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Self-policing in a Targeted Enforcement Regime
Stafford, Sarah L.
Stafford, Sarah L.
Abstract
This paper adds to the debate over whether self-policing can increase environmental protection by considering an issue that has been ignored in previous models—that self-policing may influence future enforcement. The model combines self-policing with targeted enforcement and allows for both deliberate and inadvertent violations. As expected, rewarding self-policers with more lenient future enforcement increases auditing, remediation, and disclosure of inadvertent violations. Self-policing can also serve as a complement to deliberate compliance and can thus further increase environmental performance. However, under reasonable conditions, self-policing can be a substitute for deliberate compliance and could therefore be detrimental to environmental protection.
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2008-04-01
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Economics
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.2008.tb00874.x