to Dr. Hamel was to request Hamel serve as the Director of the soon to be established Virginia Department of Technical Education. The Department, along with its Board, would, in very short order, establish a system of technical colleges regionally located throughout Virginia, with the first of those colleges opening its doors for classes in the fall of 1965. Governor Harrison’s call to Dr. Hamel did more than establish opportunities for training and education that many Virginians could previously only dream of; it also created an environment that would help to move Virginia away from the contested environment of Massive Resistance.

The period of Massive Resistance, which began nationally in 1956, is named for a set of state laws created that year in opposition to the 1954 Supreme Court ruling in the case of Brown vs. Board of Education. Virginia’s United States Senator Harry F. Byrd coined the term Massive Resistance, and led the charge against the desegregation of Virginia’s public schools (Virginia Historical Society, 2014). The laws were designed to continue the social construct of segregated public education despite the Supreme Court ruling by denying state funding to school districts which attempted to desegregate. Governor Harrison was keenly aware of the social problems these laws had caused.
During his tenure as Virginia’s Attorney General, 1958-1962, Harrison personally opposed the Massive Resistance laws, yet given his position, he was sworn to uphold these laws in cases involving Virginia and the United States Supreme Court (Saxon, 1995).

Within Virginia’s higher education community, especially its traditionally all-white colleges and universities, desegregation was proceeding, but at a very slow pace. In 1965, six of the 19 traditionally all-white colleges and universities in Virginia were enrolling undergraduate African-American students, with a combined total enrollment of 46 students (Piedmont, 1967). According to Dr. Dana Hamel the newly formed Board had no mandates regarding race or desegregation, and race was never voiced as an issue during the formation of the technical college system (personal communication, June 5, 2013). The enrollment policy in the technical college system, from the outset, was open door; a distinction still held today in the community college sector regarding access (Cohen, Brawer, & Kisker, 2014). All would be admitted regardless of race or gender. The technical college system grew quickly and with it came a new landscape for Virginia’s post-secondary education institutions.

Institutions of higher education in Virginia began desegregation during the 1950s, with the law schools at both the University of Virginia and The College of William and Mary accepting their first African-American students (Picott, 1958). In 1950, the University of Virginia accepted its first African-American student into its law school (University of Virginia, 2015). Following UVA’s lead, in 1951 the College of William & Mary enrolled its first African-American student into the law school (College of William & Mary, 2015). In 1953, Virginia Tech (then known as Virginia Polytechnic Institute)
became the first four-year traditionally all-white university within the 11 former
Confederate states to begin accepting undergraduate African-American students (Virginia
Tech University, 2015). Progress was being made, albeit very slowly.

In the K-12 arena, court ordered desegregation brought with it a backlash
throughout the Southern states, with several adopting laws aimed at defying the Supreme
Court ruling (Eskridge, 2010). Virginia created a set of laws known as the Massive
Resistance laws, which served as Virginia’s response to the 1954 Supreme Court ruling
(Virginia Historical Society, 2014). The seminal ruling of *Brown v. Board of Education*
resulted in a reversal of the previously held concept of separate but equal put forth in
*Plessey v. Ferguson* (1896). The 1954 Supreme Court ruling declared separate was not
equal, thus abolishing segregated K-12 schools.

In the Congress of the United States in 1956, under the Leadership of South
Carolina Senator Strom Thurman, Southern Congressmen and Senators signed the
Southern Manifesto in protest of the *Brown v. Board of Education* ruling two years
earlier (Day, 2014). Subsequently, Virginia lawmakers, prompted by United States
Senator Harry F. Byrd, devised a number of state laws that restricted the mobility of
African-American students who wished to attend schools formerly labeled as white.

The set of bills, known as the Massive Resistance laws, were passed in a special
session of the Virginia General Assembly in 1956 (Virginia Foundation for the
Humanities, 2015). One of the bills created by the Virginia Assembly included a pupil
placement act, which abolished school boards throughout the state replacing them with a
centralized Pupil Placement Board (State of Virginia, 1956). This three-member Board,
appointed by the Governor, *placed* students in what they perceived as the appropriate
school (State of Virginia, 1956). Another of these laws (S. 56) allowed for the restricting of state funding and the closure of school districts that abided by the 1954 Supreme Court ruling in the case of *Brown v. Board of Education* (State of Virginia, 1956). The choice to close any school was at the discretion of the Governor. In 1959, in defiance of the *Brown* decisions all public schools were closed in Prince Edward County, and would remain closed for five years (Bonastia, 2012). Schools were also closed for a lesser amount of time, in the cities of Norfolk and Arlington.

The State’s Constitution of 1902, which governed the state in 1956, made it illegal for “white and colored children to attend school together” (Sec. 140). Section 141 of the Constitution made it illegal to use state funds to support private education (Commonwealth of Virginia, 1956). The writers of the Massive Resistance legislation wanted to create a voucher system to pay for white students to attend private schools. The desire to alter the Virginia Constitution led to the Constitutional convention of 1956, where no less than seven amendments regarding public education were introduced.

The vestiges of Virginia’s official response of Massive Resistance to the *Brown vs. Board of Education* ruling would last until 1970 (Eckhart, 2008). Context is important when considering the Massive Resistance movement in Virginia. It had not been a full century since the beginning of America’s Civil War, and even though nationally great strides had been made toward racial equality, much of the South was still isolated and insulated when it came to issues of race. The doctrine of separate but equal brought about by the 1896 Supreme Court ruling in *Plessey v. Ferguson*, furthered the idea that African-Americans were somehow inferior to whites (United States Supreme Court, 1896). This concept had been the rule in Virginia for over half a century.
As I examined the events and people surrounding the creation of the technical and subsequent community college systems in Virginia, the one person whose importance has been understated in the available literature is Albertis Harrison. Harrison began his public service career in 1931 as the Attorney for Brunswick County and finally retired from public service in 1982 after serving 15 years on the State’s Supreme Court (State of Virginia, 1995). He is one of few people to have served in all three branches of the State’s Government (State of Virginia, 1995). During his time in the Senate (1948-1957), Harrison did not support the Massive Resistance legislation promulgated by United States Senator Harry F. Byrd. In Harrison’s move to the executive branch as Governor (1962-1966), he oversaw a tremendous shifting in Virginia’s society and its workforce by increasing funding to education, both K-12 and higher education, and responding to the need for Virginia’s economy to industrialize and modernize (State of Virginia, 1995). It was Harrison’s vision and political ingenuity that created the technical colleges, enabling thousands of people access to post-secondary education and job training; something previously not available (State of Virginia, 1995).

**Statement of the Problem**

In researching the early history of the technical colleges, little discussion exists regarding the functions of the Board for Technical Education, established in 1964, which served as the foundation for the later establishment of a statewide board for the community college system. In my discussions with Dr. Hamel, he stated many times the persistence of the Technical Board in developing initiatives and carrying them forward. Many of the Board members were prominent business leaders in Virginia and “no nonsense people” (Dana Hamel, personal communication, April 25, 2013). The Board’s
purpose was to create a system of technical colleges and have them ready for service as soon as possible. This creation of a system of two-year colleges meant some had to be built from the ground up, while others were adaptations of existing campuses currently under the auspices of Virginia’s four-year institutions. A thorough review of the proceedings of the Board for Technical Education and its transition into the Board for Community Colleges provides insight into the critical role the establishment of the board had on enabling greater access to higher education in Virginia.

There exists little research concerning the Virginia Industrialization Group. The Virginia Industrialization Group was composed of many of the State’s most prominent leaders in industry and business (see Appendix A for the original mailing list). This group worked quietly behind the scenes to help bring Massive Resistance to a close, and was influential in the founding of the technical college system.

These oversights in the literature regarding the history of the community college system in Virginia may have been due to neglect, or to an absence of available primary documentation to previous researchers. Critically, it is within this broader social context of the nation and the state that the roots of the current Virginia Community College System were planted.

The creation of Virginia’s system of technical colleges changed the landscape of higher education in the state by allowing open access to post-high school education to people who were previously unable to attain a college education. The establishment of these two-year colleges came about at a time when Virginia was struggling socially to find a path to prosperity that included all Virginians. Business and industry had been crippled throughout the State by the unintended consequences of Massive Resistance.
Virginia’s hardline response to the *Brown v. Board of Education* rulings caused the business community to question the idea of locating to a state that was closing its public school system (Miller, 1960). Then recently elected Governor, Albertis Harrison, having served in public office for over 30 years, saw the need for change and recognized the best way to bring business and industry to Virginia was by having an educated and a well-trained workforce. Prior to the existence of the technical colleges, higher education in Virginia was dominated by a loosely coupled system of universities and colleges. Included among these schools were the College of William and Mary, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, and the State’s flagship institution; the University of Virginia. Also included were a number of smaller schools, both public and private, and branch campuses of the three larger institutions. One of these colleges, the Roanoke Technical Institute, at the time a branch campus of Virginia Polytechnic Institute, became the State’s first two-year technical college, Virginia Western Technical Institute, and then opened its doors again on September 22, 1966 as Virginia Western Community College (Roanoke Technical Institute, 1965).

By the early 1960s, desegregation of Virginia’s major universities, on the undergraduate level, remained almost non-existent. The technical colleges marked a sharp contrast by having an open admissions policy, with no restrictions regarding race or gender (Sydnor & Hamel, 1965). With Virginia still in the midst of Massive Resistance, albeit nearing the end, the technical colleges were able to achieve a kind of social equality the four-year institutions were unable to achieve. This study sought to remedy the lack of available information regarding the inception of the two-year college system in Virginia by situating the emergence of the system into the larger context of the state.
and country that at the time was being buffeted by social change. The *Brown v. Board of Education* rulings served as a catalyst for a series of decisions by Virginia lawmakers. These decisions were accompanied by unintended circumstances that would prove to create a truly Contested Environment.

**Historical Analysis as Framework**

Using an historical framework for this study requires a survey of primary documents. This type of overview allows the researcher to place people and events within a set timeframe. It also allows the researcher to contextualize the given timeframe against modern understandings and to either support, or overturn previous findings, or to develop new findings.

The creation of the Virginia Community College System emerged from a very dark period in United States, Southern, and Virginia history. The response to the *Brown v. Board of Education* rulings known as Massive Resistance caused what I see as a desperate social knee-jerk reaction to a reality many knew was coming, but few were prepared to accept. Between the years of 1955 and 1960 as Virginians grappled with how to respond to the desegregation of public schools, officials in the state and local governments created laws making desegregated schools systems illegal and financially unsustainable. In 1959, a group of Virginia’s most prominent businessmen calling themselves the Virginia Industrialization Group (see Appendix C) came together to demand an end to Massive Resistance (Ford & Littlejohn, 2013). It was the voice of business that brought to Governor Almond’s attention the long and short-term damage the closing of Virginia’s schools meant to the economic welfare of the State.
The then Attorney General, Albertis Harrison was a staunch proponent of industry in Virginia as a means to prosperity. In 1962, when Harrison became Governor, legislation was passed creating the Virginia Department of Technical Education. The Department’s mandate was to create a series of two-year technical colleges to prepare the Virginia workforce for the demands of modern industry, in essence repairing much of the economic damage caused by Massive Resistance. To oversee the creation of these colleges, in 1964 Governor Harrison installed Dr. Dana B. Hamel, then Director of the Roanoke Technical Institute, as Director of the Board of Technical Education. The Department and its Board would later become the State Department of Community Colleges, and the State Board for Community Colleges. Dr. Hamel would become the inaugural Chancellor of the VCCS in 1966. A position he would hold until 1979.

Much of the information for this research was drawn from primary documents including oral history interviews, reports, legislation, pamphlets, books, diary entries, interviews, and newspaper articles. It is important to frame the creation of these colleges and the system in the proper historical context. Virginia’s newly elected Governor, Albertis Harrison, was a proponent of industrialization as a driver for job creation. This industrialization could not occur without an educated workforce. Beginning in the mid 1950s, Virginia lawmakers, in reaction to the *Brown v. Board of Education* ruling, had created laws crippling to the production of an educated workforce. Thus, it is important to understand the historical context of the times that served as a backdrop for the creation of the technical colleges. I argue that their creation not only helped produce a well-trained workforce to support industrial expansion in the state, but also served to advance
Virginia as a more progressive society, making itself more attractive to the relocation and location of industry.

Early in my discussions with Dr. Hamel, he consistently reminded me that the state had just come out of the period of Massive Resistance (personal communication, April 25, 2013). He felt it was important to place the creation of the technical colleges in the proper social timeframe. Dr. Hamel loaned me several documents, including the minutes from the first year and a half of meetings of the Board for Technical Education. These minutes are very well written and provide excellent detail regarding the inception of the technical colleges. Since the Board met monthly, these minutes provide a rich resource for telling the story of how the Board developed the technical system and highlights the advancement of the initial concept put forth by Governor Harrison to the eventual creation of the system and the opening of the first college in 1965. The Board’s minutes show how the membership was dedicated to the vision and mission set by Governor Harrison and how the Board understood the dire need Virginia’s business and industrial community had for the creation of a better-educated work force.

The technical college systems’ rapid evolution into a series of comprehensive community colleges was important for Virginia. In the early 1960s, only 25.2% of Virginia’s college-aged population received any type of post-secondary education (Statistics for the Sixties; Higher Education in the South, 1963). The low participation rate of the college-aged population placed Virginia second to last among the Southern states, surpassing only South Carolina which had a rate of 19.7% of college-aged citizens with post-secondary attainment (Statistics for the Sixties; Higher Education in the South, 1963).
In framing the creation of the technical colleges it is vital to understand how the funding of these colleges came about. Many in the Virginia Community College System community see the bill that passed the Virginia Assembly in January of 1966 as the document that gave life to the current system. Because the community college system began as a system of technical colleges, I posit that the financial seeds that created the system were planted almost 50 years prior with the passage of the Smith-Hughes Act of 1917. The legislation leading to the funding of the creation of technical college system will be discussed in more detail in the literature review covering the 1917 federal legislation, establishing the roots to what led up to both federal and state legislation in the late 1950s and early 1960s. It is through the understanding of the legislation, and the social climate of the times that we gain a deeper understanding of the how and the why that led to the creation of these colleges.

**Statement of the Purpose**

The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the social, economic and political factors that led to the creation of the Virginia Community College System. The questions that have prompted this research include; why did it take until the early 1960s for Virginia, today seen as an educationally progressive State, to conceive a plan to create a system of technical colleges? Was it that political conditions had never been appropriate to support expansion of technical education in the state? What effect, if any, did the Massive Resistance movement have on the creation of the technical colleges? In order to address these questions properly I explored the political, educational, social, and economic climates through a study and review of legislation, both state and federal, and related readings in the available literature.
The 1964 Virginia Assembly passed legislation creating a Department of Technical Education and a Board for Technical Education. The push for technical or vocational education had begun as far back as 1917 with the passing of the Smith-Hughes Act. The Smith-Hughes Act served a dual purpose. It provided states with guidance and financial means to prepare citizens for work in industry and agriculture, while also preparing the nation for its entrance into World War I (Hawkins, Prosser, & Wright, 1951). This era would not be the only time war played a role in the passing of vocational education legislation. The 1957 launch of the Soviet satellite Sputnik caused quite a stir in Cold War America. A few creative legislators in Washington, D.C. seized the moment by proposing higher education legislation tied to national defense (United States Senate, 2014). The proposed legislation led to the passing of the 1958 National Defense Education Act, and later, the 1963 Higher Education Act. Also passed in 1963, was the Higher Education Facilities Act. These legislative Acts provided funding throughout the nation in support of post-secondary education and training. It was through funding from the 1963 Act that Virginia was able to move forward with the creation of the Department and Board for Technical Education. The Department was charged with overseeing the development of a series of technical colleges whose formation would eventually lead to the creation of what is now known as the Virginia Community College System.

According to the U.S. Census of 1960, at the time, only 9.2% of Virginia’s males and 10.5% of females, 14 years or older sought education beyond high school resulting in a poorly trained and poorly educated workforce (Statista, n.d.). The lack of an educated populous was not unique to Virginia. At the same time as Virginia was developing its series of technical colleges, the state’s neighbor to the south, North Carolina, was doing
the same (Wiggs, 1989). Unlike Virginia, the effort to develop a system of community colleges in North Carolina had begun in the late 1940s following the close of World War II (Wiggs, 1989). Like Virginia, North Carolina was a latecomer to the establishment of state supported community colleges; yet, this status was only in appearance and not in truth. Several politicians championed the idea of creating comprehensive community colleges in North Carolina in the 1940s, but it was not until the early 1960s that these efforts begin to pay off (Wiggs, 1989). Both Virginia and North Carolina had recently elected new leadership at the start of the 1960s, Terry Sanford Governor of North Carolina (1961-1965), and Albertis Harrison Governor of Virginia (1962-1966). Both men shared a mutual vision; that educating the people of their respective states would bring economic prosperity.

Harrison, having been elected on a political platform of industrial job creation for the state, faced a formidable task. The lack of an educated population meant that his vision and promise of jobs might not become reality. In an effort to alleviate these problems while positioning Virginia for the future, in 1964 Governor Harrison gathered together some of the most successful business and education leaders in Virginia to serve as members of the Board of Technical Education. The board’s membership included, among others, S. E. Liles, Jr. owner of Tidewater Construction Company and department store owner C. Wesley Peebles, owner of Peebles’ department stores. Senator Eugene Sydnor became the Board’s chair and Dr. Dana Hamel was hired as the first Director of the Board of Technical Education. Senator Sydnor is notable for having introduced legislation in the mid-1950’s leading to the creation of the State Council on Higher Education in Virginia (SCHEV). Dr. Hamel, beginning in 1963, was the Director of
Roanoke Technical College; a branch of Virginia Polytechnic Institute. Hamel would later become the founding Chancellor of the Virginia Community College System in 1966.

**Research Questions**

In formulating questions for an historical study of the origins of the Virginia Technical College System three distinct yet interrelated topic areas are important to consider. These areas include the 1) social impact of the creation of these colleges, 2) impact the creation of these colleges had on access to higher education, and 3) impact these colleges have had on the overall quality of higher education in Virginia. In relationship to these areas I explored the following questions.

1. What were the central engines that drove the creation of the technical college system in Virginia and how did their elements converge?

2. Nationally junior/community colleges were established at the opening of the 20th century. Virginia’s leading research universities created branch campuses that served as two-year technical and community colleges. Why did Virginia invest in a statewide system of technical colleges during the time period 1964-1966?

3. How did the sociopolitical climate in Virginia during the late 1950s and early 1960s regarding racial equality and education influence the formation of the technical college system?

**Significance of the Study**

In my review of the available literature I discovered that little has been produced regarding the creation of the technical college system. Without a clear understanding of
the establishment of these colleges it would be easy to underappreciate the social, political, and economic game-changing effects their creation had on the history of Virginia higher education. Relying on primary sources, I argue a linkage exists between vocational education legislation and the eventual funds used to create the VTCS. Yet, funding is only part of the story. These colleges were created during the Massive Resistance period in Virginia. A period when, in response to the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education ruling, Virginia devised and passed several laws that openly defied the Supreme Court’s ruling requiring desegregation of public schools. Virginia’s institutions of higher education had only begun to desegregate, and the number of African-American students attending Virginia’s three most prominent four-year universities was very small in the 1950s and early 1960s.

As a new type of higher education institution in Virginia, the technical and subsequent community college system had no history to hold it back and no track record of racial equality or inequality upon which to build. The doors of Virginia’s technical colleges opened unburdened by a legacy of excluding minority students. The open admission policies left unencumbered the opportunity for all students to attend. The VTCS began as an affordable and accessible higher education choice for all Virginians and continues to play this major role today in the form of the VCCS. As community colleges are currently in the national spotlight as a means to increase the number of college graduates, understanding more about the roots of VCCS, found within the VTCS, can provide sound foundation for how the current VCCS enacts its mission.
Conclusions and Implications

The literature review in Chapter 2 will address the topics of Massive Resistance, and the political and economic climates in Virginia during the late 1950s and early 1960s. An overview of community college history will provide a landscape by which to further situate the development of the two-year technical system in Virginia. In addressing these topics, a connection to higher education, and education in general, will be discussed. For guidance in developing the Virginia system, the Board for Technical Education employed the services of several consultants. The reports produced by these consultants will be discussed throughout this dissertation. Chapter 3 will provide a summary of the methods used to produce this historical analysis, and outline the use of the document analysis and historiographic methods. Chapter 4 will summarize the key findings from the research. Finally, Chapter 5 will discuss implications for future research and practice.
CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW

The creation of the early technical colleges was a culmination of social, political, and economic forces. This review of literature focuses on several areas to help ground the research. First, a review of community college history helps set the stage for the context of this research. Second, a review of Massive Resistance is included to establish an understanding of the social climate surrounding the founding of the technical colleges in Virginia. Finally, a review of the legislation for vocational and technical education highlights changes over time.

History of Community Colleges in Brief

The first junior college in the United States was established in 1901 in Joliet, Illinois. Joliet Junior College came about as a result of a collaboration between J. Stanley Brown, Superintendent of Joliet High School, and William Rainey Harper, President of the University of Chicago (Joliet Junior College: About, 2015). The basic purpose of the junior college was to provide students with their first two years of undergraduate education so they could later transfer to a four-year degree granting institution.

Even though this transfer mission has been the accepted premise for the founding of Joliet Junior College, Brint and Karabel (1989) suggested that Harper and other higher education leaders saw the first two years of a university education as nothing more than confirming the education a student had received in high school. Harper believed the first
two years of college served to dilute the university education (Brint & Karabel, 1989), a view shared by David Starr Jordan of Stanford University and Alexis Lange of the University of California (Brint & Karabel, 1989). This elitist view created a situation where less-talented students were diverted to a junior college and away from the university. This view of “purifying” the university was accepted by others in higher education (Brint & Karabel, 1989, p. 24).

The addition of the associate’s degree was a key component in this purification. The idea was that students would seek only the two-year degree and nothing further, thus leaving the universities to educate the most talented and better-prepared students (Brint & Karabel, 1989). This concept of differentiation of students between two-year and four-year colleges may have worked had it not been for other factors Harper and other college president’s of that time did not foresee.

**Shift from junior college to community college.** Two World Wars and the Great Depression served to fuel the need for short-term community based colleges (Cohen, 1985). Between 1910 and 1940, high schools began to graduate more students than ever before as graduation rates escalated from 7% to 50% (Cohen, 1985). In this time frame, Junior colleges grew at a rapid rate, prompting some states to create entire systems of junior colleges (Cohen, 1985). It was the Truman Commission Report of 1947 that put the spotlight on two-year colleges by suggesting that post-secondary education become available to anyone who could benefit from its offerings (Cohen, 1985).

It was during the 1950s that the term *community college* began to be used, emerging in use from language in the Truman Commission report about putting post-
secondary education in reach of students from every community. It was during this
decade that community colleges, along with their transfer mission function, took on the
responsibility of providing technical education to prepare students for work in their local
community (Cohen, 1985). With the ever-expanding graduation rates from high schools
and increased demand for post-secondary education, the number of community colleges
continued to grow.

In 1920, the American Association of Junior Colleges (AAJC) was founded. Its
purpose was to promote junior college education (AACC, 2016.). The 1947 Truman
Commission Report referred to these colleges as community instead of junior colleges.
AAJC Executive Secretary Jesse Bogue (1946-1958), championed the idea of the
community college (AACC, n.d.). Later the AAJC became known as the American
Association of Community and Junior Colleges (AACJC), reflecting its identification of
the community college. In 1992, the organization dropped the junior from its name and
became known as American Association of Community Colleges (AACC) (AACC, n.d.).
The AACC remains to this day a vital supporting agency for community college
education.

**Virginia’s early junior colleges.** The Association of Virginia Colleges, in
February of 1918, adopted detailed criteria for what defined a junior college (McDowell,
1919). Included among its stipulations was “It shall confer no degrees” (McDowell,
1919, p. 90). For a complete list of the Association of Virginia Colleges criteria
pertaining to what constitutes a junior college, see Appendix B.

As late as 1960, Virginia continued to be the only state in the nation whose junior
colleges did not confer associates degrees (Thornton, 1960). This distinction changed
when, according to minutes from the Board for Technical Education, the newly formed technical colleges in Virginia were authorized to confer associates degrees (State Board for Technical Education, 1964b)

In the first half of the 20th Century, Virginia had vocational education programs within some high schools, and by 1919 had established nine junior colleges (McDowell, 1919). The nine colleges were Daleville College, Marion College, Mary Baldwin Seminary, Southern College, Stonewall Jackson College, Sullins College, Virginia College, Virginia Intermont College, and Virginia Union University (McDowell, 1919, p. 90). Of this list, only Virginia Union University is listed as being for “colored” students (McDowell, 1919, p. 90). By 1936, the number of junior colleges in Virginia had grown to include 11 colleges for “white students” (Greenleaf, 1936, p. 70), one two-year college, the Norfolk Division of William and Mary, was a branch of a four-year institution (p. 75), and St. Paul’s Normal and Industrial School had been established for “Negro” students (p. 24).

Later, in 1955, additional branch campuses of the larger four-year institutions; Virginia Polytechnic Institute and the University of Virginia would be suggested as a way of addressing the growing need for post-secondary education in Virginia (Thompson, 1955). It would not be until the early 1960s, however, before Virginia would make a concerted effort toward the establishment of a unified set of technical colleges.

Critically, the technical college system in Virginia was not established as segregated colleges. Unlike the community colleges in North Carolina where, according to Wiggs (1989), some counties were slow to establish a college because they would not be segregated, I did not find any information in the literature requesting or discussing that
Virginia’s two-year colleges be established as segregated or desegregated. No doubt this was an issue for some Virginia localities, as the state was slowly emerging from the grips of Massive Resistance, a movement of forced segregation that robbed a number of Virginian’s of a chance to obtain a basic education.

**Massive Resistance: The Contested Environment**

During multiple interviews with Dr. Dana Hamel, he stressed the need to understand the social climate at the time of the inception of the technical college system. “You have to remember we were still in Massive Resistance” (Dana Hamel, personal communication, April 25, 2013). At the time of this interview, I was unaware of the full meaning and importance of this statement for the state of Virginia. Since that time, my research has revealed Massive Resistance to be a very turbulent time in the history of Virginia, especially for the education of its citizenry.

In order to understand the factors contributing to the context at the time of the founding of what is now the VTCS, it is important to delve into a number of areas of literature. In reviewing literature about Massive Resistance it is not my intent to allow the discussion of this turbulent time to overshadow the focus on the founding of the VTCS. However, the politics and the politicians of the time period between 1954 and 1964 cannot be separated from the effects the Massive Resistance crusade had on the development of Virginia’s technical colleges.

Created as a response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in *Brown v. Board of Education* and *Brown II*, the Virginia State Assembly passed a set of laws that proved crippling to public education in the state. The legacy of these laws, one of Virginia’s darkest societal periods, continues today in the form of Virginia’s *Brown v. Board of*
Education Scholarship program designed to make restitution to those citizens’ disadvantaged by Massive Resistance (Commonwealth of Virginia, 2015; Vegh, 2011).

In an effort to better understand how and why Massive Resistance is related to the beginning of the Virginia Community College System I present the brief timeline below.

Table 1

*Timeline 1954-1964*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 17, 1954</td>
<td>Supreme Court decision in <em>Brown v. Board of Education</em> case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 31, 1955</td>
<td>Second Supreme Court ruling in <em>Brown v. Board of Education</em> case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 11, 1955</td>
<td>Public Education Report to The Governor of Virginia (“Gray Commission” Report) delivered to Governor Thomas Stanley recommending a response to the <em>Brown</em> rulings. The report suggests giving local school boards the choice of whether or not to integrate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1, 1956</td>
<td>Members of the Virginia Legislature sign the Resolution of Interposition defying the Supreme Court’s ruling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 5-7, 1956</td>
<td>Virginia Constitutional Convention convenes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 13, 1956</td>
<td>United States Senators and Congressmen from the South sign the “Southern Manifesto” pledging defiance to the <em>Brown</em> rulings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1956</td>
<td>Special Session of the Virginia Legislature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 18, 1958</td>
<td>Virginia Industrialization Group meets at Rotunda Club in Richmond. Governor Lindsey Almond and Attorney General Albertis Harrison attend.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Richard Holmqquist, Chair of Virginia Industrialization Group becomes special advisor to Governor Harrison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Passage of legislation establishing the Board of Technical Education in Virginia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Board for Technical Education is Formed. Dr. Dana Hamel, hired as Director of Department for Technical Education.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In examining Virginia’s history from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, the connection of people with events is unavoidable. During the course of my research, several key individuals emerged as critical to decisions influencing state policy. Seemingly paradoxical, some of these people were involved in both the creation of Massive Resistance, and the creation of the technical college system. The contradictions represented by the actions of these people represent political opportunism that leaves one speculating as to their true convictions.

**Virginia’s reaction to Brown v. Board of Education.** On May 14, 1954, the United States Supreme Court handed down a decision that would change public education throughout the nation, and especially in the Southern states. The *Brown v. Board of Education* ruling struck down the long held doctrine of separate but equal established by the 1896 case of *Plessey v. Ferguson*. A year later, on May 31, 1955, the Court revisited the ruling and strengthened its decision by declaring that not only was separate not equal, but we as a nation must move “with all deliberate speed” to desegregate public school education (*Brown v. Board of Education*, May 31, 1955, para. 2). The language of the first ruling striking down *Plessey* was strong, but the ruling in *Brown II*, as the 1955 ruling is commonly called, sent a shockwave throughout the South. This ruling sent the signal that there was no going back to segregated education. The idea that African-American and white children would attend the same schools and sit side by side in the same classrooms was unfathomable and unacceptable to some Southern whites. A pamphlet from a sovereignty group in Virginia said integrated schools would result in the “mongralization” of the Southern people (Defenders of State Sovereignty and Individual Freedoms, 1955, p. 3). The 1955 ruling by the Supreme Court seemed to
fan the flames created by the original 1954 *Brown* ruling. Virginia’s Governor, Thomas Stanley, was a disciple of what was known as the Byrd Machine, a political oligarchy named for United States Senator and former Governor Harry Flood Byrd. Byrd’s political operations reached throughout Virginia. No politician could be elected to statewide office without an endorsement of the Byrd machine (Mays & Sweeney, 2008).

In 1955, Governor Stanley appointed a commission, led by state Senator Garland Gray. The Commission on Public Education, commonly known as the Gray Commission, was tasked with drafting a response to the 1954 *Brown* ruling (Mays & Sweeney, 2008). David J. Mays, legal counsel for the Gray Commission, and later the Chairman of the Commission on Constitutional Government, maintained extensive diaries documenting activities surrounding the undertakings of both commissions. The Gray Commission’s recommendations to the Governor were for the implementation of what would become known as the *local option* (Mays & Sweeney, 2008). The local option would leave it up to local school boards as to how, and if at all, they would desegregate the public schools within their localities (Mays & Sweeney, 2008). “School boards would be authorized to assign pupils to particular schools” (Commission on public education, 1955, p. 8). The commission’s recommendations were to insure “that no child be required to attend an integrated school” (Commission on public education, 1955, p. 9). After Senator Byrd became aware of the commission’s recommendations, Governor Stanley reversed his initial support (Mays & Sweeney, 2008). Byrd believed the local option was a sign of weakness and Byrd was not willing to give an inch on the issue of public school segregation. Governor Stanley supported Senator Byrd’s hardline view (Mays & Sweeney, 2008).
Section 140 of the 1902 Constitution of Virginia, which governed Virginia during the time of the *Brown* rulings, made it illegal to desegregate public schools stating “white and colored children shall not be taught in the same school.” Section 141 of the Constitution made it illegal for the State to fund private education with taxpayer money, “No appropriation of public funds shall be made to any school or institution of learning not owned or exclusively controlled by the State or some political subdivision thereof.”

These two sections of Virginia’s Constitution posed problems for lawmakers. On the one hand, section 140 gave segregationist the ability to claim the *Brown* ruling unconstitutional, even though the Supreme Court had ruled the opposite. Based on section 140 of the state’s Constitution segregationist saw the *Brown* rulings as unconstitutional. On the other hand, if the U. S. Supreme Court were to ever strike down Section 140, segregationist would have little choice but to allow integrated schools to exist. Virginia lawmakers wanted to amend Section 141 to make State funds available for the funding of private schools for families (most of these being white) who did not want to send their children to integrated schools. As it stood, Section 141 made it illegal for segregationist lawmakers to adopt a policy of publicly funding private school voucher programs.

In theory, a voucher program would support both white and families who wished to send their children to single race schools, but in practice this would have mostly benefited white families. The only way to create a system whereby public funds could be used for the support of private schools was to change Section 141 of the State’s Constitution. The Gray Commission had already recognized the need for this option. Along with recommending the local option, the Gray Commission report recommended a
constitutional convention directed at the alteration of section 141 to allow the State to fund private school education (Mays & Sweeney, 2008).

Resolution of Interposition. In an effort to express the Commonwealth’s defiance to the Supreme Court’s rulings, and hoping to rally other Southern states behind Virginia, the Assembly drafted and adopted the Resolution of Interposition. This tactic is reminiscent of the secessionist movement that led to the beginning of the Civil War a century earlier. The Doctrine of Interposition states that a State does not have to abide by any federal law it deems as overreaching and a violation of that state’s sovereignty (Interposition Doctrine Law & Legal Definition, 2015). The interposition argument has been used in modern times as a response by some states to implementation of the Affordable Care Act (Cohen, 2010).

The Interposition Resolution was designed to convey to the federal government Virginia’s belief that not only did it find the decisions in the Brown v. Board of Education case unconstitutional, but also an act of evil (Commonwealth of Virginia, 1956). Within the Virginia resolution, the word evil is used twice to describe the federal government’s perceived misuse of power. The resolution defines the power of the federal government as coming from the collected power of the individual states. It accuses the federal government, by way of the Supreme Court rulings in Brown v. Board of Education, of suppressing the rights of the individual states, and as the powers of the federal government were granted by the states those powers are limited. The argument is based on the fact that the Supreme Court is not a law making body, and because it is not a lawmaking body it could not cause to happen the desegregation of public schools in the Southern states.
The only way a shift so monumental as a move to federal versus state oversight could take place, according to the Resolution of Interposition, and as interpreted by those who drafted the Resolution, was by amending the U. S. Constitution (Commonwealth of Virginia, 1956). The Resolution contended that the ruling by the Supreme Court was unconstitutional and violated the Court’s Federal Constitutional purpose of upholding and interpreting law. The Resolution declared the Supreme Court had crossed the line into making law rather than interpreting law. The Resolution stated, “Virginia emphatically disapproves” (Commonwealth of Virginia, 1956, para. 6) of the action of the Supreme Court. In disapproving, the Resolution goes on to discuss and imply that in its ratification of the 14th Amendment to the U. S. Constitution, which declares that all persons born on U.S. soil are citizens and are entitled to equal treatment, Virginia did not give up its sovereign right to operate public schools as it sees fit.

In citing the 14th Amendment, the Virginia Assembly membership did not acknowledge the unconstitutionality of the 1896 Plessey ruling that separate was not equal. Instead, the language of the resolution alludes to a protection under the Plessey ruling for Virginia to operate segregated schools. The Resolution contends that the passing of the 14th Amendment in 1868 gave states the right to operate segregated schools, and that Virginia had never conceded that right. By defying the unconstitutional decisions made by the Supreme Court, Virginia was standing up to the “progress of these evils” (Commonwealth of Virginia, 1956, para. 13) and to the “illegal encroachment upon our sovereign powers” (Commonwealth of Virginia, 1956, para. 15). The document was sent to every county in Virginia, every state in the Union and to the clerks of the U. S. House and Senate. A copy was also sent to the President of the United States.
The backlash following the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision was not limited to individual states, such as Virginia. In 1956, in the United States Congress, a combination of 82 Senators and 12 Representatives from across the states of the former Confederacy banded together in a show of unanimity (Day, 2014; U.S. House of Representatives, n.d.) The crusade, so to speak, was led by South Carolina Senator Strom Thurman, and vigorously supported by Virginia Senator Harry F. Byrd (Day, 2014). The group produced and signed a document known as the Southern Manifesto. Similar in language to Virginia’s Resolution of Interposition, the Southern Manifesto declared the Supreme Court’s decision to be not only unconstitutional, but also reckless in its disregard for the potential chaos they felt would ensue by the Court’s actions. The document’s authors argued that the Court had overstepped its Constitutional authority. “We regard this decision of the Supreme Court in the school cases as a clear abuse of judicial power” (Day, 2014, p. 160). The document states that since education was never mentioned in the “original Constitution” (Day, 2014, p. 160), and was not mentioned in subsequent amendments, the Court had no grounds on which to declare its authority.

In their opinion, the Court was without authority to make such a ruling, and certainly without the authority to declare States act “with deliberate speed” (*Brown v. Board of Education*, May 31, 1955, para. 1). The manifesto declared the Court was without authority or precedent to make or enforce such a ruling. The authors of the Manifesto used this moment to take a jab at their Northern counterparts with wording reminding Northern legislators that one of the first cases upholding separate but equal occurred in a Court decision that took place in 1849. The court case involved the City of
Boston, with subsequent similar decisions handed down in Connecticut, New York, Illinois, and several additional Northern states. This language in the Southern Manifesto was used in an effort to reinforce the idea that segregated public schools were not unique to the Southern states (Day, 2014). *Plessey v. Ferguson*, the Manifesto explained, had been used since 1896 as the gold standard when it came to deciding cases involving racial equality in public school education. By throwing out *Plessey*, a ruling that had withstood many challenges and therefore had much precedent, the Supreme Court had acted in a manner that could bring harm to school children and their families.

The signatories of the Manifesto insisted, by way of the Manifesto, that the Supreme Court’s actions in the case of *Brown v. Board of Education* represented something between a gross overreaching of power, to a treasonous act. After all the passionate rhetoric, the Manifesto declares that its authors and signatories will use whatever legal means at their disposal to reverse the Supreme Court’s decisions. It also asks that people living in effected States, to not be “provoked by agitators and troublemakers” who invade their State and to refrain from “lawless acts” (Day, 2014, p. 162). Yet, this document did little to prevent acts of lawlessness. If anything, it rekindled the vision of the Northern invaders bent on destroying the Southern way of life less than a century earlier.

*Virginia Constitutional Convention.* As members of the leadership from the Southern States in the United States Congress prepared to present their Southern Manifesto to the nation, Virginia Governor Stanley called for a Constitutional Convention. The notion of creating a voucher program whereby taxpayer dollars could be used to support private K-12 education was, according to section 141 of the 1902
Virginia Constitution, an illegal act (Commonwealth of Virginia, 1956). One way to avoid integrating public schools was to create a series of private schools, primarily for white students. To ask parents to pay for what had been free public education would not be supported by parties from either side of the desegregation argument. What was needed, according to supporters of private school funding, was a voucher system that would offer financial assistance to families who wished to send their children to single race private schools.

In order to make this possible, the Constitution would have to be changed. On March 5, 6, & 7 of 1956 a Constitutional Convention was convened in Richmond, at the State Capital building for the sole purpose of amending section 141 of the 1902 Constitution (Commonwealth of Virginia, 1956). The result of the session was the altering of the Code of Virginia to reflect the desires of the Byrd Machine and the recommendations of the Gray Commission. Namely, the changes to the Code of Virginia included several sections authorizing the use of public funds for private school education, and language regarding the role of school boards. Revisions to the Constitution gave authority to the State to take control of local schools under “certain conditions” (Virginia General Assembly, 2015, Chap. 68). Section 59 even went so far as to state it was “an Act to provide that no child shall be required to attend integrated schools.” At the end of those three days in March of 1956, the convention had produced no less than seven new chapters, several of them devoted to school segregation designed to push back against the Brown decisions and to create an environment supportive of segregated education.

To examine the writings compiled in the Journal of the Constitutional Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia to revise and amend Section 141 of the Constitution of
Virginia (1956) at the close of the event is to witness an example of personal beliefs overtaking civic duties. The Constitutional Convention did not limit itself to Section 141. Out of the Convention came numerous alterations to the 1902 Constitution, but no less than four amended chapters were passed paving the way for State tax dollars to be used to support private education (“Virginia Law: 1956 Unified Codes,” 2015)

**The 1956 Special Session.** On the surface, it took Virginia lawmakers several years to respond to the *Brown* rulings. What seemed a knee jerk reaction by Senator Byrd and others was no more than political rhetoric. The actual response of representatives from Virginia would not come in a fiery speech on the floor of the U. S. Senate, but from the alteration of the Virginia State Constitution, the attempt to create a system of private, yet publicly funded schools and a group of laws designed to undermine the very freedoms the 1954 & 1955 Supreme Court *Brown* rulings had deemed. This approach was subtle, sophisticated, and deliberate.

Following the changing of the state’s Constitution, Governor Stanley called for a special session of the Virginia Assembly to be convened in August of 1956. Journalist, Benjamin Muse (1961), who covered the Virginia Statehouse during this time, described the scene as one of controlled pandemonium; “Crowds filled the galleries of the House of Delegates on the morning of August 27, and Confederate flags fluttered” (p. 29). A propagandist newspaper, *Virginian*, printed in Newport News, was present either on the desk or in the coat pocket of almost every Assembly member that day (Muse, 1961). The *Virginian* declared the importance of the day and urged every white person in the State to travel to Richmond to witness the special session (Muse, 1961). Along with Governor Stanley’s declaration prior to the session that he would do all in his power to prevent
desegregation of the schools, images depicted in the *Virginiian*, along with captions depicting a desegregated society as lawless and dangerous to white women and children, fueled the excitement for the vote that was to come.

During the 27-day special session, the Assembly passed more than 20 Acts regarding desegregation; many aimed at rebutting the NAACP (Muse, 1961). It was in this session that the laws referred to as Massive Resistance were passed. These laws included the use of public funds for private K-12 education, the creation of a statewide Pupil Placement Board (replacing local school boards), and laws providing for the closure of schools that attempted to desegregate. With these laws, even though the Federal Courts would strike them down, meant the practice of defiance to the *Brown* rulings would persist for many years.

**The Virginia Industrialization Group: A time for pragmatism.** When personal views influence policy creation the results serve private interest with little regard to public good. The passing of the Massive Resistance laws is a very good example of personal beliefs blindly driving public policy. The policy changes in Virginia in the 1950s resulted in the closure of public schools in parts of Virginia. This action meant hundreds of children went without formal schooling; some for as long as five years. The Massive Resistance laws were in no respect good for the state of Virginia.

From this intensely contested environment arises an extraordinary collection of business and industry leaders. Membership of the Virginia Industrialization Group consisted of some of the most prominent and influential business leaders in Virginia, including future Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell (see Appendix C for membership list). Along with Powell, other distinguished members included Stuart Saunders,
President of the Norfolk & Western Railway Company and Frank Batten, publisher of the Norfolk-Portsmouth News Company. Saunders served as Chairman of the group from its founding in 1959 until 1963. In 1980, Saunders composed a brief history outlining the beginnings of the Virginia Division of Industrial Development in which he discussed how the Division evolved from the efforts of the private Virginia Industrialization Group (Saunders, 1980).

The discovery of the unexpected 11-page history written by Saunders occurred at Washington and Lee University’s Law School Archives within the papers of Lewis Powell. According to Saunders (1980), the Virginia Industrialization Group “was to operate in the background” (p. 1) to bring Massive Resistance to an end. This role explains why information regarding the Virginia Industrialization Group is so difficult to locate. The long-term intention of the group was to promote Virginia business, and their short-term goal was to express their opposition to Massive Resistance (Saunders, 1980). The Group believed that the promotion of Virginia business, particularly regarding Virginia’s ability to attract new business and industry, had been damaged by the contested climate of Massive Resistance.

Keeping in mind that Saunders (1909-1987) wrote his recollections almost 20 years after his leaving the Industrialization Group, it stands to reason there may be some discrepancies in his information. One very important discrepancy in the document is his dating of the beginning of the group. Saunders (1980, p. 1) stated the group began in 1959, whereas other sources date the beginning to 1958 (Hustwit, 2013, p. 87; Sage, 2011, p. 69). In the recollections of both Frank Batten (Sage, 2011) and Saunders (1980), the Group’s membership met for a dinner at the Rotunda Club of the Jefferson Hotel in
Richmond. The meeting took place on December 18, 1958 (Sage, 2011) with the guest of honor being Governor Lindsay Almond. Accompanying Governor Almond that evening was Attorney General, Albertis Harrison (Saunders, 1980). According to Saunders (1980), Governor Almond gave a true “fire and brimstone speech declaring his undying dedication to Massive Resistance” (p. 6).

Following the Governor’s speech practically every member of the Group spoke up against this stance (Saunders, 1980). Saunders details three points the Group wanted to make clear to the Governor: “A) Massive Resistance was doomed to failure, B) this program would produce untold harm to the Commonwealth, and C) it would seriously affect the economy and image of Virginia” (Saunders, 1980, pp. 6-7). According to both Saunders (1980) and Batten (Sage, 2011), the Governor “shook his finger” and declared he would never accept integrated school systems in Virginia (Saunders, 1980, p. 7).

Early in 1959, following two court rulings, one from a three judge federal court and the other from the Supreme Court of Virginia, denouncing the Massive Resistance laws, Governor Almond completely reversed his position on school desegregation and withdrew his support for Massive Resistance ("Massive Resistance Breaks down," 1959). The effect the influence of the Virginia Industrial Group had on ending Massive Resistance is unclear. However, it was believed by former Governor Linwood Holton that the Industrialization Group was instrumental in convincing Governor Almond of the negative impact Massive Resistance policies were having on the economy and reputation of the Commonwealth (Holton, 1998).

In a confidential memorandum, Industrial Development in Virginia, dated December 15, 1958, just days before the Virginia Industrialization Group’s meeting at the
Jefferson Hotel, Lewis Powell argues to Stuart Saunders and J. Harvie Wilkinson “there can be no substantial new capital investment in Virginia until this [school] crisis is satisfactorily resolved” (p. 2). Powell (1958) further argued that the “economy and therefore the welfare of our people” (p. 3) is at stake. “This condition will grow progressively worse unless corrective measures are taken” (Powell, 1958, p. 4). Powell (1958) outlined in his memo rebuttals to practically every aspect of the Massive Resistance movement. According to Powell (1958), the “fanciful idea of Interposition” (p. 6) was only the beginning down a path to “chaos” (p. 6). Powell was not unaware of how Virginia’s policy decisions were being viewed across the nation. In the memorandum he continued, “I doubt that enlightened business leaders elsewhere would consider Virginia an attractive place to move until we decide to rejoin the Union” (Powell, 1958, p. 6), inferring that Massive Resistance was tantamount to secession.

Two of the recommendations of the 1955 Gray Commission report; creating private schools as an alternative, and allowing for localities to decide whether or not to integrate their respective school systems, did not go unnoticed by Powell. He felt the idea of creating a system of private schools, funded with taxpayer dollars was an “unsustainable” (Powell, 1958, p. 7) alternative to public education. He also felt equally unsustainable was the local option concept as recommended in the Gray Commission report. “I am fearful that the results would be to destroy public education in large sections of Virginia” (Powell, 1958, p. 8). The close of the memorandum reveals that even though the Virginia Industrialization Group were proponents for a business friendly climate; they were not necessarily in favor of desegregated schools. Powell (1958) suggested that whatever plans the Virginia government adopted “should preserve the
public school system generally without resulting in extensive integration for years and possibly generations” (Powell, 1958, p. 10). Thus, the opposition the business group had to Massive Resistance and resulting laws focused narrowly on the immediate impact on industry and not on the social implications of segregation of public education.

Funded in part by the Virginia Industrialization Group, Richard Holmquist, would serve as consultant to Governor Albertis Harrison, and play a role in the creation of the Virginia Division of Industrial Development. Members of the Virginia Industrialization Group would serve on the first Board of Technical Education, created in 1964. The Technical Board would eventually become the Board for Community Colleges.

**Vocational Education Legislation in the United States**

Virginia was not the first State to develop a system of community or junior colleges. By the 1960s, systems were already in place in California, Florida, and Texas. Thus, Virginia had the luxury of being able to learn from the successes and failures in the design of a system format from other states. Coincidentally, Virginia’s neighbor to the south, North Carolina, was also in the midst of creating a technical/community college system in the early 1960s (Wiggs, 1989). North Carolina’s story of how its system developed parallels Virginia’s, with North Carolina facing comparable social issues, political concerns, and economic needs (Wiggs, 1989).

Under the direction of Dr. Dana Hamel, Virginia’s Board of Technical Education (1964-1965) studied the development of the colleges in North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, California, and Texas and hired consultants to advise the Board as they moved forward in developing the Virginia system (Dana Hamel, personal communication, May 23, 2013). One of these consultants, A. J. Brumbaugh (1965), concluded that Virginia
should pursue a system of comprehensive community colleges. This recommendation was discussed in the October 1964 meeting of the Technical Board and served to reinforce thoughts conveyed by Delegate French Slaughter during first meeting of the Board in July of 1964 (State Board for Technical Education, 1964a).

In the minutes of the fifth meeting of Virginia’s Board for Technical Education, dated November 25, 1964, is an onionskin copy of a letter from Dr. Hamel to Governor Harrison suggesting a funding stream could be put together from the various federal Acts that had been passed in support of vocational education. Dr. Hamel suggested to Governor Harrison that Virginia apply for funds of the following amounts provided through various federal Acts:

Smith-Hughes Act – $173,136
George-Barden Act – $1,289,113
Vocational Education Act of 1963 – $3,079,742

Grand Total = $4,663,462 (Hamel, 1964)

These initial funding amounts were important to the success of providing vocational education throughout Virginia.

As reflected in Dr. Hamel’s request, the federal Vocational Education Act of 1963 was an important funding source that helped in the creation of the Technical Board and Virginia Department for Technical Education as this Act provided states funding for the training of high school and post-secondary citizens (U.S. Government, 1963). The Act also gave Virginia lawmakers the opportunity to create much needed state legislation. This legislation came in the form of the 1964 House Bill 205, which established the technical system of colleges in Virginia. Those who drafted the bill did not mince words
when it came to describing the impetus for the creation of this legislation. The language in H. 205 describes Virginia’s current climate as being in a “state of emergency” (Virginia House of Delegates, 1964, p. 3).

The impetus for creating the State Board for Technical Education stemmed from Virginia’s lack of trained workers to respond to the growing needs of industry (Andrews, 1970). In the early 1960s, Virginia had three major institutions of higher education; the College of William & Mary, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, and the University of Virginia (Andrews, 1970). The three universities, along with their various branch campuses, could not adequately provide all Virginians with access to post-secondary training and education (Andrews, 1970). The technical college system created under Governor Albertis Harrison in 1964 was a response to this need. The next step in the evolution of Virginia’s community college system came in 1966 when Governor Mills Godwin signed legislation, H. 333, creating the current system of comprehensive community colleges (Andrews, 1970). The technical college systems’ rapid evolution into a series of comprehensive community colleges was important for Virginia, and would not have been possible without federal vocational education funding.

Along with related literature, I examined the Smith-Hughes Act of 1917, the Vocational Education Act of 1946, the National Defense Act of 1958, the Vocational Education Act of 1963 and the brief, but vitally important Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963. These Acts were created as a means of strengthening America’s workforce. A review of legislation and related literature provides historical context for the progression of vocational education in the United States and Virginia. An examination of
these Acts reveals a progression of policies that provided funding for what ultimately became the Virginia Community College System.

The Smith-Hughes Act of 1917. Federal funding to support post-high school vocational/technical education began in the early 20th century, predating the period of Massive Resistance by almost 30 years. On February 23, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson signed the Smith-Hughes Act into law (Bowen, 1987). The Act, officially known as the National Vocational Education Act, 1917, set a standard and basis for all future federal vocational education policy. Smith-Hughes was not the first attempt at in the 20th century at passing vocational education legislation. Efforts began as far back as 1912 with the introduction of vocational education legislation by Vermont Senator Carroll Page, and later the creation of the Commission for National Aid to Vocational Education in 1914 (Carlton, 2002). Yet, the Smith-Hughes stands out as the most sweeping vocational education legislation of the first half of the 20th century, and the only legislation to ever establish a federal board of education of any kind (Carlton, 2002).

No single piece of legislation before or since the passing of the Smith-Hughes Act of 1917 has had a more lasting impact on vocational education in the United States. Referred to as the “Magna Carta” of vocational education (Carlton, 2002, p. 63), the Smith-Hughes Act was the culmination of years of political compromise, and the first time the federal government ventured into legislating pre-college post-secondary education (Carlton, 2002). The intent of the legislation was to provide funding and develop programs for vocational education to students 14 years of age or older. (National Vocational Education Act, 1917)
The Act was by no means narrow in its scope; it called for the creation of a Federal Board for Vocational Education to oversee the delivery of instruction in a variety of programs including agriculture, home economics, trades, and industry training (National Vocational Education Act, 1917). The Smith-Hughes Act was specific in its intent to fund students who were preparing to enter into either farm or industry work (National Vocational Education Act, 1917).

The passing of this legislation served a dual purpose. It improved the workforce, while at the same time also provided funding and training needed to prepare the United States for its inevitable involvement in World War I (Bowen, 1987; Carlton, 2002). As far back as 1915, President Woodrow Wilson spoke of his concern of the lack of preparedness of the United States if it were to be drawn into the war in Europe (Hawkins et al., 1951). In his 1915 address to Congress, Wilson stressed the need to federalize training of industrial and agricultural education (Hawkins et al., 1951). In early 1917, in a speech before Congress, President Wilson reiterated the need to provide federally led vocational education in case the country had to mobilize for war:

> There are two sides to the question of preparation. There is not merely the military side; there is the industrial side. An ideal I have in mind is this: We ought to have in this great country a system of industrial and vocational education under federal guidance and federal aid. (Hawkins et al., 1951, p. 51)

The intention of the Smith-Hughes Act was to provide just this type of preparation.

On April 6, 1917, the United States joined military forces with Great Britain and thereby began America’s involvement in World War I (Library of Congress, 2015). It is not clear the affect the passing of the Smith-Hughes Act had on war preparations. It was
not until October 1917 that the Federal Board awarded the first grants to states, and those grants only went to seven of the 35 states that applied (Seven states in line for federal grants to education, 1917). Nevertheless, the Smith-Hughes Act would have a lasting effect on the education of America’s workforce.

**Federal Board for Vocational Education.** One of the most lasting legacies, and possibly the most historically important stipulation of the Smith-Hughes Act, was the establishment of the Federal Board for Vocational Education. This Board represented the first and only time a national board of education has ever existed in the United States (Carlton, 2002). The Board existed from 1917 until 1946. Its membership included the Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, and the United States Commissioner of Education, plus three citizens representing the sectors of agriculture, labor and commercial interest, respectively (National Vocational Education Act, 1917). The length of appointments for its citizen members were one year for one of the members, two years for another member, and three years for a third member (S.S.703, 1917). All members of the Board, with the exception of Cabinet members and the United States Commissioner of Education, received $5,000 annually for their work as board members (S.S.703, 1917). This stipend was significant given the fact that the average annual household income in America was approximately $3,500 (Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1922).

The Smith-Hughes Act allocated $200,000 annually to the Board for operating expenses. Duties of the Board consisted of arranging and hosting conferences, creating studies, reports and investigations and the printing of bulletins (Holt, 1922). The Board had the power to award grants to participating states (S.S.703, 1917), and it also had the
power to withhold grant funding for subsequent years if a state misappropriated awarded funds, or failed to follow-through on goals set forth in the state plan (National Vocational Education Act, 1917).

Each state, wishing to become eligible to receive funding from Smith-Hughes grants, was required to create a statewide board for the development of vocational education, which would report to the federal board (Carlton, 2002). Each state board was then required to draft and adopt its own plan. The State of Virginia allowed its State Board of Education to act as the State Board for Vocational Education (Hart, 1918). This single board with dual functions was a convenient way for Virginia to quickly become eligible to receive federal funding for vocational education. The Chief Executive Officer of Virginia’s first Board for Vocational Education was Harris Hart, then President of the State Board of Education (Hart, 1918).

**Analysis of the Smith-Hughes Act of 1917.** The 1917 Act, co-sponsored by Senator Hoke Smith of Georgia and Representative Dudley Hughes of Georgia, was the culmination of many years of discussions from both parties, and both houses of Congress. The focus of the bill to provide vocational training to persons 14 years and older, prior to college, with the intention to ramp up skill levels to address the need for labor in an increasingly industrialized nation (National Vocational Education Act, 1917). Not only did the Act provide funding for training in the areas of the trades, industrial subjects, farming and home economics, it also provided funding for the training of teachers of the various subjects (National Vocational Education Act, 1917). Additionally, the funds allocated by the Smith-Hughes Act required the states, and their localities, to match each
federal dollar equally. The use of matching funds meant the states would have the role as not only recipients, but also stakeholders.

Of especial import in the Act was the creation of the Federal Board for Vocational Education. The board represents the only time in history that a federal board of education existed in the United States (Carlton, 2002). The original language of section six of the Act states that the board was created for the duty of conducting studies, investigations, and drafting reports (National Vocational Education Act, 1917). Section six of the Smith-Hughes Act of 1917 also gives the federal board power over state boards for vocational education. This power was meant to ensure the provisions of the Act were properly carried out by the states. This use of language reflects the autonomous power the legislation vested in the federal board. Even though the Act does not stipulate the Board report to any specific person or office, the makeup of the Board, consisting of Cabinet Secretaries and Presidential appointees, gives the impression it was answerable to the President of the United States.

Section seven of the Act stipulates that any state wishing to receive funding from the Act must create a state board for vocational education (National Vocational Education Act, 1917). This Board would be answerable to the federal board, and required to administer within that state the provisions of the Act. The state boards were mandated to issue an annual report to the federal board indicating how funding was administered and the results of the programs the funding supported (National Vocational Education Act, 1917). To swiftly fulfill this requirement, Virginia allowed its State Board of Education to serve as the State Board for Vocational Education. In doing so, this meant that
Virginia quickly positioned itself to receive federal funding to create much needed “schools” for vocational education.

The Act did not provide funding for facilities construction or building rental, instead these schools existed within already active public high schools. In the plan of the State Board for Vocational Education, it is affirmed that Virginia was in a position socially and economically that required the training of workers in the areas of agriculture and industry (Hart, 1918). In 1918, the establishment of programs of study in approximately 20 high schools throughout the state would help fulfill this need (Hart, 1919).

Section 10 of the Act makes clear that the purpose of this Act was not to solely aid out of work individuals (National Vocational Education Act, 1917). Instead, it was meant to educate those not younger than the age of 14 who wish to enter the workforce (National Vocational Education Act, 1917). Section 10 also clarified the level of expertise expected from teachers as meeting the minimum standards set forth by the State Board, which would have already been approved by the Federal Board (S.S.703, 1917).

Section 12 of the Act indicates that training was to be administered over not less than a nine-month period, with at least 30 hours per week the student’s time devoted to “practical work” (National Vocational Education Act, 1917). The Act also funded part-time course work. Section 12 assumed part-time students would be workers who were already active in the workforce, but for whatever reasons needed to attend additional training. Eligibility meant the student had to be at least 16 years of age, and the training, taken in the evening, had to compliment work they were already doing during the day (National Vocational Education Act, 1917).
The legacy of the Smith-Hughes of 1917. For the remainder of the 20th Century, all vocational education legislation after 1917 descended from the Smith-Hughes Act. During its lifespan the Act underwent few changes until the 1930s when Presidential orders began to chip away at the power of the Federal Board for Vocational Education (Hawkins et al., 1951). In 1932, President Hoover put forward an order ordering the Board be transferred to the Department of the Interior and that pending suggested legislation abolishing the Board, it serve in an advisory capacity to the Secretary of the Interior (Hawkins et al., 1951). Later in 1932, Congress was able to veto the portion of the order transferring the Board to the Department of the Interior (Hawkins et al., 1951). The final abolishment of the Board oversight occurred one year later, early in the Presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Roosevelt completed the move of the Board responsibilities to the Department of the Interior and reduce its powers to that of an advisory body only (Hawkins et al., 1951). It would be 13 years later, in 1946 that the Board would be abolished.

President Truman, as part of a reorganization plan, viewed the Board as no longer necessary and ordered it abolished (Hawkins et al., 1951). Even though the abolishment of the Board marked a milestone in the Smith-Hughes Act it did not tarnish or erase the accomplishments of the Act. Legislation that followed the Smith-Hughes Act, such as the George-Deen Act of 1936 and the George-Smith Act of 1946, were built off the Smith-Hughes Act. Arguably major legislation effecting vocational education and higher education did not surface again until the National Defense Education Act of 1958.

National Defense Education Act of 1958. As the story goes, the 1958 National Defense Education Act (NDEA) may have not come to be if it had not been for the Soviet
Union’s launching of the satellite Sputnik. According to the United States Senate records, upon hearing of the successful launch of Sputnik the Chief Clerk of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, Stewart McClure, met with Senator Lister Hill of Alabama to discuss not only the awkward situation the launch placed the United States, but also a possible way to capitalize on the crisis it presented (United States Senate, 2014). The Senate and House, prior to the news of the launch, had presented education legislation respectively during the previous three sessions. Even with the presentation of several bills, the House and Senate failed to agree on a common bill. Public backing for legislation supporting the federal funding of higher education was weak. The United States had grown conservative and leery of anything that remotely sounded like socialism. Previous legislation had stalled on the issuance of grants versus loans for students (Senate Historical Office, 2014).

Many of the findings from the 1947 Truman Commission on Education indicated the problem of inadequate access for students to higher education was a major hurdle and had to be addressed (Gilbert & Heller, 2013). One way to address the problems of access was to make funding, either through loans or grants, more available and affordable for families (Gilbert & Heller, 2013). In 1957, the very question of loans or grants had plagued the passage of new federal education legislation for several years. Yet, the Sputnik flight helped create an opportunity for Mr. McClure and Senator Hill to lobby passage of a bill to provide federal support for higher education (Senate Historical Office, 2014).

Senator Hill, a seasoned Democrat, understood the waters he would be sailing very well. In working with colleagues in the House and Senate, Hill could seize on the
public’s paranoia with the red menace of socialism and the current outcry for action in the wake of Sputnik. The last thing Americans wanted was to be outdone by the Soviet Union, a country they had learned to distrust deeply. National pride, global technological leadership and national security were at stake. This combination of pride, outrage and paranoia set the stage to pass meaningful education legislation. If the United States were to remain a global leader, and a secure sovereign nation, it was made clear by the launching of Sputnik that more scientists, engineers, and innovative technology would be required. Senator Hill used the Sputnik event to add urgency to this need to fund higher education (United States Senate, 2014).

By tying increased funding to post-secondary education, America would be able to not only improve its higher education environment, but also say to the world the United States would not fall behind by allowing others to define the global technological future. Senator Hill was able to successfully frame the connection between education and America’s national security, and in the end the Senate and House put previous disagreements aside and agreed to support low cost loans for students instead of grants. In 1958, with the needed compromises fulfilled, the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) became law. By supporting low-interest loans millions of people were able to attain post-secondary credentials and degrees, not previously available to them. The loan programs still in use today are a direct result of this groundbreaking legislation.

The coming of World War I and the need to ready the workforce for war preparations can be tied, albeit as political rhetoric, to the passing of the Smith-Hughes Act of 1917. Likewise, language in the NDEA links this Act directly to national security. Provisions of the Act, section 101, state clearly that the “security of the nation” requires
we educate and develop young talent (United States Government, 1958, sec. 101).

Echoing the shock of the Sputnik launch, the language of the Act states “the present emergency demands” and to meet the “present educational emergency” we must improve efforts at all levels of government (United States Government, 1958, sec. 101). Because of the nature of the perceived emergency Title III of the Act stipulated specific support for the funding of education in mathematics, science, and foreign language studies (United States Government, 1958).

Of all its provisions, the one that created the most controversy was section 1001-f requiring each student who was a recipient of funding to take a loyalty oath and sign an affidavit declaring they had no intention of waging war or engaging in subversive activities toward the United States Government. Quickly after being signed into law, the necessity of the “loyalty oath” and affidavit were quickly challenged by, among others, Massachusetts Senator John Kennedy (The Loyalty Provisions of the NDEA, 1960). The presence of the loyalty oath caused several universities, including Harvard, Yale, and Princeton to refuse acceptance of funds from the NDEA on the grounds it implied interference in the intellectual process, and penalized society’s less well-off students, who needed the money most ("Senate Vote Approves Repeal of NDEA Disclaimer Provision," 1962).

Unlike the Smith-Hughes Act, the NDEA did not seek the kind of control the Federal Board exercised over states. Section 102 of the NDEA even goes so far as to stipulate the prohibition of federal control over education. The NDEA also did not require the creation of a separate state board to oversee programs affiliated with the Act’s
funding. Similar to the Smith-Hughes Act, however, the NDEA did require states to present a plan detailing how they would use the funds provided through the Act.

A major difference of the NDEA from the Smith-Hughes Act, was that the NDEA focused on *all* education, and not just vocationally related career education, even though the 1958 legislation expresses an emphasis on areas of science and technology. This disciplinary focus is not so different from present emphasis on STEM (science, technology, engineering and math) education.

The NDEA represented in essence the United States taking up the gauntlet of the technology challenge thrown down by the Soviet Union. The United States’ response resulted in investing one billion dollars over four years in student loans, scholarships and graduate fellowships (Jolly, 2009). Along with funding for scholarships and students loans the NDEA made additional matching funds available to states to fund specific programs related to guidance counseling and testing (Jolly, 2009).

**The Vocational Education Act of 1963.** The 1963 Vocational Education Act was not simply a continuation of the NDEA, despite the fact that its funding was a continuation of much of the work begun under the NDEA. Instead, the 1963 Vocational Act harkens back to that of the Smith-Hughes Act of 1917. The purpose of the Vocational Education Act of 1963 was to “strengthen and improve the quality of vocational education and to expand the vocational education opportunities in the Nation” (United States Government, 1963, para. 1). Like the Smith-Hughes Act of half a century before, it required participating states submit, through their respective state boards, a plan as to how they intended to use the funds (United States Government, 1963, Sec. 5). Unlike the Smith-Hughes Act, however, there is no establishment of a Federal Board to
oversee and regulate the activities of the state boards. Instead, Section 5 indicates repeatedly that much of the guidance states receive would come from the office of the Commissioner of Education (United States Government, 1963).

Another large and important difference in the Vocational Education Act of 1963 and its predecessors exists in a single statement in Section 4, subsection 5 that allotted federal funds may be used for the purpose of constructing area vocational education school facilities (United States Government, 1963). The Smith-Hughes Act and other vocational education legislation leading up to 1963 prohibited facilities construction. The amount of overall funding states could receive was based upon the number of potential students (United States Government, 1963, Sec. 3). Therefore, funding for one state would not be the same as that of another. It was this potential funding inequality that may have served as a driver behind the creation of the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963.

**Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963.** Upon signing the Facilities Act President Lyndon B. Johnson said it was “the most significant education bill passed by the Congress in the history of the Republic” (Lyndon B. Johnson: Remarks upon Signing the Higher Education Facilities Act, 1963, para. 2). In the President’s address from the Cabinet room of the White House, he lists several reasons this legislation was good for the Nation. These reasons included: “We will help to build 25 to 30 new public community colleges every year;” “We will help to construct the technical institutes that are needed to close the gap in this crucial area of trained manpower;” “We will modernize and expand our Federal-State programs for vocational education in order to train for the changing world of work the 8 out of 10 young people who will never obtain
a college education” (Lyndon B. Johnson: Remarks upon Signing the Higher Education Facilities Act, 1963, para. 3). The enthusiasm President Johnson had for this legislation, and its ability to continue the momentum established under the NDEA, provided Virginia’s Governor Harrison the funding required to create the technical colleges Virginia so desperately needed.

Conclusion

In order for Virginia to create its community college system certain elements had to align. Among these elements were 1) funding, 2) motivation and public need, and 3) political vision. Federal legislation had made funding for vocational education available for decades. Considering the Virginia system began as a series of vocational-technical colleges, it was logical to seek funding from federal sources supporting this type of education. During the first half of the 20th century, Virginia’s educational leadership associated vocational education more with high schools than colleges (Hart, 1918, 1919).

As Virginia’s technical college system began to emerge in the mid-1960s, there existed a number of post-high school technical colleges operated by the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and the University of Virginia. Labeled as branch campuses, these two-year colleges, especially those associated with the Virginia Polytechnic Institute, were focused on providing post-secondary vocational-technical training. As the technical college system developed, these existing university branch campuses became part of the new two-year technical college system (Hamel, 1972).

The motivation and public will to create a system of colleges came about as a response to the Massive Resistance movement of the 1950s and 1960s. As discussed above, Massive Resistance was a response to the Brown v. Board of Education rulings of
1954 and 1955 mandating desegregation of public school systems throughout the United States. Virginia’s response created a climate highly negative to education and business.

Perceiving Virginia as an anti-education state, investors in business and industry began to choose North Carolina rather than Virginia as a good place to locate new operations (Lechner, 1998). In response to Virginia’s deteriorating business climate, the Virginia Industrialization Group emerged. The Virginia Industrialization Group was a gathering of a number of Virginia’s most prominent leaders from business and industry (Saunders, 1980). The membership list included several people who would later serve on the founding Board of Technical Education. For a listing of the Virginia Industrialization Group’s membership see Appendix C.

The Virginia Industrialization Group, born of the Massive Resistance movement, became influential in its efforts to promote not only business and industry, but also technical education. The reach of the Virginia Industrialization Group into the development of technical and subsequent community college education in Virginia has never been documented. Yet, examination of historical documents indicates a connection between the Industrialization group and the founding of Virginia’s community college system.

Governor Albertis Harrison had the political vision to create a technical and subsequent community college system in Virginia. Prior to becoming Governor, Harrison had spent most of his adult life in public service as a member of the state Assembly and eventually Attorney General (State of Virginia, 1995). While running for governor, he campaigned on a platform of jobs and industrialization (State of Virginia, 1995). As Governor, Harrison appointed former Virginia Industrialization Group
Director, Richard Holmquist, as Industrial Development advisor (Powell, 1962) with Holmquist’s annual salary of $25,000 being paid by the Virginia Industrialization Group (Saunders, 1980). Holmquist’s role as advisor would lead to the creation of the Virginia Division of Industrial Development and Planning. The Division’s initial Director was Joseph G. Hamrick. Hamrick was a member of the Virginia Industrialization Group (Saunders, 1980), and a regular contributing attendee at the meetings of the Board for Technical Education.

No doubt Harry F. Byrd and his associates never thought when they began their emotional, yet ultimately ill-conceived movement of Massive Resistance that their efforts would lead to the creation of the first truly open higher education institutions in Virginia. When those first technical colleges opened their doors in the fall of 1965 they admitted anyone who wished to receive an education, without consideration to economic, racial, or ethnic background. The timing of the founding of these colleges could not have come at a more opportune moment.
CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY

The genesis of this research study regarding the history of the Virginia Technical College System and subsequent Community College System began purely by accident. In 2012, during my first semester of doctoral studies at the College of William and Mary, one of my professors, Dr. Pamela Eddy, approached me and another classmate with an offer of a possible research project. The Chancellor of the VCCS, Dr. Glenn Dubois, had recently sent an email to faculty at several of Virginia’s major research universities indicating that Dr. Dana Hamel, the founding Chancellor of the VCCS, wanted to tell the story of how the system began. Dr. Dubois felt Dr. Hamel’s oral history would make for a wonderful dissertation topic for someone. Both my classmate and I happened to work for a VCCS college, Thomas Nelson Community College, and while my classmate had already decided on a topic for his dissertation, I had not. I have an immense curiosity and appreciation for history, and immediately expressed interest in documenting Dr. Hamel’s story.

Not being from Virginia, I had no idea who Dr. Hamel was, but about two months later I found myself in a conference call with Dr. Eddy, Dr. Dubois, and Dr. Hamel arranging a time for an initial face-to-face meeting with Dr. Hamel. My first meeting with Dr. Hamel was delayed for several weeks due to various health issues he had to deal with. During this time I submitted a proposal to the Education Institutional Review Board (EDIRB) at the College of William & Mary requesting permission to conduct an oral
history with Dr. Hamel. Permission was quickly granted (see Appendix C). The proposal contained an outline of general interview questions for the first meetings.

During the course of my interviews Dr. Hamel loaned me several documents related to the founding of the System (see Appendix D for listing of meeting dates and guiding interview questions). The most valuable and data rich, were the meeting minutes from the first 18 meetings of the Virginia Board for Technical Education. These minutes became a vehicle for many of my discussions with Dr. Hamel. Dr. Hamel responded to questions in great detail about materials and events he had not read or revisited in almost 50 years. His memory was excellent, and as I conducted various follow-up fact checks I found his information to be accurate in every way. Over a period of one year, I conducted 15 personal interviews with Dr. Hamel (Appendix D). Dr. Hamel and I would generally begin our sessions with off the record conversations prior to the recorded portions. Establishing rapport and building on the exchange are critical to recording an oral history (Spradley, 1979). Prior to the beginning of each recorded session Dr. Hamel and I would discuss current events, and how those event were or could affect the VCCS. The recorded sessions, which followed the opening conversations lasted approximately one hour.

This research study includes analysis of both primary and secondary documents. My awareness and pursuit of many of these documents came as a result of oral history interviews I conducted with Dr. Dana Hamel between 2013 and 2014.

The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the social, economic and political factors that led to the creation of the Virginia Technical College System. The System was first founded in 1964 with its first colleges opening their doors in 1965. In 1966,
legislation was passed transforming the Department of Technical Education into the Department of Community Colleges, thus creating the modern Virginia Community College System. In previous histories concerned with telling the story of the VCCS, the organization of the state’s technical colleges were either not discussed or simply mentioned in passing. My research highlights, however, that the creation of the technical colleges provided the critical starting point for the founding of the community college system in Virginia. As such, the history of vocational education funding in Virginia and the United States played a pivotal role in the ultimate creation of the VCCS.

The literature review examined the history of vocational education legislation in the United States, beginning with the 1917 Smith-Hughes Vocational Act and concluding with the 1963 Higher Education Facilities Act. Federal funding for vocational education was available beginning early in the 20th century, and grew during the 1950s. The mid-20th century was a fulcrum point for expansion of access to higher education, and in Virginia this context coincided with massive changes in the state’s social climate.

My approach to researching this topic included a combination of oral history and documentary research methods (Scott, 1990). Documentary research is common in historical research, but is not the sole purview of historians (Scott, 1990). Given the timeframe of the founding of the VTCS, I could not conduct any type of participatory observations. Instead of direct observations, which is a commonly accepted method in social science research, I used oral history interviews with a key informant, Dr. Hamel, and document analysis of material he provided and additional materials I was able to locate in various archives whose collections I explored.
Methods

Interviews with Dr. Hamel provided rich insight into the founding of the technical colleges. Many of his statements, and the documents he loaned me, led to the formulation of the research questions. In order to respond to these questions I acquired documents from the specific time period of 1954-1965.

Documentary review is at the heart of an historical study (Scott, 1990). Unlike most accepted social science methods, the documentary review relies on the analysis of historical documents rather than the systematic observation of participant behavior (Scott, 1990). The use of historical documentation as a data source is more appropriately compared with data gathering practices found in archaeology (Scott, 1990). In archaeology, the researcher must first establish authenticity and credibility of physical artifacts by using established scientific practices (Scott, 1990). Likewise, looking at documents as artifacts surrounding the start of the community college system in Virginia offered a way to assess the veracity of the information presented, and allowed for triangulation of this information with other documents or oral history from the timeframe.

Documentary research is the process of using personal and official documents (i.e., artifacts). After the authenticity and credibility of the artifacts are determined, the researcher analyzes the documents in search of evidence (Scott, 1990). Documentary evidence includes information drawn from primary and secondary documents used in the examination of a subject or topic (Pitt, 1972). The documents used in this type of research may include newspaper and magazine articles, unpublished meeting minutes, correspondence, interviews, government reports, and published meeting minutes. Platt (1981) described documentary research as the use of documents as a data source. Platt
(1981) further posited that the use of documentary evidence as a primary data source is not without problems. The challenge in this type of research is the contextualizing of these materials into a coherent story. Creating a narrative, and making meaning, from a collection of arbitrary materials is part of the challenge.

Both Platt (1981) and Scott (2014) recommended criteria for document evaluation. Scott (2014) described a four-part process for the verification of evidential documents that includes: authenticity, credibility, representativeness, and meaning. Scott (2014) did not suggest these criteria be adhered to in any prescribed order; however, it is critical that authenticity and credibility be assessed both at the beginning and throughout the process, whereas representativeness and meaning may be determined as the usefulness of the artifacts are determined. My approach in this study was to use the oral history interviews with Dr. Hamel as a starting place. In order to contextualize and clarify the information gleaned from the oral history interviews with Dr. Hamel, I sought credible documentary materials.

In creating a coherent narrative, historical documentary evidence may not always be available. This lack of availability could be due to documents being destroyed or lost. Platt (1981) raised the possibility that the lack of documents may tempt the researcher to speculate on what might have happened. Speculation, while it may make good fiction, is not suitable for fact-based documentary research. Fact-based research should not resort to conjecture. For example, Kraus (2008) was asked by a young woman referring to the gaps that can occur when conducting documentary research, “Does it matter if it’s true?” Her short answer, is that yes, truth matters (Kraus, 2008). Historical researchers must
always question the veracity and authenticity of documentary evidence. The facts stated in the evidence must be verifiable (Kraus, 2008).

Along with the review of documentary artifacts, I interviewed Dr. Dana Hamel using oral history methods. Dr. Hamel was the founding Director of the Department of Technical Education, Department of Community Colleges and founding Chancellor of the Virginia Community College System. His extensive background and knowledge into the creation of the community college system was the impetus for this research project. I interviewed Dr. Hamel about a variety of subjects related to the founding of the community colleges (Appendix D).

Oral history research is unique and requires attention to detail not found in standard participatory interviewing. “The content of oral history interviews is grounded in reflections on the past as opposed to commentary on purely contemporary events” (Oral History Association, 2016, para. 5). The interviewee, in this case Dr. Hamel, wanted to tell his story. It was up to me to create questions and an environment that I felt would allow Dr. Hamel the room to tell his story, without feeling placed in a prescriptive situation. My goal was to have a conversation with Dr. Hamel, rather than a question-answer type session. The combination of oral history perspectives and documentation of the era allows access to information available from no other source (Hydrick, Dobrosky, & Yanike, 1987).

The interviews served as a way of filling in gaps and answer questions brought about by the information found in the meeting minutes of the Board for Technical Education. Dr. Hamel’s long-term memory was remarkable. More often than not, long term memory can be a very reliable source of information (Yow, 2005). I found this to
be true as I researched the information I received during the interviews. He answered my questions in detail, and without hesitation. This method of interviewing is described by Yow (2005) in which information drawn from the document review serves as a cue to the narrator. I believe by formulating questions from documents Dr. Hamel had a part in creating were instrumental in the quality of his feedback. The interviews were held at his home in Richmond, Virginia. The informal atmosphere and familiar surroundings may have been useful in helping him recall those Board meetings from almost 50 years earlier. Sometimes the use of pre-selected questions can serve as an agenda that can limit an interview by restricting the narrator’s ability to think serendipitously (Anderson & Jack, 1998).

**Data Collection**

I used two sources of data for this study. First, I conducted an oral history with Dr. Dana Hamel, founding Director of the Department of Technical Education and the founding Chancellor of the Virginia Community College System. Secondly, using the interviews and materials provided by Dr. Hamel, I collected an array of primary and secondary documents based on the information I obtained from Dr. Hamel, including the interviews. Investigation of these sources ultimately revealed additional information, which I further explored as warranted in the pursuit of answering the research questions. Then, I examined these documents and interviews for common threads.

The overarching research question driving this study was to understand the central engines behind the creation of the Virginia Technical College System. My exploration of the literature, interviews with Dr. Hamel, and preliminary analysis of documents from the time period expanded my initial research question about the founding of the VTCS. This
study also sought to understand more about the timing of the creation of the system and how contextual events helped spur the creation of the system.

**Oral History Interviews**

In the fall of 2012, I was offered the opportunity to interview the founder of the Virginia Community College System, Dr. Dana Hamel, to learn more of his experiences as the founder of the community college system. At the time I was unsure as to the direction these interviews would take, or what I would do with this information. The initial intention was broad and involved the creation of a doctoral dissertation documenting the history of the Virginia Community College System. Interviews with Dr. Hamel begin in April of 2013 and continued for a year (Appendix D). The early interviews focused primarily on my getting to know Dr. Hamel and learning about his contribution to Virginia higher education.

Eventually, Dr. Hamel lent me documentation from the early to mid-1960s that dealt with the early days of the founding of the technical system. This documentation contained the meeting minutes of the first year and a half of the Board for Technical Education. These minutes are very detailed and allowed me to construct questions for subsequent interviews. The minutes revealed, sometimes in detail, a dynamic progression of events. Dr. Hamel’s memory of that time period was very vivid, and accurate as follow-up analysis confirmed. As a result of those interviews, I began to formulate the basis for my doctoral research. I discovered that even though some histories existed regarding the Virginia Community College System, the creation of the initial technical colleges had not been explored. It was this *hole* in the research that led
me to shift my emphasis to the technical colleges rather than community colleges, and to formulate the following research questions:

1. What were the central engines that drove the creation of the technical college system in Virginia and how did their elements converge?

2. Nationally junior/community colleges were established at the opening of the 20th century. Virginia’s leading research universities created branch campuses that served as two-year technical and community colleges. Why did Virginia invest in a statewide system of technical colleges during this time period (1964-1966)?

3. How did the sociopolitical climate in Virginia during the late 1950s and early 1960s regarding racial equality and education influence the formation of the technical college system, and what shifted this from a technical system to a community college system?

These questions led me to seek documentation concerning vocational education funding legislation in the 20th century, social unrest and the Supreme Court rulings regarding the desegregation of Virginia’s public schools, and the effects an unstable social climate had on Virginia business and industry.

The meeting minutes from the Board for Technical Education, Federal and State legislation, the *Brown v. Board of Education* rulings, and Massive Resistance and the negative business climate it created, all played a part in the creation of the Virginia Technical College System. This linkage of the events occurring mostly between 1955 and 1966 were unknown and unintended at the outset of my research. It was the review
of the primary and secondary documents from this time period that made this discovery possible.

The oral history interviews with Dr. Hamel served as a starting point for this further research. I approached the interviews using an inductive methodology. I did not want to have a preset, a priori, set of codes as I was not exactly sure what I was looking to glean from the interviews. The questions formulated for the early interviews were open ended and designed to encourage Dr. Hamel to talk about himself. By doing so I learned a great deal of where he was from and what brought him to Virginia. The information gathered in the early interviews allowed me to begin building a timeline of events surrounding the founding of the technical colleges. The minutes from the Board for Technical Education served as the basis for many of the questions during the most of the interviews. I carefully read through the minutes highlighting and making notes as to possible themes and cues. I was looking for inferences regarding any intentionality in moving the technical colleges toward a system of comprehensive community colleges. I used questions formulated from my study of the meeting minutes as a foundation for most of the Hamel interviews. Much of the information I collected from the oral history interviews, and from the meeting minutes required verification. In verifying the findings of those interviews it was necessary to seek-out and examine additional primary and secondary documents. The documents I used in learning about the beginnings of the technical college system in Virginia consisted of both published and unpublished materials. Many of the published documents are no longer in print.

The libraries and archives used for my research included: The State Library of Virginia, Swem Library at the College of William & Mary, Wolf Law Library of the
College of William & Mary, Library of University of Virginia, the Lewis Powell Archives at the Hall Law Library of Washington & Lee University, The Virginia Historical Society, and the Hathitrust Digital Library at the University of Michigan. Librarians and Archivists at these institutions were invaluable in the amount of assistance they provided.

Reviewing the various forms of information from the historical documents allowed me to construct a narrative involving people, places, and events and to determine the primary historical timeframe of 1955 to 1966. The contextualization process of drawing factual information from the artifacts allowed for the creation of a narrative associating the events surrounding the creation of the technical colleges. The coupling of oral history evidence and documentary evidence allowed me to draw conclusions based on information rather than conjecture, opinion, or bias.

**Data Analysis**

In examining the archival documents and oral history interviews, I used a mixture of two methods for data analysis; historiographic and documentary evidence analysis. These two methods of analysis are related and complementary of one another. The historiographic approach is an observational method commonly applied to the study of organizations (Ventresca & Mohr, 2002). In the case of this research project, the Virginia State Assembly, The Office of the Governor of Virginia, The United States Congress, The Supreme Court of the United States, and the Virginia Department of Technical Education, generated the organizational documents reviewed. At this time the VCCS has no archive of its own, and relies on the State Library of Virginia for the retention and storage of documentation generated by the System.
Historiographic analysis requires the researcher to review archival materials to formulate ideas and discover patterns revealing connections between the various organizations revealing thematic patterns (Ventresca & Mohr, 2002). As I read through the documentary artifacts, I first took notes regarding facts unearthed and initial thoughts (Ventresca & Mohr, 2002). This note taking, along with the observation of thematic patterns, led to the creation of a type of mind or conceptual map (Westhoff, 2012). The creation of a mind map allowed me to “make connections among multiple ideas and pieces of information from other sources” (Westhoff, 2012, p. 1116). The result is a form of inductive coding, whereby I saw inferred connections between events and organizations.

During my interviews, especially in my initial interviews, Dana Hamel continually stressed that during the time period in which the technical colleges were created, Virginia was slowly emerging from the period of Massive Resistance. He felt very strongly of the importance of this point. I knew very little about Massive Resistance at the time of the interviews and failed to see how the two were related, nor how Massive Resistance connected to the creation of the technical college system. It was not until I conducted some of the documentary analysis that I discovered documents relating to the Virginia Industrial Group. Further investigation into the Virginia Industrial Group highlighted the correlation between the economic and social events that prompted the creation of the technical college system.

In using the historiographic approach, combined with documentary evidence analysis, themes emerged. The overarching categories could be grouped into social, political, and economic factors that contributed to the founding of the Virginia Technical
College System. Categorical overlap allowed for the emergence of subthemes, which include leadership, race relations and segregation, access to higher education, and business and industry.

**Researcher Statement**

In examining the history of the beginnings of the Virginia Technical College system there are sociological parallels with the Mississippi of my youth. Having been born in 1957 meant I would grow up in the midst of great social change, not just in my native state, but throughout the country. Being a native Southerner, I have direct experience with the cultural references referred to during the time period of my research study. As a child I witnessed the kind of racial inequality that became stereotypical throughout the South.

For example, I recall how due to the 1969 Supreme Court ruling in the 1969 case of *Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education* Jackson’s public school system went through a period of forced desegregation. Prior to this time, families generally sent their children to neighborhood schools. Neighborhood schools sound very nice and sensible. However, the city was divided, albeit unofficially, along racial lines. Separate was never equal in school or in daily life. There was never any doubt when driving through Jackson that you had passed from an all-white area to an all-black area. Roads in the African-American sections of the city were poor, and some homes were nothing more than shacks.

Jackson’s racial divide meant that the schools African-American children attended were not as well funded as those of their white counterparts. The quality of education offered to African-American students was less than that provided for white
children. In regards to higher education, Virginia was ahead of Mississippi in admitting African-American students. In terms of junior/community colleges, Mississippi began establishing two-year colleges as early as 1922, with these colleges remaining segregated until the 1960s (Mississippi Department of Archives and History, 2015). My first two years of college were at Hinds Junior College, located just outside of Jackson in the town of Raymond.

Growing up, I was well aware of the events that had occurred at the University of Mississippi in the early 1960s, which led to the desegregation of that institution. When I began college in 1976, I had no idea Mississippi’s junior colleges had also been desegregated during the 1960s (Mississippi Department of Archives and History, 2015).

As a former community college student, and a native Southerner, I could resonate with much of the historical evidence I uncovered during my study. Further, as an employee of one of Virginia’s community colleges I am familiar in the work of the VCCS and its current efforts to support student success and completion. I believe the emergence of the Virginia Technical College System and subsequent Community College System, and its open admissions policies made it possible for Virginia to move toward a more inclusive system of higher education.

**Conclusion**

This project began with the interviewing of Dr. Dana B. Hamel, the founding Director of the Virginia Technical College System, and later the founding Chancellor of the Virginia Community College System. It was from these interviews that I began to discover the lack of research that had been conducted in the area of the founding of the
technical colleges. The documents loaned to me by Dr. Hamel, and subsequent materials I located from various libraries and archives, corroborated what he had told me.

The oral history interviews and the primary and secondary documents helped me to place the events surrounding the creation of the colleges into a framework of time. With this framework occurred several events; the *Brown v. Board of Education* ruling, Massive Resistance, expansion of federal legislation supporting higher education, and federal legislation aimed squarely at supporting vocational/technical education.

The oral history project involving Dana Hamel gave me the direction needed to construct a time frame to work within. Much of our interviewing time focused on an analysis of the minutes of the first meetings of the Board for Technical Education. The minutes span a time period beginning in July 1964 and continuing through February 1966 with a gap until May of 1966. They were well written and rich with detail. Having Dr. Hamel available to interpret the minutes was invaluable, as it left little room for inference or guessing.

The documentary method and its reliance on archival and primary documents helped to situate the beginning of the Virginia Technical College System in the context of the political and social climate of 1955 to 1965. This period was a time of great change in Virginia. The insistence by the State’s leadership on implementing Massive Resistance inflicted a tremendous amount of damage on the public education system. The combination of oral history method and the study of documentary evidence enabled the telling of a story from a personal and situational perspective (Wagner, 2004).
CHAPTER IV: FINDINGS

“I can’t begin to tell you the things I discovered while I was looking for something else.” Shelby Foote (Coleman, Faulkner, & Kennedy, 1999, p. 54)

Three main findings are presented in this study. First are the varied and complex factors that came together to create the VTCS. These factors included, the sociopolitical climate, available funding, and a stagnant industrial sector. Taken together, they created a contested environment in Virginia. Second, the influence of business and economic factors emerged as a powerful lever for change in the state contributed to the demand for the creation of the VTCS. Finally, the role of leadership, in particular that of Dana Hamel, and the establishment of collaborative relationships, was critical in establishing the technical colleges.

A Contested Environment

During the years of 1954 to 1959, Virginia enacted Massive Resistance laws. This set of laws was intended to prevent the desegregation of public schools throughout the State. The Brown rulings represented change on a large scale, not only within the school systems of Virginia. Brown required the entire nation to reevaluate the way it viewed one another; an unintended, but necessary consequence of the Brown rulings. State leaders in Virginia were willing to go to extremes in order to prevent desegregation from taking place; including altering the 1902 Constitution. The intransigent behavior demonstrated by Virginia’s leadership, especially Senator Harry F. Byrd in opposition to
the Brown rulings helped to create a contested environment involving social, political, and economic factors. These factors placed Virginia’s State Right’s advocates and the Federal Judiciary in an unceasing struggle for power. This contested struggle escalated, resulting in damage to the State’s reputation, its public school system, and its business and industrial communities.

The start of the VTCS highlights several points of intersection, and at the center of this junction was a powerful group of Virginia business, newspaper, and industry leaders calling themselves the Virginia Industrialization Group. Due to reinforcement of segregation laws and policies, Virginia’s legislative representatives, both state and federal, put the Commonwealth on a path that quickly crippled the state’s public education system and Virginia’s national reputation. If it had not been for Virginia’s radical reaction to the Brown v. Board of Education rulings in 1954 and 1955, the will or impetus to create such a system of colleges like the VTCS may have remained elusive.

In 1957, Lindsay Almond was elected Governor of Virginia. As Governor, Almond continued the hardline stance against desegregation promoted by his predecessor, Thomas Stanley (1954-1958). Almond was a staunch advocate for the Massive Resistance laws, and is known for having closed public schools in various areas of the State. Formerly as Virginia’s Attorney General, Almond argued the case of Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, Virginia (Library of Virginia, 2015). Along with four other cases, the Davis case became part of the Brown v. Board of Education case argued before the U. S. Supreme Court in 1954 (Library of Virginia, 2015). It could be said that Almond had a more intimate relationship with the Brown
rulings than other elected Virginia officials. Even so, this relationship did not make him understanding or accepting of the changes the Brown rulings represented.

A hallmark of leadership is the belief in doing the right thing (Northouse, 2013). Does the definition of the right thing change as circumstances change? Quite possibly, but changes in a leader’s position, even if contradictory, I believe should still reflect the leader’s core values. Almond was beholden, as were many of Virginia’s elected officials, to the Byrd Machine. Harry F. Byrd had led the charge for Massive Resistance, and expected his followers to take up the banner. As expected, Almond had supported Massive Resistance throughout his governorship, but early in 1959 this all ended. On January 19, 1959, in separate rulings, both the United States District Court in Norfolk, and the Virginia Supreme Court ruled the Massive Resistance laws to be unconstitutional (Library of Virginia, 2015). Due to this ruling, coupled with the outcry by Virginia’s business community in December, 1958, Almond found himself at a crossroads. Should he continue to preach the gospel of Massive Resistance or respect the rulings of not only the federal courts, but also now the Virginia Supreme Court? To go against Massive Resistance would be to go against Virginia’s political kingmaker, Harry F. Byrd. Almond chose to do the right thing and defy the kingmaker.

Almond was a lawyer and a former Attorney General for the State of Virginia. He knew the law, and he knew that as Governor his defiance of the law was not a path he was willing to follow. In an oral history interview conducted by the John F. Kennedy Library in 1968, Almond discussed those days and how he came to his decision to break with Harry F. Byrd.

Soon after the Courts ruled in January of 1959, Almond met with Byrd to discuss
the matter. Almond had come to the conclusion that Byrd’s Massive Resistance cause was lost, but Byrd would have none of it. According to Almond (as cited in Hackman, 1968):

I could not get him [Byrd] to reason. He just said, “We can’t do it. We’ve got to stand our ground no matter what comes and we cannot have any integration in Virginia.” And I finally said to him, “Well, Senator, I have gone to the end of the road. I have done everything I can with the exception of violating the federal law. I can’t do that as governor.” So from that conference our relations became more or less strained. (sec. 4)

In early February 1959, Almond stepped in front of the General Assembly of Virginia and logically and calmly presented his case for withdrawing support of Massive Resistance. Almond knew he would pay a heavy price for his actions, and was vilified throughout Virginia as a traitor to the cause (Lechner, 1998). From that point forward Byrd politically opposed Almond in practically every possible way, even going so far as refusing to support the Democratic nomination of John F. Kennedy at the 1960 Democratic Convention in Los Angeles; Byrd had campaigned for Lyndon B. Johnson while Almond supported Kennedy (Hackman, 1968). In 1962, without the support of Senator Byrd, Lindsay Almond was appointed to the U.S. Court of Patents and Appeals where he remained until his death in April 1986 (Library of Virginia, 2015).

Almond is remembered for his support of Massive Resistance. His later withdrawal of support for Massive Resistance and defiance to Harry Byrd was an act of political suicide that took courage. Almond had listened to the business community and
to the Courts. Political suicide or not, by doing the right thing Almond demonstrated wise leadership in the midst of a highly contested environment.

**The Influence of Business**

Massive Resistance legislation had a profound effect on public education in Virginia. This period is well documented in books exploring this turbulent time such as *Southern Stalemate* (Bonastia, 2012) and *Something must be done about Prince Edward County: A family, a Virginia town, a civil rights battle* (Green, 2015). What is not well documented is the effect this movement had on Virginia’s business community. Jeffries (2001) pointed to the fact that no new industry came to Virginia in 1958, a year that marks the height of massive resistance legislation. Concerns of the business community in Virginia were highlighted in the report issued by the Commission to Study Industrial Development (1957), chaired by Charles Abbott of Charlottesville. In its report, the commission stressed the importance of education and the need for a healthy business climate. “Of all the normal functions of state and local governments that may affect and influence industrial development favorably, or unfavorably, none is more important than education at both the secondary school and college levels” (Commission to study industrial development in Virginia, 1957, p. 59). The findings target the negative effects felt in the business community due to the aftermath of massive resistance legislation.

The report went on to discuss how the uncertainty of a stable public school system would undermine industrial development in Virginia (Commission to study industrial development in Virginia, 1957). With the closing of schools, and the threat of continued school closing, it was feared that industry would choose other states to locate (Commission to study industrial development in Virginia, 1957). The report specifically
identified problems in Prince Edward County. Of note, Prince Edward County was one of the original complainants in the 1954 Brown case, and like other rural counties in Virginia, residents could greatly benefit from industrial development (Commission to study industrial development in Virginia, 1957). The enforcement of Massive Resistance laws had created one of the most serious problems facing Virginia (Commission to study industrial development in Virginia, 1957). The closing of schools was having a profound effect on preparing students for the workplace (Commission to study industrial development in Virginia, 1957), and signaled for potential investors that the climate in Virginia was not conducive to supplying an educated workforce. Many in the business community throughout the South, agreed that actions such as Massive Resistance were detrimental to the attraction of new industry and the development of existing industry (Miller, 1960). The environment had become so contested that in 1958 even the U. S. Navy voiced their concerns at the closure of schools in Norfolk (“What ‘Massive Resistance’ costs Norfolk and its businessmen,” 1958). The Navy did not state that it would leave Norfolk, but worried that Naval personnel may not be able to enroll their children in public schools (“What ‘Massive Resistance’ costs Norfolk and its businessmen,” 1958). Supporters of Massive Resistance had created an unsustainable situation. From this polarized climate emerged an extraordinary group of Virginia businessmen.

**Virginia Industrialization Group.** The purpose of the Virginia Industrialization Group was to promote Virginia business and industry and bring an end to Massive Resistance (Saunders, 1980). The Group’s first meeting in December of 1958 featured Governor Almond as the evening’s speaker. The exchange between the membership and
the Governor became contentious with neither side backing away from their positions. Even though the membership pointed out the negative effects Massive Resistance was having on Virginia business, Governor Almond vowed to continue to support Massive Resistance laws. Nothing was decided that evening, except possibly, both sides agreed to disagree.

As noted above, few weeks later, in early 1959, Almond announced he was withdrawing his support for Massive Resistance. Reasons for Almond’s denouncement included rulings by state and federal courts, both occurring on the same day, January 19, 1959, striking down Massive Resistance (Massive Resistance, 2015). It was believed by Stuart Saunders (1980) that Almond’s December 1958 meeting with the Virginia Industrialization Group had influenced decision to abandon Massive Resistance (Saunders, 1980).

With Massive Resistance in retreat, the Virginia Industrialization Group set out to establish and carry out an agenda designed to promote their collective interests and to improve the business climate in Virginia. Letters written and held at the Powell Archive at Washington and Lee University between 1959 and 1964, show the Group worked steadily to influence state policy as it pertained to business and industry. In February 1959, Frank Batten wrote a report outlining areas the Group should direct its lobbying efforts (Batten, 1959). The report was produced by a work group headed by Batten and Eugene Sydnor (Batten, 1959). The areas outlined included, development of the port of Hampton Roads, elimination of “unfavorable elements” in the state’s tax laws, strengthening of the Department of Conservation and Economic Development, and the strengthening of the state’s Chamber of Commerce (Batten, 1959, p. 3).
In 1961, Richard Holmquist was hired by the Virginia Industrialization Group to work in the Governor’s office as a consultant in industrial development. Industrial development in Virginia in 1961 was “submerged in the Division of Conservation and Economic Development” with funding that was “wholly inadequate” (Saunders, 1980, p. 8). According to Saunders (1980) the Group approached Governor Almond suggesting a “first rate expert” be hired to assist in industrial development (Saunders, 1980, p. 8). Governor Almond agreed there was a need, but expressed budgetary there were no fund to pay for such a consultant (Saunders, 1980). The Virginia Industrialization Group offered to locate a suitable consultant and pay the necessary salary (Saunders, 1980).

Richard Holmquist was chosen and in September 1961 became industrial development consultant to Governor Almond. Holmquist’s prior experience as consultant in government relations for the General Electric Corporation meant he was well suited for the position (“Holmquist Named Consultant to The Governor,” 1961). Holmquist served as consultant to both Governor Almond (1958-1962) and Governor Harrison (1962-1966). Holmquist’s $25,000 a year salary was paid by the Virginia Industrialization Group (Saunders, 1980). In 1962, under the newly elected Governor Albertis Harrison, Holmquist became Director of the Virginia Division of Industrial Development (Saunders, 1980). Holmquist’s salary continued to be paid by the Virginia Industrialization Group “for three years and four months” (Saunders, 1980, p. 9). As Director, Holmquist recognized that if Virginia intended to be competitive, it would need a trained workforce (Robertson & Clarke, 2008). Training a large amount of Virginians in as brief a time as possible would require facilities, faculty, and funding.
**Waking the sleeping giant.** Richard Holmquist described the Virginia economy of the early 1960s as a “sleeping giant” (Robertson & Clarke, 2008, para. 1). To awaken this giant and put Virginia business and its people back on the road to economic prosperity would require a coming together of business, industry, and government. The key focal point of Holmquist’s work was to build up interest in the creation of new industry in the state and to shift perceptions of Virginia not being a good place to locate due to its poorly educated workforce. To achieve this objective, Holmquist spoke to community groups about the characteristics that would make their towns and cities attractive to industry ("Industrial Growth Called Community Task," 1962).

Holmquist also told listeners that things that would attract businesses to Virginia included “good government, a progressive attitude, good labor relations, and a well-trained labor force” ("Virginia Needs to Create 400,000 Jobs in Decade," 1962, para. 7). In November of 1962, Holmquist speaking to an audience at the Kiwanis Club in Winchester, Virginia said that he could see a day, not too far in the future when a “statewide system of technical education would exist” ("Farm Community of past Rapidly Disappearing," 1962, para. 6). Just a few months later, in January of 1963, Holmquist told a meeting of the Richmond Chapter of the Society of Professional Engineers that the state needed excellent vocational schools and not the kind for “second-class citizens” ("Va. Technical Education System Urged," 1963). Holmquist promoted the idea that high quality vocational-technical education was for the good of Virginia as a whole. He argued,

“To bury our heads in the sands of selfish status quo on the educational front would not only be terribly costly in the long run, but even more
seriously, it would be a blot on our responsibilities to our youngsters” ("Va. Technical Education System Urged," 1963).

This message was quite different from those of only a few years earlier, by others, promoting Massive Resistance and the closing of public schools, and limited access to post-secondary education.

Holmquist instructed local groups on how to make their communities attractive to new industry from outside the state ("Industrial Growth Called Community Task," 1962). In June of 1962, a headline in the Danville Register told readers Virginia needs to create 400,000 jobs in decade ("Virginia Needs to Create 400,000 Jobs in Decade," 1962).

According to Holmquist, one of the key pieces to the puzzle to help fill these jobs was the need for a “properly educated labor supply supporting services and good plant sites” (para. 6) because “education continues to constitute a major problem for Virginia” ("Virginia Needs to Create 400,000 Jobs in Decade," 1962, para. 7). Holmquist made this plea reportedly in Franklin, Virginia as he continued to promote industrialization, and again emphasized the need for “a good and properly educated labor supply” ("Needs Cited," 1962, para. 3)

Throughout 1963, Holmquist continued to travel and speak of the need to bring industry to Virginia. His message was consistent and clear; Virginia needed to expand its industrial base, but could not do this without community support and an educated workforce. On February 20, 1964, Holmquist was joined at a presentation by members of the Appomattox Basin Industrial Development Corporation (ABIDC) ("ABIDC Meets in Hopewell," 1964). Joining Holmquist and the President of ABIDC was Dr. Dana B.
Hamel, then Director of the Roanoke Technical Institute (“ABIDC Meets in Hopewell,” 1964).

This meeting was not the first time Holmquist was joined by members of industry and higher education. A few days earlier, on February 13, 1964, Holmquist was joined by members of the ABIDC and Dr. Hamel at a speaking engagement in Hopewell ("Allied's Prossen Will Speak at Conference," 1964). These meetings gave Holmquist the opportunity to speak on industrialization, and his guests who were experts in their respective fields, added weight to his message. I asked Dr. Hamel about his relationship with Richard Holmquist, and his appearance at Holmquist’s presentations. He spoke very highly of Holmquist, and said that while there was talk of creating a series of colleges, Hamel’s primary concern at that time was the recruitment of students for Roanoke Technical Institute (personal communication, March 15, 2016).

In the early 1960s, Richard Holmquist was traveling the Commonwealth bestowing the virtues of industrialization; another person from Governor Harrison’s office was doing much the same. In June of 1962, Joseph Hamrick resigned his post with the South Carolina firm, Kahn-Southern, to head the Virginia Division of Industrial Development (“S.C. Man Heads VA Industrialization”, 1962). The Division had been recently formed from the Division of Conservation and Economic Development (“S.C. Man Heads VA Industrialization,” 1962). It did not take Hamrick long to find his footing. He began traveling the State as well, and also told audiences and newspaper reporters about the connections between good jobs and vocational-technical education. In an interview with the Danville Register newspaper Hamrick said, “One of the state’s major liabilities is insufficient vocational and technical training” pointing out that the
new personnel hired for a Waynesboro General Electric plant had to be “imported from outside the state” (“Virginia’s Basic Industry Growth Slow Says Official,” 1962, para. 8). Both Holmquist and Hamrick extolled the same message, vocational-technical education equated to more jobs in the state for residents and an improved economy over all.

For the next two years, and even after the Department of Technical Education was established, Hamrick and Holmquist continued to travel and proselytize about the critical need for Virginia to industrialize, and they were clear on the fact that the state could not do this without an educated workforce. According to Hamrick and Holmquist, obtaining an educated workforce was of the utmost urgency and a direct means to obtain this goal was through the establishment of a technical colleges system throughout the Commonwealth.

**Leadership and Relationships: The Watchmaker’s Son**

Dr. Hamel arrived in Virginia in 1962 when he was hired by the Virginia Polytechnic Institute (known today as Virginia Tech) to oversee the new branch campus in Roanoke; the Roanoke Technical Institute. Born in Maine in 1923, Hamel grew up in the heart of coal country in Johnstown, Pennsylvania as the son of a watchmaker. Prior to moving to Virginia, Hamel held a variety of academic positions in Ohio at the Ohio Mechanics Institute that ranged from Instructor to Acting President (Strother, 1964). In asking Dr. Hamel why he chose to leave Ohio for Virginia, he indicated he had been recruited for the position at Roanoke Technical Institute. “I never applied for a job in my life… people always contacted me” (personal communication, April, 25, 2013).

As Director of the Roanoke Technical Institute, Dr. Hamel was in an excellent position to meet and get to know many in Virginia’s industrial arena. In a follow-up
conversation to our original interviews Dr. Hamel mentioned he had known Stuart Saunders, albeit “not well” (personal communication, March 15, 2016). Hamel said he had met several of the area’s industrialists through his association with members of the Advisory Board of the Roanoke Technical Institute (personal communication, March 15, 2016). Since Roanoke Technical Institute was a branch of VPI (Virginia Tech), Dr. Hamel reported directly to then President Marshal Hahn. The Advisory Board reported to the Board of Visitors for VPI. In reviewing the college catalog from 1964/1965 the listing of the membership of the Advisory Board is filled with industry representatives, with almost half being from General Electric (Roanoke Technical Institute, 1965). Richard Holmquist had been an employee of General Electric. Dr. Hamel did not indicate to me that he met Holmquist through the Advisory Board, but it is certainly plausible.


As Holmquist and Hamel traveled the state touting industry and technical education, legislation was concurrently making its way through the Virginia Assembly. Specifically, H. 205, a bill establishing the State Board for Technical Education and the State Department of Technical Education went into effect on March 31, 1964. The legislation had broad support, with its chief sponsor being Delegate French Slaughter
(Commonwealth of Virginia, 1964). A stagnant industrial climate, coupled with the lack of access to post-secondary education for much of Virginia’s population led those who sponsored the legislation to include in the language of the bill “an emergency exists, and this act is in force from its passing” (Virginia House of Delegates, 1964, p. 3).

On April 7, 1964, a memorandum was sent from Joseph Hamrick of the Division of Industrial Development to Governor Harrison stating “Bill McFarlane and I have suggested the name of Dr. Dana B. Hamel for consideration as Director, State Board of Technical Education” (Hamrick, 1964, para. 1). William McFarlane was the head of SCHEV at the time. In July of that same year, Governor Harrison placed a telephone call to Dana Hamel offering him the position of Director of the State’s newly formed Department of Technical Education. Later that month, Governor Harrison sent a brief memo to Dr. Hamel, dated July 27. “I take pleasure in appointing you Director of Technical Education and look forward to your serving the Commonwealth of Virginia in this capacity” (Harrison, 1964, para. 1).

In August 1964, shortly after the announcement of his hiring, the Richmond Times-Dispatch newspaper interviewed Dr. Hamel. In the interview, Hamel addressed his vision that someday the technical institutes would become a series of “comprehensive community colleges” (Strother, 1964, para. 13). Leaders in Virginia, including Governor Harrison, viewed the current series of branch colleges affiliated with the universities as a system of community colleges (Williams, 1976). Hamel felt having two systems of two-year colleges, one technical and the other for college transfer, existing side by side was wasteful and unnecessary (Strother, 1964). Hamel had a vision of Virginia creating a system of comprehensive community colleges that would offer students a chance to learn
trade and industry skills, prepare to transfer to a four-year university, receive training in medical areas, and provide continuing education opportunities to adult learners (Strother, 1964). “There is no doubt in my mind that should be done. This is the kind of program we are developing at Roanoke Technical Institute” (Hamel, as cited in Strother, 1964, para. 8).

The watchmaker’s son had not conceived his vision inside a vacuum. His personal life was an excellent example of a skilled tradesman turned college administrator. Hamel knew that by combining the technical with the academic, these technical colleges could potentially produce not only industry ready labor, but also students prepared to pursue education beyond the two-year college.

**Emerging from Resistance: Creating the System**

Sociopolitical conditions played a major role in the development of the colleges, by creating a situation of cause and effect. The effect was the establishment of the colleges; a critical cause was Massive Resistance. Prior to 1956, Virginia had a thriving industrial economy. The imposition of Massive Resistance laws resulted in the closing of several public schools, which contributed to a halt in industrial growth. Not only did the closings prevent young people from receiving an education, it also made industry from outside the state think twice before considering locating in Virginia. As a result, in 1958, business and industry leaders from around the state formed an alliance, the Virginia Industrialization Group, to demand an end to Massive Resistance (Saunders, 1980). To make Virginia an appealing place for out-of-state companies to locate, the damage of Massive Resistance would need to be undone by the development of a well-trained workforce through the creation of a series of technical colleges.
In 1961, a representative of the Virginia Industrialization Group, Richard Holmquist, became industrial development consultant within the Governor’s office. The Virginia Industrialization Group paid Holmquist’s salary. Holmquist’s mission was to promote the need and desire to bring new industry into the state. Increased industrialization meant there would be a need for technical institutes or colleges. To help Holmquist present a case for technical education Dr. Dana B. Hamel, Director of the Roanoke Technical Institute joined Holmquist at some speaking engagements. Dr. Hamel was a respected expert in technical education and the Director of the newest technical institute in the state, Roanoke Technical Institute, having opened its doors in 1960 (“Roanoke School Names Director,” 1960). What Hamel had to say at these public gatherings was beneficial to helping people understand the merits of technical education.

Federal funds in support of vocational education had been previously available, but the passing of the National Defense Education Act in 1958 meant funding was now available to support technical education at the college level (Carleton, 2002). Financial support was not only available at the institutional level, but also for students in the form of federal student aid (Carleton, 2002). With all the factors aligned the stage was set for the creation of the technical college system.

The realization of the founding of the VTCS was the culmination of years of ideological discussions by Virginia’s political and educational leaders. During the early part of the 20th Century, the Virginia State Board of Education defined a junior college as being a school that was providing at least education for the freshman and sophomore years comparable to a comprehensive university (McDowell, 1919). In 1918, Virginia had nine junior colleges, none of which were publically funded (McDowell, 1919). At
this time, the junior colleges were not part of the larger four-year universities. The junior colleges had the ability to offer diplomas, but were unable to confer degrees (McDowell, 1919; Simpson, 1964). The restriction regarding the conferring of degrees was in keeping with guidelines set down by the Association of Virginia Colleges, which included in its 1918 definition of what constituted a junior college “it shall confer no degrees” (For the complete definition see Appendix D) (Simpson, 1964, p. 11). The practice of not conferring degrees remained in place until the 1960s with the founding of the VTCS.

Virginia has always been a predominantly rural state with most of its inhabitants living in either the Northern Virginia area located just south of Washington, D.C., or the Virginia Peninsula area stretching from Richmond to Virginia Beach. In a 1944 report by the Virginia Education Commission, the need for increased access to vocational/technical education was addressed (Virginia Education Commission, 1944). The 1944 report stated that:

At the present time such facilities are available to only about 25 percent of our school population and a much smaller percent of our adult citizens. The committee feels that opportunities for this training should be placed within reach of all prospective students who may be benefited by it. (p. 109)

To allow for increased access to vocational education, the report goes on to recommend the creation of vocational schools throughout the state (Virginia Education Commission, 1944). Some vocational facilities already existed, and while these were not colleges per say, they were post-secondary institutions. Reflecting the social climate of the times, the second recommendation of the 1944 report pointed out that any new
facilities would be segregated by stipulating schools for “white students” and those for “Negro students” (Virginia Education Commission, 1944, p. 109). It is also inferred in this recommendation that existing Negro schools were inferior to those for white students, as the State would need to “bring them up to the regional vocational school level” (Virginia Education Commission, 1944, p. 109).

The Davis Commission produced the Thompson report. Authored by consultant Lorin Thompson (1955), the report discussed both the creation of community colleges and the possible use of branch campuses. The report actually advised against the creation of publicly funded community colleges (Thompson, 1955). The rationale against the creation of community colleges was that it would be difficult to establish uniform educational standards. The report pointed to experiences in states with community colleges that resulted in a waste the student’s time and money (Thompson, 1955). The report also argued that community colleges caused unjustified financial burdens for the communities in which they are located. The report concluded that the privately funded junior colleges were sufficient for the needs of the states. The Report further described the junior colleges as well managed and practical in the role they held in providing the first two years of a college education (Thompson, 1955).

Despite the espoused value of junior colleges in the report (Thompson, 1955), in practice these private junior colleges only served 10% of Virginia’s enrolled students at the time. The Report recommended and supported the creation of a series of branch colleges overseen by the State’s major four-year universities (Thompson, 1955).

The 1959 SCHEV report made a number of conclusions and recommendations that would later be adopted by the Board for Technical Education. One in particular was
the proposed criterion for the placement of the colleges. The SCHEV report, authored by Martorana, Hollis, Brunner, and Morrison (1959), displayed several maps of the state of Virginia, which outlined a multilayered approach in deciding where might be the best location for a two-year college. At the time this report was produced, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, the College of William and Mary, and the University of Virginia had established branch campuses in various parts of the state. Virginia State University had only one branch campus; it was located in Norfolk.

Martorana et al. (1959) built on established branch campuses in his location criteria. The SCHEV report also focused quite heavily on identifying graduation rates, actual and projected, of the high schools located within the regions. The role of access was identified as important and the report suggested that the vocational colleges should be within a 30-mile driving distance for students (Martorana et al., 1959).

In 1964, when the State Board for Technical Education formed and the VTCS was founded, the board adopted both the SCHEV recommendations of regional locations for the proposed technical colleges along with driving distance proximity. The State Board for Technical Education adopted additional recommendations from SCHEV, including the creation of local college boards. The recommendations that were not adopted by the Technical Board had to do with the overall governance structure of the two-year college system. Martorana et al. (1959) recommended Virginia’s proposed two-year college system be divided among the existing four-year institutions and governed by the respective Boards of Visitors. The rationale for this recommendation was to avoid creating a fragmented system of higher education (Martorana et al., 1959). If local control were granted, every college would be reliant upon its own ability to raise revenue.
and each college would need to lobby the State legislature on its own behalf. The SCHEV report was tactical in recommending against local control. Yet, having the colleges divided among the four-year institutions would create a geographically controlled system, one in which the funding for the two-year colleges would be determined by the parent four-year institution’s ability to acquire funding.

In designing the Virginia Technical College System, the Board studied how junior and community colleges had been organized in other states. One of these states was California. Each junior college had a local board that was guided by the State Board of Education (State Board of Education & Regents of the University of California, 1960). California, very early in the 20th Century, adopted a regional concept for its colleges. Instead of serving a single county, the state is divided into service districts ("The California Community Colleges," 2015). The regional college model eventually adopted in 1964 by the State Board for Technical Education allowed for each college to have a local advisory board overseen by the State Board for Technical Education.

The 1959 SCHEV report suggested state funding should make-up 70% of the two-year colleges’ budgets (Martorana et al., 1959). Although the report does not specify, it is assumed the proposed 70% would be allocated to the parent institution for support of the two-year branch college. This level of funding was a conservative estimate, even for the time of the report. The report does not mention any specifics regarding the level of support expected from the local communities. According to the report, the tax structure of the time made it difficult for members of the commission to suggest a firm percentage of local support, but suggests changes in the “tax situation” could “make it possible to observe the principle of local share in support” (Martorana et al., 1959, p. 95).
In 1965, Eugene Sydnor and Dr. Hamel authored *Policies, procedures, and regulations governing the establishment and operation of the program of technical colleges in the commonwealth of Virginia: As authorized by the 1964 General Assembly*. The document presented, in very clear terms, what defined a technical college and what would be the estimated costs to build and maintain them (Sydnor & Hamel, 1965). Unlike the 1959 SCHEV report, Sydnor and Hamel (1965) presented a case for shared responsibility when it came to the building of the colleges. It was estimated that each student would require 140-150 square feet of space (Sydnor & Hamel, 1965). This estimate was approximately the average used in Florida (144 sq. ft.), whereas California used an estimate of 150 sq. ft. (Sydnor & Hamel, 1965). The funding cost of support per student, based on “other states with Technical Colleges of this type” (p. 9), was estimated at approximately $800 per student for each school year (Sydnor & Hamel, 1965).

In order for a technical college to be constructed in an area, regional localities were responsible for providing the land, construction of the buildings and “cost of utilities, fuel insurance, and upkeep of the buildings and grounds” (Sydnor & Hamel, 1965, p. 7). The State was responsible for the hiring of administrators and faculty (Sydnor & Hamel, 1965). “Student tuition and/or fees are considered State Board funds” (Sydnor & Hamel, 1965). The level of detail regarding the contributions from localities meant local governments took a level of ownership in locating the college in their region. This feature stands in stark contrast to the ambiguous statement from the 1959 SCHEV report regarding local support. The SCHEV report presented a wait and see approach regarding any monetary contributions made by the local communities (Martorana et al., 1959).
The development of the System began in the following manner. Virginia Western Technical College, previously Roanoke Technical Institute and a branch campus of Virginia Polytechnic Institute, along with Northern Virginia Technical College were the first colleges to open in the fall of 1965 (Hamel, 1972). Northern Virginia Technical College began in a rented facility at Bailey’s Crossroads, just north of what is now the Alexandria campus. Northern Virginia Technical College relocated in 1967 to Annandale (Northern Virginia Community College, 2014). These colleges were joined in the System by five area vocational-technical schools (Hamel, 1972). The vocational-technical schools were; Danville Technical Institute, Peninsula Vocational-Technical Education Center (Hampton), New River Vocational-Technical School (Radford), Valley Vocational-Technical School (Waynesboro), and Washington County Vocational-Technical School at Abingdon (Hamel, 1972). The original design of the VTCS called for the creation of 22 Colleges regionally located throughout the State. In the June 1965 meeting of the Board for Technical Education, Consultant, Dr. Eric Rhodes was asked to present a recommendation as to the formation of the System. Dr. Rhodes’ comments were recorded into the meeting minutes as the following.

The proposed Plan indicates that 22 technical colleges should be established; either as new institutions or as additions to existing two-year post-high school institutions. These 22 colleges would be so located that within 30-35 miles of every student's home a technical college would be available with the exception of the Northern Neck - Wallops Island area…It was further recommended that three colleges be approved per year or a total of six for the biennium; either as new colleges or as part of existing institutions. (State Board for Technical Education,
When the VTCS became the VCCS this plan was continued, and developed into the current 23-college system. While there is no indication in the Technical Board minutes, I speculate the 23rd college of the current system must be Rappahannock Community College, as it serves the region discussed by Rhodes in the June 1965 minutes as being an area too sparsely populated to merit a technical college (State Board for Technical Education, June 1965). Rappahannock Community College was established in 1970 (“History-Rappahannock Community College,” 2016).

Summary

Like waters from great rivers flowing toward an inevitable conclusion, The Virginia Technical College System was a confluence of events that flowed along multiple pathways. Throughout this study I have attempted to answer questions related to the founding of the VTCS. Why did it take so long for Virginia to create a system of colleges? How were they funded? How did the social climate of the time effect their founding? In answering these questions, I discovered that funding to support technical education had been available for decades, but it was not until 1958 that funding became available to support technical education on the collegiate level. This funding was further strengthened by subsequent legislation passed in 1963. In the first half of the 20th Century, Virginia had 14 privately funded junior colleges; 11 white and 3 black (Greenleaf, 1936). By the late 1950s Virginia’s four-year universities had established several two-year branch campus. Even so, Virginia continued to lack the ability to adequately provide post-secondary technical education throughout the state. State Commission reports, issued as early as 1951, began to suggest possible solutions. These
solutions suggested relying on private junior colleges and avoiding state funded community colleges, and establishing two-year branch campuses of the State’s major universities throughout the state. The Thompson (1955) report predicted a looming crisis in higher education. The predicted crisis was due to data that suggested enrollment demand for college would be such that Virginia’s current higher educational structure would be inadequate (Thompson, 1955).

In none of the reports discussing two-year colleges was difficulty with funding ever mentioned as there were available federal funds designated to support technical education. However, these funds were not available for college level work. In 1958, that all changed with the passing of the National Defense Education Act (NDEA). The NDEA was a response to the Soviet launch of the satellite known as Sputnik. The Sputnik launch sent a signal to the United States Government that America was behind in technical education. The NDEA provided money for the sciences much like current legislation has been passed in support of STEM education. The passing of the NDEA and the Vocational Education Act of 1963 meant, in the early 1960s, funding was available to support the establishment of technical education.

The impetus for establishing the technical colleges in Virginia would come as a result of the contested environment created by the Massive Resistance laws passed in 1956 by the Virginia Assembly. Massive Resistance laws crippled public education in Virginia and served to damage the state’s national image. As a result, not only did a large number of children go without an education for several years, Virginia’s business and industrial communities suffered. In response to the negative effects Massive Resistance was having on business, the Virginia Industrialization Group was formed.
The Group consisting of representatives from some of the most powerful and influential companies in Virginia gathered together to demand an end to Massive Resistance. They met with Governor Almond in December of 1958 as an attempt to make him understand the damage Massive Resistance was causing the Commonwealth. On January 19, 1959 both state and federal courts struck down the constitutionally of Massive Resistance. Not long afterward Governor Almond withdrew his support for Massive Resistance. It was believed that Almond’s meeting with the Virginia Industrialization Group had an effect of Almond’s decision (Saunders, 1980). With the court’s ruling against Massive Resistance, it was only a matter of time before Virginia would have to abide by the Supreme Courts 1954 and 1955 rulings. Massive Resistance did not end in 1959, but this was a turning point in moving Virginia out of this dark social period.

With Massive Resistance on the way out, the Virginia Industrialization Group turned its attention toward repairing the damage done to Virginia’s business and industrial sectors. It became clear that in order to attract new industries to Virginia the state would need a ready supply of trained workers.

In 1961, Richard Holmquist began work as the industrial development for the Governor’s office. Holmquist’s salary was paid by the Virginia Industrialization Group. Holmquist spent time visiting communities and discussing the merits of locating industrial sites in their localities. Holmquist also touted that someday there would be a statewide system of technical education (“Farm Community of the Past Rapidly Disappearing,” 1962).

In 1962, Dr. Dana B. Hamel moved from Ohio where he had held numerous positions with the Ohio Mechanics Institute to serve as Director of the newly founded
Roanoke Technical Institute. The VPI branch campus was the only technical institute in the state. Through the Roanoke Technical Institute’s Advisory Board, Dr. Hamel began to get to know members of Virginia’s industrial community. I have little doubt that he made the acquaintance of Richard Holmquist through members of the Advisory Board, as five of its members were from Holmquist’s former employer, General Electric. In 1963, Hamel began to speak at some of Holmquist’s public discussions about industrialization. Dr. Hamel’s portion of the talk would center on explaining what technical education was and how it is vital to the economy of the state.

Albertis Harrison became Governor of Virginia in 1962. Harrison was a known supporter of industrial development. He retained Holmquist as industrial development consultant, and later, at Holmquist’s recommendation, hired Joseph Hamrick, to serve as Director of the Division of Industrial Development. Early in 1964 the Virginia Assembly passed legislation creating the Department of Technical Education, and the Board for Technical Education. Later that same year, at the suggestion of Joseph Hamrick and William McFarlane, Director of SCHEV, Governor Harrison hired Dr. Dana B. Hamel to head the Department of Technical Education. On the Board for Technical Education were several members of the Virginia Industrialization Group. Holmquist and Hamrick, while not Board members, were present at many of the Board’s early meetings. The creation of the VTCS was a result of the efforts of the Virginia Industrialization Group to improve the climate for industry in the state and the need for the state to offer more opportunities for post-secondary education to the state’s growing population. I have found that no preference was to be made in regards to race, signaling a departure from the contested era of Massive Resistance.
CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS

The Contested Environment of the late 1950s created in Virginia a climate ripe for the emergence of a new form of higher education, which ultimately set the stage for the founding of the VTCS. The rise of Massive Resistance, Virginia’s set of segregationist laws aimed at defying the U. S. Supreme Court’s rulings in the cases of Brown v. Board of Education, served as the catalyst for dramatic social change. This draconian set of laws led to the closing of public schools in various parts of the state, and brought investment in industrialization to a virtual complete standstill. In 1958 the Virginia Industrialization Group, arranged a dinner meeting with Governor Lindsay Almond and expressed their opposition to Massive Resistance. The exchange between the Groups members and the Governor were at times less than cordial. A few weeks later Governor Almond publicly withdrew his support of Massive Resistance (Library of Virginia, 2015). The pressure from the Virginia Industrialization Group, along with federal and state Supreme Court rulings helped the Governor realize that Massive Resistance was an unsustainable cause.

As part of the healing process, the Virginia Industrialization Group set out to revitalize Virginia’s industrial efforts. Part of those efforts included the creation of a way to quickly create a large well-trained labor force. The Virginia Industrialization Group advocated for a system of technical education centers to be placed throughout the state as a way to accomplish this goal (“Va. Technical Education System Urged,” 1963).
Virginia of the early 1960s was a predominately rural state, with its major population centers located in Northern Virginia and Hampton Roads. With the exception of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute in Blacksburg, Virginia’s major universities were located around Richmond. In order to create an industry ready labor force, Richard Holmquist began pitching the idea of a statewide system of technical education in the early 1960s (“Farm Community of Past Rapidly Disappearing,” 1962). To help people understand not only the need, but also what a technical institute or college would look like, Holmquist included Dr. Dana B. Hamel in some of his speaking engagements in 1964 (“ABIDC Meets at Hopewell,” 1964). At the time, Dr. Hamel was the Director of the Roanoke Technical Institute; the only technical institute in the State.

Hamel had only been in Virginia a short time, having been hired as Director of the Institute in 1962. Prior to his arrival in Virginia, Hamel held several positions in Ohio, including Acting President of the Ohio Mechanics Institute (Strother, 1964). Hamel was a documented expert in the field of technical education, and added credibility to the message being delivered by Holmquist and Hamrick about the need for a vocational system of technical education in Virginia.

Former Governor Lindsay Almond hired Holmquist as an industrial development consultant in 1961, and Holmquist continued to work for Governor Harrison following his election in 1962. Hamrick was hired by Governor Harrison in 1963 to lead the Division of Industrial Development. The Virginia Industrialization Group paid Holmquist and Hamrick’s salaries, in full or in part during this timeframe. I have found no evidence indicating Hamel was ever officially affiliated with the Virginia Industrialization Group.
While Hamel, Holmquist and Hamrick were speaking on behalf of technical education, House Bill 205 was making its way through the Virginia Assembly. The bill was signed into law in March of 1964 creating the Department of Technical Education and the Board for Technical Education. In April 1964, Joseph Hamrick sent a memorandum to Governor Harrison stating that he and the Director of SCHEV, William McFarlane, recommended Dr. Dana B. Hamel to the position of Director of the Board for Technical Education (Hamrick, 1964). In July, Governor Harrison offered Dr. Hamel the position of Director of the Department of Technical Education.

Yet, this brief documentation of key signposts in the establishment of the Virginia Technical College System (VTCS) tells only part of the historic story. The focus of this study was centered on research questions concerning the social, political and economic forces leading to the creation of the technical colleges. Additional questions have arisen along the way. Was there ever a discussion regarding race and open admissions for the technical colleges, or was the Board color blind in decisions regarding admissions? Why was Dana Hamel selected as the first director, and ultimately the Chancellor of the Virginia Community College System, and not someone else? Each of these questions are addressed and discussed separately.

According to the minutes documenting the meetings from July 1964 through May 1965 of the Board for Technical Education, there were never any discussions concerning segregation and the admissions policies for the technical colleges. Does this mean there were no discussions regarding the subject of race? The minutes do not reflect any discussion, and I could not verify one way or the other if other discussions occurred. In my discussions with Dr. Hamel, on several occasions he emphasized two things; the need
to place the establishment of the colleges in the historical context of the contested environment of Massive Resistance, and the need to create an industry ready labor force. According to Hamel, in spite of this polarized social environment, there were never any discussions regarding race and admission requirements for admission to the technical colleges. No doubt one reason why race may not have been a point of official discussion was due to the passing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This Act, signed into law on July 2, 1964, made it unlawful for educational institutions of all levels, including technical schools, to be discriminatory in their admissions practice. The inaugural meeting of the Board for Technical Education occurred on July 14, 1964; less than two weeks after the signing of the Civil Rights Act. In order to receive federal funds, the technical colleges could not discriminate in their admission policies based on race, color, or ethnic origin (“Civil Rights Act of 1964,” 1964, Sec. IV).

Hamel’s remembrances of the lack of discussion of no limitations to admission based on race are substantiated when the Virginia Industrialization Group is reviewed as part of the historical backdrop of documentation. The Virginia Industrialization Group included businessmen whose purpose was to use technical education to increase the amount of trained labor in the state. A well-trained labor force was important to the success of Virginia’s business community. Men like Stuart Saunders, Richard Holmquist, Joseph Hamrick and Lewis Powell, all key players in the Virginia Industrialization Group, were interested in the promotion of business and industry throughout the state. The former prosperous business climate in Virginia had grown stagnant as a result of Massive Resistance.
In a 1958 letter to Stuart Saunders and Harvie Wilkinson, marked confidential, Lewis Powell wrote; “Virginia has already come to a virtual standstill in terms of major new industries locating here” (Powell, 1958, p. 1). Powell went on to stress “there will be no substantial new capital investment in Virginia until this crisis is satisfactorily resolved” (Powell, 1958, p. 2). The crisis he referred to was Massive Resistance. Powell’s letter demonstrates the Group’s opposition to every aspect of the Massive Resistance laws and says “there can be no satisfactory solution of the problem so long as this attitude continues” (Powell, 1958, p. 5). Aside from the promotion of business and industry in Virginia, one of the key reasons the Group came into existence was the defeat of Massive Resistance legislation and practice (Saunders, 1980). Recalling the creation of the Virginia Industrialization Group, Stuart Saunders wrote “it was soon apparent that one, if not the greatest, obstacle to further industrial development in Virginia was the Massive Resistance movement” (Saunders, 1980, p. 5). Saunders described Virginia’s public school system as “in a chaotic condition” that “threatened the economic development of the state” (Saunders, 1980, p. 5). The promotion of segregation in education within the Massive Resistance movement resulted in the creation of a less educated populace and the construction of an environment that made business investors reluctant to come to Virginia.

In examining the Virginia Industrialization Group’s letters and documents from the Lewis Powell papers at Washington and Lee University, the Group is portrayed as highly organized, focused, and deliberate in their actions. They were not only influential in Governor Almond’s decision to disassociate himself from Massive Resistance; they were also instrumental in creating a separate Virginia Division of Industrial Development
within the state government. Indeed, the Industrialization Group underwrote Holmquist’s salary and part of Hamrick’s salary. Prior to the early 1960s, Industrial Development was part of the Department of Conservation and Planning (Saunders, 1980).

Part of the Virginia Industrialization Group’s mission included the promotion of vocational-technical education (Saunders, 1980). In order to attract and retain industry in the state, the Group felt Virginia needed a well-trained labor force. The marketing of industry and technical education fell to Richard Holmquist and Joseph Hamrick, and they ultimately enlisted Dana Hamel to aid in educating the public about the purpose of technical education.

Knowing the level of involvement of the Virginia Industrialization Group in supporting the creation of the technical colleges, and the fact that several of their members served on the early Board for Technical Education, a conclusion is deduced that the discussions in those early Board meetings were driven by the needs of business with little consideration given to the racial make-up of the student body. The primary focus was the training of a labor force that would enable Virginia to advance industrially.

**Dana Hamel’s Role—Leadership and Relationships**

Dana Hamel, by all accounts, was a very qualified candidate for the position of Director of the Roanoke Technical Institute. He had served as a member of the staff at the General Motors Institute in Dayton, Ohio, Dean of Admissions and later as the Acting President for the Ohio Mechanics Institute (“Dana Hamel is Named to OMI Dean’s Office,” 1957; Strother, 1964). By way of a letter to Governor Harrison, Dr. Hamel accepted the position of Director on July 27, 1964 (Harrison, 1964). During his first interview with the *Richmond Times-Dispatch* on August 1, 1964, Hamel discussed his
vision for the technical colleges (Strother, 1964). Hamel envisioned a system of comprehensive community colleges that provided students the opportunity of gaining a vocational-technical education, or completing academic course work necessary for transfer to a four-year university (Strother, 1964). This vision made him an ideal choice as the person to oversee the creation of this new system of technical colleges.

In 1964 when the Virginia Technical College System was created, Dr. Hamel had only been in Virginia a short time; about two years. During this time he served as the Director of the newest technical institute in the State. As a follow-up to our initial interviews, I spoke with Dr. Hamel in March of 2016. I asked Hamel how he made the acquaintance of Holmquist, Hamrick, and others. He said the acquaintances were in large part due to connections with members of the Advisory Board of the Roanoke Technical Institute (personal communication, March 14, 2016).

Of the 16 member Advisory Board for the Roanoke Technical Institute, 10 were from prominent, and in some cases, national companies. Five were from the General Electric Company, two from the Appalachian Power Company, one from International Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITT), and one from the Norfolk and Western Railway (Roanoke Technical Institute, 1965). Additionally, one member of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute’s Board of Visitors, John W. Hancock, Jr. was among the original list of perspective members of the Virginia Industrialization Group (Roanoke Technical Institute, 1965). For a complete list of businessmen invited to attend the Virginia Industrialization Group’s first meeting see Appendix C. For a full list of those who accepted the invitation see Appendix E.
The connections Hamel made through the Advisory Board gave him the opportunity for introductions to others, not just Holmquist and Hamrick, who were leaders in the fields of business and industry. Even though, at this time in 1964, Hamel had not met Governor Harrison, Holmquist and Hamrick reported directly to the Governor. Hamel’s association with Holmquist and Hamrick and his leadership of the Roanoke Technical Institute increased his profile in the state and the opportunity for consideration of a government appointment in the newly created VTCS.

Soon after arriving in Virginia, Dr. Hamel acquired a treasured asset. A circle of acquaintances whose relationships would benefit him greatly as he transitioned into his new position as the Director of the Roanoke Technical Institute. During interviews with Dr. Hamel he reminded me on several occasions “you get things done by, through and because of people” (personal communication, April 25, 2013). This perspective is not to say Dr. Hamel viewed his colleagues as a means to an end. Rather, it points out the way that collaborative relationships increased the social network of individuals interested in establishing and supporting vocational education in Virginia. Goman (2014) points out the need to focus on people over technology. Many businesses today establish elaborate technological networks to help employees stay connected (Goman, 2014). Unfortunately, technology can have the opposite effect by alienating people by preventing real-time collaboration (Morgan, 2013). Leaders cannot expect to be successful without the help of others. Dr. Hamel’s circle of acquaintances proved to be very beneficial to his career and ultimately to the state of Virginia. Some of Hamel’s acquaintances included within their respective circles of influence, the Governor of Virginia.
Governor Harrison’s decision to take Joseph Hamrick and William McFarlane’s recommendation to hire Hamel for the position of Director was monumental and has proved to have been not only wise, but of critical importance to the shaping of Virginia’s higher education. The creation of the technical and subsequent community college systems changed the face of Virginia higher education by creating a pathway to post-secondary education for Virginians, especially those living in remote rural areas, which previously had been without access to any post-secondary education.

Social and Economic Influences

To understand the challenge facing Dr. Hamel and the Board for Technical Education the following statistics give perspective to what life was like in Virginia at that time. Of the overall population of Virginia, in 1959, 30.6% lived in poverty (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). In 1960, the population of Virginia was 3,866,949 with approximately half the population, 1,946,323 living outside of metropolitan areas (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). This meant there was a high concentration of people living in the Richmond, Hampton Roads, or Northern Virginia areas, leaving a large portion of Virginia sparsely populated. Demographically, 3,142,443 (79.2%) were white compared to 816,258 (20.6%) who were black (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). The black population in Virginia equaled the average of all the Southern states; 20.6% (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015). Educationally in Virginia, 43% of whites and 16% of blacks held high school diplomas, but only 9.6% of whites and 3.2% of blacks held bachelor’s degrees (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). The Virginia of the early 1960s was predominantly rural, white, and undereducated.
A person growing up in Virginia in the late 1950s and early 1960s had a limited ability to increase their social or cultural capital. In 1959, 30.6% of all Virginian’s lived in poverty; the national average was 22.1% (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). By 1969, Virginia’s poverty levels had improved to 15.5%, yet still higher than the national average of 12.4% (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). The way out of the poverty of this time period would be through education and mobility.

One of the advantages an education affords a person is the ability to meet and get to know people from other walks of life. To meet people whose backgrounds and origins are different from that in which they were raised. The social mobility required to gain an education is not always available, and the lack of the ability to acquire educational capital can limit a person from acquiring other forms of capital. Social scientist Pierre Bourdieu’s (1984) groundbreaking work regarding Habitus encompasses mobility and capital. Habitus, according to Bourdieu (1984), is a set of practices, judgments and relationships one acquires as a result of their economic, educational and social upbringing. As a result of the environment, a person will either acquire, or fail to acquire, cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1984). It was the cultural capital acquired by Dana Hamel and members of the Board for Technical Education that enabled them to positively influence politicians and communities to create the Virginia Technical and subsequent Community College Systems.

Virginia of the late 1950s and early 1960s was a place where approximately half its population lived in rural surroundings, and almost a third of the population lived in poverty. Virginia was a state divided socially as well as economically and racially, while at the same time Virginia was on the cusp of an industrial renaissance. A key component
to the success of a revitalized industrial community was the creation of a statewide system of technical education (“VA Technical Education System Urged,” 1963).

Massive Resistance had polarized Virginia as a whole, but it had also galvanized the business community. With the conclusion to Massive Resistance at hand, attention was turned toward expansion of industry. Because of the damage inflicted by Massive Resistance, there could be no industrial expansion without a system in place to train the Virginia labor force. The universities of the state were very good, but not suited for the rapid training required to put Virginia industry back on its feet; technical institutes were few. This need led to the creation of the VTCS. In creating the VCTS, the state created a pathway for many of its rural citizens to acquire cultural capital they were previously unable to obtain. Education gained through the VTCS afforded Virginia’s residents the ability to increase their cultural capital beyond their traditional surroundings.

**The Virginia Community College System Today—Implications**

The VTCS was founded as a means of preparing a well-trained and educated work force to aid in the revitalization of Virginia industry. In doing so, the VTCS provided unprecedented access to post-secondary education. In 2016, the VCCS is celebrating 50 years of service to the people of the Commonwealth of Virginia. Indeed, this year marks the anniversary of the start of the Virginia Community College System, but in its celebrations, the initial founding of the VTCS is not acknowledged. This oversight is unfortunate for the roots of the current VCCS are firmly planted in the founding of the VTCS in 1964 with the passing of legislation by the Virginia Assembly. Two years later, in 1966, additional legislation was passed authorizing the creation of the VCCS. On February 15, 1966 the Board for Technical Education formally adopted a
resolution announcing its support for a system of comprehensive community colleges (State Board for Technical Education, 1966a). On July 1, 1966 all colleges under the auspices of the Department of Technical Education, and Board for Technical Education were transferred to the Department of Community Colleges and the State Board for Community Colleges (State Board for Technical Education, 1966b). The membership of the new Department and Board changed very little from the Technical College Department and Board. Eugene Sydnor retained leadership of the new Board and Dr. Hamel transitioned as Director of the Department of Community Colleges.

The beginning of the VCCS as a series of technical colleges was a result of a highly successful private-public partnership engineered by Dr. Dana Hamel and Governor Albertis Harrison intent on serving the public good. Through this private-public partnership, industry also stood to gain. The interests of both the industrial community and the State intersected. The intersection of business and higher education is not unusual, especially in the community college arena. In my research, I have not been able to locate no other case where business and industry played such a major role in the creation of an entire statewide system of higher education.

Community colleges today face similar issues as those faced in the early 1960s. Virginia is still searching for solutions to remedy unemployment and job preparedness, making the continued relationship of business and higher education of paramount importance. The current VCCS Chancellor, Dr. Glenn Dubois, often addresses the skills gap, which is the divide between the skills employers need and those applicants possess (Moss, 2016). As with a half-century earlier, the answers to solving the skills gap could be found in community colleges and the relationships they have with business and
industry. In August of 2014, Virginia’s Governor Terry McAuliffe announced a new jobs initiative aimed at credentialing workers to fill jobs that do not require a bachelor’s degree (Kapsidelis, 2014). The announcement was made during the annual VCCS Chancellor’s Retreat in Richmond to a crowd that included the Presidents of all 23 community colleges in Virginia. Governor McAuliffe called for an increase from the current 38,000 credentials annually awarded in the state, to almost 120,000 (Kapsidelis, 2014). The Governor said the State’s community colleges would play a vital role in accomplishing the goal of increasing a well-trained, job ready labor force (Kapsidelis, 2014).

United States President, Barack Obama, also sees community colleges as a path to success. In 2015, President Obama announced an initiative to make community college education free to qualified students (Smith, 2015). The idea of free community college tuition would provide the chance for students to attain a workforce or transfer credential, tuition free (Smith, 2015). If President Obama’s vision is realized, it would provide unprecedented access to college and reshape the landscape of higher education.

With more attention being given to community colleges, there is a push to hold community colleges more accountable for the success of their students. One of the problems in measuring success in a community college environment is finding a reliable metric. In the pursuit of the proper metric, there does not seem to be any correct answers. Four-year universities can rely on graduation data, whereas graduation data fails to tell the full story in a community college. For example, Northern Virginia Community College has possibly the highest enrollment in the United States, but its graduation rate is only 26% (U. S. Department of Education, 2016). Another approach has been the
number of students receiving a credential (degree, certification, etc.). This can be tricky, because not all certifications are created equal. Some take months to complete while others may be obtained in a few weeks. Similar to the early 1960s, Virginia’s political leaders have recognized a need for a well-trained and educated labor force to meet the demands of industry. The early 1960s founding of the VTCS was helped considerably by the presence of the Virginia Industrialization Group. The business and industrial community continues to be a vital partner with Virginia’s community colleges.

**Future Research**

The study of the factors that led to the creation of the Virginia Technical College System revealed a complex series of causes and effects. The 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* ruling set into motion the creation of Massive Resistance laws by Virginia’s political establishment, culminating in the closure of public schools throughout the State. The crippling of the public education system in Virginia damaged the State’s reputation nationally and caused hesitation from business and industry to locate in Virginia. As a result of a stagnating business environment, a number of Virginia business and industry leaders gathered to form the Virginia Industrialization Group. This Group played a role in the demise of Massive Resistance. As Massive Resistance was ending, the Virginia Industrialization Group, in concert with the office of the Governor, began promoting the need for increased industrialization throughout the state. This increase would require an educated labor force, which meant an investment would need to be made in the creation of a series of technical colleges.

In spite of their important role, little research has been conducted concerning the Virginia Industrialization Group. This lack of knowledge could be the result of the
Group’s desire to “operate in the background” (Saunders, 1980, Forward). The Group’s influence into the creation of the Virginia Division of Industrial Development could be fascinating and important to study in order to understand better the relationship of business and higher education in Virginia. Their influence into the creation of the Virginia Technical and subsequent Community College Systems is undeniable and merits further investigation.

An examination is also needed into the Governorship of Lindsay Almond. Almond is viewed historically as a staunch supporter of Massive Resistance; which he was. He also demonstrated extraordinary courage and judgment in finally denouncing Massive Resistance. His denouncement came at a great political cost. To preserve public education in Virginia meant Almond would defy Virginia’s political patriarch, Harry Byrd. Knowing the political consequences that would await him, how Almond came to his decision of defiance would be an interesting study in leadership in a Contested Environment.

Following Almond as Governor was Albertis Harrison. Harrison demonstrated extraordinary judgment and leadership in guiding Virginia’s government during those politically sensitive years of the early 1960s. Harrison’s vision and judgment were crucial in the creation of the VTCS and VCCS. A study regarding Governor Harrison’s leadership and impact on the state of Virginia would be insightful.

One of the most important people in the creation of the Virginia Technical College System was Dr. Dana B. Hamel. I can say without hesitation, that it was his leadership and vision that led to the modern VCCS. After the technical college system became a system of comprehensive community colleges in 1966, Dr. Hamel continued as
the inaugural Chancellor of the VCCS until his retirement in 1979. After Hamel’s work with the VCCS, he cofounded the Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility (commonly known as Jefferson Labs) in Newport News, Virginia. A complete biography of Dr. Hamel’s life and work would be of great interest and importance. His insatiable curiosity and excitement for new knowledge are an inspiration to us all.

**Conclusion**

In studying the history of the VTCS I found connections I really did not expect to find. Dr. Hamel had repeatedly told me to be cognizant of Massive Resistance, but I was not aware of the impact it had on the creation of the technical colleges until I conducted my research. In following Dr. Hamel’s advice, I found myself working within a timeline beginning with the *Brown v. Board of Education* rulings and culminating with the founding of the technical colleges. In between those events is a history of damage caused by the passing and implementation of Massive Resistance laws in Virginia creating a cause and effect scenario. These laws created a toxic climate for business and industry and set the stage for the creation of the Virginia Industrialization Group, which influenced the ending of Massive Resistance and the starting of the technical system.

This Group was initially unknown to me, and quite frankly I stumbled across a reference to them in an article. That reference ultimately led me to pursue information on the Virginia Industrialization Group located within the Lewis Powell archives at the Law School of Washington and Lee University. In comparing the papers found in the archive with the meeting minutes from the Board for Technical Education I had received from Dr. Hamel, I found links within the membership of the two groups (see Appendix E). These links made clear the interest Virginia business and industry had in the creation of
the technical colleges. These colleges would prove vital to Virginia being able to regain its standing in the nation and move its people toward a more prosperous future.

The opening of the technical colleges was a long time in the making. It took the oppressive climate of Massive Resistance to signal the urgent need for reforms that, in the end, led to an excellent example of a private-public partnership between business and higher education that truly worked and continues to work today on behalf of the people of Virginia.
Appendix A

No record of the exact membership of the Virginia Industrialization Group exists. Below is the original mailing list of those invited to attend the initial meeting held on December 18, 1958 at the Jefferson Hotel’s Rotunda Club in Richmond. The list is taken from the unpublished history of the Virginia Industrialization Group compiled in 1980 by the group’s former president, Stuart Saunders (Saunders, 1980).
Foreword

I wish to acknowledge the significant contributions to this paper of J. Harvie Wilkinson, Jr., Richard C. Holquist, Edwin C. Hela of the Virginia Division of Industrial Development, the Library of Richmond Times Dispatch, and the Richmond Public Library in making this saga possible.

This is not intended to be a literary document, but merely a brief record of certain factual occurrences. I express only my own views and not necessarily those of the contributors or anyone else.

The Genesis of the Virginia Industrialization Group

In the late 1950's, Virginia was experiencing severe competition in economic development from many sections of the country, especially from southeastern states. Virginia's industrial leaders were acutely aware of this. In response to this growing challenge, Harvie Wilkinson and I decided in mid-1959 to organize a group known as the Virginia Industrialization Group (hereinafter referred to as the Group). We received an enthusiastic response to the idea from the business, financial, and newspaper community in practically all sections of the Commonwealth. The Group was to operate in the background and had no desire for any personal aggrandizement. Its sole purpose was to promote a favorable climate for industrial development in Virginia. We knew that we had a great product, but we believed that its potential had not been realized.

To give some indication of the depth and scope of the involvement of Virginia business and professional leaders in the Group, its members were:

Dr. Charles C. Abbott, Dean
University of Virginia
Graduate School of Business
Charlottesville, Virginia

Mr. Howard W. Aberg, Manager
Sears, Roebuck & Company
Arlington, Virginia

Mr. John A. Allfriend
Chairman, Executive Committee
Virginia National Bank
Norfolk, Virginia

Mr. Philip P. Allen, President
Lynchburg Broadcasting Corp.
Lynchburg, Virginia

Mr. M. W. Armistead, President
Times-World Corp.
Roanoke, Virginia

Mr. Frank Armstrong, President
National Fruit Product Co.
Winchester, Virginia
Mr. Frank Batten, Publisher
Norfolk-Portsmouth News, Inc.
Norfolk, Virginia

Mr. R. N. Beglen, Jr.
Regional Manager
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co.
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. Samuel H. Beniss
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. W. E. Betts, Jr., President
Montague Betts Co.
Lynchburg, Virginia

Mr. Samuel J. Bonacich
Vice President
Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co.
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. Leonard S. Bradley, President
Consumers Company of Lynchburg
Lynchburg, Virginia

Mr. D. Tennant Bryan
President & Publisher
Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. J. L. Camp, Jr.
Chairman, Executive Committee
Union Bag-Camp Paper Corp.
Franklin, Virginia

Mr. Harry DeButts
Upperville, Virginia

Mr. David H. Dillard
Old Dominion Box Co., Inc.
Lynchburg, Virginia

Mr. James D. Christian
N. B. Handy Co.
Lynchburg, Virginia

Mr. Alan S. Donnahoe
Executive Vice President
Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. K. B. Douglass
Chairman of Board
Smith-Douglass Co., Inc.
Norfolk, Virginia

Mr. W. W. Doyle, Jr.
Doyle's Florist, Inc.
Lynchburg, Virginia

Mr. Richard C. Edmonds
President
Edmonds Lumber Co., Inc.
South Boston, Virginia

Mr. John W. Ferguson
President
First Federal Savings & Loan
Lynchburg, Virginia

Mr. C. L. Furr, Vice President
Appalachian Electric Power Co.
Roanoke, Virginia

Mr. James H. Gillam, Jr.
Chairman of Trust Committee
First National Trust & Savings Bank
Lynchburg, Virginia

Mr. Francis K. Godwin, President
Petersburg & Hopewell Gas Co.
Petersburg, Virginia

Dr. K. P. Gifford
General Manager
General Electric Co.
Lynchburg, Virginia

Mr. E. H. Graves, Plant Manager
Continental Can Co.
Hopewell, Virginia

Mr. John W. Hancock, Jr.
President
Roanoke Electric Steel Corp.
Roanoke, Virginia

Mr. W. Wright Harrison, President
Virginia National Bank
Charlottesville, Virginia
Mr. R. Braxton Hill, Jr.
Waller & Woodhouse, C. P. A.
Norfolk, Virginia

Mr. Henry Clay Hofheimer, II
Southern Materials Co., Inc.
Norfolk, Virginia

Mr. L. D. Horner, Jr.
Senior Vice President
First & Merchants National Bank
Lynchburg, Virginia

Mr. Carlisle H. Humelsine
President
Colonial Williamsburg, Inc.
Williamsburg, Virginia

Mr. Phil N. Hunter
Northern Virginia Power Co.
Winchester, Virginia

Mr. Edwin Hyde, President
Miller and Rhoads, Inc.
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. A. G. Jefferson, President
A. G. Jefferson Company
Lynchburg, Virginia

Mr. Don L. Jordan, President
Johnson-Carper Furniture Co.
Roanoke, Virginia

Mr. Charles L. Kaufman
Attorney at Law
Norfolk, Virginia

Mr. John S. Lanahan, President
Richmond Hotels, Inc.
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. H. G. Leggett, President
Leggett's Department Store, Inc.
Lynchburg, Virginia

Mr. S. S. Liles, Jr., President
Tidewater Construction Corp.
Norfolk, Virginia

Mr. Robert S. Lockbridge
President
Craddock-Terry Shoe Corp.
Lynchburg, Virginia

Dr. Harvey Kagiyan
Assistant to Vice President
Fibers Division
Allied Chemical Corp.
Hopewell, Virginia

Mr. Robert P. Marsh, Jr.
Chairman of Board
First & Merchants National Bank
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. James T. Mathews, Manager
Sears, Roebuck & Co.
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. C. A. Maynard, Manager
Lynchburg Division
The Mead Corporation
Lynchburg, Virginia

Mr. W. H. McDowell, Jr.
President
Virginia Electric & Power Co.
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. Henry Z. McWane, President
Lynchburg Foundry Co.
Lynchburg, Virginia

Mr. A. H. Miller, President
Basic Construction Co.
Newport News, Virginia

Mr. Herbert C. Moseley, President
The Bank of Virginia
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. Lloyd U. Roland, Jr.
Chairman of Board
Roland Company, Inc.
Newport News, Virginia

Mr. Sture G. Olsson, President
Chesapeake Corp. of Virginia
West Point, Virginia

Mr. A. H. Ould, President
First National Exchange Bank
Roanoke, Virginia

Mr. John C. Parrott, President
Roanoke Gas Company
Roanoke, Virginia
Mr. William S. Patterson  
Vice President  
Patterson Drug Company  
Lynchburg, Virginia

Mr. Lewis F. Powell, Jr.  
Attorney at Law  
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. Hamilton M. Redman  
Vice President, Finance  
Norfolk & Western Railway Co.  
Roanoke, Virginia

Mr. David P. Reynolds  
Executive Vice President  
Reynolds Metals Company  
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. Webster S. Rhoads, Jr.  
Chairman of Board  
Killer and Rhoads, Inc.  
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. W. Thomas Rice, President  
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co.  
Jacksonville, Florida

Mr. Elias Richards, Jr.  
President  
Fidelity National Bank  
Lynchburg, Virginia

Mr. K. H. Richardson, Jr.  
President  
Hall-Hodges Company, Inc.  
Norfolk, Virginia

Mr. Robert L. Riggs  
Plant Manager, Nitrogen Division  
Allied Chemical Corp.  
Hopewell, Virginia

Mr. John W. Roberts, President  
Solite Corporation  
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. E. Claiborne Robins  
President  
A. H. Robins Company, Inc.  
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. Clarence J. Robinson  
President  
Robinson Terminal Warehouse Corp.  
Alexandria, Virginia

Dr. Paul D. Sanders, Editor  
The Southern Planter  
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. Stuart T. Saunders  
President  
Norfolk & Western Railway Co.  
Roanoke, Virginia

Mr. Abe Schewel  
Schewel Furniture Co.  
Lynchburg, Virginia

Mr. W. Harry Schwarzschild  
President  
Central National Bank  
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. Stuart Shumate, President  
Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad Co.  
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. Eugene H. Sydnor, Jr.  
President  
Southern Department Stores, Inc.  
Petersburg, Virginia

Mr. Frank Talbott, Jr.  
Chairman of Board & General Counsel  
Dan River Mills, Inc.  
Danville, Virginia

Mr. Charles A. Taylor, President  
Life Insurance Company of Virginia  
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. William B. Thalhimer, Jr.  
President  
Thalhimers, Inc.  
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. Henry K. Thomas  
Administrative Vice President  
Shenandoah Life Insurance Co.  
Roanoke, Virginia
Mr. Moses G. Todd  
Todd Electric Company  
Norfolk, Virginia

Mr. William H. Trapnell  
President  
Commonwealth Natural Gas Corp.  
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. H. W. Tulloch, Manager - Relations  
Specialty Control Department  
General Electric Company  
Waynesboro, Virginia

Mr. J. Hoge Tyler III  
President  
Seaboard Citizens National Bank  
Norfolk, Virginia

Mr. William Vaughan  
Vaughan Chevrolet & Cadillac, Inc.  
Lynchburg, Virginia

Mr. Edward A. Wayne, President  
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond  
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. Monroe Wells, Vice President  
Reynolds Metals Company  
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. J. Harvie Wilkinson, Jr.  
Chairman of Board  
State-Planters Bank of Commerce & Trusts  
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. Erwin H. Will  
Chairman of Board  
Virginia Electric Power Co.  
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. W. W. Winfree, President  
Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co.  
Lynchburg, Virginia

Mr. Floyd L. Wiseman, Manager  
Lynchburg Works  
H. K. Porter Company  
Lynchburg, Virginia

Mr. W. F. Woodley, President  
Columbian Peanut Co.  
Norfolk, Virginia

Mr. John B. Woodward, Jr.  
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Company  
Newport News, Virginia
Appendix B

The Association of Virginia Colleges, in February of 1918, adopted the following criteria for what defined a junior college (McDowell, 1919, p. 90):

1. It should require not less than 14 units for entrance to its college department.
2. College methods and college texts should be used in its college department.
3. The preparatory department must be approved by proper accrediting agencies.
4. The course of study in the college must be two years in length, and for graduation 60 semester hours of work required.
5. Students shall not carry for credit, work amounting to more than 16 hours per week, except to remove conditions.
6. It should maintain at least five departments with a specialist at the head of each.
7. All college teachers should have the bachelor's degree from a college of high grade, and it is desirable that each should have the equivalent of a year's study in his special line.
8. No teacher shall be required to do more than 20 hours' classroom work per week.
9. There must be a laboratory for teaching science, adequately equipped for individual work upon the part of students. Minimum suggested: Chemistry, $1,500; biology, $1,500; physics, $2,000.
10. There must be adequate library equipment. Suggestion, 2,000 volumes.
11. The number of college students should be not less than 10 per cent of the total attendance of regular academic students, and in no case fewer than 20.
12. As far as practicable the college students should be segregated from the preparatory students.

13. It shall confer no degrees.
Appendix C

IRB Communication Granting Consent to Interview Dr. Dana B. Hamel

Status of protocol EDIRC-2013-03-23-8631-rahodges set to active

Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 9:09 AM
compli@wm.edu <compli@wm.edu>

To: peddy@wm.edu, rahodges@email.wm.edu, edirc-l@wm.edu
Cc: peddy@wm.edu

This is to notify you on behalf of the Education Internal Review Committee (EDIRC) that protocol EDIRC-2013-03-23-8631-rahodges titled Field study - Interview of Dr. Dana Hamel has been EXEMPTED from formal review because it falls under the following category(ies) defined by DHHS Federal Regulations: 45CFR46.101 b.2.

Work on this protocol may begin on 2013-04-25 and must be discontinued on 2014-04-25.

Should there be any changes to this protocol, please submit these changes to the committee for determination of continuing exemption using the Protocol and Compliance Management application (https://compliance.wm.edu).

Please add the following statement to the footer of all consent forms, cover letters, etc.:

THIS PROJECT WAS FOUND TO COMPLY WITH APPROPRIATE ETHICAL STANDARDS AND WAS EXEMPTED FROM THE NEED FOR FORMAL REVIEW BY THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS COMMITTEE (Phone 757-221-3969) ON 2013-04-25 AND EXPIRES ON 2014-04-25.

You are required to notify Dr. Ward, chair of the EDIRC, at 757-221-2358 (EDIRC-L@wm.edu) and Dr. Kirkpatrick, Chair of the PHSIC at 757-221-3997 (phsic-chair@wm.edu) if any issues arise during this study.

Good luck with your study.

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COMMENTS
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No comments available

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BASIC INFO
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Title: Field study - Interview of Dr. Dana Hamel
Start Date: 2013-04-25
Year Number: 1
Years Total: 1
Campus: Main
Committee(s): EDIRC
Cc: Emails: peddy@wm.edu
Appendix D

Interview Dates with Dr. Dana B. Hamel

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<td>Telephone follow-up interview.</td>
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Sample questions used during the interviews:

1. I know you were born in Maine. Tell me about what brought you to Virginia?
2. What was your role in the legislative process?
3. Tell me about the members of the Technical College Board.
4. Governor Harrison mentioned [in letter] someone named Gene Sydnor. Who was Gene Sydnor?
5. You mentioned the “Slaughter Commission Report.” Were you referring to Delegate French Slaughter? Please discuss the report… what you recall?
6. In “No Higher Honor” [book] Governor Godwin refers to a study by a group of consultants to help determine placement of the colleges. What can you tell me about this study?
7. Please tell me about getting all the colleges accredited.
8. Please discuss your relationship with SCHEV as the VCCS was getting started.
9. Were articulation agreements first established by the Technical College Board?
10. As a leader how did you deal with those who were not in favor of the creation of the community college system?
11. How did you go about making decisions, especially those concerning allocation of funds?
12. According to the June 1965 minutes, the community colleges were first proposed as “22 technical colleges.” What can you tell me about this?
13. Do you recall if or how the Manpower Act of 1962 affected the development of the technical colleges?
14. Please describe your relationship with Harry Byrd Jr. Did you ever work with his father?
15. The October 1965 minutes discussed the renaming of the Technical College Board to the “Board of Community Colleges and Technical Education.” How significant was this?
Appendix E

Below is a list of those who accepted invitations to attend the Virginia Industrialization Group’s inaugural dinner meeting. Even though the document indicates the dinner was held on December 10 at the Commonwealth Club, the dinner was actually held on December 19, 1958 at the Rotunda Room of the Jefferson Hotel in Richmond, Virginia (Winberg, 1958)
The following are expected to be present for dinner at the Commonwealth Club at 6:30 P.M., December 10, 1936

Mr. John S. Alfriend, President
National Bank of Commerce
Norfolk, Virginia

Mr. M. W. Armstead, III, President
Times World Corporation
Roanoke, Virginia

Mr. Frank Batten, Publisher
Norfolk-Fortsmouth News, Inc.
Norfolk, Virginia

Mr. Samuel M. Bemiss
P. O. Box 1156
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. William E. Blewett, Jr., President
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock
Newport News, Virginia

Mr. James L. Camp, Jr., Vice-Chairman of the Board
Union Bag & Camp Paper Corporation
Franklin, Virginia

Mr. Walter L. Dolbere
Vice-President
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. Alan S. Donohoe
Vice-President and Director of Research
Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. Guy L. Furt, Vice-President
Appalachian Power Company
40 Franklin Road, S.W.
Roanoke, Virginia

Mr. James R. Gilliam, Jr.
Chairman of the Board
First National Trust & Savings Bank
Lynchburg, Virginia

Mr. Powell -
Attached is the only list I have.

I believe that Mr. Saunders did the inviting for the dinner meeting on the 19th of December.

Mrs. Winberg
Mr. Henry Clay Hofheimer, II
Chairman of the Board
Southern Materials Company, Inc.
Norfolk, Virginia

Mr. Robert T. Marsh, Jr., President
First & Merchants National Bank
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. Henry E. McKeen, President
Lynchburg Foundry Company
Lynchburg, Virginia

Mr. J. Rhodes Mitchell, Vice-President
C & P Telephone Company
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. E. H. Ould, President
First National Exchange Bank
Roanoke, Virginia

Mr. Lewis P. Powell, Jr.
Attorney at Law
Electric Building
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. Webster S. Rhoads, Chairman of the Board
Miller and Rhoads, Inc.
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. Robert L. Riggs, Plant Manager
Nitrogen Division
Allied Chemical Corporation
Hopewell, Virginia

Mr. Stuart T. Saunders, President
Norfolk and Western Railway Company
Roanoke, Virginia

Mr. John W. Smith, President
Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company
3600 West Broad Street
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., President
Southern Department Stores
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. J. Harvie Wilkinson, Jr., President
State-Planters Bank of Commerce & Trusts
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. John B. Woodward, Jr., Chairman of the Board
Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company
Newport News, Virginia
The following were invited but could not attend dinner at the Commonwealth Club at 6:30 P.M. December 10, 1928

Mr. Frank Armstrong, President
National Fruit Product Company, Inc.
Winchester, Virginia

Mr. R. E. Douglass
Chairman of the Board
Smith-Douglass Company, Inc.
Norfolk, Virginia

Mr. W. J. Erwin, President
Dan River Mills, Inc.
Danville, Virginia

Mr. Henry Clay Hofheimer, II
Chairman of the Board
Southern Materials Company, Inc.
Norfolk, Virginia

Mr. R. H. Hughes, President
Clinchfield Coal Company
Danville, Virginia

Mr. Bertram W. Mahoney
General Manager
Industry Control Division
General Electric Company
Roanoke, Virginia

Mr. A. H. McDowell, President
Virginia Electric and Power Company
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. Louis Reynolds
Vice-President
Reynolds Metals Company
6601 West Broad Street
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. Frank Talbott, Jr.
Chairman of the Board
Dan River Mills
Danville, Virginia

Mr. Edward A. Wayne
First Vice-President
Federal Reserve Bank
Richmond, Virginia

Mr. N. L. Whitescotton
Regional Vice-President
General Electric Company
3 Penn Center Plaza
Philadelphia 2, Pennsylvania

Mr. E. H. Will
Chairman of the Board
Virginia Electric & Power Co.
Seventh and Franklin Streets
Richmond, Virginia
Appendix F

Members of the Virginia Industrialization Group who were either a member of the Board of Technical Education, or were regular attendees.

Sydnor, Eugene (VIG, BTE) Chairman of Board for Technical Education
Blackburn, Joseph E. (BTE)
Elmore, Harry R. (BTE)
Hamrick, Joseph (VIG, Governor’s Office)
Holmquist, Richard (VIG, Governor’s Office)
Kanto, William P. (BTE)
Liles, S. E. (VIG, BTE)
Peebles, C. Wesley (BTE)
Simmonds, James H. (BTE)
Tulloch, Henry (BTE, VIG)
Willis, Gordon C. (BTE)

*BTE = Board for Technical Education *VIG = Virginia Industrialization Board
References


Allied's Prossen will speak at conference. (1964, February 13). Progress-Index, p. 15.


Mississippi Department of Archives and History. (2015). The community and junior college system in Mississippi: A brief history of its origin and development.


National Vocational Education Act of 1917, S.S. 703, 64th Cong.


doi:10.1111/j.1467-954x.1981.tb03021.x


*Report to the Governor and the General Assembly of Virginia.* Richmond, VA: Commonwealth of Virginia Division of Purchase and Print.


Virginia needs to create 400,000 jobs in decade. (1962, June 12). *Danville Register*, p. 11.


Virginia's basic industry growth slow, says official. (1962, August 24). *Danville Register*, p. 11.


Vitae

Richard Allen Hodges

Education


University of Mississippi, Oxford, MS: (MM) Master of Music (1985)

Wichita State University, Wichita, KS: (BM) Bachelor of Music (1981)

Employment

Interim Provost – Historic Triangle Campus

Thomas Nelson Community College, Hampton, Virginia (July 2012 – present)
Director of Learning Resources

Thomas Nelson Community College, Hampton, Virginia (February 2011 – present)
Adjunct Instructor of Music

Head Librarian, Historic Triangle Campus – Williamsburg

Bucks County Community College, Newtown, Pennsylvania (January 2008 – August 2010) Reference/Instructional Librarian


Youth Orchestra of Central Jersey, Plainsboro, New Jersey (1996-2014) Grants Writer and Webmaster

Lower Providence Community Library, Eagleville, Pennsylvania (June 2005 – Feb. 2006) Head of Support Services:


Instructor of Music/Artist Teacher

Itawamba Community College, Fulton, Mississippi (1985-1987) Instructor of Woodwinds/Assistant Director of Bands

Grants

Church & Dwight Employee Giving Fund Grant – 2014: Funds used to support the Youth Orchestra of Central Jersey’s educational mission and initiatives by providing support for general operations.

Mercer County Cultural and Heritage Commission – 2014: Funds used to support the Youth Orchestra of Central Jersey’s educational mission and initiatives by providing support for general operations.

Church & Dwight Employee Giving Fund Grant – 2013: Funds used to support the Youth Orchestra of Central Jersey’s educational mission and initiatives by providing support for general operations.

Mercer County Cultural and Heritage Commission – 2013: Funds used to support the Youth Orchestra of Central Jersey’s educational mission and initiatives by providing support for general operations.

Church & Dwight Employee Giving Fund Grant – 2012: Funds used to support the Youth Orchestra of Central Jersey’s educational mission and initiatives by providing support for general operations.

Thomas Nelson Community College Educational Foundation Technology Grant – 2012: Funds used to purchase ten Amazon Kindle Fire tablet computers for the teaching of Information Literacy Library Instruction at the Historic Triangle campus. If the pilot program is successful we will devise a way to expand the program to include students on the Hampton campus.

Church & Dwight Employee Giving Fund Grant – 2012: Funds used to support the Youth Orchestra of Central Jersey’s educational mission and initiatives by providing support for general operations.

Mercer County Cultural and Heritage Commission – 2012: Funds used to support the Youth Orchestra of Central Jersey’s educational mission and initiatives by providing support for general operations.

Wal-Mart Community Grant – 2011: Funds enabled the Youth Orchestra of Central Jersey to provide funding for general operating costs.
Thomas Nelson Community College Educational Foundation Technology Grant – 2011: (co-author) Funds used to purchase two computer assistive workstations for blind or visually impaired students who attend the Historic Triangle Campus in Williamsburg, Virginia.

Mercer County Cultural and Heritage Commission – 2011: Funds enabled the Youth Orchestra of Central Jersey to purchase needed instruments including piccolos, clarinets in A and various percussion instruments.

Church & Dwight Employee Giving Fund Grant – 2009: Funds used to support a series of concerts at the Nicholas Music Center at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, NJ

Mercer County Cultural and Heritage Commission – 2010: Funds enabled the Youth Orchestra of Central Jersey to change its current concert venue from its current home at West Windsor-Plainsboro High School North to the Richardson Auditorium located on the campus of Princeton University.

Mercer County Cultural and Heritage Commission – 2009: Funds provided for the day-to-day operations of the Youth Orchestra of Central Jersey

Mercer County Cultural and Heritage Commission – 2008: Funds provided for the day-to-day operations of the Youth Orchestra of Central Jersey

Mercer County Cultural and Heritage Commission – 2007: Funds provided for the day-to-day operations of the Youth Orchestra of Central Jersey

Church & Dwight Employee Giving Fund Grant – 2007: Funds used to commission a new composition for the Youth Orchestra of Central Jersey’s senior orchestra premiered at the Richardson Auditorium on the campus of Princeton University

Church & Dwight Employee Giving Fund Grant – 2006: First grant ever received by the Youth Orchestra of Central Jersey. Funds enabled the organizations three string orchestra, two symphonic orchestras and saxophone choir to perform in Ocean City, New Jersey in the spring of 2007

Louisiana State University Graduate School Travel Grant – 2004: Awarded to offset the cost of travel to the Southeast Music Library Association meeting held at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia to present the paper “To Have and Have Not: Copyrights and the Downloading of Music”

Southeast Music Library Association Travel Grant – 2003: Only person to receive this award in 2003. Designed to enable a person with recognized potential in music librarianship to attend the conference held at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill
Conference Presentations, Major Performances, Awards and recordings


“Gala Concert” – Performance as saxophonist of the Windsor Trio, presented to inaugurate Thomas Nelson Community College’s first Steinway grand piano, Hampton, VA (2012)

“Information Literacy: Using Technology to Develop Successful Research Strategies” – Presented at the Virginia Community College Association, Williamsburg, VA (2011)

“Information Literacy: Using Technology to Develop Successful Research Strategies” – Presented at the VCCS New Horizons Conference, Roanoke, VA (2011)

“The Art of the Search” – Presentation at the Faculty of the Future Conference held at Bucks County Community College, Newtown, PA (2010)

“2009 Outstanding Part-time Librarian of the Year” – Bucks County Community College, Newtown, PA

“Copyright on Campus” – Libguide created September concerning copyright and academia, Bucks County Community College (2009)

“Copyrights on Campus” – Poster presentation at Bucks County Community College Annual Technology Day in Newtown, PA (2009)

“Copyrights on Campus” – Poster presentation at the Pennsylvania Library Association Annual Meeting held at Valley Forge, PA (2008)


Performance of “Pulse 72 +-“of Ryo Noda – Northeast regional meeting of the North American Saxophone Alliance, Penn State University (2007)

“To Have and Have Not: Copyrights and the downloading of music” A paper presented at the 34th annual conference of the Southeast Music Library Association at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia (2004)


“The History of the Saxophone at the Paris Conservatory” A lecture-recital presented at the meeting of the southern chapter of the College Music Society in Munich, Germany (1992)