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A Game Theoretic Analysis of Marbury v Madison: The Origins of Judicial Review

deButts, Daniel R
Abstract
The presented research seeks to further our understanding of the Supreme Court’s formation of judicial review through an historical and game theoretic analysis. Marbury v Madison (1803) has long been hailed as a foundational case in which Chief Justice Marshall outfoxed President Jefferson in a duel of wits. Yet, despite this claim, there are surprisingly few papers that apply modern game-theory to what is widely considered a landmark—and rather iconic—supreme court case. In my paper, I review this notion and, in doing so, come to better understand inter-institutional relationships and their corresponding game theoretic strategies. More importantly, however, I suggest that Supreme Court decisions are often manipulated by their environment. The decisions themselves are not made in a vacuum—if enough pressure exists, it is possible to alter the verdict of cases, thus altering the course of history.
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James Blair Historical Review
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https://scholarworks.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1146&context=jbhr&unstamped=1
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Judicial Review, Game Theory, Constitutional History, United States History
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https://scholarworks.wm.edu/handle/internal/12824
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