Date Thesis Awarded


Access Type

Honors Thesis -- Access Restricted On-Campus Only

Degree Name

Bachelors of Science (BS)




Charles R. Johnson

Committee Members

Donald E. Campbell

Lawrence M. Leemis


A social welfare rule g selects a complete asymmetric binary relation on a set of alternatives A as a function of voter preferences over A. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem show that all social welfare rules fail to satisfy a small number of seemingly innocuous properties when voter preferences are unrestricted. In this paper, we propose several techniques for quantifying the degree of these failures for simple majority rule and Borda's rule. In addition, we develop a matricial framework for analyzing social welfare rules. We believe that the tools and methods proposed have significant potential in future analysis.

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.


Thesis is part of Honors ETD pilot project, 2008-2013. Migrated from Dspace in 2016.

On-Campus Access Only