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A Survey of Social Choice Failures: Majority and Borda Rules

Merrill, Lauren Nicole
Abstract
A social welfare rule g selects a complete asymmetric binary relation on a set of alternatives A as a function of voter preferences over A. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem show that all social welfare rules fail to satisfy a small number of seemingly innocuous properties when voter preferences are unrestricted. In this paper, we propose several techniques for quantifying the degree of these failures for simple majority rule and Borda's rule. In addition, we develop a matricial framework for analyzing social welfare rules. We believe that the tools and methods proposed have significant potential in future analysis.
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Thesis is part of Honors ETD pilot project, 2008-2013. Migrated from Dspace in 2016.
Date
2008-05-01
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Undergraduate Honors Theses
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MerrillLauren2008_2.pdf
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Advisor
Johnson, Charles R.
Campbell, Donald E.
Leemis, Lawrence M.
Department
Mathematics
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https://scholarworks.wm.edu/handle/internal/12538
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