TOWARD THE GLOBAL PUBLIC GOOD: ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

A Dissertation

Presented to

The Faculty of the School of Education

The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Education

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by

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July 2014

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Acknowledgements

A dissertation is never a solitary effort. Here, I want to recognize some of those people who made this dissertation possible. First, I would like to thank my two peer reviewers, Tehmina Khwaja and Jamison Miller. They each agreed to use my devised framework to analyze the policy, to them I am grateful. In addition, Jamison also helped me to create Figure 3.1.

I would like to thank my two committee members, Dr. Patricia Farrell and Dr. Jeremey Stoddard, who each read multiple drafts of my work and gave me valued advice. Their insights helped me to publish my research at the 2014 ASHE conference. This dissertation would not be possible without the continued guidance of my chair, Dr. Pamela Eddy. The soundness and clarity of my research is testament of her dedication to her students and their development as scholars. I would also like to thank many other faculty members and members of the William and Mary community who helped me along the way; Dr. Matthew Lambert who broadened my understanding of the public good and Dr. Judi Harris who taught me about the value of qualitative research. There are many others who have impacted my studies who I cannot name here.

It is of course my family that has the greatest influence on my work. My wife Janet has been my support system for almost ten years and has seen me through two degrees and to her I cannot express enough thanks. My children, Troy, Rosalie and Cecelia are the reason I write and research in the first place. It is for them that I labor to create a better world through education.

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ABSTRACT

Currently, 30 U.S. states have enacted performance based funding policies. Performance based funding policies stipulate that higher education institutions must meet certain performance metrics, such as graduate rates in order to receive state funding. Performance based funding is largely meant to align higher education institutions in America with the market. The overall purpose of this study is to examine how performance based funding policies have the potential to shape the public good. This area of research is important to understand because the public good is a notion that, while abstract, nonetheless affects every member of a society. The public good impacts how citizens participate in their democracy and if they participate at all. Thus it is crucial to understand how higher education policy can affect the public good.

A number of areas of the literature help inform this study. The first area looks at the different components of policy and how hegemony manifests in the discourse of policy. The next section includes a brief historical examination overview of accountability and performance based funding. The third section examines the evolution, formation and lapsing of the first round of performance based funding policies in the early 2000s as well as the formation and enactment of the second round of performance based funding, which ensued from 2007. The final section looks at the various notions of

the public good. My study is one of the first studies to how examine performance based funding has the potential to shape the public good.

This research study used discourse analysis. The sites for data collection included the six southern states of Arkansas, Tennessee, Louisiana, Texas, Virginia and Mississippi. I used the discourse tools of an input-process-output-outcome heuristic, a policy hegemony analysis, a presupposition analysis, and a social actor analysis to code the data and to analyze the findings.

This study found that the policies in the six states under review relied not only on neoliberal orientations, but also neoconservative orientations as well. The three overarching themes that resulted from the policy analysis were: government oversight, market metrics, and policy silences. These themes can be thought of as technologies that work to constrict the constellation of the public good.

College leaders should heed the results of this research because higher education institutions have a unique role in shaping the public good (Pusser, 2006; Marginson, 2007). As such, college leaders must understand this role and how performance based measures may hinder their ability to do so. Policy makers must also be cognizant of how their actions may have deleterious effects on the public good. Faculty and students, who may be most impacted by performance based policies, must learn how these policies will negatively affect the public good and further so they, the faculty and student can begin to shape a more inclusive and democratic vision of the public good not just for their own society, but globally.

Correction: At the time of publication in 2014, it was reported that 50% of state higher education funding in Virginia would be dependent on Virginia higher education meeting certain performance metrics. However this figure has since been retracted by the original source used. Currently, Virginia does not tie any higher education funding to meeting performance metrics. States in this study were selected on three criteria: location in the Southern United States, over 10% state funding tied to performance and if their performance policies were written into the state code. Virginia still satisfies two of these criterion; location and their policy written into the state code.

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

Institutions of public higher education in the United States, as their name implies, are accountable to the bodies that fund them, namely the citizenry of a state. But what exactly do the terms "public" and "accountability" actually mean? Over the last 40 years, virtually all state level policymakers in the United States have adhered to a market driven vision of public and accountability (Alexander, 2000; Giroux, 2011; Mallot, Hill, & Banefield, 2013; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Vestrich, 2008; Zumeta, 2011). A market based approach entails competition between institutions as well as institutions demonstrating their market value, by meeting certain criteria.

This market based vision of higher education is linked to the concept of the public good because advocates of market based policies argue that these policies will ensure that institutions will be held accountable to the needs of their respective states as well as be responsive to the demands of the 21st century global economy (Pusser, 2006; Tierney, 2006; Wellman, 2006). As a producer of market goods, institutions are supposed to be efficient with their use of resources and demonstrate their worth and need of funds (Burke, 2005; Zumeta, 2011).

One specific method which has emerged to hold higher education accountable is performance based funding. While performance based funding was first enacted in 1979, performance based funding gained tremendous popularity among state legislatures in the 1990s, fell out of favor later on, and has reemerged in the late 2000s as a policy tool for

funding public higher education (Miao, 2012; Zumeta, 201 1). This latest incarnation is dubbed "performance based funding 2.0" (PBF 2.0) to distinguish it from the earlier phase. Over the last three decades, performance based funding has taken many variations, with the most common form over the last decade based on withholding a portion of base funding to institutions as a means to entice institutions to meet accountability goals (Zumeta, 2011). Examples of these goals may be for an institution to produce specified target numbers of degrees, especially in the area of science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM). For example, Virginia recently enacted the Virginia Higher Education Opportunity Act (2011), which establishes an accountability system for Virginia public higher education. If institutions do not meet these targets, the state can withhold a small amount of base funding. The Act (2011) also provides additional funding sources for institutions that target STEM programs. Even small portions of base funding however, translate into millions of dollars of precious revenue for institutions, especially in a time of declining state appropriations.

Currently, 30 states have these types of performance based funding policies that withhold base funds, and another 10 states are in formal discussions to enact performance based funding policies (Friedel, Mercedes Thornton, D'Amico, & Katsinas, 2013). The intent of these policies to ensure that public higher education is held accountable to state priorities and in particular state economic priorities. Higher education is mainly seen as an investment that should yield economic returns to the individual, taxpayers, and the state in general (Rhoades & Torres, 2006). Of course this is not a new prospect. Bowen's (1977) landmark work regarding the public good of higher education illustrated

that there has always been economic benefits of an educated populace, such as higher tax revenues and decreased prison sentencing. Yet the current accountability movement assumes that improving the economy of the state and the economic priorities of individuals are synonymous with the idea of the public good and operate at the exclusion of any other democratic or civic notions of public good.

The current accountability movement, which has built over the last three decades, has its roots in the larger theory of neoliberalism (Alexander, 2000; McClendon, Hearn, & Lewis, 2006). Neoliberalism draws on the theories of economic liberalism, which holds the functioning of the market superior to any form of governmental or public interference in economic and social matters (Harvey, 2005). Neoliberalism holds that market based solutions emerge as the most efficient for any societal problem and further, that all social problems can be handled through a market mechanism (Harvey, 2005; Plant, 2010). After the tumultuous social protests of the 1960s and 1970s, many held public universities responsible for chaos occurring on campuses, such as the student protests at UC Berkeley (Newfield, 2008). State policymakers, with the support of corporate lobbyists and influential backers, sought to discipline higher education and transform it into a market good and make it serve the needs of the global market instead of the perceived radical and communist causes that occurred during the 1960s (Giroux, 2011; Mallot et al., 2013; Newfield, 2008; Zumeta, 2011). Serving the global market, either by providing vocational training, STEM degrees, potentially profitable products, or applied research is now the only form of public good universities are supposed to produce (Pusser, 2006; Zumeta, 2011). Conservatives, policymakers, corporate lobbyists, and not

a small amount of liberals, as well as many in the general public who seek to transform higher education have been influenced by neoliberalism and continue to draw on it to craft accountability measures.

A narrow neoliberal view, however, can restrict the potential for public higher education policy and higher education's role in promoting the public good. Of course the public good is defined differently by different stakeholders. If policymakers view the public good in strictly market terms, however, where does this leave ideas such as democratic citizenship, humanism, the liberal arts, and music appreciation? Markets and economic concerns are only one small fraction of what higher education has the potential to promote. And currently, this narrower vision of the public good is building (Pusser, 2006; McMahon, 2009; Wellmen, 2006). The notion of the public good is never static as it constantly is reiterated by various actors in society (Calhoun, 1998; Mansbridge, 1998; Pusser, 2006). And currently, the public good in American society may be moving in a predominantly market based direction, which will most likely limit other visions of the public good (Giroux, 2011; Lambert, Bradie, & Letizia, 2014).

Thus, it is crucial for policymakers, scholars, higher education administrators, faculty, and the general public to understand the variability inherent in the terms public and accountability because narrow meanings can imply a different vision or restricted vision of the public good. To better understand the problem of inconsistent meanings associated with public higher education accountability, it is critical to explore the evolution of notions of the public good, public goods, and the role of the accountability

movement in general and performance based funding in particular in shaping these concepts in more market driven directions.

Public Higher Education and the Ideological Evolution of Performance Funding

In the West, the first theories of the public good emerged during antiquity (Calhoun, 1998). Specifically, Plato and Aristotle sought to find common ground between the self-interested actions of the individual and the general welfare of the community (Mansbridge, 1998). Through the Middle Ages, many Christian thinkers such as St. Augustine argued that individual desires, specifically market behaviors, had to be tamed for the benefit of the common good. During the 15th century however, as capitalism began to take hold in Europe, many scholars sought to accommodate the desires and interests of the individual into the formulation of the public good, as capitalism is based on the notion of individualism (Calhoun, 1998; Claeys, 1987). By the 18th century Adam Smith (1998) famously argued that by pursuing their self-interests, individuals would actually contribute to the public good. Smith (1998) made reconciliation between self-interested pursuits and the common good.

Thomas Jefferson, however, writing in the newly created American republic, bucked Smith's (1998) views, and really the entire trend that was emerging since the 15th century of reconciling self-interest and the public good. Jefferson (2010) argued for a public good based on civic actions (Wills, 2002). Further, Jefferson (2010) believed that the surest way to inculcate these civic behaviors was through a system of free public education. Jefferson's (2010) influence on American public education is undeniable.

The American system of free public education, both the K-12 and higher education systems, while never devoid of capitalistic or utilitarian interests, were always thought to be entities meant to foster civic action (Gutek, 1995). After the Morrill acts of 1862 and 1890, and the creation of the American community college, access to a college education was opened up to the masses (Brint & Karabel, 1989; Lambert, 2014). By the 1920s, during the Progressive era, more men and even women were enrolling in colleges. And by the 1960s, it was no longer simply white men, but African Americans, minorities and large numbers of women (Geiger, 1998; Gilbert & Heller, 2008). Higher education of the 1960s and 1970s, while by no means idyllic or unproblematic, perhaps came closest to Jefferson's (2010) ideal. American higher education was a major force in promoting American democracy (Newfield. 2008).

The economic recession of the early 1970s however brought with it high inflation and unemployment (Harvey, 2005). Growing institutional budgets helped to make public higher education a target for increasingly conservative policymakers who sought to be fiscally conservative with shrinking tax dollars (Alexander, 2000; Giroux, 2011; Newfield, 2008). In the worsening economy, claims of "overeducated" Americans began to circulate as college grads had a more difficult time finding employment in a tight economy, which added to the chorus against public higher education (Carnevale, 2011). More than an economic blow however, public higher education was targeted in the 1970s and 1980s because it was held responsible for inciting much of the social events of the 1960s as well as being the site of many of these protests (McClendon et al., 2006McClendon et al., 2006; Newfield, 2008). Many policymakers saw the huge

budgets and liberal leanings of higher education institutions as an easy target for cuts and reforms (Newfield, 2008). Performance based funding is one such reform.

Performance based funding for higher education grew out of neoliberalism, which swept not only higher education but American political thinking as well (Harvey, 2005 Zumeta, 2011). For neoliberals, goals of access, equality, and civic duty are largely replaced by market driven reforms for virtually all functions of higher education (Fowler, 2009; Giroux, 2011; Mallot et al., 2013). In 1980, Tennessee led the way as the first state to implement performance based funding. Traditionally, universities received their funding based on how many students they enrolled. This approach helped to promote access to college (Friedel et al., 2013; Miao, 2012). Performance based funding instead allocates funding not based on enrollment, but on universities reaching required outcomes (Dougherty & Reddy, 2011; Friedel et al., 2013; Miao, 2012). Performance based goals may include increased retention rates, increased graduation rates or increased awarding of STEM degrees (Gorbunov, 2013). More than this, performance based goals are quantifiable goals, measurable goals that usually align with the state's market needs.

Despite this early interest in performance based funding, by the early 2000s, many of these performance based policies had been allowed to lapse in state legislatures. There were a number of reasons for this. For one, the performance policies were rigidly applied with a one-size fits all method that neglected the unique characteristics of many state institutions in the various states (Dougherty & Reddy, 2011; Friedel et al., 2013; Miao, 2012). Further, the funding in these early programs was supplemental, not part of a university's base funding, thus there was no incentive for the institution to truly buy in.

Lastly, there was heavy resistance from the higher education community regarding performance measures (Dougherty & Reddy, 2011; Friedel et al., 2013; Miao, 2012).

The year 2007 however, saw a resurgence in interest in performance based funding due to the onset of the recession. The recession resulted in a continuing decrease in state appropriations and subsequent rising cost of college tuition (Zumeta, 2011). This time, policymakers learned from the first wave of performance funding in the 1970s, which became dubbed "performance funding 1.0" (Miao, 2012). Currently, there are 30 US states that have performance based funding policies (Friedel et al., 2013). The greatest change from performance funding 1.0 is that the incentive to actually reach the goals is much greater for institutions, because the funding is not supplemental or bonus funding, but rather tied to an institution's base allocation from the state (Dougherty & Reddy, 2013). Funding allocations range from 1% to 100%, with most states allocating from 5%-25% (Friedel et al., 2013). Performance based funding is the future for state funding of higher education institutions in the United States (McClendon & Hearn, 2013).

It is crucial to further study the effects of performance based funding because performance based funding has the ability to curtail the democratic and transformational potential of higher education by only valuing its market potential. As well, it is important to examine performance based funding policies to determine if they are actually effective or not. Performance based funding can have a substantial impact on the functioning of an institution, especially in light of diminished state funds. Thus, if policymakers are going to invoke the terms public and accountability to make higher education more responsive

to state needs and priorities, these terms must be fully understood. More than this, the variability inherent in these terms must be clearly spelled out. If only narrow and market based notions of public and accountability inform policy, then the effects of policy in promoting the public good may be unnecessarily restricted.

Statement of the Problem and Research Questions

What does it actually mean to be a public institution in contemporary America? Marginson (2007) argues that the role and scope of public institutions and how these institutions produce and distribute public goods in any given society is not a universal idea, but configured by policy. Further, the notions of public and private are rarely dichotomous and clear cut as policymakers seem to believe, but rather much more nuanced (Marginson, 2011). For example, public is almost always meant to mean state subsidized and non-market, whereas private is assumed to be non-state and market influenced, and consequently, under neoliberalism, superior to public. Marginson's (2007) argument begins to problemtize this simple dualism as he posits that there are not necessarily either/or a zero-sum propositions regarding private and public goods. Rather, the lines between these spheres of public and private are blurred. For example, governments can participate in markets, and private institutions can create public good, such as better health for citizens (Marginson, 2011).

This research used work from three distinct definitions of the public good; public goods (plural), the public good (singular) and finally the public good as social criticism (Marginson, 2011). From an economic standpoint, public goods are goods that markets tend not to produce because immediate profits cannot be made from the production of

these goods. Some examples include public parks, public education, and national defense (Calhoun, 1998). The second definition of public goods is *the* public good (singular). The public good ties all citizens in a democratic network and determines how public goods are produced and distributed (Marginson, 2011). The notion of a public good (singular) is much less tangible than the former definition of public goods (plural). The public good (singular) however is crucial to the wellbeing of any society.

The third definition of the public good is the public good as social criticism Marginson (2007), Calhoun (1998), and Pusser (2006) draw on the Habermasian (1991) notion of the public sphere to describe this facet of the public good. The public sphere in Habermas's (1991) vision is a dimension of society that sustained capacity for non-violent criticism independent of the state and often directed toward the state, giving the state options for change and contributing to the ongoing renewal of the polity (Marginson, 2007; Pusser, 2006). For Habermas (1991), a true public sphere emerged in 19th century England, in the salons, coffee shops, inns, and counting houses. Habermas (1991) did not believe higher education had a role in the public sphere, but Pusser (2006) and Marginson (2007) argue that it does.

Likewise, my position for use of the public sphere as a conceptual lens follows Pusser's (2006) and Marginson's (2007) perspectives and argues for a renewed vision of public higher education institutions in a revitalized public sphere. In a wider sense, this lens aligns with the Jeffersonian ideas of public education. It is this definition of the public good, the public good as social criticism, which is under attack from neoliberals. This definition has the capability of providing citizens with the necessary tools to forge a

vibrant public good (singular) in which public goods (plural) can be more equitably distributed.

The public good is a concept which is continually forged by heterogeneous groups and social actors within a larger polity (Calhoun, 1998; Pusser, 2006; Mansbridge, 1998). When certain groups have a power differential and exploit this differential, the creation of the public good can be skewed to the vision of those who exercise power. The power differentials of policymakers who implement neoliberal policies have the potential to skew the public good in more market based direction. This is why it is crucial to view the public good as a process of democratic negotiation. Jefferson (2010) said as much. Calhoun (1998) argues that "bridging structures" are needed both within and between different publics to facilitate this democratic dialogue (p. 30). Bridging structures are political mechanisms that allow diverse groups to create some sort of a common good. These bridging structures are the heart of the democratic process in American society and of the public sphere. These bridging structures take the form of the democratic process in the public sphere, such as voting, running for office and lobbying.

A specific avenue of bridging structures is the policy process itself (Fowler, 2009). The creation of policy emerges when interest among policymakers and the general public in certain ideas take hold (Fowler, 2009). It is in this agenda setting stage where many different groups begin to discuss the possibilities of policy. During a policy process, social actors can have their voices heard and negotiate the public good with other actors. After the policies are enacted, it is much more difficult to influence them. Currently however, even though the PBF policies have been passed, the policy process

for evaluation and accountability remains open. Moreover, the bridging mechanisms are not limited to the formal constitutional procedures but can take the form of participation in the horizontal sphere, or the civic organizations and perhaps most importantly academic research and scholarship. These horizontal bridging mechanisms can allow traditionally underrepresented actors without formal power to put pressure on policymakers (Bolman & Deal, 2008), and since the policy stage for accountability policies is still open, this horizontal help redefine accountability for later policies.

Performance based funding can have a detrimental effect on the notion of the public good, if the public good is seen as a democratic process of negotiation (Calhoun, 1998). The cost of abiding by crude market notions strips higher education of its ability to act as an organ of social criticism and disseminate these criticisms, and solutions, both horizontally and vertically. Without a vigorous notion of the public good, society no longer exists. Instead, the public good is no longer public, rather it unravels and becomes atomistic, simply a collection of competing individuals with no overarching connections (Giroux, 2011). Of course, even if higher education produces only private benefits for individuals, these would still contribute to some sort of a vision of the public good (Marginson, 2007). Here, it would be a public good based on individualism and the market, but it would be lacking a true communal element, which is integral to a society which professes to be democratic. The public good cannot be a simple summation of private interests; it must be something more than the sum of its parts (Calhoun, 1998).

This research study takes up the call put forth by Pusser (2006) and Marginson (2007) to produce a renewed vision of the public good and higher education's role in

producing it. The focus on PBF 2.0 provides an opportunity to understand how performance based funding policies, which are in place or soon will be in 30 states, are configuring the public good in American society. The majority of research on performance based funding deals mainly with the reasons states choose to adopt performance based funding policies in the first place (Dougherty, Natow, Bork, Jones & Vega, 2013; Dougherty & Reddy, 2013; Gorbunov, 2013; McClendon et al.,, 2006). Since performance based funding 2.0 is so new, all of the above the studies either look exclusively at PBF 1.0 or at PBF 1.0 and PBF 2.0 in conjunction. Other studies of PBF 1.0 and PBF 2.0 examine the actual effects of performance based funding in achieving the desired metrics such as increased graduation rates (Dougherty & Reddy, 2011; Tandberg, Barakat & Hillman, 2013). There has also been research on the actual goals and substance of PBF 1.0 and PBF 2.0 policies (Doughtery et al., 2013), and . a number of policy briefs outlining the purpose of PBF 1.0 and PBF 2.0 (Friedel et al., 2013; Harnish, 2011; Miao, 2012). My study is unique because, at least to my knowledge, there has been no research done on the effect of performance based funding 1.0 or 2.0 on the public good. Another novelty of my research is that the public good is not treated as an abstract concept, rather as a tangible phenomenon manifested by the discourse in policy and realized by social actors who must follow the dictates of policy. From this view, the public good can be directly influenced by targeted action.

A critical examination of performance based funding policies can begin to discern exactly how current higher education policies configure the public good and the role of public education in society. The use of critical theory provides a forum for questioning

underlying structures, rationales, and motivations and aims to highlight areas injustice and oppression (Adorno, 1990; Kellner, 1992; Marcuse, 1990). This research begins with the premise that performance based funding impoverishes the notions of the public good and public education by the meanings the policies transmit.

All texts transmit meanings and beliefs (Crotty, 1998). Policy is no exception (Allan, 2008; Perna, Rowan-Kenyon, Bell, Thomas & Li, 2008). Other research supports the concept that discourse used in policy stresses which societal issues are of importance and which are not, and which social actors are important and can and should affect social change and which should not (Allan, 2008; Saarinen, 2008; Walsh, 2013). Discourse in policies establishes a regime of truth and determines what problems can be spoken about (Allan, 2008; Saarinen, 2008; Walsh, 2013). The hidden meaning of the text, however, is not confined narrowly to what the authors intended. Rather, the text goes beyond what the author intended into the meaning infused in the text and the interpretations readers take from the policies. Thus, the authors of the policy bring historical and social context as the prime source of understanding (Crotty, 1998).

It is not just the policies and discourse that configure the public good; rather it is the social actors that must carry out the discourse. Social actors such as higher education administrators, faculty, students and taxpayers carry out and materialize the dictates of policymakers (Allan, 2008; Ball et al., 2011). If these social actors are made aware of how their behaviors are dictated by policy, they can begin to understand how policy affects their behaviors. With knowledge of how this hegemony dictates actions, social actors who carry out these actions can begin to understand and resist (Ball et al, 2011).

Without a detailed understanding of the terms "public" and "accountable," the potential of higher education to promote socially desirable effects and ultimately positive social change may be extremely curtailed. Because states are implementing performance based funding to monitor the outputs of higher education, it is imperative to understand how state policies based on performance funding may shape restricted notions of "public" and "accountability." Further, it is important to understand how policymakers, as well as faculty, students and administrators can begin to shape a new, more complex vision of what it means to be public and accountable.

This new vision must go beyond a simple identification with state funding. Even though PBF 2.0 policies allocate a substantial amount of money, the dollar amount even in the states with the highest percentages allocated based on performance like Tennessee wind up making up only a fraction of an institution's total budget. As state funding decreases, institutions must jump through more hoops to get even that small fraction of funding. Performance based funding 2.0 policies are mechanisms of control as much as new funding methods. The notion of public is now largely equated with increasing state control and diminished funds (Lambert, 2014; Saynal & Johntone, 2009). This vision of public however may not offer citizens the avenues to continually forge a truly vibrant public good.

In order to examine how PBF 2.0 policies shape the public good and how they allow social actors to negotiate that public good, this research used policy discourse analysis. Policy discourse analysis (Allan, 2008) is a method that aims at interpreting the actual words used in policy. Policy discourse analysis can reveal hidden meanings under

apparent ones in a policy (Mertens 2009). Moreover, policy discourse analysis can show which social actors policy empowers or inhibits and what type of perceptions it can create in constituents (Allan, 2008; Saarinen, 2008; Walsh, 2013).

This dissertation draws from a number of studies and employs a variety of these methods for discourse analysis. Each of these methods will be fully explained in chapter three. What they each have in common, however, is that they illustrate how words and phrases are not transparent or concrete, but rather opaque. And due to this opaqueness, words and phrases in policies can transmit different meanings than intended, or unconsciously transmit meanings embedded in the historical foundations of the text (Allan, 2008; Fairclough, 1989; Saarinen, 2008; Tan, 2010). Essentially, the main task is to explore which social actors are empowered and neglected, and which social issues and viewpoints are emphasized.

Drawing on Allan's (2008) and Saarinen's (2008) notion that policy does not inhibit or curtail behavior, but rather promotes a certain behaviors by highlighting certain social issues and empowering certain social actors, the goal of this research study was to show how current performance based funding policies shape the notion of the public good in their various regions. The public good of any area is socially constructed with language and carried out by social actors, thus one way to measure it is through language and discourse and to identify empowered and neglected social actors. Of course, socially constructed does not imply equality of social actors. The purpose of this research is to determine exactly how performance based funding policies, which are rooted in

neoliberalism, can shape the public good. Below are the overarching research question and the associated two sub-questions which will guide the study:

How do the six selected state performance based funding policies allow the respective institutions in their states to shape the public good?

a. How does the socially constructed discourse in the policies have the potential to shape the public good?
b. What social actors does the policy discourse empower and neglect, and how do these actors have the potential to shape the public good?

In a wider sense, these questions highlight the actors in the policy, the issues that emerge between them and the discourse that connects them, in short, what type of public good, either market based, democratic, global, a combination of these, etc., that higher education institutions are able to promote. The selection of discourse analysis provides a method to answer these questions. The answers to the research questions will give a glimpse into the complicated process of shaping the public good (Allan, 2008; Ball et al, 2011; Fairclough, 1989; Saarinen, 2008; Walsh, 2013).

Significance of Research

Why should the higher education community, in particular state policymakers, higher education administrators, faculty, students and the general public, take notice of performance based funding? The simple answer is because performance based funding impacts the public good. Higher education institutions are crucial in the dynamic process of the negotiation of the public good. Yet, if higher education institutions are stripped of

their critical capability and turned into adjuncts of the market, the public good of their individual polities will undoubtedly suffer. My study is necessary because social actors must begin to understand how the discourse of PBF 2.0 may come to affect their ability to contribute to the public good, as well as affect the ability of the university to contribute to the public good. Once social actors such as faculty, students and administrators have this knowledge, they can work through the vertical hierarchies of governance structures as well the horizontal networks of various social and civic organizations to negotiate the public good. My study also points to the way the neoliberal agenda is shaping the policy process and the resulting structures created.

As a truly global and interconnected society begins to emerge, the idea of the public good and its various channels becomes more crucial (Marginson, 2011). The notion of the public good however is often vague and misunderstood. My research begins to make sense of some of the complexity. In particular, my research specifically illustrates how policies can configure or impoverish the public good and the social actors which carry the formation of the public good. Armed with this knowledge, social actors, from policymakers, higher education administrators, faculty members and students can begin to consciously forge the public good. In addition, my methods can be applied to other policies to determine how other policies contribute or impoverish the public good.

Assumptions of Research

This is a critical study, and as such, it takes a clear stance regarding performance based funding. Performance based funding, as part of the neoliberal accountability regime, is detrimental to the public good, if the public good is defined in democratic

terms (Giroux, 2011). Neoliberal accountability and performance based funding in particular must be critically examined before it is accepted wholesale by state policymakers. Further, it is assumed that policies are the truest reflection of policymakers intentions in the absence of other documents which supersede policies but are not available.

Summary of Chapter 1

Due to neoliberalism, colleges and universities are under increased scrutiny and accountability to show their contribution to society. The study used critical discourse analysis of state policies for performance based funding to determine how market driven accountability policies shape the public good of their respective regions. This research is significant because policymakers, students, and the higher education community can learn more about what it means to be a public institution of higher education in the 21st century and how performance based funding policies influence the discourse of the public good of higher education.

CHAPTER II

Literature Review

The literature review is divided into four sections. The first section examines literature on policy construction and genesis and policy discourse, which draws from critical theory. The second section is a historical account of the public good and accountability in higher education. The third section examines the accountability movement, performance based funding 1.0 and performance based funding 2.0. Finally, the fourth section surveys literature on the evolving notion of the general public good and public goods. A conceptual model is presented at the end of the chapter that provides a synthesis of the literature.

A review of the literature examining the use of discourse analysis, performance based funding 2.0 policies, and global public goods helps inform this research study (Marginson, 2007; Perna, Orosz, Gopaul, Jumakulov, Ashirbekov & Kishkentayeva, 2014). Of note, literature in some of these areas is scant. For example, here is only one quantitative study which examines PBF 1.0 and PBF 2.0 (Gorbunov, 2013). The literature on PBF 2.0 consists almost solely of explorations of the theoretical underpinnings of the concept, explanations of what PBF 2.0 policies contain, or attributes and drawbacks to PBF 2.0 policies (Dougherty & Reddy, 2013; Harnisch, 2011; Maio, 2012; Friedel et al., 2013; Quinterno, 2012). As noted in chapter one, the uptick in the number of states using or transitioning to PBF 2.0 highlights that the majority of states (30) are pursuing this option in funding state higher education (Friedel et al., 2013). Despite the growing prevalence of PBF 2.0 policies, there have not been any truly critical studies examining the effect of PBF 2.0 policies on the public good, and specifically

there have been no discourse analysis studies on the policy texts of PBF 2.0 and how the actual texts configure the public good. Thus, the findings from the present study are timely and significant to begin addressing the gaps in the literature.

By virtue of the U.S. constitution, higher education policy had largely been the domain of the states (Fowler, 2009). Regardless of the type of policy, however, policy, from its inception to its passage, is a reflection of the society from which it is situated and from the social actors that produce it (Fowler, 2009). Thus, an interrogation of the written policy text can surface the values embedded in the language, and in turn can highlight how the policy constructs reality. For this research, the focus was on understanding better how PBF 2.0 policies configured ideals of public good.

Policy Components

There are a number of typical components to the creation and enactment of policy. An issue must be defined in order for policymakers to take notice, than if there is enough attention, the issue must make its way onto a legislative agenda. This phase is usually called the policy window (Fowler, 2009). If there is enough support from the legislature, a policy is formulated, adapted and implemented. Once the policy is in place, it is then periodically evaluated. Of course the actual process is never this neat or linear, but the outline of these stages illustrates a way to understand the policy process (Fowler, 2009). During the policy window, policymakers listen to lobbyists, constituents and other parties as the policymakers explore options. Of course, all actors in this process are not equal, and those with more power shape policies for their benefit (Gildersleeve, 2013; Leslie & Berdahl, 2008; Tandberg, 2010). It is the actual language used to construct the

policy however which dictates how the policy will be implemented by the social actors meant to carry it out. Language is not neutral and language in policy is one of the most powerful methods to achieve certain social aims at the expense of others.

Discourse in policy. Language is not static. Gee (2014) likens sentences to a snapshot or a frame which captures a single instance of time and context. Words and sentences are strung together and have a variety of meanings in different contexts (Allan, 2008; Gee, 2014). These meanings however are not inherent in the words and sentences themselves. Rather, language or discourse, is constantly created in social processes such as policymaking, and does not exist a priori outside of culture (Allan, 2008).

Certain groups within a given society dominate these social processes however, and this position of power allows them to use their privileged position to push certain discourses which allow them to sustain power. Fairclough (1989) termed this social process as specific orders of discourse. Yet, the use of discourse is often unconscious, and members of a dominating class may only have a partial understanding of the discourse they employ and the hegemony that goes along with it (Fairclough, 1989). According to Fairclough (1989) critical scholars must foreground this hegemony, or non-violent method of garnering consent, and make it visible as part of a critical study of language and discourse. As language use is central to policy creation, it is important to understand the role of hegemony in the process. Typically, hegemony in policy privileges certain ideas or terms over others.

Policy is not an inhibitor of behavior as much as it is a promoter of behaviors among social actors (Allan, 2008; Ball, Maguire, Braun, & Hoskins, 2011; Perna, et al.,

2008; Saarinen, 2008). Neoliberalism uses its own discourse and language that is embedded within policies. Further, the actors who adhere to the policy put the discourse into action (Fairclough, 1989). Barneston and Cutright (2000) specifically apply this use of language to performance based funding policies. They argue that performance indicators are not neutral markers of progress as many advocates maintain, rather, performance indicators are conceptual technologies that shape what issues are thought about and how they are thought about (Barneston & Cutright, 2000). In the widest sense, performance indicators can naturalize the idea of performance base funding and make it seem neutral and objective, when in reality, performance based funding and the indicators used to measure compliance are loaded with normative assumptions.

In order to understand better exactly how certain policies promote behaviors and structure the mental worlds of students, faculty and administrators, Elizabeth Allan (2008) created a three tiered model, which employed historical studies, postmodernism, and critical theory. The first level historicizes the policies. Allan (2008) argued that policies must be viewed in their proper historical and social context in order to truly understand them. Knowing more about the context in which policies were created can provide insight into the policies themselves. For example, knowing that the attacks of 9/11 occurred give a situated backdrop for the creation of the Patriot Act. The second level of Allan's (2008) policy framework employs a critical lens. Here, she used critical discourse analysis to unearth contradictions and hidden meanings within the policies. She called these "subject positions" (p. 7). Essentially, a subject position is a prescribed set of roles and images attached to a particular term or phrase, such as non-traditional

student (Allan, 2008). These subject positions are implicit in the policy texts and can shape the attitudes and perceptions of social actors (Allan, 2008). The last phase of her framework uses postmodern theories. She sought to "destabilize" and correct the inequities she uncovered in step two using critical theory. She sought to change the faulty discourse and subject positions she uncovered in the second step.

I used Allan's (2008) framework as an initial starting place. First, like Allan (2008), I historicized the PBF 2.0 policies and situated them in their social context. The insights derived from this stage helped to drive the next stage of analysis. Second, I used critical theory to highlight where the actual discourse in policy created or sustained inequities and power imbalances. Like Allan, I understand language as discourse that is able to promote certain behaviors and ideas. Following Allan (2008) I used critical theory to understand exactly what type of ideas and behaviors the discourse has the ability to promote. Further, the discourse has been shaped by historical factors, so it is not enough to just understand what the discourse can do, but why and how the discourse was created, for what purpose and for whose benefit. The difference is that Allan (2008) then seeks to create new subject positions for actors in policy. My aim is to go further than the realm of policy and use the policy analysis to inspire actors to consciously create the public good.

Saarinen (2008) argues that a common mistake made when policy documents are used as data is that policy actually describes something that really exists. Hermeneutical methods, and specifically discourse analysis assume that policy and really all texts do not merely describe social processes, but actually help to create and sustain them (Allan,

2008; Ball et al., 2011; Saarinen, 2008). The policy language has political implications and it can narrow the field of options by emphasizing certain problems and alternatives while neglecting others (Ball et al., 2011; Fowler, 2009). Despite the loaded nature of discourse and its ability to influence behaviors and attitudes, Saarinen (2008) argues that there is little documentary analysis in higher education research regarding policy as text. Saarinen (2008) urges that simply using policy texts as data does not constitute a policy analysis; rather the actual language of the policy must be examined. Ball and colleagues (2011) further this argument and note that educational policies create and limit possibilities for actions and thought by the discourse employed. It is this ability to create and limit possibilities in educational practice that I am concerned with in PBF 2.0, and which I hope to illuminate by the specific research questions.

Presuppositions set the assumed common ground in policy discourse, which then sets the frame of interpretation of all social actors (Saarinen, 2008). Saarinen (2008) examined two types of presuppositions, *existential presuppositions* and *change of state presuppositions*. An existential presupposition presents a phenomenon as already existing, and one that can be triggered by proper names or the definite argument. A change of state presupposition implies that something needs to happen and that it has not happened already. Presuppositions are particular forms of discourse, Discourse is one factor that links social structures such as democracy and/or capitalism to social events and practices such as schooling and policymaking (Walsh, 2013). Both types of presuppositions present phenomena as something natural and beyond debate, as a natural

state of affairs that is foregone and beyond question. Other factors creating this backdrop include history, attitudes, norms, and customs to name a few.

Walsh (2013) focused on public high schools and actual classroom practices. Following Althusser (2005), he argued that public schools are an ideological apparatus that employ discourse (created by state policymakers and other state officials and informed by their special interests) to transform the school into a place of direction and training of future students regarding the ways of capitalism (Walsh, 2013). As such, policy in higher education likewise may be performing a similar function. Performance based funding policies are hegemonic and used to achieve certain class interests, such as profits and private sector partnerships.

The Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci (1992) first postulated the notion of hegemony. Hegemony, according to Gramsci (1992), is the method by which the dominant classes in society, and in this case the capitalist classes, secure their control and exploitation over the non-dominant classes. A half-century later, Foucault (1977) similarly argued that the most effective method to garner consent from a population is not through repression, intimidation and violence. Rather, the most effective method, according to Foucault (1977) was to restrict the ability for people to understand their society and structure their understanding and conception of their world in a particular way (Foucault, 1977).

Orders of discourse offer different ideologies to dominate populations by which those populations can exercise hegemony (Fairclough, 1989). The dominant order of discourse in contemporary American society is that of neoliberalism (Fairclough, 1989;

Giroux, 2011; Mallot et al., 2013). A dominant order of discourse, enforced by dominant groups, frames truth by limiting what can be thought and said about particular topics (Ball, et al., 2011; Fairclough, 1989). This framing of truth is a truth regime (Allan, 2008; Ball, et al., 2011; Fairclough, 1989; Foucault, 1972). Truth regimes are socially constructed with discourse. Discourse is not just a way of speaking, but rather creates a new regime of truth which helps to determine what can be spoken and thought by social actors (Foucault, 1972). When there are favored orders of discourse, truth can only exist within that order of discourse. None of the studies on PBF 1.0 or PBF 2.0 have viewed performance based funding as hegemonic devices, however, and this is a gap my study intends to fill.

The orders of discourse utilized by policymakers are supplied to them by the more dominant actors in policy making, such as lobbyists, think tank organizations, the media, as well as individual policymaker's social status, standing, and prestige in their social context (Allan, 2008; Fairclough, 1989; MacDonald, 2013). If social actors are aware of the power of discourse, especially actors with little or no social power, they can begin to resist it (Fairclough, 1989; Walsh, 2013). Walsh (2013) argued that classroom teachers must be attuned to this order of discourse among school administrators and the state apparatus in general, as well as be attuned if their students are reproducing it, in order to resist it (Walsh, 2013). Indeed, consciousness is the first step toward emancipation (Fairclough, 1989). Because performance indicators are not neutral, but rather reflect the assumptions and values of their advocates, in this case neoliberals, they can and must be challenged by academics (Barnetson & Cutright, 2000). My study highlights how

hegemonic values are represented in current PBF 2.0 discourse and offers methods to challenge the dominant hegemony of neoliberalism.

Social actors and policy. Policy discourse can also examine the different roles of various social actors (Allan, 2008; Saarinen, 2008). Policy discourse dictates which social actors are called upon to carry out policy and which actors are at fault (with fault a social construction made by those in power); pointedly, it can similarly ignore certain actors (Fairclough, 1989; Saarinen, 2008). Simply, social actors in policies are presented differently, and an analysis of how these actors are portrayed can help to uncover power imbalances.

Yet, policy does not just emphasize or neglect social actors, it creates subjects (Allan, 2008; Ball et al., 2011; Fairclough, 1989). A subject position created by policy is a role or position that can be performed by those subject to the policy, and policy is not universal as it produces different types of subjects (Allan, 2008; Ball et al., 2011; Fairclough, 1989). Ball and colleagues (2011) identified two types of polices: imperative/disciplinary policies, which cast teachers as passive recipients; and extortive/developmental policies which cast the teacher as a thinker. Disciplinary policy is based on compliance, whereas developmental policy provides subjects, in this case teachers, with some autonomy. A performativity discourse results in a disciplinary approach, whereas as humanist discourse can create community and informed judgment (Ball et al., 2011). These insights, specifically the creation of subjects on the one hand, and the relations between subjects on the other, can be applied to the discourse of

performance based funding policies. For my purposes, I looked at visions of the public good subjects and the relationships among subjects that are promoted.

I intended to use the discourse methods outlined to decipher discourse in PBF 2.0 policy and determine if it is disassociated from any true meaning, or if the discourse used portrays a certain meaning which in reality is not present. Yet, all of this discussion regarding policy implications is for naught if not used to inform policymaking. Dryzek (1982) cynically noted that there are two frequent reactions to policy analysis: to stop immediately because it is useless or to just simple take a side, help an organization, and forget about actually analyzing and discussing the social issue. Obviously Dryzek (1982) did not endorse either of these methods and neither do I. Instead, Dryzek (1982) argued that truly innovative policy analyses are valued by policymakers and are used to create a conversation between different policy actors.

Thinking globally. While the need for dialogue between actors is not disputed, it is my contention that there may need to be a more wide reaching method to influence policy and social action than simply contacting policymakers. The existence of empirical backing provides those who wish to question the effect of neoliberalism on the public good tools for change. Instead of hurling sound bites and talking points, opposition groups of PBF 2.0 can deconstruct the discourse of policy and explicitly show how the discourse and the policy itself has the ability to restructure the public good into a market commodity. The deconstruction of policy highlights exactly how policy can be used to achieve the interests of certain actors at the expense of others. Armed with this new knowledge, Actors who are relatively powerless in vertically hierarchies, such as faculty

in the traditionally policymaking process, can begin to exercise power through different channels which will be discussed later.

Policy analyses on performance based funding generally only consider the vertical aspect of policymaking. By contrast, my study situates performance based funding in its vertical and horizontal position to give faculty, students, and all those affected by the hegemonic apparatus of performance based funding new tools to resist. The point here is that policy analysts, scholars, and faculty members must begin to recognize the much wider channels that can influence national policy (Kaldor, 2002; McGrew, 2002). Faculty may be reluctant and not see the battle over PBF as their fight. However, PBF has direct and indirect effects on their careers and the disciplines they represent. To do nothing is to be complicit in neoliberal hegemony. The literature on globalization may provide a tool for integrating policy analysis into this wider method of influencing policy.

Over the last few decades, national policymaking bodies have been heavily influenced by their global contexts and this global context must be utilized (Held, 2002; Kaldor, 2002Marginson, et al.,, 2010; McGrew, 2002). As national economies become more connected, as social media brings more actors together, as global pollution affects more areas as well as the spillover effects from the Great Recession of 2008, national policymakers can no longer afford to ignore the global context. As Rosenu (2003) argued, the last 50 years have seen the emergence of a true global civil society. The actions of citizens in any one country, especially industrialized countries, can have drastic effects on the lives of many other people in distant countries (Singer, 2002). Pollution may be the best example of this connection (Barrett, 1999; Singer, 2002)In a

sense, all of humanity is connected for good or for ill.

One positive avenue of connection between people of the globe is global civic society. Global civil society is composed of interest groups, non-profit groups, social groups, lobbying organizations, and many other groups (Kaldor, 2002; McGrew, 2002). There is no central world governing apparatus. Rather authority is a loosely coupled phenomenon in global civil society (Weick, 1976). It is spread across many different organizations, groups, and individuals. There is no central point, no top heavy authority to clamp down on subversive information. Without a central authority, scholars, students and others can resist the hegemony of performance based funding policies and accountability policies more generally.

Here is where hermeneutical policy analysis can be most instructive. Following Critical Theory, Dryzek (1982) argued that the aim of a hermeneutical policy analysis is to engender social transformation and emancipatory change. It may best be able to achieve this in the loosely coupled (Weick, 1976) and multi-faceted context of global civil society. As globalization ensues, the bodies with the capability to influence domestic policy will most likely grow (Kaldor, 2002; McGrew, 2002). As the webs of influence bearing down on policy become wider and more complex and more global, researchers must take stock of this. If faculty and their students begin to understand these global channels, they can exercise power to challenge neoliberal hegemony.

Another way of envisioning global civil society is by situating it within a horizontal/vertical context (Marginson et al., 2010). Formal policymaking bodies constitute a vertical network, which is hierarchical and determines actual policy and

rules. It is this hierarchy that creates the formal channel by which a state government ensures that public universities adhere to their mission and produce outcomes which benefit the state (Richardson & Smalling, 2005). A primary tool to accomplish compliance is through fiscal policy, which includes the amount of operating and support funding allocated, regulations that apply to funding distribution, policies of institutional autonomy, tax policy and incentive funding (Richardson & Smalling, 2005). A policy analysis can inspire change by influencing policymakers up and down this vertical chain of command (Marginson et al., 2010). Yet, these vertical networks are not nearly as linear as they may seem (Leslie & Berdhal, 2008). Rather, policymaking can be described as incrementalist, discursive, and usually lacking an overarching purpose (Gildersleeve, 2013; Leslie & Berdhal, 2008). Perhaps most importantly, policymaking has been increasingly dominated by tremendous pressure from lobbying and special interest groups (Tandberg, 2006). When policy is dominated by special interests, policymaking must adhere to these interests and less to social issues.

In light of this move to accommodate special interests, policymaking has been described as a "garbage can" (Leslie & Berdhal, 2008, p. 330) in which policies are not created as rational solutions to pressing societal issues, but rather focus on the projects of lobbyists and policymakers, influential individuals, and earmarks that are floating about. All of these ideas are stored in the proverbial garbage can, and only when a savvy policymaker sees the opportunity for passage does it get passed. In the end, this approach can be seen as solutions actually preceding problems (Cohen & March, 1986). In short, policy is based on power as well as pressing issues in the outside environment (Fowler,

2009). Thus, only the most prominent and powerful social actors, and the values they embody, can really exert influence which leaves little room for alternative viewpoints and social actors. This singular focus may be why the horizontal sphere offers the most enticing route to influencing policy.

In contrast to vertical networks, horizontal networks are flat; they are building blocks of global civil society (Kaldor, 2002; Marginson et al., 2010; McGrew, 2002). Vertical networks are based on hierarchy, on chain of command and constitutional authority, whereas horizontal networks are more egalitarian (Richardson & Smalling, 2005). Horizontal entities, and more importantly, networks of horizontal entities can and usually do have a tremendous impact on policy formation, yet they are outside of the actual legal structure of policy making (Fowler, 2009). Policy is not strictly an effort of legislators adhering to constituents wishes. Rather it is the effort of many parties and influencers, thus researchers and those interested in policy formation must begin to understand not only the vertical chains of authority, but also the more horizontal influences outside those vertical chains. Organizations such as Amnesty International, environmental groups, the communist party, the tea party, the ACLU, and the Heritage foundation to name a few, constitute some of the organizations in global civil society (Kaldor, 2002; Tandberg, 2010).

McGrew (2002) even begins to trace the outlines of a nascent global democratic movement. Advocates for some type of global democracy call for citizens of different localities, regions and nations to forge civic links beyond the sovereign boundaries of their nation-states. While the obstacles to such an action are great, some form of global

democratic movement may be necessary because as McGrew (2002) argues "the case for transnational democracy is a necessary requirement for the realization of global social justice" (p. 510). These new democratic networks can be another method for higher education institutions to influence vertical policy structures.

A helpful heuristic was created by Simon Marginson and Robert Rhoads (2002) to more accurately view policy making in the age of globalization. They envisioned policymaking as a loop of information continuously running among local, national, regional, and global bodies, both vertically and horizontally (Marginson & Rhoads, 2002). This continuously running information (aided by the constant spread of social media), gained not just from lobbyists, but from many other social organizations, can help inform policymakers at all levels. The purpose of this "glo-na-cal" heuristic in the words of the authors is "to foster exploration and analysis of types and patterns of influence and activity, to re-conceptualize social relations and actions globally, nationally and locally" (Marginson & Rhoades, 2002, p. 291). This heuristic aims to capture the global flows of information that influence policymaking at all levels, but this heuristic goes beyond policy. It nests policy within its various vertical and horizontal contexts. This perspective shows the complex relationships and influencing factors regarding the creation of PBF 2.0 in the United States. Once these complex relationships are understood, faculty, students and others can begin to put both vertical and horizontal pressure on state policymakers to resist neoliberal hegemony. My study sought to create the need for more exploration into the influence of the global on the local and to understand better the interrelationship and levels of connection among actors: What is the

role of horizontal networks in resisting the hegemony of performance based funding? How can horizontal/glo-na-cal networks be utilized in conjunction with the more traditional vertical networks of policymaking?

Understanding more about the roots of accountability movements and the values that underpin them provides a backdrop for seeing the changing nature of the public good and public higher education. In order to truly understand how to influence policy through horizontal and other glo-na-cal networks, educational policy must be situated in its historical context in order to see its origins and roots. The next section historicizes (Allan, 2008) PBF 2.0 policies and provides a critical first step for analysis.

The Roots of Accountability and the Public Good

This section of the literature review intends to provide an historical contextualization of the accountability movement in general, and performance based funding policies in particular. This contextualization is situated within some of the evolving strands of Western thought associated with the public good.

Evolution of the public good. Any vision of the public good is a precarious balancing act between the welfare and harmony of citizens as a whole and the rights and obligations of individuals. From the time of Plato and Aristotle through the middle ages and until roughly the early Renaissance, the notions of individual gain and communal ethics were entwined (Claeys, 1987). During the early middle ages, Claeys (1987) argued that Christian thinkers such as St. Augustine leaned heavily towards the ethic side of communal ethics. Augustine for instance sought to limit the destructiveness of wealth accumulation and market mechanisms by arguing for notions of a just price based on

human need and even for the right of the poor to steal during times of famine.

By the 12th century however, there was a slow redemption of businesses and trade become more plentiful (Claeys, 1987). Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, as Europe opened up the new world and established new markets and as capitalism, or individual wealth, began to take hold many thinkers began to wrestle with the effects of the ownership of private property, once demonized and now plentiful at least for the elite, on the public good (Colletti, 1972). Perhaps Bernard Mandeville highlighted the growing tension between communal ties and private interest when he asked: How can there be common good if society is built on private vice and self-interest (Colletti, 1972)? At the same time however a radical opposition to private property also emerged and furthered the theories of Augustine and many other Christian writers (Claeys, 1987). Theorists such as Mudie and Godwin for instance sought to restrain capitalism with morality.

The Scottish theorist Adam Smith (1998) set out to answer Mandeville's question. Smith (1998) sought to fuse and private and public sphere with the theory of the invisible hand holds. This theory hold that if all citizens were left to their own devices to protect their own self-interest through commerce and trade, their various efforts would keep each other in check and create relative harmony (Smith, 1998). Smith (1998) famously declared that private vice of individuals, when taken together, would lead to public virtue better than any deliberate efforts by governments or other societal entities (Plant, 2010). Yet, Smith (1998) also realized that when markets failed to produced certain goods, such as infrastructure, defense and public parks, governments or collective agreements would have to be undertaken in order to produce them (Mansbridge, 1998; Smith, 1998).

While Smith's (1998) ideas underpinned much of the capitalist development of America, and eventually become the foundations of neoliberalism, public higher education, at least in part, was influenced by a much different and radical vision of the public good which are best represented by the works of Thomas Jefferson (2010). Smith (1998) and Jefferson (2010) wrote during the Enlightenment, a time where science, reason and the power of the human mind were thought to be the keys to ending humankind's suffering (Gutek, 1995; Letizia, 2013). Jefferson (2010) drew on some of the more radical oppositionary theories of the Enlightenment which has their roots in the radical anti-private property theories which had taking form since the Middle Ages (Claeys, 1987; Letizia, 2013). These theories were discussed previously and they largely saw the market as a threat to communal virtue. Jefferson, writing during the formation of the world's first true republican state, believed that communal virtue, not naked self-interest was the bedrock of a healthy democracy (Wills, 2010). Further, Jefferson (2010) and many of the founding fathers realized that a system of uniform, free public education for all members of the republic was the best method to inculcate this drive civic action and republicanism (Gutek, 1995). In America then, public higher education became integral to the fostering this vision of the public good. Jefferson's (2010) 1779 bill for the Virginia legislature "A Bill of the More General Diffusion of Knowledge," was one of the earliest attempts to establish a system of publically funded system of K-12 and higher education (Gutek, 1995). Jefferson's (2010) bill did not pass, but its scope and vision would serve as a model for later generations.

The above account of the public good is by no means exhaustive, but it does illustrate how higher education came to take a privileged position as a promoter of the public good in America (which the next section will expand on). The ideas of Smith (1998) and Jefferson (2010) and many other theorists are still active in the continuous shaping of the public good, and the wider tension between the community and the individual. My study frames higher education as a Jeffersonian institution which is necessary to promote communal virtue and civic behavior for the republic.

Higher education and the public good. At the founding of the United States, there was no codified system of public higher education, although many of the state institutions were financed with some combination of private donations and public tax dollars. By 1776, only a handful of colleges existed; most notably Harvard, William and Mary, and Yale (Thelin, 2004). Ironically, education was entirely left out of the United States Constitution when it was written in 1789. By virtue of the 10th amendment, education was left up to the states and localities. From 1789 until well into the 19th century, the federal government largely stayed out of higher education. The federal government's first true and successful foray into higher education came with the passage of the Morrill Act in 1862. The Morrill Act, signed by President Abraham Lincoln in the midst of the American Civil War, sold federal land for the creation of publically funded universities (Geiger, 1998; Lambert, 2014).

These land grant universities, as they came to be known, encompassed both technical and agricultural education on the one hand, as well as the more classical studies of literature and philosophy on the other (Geiger, 1998). Even though all land grants

differed, they each shared one common foundational tenet; service to their states and to their various publics that funded them. The Morrill Act of 1862 helped to solidify the notion of public higher education in the United States.

The mid-twentieth century saw an explosion of federal activity in higher education. In the 1940s, President Franklin Roosevelt, recognized that higher education was essential for the economic recovery of America (Lambert, 2014). Only with an education could citizens raise their standard of living and rise out of poverty (Lambert, 2014). From the 1940s onward, many federal policies were passed in an effort to boost college enrollment. The most famous is the GI Bill in 1944 and the national defense act in 1958. In 1947, the Truman Commission, a study group set up by President Harry Truman to examine issues in higher education, urged for higher education institutions to become radically inclusive of underrepresented populations in education, mainly African Americans, students of low income, and women (Gilbert & Heller, 2013). Further, the Truman commission called for community colleges to play a significant role in promoting this new notion of inclusivity (Gilbert & Heller, 2013). From the 1940s until the 1970s, the federal government invested millions of dollars into funding and research at higher education institutions. The 1960s saw further investment into higher education, this time under the auspices of the aims of the Great Society and Civil Rights.

The federal government sought to adhere to the goals set forth by the Truman Commission, which was access for traditionally underrepresented groups (Gilbert & Heller, 2013). This access to higher education was done primarily through need-based aid and direct loans to student. While by no means an egalitarian institution, African-

Americans, women and low-income students were being increasingly better represented in colleges and universities by the 1970s (Gilbert & Heller, 2013). Colleges were tackling social problems in society, such as poverty and racism and were true organs of democracy (Newfield, 2008). In the widest sense, public higher education in America may have been approaching Jefferson's ideal of education as a public good.

The accountability movement. The demand for accountability has its roots in neoliberalism, which took hold in the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Alexander, 2000; Zumeta, 2011). Here, the neoliberal push involved trimming public services and forcing public entities to emulate the market. The theories of neoliberalism, however, began to take shape much earlier, in the 1930s, after the effects of the wide depression and the Second World War (Harvey, 2005).

The Great Depression of the 1930s and the events of the Second World War left an indelible mark on the American psyche. Many argued that the economy could not be left to its whims because the market would only serve to enrich a few at the expense of the many (Peet, 2009). During the 1930s, after the spectacular collapse of the American economy, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt enacted a series of sweeping legislative measures which brought the federal government in direct contact with market mechanisms for the first time in American history (Harvey, 2005). These legislative measures also seriously curtailed the power of American businesses. For their part, many American businesses relented and accepted the shackling of their power because they really had no other option. Roosevelt made it clear to them that if they did not assent, the United States could possibly be facing a socialist revolution (Harvey, 2005; Wolff, 2012).

New labor laws, minimum wage, social security, and other measures were enacted to cushion the average citizen from the deleterious effects of the market (Harvey, 2005). This orientation of the government to the economy was not just an American phenomenon. After the war, many European countries turned to the idea of social welfare in an effort to not replicate the events which allowed Adolf Hitler and the Nazis to assume dictatorial power (Harvey, 2005). The prevailing concern was to make sure that citizens were taken care of properly by their government so they would never fall victim to demagoguery again. Many Western European countries began enacted high tax rates and using the revenue generated to supply social services to their citizens.

It was during this time that the movement of neoliberalism began to form in Europe and America (Harvey, 2005). Neoliberals, who drew their inspiration from 18th century liberals, namely Adam Smith's (1998) notion of the invisible hand, argued that the social welfare legislation of the 1930s and 1940s as detrimental to the market and global business. As their 18th century predecessors, neoliberals, or new-liberals, saw the market as the key to social harmony and functioning. If the market were simply allowed to function, it would guarantee happiness and justice for all (Harvey, 2005; Plant, 2010). This is the "invisible hand" (Smith, 1998, p. 7). However, the rising tide of government intervention in the 1940s and 1950s threatened the functioning of markets worldwide. In 1944, one of the founders of the neoliberal movement, Austrian economist F. A. Hayek, wrote his seminal text: *The Road to Serfdom*. In it, he argued that modern governments in America and Europe were moving their countries down the roads to serfdom because of increased government intervention and the emasculation of the individual (Plant, 2010;

Reder, 1982). In 1947, a group of economists, philosophers and thinkers met at the Mt. Perlin hotel in France and penned the Mt. Perlin Declaration, which essentially outlined the doctrines of neoliberalism: dedication to the free market, empowerment of the individual, and resistance to government intervention (Harvey, 2005).

In the late 1940s, Hayek came to America and accepted a faculty position in economics at the University of Chicago. His work on neoliberalism influenced many scholars at Chicago, most notably Milton Freidman (Overtveldt, 2007). Freidman was a professor of economics at Chicago from 1946 until 1976. Freidman economics asserts that market solutions are the most efficient and result in actions that are best for the economy (Friedman & Friedman, 1978; Overtveldt, 2007; Peet, 2009; Reder, 1982). Perhaps the most influential neoliberal theory directed towards education was the theory of human capital (Becker, 1964). I examine human capital theory in more detail later, but in summary, human capital theory treats education mainly as a monetary investment (Overtveldt, 2007; Peet, 2009; Reder, 1982). Individuals invest in their future career options via acquiring more education.

By the late 1950s, neoliberalism began to make a slow entrance into American political circles despite its fringe doctrine status. The increased power of American industry after the war found business owners looking for ideological arguments with which to rebut the political left (Overtveldt, 2007; Peet, 2009). The 1960s saw further government intervention into society, in the form of Lyndon B. Johnson's Great Society programs. These programs entailed heavy taxes on industry, the regulation of workers' rights, expansion of social services, and the enactment of environmental protections.

Johnson's Great Society programs also placed heavy focus on education. Like Roosevelt, Johnson saw education as a defense against poverty (Lambert, 2014). Millions of federal dollars were pumped into secondary and higher education as a result.

At this time, education, which had formerly been restricted to the wealthy, was framed as a necessary right for all individuals and most importantly, necessary for a thriving society (Lambert, 2014). Beginning in the late 1940s to the 1970s, a steady stream of federal programs was initiated to support higher education. These activities included: the Truman Commission on Higher Education in 1947; the 1944 Serviceman Act commonly termed the GI Bill, the National Defense Act in 1958, expansion of the community college sector to address mass education foci, and the growing close relationship between science and government in a post-Sputnik environment. An institution was to be accountable to its state by providing a liberally educated citizenry.

Despite the focus on expansion of public support for higher education in the 1960s, business and industry officials and their supporters began to turn increasingly to the ideas of neoliberalism emanating from Chicago (Harvey, 2005; Peet, 2009). Freidman and other scholars at Chicago led an aggressive advocacy campaign aimed at rightwing politicians (Overtveldt, 2007; Reder, 1982). During the 1970s, there was a proliferation of rightwing think tanks and policy organizations which helped to disseminate neoliberal ideas and get them into the political arena (Fowler, 2012; MacDonald, 2013; Newfield, 2008). The growing power of conservatism was evidenced in the 1971 Powell Memo. In it, Justice Powell of the Supreme Court sent a memo to high ranking officials in government and business. In it, he argued that there was a

communistic tendency in the US and that businesses must protect themselves by banding together. He called for research and dissemination of this research, as well as advocacy campaigns focused on promoting business needs. Even with these first signs of support for a neoliberal agenda, the larger movement remained dormant in America until the late 1970s. In the 1970s, increased activity regarding neoliberal ideas began in Latin America and began to influence key policy makers in the United States.

South America and Asia became a laboratory for the neoliberal experiment during the 1970s (Klein, 2007). The growing alliance among faculty, right wing think tanks, and conservative politicians in these regions helped to spearhead an ideological crusade starting in Chile and later in Argentina and other Latin American countries, as well as Indonesia (Klein, 2007). Ultimately, the actions of these collusions between Latin American policymakers, think tank experts, American policymakers and certain segments of Latin American higher education institutions had deleterious effects for the people of many Latin American countries. These effects included the erosion of social safety nets, healthcare provisions, and energy distribution to name a few. In many countries, social safety nets were abolished as they were seen as enabling the poor; healthcare distribution and public education were wholly or partially privatized, as was energy distribution (Klein, 2007).

In Latin America, neoliberal ideology was enforced through repression and brutality (Klein, 2007). Latin America offers a mirror of sorts. Performance based funding policies, like all neoliberal policies, require an amount of coercion to implement because the "free-market" reforms are almost always contrary to the well-being of the

people, as they largely were in Latin American (Klein, 2007). This same relationship began to emerge in the United States about two decades later, but it would not be enforced with bullets but with hegemony. I argue that performance based funding 2.0 is a manifestation of this neoliberal hegemony and emerged due to the same complex relationship between higher education administrators, coordinating and governing boards, lobbyists and policymakers in the United States during the 1990s.

While neoliberalism took hold in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s, the same time period in the United States also saw a tremendous social upheaval. Institutions of higher education were central actors in this upheaval and played pivotal roles. The civil rights movement exposed the hypocrisy of a nation which called itself equal. Unprecedented numbers of traditionally under represented students, such as women, minorities (especially African-Americans), and lower income students swelled the ranks of higher education institutions in America (Newfield, 2008). Of course higher education by no means was an egalitarian institution, but radical segments of American higher education challenged the hypocrisy of American society (Newfield, 2008). The society of democratic students at Michigan, the protests at Berkeley, the many teach-ins and sit-ins, and many others all questioned American values and gave a voice to many marginalized populations (Newfield, 2008; Pusser, 2006). Newfield (2008) argued that higher education became a threat to the ruling class and the capitalist system..

In short, universities in the 1960s became a powerful weapon for social justice. Because of this, Newfield (2008) argued that universities also became targets for conservatives. During the mid-1970s, the United States also fell into a severe economic

recession. Again, just like the 1930s, many began to seriously question the capitalist system that had wrought such economic hardship (Harvey, 2005; Wolff, 2012). Wolff (2012) further argued that the recession of the 1970s made society ripe for socialist action, much like the Great Depression of the 1930s had paved the way for the New Deal. The universities became a hub of this discontent. As a way to rebut what many conservatives saw as a rising tide of communism and radicalism, conservatives turned to neoliberalism and its focus on the market (Newfield, 2008).

Just like in Latin America, the close relationship between academia, think tanks, and government emerged and helped to push a neoliberal agenda, as outlined by the Powell memo (Harvey, 2005; MacDonald, 2013; Newfield, 2008). As the recession and stagflation of the 1970s worsened, neoliberalism became a sort of demagoguery to a frustrated and beleaguered populace because it catered to the population's baser interests, that of economic security (Peet, 2009). Higher education in particular was in the crosshairs (Letizia, 2013a; Newfield, 2008). As Freidman noted in his 1981 classic *Free to Choose*, "public education was a socialist island in a free market sea" (p. 143). He went on to chastise students at public universities, calling them lazy and accusing them of partying on the state's dime, while he lavished praise on private school students. He argued that since they were paying for their education, they took it much more seriously. Freidman went on to argue that education should be a right- but only for those who could afford it (Freidman & Freidman, 1981).

Friedman's (1981) thoughts epitomized the attitude of many toward public education at all levels. As state coffers lost money, the massive public expenditures on

education at both the secondary and postsecondary levels were scrutinized and questioned. The radical goals of the 1960s were attacked for being too costly, and for requiring a bloated bureaucracy to administer them. Instead neoliberals argued that colleges had to become more efficient with their resources and must help to spurn economic development (Newfield, 2008). Neoliberals advocated for the free market to run unfettered of the range of government legislation supporting social programs, including access to higher education (Friedman, 1981). Building on the arguments of Smith's *invisible hand,* any interventions with the market were viewed as harmful to achieving efficiency. It is this sentiment, the perfectibility of the market, which has become entrenched in current accountability policies, specifically performance based funding policies. Here, the belief is that an unfettered market will result in the best outcomes.

During the 1950s and 1960s, universities and state governments operated based on trust; universities were trusted to give back to their constituents, and they almost always did (Burke, 2005; Newfield, 2008). Of course, as Gorbunov (2013) points out, as early as the 1950s and 1960s, there were some performance systems in place in some states. Most notably were program budgeting and program planning and budgeting systems. Later, in the 1970s, some states adopted zero-based budgeting. These programs all had in common the idea that budgeting for higher education institutions should take into account performance objectives. These programs however were not widely utilized and quickly fell out of favor. In the largest sense, until the late 1970s, institutions of higher education were seen as responsible for the betterment of society by providing

powerful social benefits, such as a literate and critical populace, as well as increasing public service and civic behaviors (Bowen, 1996; McMahon, 2009; Zumeta, 2011). Higher education institutions were given the resources they needed by the state in the expectation that they would enhance individuals and society in a variety of ways, both economic and non-economic (McMahon, 2009; Zumeta, 2011).

By the late 1970s however, this trust in higher education had largely eroded, due mainly to the influence of neoliberalism on educational policymaking. Of course, all government entities were in question post-Watergate (Fowler, 2009). But higher education was target of many conservatives. From a market point of view, higher education was cast as a costly endeavor. Professors, especially of liberal arts, humanities, and social sciences were increasingly viewed as communists and radicals (MacDonald, 2013; Newfield, 2008). Due to the surge in enrollments in this decade, higher education institutions, which were short on resources, began asking states for more money and resources. As neoliberalism began to resonate with policymakers and the general public, and as stagflation set in, many questioned why states should fund these increasingly radical institutions. Further, some began to argue that higher education institutions, and really liberal arts and humanities departments, really did not produce anything of value. Instead, overpaid and underworked professors in these departments produced useless knowledge and research (Newfield, 2008; Rhoads & Torres, 2006). The motivation for supporting higher education to address the fear of a post-Sputnik world in which America lost ground to other nations was now absent. In the largest sense, neoliberal advocates changed the focus of higher education from one of equality of access, which had

resonated during the socially contentious 1960s and 1970s, to one of accountability, which began to resonate with many policymakers and the general public during the economic recession of the mid-1970s. The pendulum of policy swung to reflect this area of focus.

Yet, the accountability movement was much more than an economic argument proposed by neoliberals. Higher education became a target of traditional conservatives as well (Newfield, 2008). As Harvey (2005) points out, neo-conservatism meshes well with neoliberalism. Neo-conservatism emerged as a reaction to the alleged liberality and wantonness of the 1960s (Stanley, 2007). In particular, conservatives focused attention on public institutions of higher education and their liberal professors. Not only did professors in humanities and other departments produce research of little value, the research also threatened public order (Newfield, 2008).

The enactment of performance based funding policies during the 1990s emerged in this climate of backlash against public higher education (Bogue & Johnson, 2010; Marginson, 2011). Since neoliberals see an unimpeded free market as the best method to achieve social harmony and efficiency, neoliberals make common cause with neoconservatives. Neoliberals utilize the repressive aspect of neoconservatism to ensure that market forces remain unimpeded (Klein, 2007; Harvey, 2005; Stanley, 2007). Neoliberals advocated for market based decisions such as performance based funding to make higher education accountable to market needs. This view helped to frame the language of policymakers away from the social justice concerns of the 1960s and early 1970s to a more market driven vision of education which resonated with neoliberalism.

This historical review is not to suggest that higher education, prior to the rise of neoliberalism, was solely a bastion of the powers of the human mind. Nor is it to suggest that higher education after the 1960s was a bastion of radical democracy or that all of the research produced was excellent. What makes the neoliberal turn of the late 1970s, which continues into the present, so fundamentally different is the fact that the humanistic potential of higher education is almost completely disregarded, and in many cases, targeted because of the revolutionary potential embedded in the ideals of individual thought (Engal & Dangerfield, 1998; Newfield, 2008).

While there is no date set in stone to mark the rise of neoliberalism, the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 to the presidency may be the most convenient marker. Reagan embodied neoliberal ideas. Reagan was also seen as a stalwart conservative. The silent majority had given him a mandate to clean up the mess of the 1960s and 1970s (Diggins, 2007; Harvey, 2005; Zumeta, 2011). And, this is precisely what he set out to do. One of Reagan's first actions was to starve the beast (the federal government) of funds (Diggins, 2007; Lambert, 2014). It was argued that starving public entities of funds would force them act like market entities or simply cease functioning (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004).

Questions of enrollment declines, economic downturn, and growing influence of neoliberalism and neoconservatism spurned the first accountability movements of the 1970s (Alexander, 2000; Burke, 2005). Many policymakers sought to limit the resources to higher education (Burke, 2005). By the 1980s, policymakers questioned the quality of a college degree and college teaching (Burke, 2005; Zumeta, 2001). This assessment was spurred on by the *Nation at Risk* report in 1983 and its accusations of low quality in K-12

education.

Perhaps the 1983 "Nation at Risk" congressional report, which claimed K-12 schools in America were failing, a claim which was later directed at public higher education institutions, is the epitome of the accountability movement (Fowler, 2009). The report claimed that public education was in such a dire state that it posed a risk to national security because students were not prepared for the workforce and this put the United States at a competitive disadvantage in the knowledge economy. Policymakers and representatives from the business community argued that drastic educational reforms were needed (Fowler, 2009). As Wingspread (1993) and Burke (2002) argue, this critique soon carried over to public higher education institutions. Later works such as Alan Bloom's (1987) *Closing of the American Mind* and Roger Kimball's (1990) *Tenured Radicals*, which chastised higher education scholarship as fragmented and overtly leftist, helped to fuel this critique.

The accountability movement for higher education during the 1980s focused on assessment of skills (Burke, 2002). Policymakers and outside stakeholders, most notably business interests, argued that undergraduates should graduate college with certain skills and that current students were not graduating with these skills. Higher education institutions were given the autonomy to craft these goals. It seemed that campuses and policymakers had come to some form of agreement. This movement was superficial however (Burke, 2002). Burke (2002) argues that campuses seized the chance of autonomy while producing limited results. The recession of the early 1990s brought the assessment movement to an unspectacular end and ushered in a new and more volatile era

for higher education funding (Burke, 2002). As Gold (1995) and Burke argue, higher education was the real loser in the competition for state funds during the 1990s. State funding dropped drastically.

As the economic outlook worsened during the early 1990s, the neoliberal notion of human capital began to resonate with many policymakers and educational reformers (Becker, 1993; Overtveldt, 2007; Peet, 2009). As argued earlier, human capital theory equated education mainly with a monetary investment. It should be noted however that later scholars (McMahon, 2009; Perna et al., 2014) have argued that human capital theory does not just have to be viewed as a monetary investment, but also a social investment. Even Becker (1993) noted this. However, neoliberals have equated human capital with monetary investment (Peet, 2009). Neoliberals argue that all social phenomena could be quantified and viewed as a market good and education was no exception (Becker, 1993; Overtveldt, 2007; Peet, 2009; Reder, 1982). Education was seen as an investment of resources, mainly money and time, which stood to provide most gain for the individual. As a monetary investment, education had to produce a tangible gain, in the form of higher occupations, higher wages and ultimately a stronger economy (Becker, 1993; Overtveldt, 2007; Peet, 2009). The more academic concerns of scientific exploration and social justice were largely neglected by neoliberals, and actively targeted by neoconservatives (Mallot et al., 2013; Stanley, 2007). Instead of social justice, policymakers wanted to see results.

Another impact of the narrow reading of human capital theory was that the social benefits of higher education to society were neglected (McMahon, 2009). Even though

policymakers and neoliberals recognized the aggregate economic benefits of higher education, higher education came to be seen largely as a private good which only benefited an individual and the view no longer acknowledged education as a social good that benefited society *and* the individual. Further, if higher education is seen strictly as a private good, as it came to be by the 1980s, than it was argued that the burden of payment should fall on the individual because the individual is the only one who is thought to benefit (Bowen, 1996; McMahon, 2009). This change in perspective was another reason states began to dramatically slashing their support of higher education, arguing that the individual should pay in the form of tuition. At the same time as this deliberate reduction in state funds occurred, policymakers began demanding that higher education institutions keep their tuition low. State policymakers were increasingly willing to slash funding for higher education.

Human capital theory created a view of education as a driver of economic opportunity (Alexander, 2000; Peet, 2009). As such, the call for quality of education which sounded in the 1980s was replaced by a call for tangible *outcomes* during the 1990s. In this era, the assessment movement began in earnest (Banta, 2000; Burke, 2002). In order for higher education to drive the economy, policymakers insisted that higher education institutions produce tangible outcomes, namely an educated workforce. The prevailing sentiment amongst policymakers by the 1990s was that higher education institutions needed to be held accountable for producing these beneficial outcomes (Alexander, 2000). Educational research also came under heavy criticism for not being responsive to practical needs, for being too liberal and for being methodologically

suspect (Scheonfield & Burkhardt, 2003; Labree, 1998; Oancea, Engelbrecht & Hoffman, 2009).

Overall, the cumulative effect of this entrepreneurial push on universities altered the social contract between higher education institutions and the states that fund them (Henkel, 2005; Kallison & Cohen, 2009; Lewis & Hearn, 2003). Formerly, the agreements of these social contracts consisted of higher education institutions using state resources to create a well-rounded, educated citizenry and a vibrant public sphere (Bowen, 1996; Zumeta, 2011). By the 1990s however, the substance of these agreements had largely changed. New visions of the social contract hold that higher education institutions are largely sites to train workers for the global market and not much else (Alexander, 2000; Kallison & Cohen, 2009; Lewis & Hearn, 2003; Kizitepe, 2010; Mallot et al., 2013; Zemsky, 2005; Zumeta, 2011).

Performance Based Accountability

Performance based initiatives were one specific method to ensure higher education institutions accountability to state economic priorities (Burke, 2005). While some performance based activity had emerged earlier, by the 1990s state policymakers began to adopt a combination of three types of performance based initiatives; performance based reporting, performance based budgeting and performance based funding. The Tennessee Higher Education Commission, which is the coordinating board for Tennessee higher education, sensing the calls for growing accountability that had emerged in the 1970s, took the initiative and created the nations' first performance based funding policy, enacted in 1980 (Bogue & Johnson, 2010). Tennessee however remained

an anomaly for decade, but by the 1990s, many other states began to follow Tennessee's lead and implemented performance based policies; either performance based funding, performance based budgeting or performance based reporting (Burke, 2005). During the 1990s, South Carolina created a PBF policy with over 30 metrics, this was short lived however (Gorbunov, 2013).

In a wider sense, performance reporting, budgeting and funding are all manifestations of the larger accountability movement because each method was meant to spurn higher education institutions into producing outcomes to drive the state's economy (Gorbunov, 2013; Zemsky, 2005). It is performance funding however which has the ability to produce the most drastic institutional effects. Of the three methods, performance based reporting was by far the most widely used by the 1990s, but a program of performance funding was emerging (Burke, 2005).

Performance based reporting. Performance based reporting mandated that public universities make public all of their data. Burke (2002) argued that the reports provoked opposition from campus officials because these officials saw a threat to campus autonomy. Some campus leaders argued for self-assessments from institutions. Burke (2002) argued however that this proposal failed to garner support from policymakers and business leaders, and the general public due to a lack of trust in higher education institutions. Higher education officials did have some voice in the creation of these indicators, but the indicators were largely externally imposed (Burke, 2002).

In a larger sense, the indicators reflected the growing influence of neoliberal and human capital theories. In human capital theory the student is treated as a customer. In

order for a customer to make the best possible choice regarding his or her education, he or she needs as much information as possible (Becker, 1964; Friedman & Friedman, 1979). Policymakers began to require that state institutions begin to make public their information, such as time to degree, faculty to student ratio, graduation rates and other relevant information (Burke, 2005; Callan & Finney, 2005). Typically, coordinating and consolidated governing boards reported data on all public institutions and in some states, even private institutions (Burke, 2005). In addition, institutions often reported their own data individually as well. The reports were made public to state legislators, governors and campus leaders. The information also began to appear on board and institutional websites. Many times the information is directed prospective students and their parents (Burke, 2005; Callan & Finney, 2005).

The underlying motivation behind performance reporting is that by making individual and institutional performance will increase if results are made public. As Burke (2005) explains however, there is no link between reporting and state funding or budgeting. Many policymakers require institutions to make public a number of data.

Performance based budgeting. Unlike performance reporting, performance budgeting does link funding to outcomes. Performance based budgeting allowed policymakers to make budget decisions in light of results reported by higher education institutions (Burke, 2005). This link however is indirect. Performance budgeting allows for policymakers and higher education boards to take into consideration campus achievement and outputs when determining allocations for public institutions of higher education (Burke, 2005). There are no quantifiable or discreet formulas for gaining or

losing funding. Another important facet of performance budgeting is that performance budgeting mechanisms allocate resources for achieved results, not results that are promised by an institution (Burke, 2005). Burke (2002) notes that state policymakers saw performance budgeting as a logical maneuver to tie funding to results, but campus leaders saw this move as especially threatening.

Performance budgeting were meant to spurn higher education institutions to produce outcomes by making institutional outcomes a consideration of funding (Burke, 2005). The main advantage of performance budgeting is that it is flexible. This advantage came at the price of certainty however. Increased or decreased institutional funding relies primarily on the discretion of policymakers. Performance funding is just the opposite; certain but largely inflexible (Burke, 2005).

Performance based funding. Performance funding specifically tied funding to outcomes (Burke, 2005; Zumeta, 2001). Unlike performance budgeting which relied on indirect and discretionary methods to allocate funds, performance funding relies on specific formulas to allocate specific funds for meeting specific metrics (Burke, 2005; Gorbunov, 2013). In the 1990s, the first active round of performance based funding occurred. These policies are now referred to as PBF 1.0 to distinguish from the recent round of PBF in the 2010s. Even though the PBF 1. 0 programs varied, they shared key characteristics. PBF policies were output driven; institutions received financial incentives for producing certain outputs, such as number of graduates (Burke, 2005). The output indicators, however, were largely created without the support of campus officials; rather they were prescribed by legislators. Furthermore, there was little variation among

outputs between institutions with varying missions. There was a one size fits all approach to policy demanded indicators in which institutional missions were largely neglected in the creation of the output measures. Finally, the financial incentives under PBF 1.0 were supplemental, or in addition to an institution's base funding. If the institution did not reach its goals, it would only forego bonus funding, not be penalized with regards to its base funding (Harnisch, 2011). The intent of PBF was to ensure that an institution was held accountable to state workforce and economic needs.

Performance based funding 1.0 had mixed results. Dougherty and Reddy's (2011) study of PBF 1.0 found three ultimate impacts intended from performance funding, namely: improved retention, improved remediation, and improved graduation rate. However, their research did not find much evidence that PBF 1.0 policies promoted these ultimate outcomes. Instead, they found evidence that PBF produced more intermediate and immediate impacts (Dougherty & Reddy, 2011). The intermediate impacts were increased use of data in institutional planning, academic improvements, and student services improvements (Dougherty & Reddy, 2011). The more immediate impacts of performance funding were increased awareness of state priorities, increased awareness of institution's own performance and increased status competition among universities (Dougherty & Reddy, 2011). Other evaluations of PBF 1.0 policies found similar results (Miao, 2012; Shin, 2009). Shin (2009) used a hierarchical linear model that included the variables of the university having a hospital, faculty-staff ratios, length of PBF enacted, PhD awarding status, mission, and tuition. The variable for comparison was if states had performance based funding (or a variation of performance based funding and

performance budgeting) to states that did not have PBF in place. Even though PBF did bring slight increases of institutional awareness of state workforce needs, Shin (2009) concluded that these increases did not constitute a noticeable change in institutional performance. Only 15% of the change in graduation rates could be attributed to PBF, and only 6% of the increase to research performance, which he concluded represented a negligible effect (Shin, 2009). Both the 15% and 6% figures were significant.

The other outcome of PBF was the creation of unintended consequences, which impacted institutional success (Dougherty & Reddy, 2013). Hidden compliance costs such as the hiring of more administrative personal was one unintended consequence. Some institutions also reported narrowing their missions due to PBF. This mission contraction occurred because some missions were not rewarded by performance funding, such as civic and cultural missions, as well as certain workforce programs (Dougherty & Reddy, 2013). Problematically, the lowering of academic standards also occurred in order to make an intuition appear to look better. For example, one Florida community college eliminated their special needs services because special needs students did not contribute to performance points (Dougherty & Reddy, 2013).

Burke and Serban (1998) created a typology to examine the inner workings of PBF policies in the late 1990s. In 1998, they examined 11 performance funding programs across the United States. To categorize the different desires of policies makers that are written into policies, Burke and Serban (1998) presented the data as inputs, processes, outputs, and outcomes. Inputs had been the traditional markers of state funding, most often in the form of enrollments (Burke, 2005). The process variables

included how resources were allocated, such as teaching loads and measures of class size. An output included the direct result of college functions, such as graduation rates. Finally, an outcome encompassed social value of outputs and processes.

In a wider sense, the delineation between process, outputs and outcomes give policymakers discreet metrics to compare. Zumeta (2001) argued that the state desires these types of metrics so policymakers can easily establish measureable goals and track progress towards these goals. The reliance on discreet metrics, while useful to gauge some types of superficial institutional performance, can have a debilitating effect on measuring the actual effects that higher education institutions have on the public good, from increasing civic participation to lowering incarceration rates (Callan & Finney, 2005; McMahon, 2009). My study follows this logic in critiquing PBF 2.0 policies. I follow Burke and Serban (1998) in defining the inputs, processes, outputs and outcomes of the selected PBF 2 0 policies. I go further by examining how these inputs, processes, outputs and outcomes affect an institution's ability to contribute to the public good.

By the early 2000s, almost all of the initial PBF policies had been allowed to lapse, due primarily to the economic downturn which occurred during this time and the subsequent shortage of bonus funds for PBF (Harnisch, 2011). The reason the loss of interest in PBF 1.0 was because the funds for PBF 1.0 came from bonus funds. When the downturn hit, the bonus funds dried up. While performance based funding had ended unspectacularly, this first round of PBF paved the way for the present round of PBF. The next round of performance based funding would not rely on bonus funds, but tie performance measures to an institutions base funding. In a wider sense, performance

based reporting, budgeting and especially performance based funding, was indicative of a new political and social climate. As Burke (2005) notes, by the early 2000s, it was the market, not the commonwealth or the public good that drove higher education policy.

Performance based funding 2.0. The year 2007 saw a resurgence in interest in performance based funding. The economic downturn of 2007 reinvigorated the call for PBF by policymakers, in an effort to make higher education institutions more efficient, productive and more aligned with their state's economic needs (Harnisch, 2011). Coupled with the economic downturn was the dismal numbers regarding college completion rates (Complete College American, 2012; Miao, 2012). Of course one of the most potent barriers to college completion is the rising income gap and the drastic cuts in public funding yet these factors are never given as a reason (Pusser, Breneman, Gansneder, Kohl, Levin, Milam &Turner, 2008). Instead, colleges are simply lambasted for skyrocketing tuition and low completion rates.

This time around, policymakers learned from the first wave of performance funding, dubbed "performance funding 1.0." The crucial different between PBF 1.0 and PBF 2.0 is that funding for PBF 2.0 is tied to an institution's base funding as the funding is not bonus funding, as it was under PBF 1.0. Even the leader of PBF 1.0 policies, Tennessee, scrapped its PBF 1.0 policy and enacted the Complete College Act in 2010 which allocates 100% of base funding on meeting specified targets and outcomes.

Currently, each state relies on a slightly different political arrangement to implement and maintain PBF 2.0 policies, these three arrangements are output based formulas, performance set asides, or performance contracts (Friedel et al., 2013). Output

funding provides fiscal incentives for improvements on metrics, performance set asides allocate a certain portion of state funding for PBF 2.0, and performance contracts between institutions and the legislature similar to PBF 1.0. Despite the slight differences in policy arrangements, the central goal of PBF 2.0 is based on the notion that universities and colleges must reach certain outcomes which align with a state's economic and workforce needs (Dougherty & Reddy, 2011; Harnisch, 2011; Miao, 2012; Friedel et al., 2013). Not only do states seek similar outcomes, such as increased complete rates, they also share similar measurements of these goals, such as time to degree, credit hours accumulated, numbers of disadvantaged students who complete a degree and high need degrees earned, such as STEM degrees to name a few (Harnisch, 2011). The states using PBF 2.0 policies also share common incentives and strategies for compliance, the most typical is increased funding as a reward, but also increased autonomy for institutions which meet specific goals (Harnisch, 2014). At the time of writing this dissertation, there are 30 US states that have performance based funding policies; and six states that are in the process of implementing performance based funding policies; another 10 are in formal discussions to design similar funding policies (Dougherty & Reddy, 2011; Miao, 2012; Friedel et al., 2013; Quintelli, 2011). Table 1 (see Appendix A) gives a detailed examination of all goals, measurements and incentives of the 30 states which practice PBF 2.0.

Since its inception in 2007, performance funding 2.0, has been differentiated by policymakers within states to reflect the range of needs and missions of institutions of higher education, such as community colleges, flagships and teacher colleges. This form

of differentiation highlights a drastic change from the one size fits all approach used with PBF 1.0. In addition, the higher education community (namely higher education administrators) has been much more involved with policymakers in the process of creating and setting institutional goals, whereas PBF 1.0 policies were mainly constructed without the input of higher education stakeholders (Friedel et al., 2013). Another change from PBF 1.0 is that PBF 2.0 focuses not only on ultimate outcomes such as graduation rates and alignment with the state's economic goals, but process or intermediate metrics which help institutions achieve these goals, such as accumulation of credit hours (Friedel et al., 2013; Miao, 2012). Perhaps the greatest change from performance funding 1. 0, however, is that the greater incentive for institutions to actually reach their goals because the funding is not supplemental or bonus funding, but rather tied to an institution's base allocation from the state (Dougherty & Reddy, 2011; Miao, 2012; Friedel et al., 2013; Quintelli, 2011). While the amounts of ties to base funding are small for most states, usually from 1-10%, the satisfactory meeting of performance based goals is tied to 100% of funding in Ohio and Tennessee. Moreover, the states with small allocations for performance based funding have written it into their policies that the amount will gradually increase. Because there is much more money involved in PBF 2.0, Dougherty and Reddy (2013) argue that PBF 2.0 will have much more significant impacts on institutional behavior, and thus, these policies n eed to be scrutinized.

There has been some criticism of PBF 2.0. Jones (2013) argued that PBF 2.0 policies are limited because they do not account for the academic preparation of college students and levels on institutional funding. Dougherty and Reddy (2013) further argued

that PBF 2.0 policies tend to be ill defined and narrow and do not anticipate unintended consequences, such as hidden administrative costs. When Tandberg and Hillman (2013) performed their quantitative study they found that in 19 states where performance based funding was present, only four states increased community college graduates, rates in nine states remained stagnant, and graduation rates in six states declined. For bachelor's degrees, they found that in four states, bachelor degree conferral increased, in four states conferral decreased, and in 12 states, bachelor degree conferral remained stagnant. Given these mixed outcomes, Tandberg and Hillman (2013) warned of a bandwagon effect in which many states may be implementing PBF 2.0 policies seeing it as a "silver bullet" and not really understanding its effects. Pointedly, the findings of Tandberg and Hillman's (2013) study found limited success attributed to outcome goals of PBF 2.0 funding. Their study however covered the period from 1990 until 2010, which excludes most of the states from my study. Their study also conflates PBF 1.0 and PBF 2.0.

Tandberg and Hillman (2014) also found that PBF policies take on average seven to eight years to show increases in college success, and the longer PBF policies are implemented, the more success is likely. Yet Tandberg and Hillman (2014) argue that it may not be wise for policymakers to jump on the bandwagon of PBF 2.0 with only the *potential* for results. Tandberg and Hillman (2014) also call for qualitative researchers to examine the design aspects of performance based funding policies. My study takes up Tandberg and Hillman's (2014) call. My study specifically looks at how the design of PBF policies can shape the public good of their respective states because as Dougherty and Reddy (2013) and others have shown, increased graduation rates may come at the

expense of watered-down rigor, the abolishing of programs which are not thought to contribute to the global market and a host of other detrimental factors.

Of course some argue that early criticism of the PBF 2.0 may be shortsighted because PBF 2.0 is so new (Lederman, 2013). Others have argued that as appropriations tied to performance increase, policies will become more effective (Lederman, 2013). By and large however, the true effects of PBF 2.0 will be unknown for quite some time. What remains unknown is how the language of the policies themselves shape the implementation process, and therefore the outcomes and ultimately the public good.

McClendon and Hearn (2013) argue that PBF models have many drawbacks. For one, PBF policies have the potential to exacerbate inequality between institutions by penalizing already low performing institutions. McClendon and Hearn (2013) also posit that performance based funding can undermine campus autonomy because colleges have to meet preset goals that were largely out of the colleges hands. Another major drawback to PBF is the possible effect on institutional quality. McClendon and Hearn (2013) argue that, in an effort to promote graduation, institutions may lower their rigor and lessen degree requirements, making it easier for students to graduate.

Performance based funding in many respects is the future for higher education policy in the United States given the trend of decreased state funding for higher education (McClendon & Hearn, 2013; Tandberg & Hillman, 2013). Performance based funding drastically alters institutional governance by refocusing the efforts of administrators and faculty toward performance goals rather than individual campus goals or mission. And since higher education institutions have a special relationship in regards to promoting the

public good, institutional governance patterns have a major impact on the shaping of the public good (Pusser, 2006; Tierney, 2006; Wellman, 2006). Thus, it is crucial to further study the effects of performance based funding, and its effects on institutional governance and the public good in particular.

The forces behind PBF 2.0. Neoliberal and neoconservative ideas align together to help drive educational policy (Giroux, 2011; Hill, 2012; Rhoads & Torres, 2006). A central strategy to advance these ideas is through the dissemination of information by right wing, neoliberal, and neoconservative think tanks. These groups supply, frame, and interpret information for many policymakers (MacDonald, 2013). Even many left leaning think tanks however have adopted the neoliberal stance of seeing education as a market good and also promote accountability regimes (MacDonald, 2013). States with predominantly republican legislatures tend to adopt performance based funding policies (Gorbunov, 2013; McClendon, et al., 2006). Figure 1.1 illustrates the party designation of the states that have enacted PBF 2.0 policies, demonstrating that republican legislators are the primary proponents of performance based funding 2.0 policies. Democrats however have also been integral to the passage of many PBF policies, which is also evident from table 1.1 (See Appendix A). Many moderate democrats, sensing the political mood that values accountability and efficiency for public institutions, support performance based funding policies. These think tanks, policymakers, republicans, and in many cases a sizeable number of democrats are transforming universities into cogs of the global economy. The only perceived purpose of institutions, at least according to policymakers, is to drive the global economy (Hall &

Thomas, 2012; MacDonald, 2013; Rhoads & Torres, 2006; Vestritich, 2008).

Further, philanthropic organizations such as Lumina Foundation and The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation are also pushing a neoliberal agenda for higher education and K-12 policy (Hall & Thomas, 2012; Kovacs & Christie, 2008; Reckhow & Snyder, 2014). The Lumina and Gates foundations work closely with state legislators to craft policies for higher education; specifically performance based funding policies (Dougherty & Reddy, 2011; Friedel et al., 2013; Miao, 2012). The Lumina and Gates foundation also fund many neoconservative and neoliberal think tanks and organizations (Kovacs & Christie, 2008). The aim of these foundations is to promote degree completions above all else because as many advocates of PBF 2.0 repeatedly argue, the economic prowess of the United States is threatened due to how quickly the country is falling behind globally in the number of adults with degrees attained (Miao, 2012).

The Complete College America Foundation was established by the Gates Foundation. The Complete College American Foundation is a non-profit organization with one overarching goal: to increase college graduation rates (Complete College American, 2012; Mangan, 2013). The organization works though targeted advocacy. In order to join the Complete College American Alliance of states, a state's governor, in partnership with the higher education institutions in the state, agrees to make college completion a top priority by committing to three task: setting completion goals for universities, collect and report common measures of progress and develop action plans and move key policy levers (Mangan, 2013). The last task emphasizes the unique nature of PBF 2.0. It reads: "Use performance based funding to create the conditions for

successful reform and incentivize student progression and success" (Complete College America, 2010). What is significant about this last task is that even states that are not currently in the alliance but have adopted PBF 2.0 policies are following this mantra by using policy to tie funding to completion, which creates considerable resources for the states. Fowler (2009) describes agenda setting as the most important component of the policy process; this stage is where targeted advocacy really shapes policy due to money, power, and access to legislators. Think tanks and other organizations (discussed below) supply data regarding PBF strategies and practices to state policymakers and state officials who are considering implanting PBF policies (Hall & Thomas, 2012; Kovacs & Christie, 2008; MacDonald, 2013; Recknow & Synder, 2014).

More degree completions equate to more jobs and a stronger economy, and in neoliberal terms, the global economy is king (Hall & Thomas, 2012). An alliance of state governors, other state legislators, higher education officials, and members of the Complete College America foundation has been woven together in an effort to influence state policymaking toward performance based funding and other outcome based measures (Mangan, 2013). It should be noted, however, that scholars cannot view these organizations in distinctly positive or negative terms. Specifically, the Gates and Lumina foundations have funded some research on education that does not singularly push their neoliberal agenda. One such study (Pusser & colleagues, 2009), which, while pushing a completion agenda, also examines the financial obstacles of non-traditional students completing college. By and large however, most of the research connected to these organizations, especially since the founding of the Complete College America in 2009,

does unabashedly push a neoliberal order of discourse (Hall & Thomas, 2012).

Another organization supported by Lumina and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is the National Governors Association (NGA). Taking a page from the Lumina, Gates, and ALEC playbook, at the 2011 NGA annual meeting, the idea of performance based funding and holding higher education institutions accountable to taxpayers was a major theme of the conference (Maine report, 2012). As a result, many governors have spearheaded the push for PBF policies through their state legislatures.

Another influential organization which shapes higher education policy is American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), which is a conservative policy organization that underwrites policies for state legislators (Hall & Thomas, 2012; Underwood & Mead, 2012). Their website boasts the use of free market principles and advocates for smaller government in order to ensure the liberty of United States citizens. ALEC has been influential in pushing its neoliberal agenda across state capitols. Performance based funding is a favored method for pursuing this neoliberal agenda because it casts institutions squarely as human capital producers while scrubbing institutions of their potential for social criticism (Hall & Thomas, 2012;). On the ALEC website, there is a downloadable paper entitled "10 Questions Legislators Should Ask About Higher Education" (Murray, 2011). The first question reads: "How do American college completion rates compare, and why do they matter?" The ALEC report draws on the Lumina foundation, as well as the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think tank that has pushed for the privatization and marketization of education (Murray, 2011). Perhaps question six is even more telling. The question reads: "What is the price of a

college education, and how affordable is it?" (Murray, 2011). Public higher education institutions are chastised for skyrocketing tuition and questionable revenue generating practices, yet there is no mention of the rising income gap in the United States which hinders and increasing number of students from attending and completing college, and no mention of the concerted and successful effort of state policymakers across the country to defund and eviscerate public institutions, colleges being a favorite target. Question seven asks: "How strong is academic quality?" (Murray, 2011). Needless to say, institutions are lambasted for producing inferior graduates lacking requisite knowledge. In 2012, The Gates Foundation tried to put some distance between themselves and ALEC and since then have formally stopped collaborating on educational policies. Lumina and ALEC however still work closely together. Nonetheless, ALEC is a very powerful actor in state capitols and has been able to help push a similar agenda to Gates.

These organizations help to create and disseminate the neoliberal order of discourse (Fairclough, 1989). This order of discourse is crafted around terms such as human capital, efficiency, the global market, and others which will be explained in more detail later. While many policymakers truly believe that higher education must be accountable and performance based funding is the method to achieve this, many policymakers and their supporters also use accountability measures in general, and performance based funding method in particular, as methods to discipline higher education and to stymie its revolutionary potential (Alexander, 2000; Hill, 2012; Newfield, 2008). This result is accomplished due to the removal and limitation of institutional autonomy. Authority now moves "upwards and outwards" to parties

external to the university, such as politicians and businesses lobbyists (Barnetson & Cutright, 2000, p. 13). Further, complex judgments and understandings of an institution's progress are replaced with seemingly objective and neutral indicators which cannot capture moral, political, and humanistic understandings of what a college actually does (Barnetson & Cutright, 2000; Dougherty & Reddy, 2013).

In a wider sense, the drastic cuts to higher education are not seen as political maneuvers by the public, but rather as inevitable fluctuations of a neutral system that must to be dealt with accordingly (Edmundson & D'Orso, 2007). The actions are scrubbed of their political nature so as not to engender political opposition from the public (Edmundson & D'Orso, 2007; Hill, 2012). For example, President Obama's charged: "So let me put colleges and universities on notice. If you can't keep tuition from going up, the funding you get from taxpayers will go down" (Fried & Salam, 2012, p. 29). This statement obviates and ignores the almost 40 years of decreases in state appropriations, which largely necessitated the need to raise tuition. In the arena of higher education budgeting, Obama and republicans can find common ground in their treatment of higher education tuition (Fried & Salam, 2012).

Higher education is cast as indispensable, but in need of major reforms, which market mechanisms can supply. In a 2012 article in the *National Review*, Business Professor Mr. Vance Fried at Oklahoma State University and Mr. Reihan Salam of the *National Review Online* argue that the "higher education cartel" simply usurps state funds for their own selfish uses, jacks up tuition, and impoverishes states (p. 30). They further argue that despite the fact that between 1987 and 2009 per capita state spending on higher

education increased by 30% after accounting for inflation, college completion and graduation rates declined (Fried & Salam, 2012). While these facts are true, this argument is misleading and disingenuous. Higher education does receive more state funding, however, the funds make up a much smaller proportion of their budget due to increasing expenses. So, if institution X received 8 million dollars from the state, and it now receives 12 million, the 12 million actually makes up 10% of the budget, whereas the 8 million constituted 15% of the budget, due to the increased costs of living. So even when institutions receive more money, they receive less relative to their overall budget proportion (Burke, 2002). In this climate of decreasing revenue, many neoliberal critics such as Fried and Salam (2012), assure us that giving higher education more money is not the answer, rather, starving higher education and making institutions compete is the answer. Earlier, Richard Vedder (2004) argued that higher education and prostitution are the only industries since the beginning of time to not change their business practices, which are now largely inefficient in a globalized world. Like Fried and Salam (2012), Vedder (2004) called for decreasing funding to higher education institutions and creating market competition between them as a cure for this inefficiency.

The strategy of starving public entities of funding in order to force them to become market driven is one of the major weapons conservative and neoliberal policymakers use to discipline higher education (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Zumeta, 2011, 2001). State appropriations to public institutions have declined by 19% between 2007 and 2014 (College Board, 2014); funding per full time student decreased from $9,111 dollars in 2007-2008 to $6,646 in 2012-2013, a 30% drop. While state

appropriations have steadily decreased over the last 40 years, with intermittent raises, state appropriations have taken a severe blow since the Great Recession of 2007. Simply, states have less money to allocate overall. The Great Recession has prompted neoliberals to intensify their methods, in particular, the restriction of state appropriations (Mallot et al., 2013). Delany and Doyle (2011) have noted that higher education funding follows a "balance wheel" analogy, where higher education funding increases in good economic times and decreases in troubled times. However, Delany and Doyle go on to argue that the Great Recession of 2007 may have ushered in a new, more volatile relationship between higher education institutions and state governments where funding is even less certain. At the very least, Delany and Doyle argue that higher education funding will not return to pre-recession levels.

An article run in the *Chronicle* in January of 2014, however, did note that there was a small uptick in most states for higher education appropriations in the last fiscal year. This was also echoed by 2014 AASCU report (Harnsich, 2014). Yet as noted before, these appropriations still make up a declining share of institutions budgets. In addition, investment firms such as Moody's stated that higher education community should continue to expect an environment where stagnating and declining appropriations are the norm for the foreseeable future (Kelderman, 2014).

Even though they are starved of precious state funds, higher education institutions are then held to regimes of accountability by the same policymakers (Alexander, 2000; McClendon et al., 2006). When higher education is seen as a market good as it is under neoliberalism, it can be scrutinized and made to adhere to numerical goals and targets

(Henkel, 2005; McClendon et al., 2006). Accountability with performance based funding measures are promoted at the behest of corporate lobbyists who also adhere to neoliberal principles (Alexander, 2000; McClendon et al., 2005; Prokou, 2013). At the same time, neoconservatives attack the more abstract and radical ideas emanating from higher education, particularly from schools of education themselves (Oancea, Engelbrecht & Hoffman, 2009; Rhoades & Torres, 2006).

While there have been studies which illustrate how PBF policies can negatively impact the public good, there has been no empirical study to my knowledge which has set out to understand the specific ways in which PBF 2.0 has the potential to recast the public good in solely market terms. My study intends to fill this gap by examining exactly what type of impact PBF 2.0 policies have on the public good if the public good is framed in more communal and civic terms.

Accountability and the university. Of course, universities are not passive actors in the transformation of colleges to more business like entities (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). Rather, during the 1980s and 1990s and up until the present, universities became more entrepreneurial. Slaughter and Leslie (1999) and Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) termed this shift in practice academic capitalism. Many, but by no means all, universities in America began to deviate from their public missions in search of markets and revenue to help shore up declining state funding (Rhoads & Torres, 2006; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) argued that the practices of academic capitalism blurred the boundary between the public and private spheres. For instance, many times universities will patent research advances that were only made possible due

to public dollars and public resources given to the university (i.e., tax dollars, tuitions and grants). The universities then sell these advances back to the public and profit from them (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). Washburn (2005) echoes the conflict of interest that can arise when the public missions of universities are conflated with privatizing ventures. As well, there have been a number of cases where research has been biased toward the desired results of the private sector funders (Washburn, 2005).

Sanyal and Johnstone (2009) created a privatization matrix in which to categorize the different degrees of privatization occurring in higher education. Horizontally, the matrix goes from "high publicness" to "high privateness" (p. 12). Vertically, there are five institutional factors; mission/purpose, ownership, source of revenue, control by government and norms of management. As entities acquire more privateness, these five institutional factors come to resemble more business like practices. The purpose/mission of an institution goes from serving the public needs of the state to serving clients, ownership goes from publically owned to owned by proprietors, sources of revenue change from solely taxes to solely tuition, control by government goes from state control to control by stockholders, and norms of management goes from academic norms to business norms.

Academic freedom for scientists and other faculty members decreases as government and industry increasingly "steer" higher education in more entrepreneurial directions (Henkel, 2005). In the end, academic capitalism shifts higher education institutions more toward privateness and business norms. Of course, every university, and even departments within universities, are different and as a result, will fall into

different categories on the matrix.

While certain individual professors do benefit and promote academic capitalism, academic capitalism is largely a top down movement. Newer more entrepreneurial institutional boards composed of businessmen and others more critical of traditional higher education norms, administrators who seek patents and revenues, and professors of business and engineering schools are all pushing higher education to be more accountable to the global marketplace by producing a trained workforce and patentable products (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Wellman, 2006; Zumeta, 2001). These goals of academic capitalism elide with performance based funding. In addition, many more business savvy administrators and campus officials also act like market actors by raising prices and fees and calling for privatization of campus services (Lambert, 2014).

In a wider sense, Zumeta (2001) notes how this shift to performance based funding was the result of larger social and political factors. He cited the changing composition and politics of individual institutional governing boards and state coordinating and governance boards (Zumeta, 2001) as factors supporting the change in funding. These boards have increasingly been staffed with corporate allies and others sympathetic to business norms which are many times at variance with academic norms (Zumeta, 2001). Gorbunov (2013) specifically found that states with weaker boards, such as coordinating boards, have tended to enact more PBF policies over the last 30 years because the weaker boards are not as effective in insulating the faculty from encroaching market forces. Wellman (2006) also argued that newer more corporate friendly boards have been instrumental in pushing neoliberal and accountability measures

such as performance based funding.

The literature demonstrates the push for more entrepreneurial universities which have higher "privateness" has been led by the upper echelons of the university and the state, from college administrators, presidents, institutional and coordinating board members and policymakers (Barnetson & Cutright, 2000; Henkel, 2005; Sanyal & Johnstone, 2009; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Wellman, 2006; Zumeta, 2001). This push has come mainly at the expense of the faculty and the students (Mallot et al., 2013; Prokou, 2013).

As a critical study, my intention is to give faculty and students an empirical tool to understand how PBF 2.0 policies affect the public good and its shift to higher privateness and the changing social contract. Once the faculty and students begin to grapple with the process of constructing the public good, they can begin to deliberately negotiate more beneficial and inclusive visions of the public good for American higher education.

Public Goods and the Public Good

The overarching research question in this study attempted to access how PBF 2.0 policies shape the public good. As stated earlier, the actual configuration and operation of the public sphere in any given society is configured by policies within that society (Marginson, 2007). Nonetheless, there are still many concepts that can aid scholars and society in their classification and understanding of what defines a public good. Thus, it will be helpful to briefly examine some ideas which, if newer and more expansive policies are enacted, can help conceptualize a richer and more complex public good

Marginson (2007) identified three realms in any given society of what it means to be public; public goods (plural), the public good (singular), and the Habermasian (1991) public sphere. Public goods (plural) are perhaps the most readily accessible and easily understandable of the public entities outlined. Public goods (plural) are more tangible and discreet entities, which can include clean air, public safety, and public education (Marginson, 2007). In order for something to be classified as a public good, it is usually declared to be non-rivalrous and non-excludable good (Mankiw, 2011). If a good is non-rivalrous, all members of a polity can consume it without depleting its stock (Marginson, 2007). Similarly, if a good is non-excludable, no one (at least in theory) can be denied from consuming it (Marginson, 2007). Of course, a truly non-rivalrous and non-excludable good is very rare. Rather, public goods tend to be characterized as almost non-rivalrous and almost non-excludable. For example, public education can be considered predominately a non-rival and non-excludable good. While the actual consumption of knowledge which public educators produce is non-rivalrous, there is the question of actual resources such as funding in the form of taxes, the distribution textbooks and physical classroom space. Thus, public education can be considered almost non-rivalrous.

Along with non-rivalry and non-excludability, the creation of externalities is perhaps the most salient feature of a public good. An externality is a by-product that was not necessarily intended or at least not deliberately striven for (Marginson, 2007; McMachon, 2009). These can be positive or negative. For instance, some positive externalities of public higher education in the United States is the production of a highly

educated populace which leads to increased rates of civic involvement and a stronger democracy and rule of law, lower crime rates, reduced inequality, lower fertility rates, better healthcare, stronger social cohesion and social capital, increased tolerance for diversity among citizens, and even better selection of marriage partners (Bowen, 1996; Greenwood, 1997; McMahon, 2009; Putnam, 2000). There can also be negative externalities. For instance, a negative externality of financial success for some can be the financial distress for many and environmental destruction (Marginson, 2007). This negative externality effect is nowhere better evidenced than the financial crash of 2008 in which the private actions of bankers and lenders in the private sector led to the Great Recession and the failure of the banking system in 2008. The unintended effect of private actions led to a public disaster. Externalities may be the greatest assets of public goods, because positive externalities benefit wide swaths of the population, such as higher tax bases, higher literacy rates, lower crime rates, and the like.

McMahon (2009) has argued that the majority of educational policymakers are too narrowly focused on the market benefits of higher education, mainly the boost to individual income and the tax base. This orientation is narrow and shortsighted. McMahon (2009) points out that it is usually totalitarian countries such as Iran that promote engineering over social sciences. Without social sciences and the humanities, the rule of law in a society, democratic institutions, and the questioning of authority on the part of citizens all suffer (McMahon, 2009; Newfield, 2008). However, without a clear understanding of non-market externalities, both for the individual and society, many policymakers and potential students under-invest in higher education. McMahon (2009)

adds that future historians of education may one day castigate higher education policy of the early 21st century for failing to promote these non-market benefits, and demonstrate the truly extraordinary power of higher education to positively impact society at a time when American society is passing through the knowledge age. More than this, McMahon (2009) demonstrates that the more abstract and long term outcomes of higher education, such as civic participation, enhancing the democratic process, and the rule of law can be measured quantitatively. McMahon (2009) argues that the typical outcome based measurements of higher education, the ones mainly used in performance based funding formulas, such as degrees conferred, completion rates, test score increments, and time to graduation are useful because they are immediate and available. Yet, he goes on to warn: "but they [outcome based measures] can be and are often misused since they are relatively narrow…and reflect neither quality nor the ultimate outcomes of the higher education process" (p. 130). The goals of performance based funding should be the beginnings of the higher education process, not the end.

The situation is perhaps more dire than McMahon (2009) assumes however, while not a total conspiracy, there has been a concerted effort to suppress or at least neglect the non-market externalities of higher education, especially the socially positive non-market externalities (Newfield, 2008). McMahon (2009) argued that authoritarian regimes in other countries downplay the humanities and the social sciences because these disciplines inspire critical thinking and the questioning of authority, and focus on "harder" disciplines such as engineering. It would seem higher education policies in the United States are following a similar pattern. And one of the most effective methods to stymie

social criticism and free thinking is the narrow conception of outcome based measures. As has been argued throughout this literature review, this suppression has been primarily motivated by neoliberal and neoconservative factions such as corporations, corporate lobbyists, evangelicals, as well as affiliate organizations such as ALEC and Lumina.

Within any given polity, there are many different "publics" or groups of people with different and many times competing interests (Calhoun, 1998; Marginson, 2011; Martin, 1999; Rao, 1999). These groups are not classes in the Marxist sense, which implies a strict bounding and monolithic interests. Groups are loosely connected and usually composed of various factions. One such group in American society is neoliberals, as illustrated above. These heterogeneous groups can be brought together along lines of occupation, socio-economic status, race, ethnicity, location or any other defining feature. Moreover, individuals almost always belong to multiple groups (Marginson, 2007; Sen, 1999). As a result of these multiple groups of the public, one group's public goods can become another group's public "bad" (Marginson, 2007, p. 3). For instance, clean air is a public good for everyone, yet, economic prosperity, while a public good, also creates but these pollution, which is a negative externality. So public goods can and usually do involve some sort of political bargaining and trade off.

Because of the potential for conflict and opposition, negative externalities and "public bads" necessitate a political mechanism to govern their negative effects. The impact and effects of these different groups will be discussed in more detail in a later section. Suffice it to say for now that the actions of some groups, such as Wall Street bankers, businesses, and the financial sector in general, will create negative externalities

and their effects must be mitigated through the political process. In light of this, even private entities are public in a sense because they have the ability to produce public bads and negative externalities (Kapstein, 1999; Kaul, Grunberg, & Stern, 1999; Rao, 1999). Private entities can also produce public goods, although this is usually not the intent. For instance, if a private company pays for workforce training of its employees, the added education of those employees will most likely have a positive externality effect on society as a whole, effects usually associated with higher rates of education, such as civic participation and higher incomes (Marginson, 2007).

The heterogeneous groups which compose the various publics described above are not just located in the present either. As Bowen (1996) argues, perhaps the greatest benefit of higher education is the intergenerational benefits. Educated parents tend to raise happier and healthier children; in addition, children of parents who have higher education usually go on to higher education themselves. More than these quantifiable statistics however, Bowen (1996) further argues that higher education in the present can plant the seeds of positive social transformation in the future generations, either through parenting of pedagogy and have a ripple effect.

Marginson (2007) and others draw another distinction here as well between intermediate and final public goods. An intermediate public good is a condition needed to achieve a final public good. An example of an intermediate good is financial security for society which entails responsible behavior on the part of financial institutions that promotes favorable economic conditions. A final public good is world peace because financial stability is a precondition for world peace. Of course, a good can be an

intermediate good as well as a final good. Societal financial stability could also be an end in itself, as well as a precondition for world peace. There is no hard fast divide between intermediate and final goods, only a recognition that some goods may need to be a precondition for others. For instance, a vocational education can be seen as an intermediate good because it gives a student necessary skills at his or her vocation. These skills can help the student raise his or her income level and standard of living, which can be considered a final good.

This discussion on the nature of public goods (plural) leads into Marginson's (2011) second conception of public good, which he calls the public good (singular). In democratic societies, the public good is associated with "democratic forms such as openness, transparency, popular sovereignty and grass roots agency" (p. 418). Essentially, the public good singular emphasizes the more collective activities and benefits and how resources are accessible to all in a society (Marginson, 2011). As national borders become increasingly liquid, the national global public good of nations are slowly giving way to a more global conception (Held, 2002; Marginson, 2011). Currently, however, this harmony is coming undone.

A January 2014 Oxfam report highlights some of the staggering statistics on global inequities which are tearing at the public good. The growing inequities are tearing the fabric of societies, as well as the emerging global society, asunder (Castells, 2000; Fuentes-Nieva & Galasso, 2014; Woods, 1999). Almost half of the world's wealth is now owned by just 1% of the population. The wealth of the bottom half of the world's population, some 3. 5 billion people, is equal to the richest 85 people in the world. In the

United States, a country that long espoused that all are equal, the wealthiest 1% captured 95% of the post-recession growth since 2009 (Fuentes-Nieva & Galasso, 2014). Economic inequality turns political systems from representative organs to vehicles for the rich to capture the lowest tax rates, the best educational opportunities, and the best health care (Fuentes-Nieva & Galasso, 2014; Scherrer, 2014). Economic inequality tears at the public good by elevating certain citizens at the expense of others (Wyplosz, 1999).

Contesting the public good globally. As mentioned earlier, since different groups or "publics" in any given society will pursue different public goods, and since some groups public goods may turn out to be another groups public "bads," there needs to be a political mechanism to mediate (Kapstein, 1999; Rao, 1999). This mechanism allows different groups to contest the public good and create some type of harmony between citizens. Harmony must be found either through political means or though activism and social pressure. This idea of establishing harmony and communal activity aligns with Marginson's (2011) third notion of public; the public sphere as social criticism. Pusser (2006) and Marginson (2011) situate the university as a vehicle of social criticism. Marginson (2011) argues that universities foster creativity and dialogue beyond national contexts. Yet this "harmony" cannot simply be brought about by riots and street movements, it must be driven by a deep intellectual understanding of the situation, emerging trends, challenges and opportunities. As such, many higher education scholars argue that higher education must now grapple with the question of how higher education institutions must serve and promote a complex vision of the public good in the 21st century (Dee, 2006; Marginson, 2007; Marginson et al., 2010; Pusser, 2006; Ramaly,

2006; Tierney, 2006; Wellman, 2006). What this precise vision may be must be settled by debate and dialogue between different groups.

Yet, PBF policies generally do not even broach the issue of the public good, or the current inequities of the world. As Wellman (2006) argues, public policy needs (the need for a more complex understanding of accountability and the public good) and recent politics (the movement away large taxpayer investment in social institutions and higher education in particular) is pulling in opposite directions. The only public good under neoliberalism and the eviscerated public sector is a prosperous economy (for some), individual gain (public good/singular), and institutional revenue (Sen, 1996; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Wellman, 2006).

Any conception of the public good for higher education must take into account the ability of higher education to generate critical discussion on controversial topics such as world financial inequality and act as an organ of social criticism (Dee, 2006; Pusser, 2006 Marginson, 2011; Newfield, 2008). This approach is the only way any type of public good which can benefit all people in a society can be established, if these issues are made visible and honestly debated because these issues are so pervasive in the lives of all global citizens. Thus, a crucial component of higher education, in order to be able to instigate these types of discussions, must be that of social criticism (Giroux, 2011; Mallot et al., 2013; Pusser, 2006 Marginson, 2011; Newfield, 2008). Further, this criticism must now occur globally

Whatever one's view on globalization, it now makes sense to view all societies as globally connected at least in some sense due to the rapid increase in technology of social

media and communications (Kapstein, 1999; Rao, 1999). In addition, there is a global economy which is interconnected, as the 2008 financial crash illustrates (Held, 2001; Peters, 2010). There is a continuous global flow of knowledge, ideas, people, goods, and money that circulate amongst different regions, different localities, and among various groups and countries (Marginson et al., 2010; Spring, 2008). Understanding this global connection

Due to this emerging flow, Marginson (2011) and many others have argued for a new conception of public goods and the public good, on the part of national policymakers. This new conception entails a recognition of global public goods, which are goods shared by all people are at least widely accessible to almost everyone on the planet, such as global financial security and clean air (Hamburg & Hull, 1999; Marginson, 2011; Perna et al., 2014). Unfortunately, national higher education policies rarely look to this rich global dimension. Instead, the only global recognition is that of the global economy and market, which severely limits the potential of higher education to produce a complex variety of global public goods (Marginson, 2011). According to Marginson (2007), building a new world society, rooted in interconnectedness and global understanding is the next great challenge facing humanity. And higher education is an integral component to the formulation of this global public good because it has traditionally provided a space for the discussion, examination, and implementation of ideas (Marginson, 2007; Newfield, 2008; Pusser, 2006; Tierney, 2006). Marginson (2011) argues that the global public good must be seen as more than simply the world market and the knowledge produced by higher education institutions must be more than

financial information. Further, the information produced by higher education cannot be a private good only enjoyed by those who can afford it.

Information and knowledge of all sorts are more effective if thought of as a public good (plural) than a private market good (Stiglitz, 1999; Sy, 1999). Knowledge as a global public good can benefit almost everyone on the planet. However, global public goods will be useless if citizens do not begin to recognize the global connections between them. Thus, at the heart of any new conception of global public goods must be the re-imagination of the social bonds that keep humanity together. All will be empty theories without a strengthened social bond. These bonds can go by different names; love (Fromm, 1959), the I-thou (Buber, 1970; Feuerbach, 2006), altruism (Wolfe, 1998), trust (Tschannen-Moran & Tschannen-Moran, 2010), or social capital (Putnam, 2000) to name a few. While all the above terms are complex, they all describe some type of connection between human beings; some type of connection where the individual equates the welfare of another with herself, and in some cases, above herself. A strong bond between citizens is crucial to the maintenance of the global public good and can help disseminate information vertically and horizontally. Higher education institutions can help foster these bonds in a variety of ways, but this potential is stymied under performance based funding and accountability (Zumeta, 2011).

The global is not just an abstract supra-connection (Marginson & Rhoads, 2002). Rather the global, regional, national, and local all exist simultaneously and they all reinforce each other (Marginson & Rhoads, 2002). Global public goods, and the social bonds between citizens, must be understood as glo-na-cal, as an intricate web of the local,

national, regional and ultimately global connections. Further, the conception of public goods (plural), the public good (singular) and the public sphere as a site of social criticism can all aid in the creation of global public goods by highlighting and rectifying issues of access and distribution in glo-na-cal networks (Deem, 2001; Marginson & Rhoads, 2002; Marginson et al., 2010).

Knowledge and criticism however is useless if it is not disseminated and used to inform policy and practice (Cooper, 2009). In light of this fact, Cooper (2009) argues for "knowledge mobilization" (KM; p. 2), which is a process by which higher education institutions actively disseminate the knowledge they produce in target ways. The purpose of KM is to promote the use of research evidence in policymaking and education practice (Cooper, 2013). This is done by forging networks with various private, other public, and in some cases even for-profit organizations to use knowledge to effect positive change in society. Cooper (2013) refers to these various organizations as Research Brokering Organizations (RBO's). RBO's have the explicit mission and targeted resources to address to address the research-practice-policy gap and make knowledge created in in universities digestible and usable by policymakers and practitioners (Cooper, 2013). RBO's, such as thinktanks, are intermediaries which connect knowledge creation with knowledge usage and policymaking. While Cooper (2013) does not explicitly address fostering the global public good, KM may be an ideal method to pursue the creation of the global public good. KM could act as the underpinning of the glo-na-cal networks. In the glo-na-cal networks, new knowledge can circulate between localities, states, regions, nations and ultimately the globe. Knowledge mobilization is essential to global creation

and really the functioning of the information age in general (Bell, 1999; Cooper, 2009; Fullan, 2001). Higher Education institutions play a crucial role in KM and this role must be recognized by policymakers (Cooper, 2009).

As revolutionary organs of social criticism and transformation, institutions of higher education hold a critical role in this new era of globalization is that of global creation (Marginson et al., 2010). Higher education institutions must be able to navigate global civil society, the horizontal networks of public, private and for profit entities, and *create* new answers to pressing social issues in the form of an expanding knowledge base. Criticism is not enough; higher education institutions must ultimately create solutions to social problems they diagnose. And creation is the essential feature of higher education institutions, because they continuously create new disciplinary knowledge for society (Biglan, 1977; Lattuca & Stark, 2009; Furhman, 1997). Criticism and creation align with the Jeffersonian vision of higher education as a vehicle to foster democratic participation because criticism and creation are at the heart of an active and healthy republic. In the widest sense, criticism and creation are also at the heart of human advancement as a species. If human criticism and creation are stymied in higher education institutions, human advancement will surely be stymied, unless faculty and students challenge this suppression.

In order to criticize social institutions and create solutions, the relationship between institutions and society must be expanded. Institutions of higher education cannot simply be seen as moneymakers for the state. Kallison and Cohen (2009) as well as Callan and Finney (2005) call for higher education to be accountable by not only

producing economic returns to the state, but more importantly, by producing civic and cultural contributions to society. Dee (2006) also advocates for a new type of accountability, one which goes beyond narrow quantitative measures such as degrees produced. Rather, Dee (2006) argues that colleges should be accountable to the social needs and priorities of a state, such as aiding in poverty reduction and helping to augment public services such as K-12 education and healthcare. Measuring how well an institution of higher education produces these outcomes is how higher education must be made accountable. Zumeta (2011) is more aggressive in what he feels is needed, however. His vision of accountability ultimately calls for higher education institutions to educate their legislators and the general public to what they *should* want in society and from higher education. Institutions of higher education should be accountable to the public not by creating profit for it, but by holding themselves and other societal institutions accountable for their actions. Essentially, Zumeta (2011) sees higher education as having the ability and the responsibility of educating policymakers and the general public to this task. This responsibility is the heart of of Pusser (2006), Marginson, Murphy & Peters (2010) and Marginson's (2011) call for higher education to become a site of social criticism and creator of global public goods in the 21st century. The reframing of accountability is a crucial task to foster social criticism. Even though some studies have pointed to a conceptual reimagining of accountability (Kallison & Cohen, 2009; Pusser, 2006; Marginson, 2011), my study offers an empirical tool to do

Conceptual Framework

Below, in Figure 2. 1, is a model that draws from the literature review and outlines how the elements examined in the literature review was applied to the selected performance based funding policies. The model below represents the two phases of the policy framework employed in this dissertation (Fowler, 2012), namely the policy window created in the issues definition and agenda setting phase. First, it is critical to understand the history of the performance based funding to situate the new PBF 2.0 policies. Second, as the literature illustrated, it is necessary to understand how the policy makes inputs dependent on achieving outputs. Next, a critical examination of the policies involves identification of discourse, structuring of actions and acceptance and the role of social actors. Finally, the model shows how these factors ultimately influence the creation of the public good. The next chapter further explicates the methods used in this study. .

Figure 2. 1 Conceptual Model



CHAPTER III

Methods

The purpose of this research was to determine exactly how performance based funding policies, which are rooted in neoliberalism, can shape the public good. Neoliberalism draws on the theories of economic liberalism, which holds the functioning of the market superior to any form of governmental or public interference in economic and social matters (Harvey, 2005). Neoliberalism holds that market based solutions emerge as the most efficient for any societal problem and further, that all social problems can be handled through a market mechanism (Harvey, 2005; Plant, 2010). Since the public good of any given society is not a universal notion, but rather one prescribed and shaped by policy (Marginson, 2007), performing a policy analysis in order to discover the public good promoted by PBF 2.0 policies is necessary in order to determine how policy configures the public good. The public often assumes a transparency in policy, yet policy can be worded and written in such a way as to naturalize actions and behaviors which in reality may be extremely controversial (Saarinen, 2008). Thus, it is imperative that policy frameworks begin to truly grapple with the supposedly obviousness of policy to make policy truly transparent, especially regarding its effects on the public good. The overall research question and the sub questions were designed with this objective in mind.

To reiterate from Chapter I, the overarching research question and the two sub-questions of this study were:

How do the six selected state performance based funding policies allow the respective institutions in their states to shape the public good?

a. How does the socially constructed discourse in the policies have the potential to shape the public good?
b. What social actors does the policy discourse empower and neglect, and how do these actors have the potential to shape the public good?

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework for this study uses critical theory as a basis. The premise of critical theory is the recognition of power differentials between various social groups and classes (Creswell, 2013; Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). This power differential creates hegemony, or domination that privileges select groups. The methods and data collection in this study build on the notion of a power differential, specifically from the power imbalance between neoliberal advocates and traditional public education advocates in the policy arena. Neoliberalism is perhaps the most pervasive influence in contemporary American society (Chomsky, 2006; Giroux, 2011; Mallot et al., 2013). Thus, higher education policy is greatly influenced by neoliberalism, and as such, critical theory provides a useful framework to interrogate existing policies and to offer interpretation of the findings from this study, in particular capturing the effects of the domination and hegemony inherent in PBF 2.0 policies. In order to capture the hegemony of neoliberalism in educational policymaking, I employed critical discourse analysis, subject position identification, and social actor identification (Allen, 2008; Ball et al., 2011; Fairclough, 1989; Saarinen, 2008). Each of these methods for analysis are described further in the sections below.

Research Methodology

A qualitative method was chosen for this study because qualitative research is better able to work from different paradigms, such as postmodernism and critical theory, as opposed to quantitative research which mainly works from a positivist and post-positivist framework (Creswell, 2013; Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). Unfortunately, much education research, and especially qualitative research, is viewed by policymakers as largely ineffective because education research usually lacks predictive capabilities like the "hard" sciences of physics or chemistry that take a positivist orientation (Phillips, 2014; Gutierrez & Penuel, 2014; Rudolph, 2014; Wieman, 2014). Educational research lacks these capabilities because educational researchers cannot isolate students in a lab, rather, a researcher must contend with a myriad of historical, social, and personal factors when conducting research, and these factors make predictability of results extremely difficult (Berliner, 2003; Wieman, 2014). The subject of educational research is always changing (Gutierrez & Penuel, 2014). This notion of a changing subject is especially pertinent for studies like mine that examine the ever evolving notion of the public good.

Yet, Rudolph (2014) and Wieman (2014) argue that precisely because education research deals with social, historical and political factors that cloud predictability, education research *must* employ cutting edge methods which can attempt to capture these social, historical, and political influences. I chose this particular array of qualitative methods because this dissertation attempts to highlight the uses of market hegemony and how this hegemony shapes the public good. Thus, standard quantitative and predictive methods, such as ones used in the hard sciences, would not be able to capture the complexity of this hegemony so new methods were needed.

Selection Criteria

This study drew on the National Council of State Legislators report (NCSL), released in March of 2014, which provides the most updated list of all states that have implemented PBF 2.0 policies. It should also be noted that Alabama's PBF was not enacted by the Alabama legislature, but is a regulation created by the Alabama State Board of Education and thus was left off of the NCSL report. I have chosen to leave it off the chart as well. Currently, 30 states have implemented performance based funding policies. Table 1.1 in Appendix A shows a summary of each state that currently has a performance based funding policy in place. This table also indicates how much of the state's higher education appropriations are based on performance measures, as well as the year the PBF 2.0 policy was implemented, the political party of the governor at the time of passage, and the political party of the bill's sponsors. The year of implementation is important because it can show which states were leaders and followers in policy implementation. The metrics and funding levels show the similarities and differences between policies. Moreover, the political makeup of the state legislatures along party lines and bill sponsorship is usually a good indicator of policy adoption. All of these factors, as well as geographic location, were used to narrow the scope of this study. The visual representation of this information in Table 1.1 (located in Appendix A) provided a first level assessment and decision-making point for the selection of the state's of the study. The table (see Table 3.1) below provides an overall summary of the range of data points within the PBF 2.0 states and illustrates the states with the most and the least amount of funds invested in performance based funding.

Table 3.1. Performance Based Funding, Largest and Smallest Amounts.

Funding Category	States	Number of States
States with PBF under $5 million dollars	OK	1
States with PBF $5 million dollars and over	AZ, FL, MA, NC, SD,WA,	6
States with PBF of 10% or over	AR, CO, GA, OH, LA, MI, ND, NV, TN, TX,VA	9
States with PBF of below 10%	HI, IL, IN, ME, MI, MN, MO, OH, PA, MT, NM	11

The number in the right column does not add up to 30 because Ohio is counted twice because Ohio allocates 100% PBF for four year colleges and only 5% for community colleges. Even though Arkansas, Colorado and Nevada currently allocate under 10%, I have counted these states in the over 10% category because they are legislated to raise the percentage of PBF to over 10%. Further, the percentage of funds allocated by Kansas and Utah are still to be determined and thus have been left off the chart.

As mentioned in the literature review, Complete College America is a non-profit organization funded in part by the Bill and Melinda Gates foundation. The sole purpose

of Complete College America is to significantly increase the number of students graduating from colleges. There are currently, 26 states which are part of the Complete College America Foundation alliance. There is significant overlap between the 26 state CCA alliance and the 30 states which have performance based funding policies in place. CCA alliance members which do not have PBF policies in place are Arizona, Washington, North Dakota, Kansas, Michigan, North Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia. While membership in the CCA alliance does not guarantee a PBF policy, the goals of the alliance and PBF are similar.

In order to provide an in-depth examination of the mechanisms of hegemony present in performance based funding policies and their relation to the public good, I employed a set of criteria to determine a sub-set of the states currently using PBF 2 0 to study in depth. Of the 30 states with PBF 2.0 in place or in legislative approval process, one-third (10 states) are in the South. This study defined the American South to include the states of the old confederacy (McPherson, 1989); Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, Alabama, Arkansas, Tennessee, Louisiana and Texas. Every state in the south except South Carolina and Georgia at the time of this writing has enacted a PBF 2.0 policy. South Carolina's legislators are currently in talks to enact a PBF policy and Georgia is set to enact their policy in 2015 (Friedel et al., 2013). Thus, a bulk of the states with PBF 2 0 policies is located in the southern region of the country. Alabama has a rule in place made by the state board of education, thus I have not included it as a policy.

Fowler (2009) argued that different regions of the country are marked by different political cultures. The south is marked by what she terms a traditional culture and

conservative culture (Fowler, 2009). Thus, the South forms a unit that can be demarcated from the rest of the county. Investigating the role of policy discourse in a region with similar ideology allows for a basis of comparison among states in the region. The other two-thirds of states with PBF 2.0 policies are dispersed around the country, and no other region has the concentration of contiguous states with policies in place like the South.

Diffusion theory is usually argued to be one of the strongest motivations for states to adopt similar policies (Berry & Berry, 1990; Gorbunov, 2013 Mintrom, 1997). Policymakers in certain states look to neighboring states to see what works and what does not. Gorbunov (2013) found statistical support, at least in part, for a policy diffusion mechanism at work in PBF 1.0 and PBF 2.0 policies. Gorbunov (2013) argued that a state's mere location next to a state with a performance based funding policy did not in itself matter; however, if the neighboring state had a successful example of a performance based funding policy, then policy adoption in other neighboring states became more likely. Lederman (2013) quoted David Tandberg, assistant professor of Higher Education at Florida State University as arguing that a bandwagon effect may is at work in regards to performance based funding, where states, seeing other states adopting performance funding policies, rush to implement similar policies.

The state of Tennessee is by far the leader of PBF, first implementing a version of PBF 1.0 in 1978, and implementing PBF 2.0 in 2010, both with success (Bogue & Johnson, 2010). Tennessee has become the model of PBF for other states to emulate since its inception in 1978 (Bogue & Johnson, 2010; Burke, 2002; Gorbunov, 2013; McClendon et al., 2006). This is why I chose to use a policy diffusion mechanism amongst the Southern states.

Funding is the most salient issue in PBF 2.0 policies since PBF 2.0 ties base funding to performance (Miao, 2012). Five states in close proximity to Tennessee have not only adopted performance funding, but have also followed Tennessee's lead and tied a substantial amount of base funding to meeting performance criteria. Mississippi ties 100% of its funding to meeting performance criteria (after an operational set aside), , Texas allocates 10% of base funding, Louisiana allocates 15% of based funding, Arkansas will allocate 25% of base funding by 2019, and Virginia allocates 50% of base funding.

The six states (Tennessee, Louisiana, Virginia, Mississippi, Texas, and Arkansas) also have other similarities which made them easy to compare and see as a region or unit. For one, these states all have a similar policy mechanism. The PBF policies in the six states chosen all amended the state code, versus being an annual budget issue or written as a rule. As Gorbunov (2013) found, PBF 1. 0 policies that were enacted as part of the state code and not as annual bills tended to be stronger and last longer. Further, the PBF policies in each of these states apply to two- and four-year schools.

Thus, the final criteria for selecting the six states were: location (in the South), funds (over 10%), and policy mechanism (state code and applied to two and four year schools). All states had to satisfy these three requirements to be included in my study. These three requirements offered a rationale for selection based on salient features of policy, location, funding and mechanism. See Table 3.2 Table 3.2 highlights that all selected states have met the three-part criteria for site inclusion.

Figure 3.1 PBF Diffusion



Table 3. 2. Criteria for State Selection.

State	Location in the South	Funding over 10% of base funds	Policy Mechanism (enacted in state code and applies to two and four year schools)
Tennessee	X	X	X
Mississippi	X	X	X
Virginia	X	X	X

Texas	X	X	X
Louisiana	X	X	X
Arkansas	X	X	X

There were also other similar characteristics that a majority of states in the south shared. However, not all states that I selected fulfilled all the following characteristics. Nonetheless, these characteristics are usually indicative of performance funding policies thus I thought it would be pertinent to illustrate which characteristics were present in the six states selected. For one, the Southern states are similar politically in terms of makeup of state legislatures. Research on PBF 1.0 and PBF 2.0 shows that states with republican legislatures are more likely to pass accountability measures for higher education, in particular performance based funding (Burke, 2002; Gorbunov, 2013; McClendon et al., 2006). McClendon (2009) also demonstrated that gubernatorial party has an impact on the passage of PBF funding, as states with republican governors are more likely to enact PBF policies. Even though other studies (Gorbunov, 2013; McClendon et al., 2006) found that gubernatorial party was insignificant, I chose to include gubernatorial party as a sample selection criterion because one for the major impetus for PBF 2.0 is the National Governor's Association.

Not surprisingly, at the time of passage of PBF 2.0, many of the southern legislatures were either republican controlled or split (Louisiana and Arkansas were the only two that had democratically controlled legislatures). In addition, every state in the

South but Arkansas and Tennessee had a republican governor at the time of PBF 2.0 passage. These tallies are not to suggest that PBF is solely a republican initiative, as President Obama and many democrats have gotten on board as well (Friedel et al., 2013). A look at the sponsors of PBF bills in the southern states further indicates that both republicans and democrats have sponsored PBF legislation. There are also many republican dominated states that are not in the south that have enacted PBF policies, such as Massachusetts and Minnesota. Nonetheless, states with republican legislatures and/or governors are linked more often to enactment of accountability measures for higher education (Gorbunov, 2013; McClendonet al., 2006). See Table 3. 3 for a summary of the six states identified above and their gubernatorial party, legislative party, and coordinating board status. This table demonstrates certain other similarities between states. The factors tend to be associated with performance based funding.

Table 3.3. Typical factors associated with Performance Based Funding.

State	Republican Gubernatorial control at time of passage	Republican Legislature control party at time of passage	Presence of coordinating board
Tennessee		X	X
Mississippi	X	X	
Virginia	X	X	X
Texas	X	X	X

Louisiana	X		X
Arkansas			X

The other southern states, Alabama, Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia were not selected for study for a range of reasons. Recall, Alabama's PBF initiative was written as a rule by the Alabama board of regents, thus does not meet the essential criteria for inclusion, namely analysis of PBF 2.0 policies. Florida and North Carolina's allocation methods are not based on defined percentages, but rather a set amount of money. North Carolina dedicates $24 million dollars to community colleges and $1 million to four year schools if they meet performance standards. Florida allocates $15 million to departments of public institutions which graduate graduates in high needs fields determined by the legislators. In addition Georgia and South Carolina have not yet enacted their policies. Finally, Alabama, while a southern state and while allocating 15% of base funding for PBF 2.0, did not enact a policy through the legislature but as a role through the Board of Education. That is why Alabama did not meet the criteria. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the final state selection and how each of these states meets the selection criteria.

No selection criterion is ideal. By focusing on the 10 states in the south, the selection criterion eliminated states for consideration states like Ohio and North Dakota (both tie 100% of base funding to PBF); Washington State which like Tennessee has a sophisticated and long running PBF policy; as well as other non-Southern states which allocate a high amounts, such as Colorado which ties 25% of funds to meeting

performance criteria, and Maine which will allocate 30% of its base funding to PBF. Nonetheless, even with important states such as Ohio, Colorado, Maine, North Dakota, and Washington missing from the analysis, the six southern states I have selected serve as a good starting point to examine PBF 2.0 policies due to their political make-up, geographic location, similar policy mechanisms for distributing funds, the high amounts allocated to PBF, and their proximity to the PBF pioneer, Tennessee.

Data Analysis

Each state policy included in this study represents one unit of analysis. The data, in the form of the six state policies, was analyzed using a two-step policy framework. The first step builds on Allan's (2008) framework and historicizes the policies; this step began in the literature review and continued through the analysis. More than just locating the policy itself in its proper historical and social context however, the actual behaviors desired by the policy itself must be historcized. In order to determine the actual behaviors desired by the policy, I have drawn on the typology developed by Serban and Burke (1998) for their analysis of PBF 1.0 policies which is explained below. The second step builds on Allan's (2008) use of critical theory to critique policy. Here, I employed three specific methods derived from critical theory to determine exactly how the policies configure the public goods; 1. a priori hegemony discourse analysis, 2. presupposition examination, and 3. social actor identification. These three methods are explained in more detail later in this section. Once these methods are performed on each individual policy, I then conducts a cross-site comparison. The cross-site comparison focused on a series of key factors influencing policy development, namely: similar social

actors, similar hegemonic terms, and similar externalities for a regional public good which covers part of the southern region of the United States.

First step of the policy framework. The policy framework used for analysis follows Allan's (2008) historization process. Once the desired policy behaviors are known, they can be compared to the historical analysis in the literature review. This analysis can determine how the desired policy behaviors align with neoliberalism. In order to determine the behaviors desired by the policy, I followed Burke and Serban's (1998) input-process-output-outcome heuristic, which they created to analyze PBF 1. 0. An example of how Burke and Serban's (1998) heuristic was actually used to analyze the data appears in the following table, using the policy for Virginia (Virginia Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2011) as an example. The numbers in the parentheses are the location of the input, process, output or outcome in the policy. Since many of the desired outcomes and outputs of PBF 2.0 are similar to PBF 1. 0, as well as the inputs and processes, Burke and Serban's (1998) heuristic provided a good tool for analysis of PBF 2.0 policies. Every time I identified whether a policy intended to promote an input, a process, an output, or outcome, I recorded it in the table in the appropriate place. Thus, in the first box on the right hand side under outcomes, the chart reads: "Fuel economic growth in Virginia and produce revenues for state and local government" (10). This outcome appeared once in section 10. The box in the second row under processes which reads "higher education institutions should pursue cost efficient opportunities (10, 17)" appears twice in the policy, once in section 10 and again in section 17. It should also be noted however that inputs, processes, outputs, and outcomes can overlap.

Table 3.4. Sample of Input-Process-Output-Outcome Table

Inputs	Processes	Outputs	Outcomes
Expand enrollments in Virginia public and private institutions (10)	Long term commitment, policy framework for institutional development (10)	Promote institutional diversity (10)	Fuel economic growth in Virginia and produce revenues for state and local government (10)
Generate sustainable state support (10)	HEI should pursue cost efficient opportunities (10, 17)	Virginia to build on its already strong Higher Education system (10)	Prepare Virginians for jobs in the knowledge economy (10)

Once each state was coded with Burke and Serban's (1998) heuristic, the information began to form a picture of the behaviors desired by the current performance based funding policies in each state. From the table created for each state, I then wrote a summary description of the desired behaviors in each state, and it is this description which is presented in the results chapter. For integrity of the data analysis, the six coded tables for each state policy appear in the appendices and can be compared to my descriptions. Further, these desired behaviors are also considered in their historical context by comparing them to the historical analysis performed in the literature review to see if the behaviors align with neoliberalism. .

Second step of the policy framework. The second stage of analysis involved discourse analysis. There is no one way to perform a discourse analysis as many different scholars have put forth a variety of methods to practice it (Allan, 2008; Ball et

al., 2011). Thus, instead of adopting one method, I instead created a "toolbox" of different methods of analysis to apply to policies (Allan, 2008; Ball et al., 2011; Fairclough, 1989; Saarinen, 2008; Walsh, 2013). The purpose of choosing these various methods was to answer various aspects of the research question. The three different approaches to discourse analysis and their applications are listed below, with each aligning with the overarching research question as well as the sub-questions. In the widest sense, the research questions aimed at detailing exactly how the actual words in the policy texts portray the notion of the public good. The three methods used are identifying hegemony, identifying existential and change presuppositions, and identifying social actors. I read each policy three separate times, and each time I used one of the three approaches outlined below for coding. For each state policy, I created a separate table.

Discourse linkage/hegemony. Allan (2008) first developed a list of a priori categories. She then compared the policy text to determine if these categories were present in the policy documents. Once she determined if the categories were present, she then interpreted the categories according to her critical analysis. Likewise, I specifically focused on determining if the discourse used in the policy reinforced the hegemony of neoliberalism by making neoliberalism seem natural, inevitable or unchangeable. Further, I analyzed how each category had the potential to shape the public good by drawing on my earlier analysis in the literature review.

In order to examine this discourse, I have created a list with commonly employed hegemonic terms to use for the a priori deductive analysis (Yin, 2011). Deductive coding was more appropriate for my research because I sought to determine if certain neoliberal

and neoconservative ideas were already in the policies, as opposed to an inductive approach where I would wait to see what themes emerged (Yin, 2011). I knew what I was looking for and suspected I would find it. The list was compiled from the information reviewed in the literature chapter. The terms selected included:

1. market/economic growth /revenue and profit generation
2. efficiency
3. vocational/workforce training /human capital/ job creation
4. accountability and performance
5. public-private partnerships
6. tuition un-affordability
7. competition
8. knowledge economy
9. science technology engineering and mathematics
10. online instruction
11. prestige
12. government oversight

Each term selected was based on a particular reason. As evidenced by the literature review, the first category of market growth is perhaps the best summation of neoliberalism. Thus I made it the first term, as the market undergirds all of neoliberal thought. The terms from position two to seven are other major planks of neoliberalism. Efficiency is perhaps the main motivation espoused behind formation of PBF policies; colleges are supposed to be more efficient with their resources, and do less with more

(Burke, 2005; Dougherty & Reddy, 2013; Harnisch, 2011; Miao, 2012). Efficiency, private sector initiatives and STEM emphasis also make colleges more attractive entities on the market which can help to increase performance and with higher performance, institutions are thought to be more accountable to the state. Thus, the terms accountability and performance overlapped and were counted together (Burke, 2005; Burke & Serban, 1998; Richardson & Smalling, 2005; Zumeta, 2011). Obtaining private funding and promoting workforce and vocational training are the other foundational planks of PBF policies (Burke, 2005; Dougherty & Reddy, 2013; Harnisch, 2011; Miao, 2012). Public-private partnerships were made a separate reference. Private sector and market based initiatives entail competition. Further, competition is seen as a mechanism to make institutions more efficient. Efficiency, private sector initiatives, and STEM emphasis is supposed to make higher education institutions accountable to the states that fund them. Many policymakers however lament the fact that higher education tuition is skyrocketing and pin the blame on colleges (Fried & Salam, 2012; Vedder, 2004). The idea of tuition un-affordability was therefore made a separate coding reference. Another major plank of neoliberalism is competition. While a separate category of competition may overlaps with the idea of the market in general, I thought to include it a separate category to detect if there was a heightened focus on competition/

Categories eight through 11 are more nuanced and specific, but nonetheless are important to neoliberals and turning higher education into a more market like entity. The term knowledge economy is rife in PBF literature. Another concern of policymakers is increasing STEM degree production and education; this is also evidenced by many state websites. Aligning with the private sector, especially in STEM initiatives was present in

the literature. Online instruction is usually touted as a way to secure additional revenues (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Rhoads & Torres, 2006). Finally, many policymakers and administrators are concerned with raising the perceived image of higher education institutions so they can compete in the various rankings scales.

The last term however is more reminiscent of neoconservativism. Government oversight has increased over public institutions as trust between the state and institutions as lessened over the last three decades (Burke, 2005; Richardson & Smalling, 2005; Zumeta, 2011). Thus, I included government oversight as a term because many times government action is needed to spurn market action (Harvey, 2005; Hayek, 2008)

References to tuition un-affordability, STEM disciplines, and online education were fairly straightforward. However, some terms were more difficult to delineate, for instance government oversight. I only coded a reference to government oversight when the policymakers explicitly mandated higher education institutions or their boards to do something, usually with the verb shall or must. Thus, a clause which read: "The institution shall develop an outcomes based funding policy" was counted as a reference to government oversight. I did not however count the subsequent references to the actual mandated outcomes to avoid overrepresentation of terms. I counted individual terms only for references to accountability/ performance.

The above list of neoliberal terms is sampling of what Fairclough (1989) called an order of discourse. I first read each of the six policies and noted each time a reference to a neoliberal term was made. I recorded this in a table tabulating the codes. I did not simply count how many times a term was used, however, because I wanted to avoid over representing certain terms. There is a measure of discretion involved in this process.

What constitutes a reference? A reference was recorded only when a term constituted an independent idea within the policy text. A term is the actual wording (i. e. government oversight), a reference is how many times a term is mentioned. A reference is not a single word; rather a reference is a hegemonic mechanism which can be represented by different words (Ball et al., 2011; Fairclough, 1989). The terms in the tables are proxies for these hegemonic mechanisms. For instance, human capital and workforce training would be counted as the same reference because each denotes vocational skills. Similarly, accountability and performance both denote how an institution is benefiting its state and using its resources given by the state. Institutions are generally held accountable by their performance. Vocational skills and institutional performance can be mentioned in a variety of ways, but each represent a hegemonic mechanism which has been shown to be used by policymakers and critics to discipline higher education institutions.

Also, all policies are structured differently. A common construction is by delineated sections. For instance, Tennessee has numbered sections (1-10), and if necessary these are broken down into smaller sections, with capital letters, then lower case roman numerals if needed (e. g., section 2Ai, section 3Bii, etc.). In other policies, such as Mississippi, every line is numbered. For policies with divided sections such as Tennessee, I only counted an a priori code in a subsection if a new idea was present, not if an idea was merely being elaborated on. Of course there is overlap between terms, and there might be terms that are not represented. The frequency of neoliberal references used in the policy hints at the use of hegemony within the policy, especially when this number is compared to the amount of non-hegemonic terms used in a policy.

What is *not* said in a text may be just as or more important than what is said (Barnetson & Cutright, 2000). To analyze what the policies may have been lacking in their framing of the public good, I created an a priori list of terms that do not usually occur in neoliberal literature. I reviewed the literature on non-market private and social benefits generated by higher education and created an a priori list to determine if the selected PBF policymakers were cognizant of these benefits or why trying to promote them. Again, here I am looking for policy silences (Allan, 2008). I simply analyzed each policy and determined if any of the categories below were present. The list consisted of the following categories:

1. health/life expectancy
2. poverty reduction/financial assistance
3. general happiness
4. non-market knowledge and research
5. art/literature and/or theater
6. cultural diversity
7. pedagogy
8. college mission
9. institutional autonomy
10. enhancing citizenship/public service
11. liberal arts
12. externalities/social benefits
13. social transformation/social criticism

14. reduced crime rate
15. interdisciplinary/global linkages
16. social contract/state resident enrollment
17. pollution reduction/clean air/environmental concerns
18. global public goods/glo-na-cal good
19. deliberate intergenerational concerns
20. just use of STEM. .

Categories one through eleven are more individual in nature. However, these categories have definite social benefits as well (McMahon, 2009). Categories four through 20, likewise, are more social, but have individual benefits as well (McMahon, 2009).

Higher education has a positive effect on health and life expectancy, can reduce inequality in certain cases, increases general happiness of individuals, increases cultural diversity and tolerance, enhances citizenship, lowers the crime rate, and increases awareness of environmental conditions (Bowen, 1996; Greenwood, 1997; McMahon, 2009). McMahon (2009) furthers argues that non-market disciplines such as the humanities, liberal arts, history, education, political science, and sociology contribute just as much if not more to the enhancement of social and economic institutions as well as generate more positive externalities. Thus, all the above terms were included in the a priori list of factors that can have either a personal and/or societal benefit (Goan & Cunningham, 1997; Greenwood, 1997). Bowen (1996) demonstrates that higher education also increases civic behavior, leads to greater appreciation of culture (i. e. art, music and theater), and in the highest sense can lead to positive social transformations for society and positive individual changes.

The rest of the list deals more with social benefits of higher education. Marginson (2007) and Marginson and Rhoads (2002) argue that higher education must begin to produce global public goods and work within a glo-na-cal context, thus these were made terms. As has been argued in this study, institutions of higher education create social contracts with the state and its citizens (Lewis & Hearn, 2003). The social contract is bound up with the specific individual mission of a college as well as an institution's level autonomy to meet this mission (Dee, 2006). So social contract, mission, and autonomy were all included. Finally, science and STEM can be used justly and in the service of humanity (Hall, 2013; Suroanta & Vaden, 2007). I have followed their lead and placed just use of STEM in the coding to indicate if policymakers see STEM as anything more than a profit generator.

Uncovering what a policy is silent about, or what a policy does not broach is indicative about what policymakers value and what they do not value (Allan, 2008). The a priori list of categories I have compiled are categories in which neoliberals are usually silent on (Giroux, 2011). If a policy makes no mention of fostering civic behavior, this absence is indicative, it is a policy silence (Allan, 2008). Something present in policy promotes a certain behavior (i.e. creating more patents) and a policy silence does not promote a behavior (fostering civic behavior). Thus, policy silences do not promote certain behaviors and simultaneously discourses present in policy promote certain behaviors. Policy silences and discourse work to the public good.

If and when I saw these terms in the policies, I recorded them in the table along with their frequency and location. I then compared each category in the list to the ideas of the public good in order to determine how which type of vision of the public good the

term was capable of producing. I only counted a term in the frequency count if it signified a new idea, not if it was part of the same idea in a sentence. Once the frequencies of the references were recorded, I created a visual representation to see what trends emerged. This visual representation was created using bar graphs for each state.

The a priori codes I created are illustrative of the neoliberal order of discourse, as well as and opposed order of discourse, which I have named non-hegemonic terms (Fairclough, 1989). Of course no a priori listing can be exhaustive; nonetheless, each table is fairly representative of each order of discourse which is represented in the literature review (Fairclough, 1989). To determine what notion of the public good is manifested by the policies, the questions that must be asked of the identified terms is: how does the discourse in policy determine what can be said or thought about the public good (Allan, 2008; Ball et al., 2011; Fairclough, 1989; Gramsci, 1991; Saarinen, 2008; Walsh, 2013)? This question is the heart of this study; I am trying to discern how the discourse in policy shapes the public good. Do the terms identified only allow for the public good to be conceived of in monetary terms? Are traditional purviews of higher education, such as democracy, citizenry and the creation of new knowledge promoted by the discourse? Of is the discourse silent on these topics? More than traditional views of the public good, does the discourse in the policy allow for the policies to promote ideas associated with the global public good outlined in the literature review, such as building social capital, open technology and solving world problems such as financial instability?

Reference frequencies are imperfect conceptual tools, however, due to the varying length of policies. Some policies can be 10 pages while another policy is two pages. Thus, at the outset of each section of the individual states, the page length in standard

printed pages (11"x 8.5" paper size) is given to give the reader some sort of idea of how references were distributed through the policy. All of the tables are included in the appendix (See Appendices B). From each table, I wrote a description of the different orders of discourse that are present or not present within the policy. These descriptions are presented in the results section and represent, at least partially, how PBF policies frame the public good. Two examples of the coding procedures are given below. The first column is the hegemonic term identified from the literature; the second column is the frequency count and location of each term. The last column is a description of how the term shapes the public good. Each example is taken from the actual coding of the Virginia Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2011.

Table 3.5. Sample of hegemonic categories

Hegemonic/Neoliberal Term/Notion	**Location/ Frequency**	**How the term shapes the public good**
References to knowledge based economy	(10) 2 TC: 2	Knowledge driven economy signifies a move away from traditional manufacturing economy toward an information based economy; i. e software, computer design, statistical information are the drivers of profit (Bell, 1999; Marginson, 2011). As such, advocates of the knowledge based economy want to spurn knowledge/information production which will lead to greater performance and economic success (Marginson, 2011). The public good, in a knowledge driven economy, refers to economic knowledge and augmenting one's competitive position in the global market. (Bell, 1964; Marginson, 2011). And this is clearly the intent of Virginia policymakers, to push HEI's to train citizens for the global market.
References to efficiency, optimal use of resources	(10) 9, (16) 4, (17) 1, (19) 5, (20) 4 TC: 23	Efficiency is one of the guiding criterion of which neoliberals use to judge social institutions (Harvey, 2005; Fowler, 2009). Neoliberals desire academic to be an efficient machine (Giroux, 2011; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004) and accuse higher education of inefficiency (Bryson, 2004; Harvey, 2005; Lambert, 2014). While efficiency should be a consideration of any HEI, if pursued narrowly, efficiency can crowd out other

		important criterion by social institutions should be judged, such as creativity, equality and community (Fowler, 2009; Giroux, 2011). With 23 references to efficiency in the policy, efficiency as a guiding principle of higher education seems to be highly valued by Virginia policymakers.

Table 3. 6 is a sample of the non-market categories that appear in the Virginia Higher Education Opportunity Act. The numbers in parentheses represent where the category was located in the policy, if the category was not present, I put in N/A. An N/A or a very low number of mentions in conjunction with the discourses present can help shape behaviors and the overall a vision of the public good. The number after the category is where the category was located in the policy and TC is the total count of how many times the category was mentioned (if it was mentioned at all).

Table 3.6 Sample of non-market terms

Private Non-market benefits and externalities	**Frequency Count/Location**	**How the public good is shaped by the term(s)**
References to health/life expectancy	(10)1, (16)1, (19)1 TC: 3	One of the most significant private non-market benefits of higher education is better health and longer life expectancy for the individual (McMahon, 2009). There were three references to health, but the policymakers were only promoting HEI to train more health professionals because health professionals are identified as a crucial area. While training health professionals will help individual health, there is no recognition of the ability of higher education to directly influence an individuals' health and life expectancy.
References to poverty reduction/ assistance/financial stability	(10)1, (15)5, whole section, (17)1, (20)1, (21)1	References to some aspect of poverty reduction and/or assistance to struggling families is mentioned nine times in the policy, and is the topic of section 15. The policymakers do seem to recognize

	TC: 9	the growing plight of poorer families and their struggle to afford college (Lambert, 2014). In light of the public good however, and as mentioned earlier, there is no recognition of the reasons for this growing poverty, namely that neoliberal policies in the United States are perpetuating a growing income divide (Mallot et al., 2013). Rather, Virginia policymakers have put the onus on the institutions to make tuition more affordable. Without the recognition of societal role in poverty creation and reduction, the public good cannot be accurately pursued.

Both the hegemonic and non-hegemonic lists are deductive because they are apriori. Originally, I planned on including an inductive portion of coding. However, after analyzing the policies using the deductive methods, as well as a preliminary inductive method, I realized that nothing new emerged. The non-hegemonic chart in conjunction with the hegemonic charts captured all of the desires of policymakers. The limited scope of the policies is due primarily to the fact that similar discourse was used to construct the policies, namely the discourse of college completion. The conceptual tools in this section examine the hegemony present in discourse as well as the hegemony present in policy silences.

Existential presuppositions and change presuppositions. I identified all existential and change presuppositions in the six PBF 2.0 policies by looking at all definite and indefinite articles and verbs. The grammatical construction of a sentence can position certain terms as active or passive and this positioning helps to promote or de-emphasize those terms (Fairclough, 1989). The first method in this phase examined the actual terms of hegemony; this phase looks at the articles and verbs that surround those

ideas. I am seeking to determine how the notion of the public good is created by the articles, verbs, and discourse in the policy, and which vision of the public good the discourse ultimately creates.

Below is a sample table of presuppositions recorded from the Virginia Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2011. In the first column, each article that signified an existential presupposition was recorded and each verb that signified a change presupposition was recorded. I then recorded the location for each presupposition. In the last column, I noted how the presupposition helped to shape the public good. Table 3.7 illustrates samples of presuppositions for the Virginia Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2011.

Table 3.7. Sample of Presuppositions

Presupposition Type	**Location**	**How presupposition shapes the public good**
"the following purposes shall inform the development of funding policies, performance criteria… relieves the upward pressure on tuition associated with loss of state support due to economic downturns or other causes" (Change)	(10)	The volatile situation of declining state funding is cast as a neutral occurrence, mainly the result of economic downturns. The use of the word "relieves" further implies that this volatile situation can be somewhat ameliorated by actions of Virginia policymakers and HEI's themselves, mainly by crafting quality performance criterion. The public good is framed as politically neutral, able to be improved by accountability policies, and thus the need for this change.
"The objective of this chapter is to fuel strong economic growth in the Commonwealth. " (Existential)	(10)	This is an example of an existential presupposition because economic growth is cast as unquestionably desirable, as if Higher Education's main purpose is and has always been, economical. The public good is framed as inherently economical with no consideration of its non-market potential or other non-market public goods (Marginson, 2007). This policy is a Virginia policy, but gives no recognition of Virginia's place in a glo-na-cal network, save for competition (Marginson & Rhoades, 2002). There is no conception of global

		public goods or global harmony, just the global market (Kaul, 1999).

The line between change and existential presuppositions can be blurred at times, however. The decision of existential or change requires discretion. In order to be transparent, I gave the location of each presupposition so readers can decide for themselves the nature of the presupposition. For the sake of clarity and brevity, I did not record similar presuppositions which were used throughout the policy. I did record every time a presupposition was found however.

Attention to social actors and subject positions. The third process of coding for the discourse analysis examined how policy writers empower certain social actors and neglect or relegate others, what types of power each actor has, as well as what subject positions the policy creates for higher education institutions to act within (Ball et al., 2011; Fairclough, 2010; Saarinen, 2008). It must be noted that there is inevitably some cross over between methods, particularly the presuppositions and the social actors and the hegemonic terms. The reason for this cross over is because the same discourse is being studied in different ways.

In the table below (3.8), which is a sample from the Virginia Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2011, I first recorded which social actors were emphasized through the discourse by paying attention to which actors the policy actually mentioned, their roles and responsibilities, and how those actors were positioned with the use of grammar, namely if they were agentless actors or not. I then noted their location in the policy and

finally how that actor would most likely shape the public good. I tallied how many times a social actor was mentioned by the policy.

Table 3.8. Sample of Social Actors.

Social Actor(s)	Positioning	Location	How actor(s) frames public good
"Employers" "Marketplace"	"marketplace demand, earning potential, and employer satisfaction… can be used to assess degree programs"	(20)	HEI are to tailor degree programs and PBF criteria to what the market demands and future employer's desire. The market demands and future employer's desire technical skills which can augment profit and revenue. Thus the public good that these social actors desire is one based on the acquisition of practical skills (Calhoun, 1998; Mansbridge, 1998). Practicality and efficiency are the integral planks of the public good for these actors. In addition, the "market" is cast as an agentless entity. One in which is made to seem natural and neutral (Edmundson & D'Orso, 2007; Habermas, 1973).
"non-public institutions"	"The role of nonpublic institutions in addressing the goals set forth in this chapter and make recommendations regarding such matters. "	(20)	Non-public institutions are given a place at the table. Assumed in this is nonpublic not for profit as well as for-profit colleges. FPCU's have radically different visions of the public good. Nonpublic non-profit institutions can find common ground with publics, but FPCU's generally value efficiency and practical interests. Further, FPCU's have had increasing power in state legislatures in determining assessments (Ramaly, 2006). The public shaped by FPCU's and Public universities are much different, but there is no mention of that in the policy.

Third step. Once the above two steps of the analysis was finished, there was a total of 30 tables. Six tables were generated for the first phase and 24 tables (4 methods x 6 policies) were generated for the second method. Following Marginson (2007) who argued that policy configures the public sphere of any given polity, I examined the first six tables for commonalities among the six states. I looked across the four different categories on each of the six tables and recorded similarities onto a grand table. The outline of the categories for the grand table mirrors that of step one of the process,

namely inputs, processes, outputs, and outcomes (see table 3.9 below). Once I discerned commonalities among the six policies, I then compared the results to the analysis in the literature review. Essentially, I was trying to answer the question of how did the inputs, processes, outputs and outcomes align with or promote neoliberal goals, and if a neoliberal influence was present in the inputs, processes, outputs and/or processes.

Table 3.9. Grand Table 1

Inputs	**Processes**	**Outputs**	**Outcomes**

Next, I created another grand table with four columns, a column to record hegemonic terms found across the six policies, a column for non-hegemonic terms, a column to record the presuppositions common to all six policies and a column to record the social actors.

Table 3.10 Grand Table 2.

Hegemony	**Non-hegemonic**	**Presuppositions**	**Social Actors**

To organize the results, I searched for overarching patterns and commonalities in the data across the six policies (Creswell, 2013; Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Yin, 2010). Yin (2011) calls this stage "reassembling" the data (p. 191). I reassembled the data across the

different forms of data I produced during the study. I looked to the hegemonic and non-hegemonic counts, presuppositions and social actors to determine where the commonalities across categories occurred. Using these findings, I move into the discussion in order to present a how performance based funding policies shape the public good, at least of the states under study.

Researcher as Instrument Statement

My roles as the researcher had a fundamental impact on the ways in which the policies were analyzed and coded. Further, I am also a citizen in this republic. Implicit in the make-up of a republic is the notion of a communal public, a commonwealth that is a result of the civic and social behaviors of all its members. One of the traditional purposes of higher education, at least since the Enlightenment, has been to help produce citizens who can participate in a republic (Gutek, 1995). Giroux goes so far as to argue that pedagogy is synonymous with democracy (Giroux, 2011). Right now however, education is treated as a commodity, and the values of profitably and efficiency seem to be the sole values regarding higher education. Of course there is no set of "correct" values to govern higher education. The values must be a result of dialogue and rational debate. Both of which however have been largely replaced with sound bites, catchwords, and propaganda. Terms such as "globalization," and "knowledge economy" or "global competitiveness" are forcefully evoked by politicians; yet, I feel that constituents and the politicians using these terms really have not considered their true implications.

On a more personal note, neoliberalism values the free market, disdains notions of the public good, prefers consumers to citizens and seeks a quantitative basis for all decision making. I am not naïve enough to believe that human beings can survive

without a market mechanism, however, I feel that neoliberalism's pathological pursuit of market based mechanisms are threat to the public good which higher education institutions have provided for almost two centuries. I do not believe that vocational and market pursuits should be completely absent from education, yet these things cannot be pursued at the expense of the more liberal and communal aspects of public education, I am a public school teacher and an adjunct lecturer in History, I believe in education for democracy and the public education system based on redistribution of taxes. In addition to quantitative methods of knowing, I think qualitative methods are just as, if not more important methods for human beings to understand their world. In sum, I embody everything that neoliberalism condemns.

My motivations for undertaking this study was to question the prevailing values of higher education, namely, efficiency, profit, competition, and pathological individualism. I write from the position of what I feel are the neglected values of humanism, the public good, social justice, and democratic pedagogy. More than this, I feel that ignoring these values can and will be detrimental to society as a whole. What good will profit be if we do not understand what to spend it on? What good will individual enrichment be if all individuals are in conflict? These reasons contribute to my interest in doing this study and are why I chose a critical lens for analysis. Critical theory is a tool of social transformation and I intend to use it this way (Jay, 1996; Marcuse, 1990). Higher education must not only be a tool of the market, but one of enlightenment and democracy as well. Critical theory can help transform higher education into this tool of democracy.

Limitations of the Study

As with any research, limitations exist for this study. The first limitation is that only the policy itself is being analyzed, not the behaviors it produces. As Walsh (2013) noted, ideological apparatuses like schools, which are subject to the state, usually employ hegemony, the purpose of which is gain consent from dominated classes. Yet, there is no guarantee that the dictates of hegemony will followed, and if they are, they may not be followed the way members of the dominant classes envisioned them. Walsh (2013) stressed this point that places like school are sites of social practice, and the practice of discourse is subject to many outside factors. Thus, a policy analysis can never predict or describe behavior, rather is can only analyze the actual policy itself and understand what type of reality it creates for people act within and indicate what intentions were espoused by the policy makers. Further, as Tan (2010) noted, the implementation of policy and the experience of that policy are two different phenomena. The way performance based funding policies are experienced at one school may differ markedly from how they are experienced at another school, even within the same locale or state.

One major limitation of this study is that I am examining specific state policies. Each state in the United States is unique; it has a unique political and social culture. Due to this, the policies passed in one state may reflect idiosyncratic features of a states' political and social landscape and may not be representative of policy as a whole. I may not have fully realized or represented the specific state contexts, the times in which the policies were created, or the actors' motivations.

Delimitations of the Study

This research is delimited to the states of Arkansas, Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee Virginia and Louisiana, and to the performance based funding polices employed by each of these states. This left 24 states which I did not analyze that have or plan to enact PBF 2.0 policies. The analysis was delimited to the policies themselves versus any other data points, such as interviews with legislators, review of state newspapers, etc.

Trustworthiness of Study

The last decade, there has been a general consensus among policymakers and many educational reformers that qualitative research is vastly inferior to evidence based quantitative research (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Phillips, 2014; Weiman, 2014). Since 2011, however, there has been some backlash against this position, nonetheless, critics of qualitative research argue that qualitative research is fiction, that no truth is possible with qualitative research because it is based on researchers subjective experiences and bias, and not concrete facts (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Weiman, 2014). Since qualitative research is perceived as unscientific, its critics claim that it lacks external and internal validity (Phillips, 2014). External validity is the ability for the results of a study to be generalized to a wider population. Internal validity is the replicability of a study (Gall, Gall & Borg, 2007; Rudolph, 2014). Denzin and Lincoln (2011) argue that in qualitative research, the notion of external and internal validity is replaced by trustworthiness. The reason for this is twofold. First, qualitative research does not work with quantifiable data. Educational researchers cannot isolate or control students like physicists can isolate and control atoms (Phillips, 2014). Educational researchers must work with a certain

degree of messiness. Therefore, results of qualitative studies are usually not "generalizable" in a quantitative sense, but do uncover important findings, even for limited populations (Weiman, 2014). These findings can then be expanded on by later researchers and methods. To account for the fact that qualitative studies do not work with discreet and quantifiable data, the qualitative researcher must show that the methods/instruments used are not based solely on the subjective or emotional whims of the researcher (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Gutierrez & Penuel, 2014). Qualitative researchers also argue that researcher bias is inevitable in any study, even quantitative studies (Creswell, 2013). To account for this, qualitative researchers must be explicit and show how their own bias colors their work.

Thus, it was crucial to illustrate exactly how this dissertation study exhibits trustworthiness and to demonstrate how the discourse methods created for this study are reliable and not subjective interpretations. Each method with the exception of the non-hegemonic counts has been drawn from the existing literature and has been used in practice in some forms. This process allowed for each method to have been subjected peer review.

To ensure for accuracy and objectiveness I devised a system of interrater reliability (Neuendorf, 2002). I first asked two peer reviewers to review each of my methods and results. The peer reviewers reviewed each component of my process by determining if my results were consistent. The reviewers checked my determination of reference counts, presuppositions and social actors. Essentially, each reviewer was given the same instructions for using the tools I have appropriated and created. The reviewers were then given the Mississippi policy to code. Between the two reviewers and myself,

there was a 99% agreement. This percentage was determined by counting all the points of the policy that could be agreed upon. Here, I counted every box from the input-process-output-outcome heuristic, each location and frequency box from the hegemonic and non-hegemonic charts (the middle column), each presupposition box (the left hand column) and the social actors (the left hand column). In the Mississippi policy, there were 60 points of potential agreement. Thus, between the two reviewers, there was 120 points of agreement. There was only one point where reviewer one and I disagreed. Reviewer two and I did not disagree on any coding. So, I divided 119 points of actual agreement, by 120 points of potential agreement and came up with 99%.

The point of disagreement with reviewer one regarded the Mississippi's creation of a 23 member council (EAC) to administer the PBF policy. I counted the council as 15 separate references while reviewer one believed it should be counted as one reference. I decided to count it as 15 references because almost two pages of the four page policy were dedicated to listing the composition of the EAC. The policymakers used a separate line in the policy to denote a member. However, I did not count 23 references because some lines called for multiple members on the council. For instance, the policymakers called for two members of the business community to sit on the council, I counted this as one reference, not as two. Similarly, the last page of the policy dealt with the payment and reimbursement of the EAC members. I felt that the EAC was the centerpiece of the Mississippi policy and thus decided to count each line as a separate reference. However, even the 15 references was on the conservative side because some of the lines referenced two or more members. For instance: "two member of the business community" was one line, and thus, I counted the two members as one reference. The debate over how to count

the Mississippi policy was the biggest disagreement with the peer reviewer process. I included it here to demonstrate my own thought process for coding and to discuss the resolution of this disagreement.

The methods used are also replicable. I have replicated the use of other researcher's methods and appropriated them for my own use. I have also disclosed my biases and shown how my biases may color the study. The disclosing of bias and leanings of the part of the researcher is integral to qualitative and really all research.

Perhaps the clearest way for study methods to be reliable and accurate is for the researcher to be transparent and detail exactly how he or she arrived at her or his conclusion. Attached to this dissertation study are a number of appendices that document exactly how data was gathered and analyzed so an interested party could view my thought process and procedures. In addition, the methods section details exactly how each action was performed and how the results were obtained. It was also important for me to keep a researcher's log in order to guard against biases that may arise on my part. The log is contained in the appendix, in the sections marked "how term shapes the public good." Again, I have tried to clearly detail exactly how I used the instruments, how I created them, how I collected the data, how I analyzed the data and how I arrived at the conclusions I drew.

Summary of Chapter III

The third chapter detailed the , data collection and data analysis which was used and performed in this study. A qualitative research design was used to capture the nuances of critical theory and postmodernism. The current 30 PBF 2.0 policies were

reduced to six, and the analysis of these policies employed a two part policy framework. Finally, the section detailed the researcher's biases, limitations of the study, as well as steps taken to ensure the trustworthiness of the study and the interpretations of the data.

Chapter IV

Results

This chapter presents the results of the analysis of the six state policies on PBF 2.0 funding. The first analysis examined is Tennessee, as the state of Tennessee is the leader of performance based funding policies (Bouge & Johnson, 2010). Tennessee was also the first southern state to enact a PBF 2.0 policy, in January 2010. The next southern state to enact a PBF 2.0 policy was Louisiana in June 2010. The remaining four states all enacted their PBF policies in 2011.

For each state, the results of the Inputs-Processes-Outputs-Outcomes are first examined. Next, the results of the hegemonic chart and the presuppositions chart are examined. The social actors are then surveyed, and the results of the external chart are presented. Lastly, for each state, there is a section entitled PBF in practice which examines the data on graduation rates since the implementation of the PBF practice. While it is still too early to determine if PBF policies are effective, the data can hint to some early trends. The final section of the results chapter presents a cross-case analysis that analyzes the similarities and differences of the six policies. Since the public good of any state or region is configured by policy, the results represent how the policies in question shape the public good, at least in part (Marginson, 2007).

Tennessee

Tennessee was the first state to employ PBF in 1981. Since then, the state of Tennessee has been a pioneer in performance based funding for higher education (Bouge

& Johnson, 2010). According to the Tennessee Higher Education Commission website, by the mid-2000s, the Tennessee Higher Education Commission (THEC), which is the coordinating board for all public Tennessee higher education institutions, had beenresearching new funding formulas for higher education, based on productivity and institutional mission. It should also be noted that Tennessee is a member of the Complete College Alliance. In late 2009, the THEC proposed a new outcome based funding model to the governor which would replace the old enrollment formula, as well as PBF 1.0 formula which was based on incentives. In January 2010, with the support of the governor, the Tennessee legislature enacted a new performance based funding program which was titled Complete College Tennessee Act of 2010. The current PBF 2.0 program in Tennessee ties 100% of base funding to institutions meeting certain performance metrics and accounts for individual institutional mission in the creation of the performance metrics. The Tennessee performance based funding policy is eight and half standard pages in length.

There are three major governing boards in the state of Tennessee. The Tennessee Higher Education Commission (THEC) coordinates all public institutions of higher education in Tennessee. The University of Tennessee Board of Trustees (UT) is responsible for the governance of the university system including the large universities in Knoxville, Chattanooga, Memphis and Tullahoma, as well as various extensions throughout the state. The Tennessee Board of Regents controls all other public universities in the state including comprehensive four year institutions such as Middle Tennessee State University, and all the states community colleges and technology

centers.

Input-process-output-outcome. An analysis of this policy determined there were two inputs, 17 processes, 11 outputs, and 10 outcomes identified in the input-process-output-outcome chart for Tennessee (see Appendix B). The two inputs dealt with output based funding and the collection of fees and tuition and ultimately aligning funding with promoting the Tennessee Master Plan.

The desire for efficiency on the part of Tennessee policymakers is evident in the processes that appear in the Tennessee policy. In section 3.1C for example, the policy reads: "ensure minimal redundancy in degree offerings." The Tennessee policymakers also allocate more control to themselves at the expense of the institution. For example, in section 3.2 the policymakers must: "approve institutional mission statements for each higher education institution- degree offerings, type of students served," as well as allowing for the comptroller of the state to conduct audits of the Board of Regents and Board of Trustees. The Tennessee policymakers also created a process in the policy to allow for the cooperation between Tennessee higher education institutions and K-12 schools, other higher education institutions, businesses, civic, and community leaders (see section 3. 3). The nature of this cooperation will be discussed later. The processes of the Tennessee policy are typical: end of terms enrollments, student retention, and increased transfer rates. Another process emphasized the fostering of outcomes across a range of variables weighted to reinforce each institution's mission and to provide incentives for productivity improvement consistent with the Master Plan (located in section 3. 4).

The outputs (which Tennessee policymakers erroneously call outcomes) desired by Tennessee policymakers are timely progress to degree, competitive research, and student success. Graduation of adults (over 25) and low income students are weighted heavier in regards to completion metrics. Other weights are applied to each outcome depending on the priority and institutional mission. The type of outputs desired by Tennessee policymakers also target a particular type, namely: "Increasing number of STEM degrees to doctoral schools University of Tennessee and other institutions" (located in section 9.1). Another output desired by policymakers is to: "increase the prestige of University of Tennessee as top tier institution" (located in section 9.5). In sum, the outputs focus on promoting institutional productivity and increasing graduation rates. The Tennessee policymakers have also reorganized the Tennessee community college system, targeting this sector to produce more outputs. Section 8.c4 reads: "Standardized and centralized community college system aimed to produce more rapid and significantly higher rates of program completion through structured degree programs that incorporate fixed course offerings on a pre-determined schedule." The policy seeks to make for a seamless system of post-secondary institutions. The outputs are wide ranging and they encompass both two and four-year colleges. And it is these outputs which now determine 100% of base funding in the state of Tennessee. An output, however, is only a temporary; it is outcomes which are the ultimate goals of colleges.

The first outcome the policy (located in section 3.1A) identifies as its goal to "address states' economic development and workforce needs." A similar outcome in section 9.8 reads: "Promote research in science, technology engineering and mathematics

that encourages entrepreneurial opportunities in Tennessee," and another outcome in section 9.2 reads: "Accelerate the state's economic and workforce development efforts in the field of energy sciences and engineering." The main long range behaviors desired by the policymakers are the strengthening of the Tennessee economy and the promotion of entrepreneurial opportunities in Tennessee. Of note, these outcomes were almost identical to the five other policies examined.

The Tennessee policy also contains unique outcomes. Two of the outcomes specifically related to the University of Tennessee establishing partnerships with the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in Tennessee (located in section 9.4). Specifics regarding this outcome (located in section 9.9ab) require the establishment of "an academic unit at ORNL, with appointment and oversight of graduate students, the appointment of ORNL staff as faculty, and the development of interdisciplinary curricula between the two institutions." Another outcome (located in section 11.ab) was the establishment of a research consortium:

> St. Jude's Hospital, Tennessee Health Services and University of Tennessee now a Memphis Research Consortium (MRC). The MRC is a collaborative research venture with other leading business and research entities to promote economic development and job creation, promote opportunities for RD in public health, medical devices, medical and healthcare, bio-based products and chemical manufacturing, logistics and supply chain, computational and computer sciences, and learning technologies and related fields.

Both the partnerships with ORNL and the creation of the MRC are long range behaviors desired by Tennessee policymakers.

Policy discourse and policy silence. The results of the hegemonic chart and the non-hegemonic chart demonstrate in more detail how the Tennessee performance based funding policies help shape a more neoliberal vision of the public good. There are 17 references to accountability/performance which equates to two references per page, 13 references to public/private partnerships which equates to 1.5 references per page, nine references to the market which equates to roughly one reference per page and 10 references to STEM, which equates to roughly 1. 1 reference per page, there were 11 references to efficiency, which equate to over one reference per page. Thus, on average, each page contains roughly seven neoliberal references. Moreover, the neoliberal hegemonic discourse in the policy works in conjunction with the neoconservative strands as well. There are 25 references to government oversight (a key designator of the neoconservative orientation), which equates to just under three references per page. This was the most referenced category in the 8.5 page policy Appendix B.

Yet, there are scant references to other non-hegemonic categories that support externalities that support well-being. One of the greatest externalities that Tennessee policymakers pursue is that of creating better health practices: Tennessee policymakers have dedicated an entire section to promoting health concerns. In section 11, the policymakers urge for public health research, using the creation of a research consortium with St. Jude's Children Hospital as a vehicle to achieve this goal. There were two direct references to public service and one reference to civic leaders. There were four

references to ensuring that Tennessee citizens are served. There is also one reference to pollution reduction (which could also be considered an externality). Finally, there were two references to partnerships with civic and community leaders. In sum, the non-hegemonic chart indicates that there is some concern among Tennessee policymakers about the promotion of public health, clean energy, and public service. Of course, the reference counts for these things are miniscule compared to the references in the hegemonic chart. The nine references to non-hegemonic categories pales in comparison with the 76 policy references that tally the neoliberal and neoconservative categories.

According to non-hegemonic chart (Appendix B) the Tennessee PBF 2.0 policy does not recognize or promote any ideas of: non-profitable knowledge, visual or performing arts, liberal arts, cultural diversity, enhanced pedagogy, social benefits/externalities, reducing the crime rate, institutional autonomy, global linkages or intergenerational concerns. Both the neoliberal and neoconservative references work to create a policy mechanism which guide Tennessee higher education institutions to be more market responsive. At the same time, this neoliberal/neoconservative hegemony works in the space of a policy silence. With respect to the more individual and social non-market benefits of higher education. The presuppositions in the policy help to structure the categories to achieve this hegemony within the policy silences.

Presuppositions. The title of the policy is an echo of larger criticisms of higher education: "Complete College Tennessee Act of 2010." This title is an example of a change presupposition because the title implies that prior to the enactment of this policy, not enough was being done by Tennessee higher education institutions to help their

students graduate. Because of this lack of accomplishment by the states' institutions of higher education, the Tennessee legislature feels it must intervene as the colleges are not doing enough. This faulty assumption is based on simple causal thinking, i.e. that punitive policies will allow for more students to earn degrees. Other presuppositions are indicative of this as well. For example in section 3.1: "The commission shall construct a statewide master plan that directs higher education to be accountable for increasing the educational attainment levels of Tennesseans" (There were similar presuppositions in 3. 1B, 3. 3 and 8. 4). The use of the word "directs" implies that higher education institutions are not currently being accountable and not educating Tennesseans at an acceptable rate. In line with the main outcomes of the policymakers (which is contained in the next line 3. 1A), Tennessee policymakers aim to address the state's economic and workforce development.

The discourse frames outcomes based funding as beneficial and natural for higher education. A presupposition from section 3.4 reads: "The policies and formulae or guidelines shall result in an outcomes-based model…. end of term enrollment, student retention, timely progress toward degree completion…" (There is a similar presupposition located in section 4.2). Tennessee policymakers assume that an outcome based model is desirable and the optimal method to measure the worth of higher education. The outcomes to measure higher education are timely progress toward degree, retention and end of term enrollment.

There are a number of change presuppositions that were identified. These change presuppositions are worded to make it sound like prior to the performance based funding

policy, Tennessee higher education institutions were inefficient and wasteful as evidenced in section 3.1: "The plan shall include, but not be limited to, the consideration of the following provisions…using institutional mission differentiation to realize statewide efficiencies through institutional collaboration and minimize redundancy in degree offering…" In section 8.3 another presupposition read:

> the board shall identify and implement consolidation of services among institutions and standardization of processes between institutions in order to improve efficiency and effectiveness in all functional areas, including, but not limited to, student services, academic support and institutional support.

Each statement implies that Tennessee higher education institutions' were not being efficient with their use of resources in academic, operations, and student affairs areas. Thus, the presuppositions are considered change presuppositions. The policy language highlights that policy makers supposed a redundancy in programs offered and they sought to reign in higher education.

The language in the policy portrays neoliberalism as the obvious and taken for granted system of organization for higher education. Here is evidence from section 3.1A: "The plan shall include, but not be limited to, the consideration of the following provisions: addressing the state's economic development, workforce development…" (There were similar presuppositions in sections 9. 1 and 9. 8). Economic and workforce development are a main outcome of the policy.

While the Tennessee policymakers encourage partnerships with civic and community leaders, they also actively encourage partnership with the private sector. This active encouragement aligns with the rest of the neoliberal strands in the policy and the outcomes. An example is located in section 3.3 which reads: "…the commission shall establish a master plan that requires a broad degree of regional cooperation between postsecondary institutions with secondary institutions and business, civic and community leaders." This change presupposition implies that cooperation of higher education with outside entities is desirable and should now occur regularly.

Social Actors. The Tennessee policymakers empower certain social actors and neglect and or restrain others. The actors empowered are largely outside agencies such as the Tennessee Higher Education Commission and the actors neglected are faculty and institutions. For a full list, see appendix B.

The hierarchy established by Tennessee PBF 2.0 policy looks like this from bottom to top: higher education institutions (community colleges and four-year schools)- Board of Regents, Board of Trustees, Tennessee Higher Education Commission –Office of Legislative and Budget Analysis, comptroller-house and senate committees, governor. Technology centers are under the legislature but over the Tennessee Higher Education Commission, and ORNL is not subject to the legislature but can impact higher education institutions- the finance and ways and means committees in the house and senate.

Tennessee legislators and officials are the most powerful actors in the policy. For one, the finance and ways and means committees in the house and senate are the controllers of the purse string and must ultimately determine if an institution should

receive funds. The comptroller has the power to audit the Tennessee Higher Education Commission, the Board of Regents and Board of Trustees in regards to their accountability efforts to provide high enough levels of educational attainment. Below is text from section 13:

> An audit of the Tennessee Higher Education Commission, the University of Tennessee board of trustees, and the board of regents may be conducted by the comptroller of the treasury. If such audit is conducted, the audit shall specifically focus on overlap in mission, cost inefficiencies, management practices and the restructuring of higher education stipulated by the implementation of this act. (Complete College Tennessee Act of 2010, 2010)

The governor signed the bill into law in January 2010. The governor is a powerful, but removed player. The education committee in the house and senate must prepare an annual report for the governor regarding the progress of institutions and the Performance based funding policy. Thus, the governor can presumably make recommendations for policymakers to follow and ultimately for higher education institutions to abide by if these recommendations are put into future policy revisions.

The Tennessee PBF 2.0 policy empowers actors not wholly under the control of the state legislature. The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is a special actor in the Tennessee performance based funding policy. ORNL is a laboratory run by the U. S. Department of Energy. According to ORNL website, the mission of the laboratory is foster the commercialization of research for the market (http://www.ornl.gov/about-ornl).

The policymakers encourage partnerships between Tennessee institutions and ORNL. It is understood in the policy that the policies of ORNL and the Federal Department of Energy are in no way impinged upon by the Tennessee performance based funding policy, yet graduate students of University of Tennessee higher education institutions can be placed under the supervision of ORNL staff and ORNL staff can be made professors. The policy also allows ORNL employees oversight of graduate students. Doctoral students at University of Tennessee are given the opportunity to perform transformative research in the fields of energy research and engineering. But this only affects doctoral students in energy and engineering fields and neglects doctoral students a variety of other disciplines. Here, ORNL operates much like a business despite their role as a governmental agency.

The Memphis Research Consortium (MRC) is empowered by the Tennessee policymakers in a variety of ways. The MRC is encouraged by Tennessee policymakers to develop strategies and plans for establishing and enhancing opportunities for research and development in private industries as well as public health services. While there is a public component, the MRC is largely encouraged to engage in industrial and commercial ventures.

Technology centers are given more autonomy than any other institution in the policy, because the Tennessee Higher Education Commission does not control their budgets or funding. Again, this speaks to the fact that technology, STEM, and workforce training are prized facets of the public good and policymakers promote these facets, usually at the expense of the humanities.

The Tennessee Higher Education Commission (THEC) is the coordinating agency for the state of Tennessee, with members appointed by the governor. The commission is charged by the legislature with developing a statewide master plan for all public universities. The purpose of the plan is to make Tennessee higher education institutions accountable and to allow them to address the state's economic and workforce needs. The Tennessee Board of Regents (BOR) is the governing body of University of Tennessee and its members are appointed by the governor. The Board of Regents and Board of Trustees (BOT) are invited to aid the Tennessee Higher Education Commission in crafting the master plan. These entities have more of an advising role in the creation of the master plan. With these three agencies (THEC,BOR, BOT) underneath the legislature, there is a clear hierarchy of power in Educational policy making in Tennessee.

The Tennessee Higher Education Commission must submit the higher education funding formula to Office of Legislative Budget Analysis and to the comptroller of the treasury annually. (The Tennessee Higher Education Commission must also work to establish uniform plans of statistical analysis and accounting). The Office of Legislative Budget Analysis and comptroller than give comments on the budget to the house and senate education committees.

Governing boards of individual institutions are given some power to help craft the master plan, but this power is only given after the debate about whether having a master plan based on quantifiable outcomes is over. All public institutions in Tennessee are largely viewed as passive actors by Tennessee policymakers with limited capabilities of

agency. The Tennessee Higher Education Commission is supposed to solicit input of public higher education institutions, but this input comes subsequent to the input of Board of Regents and Board of Trustees. This ordering essentially makes any college level input moot. Further, the four year higher education institutions are not supposed to contribute input to the question of accountability. The method of accountability has already been decided: outcome based performance. All institutions are supposed to work within the confines of performance and outcomes funding and not offer alternative models of accountability.

However, there is one clause which does give a degree of power or at least latitude to all higher education institutions to carry out their missions. Section 3.3 reads that nothing in the act can prohibit any institution from pursing its mission. However, what if an institutional or departmental mission comes into conflict with PBF, such as a humanities program or program meant to foster urban renewal or civic behavior among citizens? Thus, the power dynamic is ambiguous and it remains unknown how the state would deal with a contested situation over an institution's mission.

Community Colleges perhaps are the most restricted entities in the state of Tennessee under this policy. Perhaps not surprisingly, the two-year sector is located at the bottom of the higher education hierarchy. The Tennessee performance based funding policy creates a brand new framework to unify, centralize and streamline community college operations and offerings.

Students are also viewed as largely passive actors. It is assumed that increasing the number of degrees is the surest way to educate the citizens and increase the public

good. While the Tennessee policymakers do recognize some social benefits of higher education, the thrust of the policy is financial betterment. So the real voice and power of Tennessee citizens as promoted by the policy is somewhat questionable because their welfare is couched mainly in quantifiable outcomes which are really simplistic assumptions; i. e. the assumption that simple outcomes can promote the public good.

PBF in practice. While it is too early to tell if PBF 2.0 policies are having an effect, graduation rates in every Tennessee four year institution and most of the Tennessee community colleges have risen since 2010. Since 2010, there has also been declining enrollment of students at Tennessee higher education institutions. Again, as Tandberg and Hill (2014) found, it takes roughly seven to eight years to begin to see a change in graduation rates. The early statistics show promise that the policy is contributing to increasing graduation rates.

The actions of Tennessee higher education institutions have been shaped by the PBF 2.0 policy in place. The policy encouraged partnerships with local high schools, which is a good thing in itself. However, Tennessee colleges are employing a Pearson software design to offer remedial math in high schools. It will be remembered that Pearson is a multi-billion dollar educational firm and profits handsomely from this. Tennessee has also partnered with Lumina foundation to award grants to students, which gives the Lumina foundation added power because they are holding more purse strings. Finally, Tennessee has partnered with the for-profit company Civtats (Fain, 2013). Civitas is a data company that offers data forecasting services to institutions to help them meet their metrics, such as retention and graduation targets. Tennessee institutions plan

to use Civitats to help them project graduation and completion rates and help institutions to increase them (Fain, 2013). This means that the state of Tennessee will be paying taxpayer money to forecast data prediction.

Louisiana

The Louisiana constitution authorizes the Louisiana Board of Regents to develop a Master Plan to guide higher education institutions. As the Louisiana Board of Regents website states "Accountability is a major theme running through the Master Plan." The policy is titled the Louisiana Granting Resources and Autonomy for Diplomas Act (GRAD). The GRAD act is part of the larger Master Plan for Louisiana higher education institutions. The GRAD reflects the focus on accountability, as well as performance and bolstering the state's economy. The main goal of the plan and the GRAD act is to increase educational attainment of Louisiana citizens.

The Louisiana Board of Regents coordinates all public higher education institutions in Louisiana. In 2011, the Board of Regents developed the Master Plan which is in effect. The GRAD act is way to promote the intents of the Master Plan. The GRAD act is nine and half standard pages. The GRAD act was supported by the republican governor of Louisiana, Bobby Jindal, who signed it into law in June of 2010. Bobby Jindal is a noted conservative and influential in the Republican Party. The Louisiana state legislature however was democratically controlled at the time. Louisiana is also member of the Complete College Alliance. The GRAD ties 15% of base funding to institutions meeting performance objectives.

Input-process-output-outcome. In the Louisiana policy, there are 11 inputs, 10 processes, 11 outputs, and eight outcomes. As in the other states reviewed, the inputs, processes, outputs and outcomes are typical of neoliberal concerns.

Three inputs deal with the granting to Louisiana higher education institutions the autonomy to raise tuition if the higher education institutions meet certain performance indicators. The tuition increases apply to both resident and nonresident students (located in sections 3.20-23 and 6. 1-15). Six inputs grant Louisiana higher education institutions the ability to utilize surplus funds and delineate what institutions can and cannot do with reserve and surplus finds (located in section 10.3-8 and section 9. 20-23). An input in section 7.1 reads "Autonomies granted. Procuring information technology products and services. " This input allows institutions some autonomy in regards to purchasing technology products and services. This input, along with the above inputs, gives Louisiana higher education institution some limited autonomy, at least in their financial and contractual obligations.

Three of the 10 processes are directly linked to the notion of efficiency. These efficiency oriented processes read: "Institutional efficiency and accountability. Eliminate remedial education course offerings and developmental study programs unless such courses or programs cannot be offered at a community college in the same geographic area" (located in sections 3.14- 3.16); "Eliminate associate degree program offering unless such programs cannot be offered at a community college in the same geographic area or when the Board of Regents has certified educational or workforce needs" (section 3.17-19); and finally "…remaining competitive, increasing their effectiveness and

efficiency" (located in section 1. 20-21). Not only are the processes in the policy related to efficiency, there is a conscious effort to raise the quality of the institution and students. For example, the process located in 2.21 states: "Phase in increased admission standards and other necessary policies." This process also speaks to the notion of institutional prestige. As colleges are ranked by entities such as U. S. News and World Reports, policymakers desire to increase institutional prestige. However, this prestige may come at the expense of access, especially for underserved populations as well as community colleges which do not generally figure into the rankings.

Three more processes deal with collaboration (located in sections 2.26-2.28): "Develop referral agreements with community colleges and technical college campuses to redirect students who fail to qualify for admission into the institution" and "Develop partnerships with high schools to prepare students for postsecondary education.". Further support for collaborating was found in 2.29-30: "Demonstrate collaboration in implementing the articulation and transfer requirements…." Lastly, and perhaps the most strongest process, which facilitates the neoliberal and neoconservative agenda states (located in section 3.14):

> Workforce and economic development. (a) Eliminate academic program offerings that have low student completion rates as identified by the Board of Regents or are not aligned with current or strategic workforce needs of the state, region, or both as identified by the Louisiana Workforce Commission.

This passage is a noteworthy because it allows for a reduction in certain offerings and frees up resources that can then presumably be put to use in other offerings that are more amenable to the market and profitability. More than just an educational outcome, the reduction in specific course offerings also impacts strategic planning because the mission and the goals of institutions in Louisiana are beginning to change as well. Workforce training is supplanting all other goals and reconfiguring the mission of Louisiana higher education institutions.

The outputs of the Louisiana policy are typical of other accountability measures in the plans discussed above. For example, "improving college completion…" and "cohort graduation rates…" (located in sections 1.22 and 2. 12 respectively), followed by "Increase the percentage of program completers at all levels each year" (located in 2.16) and "increasing the performance of associate degree recipients who transfer to institutions that offer academic undergraduate degrees at the baccalaureate level or higher" (located in section 3. 11). Other outputs include: "Having a high percentage of graduates or completers each year as compared to the state average percentage of graduates and that of the institution's peers" (located in 4. 10-12), and "Having a high level of research productivity and technology transfer" (in section 4. 16), as well as "a graduation rate of at least sixty-percent for any institution classified as a 'Four-Year 2' institution by the SREB" (section 8. 15-16).

The focus on graduations highlights an apparent assumption of the Louisiana policymakers, namely that colleges are solely responsible for graduation rates. There are a myriad of factors which influence college graduation rates such as family background,

socio-economic factors, as well as larger economic trends. Thus, a specific focus on the actions of the college for increasing graduation rates may be a good start, but not nearly enough.

The policy also lays out what outputs are expected if institutions reach their first performance indicators (in section 8.13-14; 8.17-19):

> If an institution's initial performance agreement is renewed for a second six-year period, the institution in exchange shall: further increase cohort graduation rate goals as specified in Subparagraph (C(1)(a) of this Section including the following, as applicable: graduation rate of a at least seventy-five percent for any institution classified as a 'Four-Year1' institution by the SREB.....a graduation rate of at least fifty percent for any institution classified as a 'Four-Year 3', 'Four-Year 4', or 'Four-Year 5', institution by the SREB.

Additionally, the policy dictates an "Increase the use of technology for distance learning to expand educational offerings." Distinguishing goals by four and two-year schools further demonstrates how the policy is increasing the stratification between four-year schools and community colleges. Two-year schools are further seen as remedial institutions and four-year schools are seen as prestigious. Yet, community colleges are not just remedial schools, but also serve as the points of entry for many low income students. The limited view of the role of community colleges highlights how the discourse in the policy reinforces stereotypes of the two-year sector and how the policy serves to reify their role to workforce development.

Like the outputs, the outcomes are also typical of other performance based funding policies. The outcomes center mainly on preparing a workforce that can meet the state's workforce and economic needs. For example, the outcome in section 2.12 states: "meeting the state's current and future workforce and economic development needs…." Further, the output in section 2.12-13 reads: "graduation productivity goals that are consistent with institutional peers…". Another output focuses on "Increase passage rates on licensure and certification exams and workforce foundational skills" (in section 2.19-20). These outcomes are indicative of a focus on the part of Louisiana policymakers toward workforce and economic needs. This economic focus is to the exclusion of any democratic concerns.

Louisiana policymakers also seek to harness educational research for financial purposes as well as to support technology transfer. For example, the policy requires (in section 3.7-9): "Increase research productivity especially in key economic development industries and technology transfer at institutions to levels consistent with the institution's peers." Of course, the main outcome is to create overall economic growth: "To the extent that information can be obtained, demonstrate progress in increasing the number of students placed in jobs" (section 3.10-12).

There is also a push to encourage public private partnerships and aligning with business and market needs (section 4.4-6): "Offering a specialized program that involves partnerships between the institution and business and industry, national laboratories, research centers and other institutions," and "Aligning with current and strategic statewide and regional workforce needs as identified by the Louisiana Workforce

Commission and Louisiana Economic Development" (section 4. 7-9). A desired outcome is sought by making transitions among institutions easier: "Having a high number of graduates or completers who enter productive careers or continue their education in advanced degree programs, whether all at the same or another institution" (in section 4.13-15). The inputs, processes, outputs, and outcomes exhibit strands of both neoliberal and neoconservative hegemony, which is explored in more detail in the following section.

Policy hegemony and policy silence. More than any other policy, the Louisiana higher education policy has 56 total references to accountability and performance which equates to almost 6 references per page. The performance markers mainly center on graduation and completion rates. The entire act is predicated on granting diplomas. As noted, the Louisiana PBF 2.0 policy is named the GRAD act. The GRAD act directly aligns with the larger criticisms of neoliberals directed at higher education; namely that higher education is inefficient and too costly (Fried & Salam, 2012; Vedder, 2012). The Louisiana policy is indicative of this neoliberal criticism of higher education and the acronym unequivocally signals the end goal of increasing graduation rates.

Along with accountability, the direct references to the market and the private sector help to reinforce neoliberal hegemony. There were 12 references to the market/economic growth/ revenue and profit generation investment/ commercialization which equates to over 1 reference per page. The main intent of Louisiana policymakers is to encourage higher education institutions to help meet state and regional workforce needs by training a workforce and by placement of graduates in specific fields. The policymakers have also sought the aid of the Louisiana Workforce Commission in

crafting output and outcome metrics. The first reference to workforce training calls for partnerships among higher education institutions and businesses, and national laboratories and research centers. The second reference, however, stipulates that two members of the business community must sit on a review panel, which is to monitor the progress of each Louisiana higher education institutions institution toward meeting the performance goals. Thus, there is an institutionalized mechanism of annual evaluation of the PBF policy, yet this evaluation is conducted and driven by the legislature and members of the business community.

There were also a number of other market related references common to neoliberal hegemony. There were 13 references to efficiency/optimal use of resources which equates to roughly 1 reference per page. There is a list of specific data that higher education institutions are required to give the legislator auditor, legislature and Board of Regents. Louisiana higher education institutions must demonstrate that they are acting efficiently. The references to efficiency are also indicative of the purposes (Outcomes) of the policymakers, which is to ensure that Louisiana higher education institutions remain competitive.

As with the other policies studied, there was a pervasive strand of neoconservatism in the Louisiana policy. There were 19 references to government oversight located in sections. It should be noted that the references to government oversight do not count individually mandated performance goals to avoid redundancy. Rather, only references to direct oversight, such as the mandating of reports and monitoring, as well as the mandating of performance based systems, were counted.

Louisiana higher education institutions must submit reports for a variety of things. Louisiana higher education institutions must submit three separate reports, one to the Board of Regents, one to the legislative auditor of the state, and one to the legislature. These reports must contain a number of specified data, such as number of students by classification, number of instructional staff members, class ratios, staff in administrative areas, and other points. The legislature and Board of Regents can request any additional information when they see fit. There is also an annual review of each plan by the Board of Regents. The legislative auditor must also perform a performance analysis six months after the agreement. The policy also dictates how Louisiana higher education institutions use their surplus funds, creating centralization within oversight of funding. Louisiana higher education institutions are given mandated goals, but leeway in how to achieve them. Burke (2005) defines this as a partial mandate. Yet, decentralization with direction is not true autonomy, when centralization of a prescribed, market base goal, is sought.

As for the non-hegemonic chart, there were no references to health/life expectancy, general happiness, non-market knowledge, art/literature/theater, pedagogy, college mission, enhancing citizenship, liberal arts, externalities/social benefits, reduced crime rate, social transformation, pollution reduction, deliberate intergenerational concerns, and a just use of STEM.

There were two references from the non-hegemonic chart in the Louisiana policy, specifically targeting interdisciplinary and global linkages. The first reference is to establishing partnerships with high schools to prepare students for postsecondary education. This connection creates the potential to help forge links in a glo-na-cal

network, in this case with an emphasis on the local (Marginson & Rhoades, 2002). There is also one reference to cultural diversity. This reference was to historically black colleges and deals with keeping tuition at a certain level for HBCU's.

Presuppositions. The references to accountability, the market and efficiency are entwined throughout the Louisiana policy. One of the first existential presuppositions demonstrates this entwinement, as well as how the various strands of neoliberalism are made natural by the discourse of the policy (section 1.19-22):

> B. Purpose. The purpose of this Section is to support the state's public postsecondary education institutions in remaining competitive and increasing their overall effectiveness and efficiency by providing that the institutions achieve specific, measureable performance objectives aimed at improving college completion and at meeting the state's current and future workforce economic development needs and by granting the institutions limited operational autonomy and flexibility in exchange for achieving such objectives.

The interpretation of the policy highlights how Louisiana policymakers see the purpose of higher education as a driver of the state economy and a means to train a workforce. Partnerships with the private sector are also seen as desirable and unproblematic. If higher education institutions meet performance objectives, they will be granted limited autonomy to raise tuition and enter in contracts and use surplus funds.

Two similar existential presuppositions read (sections 4.7-9 and section 4.4-6): "Aligning with current and strategic statewide and regional workforce needs as identified

by the Louisiana Workforce Commission and Louisiana Economic Development," and "Offering a specialized program that involves partnerships the institution and business and industry, national laboratories, research centers, and other institutions." Higher education institutions many times are forced to act as market like entities in order to survive in a climate with decreased funding.

> The most striking existential presupposition is located in section 3.14. It reads:
>
> Workforce and economic development, (a) Eliminate academic program offerings that have low student completion rates as identified by the Board of Regents or are not aligned with current strategic workforce needs of the state, region, or both as identified by the Louisiana Workforce Commission.

Because the liberal arts, social sciences and other disciplines are not seen to have market potential, the interpretation is that they do not fall under this clause. The policymakers pose this clause as if there should be no question that non-market programs and programs with low enrollment should be cut if they do not align with market needs. Further, the market is held as the ultimate source of order. Louisiana higher education policymakers seem to agree that if a course does not align with workforce needs, it has to go.

Louisiana higher education institutions are granted the ability to raise tuition in exchange for meeting performance objectives. This ability to raise tuition is in contrast to most policies in this study that urge their institutions to keep tuition low. Yet, the ability to raise tuition is limited and controlled within the Louisiana policy (see sections 6.7-6.11 and 6. 16-20): "the authority to increase tuition and mandatory fee amounts by

up to five percent," and "Increase tuition and fee amounts by up to ten percent annually, without legislative approval, until the institution reaches the average tuition and fee amounts of its peer institutions." Tuition increases are seen as unproblematic by Louisiana policymakers and actually desirable in dire economic circumstances because tuition increases give the higher education institution another revenue source, thus it was labeled as an existential presupposition. While the tuition increases will help higher education institutions make up their revenue shortfall, there is no consideration of the potential social actors that tuition increases negatively impact, namely middle and low income students. Other autonomies have to deal with the ability to spend surplus funds and enter into contracts and consortiums. While these are necessary, the autonomy granted to Louisiana's higher education institutions is rooted in the goals of business.

The strong neoconservative strand in the policy is further evident from the presuppositions located in sections 4.17-29 and 5.12-14 respectively: "Submit a report to the Board of Regents, the legislative auditor, and the legislature containing certain organizational data, including…," and "The Board of Regents may revoke an agreement at any time if it determines that an institution has failed to abide by the terms of the agreement." The wording implies that higher education institutions are too important to be left to their own devices, and that they must be policed. This "fact" is taken for granted by policymakers, thus making it existential. Strict oversight systems have been developed over the last few decades to ensure higher education institutions are producing for the economy and not wasting time on frivolous research. It is evident in the Louisiana policy that there is no real debate as to who has power over whom—the state

government is the final arbitrator. The potential for Louisiana higher education institutions to create their own accountability measures, outside the market, and contribute to the public good is overridden in the Louisiana policy, which is common in many performance based funding policies (Barnetson & Cutright, 2000).

Social actors. The empowered social actors are also evidence of the neoliberal and neoconservative strand in the Louisiana policy. For one, the Board of Regents, and the subsequent review panel which is to be formed from them, have dominant roles in the policy. For over 10 years Louisiana policymakers have been exploring PBF. There were some preliminary policies, but the GRAD act of 2010 is the first comprehensive PBF 2.0 in Louisiana. The Board of Regents created a six year master plan for each institution. Each plan is the initial performance agreements of the GRAD act. Institutions may agree to the plan. There is little to no input from higher education institutions. The Board of Regents is furthered empowered to create a review panel which meets annually and whose task is to review the progress of higher education institutions in meeting their performance goals. The Board of Regents has the authority to revoke an agreement if it is determined that the higher education institution has not met its obligations. Thus, the Board of Regents is greatly empowered by the Louisiana legislature. The GRAD act is a response to the low educational attainment rate in Louisiana and the supposed economic crisis emerging due to this situation.

The Louisiana Legislature, the Joint Legislative Committee on the Budget and Legislative auditor are all empowered actors in the policy. Higher education institutions are subordinate to the legislature and legislative auditor, as well as the Board of Regents.

While the Board of Regents determines if higher education institutions are meeting their objectives, it is the Joint Legislative Committee on the budget that actually makes the decision. Higher education institutions are also required to submit data on a variety of efficiency points, such as teacher student ratio. In Louisiana, there is a vertical hierarchy created and higher education institutions are at the bottom.

The governor is a prominent actor in this policy. Governor Bobby Jindal, who has been in office since 2007, has been a strong advocate of performance based funding and helped to spearhead the effort in his home state. He signed the bill into law in June of 2010. The law is in part the result of executive power, and the visions of Jindal and the business community of what higher education should be. Thus, the governor holds great influence over the ever evolving vision of the public good.

The Louisiana Workforce Commission (LWC) is another important actor in the policy. The LWC is a workforce agency whose mission it is to get people a job and to make Louisiana a great place to grow a business. Since the LWC has helped to shape the policy, the ideas of workforce training and driving the state's economy are one of the main focuses of the policy and how the public good is conceived by Louisiana policymakers.

Two other sets of important actors in the Louisiana policy which further demonstrate the influence of neoliberalism are "business, industry, national laboratories and Research Centers" (section 4.4-6), and "Two representatives of the business community" (section 8. 6). Two representatives of the business community are even given a place on the review panel. So market actors actually have some power to

regulate Louisiana's institutions of higher education and ensure that Louisiana higher education institution are conforming to business needs. In addition to powers of regulation, Louisiana higher education institutions are encouraged to partner with the private sector. These partnerships may privilege business actors as well.

There are two outside agencies empowered by the Louisiana policymakers. These actors are institutional peers and the Southern Regional Educational Board (sections 2.13 and 6.19). This recognition of peer institutions is also indicative of the policymakers concern with institutional prestige. Institutional peers are held up as a benchmark for Louisiana higher education institution to emulate and to gauge their progress and tuition rates by. Thus, the peer institutions do become influential in the operations of Louisiana higher education institutions. The SREB's main role in the policy is to help set appropriate rates for tuition raises, by using the other states in the association for averages and benchmarks.

The next set of actors is public postsecondary education institutions, community colleges/technical colleges, and the individual institution's management board. Like the Virginia's 2005 Restructuring Act, the GRAD act allows institutions to enter into agreements with the legislature. In these agreements, Louisiana higher education institutions pledge to meet certain metrics in exchange for authority to raise tuition. Thus, there is a small measure of empowerment for Louisiana higher education institutions. In many ways Louisiana's PBF 2.0 policy, the voluntary GRAD act, could be seen as a way to force cash strapped higher education institution into an accountability agreement. Nonetheless, many representatives from management boards of the

individual institutions and other high ranking officials in institutions were on record giving strong praise to the governor and the GRAD in general.

Students are actors in the policy as well (in-state and out of state residents and financially needy students). Students are primarily seen in one of two ways. First, students are seen as paying customers. A major focus of the policy is the ability for Louisiana higher education institutions to raise tuition in return for meeting certain targets. Second, students are also seen as potential workers. Institutions must reach certain performance targets in order to be fully funded by the legislature.

PBF in practice. Performance based funding policies have impacted Louisiana policymakers. Civitas Learning has partnered with the University of Louisiana at Lafayette. In addition, Louisiana policymakers have passed subsequent legislation in 2013, titled GRAD Act II, which enhanced the scope and mandate of PBF2.0 policies in the state of Louisiana. According to the Louisiana Board of Regents websites, graduation rates in Louisiana have remained stagnant since the implementation of the GRAD act in 2010

Mississippi

Mississippi, like Tennessee, is a member of the Complete College America Alliance. According to the Mississippi Board of Regents website, in 2009 the Mississippi Board of Trustees proposed a funding formula based on maintenance costs as well as limited performance measures. This motion was blocked by the Mississippi legislature however.

In 2011, the Mississippi legislature passed HB 875, which authorized the newly created Education Achievement Council to research and develop a new funding mechanism based on performance for higher education institutions. The performance based funding policy for the state of Mississippi is the shortest in length of the six policies, totaling four standard pages. The 2011 legislation was enacted as part of the code of Mississippi and it created the basic framework for performance based funding in the state. More detailed and updated formulas are to be enacted every fiscal year if necessary. As a result, the state of Mississippi has partnered with the non-profit organization National Center for Higher Education Management Systems to research these different systems (NCHEMS). One of NCHEMS goals is to assist state boards and institutions implement new performance based models. The 2013 regular session of the Mississippi legislature was the first to adopt specific metrics. This study however will examine the initial PBF legislation, HB 875, which is part of the state code.

Mississippi ties 100% of base funds to institutions meeting performance metrics. There is a small set aside for operational costs which is not included in the 100% however. At the time of passage of Mississippi's PBF 2.0 policy, Mississippi had a republican governor and republican controlled legislature. Mississippi has a governing board, the Mississippi Board of Trustees, which oversees all eight of Mississippi's public universities. There is also the Mississippi Board of Community Colleges, which oversees all community and junior colleges in the state.

Input-process-output-outcome. There was one input, seven processes, three outputs and one outcome. The first input called for the legislature to allocate funds to the

Board of Trustees for the purposes of "Learning for the administrative, contractual costs, travel and other expenses (located in lines 99-102).

The first processes (located in lines 10-12) reads: "There is created an Education Achievement Council whose purpose is to sustain attention to the states goal... " The processes put forth the powers of the Council. The council is given sufficient latitude to enter in contracts it feels necessary to achieve its mission and is given the task of planning. It is also the largest council from the six states examined at 23 members. The ultimate task of the Mississippi Education Achievement Council is process orientated as the Council is to create a new funding formula based on productivity and achievement of Mississippi's higher education institutions (located in lines 61-64). Another process (located in lines 73-74 and 79-82), call for each institution to submit an annual report to the legislature.

The outputs and outcomes of Mississippi performance based funding policy were similar to the other policies studied. The first output (located in lines 47-50) called for achievement goals to be created. The second output (located in lines 57-60) described the actual goals created: "Establish benchmarks to measure progress, including degrees awarded per 100 FTE students calculated by using credit hours…". The last output (located in lines 72-76), mandates the creation of an "annual state report card…which will be made available on the education achievement council website." This report card will detail the progress of each institution in the state of Mississippi in meeting their goals. Another outcome in the policy (located in lines 11-13) reads: "…increasing the educational attainment and skill levels of the state's working-age population benchmark

to the national average by 2025." The focus here is on workforce and vocational development and again is similar to the other policies studied.

Policy hegemony, policy silence. The hegemonic chart and the presuppositions chart (both in appendix C) reveal that like the Tennessee policy, the Mississippi policy is undergirded with neoliberal and neoconservative elements. In the case of Mississippi, the neoconservative element seems to be stronger than the links to neoliberalism. Perhaps most glaringly, there were 47 references to government oversight which averages to almost 12 references per page. Of these 47 references, about half were references to the 23 members of the Mississippi Education Achievement Council (located in lines 15-46).

There were 12 references to accountability and performance which averages three references per page. The mentions of accountability and performance were also related to the two references for vocational training. The major outcome of the Mississippi policy is increasing the educational attainment and skill levels of the state's working-age population benchmark to the national average by 2025. In order to achieve this, the state requires the creation of performance metrics.

There were four combined references to the market and partnerships with the private sector, averaging one per page (located in lines 44, 68, and 104). There is only one direct reference to economic growth; the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Mississippi Economic Council (MEC) is one of the appointees to the Mississippi Education Achievement Council. This appointment process is significant because the Mississippi Education Council is given tremendous power over Mississippi higher education.

As for the externality chart (located in appendix C) there was one indirect reference to general happiness in line 42 and one reference to cultural diversity in line 38. The Executive Director of the Mississippi Department of Mental Health is one of the members appointed to the EAC. In addition, there was one reference to cultural diversity. Out of the three college presidents are appointed to the EAC, one of which has to be from a HBCU. There were no references to any externalities, civic actions or social transformation.

Presuppositions. Many presuppositions in the policy naturalize government oversight of higher education and the use of performance objectives. For instance lines 10-14 read: "There is created an Education Achievement Council whose purpose is to sustain attention to the state's goal of increasing the educational attainment and skill levels of the state's working-age population benchmark to the national average by 2025." This example is a change presupposition because the wording of this clause implies that Mississippi higher education institutions were not meeting this objective prior to the policy and thus, stricter accountability and oversight measures were needed to police Mississippi higher education institutions and bring them into conformity with the trend of accountability.

Other change presuppositions spell out the powers of the Council. Lines 1-5 read: "To direct the Mississippi Education Achievement Council to Research and Develop a New Funding Mechanism for Community Colleges and Institutions of Higher Learning Based Upon Productivity..." The use of the verb "directs" implies that the funding mechanisms of Mississippi higher education institutions, which were based on enrollment

are no longer adequate, thus this can be read as a change presupposition. The Mississippi Education Achievement is directed to create a new funding mechanism based on outcomes and performance.

Another change presupposition (located in lines 70-72) reads: "The Mississippi education council shall: monitor and report on the state's progress toward these education achievement goals..." The Mississippi Education Achievement Council is to make its recommendations to the legislature based on annual reports from the individual Mississippi higher education institutions.

An example of an existential presupposition that naturalizes oversight and accountability for Mississippi higher education institutions, located in lines 52-54, reads: "The Mississippi Education Achievement Council shall: establish the education achievement goals for the state..." In the hierarchy, the Mississippi Education Achievement Council is positioned above Mississippi higher education institutions and is entrusted to establish benchmarks and progress, as well as achieve education goals. Another example of an existential presupposition in lines 46-50 reads: "The Mississippi Education Achievement Council shall work collaboratively with the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning and the State Board for Community and Junior Colleges to achieve the state's goal." The use of the term collaboratively implies that the Mississippi Education Achievement Council is put on the same footing as the Board of Trustees of individual institutions and the State Board of Community Colleges to achieve the states' educational goals.

An existential presupposition (located in lines 68-69) that reinforced the market alignment reads: “Contract for any professional services that it deems necessary to complete its work.” This statement assumes that public and private (especially for profit) partnerships are desirable and necessary and there is no contention on this point, thus its label as an existential presupposition.

Social Actors. The social actors identified in the Mississippi policy were typical, mainly the EAC, boards, the governor, legislature and the institutions. The full list is in appendix C. The Mississippi Education Achievement Council is created by the policy and vested with tremendous power. This vested power in a single council is similar to other performance based funding policies which also create legal bodies to police higher education. The Mississippi Education Achievement Council is composed of 23 members. These members are as follows: Chairmen of the House and Senate University and College Committee, Chairman of the House and Senate Education Committees, a representative from the Governor’s office, two members from the Board of Trustees, the Chairman of the State Board of Education, the Chairman and one member of Board for Community and Junior Colleges, the State Superintendent of Public Education, the Commissioner of Higher Education, the Executive Director of the State Board for Community and Junior Colleges, three presidents of state institutions (one must be from a Historically Black College or University), the Executive Director of the Mississippi Department of Mental Health, the President and Chief Officer of the Mississippi Economic Council and the Chairmen of the House/Senate Appropriations Committee.

The makeup of the Council is noteworthy for a number of reasons. For one, there

are no representatives of any civic organizations or organizations that represent the humanities or social sciences, just policymakers and businesses. There is also a representative from mental health and an HBCU on the council. Further, out of the 23 total members, only three members are members of universities; three presidents of state institutions. There is no mention of which state institutions will be represented except for an HBCU.

PBF in practice. The Board of Trustees and State Board for Community and Junior Colleges are supposed to work with the Mississippi Education Achievement Council to craft the benchmarks and outcomes for Mississippi higher education institutions. While the policy does give the Board of Trustees and the State Board for Community and Junior Colleges some power, it is already assumed that the creation of outcomes is the most effective way to measure Mississippi higher education institutions. Therefore the power of the Board of trustees and State Board for Community and Junior Colleges are already circumscribed.

Virginia

In March of 2010, republican governor Robert McDonnell established the governor's council for higher education reform to research performance funding models for higher education. In January of 2011, the Virginia General Assembly passed the Virginia Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2011. According to the State Council of Higher Education in Virginia website, the purpose of the act is to "significantly increase college attainment by the year 2025." Even though Virginia is not formally a member of the Complete College Alliance, the language and purposes of the policy is very similar to

the language and purposes of Complete College America and the Gates Foundation. It should also be noted that the Virginia Higher Education Opportunity Act was part of a larger reform agenda by Governor McDonnell to ensure that all Virginia state agencies are acting efficiently and accountable to taxpayers.

The Virginia policy, titled the Virginia Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2011, is eight standard pages long. Virginia ties 50% of base funding for institutions to meeting certain performance metrics. At the time of passage in 2011, Virginia has a republican governor and a republican controlled House of Delegates. The Virginia Senate however was democratically controlled by a slim majority. There is no consolidated governing board for the four year institutions in Virginia, rather there is only the State Council of Higher Education in Virginia (SCHEV) which is a coordinating board. There is a governing board for the community college system, the Virginia Community College System (VCCS).

Input-process-output-outcome. The policy contained 16 inputs, 25 processes, 17 outputs, and 18 outcomes. Virginia policymakers tie 50% of base funding to performance. The other 50% is tied to enrollment. The inputs reflect this division. Five of the 16 inputs (located in sections 10, 13, 14 and 16) have to deal with incentivizing enrollment. The reference in section 16 specifically aims to incentive enrollment of Virginia residents in Virginia higher education institutions. The specific methods to incentive enrollment however were not mentioned. There are also two inputs that promote financial aid for needy Virginia residents. Three inputs deal with the creation of performance based metrics and tying base funding to these metrics (located in sections

12, 13 and 16). The input in section 16 specifically encourages funding mechanisms for higher education which target economic and commercial innovation.

Five of the 25 processes promote the efficient use of resources. An example from section 10 reads: "Take advantage of correlation between higher education and economic growth." There were two processes which aimed to facilitate the production of outputs common to the accountability movement in general. A typical process encouraging the production of outputs (see section 17) reads: "Six year plan development which addresses financial and academic concerns and enrollment plans and for degree conferral targets." Another typical accountability process (located in section 10) reads: "higher education institutions to inform funding, performance criteria and economic metrics such as market demand, earning potential and employer satisfaction." Creating mechanisms which facilitate public and private partnership, as well as the increase of STEM degrees were also present in the Virginia policy in section 19: "Identify best practices to get STEM in higher education and K-12, enhance K-12 STEM teacher preparation and math readiness," and "Create council with private sector leaders, military personal and government scientists and education specialists."

The outputs desired by policymakers are also in line with typical accountability outputs. For one, in section 10 the Virginia policymakers desire to: "Generate 100,000 additional undergraduate degrees for Virginians by 2025." This output is also in line with President Obama's call for five million more college graduates. Specifically, Virginia policy makers desire the output of most of these degrees to be in STEM fields (see section 10): "Increase degree attainment in STEM fields and health fields." (Similar

outputs are located in sections 16 and 19). There is also a push to have students who have partial credits to complete their degrees, as well as nontraditional students. Sections 10 and 16 read: "Increase degree completion for those with partial credits and for non-traditional students with other obligations." In section 10 the policymakers also want to: "promote high degree attainment at private institutions in Virginia." All of these outputs have in common the goal of increasing degrees.

Seven out of the 18 intended outcomes of the Virginia higher education policy are aligned with the market. Another three outcomes are intended to promote job creation in Virginia. Some examples of the market based outcome are: "Fuel economic growth in Virginia and produce revenues for state and local government," and "Ensure economic opportunities and personal growth to all Virginians," "Promote commercialization of new products," and "Promote investment of business in Virginia" (see section 10). Some references specific to job creation included: "Promote educated workforce" and "Prepare Virginians for jobs in the knowledge economy" (located in section 10). The outcomes are typical neoliberal outcomes which are centered on the market.

Policy hegemony, policy silence. The Virginia policy is perhaps one of the most heavily influenced by neoliberalism as the language of the outcomes highlights. For example, there were 25 references to the market and commercialization in the Virginia policy [section 10 (10 references), section 16 (six references), section 19 (five references), and section 20 (four references)]. Promoting economic growth is by far the most salient feature of Virginia's policy. It is the single most referenced term in the policy. This equates to over 3 references per page.

Other references are also indicative of this market focus. Perhaps the short name of the policy captures the policymaker's desire to increase vocational training: The Top Jobs Act or TJ21. There is no debate here on the purpose of higher education for the writers of TJ21 and their visions of the public good: fueling the creation of jobs which are relevant to the global market. Only jobs that allow one to compete in the global market are valued in the TJ21 policy. Competition, another staple of the market focus, is also referenced four times in section 10. There were 12 references to workforce training in section 10 (five references), section 19 (three references) and section 20 (four references) which equates over 1 reference per page.

Along with market references, there were 11 References to Science Technology Engineering and Mathematics in section 10 (one reference), section 16 (one reference) and section 19 (nine references) which equate to over one reference per page. STEM has become something of a neoliberal policy buzzword. There are five references to accountability and performance. There are 12 references to tuition unaffordability which equates to over one reference per policy. The references in the above paragraph are also strongly indicative of neoliberalism. .

The second most referenced term in the policy was government oversight, with 23 references, which equates to almost 3 references per page. As with Mississippi, Virginia created a council to administer and oversee the policy. As anticipated with the neoliberal orientation of the policy, the Virginia General Assembly has the final say. Recall, the Mississippi council has about twice as many members as compared to the Virginia council.

Presented next are the results of the non-hegemonic chart located in appendix B. First, there were no references to civic participation, social transformation, general happiness, non-market research, cultural diversity, liberal arts, global public goods, intergenerational concerns and a just use of STEM technologies. All the references that the policy is silent about are crucial to establishing a vibrant public good.

There were scant references to the remaining non-hegemonic categories. There were three references to health/life expectancy (located in sections 10, 16, and 19). The policymakers promoted Virginia higher education institutions to train more health professionals because health professionals are identified as a crucial area. There were a total of nine references to poverty reduction/ assistance/financial stability in sections 10, 15, 17, 20 and 21. References to some aspect of poverty reduction and/or assistance to struggling families are mentioned nine times in the policy, and are the topic of section 15. The policymakers do seem to recognize the growing plight of poorer families and their struggle to afford college. There was only one reference to "pedagogical innovation" and it was in the introduction of the policy in section 10.

There were four references to college mission (located in sections 10, 16, 17, and 18). Different higher education institutions with different missions can contribute to the public good, in line with their mission, in a variety of ways, such as through teaching or research (Pusser, 2006). The stress on honoring the unique missions of the various colleges however may come into conflict with the market driven outcomes of the policies.

There were five references to glo-na-cal linkages, two in section 10, one in section 16 and two in section 19. There were two references to resource sharing between and among Virginia's higher education institutions. There also two references to the public private partnerships, which were mostly meant to mean the private sector, judging from the outcomes of the policy. Resource sharing and profit generation was cast primarily as a way to save money and be efficient, but as Held (2001) notes, linkages between different institutions constitute global civil society.

There were a total of six references to social contract/state support/resident enrollment, one in section 10, and five in section 14. The policymakers also mentioned that Virginia is dedicated to providing "sustainable state support." Yet, the state support is conditional on meeting certain metrics, which some colleges may have difficulty meeting. There were two references to institutional autonomy in the Virginia performance base funding policy, one in section 10, and one in section 20. In line with the 2005 Restructuring Act, institutional autonomy is usually understood as financial autonomy for institutions to raise tuition and pursue financial contracts and this is the autonomy that higher education institutions in Virginia are granted. The non-hegemonic categories referenced in the Virginia policy are wide ranging, but non come close to the reference counts of the hegemonic chart.

Presuppositions. The actual wording of the Virginia Policy reinforces the hegemonic terms and the market focus. For example: "The objective of this chapter is to fuel strong economic growth in the Commonwealth" (located in section 10). This discourse is an example of an existential presupposition because financial growth is cast

as unquestionably desirable, as if Higher Education's main purpose is and has always been, economical.

An example of a change presupposition that enforces the market focus reads: "to promote university based research that produces outside investment in Virginia, fuels economic growth, triggers commercialization of new products and processes, fosters the creation of new businesses…" (located in section 10). The market focus above is meant to hold Virginia higher education institutions accountable to a state's economic needs. And these market metrics are cast as unquestionably beneficial by the language of the policy: "to allow these attributes to inform the development and implementation of…economic opportunity metrics." The policymakers want to allow colleges with unique missions the ability to have their unique missions inform the development of economic opportunity metrics. A sizeable amount of funding is predicated on the assumption that higher education institutions should be meeting economic and marketplace metrics.

In section 16, there is a change presupposition which reads: "The Governor shall consider…and may fund targeted economic and innovation incentives…Such incentives may include…optimal year-round utilization of resources and other efficiency reforms designed to reduce total institutional cost." This wording implies that higher education institutions in Virginia, at least up to the writing of this policy, were inefficient or at least not using their resources in the best manner possible. The policy mandates higher education institutions to be more efficient with their resources.

A change presupposition further places the blame for rising tuition on the shoulders of higher education institutions. For example, the policy states in section 10, "the following purposes shall inform the development of funding policies, performance criteria… relieves the upward pressure on tuition associated with loss of state support due to economic downturns or other causes." The volatile situation of declining state funding is cast as a neutral occurrence, mainly the result of economic downturns the deliberate move by policymakers to cause this is not mentioned. The use of the word "relieves" further implies that this volatile situation can be somewhat ameliorated by actions of Virginia policymakers and higher education institutions themselves, mainly by crafting quality performance criterion.

Further, the policy states: "each institution shall include in its six-year plan an institutional student financial aid commitment that…provides assistance to students from both low-income and middle income families" (located in section 18). Again, the policymakers have put the onus of cost reduction on the universities. This assumption is misleadingly simple. This statement from the policy mandates that universities devise ways to provide assistance to low and middle income families and that Virginia's higher education institutions have not been doing this prior to the advent of this policy. Of course, universities should be working to provide any type of assistance, but the statement assumes that universities should be the *only* entities held accountable for making college more affordable. There is no recognition of political forces in driving up tuition. The market and accountability references are embodied in the two references to the knowledge economy in the Virginia policy: "Prepare Virginians for jobs in the

knowledge economy" (located in section 10). .

A change presupposition in section 10 illustrates the notion of government oversight evidenced in the references: "to establish a higher education funding framework and policy that promotes stable, predictable, equitable and adequate funding." The assumption here is twofold. The first assumption is that funding for higher education is not stable, predictable, equitable, or adequate. This sentiment is accurate. Equality and adequacy in funding is sorely lacking. The second part of this assumption is that PBF models will somehow rectify this situation.

Social actors. There are a number of social actors in the Virginia policy. Perhaps the most prominent actors are future employers and even "the market." The ubiquitous use of the "market" in the TJ21 policy makes the market a sort of agent-less entity. The market is taken to be an objective entity with objective and seemingly common sense (Fairclough, 1989) demands which must be fulfilled. Higher education institutions are to tailor degree programs and PBF criteria to what the market demands and future employer's desire.

Not surprisingly, the private sector is also a major player in the Virginia policy (see sections 10, 16, and 19). As might be expected, the private sector and businesses are given special attention (along with the market as an agent-less actor). There are multiple references to businesses and private sector leaders. Public-private partnerships are seen as a way to enhance the functioning of public institutions. Viewing partnerships as simple dichotomous understandings between the public and private spheres can limit the perpetuation of the public good.

Another actor is that of non-public institutions (see sections 10 and 20). Assumed in this is private not-for-profit as well as for-profit colleges. Section 10 urges increased enrollment at public and private nonprofit colleges. Private colleges even have a limited amount of power in helping to craft metrics. For example, section 20 allows for the creation of council of higher education representatives (one from each college) and private not for profit colleges are allowed on the council, but do not have voting power. However, in the policy (see section 20, paragraph 6), the term nonpublic is used without the designation of not-for-profit as in paragraph 6. So, while public higher education institutions are given preference over private non-profits and for profits, there is at least some ambiguity their roles.

Public higher education institutions in Virginia, including Community Colleges also play a role in the policy, as located in sections 10 and 16. There seems to be some measure of participation afforded to all higher education institutions in Virginia. All higher education institutions are invited to help shape funding policies, performance criteria, and economic opportunity metrics (located in sections 10 and 16). In addition, the policymakers stress that institutions with unique missions will be protected.

Faculty are emphasized in the policy, but in an unexpected way (see sections 13 and 18). Policymakers desire Virginia higher education institutions to pay their faculty "the amount required to reach the Commonwealth's faculty salary goal of the 60th percentile of the most recently reported average faculty salaries paid by that institution's peer institutions…. " This is undoubtedly a good thing. Yet, faculty are not factory workers who simply work for a wage. Faculty are characterized as a monolithic whole

with no understanding of the vast differences between disciplines and the different bases of academic knowledge.

Virginia undergraduate students are a major focus of the policy, with references to this population interspersed throughout the policy. The policymakers want to ensure that Virginia students are serviced by Virginia higher education institutions. Nonetheless, Virginia students are treated as passive actors. In addition, the policy does not mention graduate students. In this vision of the public good, student potential and advocacy is not recognized. Students are seen as having no active role in the functioning of Virginia higher education institutions except as receive the services and instruction of Virginia higher education institutions. There is no mention of student activism, civic participation, or creativity.

Like the other policies examined, some type of oversight committee to administer the policy is enacted and given substantial powers. In the case of Virginia, this committee is the Higher Education Advisory Committee (located in section 20). The committee is an important actor empowered by the policy. The role of the committee is to develop and review every five years: the methodology to choose the formula for enrollment funding and low income families, the creation of performance criteria and economic metrics for institutions to be measured by in order to determine funding, as well as the authority to develop state goals under the 2005 Restructuring Act. The Committee then submits these recommendations to State Council Higher Education of Virginia (SCHEV), SCHEV then reports to the governor and General Assembly for approval.

There seems to be an imbalance of power in the creation of this committee. The chair is a member of the executive department and five of the 10 members are part of the executive department. The presidents of each college in Virginia choose the five presidents to sit on the committee. Further, there are 23 Community Colleges and 15 public institutions, yet the community college system has only one representative. There is also no mention of liberal arts universities or HBCU's, only doctoral and comprehensive institutions.

The Governor and the General Assembly have the ultimate power; these entities make all final decisions. The hierarchal chain extending from the Governor and General Assembly extends to certain secretaries in executive branch, then to SCHEV, then to the committee and finally to the individual institutions, which are further arranged in a hierarchy with doctoral and comprehensive institutions at the top and community colleges closer to the bottom and with liberal arts and HBCU's in an ambiguous position. This hierarchal positioning scheme does not lend itself to trust. In Virginia, any remnant of trust has largely been replaced with hierarchy and performance criteria.

The Virginia policy establishes a hierarchal vertical chain of command with Virginia higher education institutions at the bottom, with the committee on top of the Virginia higher education institutions, the State Council for Higher Education in Virginia on top of the committee, and finally the governor and General Assembly on the top. This strict oversight of Virginia higher education institutions is in clear contrast to the relationship of trust and the social contract, which characterized government and Virginia higher education institutions relations for most of the 20th century. This hierarchy also

takes oversight out of the institutions hands and entrusts oversight capabilities to outside entities.

PBF in practice. In retrospect, the Virginia Higher Education Restructuring Act of 2005 seemed to be a reinvigoration of trust between the General Assembly and Virginia higher education institutions given its grass roots inception (Leslie & Berdahl, 2008). Critically, the major provisions of the restructuring act of 2005 are still in effect, concurrently with TJ21. Yet, upon further inspection, higher education institutions traded accountability measures for limited financial autonomy in the 2005 Act (Leslie & Berdahl, 2008). Now, as part of the accountability piece and the "state ask" list, Virginia higher education institutions have to comply with new, more stringent and market based accountability measures to ensure themselves some limited financial freedom. The 2011 act delivers on some of the state ask provisions, namely economic development, student progress and success, research, finance and administrative and academic offerings.

According to the SCHEV website, since 2010, there have been roughly 5,000 more graduates in the state of Virginia. However, roughly 2,000 of these graduates came from one school, Liberty University, which delivers online degrees that may be for residents outside of the state. Also, enrollment across all sectors in the state of Virginia has increased. Incentivized enrollment was another facet of the policy. The increased graduation rates are most likely the result of increased enrollment.

. **Texas**

In his 2011 state of the state address, republican governor Rick Perry called for an

outcome based funding model for higher education institutions (Harnisch, 2011). Later that year, the Texas Performance Based Funding Policy was enacted by the state legislator. Perry also pushed other accountability and efficiency measures in higher education, most notably the $10,000 degree which is a pathway for a cheaper degree for students mainly in engineering and business fields. In 2013, the Texas Legislature passed specific performance based measures for individual Texas institutions.

The Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board (THECB) is the coordinating board for Texas higher education. According to the THECB website, their mission entails significantly increasing postsecondary completions, keeping college affordable for all Texans, and aligning Texas Higher Education with state workforce and economic needs. The Texas performance based policy was five and half standard pages long. This language reflects much of the neoliberal discourse surrounding higher education. Not surprisingly, Texas is also a member of the Complete College America Alliance.

Input-process-output-outcome. The performance based funding policy contained seven inputs, 13 processes, seven outputs, and four outcomes. An input located in section 1.9-1.10 reads: "To secure an equitable distribution of state funds." Two inputs deal directly with securing efficient and equitable funding for higher education. The remaining inputs all deal with making funding in Texas based on student success and achievement. An input located in section 2.14-2.16 reads: "Funding policies that promote postsecondary educational success based on objective indicators of relative performance."

The processes are varied. The process located in section 1.12, 1.14-15 call for

promoting programs of superior quality and institutional diversity: “Provide incentives for programs of superior quality and for institutional diversity.” Another process located in sections 1.12 and 1.18-20 calls for efficiency: “Discourage unnecessary duplication of offerings between institutions and unnecessary construction on any campus.” The remainder of the processes deal with students meeting certain benchmarks, such as completing a certain amount of credit hours. These processes are located in sections 5.8-17.

The processes also describe the power of the board in regulating and approving output and performance metrics. A process from section reads 5.23-27:

> The board shall include in its findings and recommendations to the legislature under Section 61.059: (1) an evaluation of the effectiveness of the student success measures described by this section in achieving the purpose of this section during the preceding state fiscal biennium

In section 6.5-9, the board has also mandated that higher education institutions supply any information which the board deems necessary:

> The board shall adopt rules for the administration of this section, including rules requiring each institution of higher education to submit to the board any student data or other information the board considered necessary for the board to carry out its duties under this section.

The thrust of the outputs focuses on the awarding of bachelor degrees and certificates. For instance section 4.11-15 reads:

> The purpose of this section is to ensure that institutions of higher education produce student outcomes that are directly aligned with states education goals and economic needs. For general academic teaching institution other than public state college: the success measures considered by the board under Subsection (d) must include: the total number of bachelor's degrees awarded by the institution.

Another similar output regarding degree attainment goals outlines the need to document the six year graduation rate of students of the institution (located in section 4.20-26).

The outcomes are typical of neoliberal accountability policies. The first outcome reads located in section 2.10-14 reads: "The legislature finds that it is in the state's highest public interest to evaluate student achievement at institutions of higher learning and develop higher education funding policy based on that evaluation." Supporting this goal, the policy also asserts outcomes for: "Maintaining the state's competitiveness in the national and global economy," and: "…supporting the general welfare of this state." The final outcome reads: "The purpose of this section is to ensure that institutions higher education produce student outcomes that are directly aligned with states education goals and economic development needs" (located in section 2.19-22). These outcomes are indicative of neoliberalism with their emphasis on workforce training and driving the state's economy.

Policy hegemony and policy silences. There were 26 references to accountability and performance in the Texas policy which equates to almost five references per page. These 26 references indicate a concern in the state about ensuring

Texas higher education institutions meet certain goals and standards. These standards, as evidenced by the main outcomes of the policymakers are market driven. The board creates outcomes for higher education institutions to meet and these outcomes are the criterion for judgment of these higher education institutions.

There were 11 references to government oversight in total which equates to roughly two references per page. The Texas performance based funding policy incorporates the educational goals which were first identified in the board's long-range statewide plan. The goals which the Texas legislature find in the "state's highest interest" are student achievement goals. This section is especially indicative of governmental oversight because the policymakers maintain that funding by student achievement is necessary to the state's public interest. Further, the board considers it appropriate to use student success measures to allocate funds. Again, the goals and framework for student achievement are taken from the state's long range plan. The policy requires that each institution must submit to the board any student data or information which the board feels is necessary. There is no specification of what this data are however.

In the non-hegemonic chart, located in appendix F, there were no references to general happiness, non-market knowledge, art/literature/theater, cultural diversity, pedagogy, enhancing citizenship, liberal arts, externalities, reduced crime rates, interdisciplinary/global linkages concerns, social transformation, institutional autonomy, global public/glo-na-cal, deliberate intergenerational concerns and a just use of STEM.

There were three references to non-hegemonic terms; life expectancy, poverty reduction, and college mission. Life expectancy is incorporated with the health fields, and was designated a critical field by the Texas policymakers in section 3. 15. There is an entire section devoted to poverty reduction in the form of at-risk students (section 4. 18-19). The issues with "at-risk" students were discussed earlier, but suffice to say that while there is necessary attention given to at-risk students, the policymaker's solution is simplistic. The assumption that a top down approach/policy mandate may help to retain at-risk students ignores the complexity and nuances of these students' situation of which education is merely one facet. In addition, at risk students are only assumed to be at the community and state colleges, which are cast lower than the research universities. Assumptions of what type of students should attend particular types of colleges can lead to a stratified hierarchy of empowered-and less empowered-social actors which have an unequal ability to contribute to the public good.

The last non-hegemonic reference was to individual college missions (section 1. 24). There is recognition of the unique role and mission of each institution. One of the policy recommendations of PBF 2.0 advocates was for policymakers not to create a universal design or standard, but rather to allow each higher education institution mission to inform the creation of metrics (Dougherty & Reddy, 2011; Miao, 2012).

Despite this intention as dictated by the clause in the policy, there seems to be a major contradiction because the bulk of the policy is dedicated to establishing uniform standards for institutions to meet. The only differentiation is between larger research universities on the one hand and state colleges and community colleges on the other.

Each set of colleges is supposed to adhere to different outcomes, which are elaborated in the policy.

P**resuppositions.** The accountability measures are presented as uncontested facts in the policy. The first clause of the policy reads: "A BILL TO BE ENTITLED AN ACT relating to student success-based funding" (section 1.13). The name of the act itself implies that higher education institution in Texas may not have been promoting student success, and that the legislature needs to promote student success, thus it is a change presupposition. Another existential presupposition (section 1.21) illustrates the supposed objective and uncontested nature of nature of performance goals reads: "Emphasize an alignment with education goals established by the board." This presupposition gives the impression that the board's educational goals are beneficial and necessary.

A number of change presuppositions create the sense that the policy is allowing for a more beneficial vision of the public good. For example: "The legislature finds that it is in the state's highest public interest to evaluate student achievement at institutions of higher education and to develop higher education funding policy based on that evaluation." Further supporting this concept, the policy outlines in section 2.10-21:

> Funding policies that promote postsecondary educational success based on objective indicators of relative performance, such as degree completion rates, are critical to maintaining the state's competitiveness in the national and global economy and supporting the general welfare of this state. There for, the purpose of this section is to ensure that institutions of higher education produce student

> outcomes that are directly aligned with the state's education goals and economic development needs.

The above clauses perhaps more than any other clause in the Texas policy illustrates the public good envisioned by the Texas policymakers. The public good they desire is one that is promoted by student outcomes. Texas policymakers believe that if higher education institutions promote student outcomes, that this will contribute to the public good of Texas because student outcomes ensure that higher education institutions are maintaining the state's competitive in the national and global economy. The public good is equated with state's position in the national and global economy. This view is seen as an existential, unquestioned belief, and also a belief that should guide future policy.

The determination of critical fields for Texas policymakers is important to drive the Texas economy:

> Except as otherwise provided under Subdivision (2), the fields of engineering, computer science, mathematics, physical science, allied health, nursing, and teaching certification in the field of science or mathematics are critical fields. Beginning September 1, 2012, the board, based on the board's determination of those fields of study in which the support and development of post-secondary education programs at the bachelor's degree are most critically necessary for serving the needs of this state, by rule may: designate as a critical fields a field of study that is not currently designated by this subsection…or removed a field…

The Texas policymakers assume that STEM fields are the most crucial for the well-being and public good of Texas, as well as the best method to make Texas competitive in the national and global economy (see sections 3. 12-3. 22). The Texas policymakers have mandated that Texas higher education institutions follow this reasoning as well.

The notion of efficiency is also naturalized in the policy by use of the presuppositions. For instance, section 3. 5 reads: "allocate resources efficiently and provide incentives for programs of superior quality for institutional diversity…." The assumption is that prior to this act, resources were not allocated efficiently, now however with the introduction of PBF, resources will be allocated efficiently. Thus, this clause represents a change presupposition. Again, the assumption is that PBF funding, which is based on achieving certain success measures, at least in part (10% in Texas) is the most equitable way to distribute funds. The prior way, funding totally by enrollments, is deemed inefficient. Another change presupposition (in section 1.18-1.20) confirms this interpretation: "discourage unnecessary duplication of course offerings between institutions and unnecessary construction on any campus." The policymakers assume that prior to this act; there was great waste and inefficiency in college course offerings and unnecessary construction on campus. The PBF policy intends to rectify this shortcoming of the Texas higher education institutions.

A change presupposition located in the section 6.5-9 legitimizes neoconservatism:

> The board shall adopt rules for the administration of this section, including rules requiring each institution of higher education to submit to the board any student

> data or other information the board considered necessary for the board to carry out its duties under this section.

The use of the word "requires" in the passage makes it clear that the board can mandate Texas higher education institutions to produce information. The vertical chain of command, from legislature to Texas higher education institution is the formal method by which higher education institutions benefit society (Richardson & Smalling, 2005).

Social actors. There were a variety of actors empowered by the Texas policy. The first actor mentioned in the policy is the student population. The policy is created for students, specifically for promoting student outcomes. However, students are not totally empowered, rather they are seen largely as passive actors with one purpose: to drive the national and global economy. So the students' agency rests only in their ability to be market actors. Students are not viewed as citizens, but as workers.

There is a further subset of students, at-risk students. At risk students are defined as part-time, working full-time, receiving a Pell Grant, 20 years or older, or below the national mean on the SATs. While the Texas policymakers recognize the growth of at-risk students, there is no real empowerment of these types of students. One of the outcomes based measures for higher education institutions is to increase the number of at-risk students. Despite the recognition of the growth of at-risk students, the high cost of tuition deters them from attending and completing college. So the seeming empowerment can be seen as a disempowerment.

The next actor identified were Texas public institutions, yet the colleges and universities have little power. The institutions of higher education in Texas are divided

up into research universities (sites for research) and public colleges and community colleges (sites for remediation). This stratification of institutions disenfranchises community colleges at a time when the nation's attention has turned to the two-year sector to help boost up college completion. Community colleges and state colleges have different accountability measures than research universities. Community colleges and state colleges are to meet more developmental and remedial goals, whereas research universities have more degree and research goals.

The Texas Legislature is another actor (section 1. 4). The legislature has prescribed outcomes that higher education must follow. Two other empowered actors in the policy are the board of education (located in section 1. 22) and the state of Texas (located in section 2. 12). The board has tremendous power over Texas's institutions of higher education. The board created the educational goals that the colleges and universities must meet. Higher education institutions have little input into the creation of metrics and outputs; rather the board largely shapes these.

PBF in practice. In Texas, performance based funding policies are already having an impact on institutional behavior and how the public good is structured. First, Texas has led the way in the creation of the $10,000 dollar bachelor degree, which is supposed to be a streamlined degree in certain programs at certain schools (Kiley, 2012). The degree is meant simply to get students a degree in the quickest way, there is no focus on the humanities or liberal arts, just alignment with business needs. Efficiency here is also equated with low-cost. Similarly, Texas community colleges have responded to PBF 2.0 calls for efficiency by cultivating better partnerships with industry and creating fast

track degrees into the workforce (Fain, 2013). Texas higher education institutions also have partnered with the for-profit company Civitas, similar to Tennessee Civitas is a company which uses analytical processes to predict graduation rates and other data points.

Graduation rates in the state of Texas have decreased since the implementation of the PBF policies. In 2011, Texas ranked 17th out of the 50 states for six year graduation rates at four year institutions. In 2014 Texas ranked 33rd. Enrollment rates have largely remained steady since 2011.

Arkansas

In the 2011 Arkansas state of the state address, Democratic governor Mike Beebe called for a performance based funding system for Arkansas higher education institutions, specifically linking funding to coursework completion and graduation rates (Harnisch, 2011). Later that year, the Arkansas legislature enacted its performance based funding policy. The Arkansas policy is seven standard pages. By 2019, 25% of Arkansas state funds will be tied to institutions meeting certain performance metrics.

The Arkansas Higher Education Coordinating Board (AHEC) is the coordinating board for Arkansas public institutions and helps to implement the Arkansas PBF policy. Accountability and aligning higher education with workforce needs are a major plank of the AHEC's goals. Not surprisingly, Arkansas is a member of the Complete College America Alliance. The language of their policy reflects their membership.

The PBF 2.0 policy in Arkansas is an anomaly in some ways. The governor at the time of enactment was a democrat. Both houses in the Arkansas legislature were also

democratic in 2011 when the Arkansas PBF 2.0 policy was enacted. This is noteworthy because as previous literature has demonstrated, PBF 2.0 is largely a republican initiative (Gorbunov, 2013; McClendon et al., 2006).

Input-process-output-outcome. There are seven inputs, 15 processes, six outputs, and four outcomes in the Arkansas performance based funding policy. There were more processes listed in the policy than I put in the table. The reason I did not include these processes is because they were redundant. The redundancy shows that these processes are highly valued by policymakers.

The input located in section 2. 11-16 lays out the funding mechanism for the policy:

> The Department of Higher Education, in collaboration with the state college and university presidents and chancellors, shall develop funding formulas consisting of a needs-based component and an outcome-centered component which will, in principle, seek to provide fair and equitable state support to all post-secondary students

The input in section 3.34-35 further reads "The model shall ensure adequate, equitable, and stable funding and be based on reliable and uniform." The next two inputs designate 75% of the funding for enrollment and needs, and 25% of funding for outcomes. The funding formula is graduated over time. The current split is 5% for outcomes and 95% for enrollment. There is a 5% gradual step each year, until the split reaches 75%/25% by the 2018-2019 school year.

The processes for all students in two-year colleges are: end of course enrollment, student retention, student transfer activity, and research activity. The processes for students in all state supported institutions are: course completion, critical needs shortage areas, minority students, economically disadvantages students and nontraditional students. The first process of the policy (see section 2.18) sums up the intentions of the processes of the policy: "[state recognition of] (1) The different needs for the lower level, upper level, and graduate level instruction at the various institutions." The remaining processes merely reiterate the intentions of this first process summary.

Similar in summation format, the first output of the policy (section 1. 9) is indicative of the outputs of the entire policy: "AN ACT TO PROMOTE ACCOUNTABILITY AND EFFICIENCY AT STATE-SUPPORTED INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION" [Capitals in original]. The outputs of Arkansas's policy are similar to outputs in other accountability policies. For two-year colleges, the outputs are: number of credentials awarded, including an emphasis on high-demand credentials and graduates from underserved populations. The outputs for four-year schools are: degree completion and critical needs shortage areas. On page six, the same outputs are reiterated again, except in section 6. 31, the output reads: "certificate and degree completion."

The first two outcomes of the policy are typical of the other accountability policies. The first two outcomes (located in sections 4.6-9 and 4.31-32) seek to hold Arkansas community colleges and four-year institutions responsible for addressing the economic development and workforce needs of the state. The last two outcomes (located in section 7.19-26 and 7.26-29), however, are unique to the Arkansas policy. They read:

> EMERGENCY CLAUSE. It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that there is an increasing need to ensure accountability and efficiency with our limited financial resources in trying economic times; that clarifying the funding mechanisms for state supported institutions of education will allow the limited financial resources to be allocated in a fair and equitable manner; and that this act is immediately necessary because funding for state-supported institutions is necessary for the 2012-2013 academic year.

The section continues with: "Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this at being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on." Both outcomes are unique because of the severity and tone, as well as the dire portrait painted of not only the higher education landscape but society in general. The last outcome reads: "[state recognition of] unique missions such as agricultural extension services, research, medical sciences, workforce development, and public service and growth, economies of scale…." The outcomes, with the exception fo the last two, are similar to the other five policies studied.

Policy hegemony and policy silence. The most hegemonic references were to accountability and performance. There were 19 in total which equates to roughly two references per page. There is no mention of social justice in this policy, but rather, a focus on the emergency of trying economic terms which demands accountability and efficiency measures to be implemented. The Arkansas policymakers echo this call to make public higher education institution in Arkansas accountable to the state by monitoring their performance. The public good for Arkansas is determined by market

metrics of performance.

There were five references (all located in section five) to direct market growth and higher education's role in promoting the market. This tally equates to less than one reference per page. Like all other policies examined in this study, the Arkansas PBF's main outcome is to address the state's economic development and workforce needs. Again, this is in direct alignment with neoliberal priorities and values in which the smooth functioning of the market is valued above all, even if the market needs government intervention to sustain it. However, the Arkansas policymakers have gone even further than simply aligning the policy with neoliberal values; they have declared an emergency in section 8. The emergency clause is discussed in further detail in the presuppositions section.

There were also five references to efficiency, which also totals to under one reference per page. The five references to efficiency in the Arkansas policy are telling; they decry the supposed redundancy and waste in the public higher education system by calling to eliminate "redundancy in course offerings."

There was only one reference to government oversight; however it was comprised of an entire section, which was Section 8, lines 7. 19-35. The Arkansas policymakers have declared an emergency and outcome based measures as the only way to stave off disaster. Due to "trying economic times" Arkansas policymakers have declared accountability and efficiency measures necessary. This emergency clause presents a unique portrait of higher education from the other polices viewed with respect to its extremist orientation. As for the non-hegemonic chart, there were no references to

health, general happiness, non-market research, art/literature/theater, enhancing the public mission, liberal arts, externalities, interdisciplinary concerns, institutional autonomy, pollution reduction, deliberate intergenerational concerns and just STEM.

There are two references to poverty reduction (sections 4.33-35 and 6.33-35). The graduation of low income, minority and nontraditional students is an outcome set for higher education institutions to reach. The recognition of changing demographics, income levels, and status (i. e. part-time, students with familial obligations) is important because all three types of students in these categories are growing and higher education institutions need to understand their unique challenges and needs. Of course, as mentioned earlier, the growing income divide is making it more difficult to for low income students and nontraditional students to attend higher education. So the recognition of the growth of this type of student is positive, but there is no recognition of the causes behind this growth, which in part can be traced to neoliberal policies.

There are also three references to pedagogy in the Arkansas policy (sections 2.18-19, 4.18 and 6.5). The first mention of pedagogy in line 2.18 calls for a clear differentiation of lower level, upper level, and graduate level education at the various institutions. The other references call for addressing the quality of instruction and student learning. The question of what the policymakers consider good pedagogy however is unclear.

There are also three references to college mission in the Arkansas policy (sections 2.22-23, 4.3-4, 4.12-13), as well as two references to public service (sections 2.23 and 7.28). The first mention of a higher education institutions unique mission lists specific

special higher education institutions missions; agricultural extension, research, medical sciences, workforce development and public service, growth and economies of scale. While some are vague (such as public service and growth) and while some align primarily with neoliberalism (workforce training), the recognition of individual missions especially that of public service, is a crucial factor in promoting the public good of any polity (Dee, 2006).

There were three references to the social contract in the Arkansas policy. Arkansas policymakers desire to increase the educational attainment levels of Arkansas citizens. In this statement, there is an implicit recognition of the social contract between a higher education institutions and the state it is located in, namely to educate the citizens of that state (Bowen, 1996; Lewis & Hearn, 2003). However, the policymakers specifically state that they want to increase the educational attainment of Arkansas citizens by addressing the state's economic development and workforce needs. .

Presuppositions. The existential prepositions (sections 2.9, 2.25 and 3.34) further positions the hegemonic terms of accountability as the natural state of affairs. For example, the reference from section 2.9 reads:

> The Department of Higher Education, in collaboration with the state college and university presidents and chancellors, shall develop formulas consisting of a needs-based component and an outcome-centered component which will, in principle, seek to provide fair and equitable state support to all postsecondary students.

The use of the word "shall" in the presuppositions above indicates that Arkansas

policymakers assume that outcome-centered funding can provide fair and equitable state support to all public higher education institutions. This seems to be a universal assumption on the part of virtually all neoliberals and higher education policymakers that outcome based funding is equitable because it is aligned with the market. This wording presents an existential presupposition because there seems to be no debate regarding the potential of PBF policies. The phrase "in principle," however, seems to be recognition that outcome funding may not be a cure all or the phrase may give policymakers an escape option if PBF policies do not work as planned. The "in principle" phrase was only used in section 2. 9 and nowhere else in the policy.

The presupposition in section 3.4 further naturalizes the pursuit of performance objectives. The policy reads: "The outcome-centered component shall seek to promote and increase the satisfactory progression, matriculation, and graduation of all students enrolled in two-year colleges and universities" The use of the word "shall" demonstrates that Arkansas policymakers un-problematically assume that an outcome centered component can increase the desired outcomes, and thus an existential presupposition.

The strongest reference to the market is located in 4. 6. It reads: "The model shall hold universities accountable for increasing the educational attainment levels of Arkansas citizens by: Addressing the state's economic development and workforce needs." This is an existential presupposition because the policymakers labor under the assumption that educational attainment is synonymous with the state's economic development. Again, the public good is assumed to be equivalent to the market.

Two change presupposition which further reinforces the idea that Arkansas higher education institutions were acting inefficiently state (sections 4.13 and 4.16 respectively): "…and allowing for collaboration and minimal redundancy in degree offerings…" and "The model shall promote a seamless and integrated system of postsecondary education designed to meet the needs of all students" These are change presuppositions because the policymakers assume that the Arkansas system of higher education prior to the implementation of this policy was inefficient and unable to meet the needs of students.

The Emergency clause is an existential presupposition. The clause invokes a crisis and poses the free-market measures and accountability systems as the solution to that crisis. Klein (2007) describes this as disaster capitalism. This interpretation is right from the Milton Friedman playbook. Freidman (1980) argued that capitalists must take advantage of existing crises and in the most extreme, create a crisis and then exploit it. As Klein (2007) describes, the crisis used to be the means to the end (profit), whereas now the crisis *is* the end. She calls this: The Shock Doctrine. The emergency clause is an existential presuppositions because the policymakers take it for granted that there is a crisis: "Therefore, an emergency is declared." Who has declared this emergency? Does the Arkansas legislature have the ability or the knowledge to declare such a state? What are the roots of this emergency?

As has been mentioned previously, the roots of this crisis are neoliberalism. The continued decline of state funds is not an accident, but rather a deliberate act to "discipline" higher education (Rhoads & Torres, 2006, p. #). And yet, at the same time, Arkansas policymakers have declared an emergency due to the decrease that they, or least

those of their ilk, are supporting. The public good is cast as in danger, especially with the usage of the phrase: "this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety." The very elements of public good are invoked and said to be danger. The public good shaped in this passage is one of fear and uncertainty. Accountability measures are promoted by the Arkansas policymakers as the only way to restore the public good.

Social actors. Two empowered social actors in the Arkansas policy are the Arkansas Department of Higher Education (ADE) and the State College and University presidents and chancellors which are first mentioned in section 2.10 and section 2.13, respectively. The ADE is to work in collaboration with the presidents and chancellors of the various universities in the state to develop the needs and outcome funding portions of the formula. While on the surface it seems that the ADE and the various presidents have a significant amount of power, they really do not. Their power is circumscribed because they can only act within the confines of outcome based policies. The power structure looks like this: General Assembly and Governor on top, the Arkansas Higher Education Coordinating Board in the middle and the (a) Arkansas Department of Education and (b) Arkansas College presidents and chancellors at the bottom.

Outcomes are drafted by the ADE in collaboration with Presidents and Chancellors. The power relation between the ADE and the Presidents is unclear. This co-created draft is then presented to the AHECB. The AHECB then must approve it and submit it to the General Assembly and the Governor. As with all the other PBF policies, a hierarchy is created in this reporting structure. The representatives of the institutitons

are presidents and chancellors. The next actors mentioned are postsecondary students (section 2. 15). Postsecondary students are the focus of the policy, yet they are not empowered, rather they are cast as passive entities. There is an assumption that equitable state support for all students can be achieved by implementing outcome based funding.

The next actors mentioned are public four year institutions in Arkansas. Both community colleges and four-year higher education institutions are treated as completely passive actors. Community colleges and four-year higher education institutions are not given any agency to promote their specific visions of the public good. Without agency, both community colleges and four-year higher education institutions must submit to the outcomes laid down by the ABE and AHECB and ultimately the General Assembly. The limitation of community colleges and four year higher education institutions agency is indicative of neoliberalism and neoconservatism. It would seem that Arkansas policymakers have put restraints on Arkansas higher education institutions similar to the other states in this study. There is also no mention of faculty members or the role of staff. There is no mention of academic freedom. All higher education institutions in Arkansas are restricted and made to pursue market based outcomes.

The Arkansas Higher Education Coordinating Board (section 7.11-77) is another predominant actor in the policy. While the ADE and the presidents and chancellors draft the outcomes to be reached, the AHECB must approve them. Thus, there are two layers of board oversight. Arkansas Citizens are also mentioned in the policy in sections 4.67 and 5.29. Increasing the educational attainment levels of Arkansas citizens is one of the main outcomes of the policy. Arkansas policymakers are fulfilling part of the social

contract between higher education institutions and the polity by ensuring that Arkansas higher education institutions are aiding Arkansas citizens. The way Arkansas policymakers intend to accomplish this is by aligning citizen's interest with the market.

PBF in practice. Structural changes in Arkansas have also resulted due to the passage of PBF 2.0 policies. Perhaps the most glaring is the creation of student success centers which are funded by the Kresge foundation. The Kresge foundation partnered with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to fund these centers. The centers are to help to coordinate the actions of the state's 23 community colleges and orient their actions toward completion strategies. The centers also act as hubs where various faculty members can collaborate (Fain, 2013). Again, having a plan for students to complete college and faculty collaboration are by no means negative, however, these organizations are independently funded and push the completion agenda of the Gates and other similar foundations at the expense of any truly liberal learning.

Graduation rates for bachelor's degrees in the state of Arkansas have fluctuated since 2011. In 2011, four year universities in the state of Arkansas awarded 4,778 bachelor degrees. In 2013, 4,637 bachelor degrees were awarded. In 2011, two year public institutions in the state of Arkansas awarded 952 associate degrees. In 2013, 1,074 associated degrees were awarded. Subsequently, enrollment in two year institutions in Arkansas rose between 2005 and 2008 (six year graduation cohorts) from 43,338 to 49,838. Enrollment in four year institutions rose between 2005 and 2008 from 74,788 to 76,706.

Cross Case Comparison

This section presents a holistic and synthesized view of the six southern policies and describes how the policies have shaped the Southern regional public good. This composite offers a comparison of the six states' policies regarding the input-process-output-outcome chart, the hegemonic and non-market chart, the presuppositions chart, and the social actors chart. This section will present the themes that emerged from data across all six policies. The three emerging themes include government oversight, market outcomes and policy silences.

Theme 1: Government oversight. The assertion of increased government oversight is evidenced by the fact that there were 149 total references to some type of government oversight mechanism across the 42.5 pages of policies (three and half references per page). Likewise, the social actors chart empowered by the policies are "outwards and upwards" of the university and they have oversight capabilities of the institutions of higher education (Barnetson & Cutright, 2000, p. 3). These entities usually include state boards, coordinating boards, councils and other committees. Further, many of the presuppositions naturalize this type of oversight and make it seem natural and necessary. Indeed, the policies had to address the assumed poor outcomes of the higher education sector.

Of course it is to be expected that state policymakers would want some measure of control over state institutions. However, the oversight that emerged in all the policies was enacted to ensure that higher education institutions were meeting narrow outcomes, namely performance goals. The hegemony of PBF policies then is not an abstract

concept. Rather, the hegemony begins with discourse but materializes in the creation of top down, vertical governing structures. Neoliberal concepts drive the language of the policies and focus on identification of particular outcomes that each state's government oversees.

There was a measure of variation between degrees of oversight and the composition of these vertical structures by state however. Virginia, Mississippi, and Louisiana policymakers each created a new council to administer the PBF policies in conjunction with existing coordinating or governing boards, college presidents, legislative agencies committees and officials, and even private sector actors. Texas, Arkansas, and Tennessee policymakers did not create new bodies, but utilized their coordinating or governing boards, college presidents, legislative agencies committees and officials.

Within the arena of government oversight, faculty members did not even figure into the reporting hierarchy. In every policy, the autonomy and freedom of individual faculty members to pursue their research, which has been a staple of American higher education for over 100 years, is conspicuously absent. Students only figured in as largely passive actors, never as cognitive or creative persons who may actually have a stake in the creation of accountability measures. In the case of these six performance based funding policies, the roles set forth for empowered actors to realize are roles of oversight, while the roles for institutions and faculty are roles of compliance and obedience. The need for government oversight and enforcement of market mechanisms also carries with it an assumption on the part of the policymakers that higher education institutions are *in*

need of reform and can only be rectified with market mechanisms. This deficit view of higher education was also indicative in many of the existential and change presuppositions.

There were certain actors who were extremely influential in the creation of the policies as well. The Bill and Melina Gates Foundation, Lumina and Complete College America as well as other business lobbyist groups such as ALEC were all were influential during the policy window and helped to influence the creation of PBF 2.0 policies. The organizations have forged close ties with the state legislators. These organizations have the financial resources and access to policymakers. The members of these organizations are so close to state policymakers because they advise state policymakers and in some cases even craft model legislation (Complete College America, 2013; Fowler, 2009; Miao, 2012, Tandberg, 2010). In addition, members from state and coordinating boards, as well members from administrative ranks of state institutions were included in the process to create PBF 2.0 policies in every state policy studied (Complete College America, 2013; Miao, 2012). In no state were faculty, students or representatives from any type of civic organizations given any voice to participate in the creation of these metrics.

Due to the creation of this hierarchy, recommendations and decisions in each state must travel up the chain of command to the legislature, going through a different committee or body every time. In each state then, the legislature is now tightly coupled to every institution in the state by this vertical hierarchy. This finding is not to say that a hierarchy did not exist before PBF 2.0 policies, but rather, all the PBF 2.0 policies

examined in this study greatly increased the power of this hierarchy. Another salient facet of the enforcement theme due to governmental oversight, and perhaps the greatest irony, is that of bureaucracy. A new bureaucratic structure, or at least more layers of red tape, are seen by policymakers in the six states observed, to make higher education institutions more efficient and accountable. So enforcement comes with the price tag of bureaucracy, increased administrate duties and added paperwork across all six policies.

The notion of institutional autonomy occupies a curious position in the policy. The Virginia and Louisiana policymakers have placed a premium on institutional autonomy. The GRAD act specifically allows universities to gain autonomy in financial matters, specifically in raising tuition. The Higher Education Opportunity Act in Virginia leaves the provisions of the 2005 Restructuring Act in place. The autonomy granted to Virginia and Louisiana institutions is not academic freedom in the traditional sense for institutions to pursue research however. The autonomy is only limited autonomy to raise tuition. The remaining four policies do not mention institutional autonomy. Institutional autonomy has been severely restricted across all six policies.

Theme 2: Market mechanisms. The second theme details exactly what market mechanisms were enforced; namely accountability/performance. There were 134 references to accountability and performance across the six policies. This tally is not surprising considering the fact that these are performance based policies. The desire for accountability, however, is also indicative of the fact that policymakers believed that by and larger higher education institutions in their states *were not* being accountable at present. Specifically, the Input-Process-Output-Outcome Grand Table located in

Appendix F, shows that college graduation rates (outputs) and ultimately strengthening of a state's workforce and economy are the main measures of accountability desired by policymakers in all six states.

Yet, in order to achieve these outputs and outcomes, policymakers have also had to restructure the processes and inputs. According to the Grand Hegemonic Table located in Appendix F, increasing STEM graduates, increasing revenues and profits, as well as promoting overall institutional efficiency were assumed by policymakers to be some of the best ways to achieve their outputs and outcomes. Again, presuppositions across the six policies legitimized these processes as natural for higher education.

All six policies also empowered some type of market actor. This varied by state. Virginia and Louisiana policymakers by far empowered business and private sector actors the most. In both of these states, business actors were allowed to deliberately influence institutions of higher education in various ways, such as sitting on committees and giving input regarding accountability metrics. Tennessee policymakers also sought to promote partnerships with many private sector industries, as well as the Federal Department of Energy's Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). The mission of ORNL is to promote private sector investment and commercialization. Mississippi policymakers allotted one of the seats on the EAC to a private sector leader. Texas and Arkansas policymakers while not directly empowering any specific private sector actors did all desire outcomes which sought to promote institutional alignment with the market.

Theme 3: Policy silences. The third major theme that emerged from the cross policy analysis was that of policy silences. Policy silences were illustrated largely by the

non-hegemonic chart. No policy made any mention of non-market knowledge, references to liberal arts, performing or visual arts, externalities or intergenerational concerns. In addition there were scant references across the policies to general happiness, cultural diversity, pedagogy, enhancing citizenship, reducing crime, reducing pollution, promoting global linkages and a just use of STEM. Further, the social actors not empowered, such as faculty members and graduate students for instance, have no ability to contribute to the formation of the policy or the metrics.

There were some limited exceptions. Tennessee policymakers did encourage partnerships with civic organizations and the promotion of clean energy technology, but their main focus, as evidenced by the outcomes, was for Tennessee institutions to be market driven. Likewise, the Louisiana policymakers do seek to give Louisiana institutions a degree of autonomy, but this autonomy is only to raise tuition and not to pursue research. Further, Virginia and Arkansas sought to inspire global linkages, but only in the context of the global market. The few non-hegemonic references across the six policies (see non-market/externality chart in appendix F) of which many still carried indirect hegemonic connotations where more than offset by the hegemonic references, presuppositions and vertical hierarchies.

In the policy silence, hegemony may become amplified. The market hegemony, identified in theme 2 is enforced with government oversight identified in theme 1. Further, this enforcement occurs over a policy silence identified in theme 3. A policy silence means that there is no alternate vision or ideas present in the policy in regards to the ideas listed in the previous paragraph. The PBF 2.0 policies are silent on the cultural,

communal, humanistic, and most importantly, civic benefits of higher education. The social actors in the policies are not able to carry out these behaviors, at least under the mandate of the policies. At least for PBF 2.0 policies, there is only one "truth," that higher education institutions should work like market entities and the benefits derived from higher education should be largely financial. This prospect is enforced through various hierarchical systems.

Summary of Chapter IV

This chapter examined the results of the five part coding process which was applied to the performance based funding policies of Tennessee, Mississippi, Texas, Virginia, Louisiana and Arkansas. The first coding process was the input-process-output-outcome chart. The purpose of this heuristic is to determine the behaviors desired by policymakers from higher education institutions.

The next task was the hegemonic and non-hegemonic chart. The hegemonic chart is meant to determine what discourse categories were used and how many times the they were used. The non-hegemonic chart was used to determine what categories were *not* present in the policies. The non-hegemonic chart was used to determine what, if any, social benefits were present in the policies. The presuppositions chart was used to determine exactly how the categories of discourse were positioned in the policy. For the determination of presuppositions, I looked specifically at the definite and indefinite articles and how they positioned the discourse. The last task was the social actors chart. This chart was used to determine which social actors the policies empowered and which social actors the policies neglected.

Next, the similarities in each of the policies were presented in a composite analysis. The cross policy analysis examined the overarching themes that appeared across the six policy analyses. The three overarching themes were government oversight, market accountability and policy silences. These themes will be further explored in the discussion. The full results for each state are presented in the Appendix B-H.

Chapter V

Discussion

This study set out to answer the overarching research question of: How do the six selected state performance based funding policies allow the respective institutions in their states to shape the public good? In order to answer this question, two more specific sub-questions were posed which read:

a. How does the socially constructed discourse in the policies have the potential to shape the public good?
b. What social actors does the policy discourse empower and neglect, and how do these actors have the potential to shape the public good?

What follows is a discussion of how the public good was shaped under the mandate of the six performance based funding policies examined in this study. Implications for practice will be then discussed. Lastly, directions for possible future research will be examined.

Any notion of the public good, as noted in the literature review, by no means has clear cut boundaries. Different nations, states, regions, and even communities have multiple and competing publics within their borders and each public has its vision of a public good (Calhoun, 1998; Mansbridge, 1998). This study only examined how the public good was shaped in each individual state studied. Of course, elements of these different public goods can and do diffuse over the borders of the states. The initial policies are partially the result of policy diffusion. Thus, when the public good of the individual states is discussed below, this vision of the public good cannot be taken to be

strictly limited to the boundaries of each individual state. Rather, "public good" must always be seen as a fluid notion that has the ability to diffuse over state borders, especially if undergirded by power interests.

The Public Good

The three themes that emerged from the cross policy analysis included government oversight, accountability to the market, and policy silences. These themes converged to create and reify the vertical structures in the policies. The two subheadings in this section are an answer to the two sub-research questions above.

Discourse and the public good. The evidence uncovered in my study indicates that the evolution of performance based funding measures requires greater levels of government control to implement the neoliberal ideology. Strikingly, government oversight (149 references) and accountability and performance (134 references) were the most referenced items in the six policies reviewed. The reference counts also indicated a focus on efficiency (54 references), market growth (54 references), and STEM (20 references) and workforce training (23 references). In comparison, the policies were silent regarding social externalities associated with the public good (0 references to democracy, social transformation, liberal arts, externalities) and scant references to other important factors of a healthy democracy. The discourse in the policies, thus, begins to form the parameters of a truth regime concerning higher education (Allan, 2008; Ball et al., 2011; Foucault, 1977; Fairclough, 1989). It is this truth regime that contributes to the social construction of the public good.

The presuppositions identified in the study help to cement and augment the power of discourse by presenting the policy discourse as a natural state of affairs. For example, the policies use language that indicates that higher education is failing and must be "fixed." Perhaps the clearest indicator of higher education's failure is present in the language of the Arkansas policy. Arkansas policymakers have declared an emergency of trying economic times. Further, the policymakers declare that accountability movements, such as performance based funding measures, are what is needed to remedy this emergency.

The performance based metrics in this study serve as proxies for institutional performance and progress (Barnetson & Cutright, 2000; McMahon, 2009). These proxies are symbolic of what higher education institutions should contribute to society, and in turn to the public good. The metrics include overall graduation rates, STEM graduation rates, retention rates and end of course credit hours obtained to name a few (Burke, 2002). Yet, the metrics in use are not neutral proxies. Instead, the measures created to document performance and progress originated from groups with political influence, such as ALEC, Lumina and The Gates foundation (Hall & Thomas, 2012). The performance metrics outlined in the polices are a form of discourse and this discourse has the power to shape the public good when operationalized by the social actors empowered in the policy. Specifically, some forms of discourse regarding metrics include: references to college success, references to increasing graduation rates (which I classified as accountability and performance), references to optimizing resources and doing more with less (which I classified as efficiency), and references to growing the economy and revenues (which I

categorized as market references). The discourse of these measures merely reifies the discourse of neoliberalism, ultimately framing the truth of higher education's contribution to society in a particular form of public good. Here, the public good is largely rooted in the market because graduates equal workers for the global economy (Giroux, 2011; Hall & Thomas, 2012; Mallot et al., 2013; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2005). Ideas such as civic participation and social criticism are not even broached by these metrics.

As politically charged proxies, the metrics do not represent the complexity of the public good or higher education's contribution to it. The metrics of course do measure a portion of higher education's contributions, at least its economic contributions to society and the market. While these contributions are obviously important, if these contributions are the *sole* focus of policymakers, the larger civic and social contributions of higher education are ignored (McMahon, 2009). The proxies of PBF 2.0 largely represent the power interests of the aforementioned organizations and powerful policymakers in the states' legislative and gubernatorial offices precisely because the metrics ignore the larger contributions of higher education. Democracy and the public good cannot be simply equated with market prosperity because democracy and social institutions are complex (Adorno, 1973; Marginson, 2007; Marginson, 2011). The civic participation of citizens, historical antecedents of various societies, cultural norms, the utilization of new knowledge and insights, and the mobilization of different groups and classes are some of the components of healthy republic and the public good. These factors still hold true more than ever as the populations in the world are coming in increased contact with each

other through faster communication and transportation (Held, 2002; Marginson, 2011; Pogge, 2008; Singer, 2002).

The historical, social, cultural and civic factors above are components of democracy which form a sort of constellation of political, social, cultural, historical, psychological and economic factors which are necessary building blocks of the public good. The non-hegemonic chart began to illustrate some of the complexity of this constellation. Higher education institutions are nodal points in this constellation because as centers of knowledge creation, higher education institutions, and the faculty and students within them, help to constantly redefine and enlarge the constellation with research and new knowledge. Movement and action in a republic are motivated by a complex set of factors within the constellation. Yet, this complexity is all but absent in the discourse of the reviewed policies. Instead, a narrow definition of the public good emerges. A constricted market view of the public good may not allow other non-market information in the humanities and social sciences to inform 21st century society.

Performance and market prosperity, which in some form or another are embedded in the outcomes of every policy examined in this study, are not just seen as a means to an end or an intermediate public good, but rather, *as ends themselves* or a final public goods. This attention to market growth gives short shrift to non-rivalous, non-excludable goods that are prone to market failure, such as global public goods like global financial security, global peace, and global creation (Marginson, 2007; Marginson et al., 2010). As stressed in the literature review, higher education institutions traditionally had a social contract with their respective states (Lewis & Hearn, 2003). The agreements of these social

contracts consisted of higher education institutions using state resources to create a liberally educated citizenry and a vibrant public sphere (Bowen, 1996; Zumeta, 2011). The belief of a liberal education is that students will be rounded and understand a variety of disciplines and ideas (Lewis & Hearn, 2003; Zumeta, 2011).

The terms of this social contract have now been altered. Higher education institutions are no longer trusted by their states to educate the state's students (Alexander, 2000; Burke, 2005; Henkel, 2005). Nor is a liberal education what is desired by policymakers (Newfield, 2008; Zumeta, 2011). Now, an education that trains workers for the global market is valued by most policymakers (Burke, 2005; Henkel, 2005; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004).The politically charged metrics which only represent a fraction of the potential of higher education attest to the desire of policymakers. The higher education institutions observed in this study, are supposed to serve the global market, not create global public goods, at least as evidenced by the outcomes in this study.

The elimination of fluidity by the PBF 2.0 policies examined also shapes the public good as a process of simple causation. The simplistic casual thinking on the part of policymakers holds that increased graduation rates, especially in critical fields such as STEM, will make states and citizens more competitive in the global economy (Hall & Thomas, 2012). Due to the faulty and incomplete truth regimes which emerge due to PBF 2.0 funding, the process of discourse acquiring meaning is arrested. The complex movement of the constellation of the public good is replaced by simple truisms, such as: higher education institutions can only train a workforce or that STEM graduates simply drive the economy. Discourse and presuppositions only have power to shape reality

however. The desired behaviors in discourse are carried out by social actors (Allan, 2008; Foucault, 1977; Walsh, 2008).

Social actors. These truncated casual connections may not leave room for social actors to participate in the complexity of the constellation which is the public good. The agency, power and ability of social actors is constrained by faulty truth regimes because their outlets for enlarging the constellation of the public good are limited solely to economic measures. The connections between the economic, political and cultural realms of society are also severed by this assumption of simple causation. For instance, as McMahon (2009) notes, law degrees and history degree do drive the economy, albeit indirectly, by strengthening the rule of law which is integral to economic prosperity. Further, economic prosperity is key to general happiness and lower crime rates. These connections can be lost however if the public good is not viewed as a constellation.

The social actors that promote this truncated vision of the public good are actors and organizations which have largely have a neoliberal agenda. Five of the six states were part of the Complete College America Alliance. Virginia, while not a member, displayed very similar actions and language as the other member states in its policy. The similarity of language in each policy illustrates the role of organizations such as ALEC, Gates, Lumina, Pearson and Complete College America on the policymakers examined in this study, as well as the various business lobbyists on state policymakers. For example, the Complete College America alliance argues that their overarching goal is increase college access (Complete College America website, 2014). This goal is echoed by Gates (which funds CCA), Lumina, ALEC and Pearson websites. Each of these organizations

has substantial ties to business leaders, think tanks, and others who have an agenda to align public education with the market by creating an educated workforce and patentable research (Hall & Thomas, 2012; Kovacs & Christie, 2008; MacDonald, 2013; Recknow & Synder, 2014). The PBF 2.0 policies examined in this study bear the mark of these neoliberal and neoconservative influences. It is the truth regime that these actors believe to be true which is mandated as policy.

The truth regimes create a public good for higher education that empowers certain actors at the expense of others. ALEC, which largely represents the interests of the American business community, as well as many state policymakers who are influenced by the business community, maintain a powerful lever of control over public (and in some cases private) higher education institutions by the use of PBF 2.0 policies. PBF 2.0 policies limit potential threats towards the business community which can and usually do emanate from higher education institutions such as radical scholarship and informed activism, which happened in the 1960s and 1970s. Similarly, Lumina, Pearson, Kaplan and The Gates foundation benefit from PBF 2.0 policies because these foundations also largely represent the business community. For instance, a former Kaplan executive started the for-profit company Civitas Learning in 2012. Civitas Learning is a data analytics company which charges higher education institutions subscription fees to use their data forecasting service, which can help predict graduation rates.

Institutions in four of the six states studies (excluding Virginia and Mississippi) have partnered with Civitas to aid them in predicting graduation rates. Pearson software is currently being used Higher Ed K-12 partnerships in the state of Tennessee. These

partnerships were encouraged in the PBF 2.0 policies and have been traditionally promoted by neoliberal advocates (Kovacs & Christie, 2008).

The control exercised by ALEC, Lumina, Gates, Pearson, Kaplan and policymakers has a dual purpose. PBF 2.0 policies stifle dissent and potentially threatening actions that higher education institutions can produce. PBF 2.0 policies also enable these organizations to direct higher education institutions toward goals which align with those organizations' vision of the public good, which is a market based vision such as for-profit ventures like Civitas Learning, which put taxpayer money in private corporations.

Actors empowered in this study include either newly created oversight committees, such as the Education Achievement Council in Mississippi, the review panel created in Louisiana, or the higher education body created in Virginia; or they include existing oversight committees, such as those in existence in Texas, Arkansas, and Tennessee. The discourse and presuppositions in the policies studied help to direct the empowered social actor's behavior toward the desired outcomes of policymakers. For example, now, higher education in Arkansas is supposed to be "Addressing the state's economic development and workforce needs," in Louisiana, "meeting the state's current and future workforce and economic development needs," in Tennessee, "Address states' economic development and workforce needs," in Texas, "Maintaining the state's competitiveness in the national and global economy," in Virginia, "Fuel economic growth in Virginia and produce revenues for state and local government," and in Mississippi "increasing the educational attainment and skill levels of the state's working-

age population benchmark to the national average by 2025." The created truth regime can begin to form the boundaries of speech, thought, and action for actors involved with higher education policy. In turn, these actions can ultimately shape the public good in a more restricted way. This constriction occurs at the level of discourse as noted in the section above but then transpires in the realm of social action.

The discourse used in the performance based funding metrics and reinforced by the created vertical hierarchies reconfigure the constellation of the public good, at least in part, for the southern region of the United States. The complex and fluid movements and interactions between the heterogeneous groups and social actors, as well as the relationship between actors and institutions are largely simplified. For instance, policymakers at many levels take measures of material prosperity, such as income as proxies for quality of life (McMahon, 2009; Sen, 1988). As Sen (1988) points out, however, many times measures of material prosperity can actually be inverse of wealth distribution and true quality of life. Similarly, the notion of human capital is seen only as an economic one (McMahon, 2009; Perna, et al; 2014). Material prosperity and human capital are simplistically assumed to equate with quality of life and prosperity in the six states studied.

A simple measure of material gain does not reveal anything about income inequality, democratic access or cultural vibrancy. Further, no longer do informed debate and the creation of new societal values and structures get created by a larger group. Instead of egalitarian groups of professors, administrators, citizens, businesses, civic organizations, and other entities negotiating the public good, powerful actors now

influence the discourse. As the policies in this study make clear, the only movement in the vertical hierarchies is top down. There can be no organic growth or grassroots movement from universities to help shape the public good or even question the definition of accountability (Prokou, 2013). Universities can only submit their plans and metrics for approval by the state policymakers, and these metrics serve the ultimate goal of training a workforce to help drive the global economy. This top down movement eliminates much of the vibrancy that constitutes the public good as produced by higher education.

The position of institutions of higher education at the bottom of the hierarchy also impedes the colleges from producing global public goods (Kaul, et al., 1999; Marginson, 2011). If the pursuit of global public goods, such as world peace, the strengthening of democratic capabilities, and social criticism (all of which can also be prone to market failure) are not embedded in a performance metric, why should institutions waste time pursuing them? Institutions will be fiscally penalized if they do not meet metrics created for them. And the metrics in this study, as evidenced by the reference counts and policy silences are not aimed at promoting global public goods or any vision of the public good that is not rooted in the market.

Neoconservativsm,(Harvey, 2005; Stanley, 2007) and the use of government control to stifle dissent through such means as the vertical hierarchies created by policymakers in this study may be very amendable to policymakers in the southern United States, the region examined in this study. The southern region of the United States is mainly conservative, and power and policymaking in the area is dictated in large part by patronage or "good ole boy" networks (Fowler, 2009, p. 197). Because of these

entrenched networks, it is difficult for newcomers to the south and people outside of certain social circles to gain power or challenge established norms (Fowler, 2009). The analysis of the policies reviewed in this study support these tendencies. For example, members of state coordinating or governing boards, which play an active role in every policy are appointed by the governor. Other positions in state higher education agencies, as well the newly created advisory boards (such as in Virginia and Mississippi) could also be ripe for patronage and "good ole boy" connections. Policies created in other areas of the country however, may look slightly different, be more market oriented or have less government control, depending on the region. These structures in turn help conservatives and neoliberals to police public higher education institutions and force colleges to be accountable to state economic and workforce demands. As a result, a particular type of public good is created.

The emergence of the PBF 2.0 policies reviewed in this research study occurred within an historical backdrop. Since the 1970s, neoliberal ideas have almost always been supported with neoconservative ideas (Harvey, 2005; Marginson, 2008; Stanley, 2007). The Powell memo in 1971, the establishment of right-wing, market friendly governments in Latin American during the 1970s, and the election of Ronald Reagan in 1981 are early examples of this confluence. In the U.S., many conservatives sought to coral the power of higher education institutions after the social turmoil of the 1960s and 1970s (Newfield, 2008). One means to place limitations on higher education and establish accountability was through policy.

By the 1990s, the accountability movement was in full swing and neoliberals and neoconservatives used this platform to police higher education and to make colleges accountable to the market and workforce demands (Burke, 2005). The first round of policies used in this era included what is now called Performance Based Funding 1.0 (PBF 1.0). In this case, PBF 1.0 was largely predicated on providing financial incentives outside of an institution's base funding as a means to encourage institutions to be accountable to the market (Dougherty & Reddy, 2013; Harnisch, 2011). PBF 1.0, however, failed to motivate higher education institutions to align closer with the market and virtually all PBF 1.0 policies were abandoned by the 2000s.

One of the overarching motivations behind PBF 2.0, for all the policymakers blusters about the market, college success, and workforce readiness, may actually be more about control than accountability. No longer are institutions encouraged to be accountable to the market as they were in PBF 1.0, now institutions are *mandated* with new authoritative structures and a new truth regime. The links of outcomes to larger percentages of funding for state colleges reinforces the mandate. All of the added layers of vertical authority help cement a hierarchy that places higher education institutions, and specifically faculty members and students, toward the bottom of the decision making ladder. The creation of this vertical hierarchy is a demonstration of power; the power of policymakers to police higher education institutions (Morgan, 2006). In addition, the creation of the vertical hierarchy, inspired by the actors who created the policy, is an example of how policy can be used to elevate the interests of certain social actors, in this case businesses and private sector actors at the expense of other actors, in this case,

faculty and students (Allan, 2008). Foucault (1977) aptly argues that power precedes truth. Here, the vertical hierarchy and the discourse help to create the truth that higher education is only supposed to train workers for the global market. Institutional actions which do not align with this "truth" are not rewarded by policymakers, as least according to the mandates of the six performance based policies examined in this study.

The truth regime examined in this study also has the ability to create unintended consequences for higher education institutions. As Dougherty and Reddy (2013) pointed out, a narrowing of institutional mission, reduced rigor and quality and hidden compliance costs are among these consequences. The policy silences are telling here. Institutions will not invest time and scarce resources in activities which not earn them funding, thus narrowing their mission. As evidenced by the policy silences, many of the traditional activities of public education institutions are not even broached by policymakers, such as fostering democratic citizens. The Louisiana policymakers even went so far as to mandate that programs which do not drive the economy be cut for the sake of efficiency. Public institutions, especially land grant colleges, have a mission to serve the public. However, with the emphasis of policymakers solely on the financial capabilities of higher education, and as evidenced by the policy outcomes, the public mission of public institutions are in jeopardy.

Further, the Mississippi, Virginia and Louisiana policies created new committees to help administer the PBF 2.0 policies. These committee members need to be reimbursed for their time and effort, they will have to spend time filling out paperwork and attending meetings as well. Even where policymakers did not create new committees, new

additional duties must be taken up by members of existing committees and organizations. In fact, the last page of the Mississippi policy is devoted specifically to reimbursement of the EAC. The creation of new committees and the burdening of officials in existing committees and organizations will undoubtedly create more bureaucratic hindrances as well as compliance costs.

As previous research demonstrated the presence of republican legislators usually increases the chances of a state adopting performance based funding policies (Gorbunov, 2013; McClendon & Hearn, 2014; McClendon et al., 2006). The majority of legislators involved with the creation and enactment of the reviewed PBF 2.0 policies were republicans. Importantly, however, even though the majority of legislators in the state's I studied were republican, my evidence suggests that democrats cannot be assumed to be opponents of performance based funding policies and accountability policies in general. Many times, democrats, such as the governor of Arkansas and Tennessee, the majority of legislators in the Arkansas general assembly, as well as the majority of legislators in the Louisiana assembly support PBF policies. Thus, democrats too can and do have an instrumental role in promoting PBF policies. The quantitative methods employed in the previous research may overlook the active role of democrats in shaping the public good with PBF 2.0 polices. The two-party support of this type of funding indicates ubiquitous support for the neoliberal agenda.

The overarching research question of this study was to determine exactly how the selected PBF 2.0 policies shaped the public good in their respective states. The PBF 2.0 policies in this study have the potential to narrow the public good in these individual

states and the regions as a whole by simplifying it, by only allowing social actors to think about the public good in limited ways, and measure it in certain ways, namely by the metrics of neoliberalism and neoconservatism. These metrics are reflections of the power interests of the social actors and organizations which created them, namely ALEC, Gates, Lumina, Pearson as well as the various business interests which influence policymakers on both sides of the aisle.

All of these parties and organizations converge in the functioning of these vertical hierarchies and the neoliberal metrics and stifle the participation of other actors, such as faculty and students and really the enlargement of the constellation that is the public good. The different parties each have individual interests and these interests coincide. It is this convergence that forms a greater hegemony than the hegemony that each individual party is capable of producing.

This convergence of hegemony can be traced back to at least the 1970s. As the literature review demonstrates neoconservatives and neoliberals made common cause because neoliberals desired public education to be market driven while neoconservatives desired education not to disturb traditional values (Newfield, 2008; Stanley, 2007). The convergence of hegemonic interests examined in this study is a continuation of the events discussed in the literature review. Parties such as ALEC, The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, The Lumina Foundation and others largely embody neoliberal and neoconservative ideals. And while many state policymakers also adhere to neoliberal ideas, many state policymakers, especially in the South which is generally conservative, adhere to neoconservative values (Fowler, 2009). The result of this convergence of

hegemonic interests is a greater hegemony than the sum of its parts, and a public good which is only good for certain actors and only a conduit for their interests.

Higher education institutions are democracy in action (Giroux, 2011). By virtue of this democratic activity, higher education institutions help to shape the public good. Yet this civic activity cannot just be for the present. As has been stressed in this study, a vibrant public good that allows for the creative capabilities of social actors to flourish is vital because humanity can create new and higher forms of knowledge to govern itself, such as global public goods (Marginson et al. 2010). As the populations of the world become more interconnected, the creation of global public goods, such as new knowledge, becomes a necessity not just for the wellbeing of the species, but for the *advancement* of the species. The higher education policies of any given polity may need to encourage social actors to utilize this knowledge to construct solutions to pressing issues and to create even higher forms of knowledge.

The truth regime created by ALEC, Lumina, Gates, Pearson, Kaplan, state policymakers and the business community, however, is a constraint on human thought and human creation because this truth regime limits how certain social actors can participate and even conceive of the public good. It also limits what new knowledge actors and institutions can produce and access knowledge. Much of the non-market knowledge produced by higher education institutions is constricted and even suppressed. Due to this restrictive nature, the truth regime of PBF 2.0 policies may ultimately be able to atrophy the capabilities of higher education institutions to advance the human species.

It is not enough however to simply point out injustices. Critical theory also calls for injustices to be rectified (Adorno, 1990; Habermas, 1990; Marcuse, 1990). Here scholars must utilize the democratic capabilities of higher education institutions to help forge this new vision of the public good which can ultimately be a fertile ground for human creation and advancement as a species.

Implications for Future Practice

The truth regime of "college success," following Fairclough (1989) and Ball (2011) may now be taken for granted by policymakers and the general public. As such, how can critics even begin to argue with the commonsense assumption that all students should complete college? This truth regime may be able to be challenged by a new conception of knowledge mobilization, that of critical knowledge mobilization (CKM). The goal of knowledge mobilization (KM) is to allow for research and evidence to better inform policy and decision making (Cooper, 2013). The goal of critical knowledge mobilization is to allow for research and evidence to better inform policy and decision making *in order to challenge unjust truth regimes*.

These truth regimes shaped by the faulty (and politically charged) assumptions embedded in the metrics that measure the performance of educational institutions. The metrics only measure progress in degree outputs as well as processes such as retention and credit hours completed. The metrics assume that progress can only be made in simple quantifiable measures. With simplified metrics, institutional progress can only occur by increased degree output. These metrics are important, but only a start to the true impact of higher education institutions on their respective societies. Institutional progress and

accountability are much more complex however, especially for a republic in the 21st century information age. Critical knowledge mobilization can help to expand the simplistic notions of progress and accountability.

Critical knowledge mobilization is a democratic activity, but it transcends the boundaries of communities, states, regions and even nations. It also cannot be one sided or partisan. It cannot be liberal or conservative. For instance, two of the biggest supporters of performance based funding are Bill Gates and Barak Obama, both of which are democrats. In addition, as evidenced by this study, many democrats had a hand in the creation of PBF 2.0 policies. The overriding concern of CKM must be evidence. All ideas must be based on sound evidence obtained from sound research.

Marginson (2007) and Pusser (2006) argued that higher education institutions have a special role in society. Higher education institutions are necessary vehicles of social criticism which help to provide necessary insights to any society. Further, Marginson (2007), Pusser (2006), and Newfield (2008) see higher education institutions as integral to contributing to the public good, not just as economic motors or workforce trainers, but by providing this necessary social criticism aa well as giving diverse social actors an avenue for negotiating the public good. Marginson, Murphy, and Peters (2010) go on step further. They argue that higher education institutions should not only be institutions of social criticism, but also creation.

Building on these ideas (Marginson, 2007; Marginson et al., 2010; Pusser, 2006), I argue that in order to become this necessary vehicle of social criticism and creation, higher education institutions must challenge the truth regime established by performance

based funding 2.0 policies and create new forms of knowledge. In order to challenge the current truth regime, which inhibits the creation of a truly vibrant public good, higher education institutions can begin to create and disseminate their own knowledge through the process of CKM. Higher education institutions are bounded by virtue of their position in a vertical hierarchy, thus, they must answer to the state. But colleges can simultaneously re-position themselves in the emerging glo-na-cal environment and build on horizontal networks. And while the PBF 2.0 policies examined in this study largely stymie public higher education institutions from contributing to the public good except in ways that conform with neoliberalism, there are options present in the policies that can be exploited by faculty and students to promote a more vibrant vision of the public good. Following, I outline some of these options.

Marginson (2011) argues that the next greatest challenge for humanity is to build some sort of global community or at least recognition of humanities' global links. Critical knowledge mobilization can facilitate and sustain the creation of glo-na-cal and other horizontal networks by utilizing the strengths and positions of Research Brokering Organizations (RBOs) (Cooper, 2014). These networks, driven by higher education institutions, can create and disseminate new knowledge.

Of crucial importance here are faculty members at both public and private colleges. Of course, the term faculty is too monolithic. Researchers cannot generalize the desires and behaviors of all faculty members. Nonetheless, many faculty members, presumably in education schools, as well as liberal arts and social sciences, and even some in the hard sciences, by virtue of their disciplines, most likely do not agree with the

dictates of neoliberalism that have been mandated for them by PBF 2.0 policies (Giroux, 2011; Mallot et al., 2013). Presumably, some faculty members would have an interest in challenging the truth regime created by the PBF 2.0 policies in this study.

Yet, we know that faculty members are at the bottom of the vertical hierarchies and do not have the power to act outside of these hierarchies, as the PBF 2.0 policies have made sure. One method for faculty members to challenge the truth regime and take the "material turn" suggested by Saarinen (2008) is to make information dissemination and identification of RBOs part of their goal by writing information dissemination into their departmental strategic plans (Cooper, 2013).

While any university department can engage in CKM, schools of education may offer one of the best avenues for pursing CKM. Education is not a discipline in the traditional sense, but rather a field because education has no set framework (Berliner, 2002; Labree, 1998). As a field, educational researchers have the freedom to integrate the insights from a variety of disciplines to augment their findings. Education departments can utilize this freedom to create new forms of knowledge and criticize social institutions (Gutierriez & Penua, 2014; Marginson et al; 2010; Schoenfield & Burkhardt, 2003;Weiman, 2014). In addition, education departments train future teachers, which may be the most important position in the university (Hill, 2006). Education departments can begin to identify their own strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and challenges and determine how they can best disseminate their ideas and to whom (Bryson, 2004). Strategic planning, by pursuing goals of justice, can become a process of empowerment and liberation for those affected by the plans (Letizia, 2013). Here, planners, in this case

certain faculty members and even students, can turn to some of the non-hegemonic categories identified in research.

For instance, poverty reduction, which was addressed 14 times in some form or another in the policies, could become a plank of strategic plans. The method for pursuing poverty reduction does not just entail reducing tuition as the policymakers have it. Strategic planners can address the root of the problem and aim to alleviate the social conditions which cause poverty by working with RBO have and sites of social practice. Faculty members, academic departments, and students could pursue research on poverty reduction and actively share this research with K-12 schools, civic, and philanthropic organizations. Poverty reduction is complex, and higher education institutions produce much needed information and research to tackle this problem, but the information must be disseminated to parties and citizens who can utilize it. The empowerment of certain social actors, actors who traditionally do not have power to advocate for themselves, such as those in poverty, can be a powerful method in facilitating the creation of a more vibrant public good and newer more complex social bonds between citizens (Fromm, 1956; Fitzsimmons & Uusiautti, 2013; Putnam, 2000). Empirical studies such as mine can point to dis-empowered actors and CKM can give them a voice.

Instructors can then mobilize student researchers and student teachers to bring their critical knowledge into their places of work. Faculty and students can bring their knowledge to school boards, county governments, and state legislators. Further, faculty, students, and other interested parties can forge and sustain membership in civic organizations. Specifically, this study noted that reference to STEM (20 references) and

vocational training (23 references) were present in almost all policies examined. Researchers and others could exploit these neoliberal concerns and forge horizontal networks with science departments in universities, private science foundations, environmental organizations, humanitarian organizations, and government officials to advocate for more just uses of STEM and STEM training. There are literally endless possibilities for CKM and the forging of new networks to challenge the neoliberal truth regime. The forging of networks can be a lever of power to challenge the formal power of policymakers (Bohman & Deal, 2008). CKM may be able to forge the links of a global democracy which transcends national borders (McGrew, 2002). In the widest sense, this global democracy can be considered Jeffersonian, as it will allow multiple actors greater access not only to their own society, but perhaps to an emerging global society as well (Giroux, 2011). These actors can utilize the networks of global civil society (Kaldor, 2000). From these networks, social actors can act civically toward a global public good.

These various horizontal linkages between universities, RBO's and sites of practice will take very different forms as they are created amongst different populations in different regions. Institutions in the six states studied can begin to form their own network of active citizens who wish to challenge the truth regime created by southern policymakers and "good ole boy" networks and really all vertical hierarchies.

Some of the activities that I am advocating for already occur. For instance, during the decade of the 2000s, The National Forum on Higher Education and Public Good, The Center for the Study of Higher and Postsecondary Education at the University of Michigan and the Kettering Foundation led a series of talks and meetings with residents

of Brightmoor Michigan, which is largely an urban, poverty stricken neighborhood of Detroit. The effort led to increased civic participation from the residents of Brightmoor, in the form of attending public meetings, creating new civic organizations and becoming active in local politics (Joslin & Burkhardt, 2011). Another example involved a group of interdisciplinary scholars from the University of Montana, UC Riverside, Chief Dull Knife Community College, and a Malian Agricultural College working Malian villagers in Africa to prevent and stop the spread of Ebola (Dunkel & George, 2011). These examples represent a good start to CKM, but in order to challenge the truth regime of neoliberalism and neoconservatism, more critical efforts will be needed.

CKM advocates for higher education institutions to foster *deliberate* and *coordinated* action between various institutions, organizations, RBO's and sites of practice to challenge neoliberal and neoconservative truth regimes and to shape the public good of various glo-na-cal networks and produce global public goods in these networks. CKM is a method of praxis, of combining theory and action. Education cannot just lead to action without a corresponding theoretical component. Rather, social action must be informed by calculated and empirical research and theories. This deliberate and coordinated effort to challenge injustice is central to CKM. Truth regimes and injustices must be recognized and challenged. One way to accomplish this is by creating empirical methods such as the one used in this study to truly understand how the public good of a region is shaped. Only then can the public good be challenged with praxis.

By bringing research and findings to practitioners, policymakers, and most importantly, parties that can pressure policymakers, higher education institutions can

actively shape the public good. This vision of the public good, as examined in the last section, is one rooted in global creation and the creation of global public goods. The essence of CKM is not only the creation of knowledge, but the actual use and implementation of this knowledge. Moreover, CKM can become a political mechanism to help diverse groups, some with limited power, some with no power, to negotiate the public good and mitigate public "bads." In the widest sense, CKM can help higher education be truly accountable, not just to market, but to the wider social and democratic needs of states, regions and even globally. CKM may even be able to lead a gradual revolution by cultivating the inherent possibilities for connection and change that exist in our glo-na-cal networks (Berman, 1988; Hedges, 2013). This revolution could usher in a new phase of the public good and global democracy.

Future Research

This study looked at how PBF 2.0 policies shape the p ublic good of six southern U.S. states. Future researchers could pursue this line of inquiry and examine how the public good is then negotiated by the actors that must heed the policies in other regions. Surveys, interviews, ethnographic, and phenomenological methods could provide additional methods to investigate how the public good is shaped beyond the level of policy. In addition, quantitative and statistical studies could demonstrate how PBF 2.0 policies are affecting college graduation rates.

This study also argued that higher education institutions must resist their transformation into centers of workforce training. Future research could offer ways for institutions to actually accomplish this resistance. Of particular interest here is an

elaboration of global public goods (Marginson, 2011). I have offered the idea of critical knowledge mobilization as one method to resist. Future studies could expand on this method. Critical theory will be of great use in examining how to resist neoliberalism backed by neoconservatism.

Conclusion

It is no secret that neoliberalism has influenced higher education policymaking over the last four decades (Giroux, 2011; Mallot et al., 2013). This study adds to the literature supporting this assertion. This study, however, went further than just detailing how neoliberalism affects higher education policy. For one, the evidence in this study revealed that the market focus of neoliberalism is undergirded by a strong strand of neoconservatism, at least in the six policies studied.

The second way in which my study went further than most studies was because my studied examined how PBF 2.0 policies impact the public good. My study revealed three major points. First, at least for the policies examined, the public good has the potential to be narrowed by the neoliberal metrics used to create the policy. Further, only certain actors are allowed to participate in the negotiation of the public and only certain types of information are privileged. Neoliberal metrics and standards help to define the boundaries of the truth of the public good, and these neoliberal ideas are enforced by neoconservative means.

The narrow metrics also create unintended consequences for public higher education institutions and their respective states. Among these unintended consequences

are a narrowing of the public mission of universities, possible decreased rigor and added bureaucracy and inefficiency.

These neoliberal metrics were created by a variety of organizations such as ALEC, The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and The Lumina Foundation to name a few. These metrics serve the interests of these organizations, which is silencing dissent and promoting education as a means to profit. The interests of the various organizations converged to stifle public higher education.

Critical knowledge mobilization is one method which can work to not only mitigate the effects of performance based funding, but can also work to tap into and expand the creative capabilities of higher education institutions in the information age. If humankind is to move forward and create a truly global society based on standards of inclusion and justice, humankind will need all of the avenues for negotiating the public good that it can envision.

Appendix A

PBF 2.0 Metrics

Below is a detailed chart of all U.S. states which are in some stage of performance based funding. The chart presents the year of implementation, the amount of funding, the metrics used, the political party of the legislative and executive branch when the policy was enacted, the sponsorship of the bill by party and the type of legislation and voting outcomes by party. An asterisk indicates that information either could not be obtained at the time of writing or the information is incomplete.

State and year of implementation	**Amt of PBF and impact**	**Metrics**	**Political party of legislative/ executive branch when PBF was enacted**	**Sponsors hip of the bill by party**	**Type of Legislation/ Voting outcomes by party**
Arizona 2011	5 million	Public universities: • Degree completion • Credit hour completion • Research and public service funding • STEM and other high-need fields as weighted	R/R	Biggs- R	PBF preliminary plan developed by Arizona Board of Regents and passed as statute. Revamped in 2013.
Arkansas 2011	5% in 2014-2015 25% in 2018-2019	Separate, yet similar formulas for community colleges and universities: 40% of performance funding: • Total credentials awarded • Bachelor credentials awarded • STEM production • Student progression	D/D	Baker-R Key- R Roebuck-R	Stand alone legislation , now part of Arkansas Code 92 Ayes 0 Noes 7 NV (45/92 Ayes-R) Senate: 35 Ayes 0 Noes (20/35 Ayes-R)

		60% of performance funding: • Optional measures selected by each institution			
Colorado 2011	25%	The metrics are still under development with the following goals: • Increase attainment • Improve student success • Diversify enrollment and reduce attainment gaps • Restore balance in postsecondary revenues and maintain productivity	Split/D	Heath-D, Nicholson-D Ferradino-D Fischer D Court-D Fields-D Hamner-D Labudun- D McCann- D Lee- D Virgil- D Peniston- D Schaffer- D Stephens- R Tyler- D	Formula proposal, most likely will be approved by CO legislature.
Florida 2013	15 Million (bonus funding)	The metrics are under development with the goals of increasing graduation and employment rates in targeted program areas, and increasing the number of industry certifications	R/R	Legg- R Co-sponsors: Stargel-R Brandes-R Benacquieti o-R Bean-R Sobel-D	Stand alone legislation to amend code, now part of K-20 Education Code House: 115 Ayes 0 Nays (79/115 Ayes R) Senate: 40 Ayes 0 Nays (27/40 Ayes R)
Hawaii 2013	2%	Degrees and certificates awarded; Degrees and certificates awarded to Native Hawaiian students; Degrees and certificates awarded to students in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math (STEM) fields; Number of low-income students participating	D/D	Chang D Bertram- D Evans-D Hano-hano-D Herkes-D Ito-D Magaoay-D MizunoD Shima-bukuroD Takai-D Tsuji-D Yama-shita-D Lee-D Morita-D	Stand alone legislation to amend code, now part of HI code House: 43 Ayes 5 Nays 3 NV (2/43 Ayes- R) Senate: 22 Ayes 2 Nays 1 NV (4/18 Ayes-R)

		the Federal Pell program; Number of transfers from the community colleges to the baccalaureate campuses.		Rhoads-D Takamine D Takumi-D	
Georgia 2017	100%	TBD	R/R	Hill-R England-R Rodgers-R Rice-R Carter-R Grant-R	Expected to be passed by GA legislature in FY 2015
Illinois 2011	Less than 1%	Public universities: Degree completion • Amount of money spent on each degree • Bonuses for low-income and minority students, and for STEM degrees	D/D	Maloney-D Crespo-D Althoff-R Pritchard-R	Stand alone legislation to amend code, now part of IL code.*
Indiana 2011	5% (2014) 6% (2015) 7% (2015)	Institutions evaluated against the same benchmarks regardless of size or mission: • Overall degree attainment • On-time degree attainment • Low-income degree attainment • Dual-credit completion • University research improvement	R/R	Murphy-R Popp-D Smith- R	Part of budget 2011-2013 biennium budget. House: 59-39 Senate 37-13
Kansas 2013	New Funds	Increase Higher Education attainments Meeting needs of Kansas economy	R/R	Schodorf-R Vratil-R Hensley-D Abrams-R King-R Marshall-R Owens-R Schmidt-D Teichman-R Umbarger-R Wagle-R	Senate Bill no. 143 part of Kansas Statute 74-3202d House 123 Yeas 0 Nays Senate 39 Yeas 0 Nays

Louisiana 2010	15%	• Graduation rate and graduation productivity goals consistent with institutional peers • Program completion • Partnerships with high schools to prepare students for postsecondary education exams and workforce sills	D/R	Tucker-R Arnold-D Badon-D Burns-R Burns-R Carmody-R Carter-R Gisclair-D Hardy-D Hines-R Hoffman-R Katz-R Labruzzo-R Ligi-R Robideaux-R Simon-R Smiley-R Williams-D Wooton-R Appel-R Donahue-R Duplessis-D Martiney-R Quinn-R	GRAD Act Stand alone legislation to amend code, now part LA code House: 74 Ayes 23-Nays 6 NV (43/74 Ayes-R) Senate: 26 Ayes 13 Nays (18/26 Ayes-R)
Maine 2012	5%	Degrees awarded—additional points awarded for community college transfer students and adults over age 30 earning degrees Degrees in STEM, Allied Health and other high priority fields Number of research grants and contracts received during the year Dollar value of research grants and contracts received during the year Number of degrees awarded per $100,000 of net tuition and fees and revenues.	D/R	N/A	Performance based funding recom-mendations adopted by University of Maine Board of Trustees in 2012.*
Massachusetts 2013	$20 million	Four and two year public institutions • Student learning • Workforce alignment	D/D	Tarr-R	Part of FY 2014 Budget. Budget votes- House:

	(only two year institutions)	• Preparing citizens College participation College completion Closing achievement gaps Operational efficiency			157 Ayes 0 Nays (18/157 Ayes R) Senate: 36 Ayes 1 Nay (3/36 Ayes R)
Michigan 2012	3%	Public universities: • Graduation rates • Number of degrees awarded in STEM and other critical area fields • Research and development expenditures • Includes an incentive for universities to not increase tuition by more than four percent • To be eligible for performance funding, student transfer network, have reverse transfer agreements in place with at least three community colleges, and accept dual enrollment credits Community Colleges: • Across the board improvement (50%) • Degree completion (17.5%) • Local strategic value (15%) • Administrative costs (7.5%)	R/R	Genetski-R	Funded in the budget House: 65 Ayes 43 Nays (59/65 Ayes R) Senate: 25 Ayes 12 Nays (25/25 Ayes R)
Minnesota 2013	5%	Four and two year universities: • Graduation rate or degrees, diplomas & certificates conferred • Persistence and completion rate • Related employment rate • Reduce student expenses through the use of	D/D	Bonofel-D Clausen-D Dziedzic-D Pelaski-D Poppe-D Rosen-thal-D Winkler-D Durholt-D Hartman-D Frieberg-D Morgan-D Bermy-D	Omnibus Higher Education Bill, now part of Code of MN House: 76 Ayes 56 Nays (3/76 Ayes-R) Senate: 44 Ayes 22 Nays (8/22 Ayes-R)

		Open Educational Resources (OER) tools and services • Reallocation of funds from expense realignment		Atkins-D	
Mississippi 2011	100% (after certain set aside for operational costs)	Public universities: • Retention rate • Undergraduate graduation rate • Diversity of faculty • Research/Public service • Expenditures	R/R	Buck (5th)-D Buck (72nd)-D Barker- R	Stand alone legislation to amend code, now part of MS code: 114 -Ayes 5 -Nays 3 -NV (52/114 Ayes-R) Senate: Ayes-49 Nays-0 NV-2 (29/49 Ayes-R)
Missouri 2014	2-3%	Metrics vary by institutional sector and focus on the following areas: Student success (a) rates; (b) retention rates; (c) completion of developmental and first-credit bearing course; (d) credit accumulation Degree attainment: (a) total degrees awarded (b) graduation rates Quality: (a) job placement; (b) licensure/certification exam results and pass rates (c) assessment results in major field, general education Financial responsibility/efficiency (a) share of E&G spending on core mission; (b) revenue growth per FTE student; (c) completed credit hours per $100,000 of state appropriations or EG spending	R/D	Swan-R Walker-R Lichte-negger- R Morris-R Fitzwater-R Rowden-R	Passed MO House Committee on Higher Education Read for first time in MO Senate, awaiting action.*

Montana 2015	5% (for trial phase)	TBD	R/R	N/A	Pilot Program in Progress.
Nevada 2013	5% (FY 2013) 20% (FY 2018)	Community colleges and public universities Certificate and degree completion • Transfer • Increased success of underserved populations	D/R	Lee-D	Legislation passed to form committee and study impacts of PBF
New Mexico 2013	5%	Public universities: • Number of certificates and degrees awarded • Number of certificates and degrees awarded in state workforce priority areas Number of certificates and degrees earned by financially at-risk students	D/R	Saavedra-D	Enacted yearly in NM budget, in General Appropriations Act (failed to pass).*
North Carolina 2012	24 million Comm-unity college	State Board of Community Colleges • Basic Skills Student Progress • Developmental Student Success Rate in College-Level English Courses • First Year Progression • Licensure and Certification Passing Rate • GED Diploma Passing Rate • Developmental Student Success Rate in College-Level Math Courses Curriculum Student Completion College Transfer Performance	R/D	Brubake-R Gillespie-R (Governor vetoed it, but signed into law)	Stand alone legislation to amend code, now part of NC code. House: 72 Ayes 47 Noes (70-R) Senate: 30 Ayes 19 Noes (30-R)
North Dakota 2013	100% (but cannot be less than	Community colleges and public universities Credit completion , Credits are weighted by level au7nd in relation	R/R	Legislation recom-mended by the non-partisan Legislative	Stand alone legislation to amend code, now part of ND code House: 91 Ayes 1 Noe

	96% of previous years amount	to state workforce needs		Council of North Dakota.	(72/91 Ayes-R) Senate: 41 Ayes 1 Noe (35/41 Ayes-R)
Ohio 2012	Four year universities: 100% Comm-unity College 5%	At-risk students are more heavily weighted in formula, and there is a STEM course incentive Public universities: • Course and degree completion Community colleges • Progression from remedial to college level courses • Students earning 15 and 30 college level credits • Students earning an associate degree • year institutions	Split/D	N/A	PBF in process of being phased in.*
Oklahoma 2012	2.2 million	• Campus degree completion plan • Retention rates • Pell Grant retention rates • 24-credit-hour completion rate • Graduation rate • Program accreditation	R/R	N/A	Adopted by state regents. The PBF adopted by the regents applies to additional funding for higher education appropriated by the state legislature.*
Pennsylvania 2011	2.4%	Public universities: Mandatory • Student success: degrees conferred and closing achievement gap • Access: close access gap and faculty diversity • Stewardship: private support dollars raised Optional (choose any 5 metrics from the following categories) • Success: deep learning scale results, senior	D/D	N/A	Conceptual Framework to guide proposed PBF adopted by Board of Regents.*

		survey, student persistence, value added, and STEM degrees • Access: faculty career advancement, employment diversity, student experience with diversity, and student diversity • Stewardship: facilities investment, admin. expenditures as a % of educational costs, faculty productivity, and employee productivity • University-specific may create no more than 2 indicators			
South Dakota 2013	6 million	After a one-time performance funding pilot for public universities based on three years of degree production data, with more funding for producing graduates in high-priority fields, 2013 legislation provides the framework for performance funding and the creation of the Council on Higher Education Policy Goals, Performance, and Accountability	R/R	Olson-R Bradford-D Johnston-R Jones- D Kirkeby-R Peters-R Tide-mann-R White-R Dryden-R Munst-erman-R Wismer-D	Stand alone legislation to amend code, now part of SD code. House: 36 Ayes 29 Nays 5 Excused (19/36 Ayes-R) Senate 30 Ayes 1 Nay 4 Excused (26/30 Ayes-R)
Tennessee	100%	Public universities: • Students accumulating 24, 48, and 72 hours Bachelor's, master's, doctoral, and law degrees Research/grant funding • Transfers out with 12 hours • Degrees per 100 full-time equivalent (FTE) • Six-year graduation rate	R/R	Kyle-D Woods-R Gresham-R McNally-R Berke-D Yager-R Bunch-R Herron-D Tate-D Finney-D Norris-R	Stand alone legislation to amend code, now part of TN code House: 93 Ayes 2 Nays (48/96 Ayes-R) Senate: 32 Ayes 0-Nayes (19/32 Ayes-R)

		Community Colleges• Student accumulating: 12, 24, and 36 hours • Dual enrolled students Associate degrees, 1 year certificates, and less than 1 year certificates • Graduates placed in jobs • Remedial and development success • Transfers out with 12 credit hours • Workforce training (contact hours)• Award per 100 FTEs			
Texas 2013	10%	Community/junior colleges: • Developmental education • Gateway courses • College credit hour attainment Credentials awarded • Transfers to a four year Institution	R/R	Branch-R Pitts-R Taylor-R Patrick-R Villareal-D	Stand alone legislation to amend code, now part of TX code Total Vote: 127 Ayes 14 Noes (95/127 Ayes-R)
Utah 2011	TBD	Senate Bill 97 establishes "mission based funding" as a basis for higher education appropriations in Utah instead of funding institutions based solely on enrollment growth; mission-based funding will consider both enrollment growth and the strategic priorities for colleges and universities. As appropriations are available, community colleges and public universities submit proposals for high impact initiatives to be reviewed and approved by the Board of Regents. Accountability	R/R	Hillyard-R Brown- R	Stand alone legislation to amend code, now part of UT code House: 67 Ayes 3 Noes 2 NV (54/67 Ayes-R) Senate: 27 Ayes 0 Noes 2 NV (23/27 Ayes-R)

		reports demonstrate the impact of the funded initiatives.			
Virginia 2011	50%	Public universities and community colleges: • Increased enrollment • Increased degree completion • Improved retention and graduation rates • Increased research output • Increased degree production in STEM fields Increased degree efficiency gains through: • Year-round use of campus facilities • Online courses • Resource sharing • Better use of technology	Split/R	Norment-R Houck-D (chief patrons)	Stand alone legislation to amend code, now part of VA code House: Ayes-98 Noes-0 No vote-2 (59/100 Ayes-R) Senate: Ayes-40 Noes-0 (20/40 Ayes-R)
Washington 2012	10.5 million	Community and technical colleges: Building college level skills adult literacy/English language proficiency test score gains, GED or H.S. diploma, and passing pre-college writing or math • First-year retention: earning 15 and 30 college level credits • Completing college level math passing courses required for technical or academic associate degrees required for technical or academic associate degrees • Completions: certificates, associate degrees, and apprenticeship and apprenticeship train	D/D	N/A	State Board of Education adopted recom-mendations of Student Achievement Advisory Group in 2012.*

Appendix B

Tennessee

Table 1B. Input-Process-Output-Outcome Chart.

Number and/or letter in parentheses denote location in policy.

Inputs	**Processes**	**Outputs**	**Outcomes**
Ensure fair and equitable distribution of public funds to TN HEI consistent with goals of the Master Plan (3.4)	Develop statewide Master Plan for Tennessee Higher Education (3.1)	Ensure increased degree production (3.1B)	Address states' economic development and workforce needs (3.1A)
The policies and formulae or guidelines v provide for the consideration of the impact of tuition, maintenance fees and other charges assessed by each institution in determining the fair and equitable distribution of public funds as required by this subdivision. The commission shall therefore review tuition, maintenance fees and other charges assessed	Ensure minimal redundancy in degree offerings (3.1C)	Ensuring competitive research (3.1C)	Foster economic growth (9.1)

by each institution…(3.4B)			
x	Approve institutional mission statements for each higher education institutions degree offerings, type of students served (3.2)	Master Plan will provide Higher Education Opportunities to all TN citizens (3.3)	Accelerate the state's economic and workforce development efforts in the field of energy sciences and engineering (9.2)
x	Nothing in policy can deter higher education institution from pursuing its mission (3.2)	Outcomes-, timely progress to degree, research and student success (3.4)	Support the development of clean energy technologies and jobs in Tennessee (9.3)
x	Master Plan promotes high degree of regional cooperation between K12, higher education institutions, businesses, civic and community leaders (3.3)	Standardized and centralized community college system will aimed to produce more rapid and significantly higher rates of program completion through structured degree programs that incorporate fixed course offerings...on a pre-determined schedule. (8.c4)	Strengthen existing partnership between University of Tennessee and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) (9.4)
x	Master Plan emphasizes outcomes across range of variables weighted to reinforce each higher education institutions mission and provide incentives for productivity improvement consistent with the Master Plan (3.4)	Increasing number of STEM degrees to doctoral schools University of Tennessee and other institutions (to foster economic growth) (9.1)	Promote interdisciplinary program of energy science and engineering at the University of Tennessee , Knoxville that shall provide students an opportunity to undertake transformative research activities (9.6)
x	commission shall develop a university tract program within the	Increase prestige of University of	Promote research in science, technology, engineering and

	University of Tennessee and Tennessee Board of Regents of 60 hours for transfer and applied toward BA attainment at public institutions (4.e1)	Tennessee as top tier institution (9.5)	mathematics that encourages entrepreneurial opportunities in Tennessee (9.8)
x	Community College students must be supplied with sufficient information about programs and courses so they know which courses will lead to degree and which ones will not (4.2ab)	Promote collaborative research and development by interdisciplinary teams of University of Tennessee, Knoxville, and other state university faculties and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in energy-related fields (9.7, 9.9)	University of Tennessee is allowed to establish an academic unit at ORNL, with appointment and oversight of graduate students, the appointment of ORNL staff as faculty, and the development of interdisciplinary curricula between the two institutions (9.9ab)
x	Any person who satisfies the admission requirements for any two year school under jurisdiction of board of regents and any four year school under the board regents may be admitted to both (6g)	Ability to establish partnerships with private entities (11.a)	St. Jude's Hospital, Tennessee Health Services and University of Tennessee now a Memphis Research Consortium (MRC). The MRC is a collaborative research venture with other leading business and research entities to promote economic development and job creation, promote opportunities for RD in public health, medical devices, medical and healthcare, bio-based products and chemical manufacturing, logistics and supply chain, computational and computer sciences, and learning

			technologies and related fields. (11.ab)
x	All 13 Tennessee Community Colleges, which operate independently, will now be unified under a standardized system, offering block scheduling (8.c1-6)	x	Promotion of participation by other institutions of higher education, hospitals and other health services providers, organizations engaged in the promotion of public health, medical devices, medical and healthcare, bio-based products and chemical manufacturing, logistics and supply chain, computational and computer sciences, learning technologies, bioscience, and bioengineering and related business and research, as well as industrial and commercial enterprises engaged in business activities related to these areas (11.ab)
x	An audit of the Tennessee Higher Education Commission, the University of Tennessee board of trustees and the board of regents may be conducted by the comptroller of the treasury (13)	x	x
x	The commission must submit higher education funding formula to the office of legislative budget analysis and the	x	x

	comptroller no later than December 1 (3.4A)		
x	The office of legislative budget analysis and the comptroller shall each provide comments on the higher education funding formula to the general assembly (3.4A)	x	X
x	The commission, with commissioner of finance and comptroller, shall establish uniform standards of accounting, records and statistical reporting with which standards shall be adhered to by the various institutions in preparing for submission to the commission statistical data and requests for appropriations (3.4C)	x	x
x	The commission shall review tuition and fees and other charges assessed by each institution and make recommendations to the respective governing boards (3.4B)	x	x
x	end of terms enrollments, student retention, transfers	x	x

x	Promotion of partnerships between community colleges and technology centers (8.c5)	x	x
x	Tennessee four year institutions may no longer offer remedial courses, but can plan with community college to offer remedial courses (7)	x	x

Table 2B. Visual Representation of Tennessee Input-Process-Output-Outcome Counts.



Table 3B.

Hegemony/Discourse chart

Number in parentheses refers to location in policy, the following number is the frequency, and TC is total count.

Hegemonic/Neoliberal Term/Notion	Location/Frequency	How the term shapes the public good
References to the market/economic growth/ revenue and profit generation investment/ commercialization	(3.1A)1, (3.3)1, (9.1-8)3, (11b)4, TC: 9	The promotion of economic development in Tennessee is one of the main desired outcomes of Tennessee PBF. In conjunction with other business related references in the policy, the public good is decidedly construed in market terms and financial capabilities. As has been mentioned before , the market cannot (and will not) readily produce non-rivalrous and non-excludable goods (Marginson, 2007). And the public good of any polity will be impoverished if there is a lack of public goods.
References to efficiency, optimal use of resources	(1C)2, (4.2)1, (8.3)4, (13) 4 TC: 11	There is a push by Tennessee policymakers to ensure that Tennessee institutions, especially community colleges, are not wasting resources and not duplicating programs. In addition, the Tennessee legislature can audit all educational programs. Efficiency is a guiding principle of neoliberalism in general and the accountability movement in particular (Burke, 2005; Fowler, 2009). Efficiency is a valued foundational plank of the public good in Tennessee higher education institutions one that is enforced with audit and government oversight. Efficiency and accountability have been a wider concern of higher education policy in the US and globally over the last

		forty years (Prokou, 2013). The Tennessee policymakers have been inspired by this accountability focus. However, the focus on accountability has been pursued at the expense of social justice concerns (Mallot, et al., , 2013; Prokou, 2013).
References to vocational/workforce training and human capital/ job creation	(1.A)1, (9.2-3)2, (11b)1 TC: 4	There are only four references to job creation, but again, in conjunction with the other business terms, these four references help to further shape the public good in market terms.
References to accountability and performance	(1)1, (3.1)2, (3.1B)1, (3.4)7, (3.4C)1, (8.1-5)3, (9.1)1 TC: 16	Accountability and government oversight are the major planks of the Tennessee PBF policy. There is a total of 35 references of accountability and government oversight. The entire Tennessee community college system is overhauled and reorganized while the Tennessee policymakers seek to hold four year higher education institutions accountable to. There seems to be little trust between Tennessee policymakers and Tennessee higher education institutions. Instead, the Tennessee PBF is used to restructure higher education in Tennessee. Of course the policymakers do call for the University of Tennessee Trustees to help inform PBF measures. Nonetheless, Tennessee higher education institutions become hierarchal entities, at the bottom of the chain. The vision of the public good can be constrained by

		lack of trust and hierarchy (Burke, 2005; Pusser, 2006;). It should also be noted that this act makes it so the commission has NO authority for recommending individual technology centers operating budgets. The 27 Tennessee technology centers are operated under the Tennessee Board of Regents and specifically focus on workforce training. Higher education institutions are complex entities charged with fostering the public good (Ramaly, 2006). Their complexity defies the assumption of simple causation (Bohman & Deal, 2008). Tennessee policymakers assume that tighter government control will force higher education institutions to conform to their (Tennessee policymakers') wishes. Policymakers cannot assume simple causality in complex organizations however, yet policymakers are paid to give simple answers to constituents. Yet, as Bohman and Deal (2008) argue, in complex organizations, turning on a lightswitch will not light the room, but make a toilet flush ten blocks away. Higher education institutions are very complex and simple casual assumptions can impede their functioning and the creation of the public good. The absence of trust and tighter bureaucratic control will most likely pressure the entire the

		system of higher education in unforeseen ways (as well as predictable ways) and pressure the entire system, limiting its ability to contribute to the public good and contribute to KM (Cooper, 2009).
References to public-private partnerships and collaboration	(3.3)1, (8.4-5)2, (9.1-9ab)7, (11a-c)3 TC: 13	see STEM
References to tuition un-affordability	(3.4A)1, (3B)2 TC: 3	There is recognition of tuition increases, but there is no mention of the political motivations behind tuition increases, which have been largely due to the continual slashing of public funds at the hands of neoliberals over the last four decades (Newfield, 2008; Zumeta, 2011). Rather, tuition increases are treated as almost agentless actions which higher education institutions must deal with effectively (Edmundson & D'Orso, 2007).
References to competition	(3.1C)1, (4.1A)1 TC: 2	See prestige.
References to knowledge based economy	N/A	N/A
References to Science Technology Engineering and Mathematics	(9.1-9ab)9, (10)1,	There is a special relationship between STEM, technology and a private partnership with Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). ORNL is

	TC: 10	a laboratory run by the US Department of Energy. Yet, the mission and purpose of ORNL is to promote the commercialization of goods in the private sector. Thus, as Marginson (2007) notes, the dichotomy between public and private is blurry. Further, Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) argue that neoliberalism conflates the boundaries between the public and private spheres. This conflation of public and private purpose is illustrated by Tennessee policymakers. Promotion of STEM disciplines and collaboration with ORNL, a public laboratory, is meant to spurn private sector growth. The public good, in line with business purposes of Tennessee policymakers and outcomes of Tennessee PBF is, at least partially, to promote private interests. The policy allows for ORNL employees oversight of graduate students. As Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) and Washburn (2005) note, this could lead to a conflict of interest especially if ORNL is pursuing for-profit ventures which collide with UT's public mission. Again, this is a further example of the conflation of public and private interests.
References to online instruction	N/A	N/A
Elevation of status/prestige	(9.5)1	While there is only one reference to prestige, and only two to competition, these

	TC:1	references are important because another plank of neoliberalism is that universities be competitive and compete for students and resources (Marginson, 2007; Rhoads & Torres, 2006; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). This competition is sustained and enhanced by the various college ranking systems (Marginson, 2007). The desire for the University of Tennessee to be a top tier university is indicative of this competitive strand of neoliberalism. Competition and rankings structure the public good as a market, where competition (never on equal terms) determines status and position.
References to Government Oversight	(3)2, (3.2)1, (3.4C-D)2, (4)1, (4Ai-ii)3, (4.2)3, (4.3)1, (4.3f)1, (5)1, (6)1, (7)1 (8.c1-5)6, (11c)1, (12)1, (13)1 TC:25	See accountability.

Table 4B. Visual Representation of Hegemony Counts in Tennessee Policy.



Table 5B. Non-hegemonic chart.

Number in parentheses refers to location in policy, the following number is the frequency, and TC is total count.

Private Non-market benefits and externalities	**Frequency Count/Location**	**How the public good is shaped by the term(s)**
References to health/life expectancy	(11a-c)8 TC: 8	Tennessee policymakers have dedicated an entire section to promoting health concerns. In section 11, the policymakers urge for public health research as well as create a research consortium with St. Jude's Children Hospital. As discussed earlier, there is a conflation of public and private entities, but there is some recognition (two references) of purely public health concerns. Public health and well-being are integral parts to any notion of public good (Kaul et al., 1999; Zacher, 1999). The furtherance of public health is a precursor to general wellbeing (McMahon, 2009).

		However, the policymakers mention public health in conjunction with private partnerships, including businesses; so again, the public good may not be framed in purely public terms.
References to poverty reduction/assistance/financial stability	N/A	N/A
References to general happiness	N/A	N/A
References to non-market knowledge and research	N/A	N/A
References to art, literature, theater	N/A	N/A
References to cultural diversity	N/A	N/A
References to pedagogy	N/A	N/A
References to college mission	(13)1, (3.1)1, (3.1C)1, (3.2)3, (3.4)1 TC: 7	There is an emphasis on individual college missions, even a safeguard to protect unique college missions (although what constitutes a unique mission is left undefined). Unique missions promote the public good in a variety of ways, through research, service, teaching and other ways (Pusser, 2006; Ramaly, 2006). Despite the safeguards, each institution is situated in the hierarchy, at the bottom. How an institution can exercise its mission within a hierarchy remains to be seen.
References to enhancing citizenship/public service	(3.2)1, (3.3)1 TC: 2	There were two direct references to public service and one reference to civic leaders. Tennessee policymakers do

		recognize public service as part of the public good.
References to liberal arts	N/A	N/A
References to externalities/social benefits	N/A	N/A
References to social transformation/social criticism	N/A	N/A
References to reduced Crime Rate	N/A	N/A
References to glo-na-cal/horizontal linkages	(11.a-b)2 TC: 2	See health and public service
References to social contract/state support/resident enrollment	(3.1)1, (3.2)1, (3.3)1, (8.1)1 TC: 4	There were four references to ensuring that Tennessee citizens are served. This speaks to the social contract between the state and higher education institutions (Lewis & Hearn, 2003). Of course, the main outcome of the policy is to promote economic and market efficiency for Tennessee and its citizens. So service to citizens in framed in market terms.
References to institutional autonomy	N/A	N/A
References to pollution reduction/clean air	(9.3)1 TC: 1	There is one reference to pollution reduction. The Tennessee policymakers want to promote the creation of clean energy products. Clean air and pollution reduction are integral to any vision of the public good and are public goods in themselves (Kaul, et al., 1999). However, the promotion of clean energy is framed within

		public/private partnership, specifically with ORNL.
References to global citizenship, global public goods/national/regional local goods or publics	N/A	N/A
References to deliberate inter-generational concerns	N/A	N/A
References to just use of STEM	(9.3)1 TC: 1	See pollution/clean air

Table 6B. Visual Representation of Tennessee Non-hegemonic categories.



Table 7B. Presupposition Table.

Presupposition Type	**Location**	**How presupposition shapes the public good**
"Complete College Tennessee Act of 2010"	(1)	This title implies that not enough students are finishing college and that more must be done to achieve this. Further, the Tennessee legislature will help to achieve this, because colleges are not doing enough. This is another faulty assumption, based on simple causal

		thinking, i.e. that punitive policies will allow for more students to earn degrees. Higher education institutions are vastly complex entities because they contribute to the public good (Ramaly, 2006). Furthermore, the individual decision to pursue a degree is but one fragment in the complex processes of higher education and will need more than simplistic policy inducements.
"The commission shall construct a statewide master plan that directs higher education to be accountable for increasing the educational attainment levels of Tennesseans." (change)	(3.1) similar presuppositions in (3.1B), (3.3) and (8.4).	The use of the word "directs" implies that higher education institutions are not currently being accountable and not educating Tennesseans at an acceptable rate. This is a common claim, critics claim that too many students enroll but do not finish college and blame the HEI for not caring about students, thus to attempt (Burke, 2005; Zemsky, 2005). In line with the main outcomes of the policymakers (which is contained in the next line 3.1A), is to address the state's economic and workforce development. More college degrees translate to higher personal incomes and a higher tax base (McMahon, 2009). Thus, the vision of the public good held by Tennessee policymakers is largely one rooted in economics and market concerns, and the attainment of more college degrees is supposed to contribute to this vision of the public good.
"The plan shall include, but not be limited to, the consideration of the following provisions: addressing the state's economic development, workforce development…" (existential)	(3.1A) similar presuppositions in (9.1) and (9.8)	The policymakers assume that economic and workforce development should be the main outcome of the policy, this is purpose of the plan. Economic concerns are vital to any vision of the public good (Bowen, 1996; Kaul, et al., 1999). However, there are many other factors that must be present for a vital public sphere (Calhoun, 1998). This preoccupation with economic and workforce concerns is common to neoliberalism, as well as

		neoconservatives (Marginson, 2008; Stanley, 2007). The market is seen as the guarantor of profit and efficiency for neoliberals, and social order to neoconservatives (Marginson, 2008). Thus, the promotion of the market is advantageous to both neoliberals and neoconservatives, and this is present in Tennessee PBF policy.
"The plan shall include, but not be limited to, the consideration of the following provisions…using institutional mission differentiation to realize statewide efficiencies through institutional collaboration and minimized redundancy in degree offering…" (change) "…the board shall identify and implement consolidation of services among institutions and standardization of processes between institutions in order to improve efficiency and effectiveness in all functional areas, including, but not limited to, student services, academic support and institutional support." (change) "It is the legislative intent that community college students who wish to earn baccalaureate degrees in the state's public higher education system be provided with clear and effective information and directions that specify curricular paths to a degree." (change)	(3.1C) (8.3) (4.2)	Each statement implies that Tennessee higher education institutions were not being efficient with their use of resource in academic, operations and student affairs areas. As a result, there was a redundancy in programs offered and the policymakers sought to reign in higher education. Efficiency is a guiding criterion of neoliberalism and way to discipline higher education (Alexander, 2000; Mallot, et al, 2013; Newfield, 2008). The public good of neoliberals is undergirded by efficiency and the Tennessee policymakers embody efficiency and seek to make Tennessee higher education institutions more efficient. This also aligns with the neoliberal sentiment that higher education institutions are not nimble enough, due mainly to the clumsy processes of academia like faculty governance and peer review (Dee, 2006).

"…the commission shall establish a master plan that requires a broad degree of regional cooperation between postsecondary institutions with secondary institutions and business, civic and community leaders." (change)	(3.3)	This statement implies that cooperation of higher education with outside entities is desirable. This outside cooperation is essential, however the policymakers equate private sector businesses with civic and community leaders. This equation of private and public interests can be problematic. The public sector and private sector have opposed goals (Bryson, 2004). Of course, as Marginson (2007) notes, public entities can provide market values while private entities can impact the public good or bad. Nonetheless, the assumption that the private and public sector can be simply equated may prove problematic, not least of all because many business leaders most likely have different visions of the public good than do civic and especially community leaders.
"The policies and formulae or guidelines shall result in an outcomes-based model….end of term enrollment, student retention, timely progress toward degree completion…" (existential)	(3.4) similar presuppositions in (4.2)	Tennessee policymakers assume that an outcome based model is desirable and the optimal method to measure the worth of higher education. The outcomes to measure higher education are timely progress toward degree, retention and end of term enrollment. While these can be desirable outcomes (or more accurately outputs) a narrow focus on simple quantifiable measures will limit the vitality of the public sphere and public good (McMahon, 2009). higher education institutions are charged with promoting the public good, and the notion of the public good is notoriously complex, thus the encouragement of simple quantifiable measures may limit the understanding of the public good.
"The commission shall have no authority for recommending individual technology centers operating budgets…"	(3.D)	This statement implies that the commission, which has some voice in almost all funding concerns of higher education institutions, has no authority in the budgets of technology centers. The purpose of Tennessee technology centers

(existential)		is to create a higher standard of living for Tennesseans, primarily through providing workforce training (Tennessee tech website). The technology centers also partake in a variety business ventures with the private sector. However, the implicit message here is that academic institutions need to be disciplined and held accountable to economic needs, but technology centers which already cater to economic needs do not need to be held accountable. This idea is taken as a fact. The policymaker's unquestioned acceptance of this "fact" can elevate the mission of the technology centers over the mission of public universities, which is much broader than workforce training. With the narrow focus on workforce training, the humanizing features of STEM initiatives (Suronata & Vaden, 2007) as well as the ultimate promotion of world financial stability (Mendez, 1999) may be lost. Again, the implications for the public good work to structure the public good in market terms.
"after July 1, 2012, four-year institutions governed by the board of regents and the University of Tennessee board of trustees shall not offer remedial or developmental courses…to any student" (change)	(7)	The notion that four year higher education institutions should not be for remediation can privilege more wealthy citizens, in wealthier school districts, whose localities adequately fund K12 higher education, over citizens from poorer school districts that cannot offer their students advanced classes, like AP Calculus. While the policy allows four year higher education institutions to work with two year higher education institutions to provide remedial education, the policymakers ignore the growing social disparities that mark United States localities (such as tax disparities), and cater only to the more wealthy citizens by making the four year higher education institutions for them . This also assumes that higher education should be an

		individual good, not a social one, as only those with money can afford to have a premiere higher education (Burke, 2005; Fowler, 2009; Lambert, 2014; McMahon, 2009). This abolition of remediation can also stratify institutions, where four year institutions (and the more prestigious ones at that) occupy the top of the hierarchy and train the upper classes, and community colleges are simply centers of workforce training to train middle and lower class students who did not have the benefit to attend a wealthy K12 district.
"The provisions of this agreement shall address matters including, but not limited to, the appointment and oversight of graduate students, the appointment of ORNL staff as faculty…" (existential)	(8.9b) similar presuppositions in (11.a) and (11.b)	Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) argue that the boundaries between the public and private spheres in higher education have been increasingly blurred as a result of higher education institutions emulating the private sector. Washburn (2005) similarly notes that as a result of higher education institution's trying to encourage the creation of patents and profitable research, there has resulted in conflicts of interest between profit and the public good. The revolving door between UT and ORNL could lead to such conflicts. The presupposition does not recognize the potential for conflicts of interest. This presupposition furthers Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) and Marginson's (2007) claim for the potential conflation of the public and private spheres if public entities pursue market ventures.
"An audit of the Tennessee Higher Education Commission, the University of Tennessee board of trustees and the board of regents may be conducted by the comptroller of the treasury. If such audit is conducted, the audit shall specifically focus on overlap in mission, cost inefficiencies, management practices and the restructuring of higher education	(13)	Among other powers, the Tennessee policymakers have granted themselves the power to audit any aspect of the University of Tennessee. This is understandable on some level, because the university is a public entity. The audit in itself is not so problematic; it is what the auditors are looking for. They want to hold higher education accountable, yet as stressed in other places, these

stipulated by the implementation of this act. ” (Change)		accountability measures are narrow and unable to truly capture the potential of higher education institutions (McMahon, 2009; Ramaly, 2006). The public good cannot be reduced to simple quantifiable measures (Ramaly, 2006). However, the audit power, and the other top heavy reforms embedded in the policy, can also be read as a clear sign of mistrust between the legislatures and the higher education institutions. This mistrust has been seen on a national level (Burke, 2005; Zemsky, 2005). Mistrust between legislatures and higher education institutions can have a negative impact on the formation of the public good because mistrust can breed resentment and close down true dialogue and the ability of higher education institutions to produce social criticism, which is one of their core functions (Marginson, 2007; Pusser, 2006; Zumeta, 2011). Without social criticism, there can be no vibrant public sphere (Calhoun, 1998; Mansbridge, 1998; Marginson, 2007; Pusser, 2006).

Table 8B. Social Actors Chart.

Number in parentheses refers to location in policy and TC is total count.

Social Actor(s)	**Positioning**	**Location/Frequency**	**How actor(s) frames public good**
Tennessee Higher Education Commission (THEC)	“The commission shall construct a statewide master plan…”	First mention: (3.1) TC: 26	THEC is the coordinating agency for the state of Tennessee, with members appointed by the governor. In 2001, Zumeta (2001) argued that coordinating boards across the nation have been advocating performance based funding policies for over

			two decades because they have been increasingly staffed with corporate allies. This trend seems only to have intensified. The commission is charged by the legislature with developing a statewide master plan for all public universities. The purpose of the plan is to make Tennessee Higher Education accountable and to allow Tennessee higher education institutions to address the state's economic and workforce needs.
University of Tennessee Board of Trustees/ Board of Regents	"…with input from the board of regents and the University of Tennessee board of Trustees…	First mention: (3.1) TC: nine BOT TC: 15 BOR	The Board of Trustees is the governing body of UT and its members are appointed by the governor. The Board of Regents The Board of Trustees and Board of Regents are invited to aid the THEC in crafting the master plan. These entities have more of an advising role in the creation of the master plan. With these three agencies underneath the legislature, there is a clear hierarchy of power in Educational policy making in Tennessee. At one point, boards were supposed to insulate faculty from the political fallout of operating in republic (Wellman, 2006). Now however,

			these boards have are increasingly staffed by corporate allies sympathetic to business needs (Zumeta, 2001). This massive centralization of power may be an inhibitor of certain voices contributing to the public good, it may also stymie the creation of bridging structures (Calhoun, 1998)
Four Year Public Institutions	"The commission shall engage public universities, community colleges, and technology centers for input during the creation of the master plan."	First mention: (3.1) TC:	Four year public institutions are largely viewed as passive actors by Tennessee policymakers. The THEC is supposed to solicit input of public higher education institutions, but this input is supposed to come subsequent to the input of Board of Regents and Board of Trustees. Further, the four year higher education institutions are not supposed to contribute input to the question of accountability. The method of accountability has already been decided: outcome based performance. The four year institutions are supposed to work within the confines of performance and outcomes funding and not offer alternative models of accountability.

			Yet, as Zumeta (2011) argues, higher education institutions have to tell policymakers and the general public what they *should* desire for accountability purposes. However, there is one clause which does give a degree of power or at least latitude to all higher education institutions to carry out their missions. Section 3.3 reads that nothing in the act can prohibit any institution from pursing its mission. However, what if an institutional mission comes into conflict with PBF, such as a liberal arts based mission? Thus this power dynamic is ambiguous. In addition, this clause may also empower Tennessee higher education institutions to pursue KM and other public service goals (Cooper, 2009).
Community Colleges	"The commission shall engage public universities, community colleges, and technology centers for input during the	First mention: (3.1) TC: 19	Community Colleges perhaps are the most restricted entities in the state of Tennessee under this policy. The Tennessee PBF policy creates a brand new framework to unify, centralize and streamline community college operations and offerings. Community Colleges are integral to the public

	creation of the master plan."		good because they can give educational opportunities for transfer and vocational training for many who may not have the chance (Brint & Karabel, 1989). Thus it is imperative that centralization does not restrict their ability to provide this.
Technology Centers	"The commission shall engage public universities, community colleges, and technology centers for input during the creation of the master plan."	First mention: (3.1) TC: 6	Technology centers are given more autonomy than any other institution in the policy, because the THEC does not control their budgets or funding. Again, this speaks to the fact that technology, STEM and workforce training are prized facets of the public good and policymakers promote these facets, usually at the expense of the humanities (Calhoun, 1998; Mallot, et al., 2013; Vestrich, 2008; Wolfe, 1998).
Tennessee Citizens	"The commission shall construct a statewide master plan that directs higher education to be accountable for increasing the educational attainment levels of Tennesseans."	First mention: (3.1) TC: 2	One of the major purposes of the policy is to hold Tennessee higher education institutions accountable for increasing the level of educational attainment of Tennessee citizens. It is assumed that increasing the number of degrees is the surest way to educate the citizens and increase the public good. As McMahon (2009) has shown however, a

			myopic focus on quantifiable outcomes can and usually does blind policymakers and citizens to the larger social benefits of higher education. While the policymakers do recognize some social benefits of higher education, the thrust of the policy is financial betterment. So the real voice and power of Tennessee citizens as promoted by the policy is somewhat questionable because their welfare is couched mainly in quantifiable outcomes which are really simplistic assumptions; i.e. the assumption that simple outcomes can promote the public good (McMahon, 2009; Ramaly, 2006).
Governing Boards of Individual Institutions	"In consultation with the respective governing boards, approve institutional mission statements concurrent with the adoption of each revised statewide master plan"	First mention (3.2) TC: 3	In the Tennessee PBF specifically, governing boards of individual institutions are given some power to help craft the master plan, but this power is only given after the debate about whether having a master plan based on quantifiable outcomes is over. Formerly, boards were supposed to insulate faculty, but now, as Zumeta (2001) has noted however, much like coordinating boards,

			individual governing boards have been instrumental in promoting a neoliberal agenda because the boards have been increasingly staffed with corporate allies. So it is likely that many members on these individual boards are in agreement with the notion of performance based funding. Thus, the voices advocating an alternative vision of the public good may not be heard, especially if those voices are not in a position of authority.
Governor of Tennessee		(3.3) and (5). TC: 2	The governor signed the bill into law in 2010. The governor is a powerful, but removed player. The education committee in the house and senate must prepare an annual report for the governor regarding the progress of institutions and the PBF policy. Thus, the governor can presumably make recommendations for policymakers to follow and ultimately for higher education institutions to abide by if these recommendations are put into future policy revisions. It should also be remembered that the NGA was responsible for pushing PBF policies.

Office of Legislative budget analysis/ Commissioner of Finance	"The office of legislative budget analysis and the comptroller of the treasury, shall provide comments on the higher education funding formula to the chairs of the education and finance, ways and means committees of both houses of the general assembly."	(3.4A) first mention TC: 3	The THEC must submit the higher education funding formula to OLBA and to the comptroller of the treasury annually. (The THEC must also work to establish uniform plans of statistical analysis and accounting).The OLBA and comptroller than give comments on the budget to the house and senate education committees. The OLBA and comptroller are the "middle men" between the THEC and the legislature. This helps cement a hierarchy which places higher education institutions toward the bottom of the decision making ladder. This is not uncommon, as Alexander (2000) has noted, many policymakers feel that education is too important in regards to the economy to be left to educationalists, so the power must be taken out of their hands. This speaks to the lack of trust (Burke, 2005) and the subsequent effect on the public good, as well as the simple assumption that higher education is simple organization.
Comptroller of the Treasury	"The office of legislative budget analysis and the	(3.4A) first mention	The comptroller also has the power to audit the THEC, the Board of

	comptroller of the treasury, shall provide comments on the higher education funding formula to the chairs of the education and finance, ways and means committees of both houses of the general assembly."	TC: 5	Regents and Board of Trustees in regards to their accountability efforts to provide high enough levels of educational attainment. This gives the comptroller a tremendous amount of power to influence how higher education institutions are held accountable and how higher education institutions respond to accountability measures. This further adds to the power that that the executive branch has and the less power that higher education institutions have in the hierarchy. The hierarchy looks something like this in Tennessee, from bottom to top: higher education institutions-(Community Colleges and four year institutions)-Board of Regents- Board of Trustees, THEC-OLBA, comptroller-house and senate committees, governor. Technology centers are under the legislature but over the THEC and ORNL is not subject to the legislature but can impact higher education institutions. A vertical hierarchy can stymie the power and influence of an institution (Marginson et

			al., 2010) and thus it is essential that higher education institutions begin to look horizontally as well.
Education and Finance/Ways and Means committees	"The office of legislative budget analysis and the comptroller of the treasury, shall provide comments on the higher education funding formula to the chairs of the education and finance, ways and means committees of both houses of the general assembly."	(3.4A) first mention TC: 5	The finance and ways and means committees in the house and senate are the controllers of the purse string which makes them arguably the most powerful actors in the policy. The power of the purse usually allows those actors the ability to shape the public good in their image yet these views may not be equitable or inclusive (Calhoun, 1998; Mansbridge, 1998). In a wider sense, a budget is not just a list of expenditures, but a reflection of a polities priorities (Fowler, 2009).
Oak Ridge National Laboratory	"The provisions of this agreement shall address matters including, but not limited to, the appointment and oversight of graduate students, the appointment and oversight of graduate students, the appointment of ORNL staff as faculty, and the development of interdisciplinary	(9.1-9.1-b). TC: 7	It is understood that the policies of ORNL and the federal Department of Education are in no way impinged upon by the Tennessee PBF policy, yet graduate students of UT higher education institutions can be placed under the supervision of ORNL staff and ORNL staff can be made professors. Thus, ORNL is perhaps the most powerful player in the policy, perhaps even more powerful than the Tennessee

	curricula between the two institutions."		legislature. While ORNL is a public entity, their mission is to advance private sector interests. As Slaughter and Rhoades (2004), Marginson (2007) as well as Washburn (2005) note, this may be a blurring of the public and private spheres. So the power of ORNL over the Tennessee executive and legislature could lead to conflicts of interests between the public mission of UT and private sector endeavors by the federal government. The goals of ORNL are to promote private sector innovation, yet as Stiglitz (1999) agues patents and commercial knowledge may be more effective as public goods, because the market is not the most effective allocator of information (Sy, 1999).
Doctoral Students at UT	"…that shall provide students an opportunity to undertake transformative research activities."	(9.6) TC: 1	Doctoral students at UT are given the opportunity to perform transformative research in the fields of energy research and engineering. But this only affects doctoral students in energy and engineering fields and neglects doctoral students a variety of other disciplines. So only a

			small portion of students; STEM doctoral students, are empowered by the policy. This neglect of other disciplines, such as the humanities and social sciences is characteristic of many PBF policies (Zumeta, 2011). This neglect also limits the actors which can participate in the ongoing creation and sustainment of the public good (Calhoun, 1998). There is also an artificial divide between STEM and the humanities, whereas STEM can be humanized and made just (Hall, 2008; Suronta & Vaden, 2007).
University of Memphis/University of Tennessee Center for the Health Sciences/St. Jude Children's Research Hospital	"…it is hereby declared that the University of orators in the Memphis, the University of Tennessee Center for Health Sciences and St. Jude Children's Research Hospital are lead collaborators in the Memphis Research Consortium." "…the promotion of public health, medical devices, medical and healthcare, bio-based products and chemical	(11.a-b) TC: 1	The Memphis Research Consortium (MRC) is empowered by the Tennessee policymakers in a variety of ways. The MRC is encouraged by Tennessee policymakers to develop strategies and plans for establishing and enhancing opportunities for research and development in private industries as well as public health services. While there is a public component, the MRC is largely encouraged to engage in industrial and commercial ventures. Partnering with the private sphere can blur

	manufacturing, logistics and supply chain, computational and computer sciences, learning technologies, bioscience, and bioengineering and related business and research, as well as industrial and commercial enterprises engaged in business activities related to these areas."		the public mission of the public university (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Washburn, 2005). While there is a public health component, the MRC is a largely encouraged to undertake private sector initiatives, which could lead to the blurring of the public and private spheres, and the privileging of the private sector over the public good.

Appendix C

Louisiana

Table 1C. Inputs-Processes-Outputs-Outcomes.

Number in parentheses refers to the location in policy.

Inputs	**Processes**	**Outputs**	**Outcomes**
"Upon entering the initial performance agreement, adhere to a schedule established by the institution's management board to increase nonresident tuition amounts that are not less than the average tuition amount charged to Louisiana residents attending peer institutions…" (3.20-23)	"…in order to be granted limited operational autonomy [for higher education institutions].." (2.7)	"…improving college completion…" (1.22)	"…meeting the state's current and future workforce and economic development needs…" (2.1-2)
"Autonomies granted. …For the 2010-2011, 2011-2012, 2012-2013 (if the BOR has determined the institution has met the short term targets established in the performance agreement) authority to increase tuition and mandatory fee amounts by up to five percent annually." (6.1-15)	"Develop partnerships with high schools to prepare students for postsecondary education." (2.17-18)	"…cohort graduation rates…" (2.12)	"…graduation productivity goals that are consistent with institutional peers…" (2.12-13)
"Autonomies granted. Increase tuition and fee amounts by up to ten percent annually, without legislative	"Phase in increased admission standards and other necessary policies…" (2.21)	"Increase the percentage of program completers at all levels each year." (2.16)	"In crease passage rates on licensure and certification exams and

approval, until the institution reaches the average tuition and fee amounts of its peer institutions…" (6.16-18)			workforce foundational skills." (2.19-20)
"Autonomies granted. Carrying forward unexpected and unobligated funds form one fiscal year to the next." (6.29-30)	"Provide feedback to community colleges and technical college campuses on the performance of associate degree recipients enrolled at the institution." (2.25-26)	"Increase the use of technology for distance learning to expand educational offerings." (3.5-6)	"Increase research productivity especially in key economic development industries and technology transfer at institutions to levels consistent with the institution's peers." (3.7-9)
"Surplus funds; retention; use; exceptions A. Except as otherwise provided by this section, any public college or university or any consortium of colleges and universities which adopts a building and facility preventative maintenance program approved by the Board of Regents may retain any funds appropriated…to such college, university, or consortium thereof from the state general fund which remain unexpended and unobligated at the end of the fiscal year…" (9.11-18).	"Develop referral agreements with community colleges and technical college campuses to redirect students who fail to qualify for admission into the institution." (2.26-28)	"…and in increasing the performance of associate degree recipients who transfer to institutions that offer academic undergraduate degrees at the baccalaureate level or higher." (3.11-13)	"To the extent that information can be obtained, demonstrate progress in increasing the number of students placed in jobs…" (3.10-12)
"Monies from such reserve fund shall be used solely for preventative	"Demonstrate collaboration in implementing the articulation and transfer	"Having a high percentage of graduates or completers each year as compared to the	"Offering a specialized program that involves partnerships between the institution and

maintenance purposes in accordance with the approved plan." (9.18-20)	requirements…" (2.29-30)	state average percentage of graduates and that of the institution's peers." (4.10-12)	business and industry, national laboratories, research centers and other institutions." (4.4-6)
"Retained funds shall be spent only on nonrecurring projects and such expenditures are subject to approval by the appropriate post secondary education management board, the Board of Regents and the Joint Legislative Committee on the Budget." (9.20-23)	"Institutional efficiency and accountability. Eliminate remedial education course offerings and developmental study programs unless such courses or programs cannot be offered at a community college in the same geographic area." (3.14-16)	"If an institution's initial performance agreement is renewed for a second six-year period, the institution in exchange shall: further increase cohort graduation rate goals as specified in Subparagraph (C(1)(a) of this Section including the following, as applicable: graduation rate of a at least seventy-five percent for any institution classified as a "Four-Year1" institution by the SREB (8.13-14)	Aligning with current and strategic statewide and regional workforce needs as identified by the Louisiana Workforce Commission and Louisiana Economic Development." (4.7-9)
"Except as otherwise provided by this Section, no public postsecondary education institution as provided in Subsection A…may carry forward more than two percent of its prior fiscal year's state general fund appropriation…" (9.27-29)	"Eliminate associate degree program offering unless such programs cannot be offered at a community college in the same geographic area or when the Board of Regents has certified educational or workforce needs." (3.17-19)	"…a graduation rate of at least sixty-percent for any institution classified as a "Four-Year 2" institution by the SREB." (8.15-16)	"Having a high number of graduates or completers who enter productive careers or continue their education in advanced degree programs, whether all at the same or another institution." (4.13-15)
"The provisions of this Section requiring at	…remaining competitive, increasing	"…a graduation rate of at least fifty percent for	"Having a high level of research productivity

least fifty percent of retained funds to be maintained in a reserve fund and used only for preventative maintenance purposes and prohibiting more than two percent of certain state general fund appropriations or allocations from being carried forward shall not apply to any public postsecondary education institution entering into a performance agreement…" (10.3-8)	their [HEI] effectiveness and efficiency …" (1.20-21)	any institution classified as a 'Four-Year 3', 'Four-Year 4', or 'Four-Year 5', institution by the SREB." (8.17-19)	and technology transfer." (4.16)
"Autonomies granted. Procuring information technology products and services." (7.1)	"The Board of Regents may grant such autonomies to an institution during the initial agreement period if all of the following are met.	"For any community college and technical college campus, a graduation rate that is at least equal to the SREB average for peer institutions." (8.20-22)	x
x	"Workforce and economic development. (a) Eliminate academic program offerings that have low student completion rates as identified by the Board of Regents or are not aligned with current or strategic workforce needs of the state, region, or both as identified by the Louisiana Workforce Commission." (3.1-4)	x	x

Table 2C. Visual Representation of Louisiana Input-Process-Output-Outcome Counts.



Table 3C.

Hegemony/Discourse chart

Number in parentheses refers to location in policy, the following number is the frequency, and TC is total count.

Hegemonic/Neoliberal Term/Notion	**Location/Frequency**	**How the term shapes the public good**
References to the market/economic growth/ revenue and profit generation investment/ commercialization	(2.1), (3.1), (3.7)2, (4.4), (4.9), (4.13), (4.16)2, (5.28), (8.6) TC: 11	Louisiana policymakers desire to make research coming from higher education institutions more profitable. This aligns with neoliberal purposes and desires for public education (Rhoads & Torres, 2006; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Washburn, 2005). However, the

		promotion of only market based knowledge will limit what can be produced for the public good.
References to efficiency, optimal use of resources	(1.6), (1.21)2, (3.14), (4.20), (4.21), (4.22), (4.23), (4.24), (4.26), (4.27), (5.1), (5.26) TC: 13	One specific section is telling (4.20-29). There is a list of specific data that higher education institutions are required to give the legislator auditor, legislature and Board of Regents. The data are efficiency driven. Louisiana higher education institutions must demonstrate that they are acting efficiently. This aligns with the efficiency push, which has driven higher education policy for almost 40 years (Prokou, 2013).
References to vocational/workforce training and human capital/ job creation	(2.1), (2.20), (3.1), (3.3), (3.4). (3.11), (4.7), (4.9) TC: 8	There are six references to vocationalism. Workforce development and vocational training are an integral platform of neoliberalism, more specifically to the notion of the human capital. The Louisiana policymakers do not promote the expanded vision of human capital suggested by McMahon (2009). Rather, there is no mention of social benefits of human capital, which is typical of all the policies examined in the this study. The main intent of the policymakers is to encourage higher education institutions to help meet state and regional workforce needs by training a workforce and by placement of graduates in specific fields. The policymakers have also sought the information of the Louisiana Workforce Commission. With

		only one conception of human capital, the public good may be unnecessarily restricted.
References to accountability and performance	(1.4), (1.6), (1.7), (1.8)2,(1.22)2, (2.3), (2.4), (2.6), (2.8), (2.9), (2.11), (2.12)2, (2.16), (2.19), (2.23)2, (3.2), (3.11), (3.14), (3.20), (4.3), (4.10), (4.13), (5.5), (5.7), (5.9), (5.10), (5.15), (5.21), (5.23), (5.25), (5.28), (6.2), (6.8), (6.14), (6.15), (7.13), (7.27), (7.30), (8.4), (8.9), (8.11), (8.13), (8.15), (8.17), (8.21), (8.23), (8.25), (8.27), (8.29), (9.1), (9.3), (10.7) TC: 56	The 56 references to performance are by far the most in any policy examined. The Louisiana policymakers have created a series of performance markers for Louisiana higher education institutions to reach. The performance markers mainly center on graduation and completion rates. The acronym GRAD act stands for Granting Resources and Autonomy for Diplomas Act. The entire act is predicated on granting diplomas. This directly aligns with the larger criticisms of neoliberals directed at higher education. For instance, Fried and Salam (2012) and Vedder (2004) both argue that higher education is unproductive because higher education institutions have lagged in graduation rates. Higher education is chastised for being unproductive and not doing enough to graduate students. This sentiment has been one of the driving factors in the switch from input (enrollment) based funding to outcome funding (Zumeta, 2011). The Louisiana policy is indicative of this neoliberal criticism.
References to public-private partnerships and collaboration	(4.4-6), (8.6) TC: 2	The first reference calls for partnerships between higher education institutions and businesses, national laboratories and research centers which is typical of neoliberalism in general (Slaughter & Rhoades,

		2004), and this study in particular. The second reference however stipulates that two members of the business community must sit on a review panel which is to monitor the progress of each Louisiana higher education institutions institution toward meeting the performance goals. Thus, there is an institutionalized mechanism of annual evaluation of the PBF policy, yet this evaluation is conducted and driven by the legislature and members of the business community. If the public good is a fluid notion, this mechanism of evaluation helps contribute to its fluidity, but since it is only under the direction of business members, this vision will most likely be skewed toward business interests and blurs the boundary between public and private spheres. Again, this aligns with the practice of academic capitalism over the last four decades (Rhoads & Torres, 3006; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Washburn, 2005).
References to tuition un-affordability	(3.26), (7.20) TC: 2	The references to tuition are mostly to raising it which will be discussed later. There are two specific references to tuition unaffordability however. Again, like the other policies, there is no mention of the causes behind tuition hikes. The tuition hike is assumed to be a neutral occurrence and the higher education institutions is supposed to mitigate it.

References to competition	(1.20) TC: 1	One of the purposes (Outcomes) of the policy is to ensure that Louisiana higher education institutions remain competitive. While competition can be integral to the public good, cooperation among institutions and social actors is more valued (Calhoun, 1998). Competition is a market mechanism and if competition is the only mechanism for creating dialogue between entities and actors, this will severely limit what can be said and done in regards to creating the public good and new knowledge in general (Marginson, et al., 2010).
References to knowledge based economy	N/A	N/A
References to Science Technology Engineering and Mathematics (STEM)	N/A	N/A
References to online instruction	(3.5) TC:1	There is one reference to using technology to expand educational offerings. While it does not mention profit or the private sector directly, it is in the workforce development section.
Elevation of status/prestige	N/A	N/A

References to Government Oversight	(1.9), (1.16), (4.17)2, (4.18), (5.3), (5.5), (5.10), (5.13), (5.15), (5.20), (6.7), (6.12), (7.25), (7.30), (9.5), (9.13), (9.27), (10.3) TC: 19	The references DO NOT count mandated performance goals. Rather, only references to direct oversight, such as the mandating of reports and monitoring were counted. Louisiana higher education institutions must submit reports for a variety of things. For one, Louisiana higher education institutions must submit three separate reports, one to the Board of Regents, one to the legislative auditor of the state and one to the legislature. This report must contain a number of specified data, such as number of students by classification, number of instructional staff members, class ratios, staff in administrative areas, and other points. The legislature and Board of Regents can request any additional information when they see fit. There is also an annual review of each plan by the Board of Regents. The legislator auditor must also perform a performance analysis six months after the agreement. The policy also dictates how HEI use their surplus funds. This aligns with the notion of decentralization with direction (Burke, 2005). Also refer to autonomy. Higher education institutions are given mandated goals, but leeway in how to achieve them. Burke (2005) defines this as a partial mandate. Yet, decentralization with direction is not true autonomy, it does not give Higher education institutions the ability to create new

		knowledge and solutions to problems, rather it prescribes a goal, a market based goal, to be reached. The assumption is that higher education institutions can and should only produce knowledge that drives the market.

Table 4C. Visual Representation of Hegemony Counts in Louisiana Policy.



Table 5C. Non-hegemonic Chart.

Number in parentheses refers to location in policy, the following number is the frequency, and TC is total count.

Private Non-market benefits and externalities	**Frequency Count/Location**	**How the public good is shaped by the term(s)**
References to health/life expectancy	N/A	N/A
References to poverty reduction/ assistance/financial stability	(7.18-24) TC: 1	See autonomy.
References to general happiness	N/A	N/A
References to non-market knowledge and research	N/A	N/A
References to art, literature, theater	N/A	N/A
References to cultural diversity	(3.24-28) TC: 1	There is one reference to historically black colleges. The reference deals with keeping tuition at a certain level for HBCU's and that is it.

References to pedagogy	N/A	N/A
References to college mission	N/A	N/A
References to enhancing citizenship/public service/	N/A	N/A
References to liberal arts	N/A	N/A
References to externalities/social benefits	N/A	N/A
References to social transformation/social criticism	N/A	N/A
References to reduced Crime Rate	N/A	N/A
References to glo-nc-cal/horizontal linkages	(2.17), (2.29), (4.4-6) TC: 3	The first reference is to establishing partnerships with high schools to prepare students for postsecondary education. This is an excellent recommendation and one that has the potential to help forge links in a glo-na-cal network, with emphasis on the local (Marginson & Rhoades, 2002). Further, higher education institutions can act as knowledge brokers and transmit information to local high schools (Cooper, 2013). In the information age, RBO's and information producers, as well as users must understand and facilitate connections in order to properly utilize and digest the massive amounts of information which is created and disseminated continually (Bell, 1999; Cooper, 2013). This provision helps higher education institutions to achieve this. Also called for partnerships with research centers and other institutions, so this could be interpreted broadly for KM.

References to social contract/state support/resident enrollment	N/A	N/A
References to institutional autonomy	(2.2), (2.7), (6.1), (6.26), (7.4), (7.16) TC: 6	The main autonomy granted to Louisiana higher education institutions is the ability to raise tuition in exchange for meeting performance objectives. Raising tuition will severely limit the ability of middle and low income students to afford college. However, there is one reference to students with financial hardship, yet this only covers students in dire circumstances. The middle class will be adversely affected by a raise in tuition (Lambert, 2014). Of course, this aligns directly with the wider aims of neoliberalism and human capital, which is to make a higher education a market good like any other commodity for those who can afford it (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). Friedman and Friedman (1981) stated as much verbatim in their classic *Free to Choose* in 1981. A public higher education, subsidized by taxpayers, empowers the middle and even lower classes by giving them access to a cheap but quality education. This was evidenced by the 1960s and 1970s, just prior to the rise of neoliberalism (Newfield, 2008). Yet, the actions of the protestors during the 1960s, and the threat to the social order they raised, frightened the ruling and business classes. So, while not every lawmaking is conspiring to keep middle class students from obtaining a higher education, the autonomy to raise tuition to deal with declining revenues, which is a favored weapon of neoliberal

		advocates, does bar many middle and lower class students from obtaining an affordable and quality higher education. Proponents of this method argue that higher tuition-high aid model works, but it hurts the middle classes (Lambert, 2014). In a wider sense, it deprives these classes from knowledge from which they can contribute to the public good. Other autonomies have to deal with the ability to spend surplus funds and enter into contracts and consortiums. While these are necessary, the autonomy granted to Louisiana higher education institutions is of a business nature.
References to pollution reduction/clean air	N/A	N/A
References to global citizenship, global public goods/national/regional local goods or publics	N/A	N/A
References to deliberate inter-generational concerns	N/A	N/A
References to just use of STEM	N/A	N/A

Table 6C. Visual Representation of Non-hegemonic Counts in Louisiana Policy.



Table 7C. Presupposition Table.

Number in parentheses refers to location in policy, the following number is the frequency, and TC is total count.

Presupposition Type	**Location**	**How presupposition shapes the public good**
"B. Purpose. The purpose of this Section is to support the state's public postsecondary education institutions in remaining competitive and increasing their overall effectiveness and efficiency by providing that the institutions achieve specific, measureable performance objectives aimed at improving college completion and at meeting the state's current and future workforce economic development needs and by granting the institutions limited operational autonomy and flexibility	(1.19-22) page break (2.1-3).	The purpose of higher education institutions is to drive the state economy and train a workforce. Partnerships with the private sector are also seen as desirable and unproblematic. If higher education institutions meet performance objectives, they will be granted limited autonomy to raise tuition and enter in contracts and use surplus funds. The issues of tuition increases/high tuition, high tuition model were discussed earlier. Yet, there is no mention of any of this in the policy language, or of the problematic issues regarding public-private sector partnerships which place

in exchange for achieving such objectives." (existential) "Aligning with current and strategic statewide and regional workforce needs as identified by the Louisiana Workforce Commission and Louisiana Economic Development." (existential) "Offering a specialized program that involves partnerships the institution and business and industry, national laboratories, research centers, and other institutions." (existential)	(4.7-9) (4.4-6)	profits over people and the public mission of higher education institutions (Washburn, 2005). Instead, the policymaker's unproblematic-ally assume the purpose of higher education is market based. The use of the article "the" positions this as an existential presupposition. Habermas (1973) argues that in an advanced capitalist economy, all organizations must play the game of capitalism. Even unions and welfare organizations must adapt to the capitalist economy. Public higher education institutions must also adapt to capitalism, and the phenomenon of academic capitalism and higher education institutions transforming into market entities is an example of this (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). Higher education institutions many times are forced to act as market like entities in order to survive in a climate with decreased funding.
"…Any public postsecondary education institution, including professional schools, may enter into an initial performance agreement with the Board of Regents in order to be granted limited operational autonomy…"	(2.6-7)	See above.
"Increase the percentages of program completers at all levels each year."	(2.16)	There is a simplistic assumption that performance based funding and higher education institutions can increase degree and certificate completion when in reality, the reasons for completion,

"Increase passage rates on licensure and certification exams and workforce foundational skills." (existential) "A graduation rate of at least seventy-five percent…"	(2.19-20) (8.13-19)	and non-completion are much more complex (Bohman & Deal, 2008; Dee, 2006; Wellman, 2006). The public good, as in many other PBF policies is cast as composed of simplistic processes, which gives the illusion of simplicity. The illusion of simplicity may impede the discussion of complex solutions.
"Workforce and economic development, (a) Eliminate academic program offerings that have low student completion rates as identified by the Board of Regents or are not aligned with current strategic workforce needs of the state, region, or both as identified by the Louisiana Workforce Commission." (existential)	(3.1-4)	The liberal arts and many social sciences can pose a threat to the market (Giroux, 2011; Hayek, 2008; Newfield, 2008; Mallot, et al., 2013; Stanley, 2007). The liberal arts, social sciences and other disciplines do not have market potential, and thus could fall under this clause. Should the classics not be studied? Quantum physics? The policymakers pose this clause as if there should be question that non-market programs and programs with low enrollment should be cut if they do not align with market needs. Further, the market is held as the ultimate source of order. If this order has the potential to be disrupted, then the disruption can be ended in the name of market efficiency (Hayek, 2008). Government intervention in social matters can be tolerated when those matters impede the market. Here, neoliberalism and neoconservatism make common cause (Harvey, 2005; Hayek, 2008. Under neoliberalism and neoonservatism, the public good is composed of order, efficiency and the market.
"Increase research productivity, especially in key economic development industries and technology transfer at institutions to levels consistent with the institution's peers."	(3.7-8)	Research is equated with market productivity. There is no mention of the power of research to be used for purposes such as social justice. Further, research for the market is generally not

(existential and change)		research which has the potential for social criticism. Of course research does have market potential, but the potential for research in all fields is limitless in the information age. Yet, there is an assumption by Louisiana policymakers that Louisiana higher education institutions, with the term increase, are not achieving what they should be in regards to their research. This is why it is change and existential. The belief is that GRAD act and master plan will aid Louisiana higher education institutions in creating more profitable research.
"Eliminate remedial education course offerings and developmental study programs unless such courses or programs cannot be offered at a community college in the same geographic area." (existential)	(3.14-16)	The wording of the policy makes it clear that that 4 year higher education institutions are to be places of higher learning and that community colleges are to be remedial institutions. This clause affects many students who attended lower quality K-12 institutions and are in need of remedial education. Now, the four year higher education institutions will not offer this.
"Submit a report to the Board of Regents, the legislative auditor, and the legislature containing certain organizational data, including…" (existential) "The Board of Regents may revoke an agreement at any time if it determines that an institution has failed to abide by the terms of the agreement."	(4.17-29) page break (5.1-4) (5.12-14)	The wording implies that higher education institutions are too important to be left to their own devices (Alexander, 2000). This is taken for granted by policymakers, thus the reason for this being labeled existential. Since higher education institutions are so vital to a state's economy, many policymakers and businessmen are loathe to leave higher education in the hands of liberals and educationalists (Alexander, 2000). Policymakers simply do not trust institutions to drive the economy (Burke, 2005). Thus, strict

(existential)		oversight systems have been developed over the last few decades to ensure higher education institutions are producing for the economy and not wasting time on frivolous research. Higher education institutions have a special relationship to the public good because they are knowledge producers (Dee, 2006). The special relationship is hampered and driven toward strictly economic goals with the vast oversight mechanisms of this policy. It is evident in this policy that there is no real debate as to who has power over who. Of course, state legislators have control over public HEI because public higher education institutions take public tax dollars, Yet, public higher education institutions need to be given a special freedom and as Zumeta (2011) argues, sometimes HEI need to instruct the legislators and the general public as to what the legislators and public *should* deem as accountability, i.e social justice and equity concerns. The potential for higher education institutions to do this and contribute to the public good and instruct policymakers is blatantly overridden here. It becomes obvious here that the public good is shaped by policymakers and their lobbyists, not higher education institutions.
"…the authority to increase tuition and mandatory fee amounts by up to five percent." "Increase tuition and fee amounts by up to ten percent annually, without legislative approval, until the institution reaches the average tuition	(6.6-7) (6.16-18)	Tuition increases are seem as unproblematic and actually desirable in dire economic circumstances because tuition increases give the higher education institutions another revenue source. Tuition increases ca be likened to a type of tax on users (Zemsky, 2005). While the tuition increases will help higher education institutions make up their revenue shortfall, there is no consideration of the potential social actors that tuition increases negatively

and fee amounts of its peer institutions." (existential)		impact, namely middle and low income students. If these students are barred, higher education institutions becomes more stratified., There is an implicit assumption in the policy that higher education should function as a market good and be available only to those who can afford it, save for the most neediest. This is a page from Friedman and Friedman's (1980) playbook, and it is written into the actual discourse of the GRAD act. The idea that the market distributes goods to only those who deserve them is also in play here as well.

Table 8C. Social Actors Chart.

Number in parentheses refers to the location in policy and TC is total count.

Social Actor(s)	**Positioning**	**Location**	**How actor(s) frames public good**
Board of Regents Review Panel	"to provide for performance agreements between the Board of Regents and public postsecondary education institutions…" "Such determination shall be based on the recommendations of a review panel established by the Board of Regents to conduct a comprehensive review of HEI's progress in meeting the performance objectives…"	(1.5) first mention TC: 31 (8.2-8)	For over ten years Louisiana policymakers have been exploring PBF. There were some preliminary policies, but he GRAD act of 2010 (and 2011) is the first comprehensive PBF 2.0. The Board of Regents created a six year master plan for each institution. Each plan is the initial performance agreements of the GRAD act, to which higher education institutions may agree to. There is little to no input from higher education institutions .The Board of Regents is furthered empowered to create a review panel which meets annually and whose task is to review the progress of higher education institutions in meeting their performance goals. The Board of

		TC: 1	Regents has the authority to revoke an agreement if it is determined that the higher education institutions has not met its obligations. Thus, the Board of Regents is greatly empowered by the Louisiana legislature. The GRAD act and Louisiana PBF in general are responses to the low educational attainment rate and the supposed economic crisis which has resulted in Louisiana The blame is implicitly placed on higher education institutions for not doing enough to graduate students, when in reality there is a whole host of factors which are superficially recognized in surrounding documents, but not the policy itself.
public postsecondary education institutions community colleges/technical colleges Institution's management board	See above "Implement policies established by the institutions management board…"	See above TC: 5 (2.12) first mention TC: 7	Since Louisiana is the only state where a 2/3 majority of the legislature is needed to raise tuition at public institutions, virtually all higher education institutions volunteered to participate. Thus, there is a small measure of empowerment for Louisiana higher education institutions. However, not participating would mean increased limitations of higher education institutions resources and funds, it is no surprise that every higher education institutions entered into the agreement. In many ways the voluntary GRAD act could be seen as a way to force cash strapped higher education institutions into an accountability agreement. Nonetheless, many representatives from management boards of the individual

			institutions and other high ranking officials in institutions were on record giving strong praise to the governor and the GRAD in general. The management boards have been mostly staffed with corporate allies and other business advocates and thus many are amenable to performance funding and the focus on driving the state's workforce (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Zumeta, 2001). There is a focus on transfer agreements, as well as coordination agreements with community colleges which is necessary. Community college-Four year institutions pipeline many times is not well articulated, and transfer agreements can help remedy this, as well as strengthen the position of community colleges if they offer students the prospect of definite transfer. Louisiana higher education institutions I stand to gain a limited measure of power under the GRAD act (similar to Virginia restructuring act of 2005) where they exchange performance for the ability to raise tuition and handle business dealings. This freedom however is only in a business and market sense and not the freedom needed to pursue the public good in all its richness and complexity (Dee, 2006). The social aspects of the public good are neglected in favor of the market.

Faculty	*	* TC: 0	The faculty are neglected by the policymakers. There interests and research is subordinated to the market and must conform to quantifiable outcomes. Humanities and social science faculty are the most dis-empowered, because at least according to the policy, if courses have low enrollment or do not align with state workforce needs, they can be terminated. Again, as Marginson (2008), Newfield (2008) and Stanley (2007) notes, this dis-empowerment of humanities faculty aligns with neoliberalism and the idea that nothing can disrupt the market.
Institutional peers	"…goals consistent with institutional peers"	(2.13) first mention TC: 3	Institutional peers are obviously not empowered by the Louisiana policymakers, but they are held up as a benchmark for Louisiana higher education institutions to reach and gauge their progress and tuition rates by. Thus, the peer institutions do become influential in the operations of Louisiana higher education institutions.
Southern Regional Educational Board	"The incremental tuition and fee amount increase shall be weighed in such a manner that the median household income in Southern Regional Education Board states…"	(6.19-20) TC: 7	The SREB's main role in the policy is to help set appropriate rates for tuition raises, by using the other states in the association for averages and benchmarks.
Louisiana Workforce Commission	"Eliminate academic program offerings…not aligned with current strategic workforce needs of the state, or region, or both as identified by the	(3.4) first mention TC: 3	The Louisiana Workforce Commission (LWC) is a workforce agency whose mission it is to get people a job and to make Louisiana a great place to grow a business. While these are important and laudable goals,

	Louisiana Workforce Commission."		they can be pursued at the expense of more social goals (McMahon, 2009). The workforce commission has the same goals and vision as many tenets of neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005). Since the LWC has helped to shape the policy, the ideas of workforce training and driving the state's economy are one of the main focuses of the policy and how the public good is conceived by Louisiana policymakers.
Business and industry National laboratories Research Centers Two representatives of the business community	"Offering a specialized program that involves partnerships between the institution and business and industry, national laboratories, research centers, and other institutions "The composition of the review panel [created by BOR to assess whether HEI's are meeting performance goals] shall be the same as is provided in R.S. 17:3138 (C) with the addition of two representatives from the business community…"	(4.4-6) TC: 1 (8.6) TC: 1	The public good is continually shaped by a variety of social actors (Calhoun, 1998). Since market actors are given duties and responsibilities in the Louisiana policy, the Louisiana policy is predominantly shaped by market actors. The market focus is thus predominant in this policy. More than just influence however, two representatives of the business community are even given a place on the review panel. So market actors actually have some power to regulate higher education institutions and ensure that Louisiana higher education institutions are conforming to business needs, which was the purpose for placing them on the review panel in the first place. Business representatives on the committee is the conjunction of neoliberalism and neoconservatism in practice. In addition to powers of regulation, Louisiana higher education institutions are encouraged to partner with the private sector.

			These partnerships would privilege business actors as well.
Students (in-state and out of state residents and financially needy students)	"…adhere to a schedule established by the institutions management board to increase nonresident tuition…"	(3.21 nonresident) TC: 6	Students are primarily seen in one of two ways. First, students are seen as sources of revenue. A major focus of the policy is the ability for Louisiana higher education institutions to raise tuition in return for meeting certain targets. The second view of students is a performance outcome. Institutions must reach certain performance targets in order to be fully funded. While obtaining a degree will undoubtedly be a boon for any individual, individuals are primarily seen looked at by policymakers as outcomes and revenue sources and thus, their power to contribute to the public good is severely hampered.
Legislature Joint Legislative Committee on the Budget Legislative auditor	"The Board of Regents shall determine whether to recommend renewal of an institution's performance agreement subject to the approval of the Joint Legislative Committee on the Budget …" "Submit a report to the Board of Regents, the legislative auditor, and the legislature containing certain organizational data"	TC: 5 (8.1) First mention TC: 3 (4.16-18) first mention TC: 5	Higher education institutions are subordinate to the legislature and legislative auditor, as well as the Board of Regents. While the Board of Regents determines if higher education institutions are meeting their objectives, it is the Joint Legislative Committee on the budget that actually makes the decision. Higher education institutions are also required to submit data on a variety of efficiency points, such as teacher student ratio. Again, like the other five policies, a vertical hierarchy is created which has the ability to stifle the various potential contributions of higher education

			institutions and structures higher education as a subordinate entity which is charged with driving the state economy only.
The Governor	"This Act shall become effective upon signature by the governor…"	(10.9) TC: 5	Governor Bobby Jindal has been a big advocate of performance based funding and helped to spearhead the effort in his home state. He signed the bill into law in June of 2010. The law is in part the result of executive power, and the visions of Jindal and business community of what higher education should be. Thus, the governor is a major actor in this process, and has helped to create a policy which lays a foundation for the ever evolving vision of the public good. This vision draws from neoliberalism, as well as neoconservatism, and only allows for certain actors to contribute to the public good of Louisiana.

Appendix D

Mississippi

Table 1D. Input-Process-Output-Outcome

The number(s) next to the item is the numbered line in the policy.

Inputs	**Processes**	**Outputs**	**Outcomes**
The legislature may appropriate funds to the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning for the administrative,	…direct MS Education Achievement Council to research and develop a new funding mechanism for [HEI's]based on	Establish education achievement goals for the state (47-50)	…increasing the educational attainment and skill levels of the state's working-age population benchmark

contractual costs, travel and other expenses (99-102)	upon productivity…(1-6)		to the national average by 2025 (11-13)
x	There is created an Education Achievement Council (EAC) whose purpose is to sustain attention to the states goal…(10-12)	Establish benchmarks to measure progress, including degrees awarded per 100 FTE students calculated by using credit hours…(57-60)	x
x	The Education Achievement Council (EAC) shall consist of twenty-three members…(15-16)	[creation of] annual state report card…which will be made available on the education achievement council website (72-76)	x
x	…develop appropriate planning processes…(55-56)	x	x
x	Contract for any professional services that it deems necessary to complete its work (68-69)	x	x
x	The EAC shall monitor and report on the state's progress (70-72)	x	x
x	The commissioner of Higher Education…shall serve as the principal staff to support the Education Achievement Council…The Commissioner of higher education and the executive director of the state board for community and colleges shall provide appropriate staff to support the work of the	x	x

	education achievement council…(115-120)		
x	Annual reports submitted by each state institution (73-74 and 79-82)	x	x

Table 2D. Visual Representation of Mississippi Input-Process-Output-Outcome Counts..



Table 3D.

Hegemony/Discourse chart

Number in parentheses refers to the line in the policy and TC is total count.

Hegemonic/Neoliberal Term/Notion	**Location/Frequency**	**How the term shapes the public good**
References to the market/economic growth/ revenue and profit generation investment/ commercialization	(44) TC: 1	There is only one direct reference to economic growth; the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Mississippi Economic Council (MEC) is appointed to the EAC. This is significant because the EAC is given tremendous power

		over Mississippi higher education institutions. The CEO of the MEC can help drive Mississippi higher education institutions in more business directions. As Klein (2007) notes, the US government over the last 15 or so years has become a "hollow state" which is used by policymakers to further the interests of industry. The lack of any civic/community representation on the EAC could be indicative of this trend of government becoming a hollow state serving the needs of industry. The hollow state however may not be promote a vibrant public good or a variety of public goods accessible to all (Wolfe, 1998). The market also has difficulty in producing public goods which are non-rivalrous and non-excludable, and these goods are necessary for sustaining a vibrant vision of the public good. Further, If the public good is seen only as an aggregate of individuals, it will be harder to build social capital that transcend the market (Putnam, 2000). Social capital is integral to creating a vibrant public good.
References to efficiency, optimal use of resources	N/A	N/A
References to vocational/workforce training and human capital/ job creation	(12, 13) TC: 2	See accountability/performance.
References to accountability and performance	(2, 5, 10, 11, 12, 50, 53, 57, 58, 59, 60, 63)	The mentions of accountability and performance were related to the references for vocational

	TC: 12	training. The major outcome of the Mississippi policy is increasing the educational attainment and skill levels of the state's working-age population benchmark to the national average by 2025. In order to achieve this, the state requires the creation of performance metrics. This use of performance metrics for the promotion of vocational skills is one of the bedrocks of PBF and the accountability movement more generally (Burke, 2005; Zumeta, 2011). As McMahon (2009) notes however, a narrow focus on performance metrics can blind policymakers to the wider social benefits of higher education. Further PBF measures do not measure all the contributions that higher education contributes to the polity (Kallison & Cohen, 2011). Accountability, framed in terms of efficiency has driven neoliberal policy for the last three or four decades, and this trend is evident in MS policy as well (Prokou, 2013).
References to public-private partnerships and collaboration	(44, 68, 104) TC: 3	There is some opportunity for public private collaboration. As stressed throughout this study, this collaboration can lead to a blurring of public interests (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Washburn, 2005). There is also a simple assumption of causality here, notably that the public and private partnerships can and will be beneficial (Tierney, 2006).
References to tuition un-affordability	N/A	N/A

References to competition	N/A	N/A
References to knowledge based economy	N/A	N/A
References to Science Technology Engineering and Mathematics	N/A	N/A
References to online instruction	N/A	N/A
Elevation of status/prestige	N/A	N/A
References to Government Oversight	(2, 5, 15-46, 47-49, 52, 64, 70, 80, 83, 86, 91, 96(2), 103, 115, 118) TC: 48	As state governments increasingly cut funding, they increase oversight and regulation. One of the criticisms of higher education is that higher education is inefficient and unable to meet the needs of the knowledge economy (Burke, 2005; Newfield, 2008; Pusser, 2006; Zumeta, 2011). The irony of this situation is that as oversight increases, more levels of governance and bureaucracy will most certainly make higher education institutions less efficient and more cumbersome as they try to respond to the increased demands and regulations. In a wider sense, the added layers of bureaucracy will most certainly make the task of serving the diverse needs of the public good and the production of public goods more difficult if Mississippi higher education institutions are beholden to the growing demands of state policymakers and their lobbyists which are increasingly aimed at promoting the market (Zumeta, 2001). A major portion of the policy is dedicated to enacting the EAC and describing its creation and

		functioning. Mississippi higher education institutions have the awesome potential to promote the public good through their missions, research and teaching (Pusser, 2006; Wellmen, 2006). However, the preoccupation with oversight can blind policymakers to this awesome potential.

Table 4D. Visual Representation of Hegemony Counts in Mississippi Policy.



Table 5D. Non-hegemonic chart.

Number in parentheses refers to location in policy and TC is total count.

Private Non-market benefits and externalities	**Frequency Count/Location**	**How the public good is shaped by the term(s)**
References to health/life expectancy	N/A	N/A
References to poverty reduction/assistance/financial stability	N/A	N/A
References to general happiness	(42) TC: 1	The Executive Director of the Mississippi Department of Mental Health is one of the members appointed to the EAC. Mental Health has a direct impact on general happiness and thus the Executive Director on the EAC can help to push Mississippi higher education institutions in directions which can promote positive mental health, which is obviously a key component of the public good (McMahon, 2009).

References to non-market knowledge and research	N/A	N/A
References to art, literature, theater	N/A	N/A
References to cultural diversity	(38) TC: 1	Three college presidents are appointed to the EAC, one of which has to be from a HBCU. This appointment can help the EAC as it considers cultural diversity and tolerance issues, which are integral to any vision of the public good (Calhoun, 1998; Mansbridge, 1998).
References to pedagogy	N/A	N/A
References to college mission	N/A	N/A
References to enhancing citizenship/public service/	N/A	N/A
References to liberal arts	N/A	N/A
References to externalities/social benefits	N/A	N/A
References to social transformation/social criticism	N/A	N/A
References to reduced Crime Rate	N/A	N/A
References to glo-na-cal/horizontal linkages	N/A	N/A
References to social contract/state support/resident enrollment	N/A	N/A
References to institutional autonomy	N/A	N/A
References to pollution reduction/clean air	N/A	N/A
References to global citizenship, global public goods/national/regional local goods or publics	N/A	N/A
References to deliberate inter-generational concerns	N/A	N/A

References to just use of STEM	N/A	N/A

Table 6D. Visual Representation of Non-hegemonic Counts in Mississippi Policy.



Table 7D. Presupposition Table.

Presupposition Type	**Location**	**How presupposition shapes the public good**
"To direct the Mississippi Education Achievement Council to Research and Develop a New Funding Mechanism for Community Colleges and Institutions of Higher Learning Based Upon Productivity… (change)	(1-5)	The use of the verb "directs" implies that the funding mechanisms of Mississippi higher education institutions, which were based on enrollment are no longer adequate. The EAC is directed to create a new funding mechanism based on outcomes and performance. Productivity is the cornerstone of this new funding mechanism. As Wellman (2006) argues, higher education governance has a direct impact on the public good. If higher education governance is dominated by productivity

		concerns, then the public good that Mississippi higher education institutions produce may be dominated by narrow productivity concerns.
"There is created an Education Achievement Council whose purpose is to sustain attention to the state's goal of increasing the educational attainment and skill levels of the state's working-age population benchmark to the national average by 2025" (change)	(10-14)	The purpose of the EAC is to help Mississippi higher education institutions achieve the outcome of PBF policy, which is to increase the educational attainment levels of Mississippi working age population. The wording of this clause implies that Mississippi higher education institutions were not meeting this objective and thus, stricter accountability and oversight measures were needed to police Mississippi higher education institutions and bring them into conformity with the trend of accountability.
"The EAC shall work collaboratively with the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning and the State Board for Community and Junior Colleges to achieve the state's goal… (existential)	(46-50)	The use of the term collaboratively implies that the EAC is put on the same footing as the Board of Trustees of individual institutions and the State Board of Community Colleges to achieve the states' educational goals. Some power of the individual boards is given to the EAC. The EAC his empowered while the individual boards are slightly disempowered.
"The EAC shall: establish the education achievement goals for the state…" (existential)	(52-54)	The EAC is positioned above Mississippi higher education institutions and is entrusted to create establish benchmarks and progress, as well as achieve education goals. More than this, it is assumed that the EAC has the knowledge and power to

		achieve these tasks. If higher education governance impacts the public good, than the creation of extra layers of governance, populated by corporate allies and neoliberals (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Zumeta, 2001) can shape the public good in a more market driven way. In addition, the assumption that these allies have the knowledge and ability to legislate for Mississippi higher education institutions will also have an impact on Mississippi higher education institutions and public good.
"The EAC shall: establish appropriate benchmarks to measure progress…" (existential)	(57-58)	See above
"Contract for any professional services that it deems necessary to complete its work" (existential)	(68-69)	This statement assumes that public and private (especially for profit) partnerships are desirable and necessary. Privatization is not an either/or concept but rather complex with varying degrees (Lambert, 2014; Marginson, 2007). Crude market privatization however, where services are contracted out to private companies, can blur the boundary between the public and private spheres for a university because universities may desire to serve their corporate partners and not the public good (Washburn, 2005). Privatization questions also force higher education institution and policymakers to ask who owns what, and this disentanglement

		can become tricky (Lambert, 2014; Stiglitz, 1999).
"The EAC shall: monitor and report on the state's progress toward these education achievement goals…" (change)	(70-72)	The EAC is to make its recommendations to the legislature based on annual reports from the individual Mississippi higher education institutions. This added layer of bureaucracy can be seen as a loss of trust. Mississippi higher education institutions are no longer trusted to serve society and the public good and must be monitored (Alexander, 2000; McClendon, Hearn and Deaton, 2005). Higher levels of trust create more social capital and more lasting social bonds which can enhance the public good (Putnam, 2000). It follows that less trust can lessen social capital and the bonds between individuals and institutions. There is also the assumption of simple causality here, namely that Mississippi higher education institutions are simple entities and that more accountability will force them to produce results desired by policymakers.

Table 8D. Social Actors Chart.

Number in parentheses refers to location in policy and TC is total count.

Social Actor(s)	**Positioning**	**Location**	**How actor(s) frames public good**
Education Achievement Council	"There is created an Education Achievement 10	(11)	The EAC is created by the policy and vested with tremendous power. This is similar to other

	Council whose purpose is to sustain attention to the state's goal 11 of increasing the educational attainment and skill levels of the 12 state's working-age population benchmark to the national average 13 by 2025."	TC: 12	PBF policies which also create legal bodies to police higher education. The EAC is composed of 23 members. Some of the more notable members are the chairmen of the House and Senate Universities and Colleges Committees, a representative of the governor's office, the chairmen of the state board of education, three presidents of four year higher education institutions, three CC presidents and the chief executive of the Mississippi Economic Council to name a few. This speaks to the growing lack of trust between higher education institutions and the state (Burke, 2005). There are also no faculty members or any representatives of humanities or social sciences, just policymakers and businesses (there is however a representative from mental health and an HBCU). Nonetheless, the EAC has tremendous power and the membership is not representative of the diverse missions of higher education institutions in the state of MS. Uneven power

			differentials can impact the promotion of the public good (Calhoun, 1998). A good portion of the policy is dedicated to the creation and reimbursement of the council.
Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning	(d) Two (2) members of the Board of Trustees of State 23 Institutions of Higher Learning;	(23), (36), (48), (77), (100) TC: 5	The Board of Trustees, along with the SBCJC and the EAC, is supposed to work together to craft the benchmarks and outcomes. While the policy does give them some power, it is already assumed that the creation of outcomes is the most effective way to measure higher education institutions. So the power of the Board of Trustees and SBCJC are already circumscribed. Of course, most boards are corporate allies and neoliberal advocates (Zumeta, 2001). However, boards were supposed to insulate faculty for the political vicissitudes of the state (Dee, 2006).
State Board for Community and Junior Colleges		(28), (34), (40), (78), TC: 4	See above.
Governor/legislature		(21), (65)	Obviously, the executive and legislative branch

		TC: 2	have tremendous power, as they should over public entities. But more scrutiny and micromanagement and less trust will most likely have detrimental effects on the creation of the public good (Burke, 2005; Wellman, 2006). higher education institutions need a type of freedom not afforded to other public entities because HEI directly foster the public good (Ramaly, 2006).
Mississippi higher education institutions and community colleges		TC: 4 (HEI) TC: 3 (CC)	The role of higher education institutions and community colleges are limited by the policymakers. The decisions regarding their outcomes are vested in the upper echelons of the institutions, and even this ability is curtailed. Higher education institutions and community colleges, especially at the faculty level, are given very little power in the PBF policy. This again speaks to the lack of trust (Burke, 2005). This oversight also hinders the higher education institutions to engage in the necessary task of KM (Cooper, 2009).
Commissioner of Higher		(115-120)	The Commissioner of Higher Education/Executive

Education/Executive Director of the State Board for Community and Junior Colleges		TC: 1	Director of the State Board for Community and Junior Colleges provide the appropriate staff for the EAC. This is another layer of bureaucracy further removed from the individual higher education institutions. This centralization of authority at the top levels of government may reduce the ability of individual institutions to deal with local and complex issues (Wellman, 2006). The creation of the EAC also speaks to the lessening of institutional autonomy (Pusser, 2006).

Appendix E

Virginia

Table 1E. Input-Process-Output-Outcome Chart.

Numbers in parentheses represents location of section in the policy.

Inputs	**Processes**	**Outputs**	**Outcomes**
Expand enrollments in Virginia public and private institutions (10)	Long term commitment, policy framework for institutional development (10)	Generate 100,000 additional undergraduate degrees for Virginians by 2025 (10)	Fuel economic growth in Virginia and produce revenues for state and local government (10)
Generate sustainable state support (10)	Affordable access (10)	Promote high degree attainment at private institutions in Virginia (10)	Prepare Virginians for jobs in the knowledge economy (10)
Needs based financial aid for low income (10)	Promote managerial autonomy (10)	Increase degree completion for those with partial credits and for non-traditional students with other obligations (10, 16)	Achieve national leadership position in degree attainment and personal income (10)
Funding for basic operations (12)	Take advantage of correlation between higher education and economic growth (10)	Increase degree attainment in STEM fields (and health) (10, 16, 19)	Promote educated workforce (10)
Funding for need based aid (12)	Technological and pedagogical innovation (10)	Increase research capacities (16)	Ensure economic opportunities and personal growth to all Virginians (10)

Funding for meeting performance criteria (12)	Improve undergraduate retention rates (10, 16)	Align HEI efforts with market priorities (19)	Provide financial innovation and enhanced economic opportunity (10)
67% funds from general funds, 33% from other funds (13)	Provide information about economic value and impact of degree program (10)	Increase research in STEM fields (10)	Promote job creation in Virginia (10)
funding can be increased or decreased due to enrollment and due to meeting or not meeting targeted financial incentives (13)	Promote optimal use of facilities and resources (10, 17)	Promote and sustain innovative models to degree attainment (10)	Make Virginia one of the most highly educated states (10)
HEI to keep pace with 60th percentile faculty salary (13)	Technology based instruction, online instruction (10, 16)	x	Promote investment in Virginia economy (10)
Incentivize enrollment (14)	Increasing online opportunities for non-traditional students to enhance B.A. readiness (10)	x	Promote commercialization of new products (10)
FTE funding (14)	Sharing resources between institutions to enhance B.A. readiness (10, 17)	x	Promote formation of new businesses in Virginia (10)
Any additional funds that the General Assembly feels is necessary (14)	Expand dual enrollment, AP and transfer options to enhance B.A. readiness (10, 16)	x	Promote investment of business in Virginia (10)
Tuition assistance grant (14)	Autonomy, accountability, affordable access and mutual trust (10)	x	Enhance security and economic competition of US and Virginia (10)
Increase enrollment of Virginia students (16)	Six year plans must find ways to relieve pressure on tuition (10, 17)	x	x

Funding from governor and General Assembly for targeted economic innovation (16)	Safeguard unique missions of individual HEI in Virginia (10)	x	x
x	Six year plan development which addresses financial and academic concerns and enrollment plans and for degree conferral targets (17)	x	x
x	Create council with private sector leaders, military personal and government scientists and education specialists (19)	x	x
x	Identify best practices to get STEM in higher education and K12, enhance k12 STEM teacher preparation and math readiness (19)	x	x
x	HEI to inform funding, performance criteria and economic metrics such as market demand, earning potential and employer satisfaction (10, 20)	x	x
x	Need based financial aid formula in yearly plan to assist low and middle income families (15)	x	x
x	Promote institutional diversity (10)	x	x

x	Realize potential for enhanced benefits of Restructuring Act (10)	x	x
x	Ensure/preserve Virginia excellent higher education system and its cost efficiency (10)	x	x

Table 2E. Visual Representation of Virginia Input-Process-Output-Outcome Counts.



Table 3E.

Hegemony/Discourse chart

Number in parentheses refers to location in policy, the following number is the frequency, and TC is total count.

Hegemonic/Neoliberal Term/Notion	**Location/ Frequency**	**How the term shapes the public good.**
References to the market/economic growth/ revenue and	(10)10, (16)6 whole section, (19)5, (20)4	Promoting economic growth, at the expense of any other non-market goal, is the bedrock of neoliberalism and academic capitalism (Giroux, 2011; Newfield,

profit generation investment/ commercialization	TC: 25	2008; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). Promoting economic growth is by far the most salient feature of Virginia's PBF policy. It is the single most referenced term (24). Thus, economic growth is not just seen by policymakers and their supporters as a means to an end or an intermediate public good, but rather, *as an end itself* or a final public good (Kaul, et al., 1999). In addition, markets do not readily produce public goods which are generally non-rivalrous and non-excludable, because it would be disadvantageous for markets to produce things which someone could not profit from (Marginson, 2007). With 25 references to the market, this could give short shrift non-rivalous, non-exludable, public goods. Economic concerns are integral to any notion of the public good, but it is financial stability which should be pursued (Kaul,et al., 1999). Financial stability ensures that all citizens have access to basic means of survival. In widest sense, global financial stability is a precursor for world peace (Kaul, et al., 1999), not uneven profit generation. And world peace is perhaps the most valued and necessary of all global public good (Mendez, 1999). However, there is no mention of financial stability in the TJ21 policy, only 25 references to profit, revenue generation, commercialization or personal income.
References to efficiency, optimal use of resources	(10) 9, (16) 4, (17) 1, (19) 5, (20) 4 TC: 23	Efficiency is one of the guiding criterion of which neoliberals use to judge social institutions, and it has become the guiding principle of neoliberal higher education policy over the last few decades (Harvey, 2005; Fowler, 2009; Prokou, 2009). Neoliberals desire HEI's to be an efficient machine and give little notice to issues such as social justice (Giroux, 2011; Prokou, 2013; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004) and accuse higher education of inefficiency (Bryson, 2004; Harvey, 2005; Lambert, 2014). While efficiency should be a consideration of any HEI, if pursued narrowly, efficiency can crowd out other important criterion by social institutions should be judged, such as creativity, equality, community and social justice (Fowler, 2009; Giroux, 2011; Prokou, 2013). With 23 references to efficiency in the policy, efficiency as a guiding principle of higher education seems to be highly valued by Virginia policymakers.
References to vocational/workforce training and human capital/ job creation	(10)5, (19)3, (20)4 TC: 12	The emphasis on workforce training is a staple of the neoliberal paradigm (Newfield, 2008: Mallot, et al., 2013). From the neoliberal standpoint, the purpose of higher education is a technical one, higher education is supposed to train workers to compete in the global economy (Giroux, 2011; Harvey, 2005; Vestritch, 2008). Pat McCrory's comments are indicative of this. The liberal arts and critical thinking are cast as

		frivolous, non-efficient and not able to drive the global workforce. Perhaps the short name of the policy captures this sentiment: The Top Jobs Act or TJ21. There is no debate here on the purpose of higher education for the writers of TJ21 and their visions of the public good: fueling the creation of jobs which are relevant to the global market. Only jobs that allow one to compete in the global market are valued in the TJ21 policy. This focus on jobs relevant to the global market is also indicative of neo-conservatism. Neo-conservatives value order and stability in society, and agree with neo-liberals that the market is the best way to ensure order (Harvey, 2005). After the tumultuous 1960s, many neo-conservatives made common cause with neo-liberals in the elevation of market priorities at the expense of more critical and humanistic positions (Harvey, 2007). In the absence of any calls for more humanistic vocations, ones which have the potential for criticism of the global market, there seems to be a strand of neo-conservatism in TJ21 as well.
References to accountability and performance	(10)2, (16)1 (20)2 TC: 5	Neo-liberals have repeatedly argued that the public sector is bloated and backward and in need of serious, market driven reform Giroux, 2011; Harvey, 2005; Mallot, et al., 2013; Newfield, 2008; Zumeta, 2011). This demonizing of the public sector is akin to Klein's (2007) "disaster capitalism." Colleges in particular are cast as backward, bloated and inefficient (the crisis). The method to ensure public institutions is to hold them accountable to the public and the public tax dollars (Zumeta, 2011). The Virginia policymakers echo this call to make public HEI in Virginia accountable to the state by monitoring their performance. The public good for TJ21 is determined by market metrics of performance. Again, this reflects what Prokou (2013) has noted for higher education policymaking in neoliberal regimes: a trend toward efficiency and accountability and move away from social justice.
References to public-private partnerships and the expertise of the private sector	(10)1, (16)1 TC: 2	Neoliberals draw a sharp divide between the public and private spheres (Marginson, 2007). Yet the spheres are not equal, rather the private, market based sector is elevated in hierarchal domination over the public sphere in neoliberal discourse (Harvey, 2005; Marginson, 2007; Rhoads & Torres, 2006; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). Following this, many neoliberals push public-private partnerships between universities and the private sector in order to make the public university perform more like a market entity. This is the case in the TJ21 act. The policy seeks to foster public-private partnership, assuming that private partnership is desirable. In fact, in section 23-38.87:19, the policymakers even push for private-sector leaders to

		help assist higher education institutions in upgrading STEM programs.
References to tuition un-affordability	(10)4, (16)1, (17)3, (18)2, (20)2 TC: 12	In the TJ21 policy, one of the main causes of rising tuition; declining state funding is cast as a neutral issue without political motivations, when in fact, as this study has argued; the slashing of state funds is most definitely a political issue motivated by the ideas of neoliberalism (Habermas, 1973; Edmundson & D'Orso, 2007). If only seen as a neutral issue, then the solution to the problem of rising tuition is will also be neutral, and this is precisely how TJ21 treats rising tuition. The policymakers seek to make college "affordable" and tame tuition by making adjustments to the HEI and not to social conditions influencing it (Mallot et al., 2013). The policymakers in Virginia do not recognize that the public good has been narrowing shaped because there is no recognition of political forces shaping it and driving tuition upward (Calhoun, 1998; Mansbridge 1998; Pusser, 2006).
References to competition	(10)4 TC: 4	The market is a mechanism for resource distribution (Freidman & Freidman, 1981), but it distributes resources according to possession of capital, which is uneven. Thus competition the foundation of the market mechanism. Public institutions, being state subsidized, are not competitive because they have been traditionally given resources by the state (Hill, 2012; Harvey, 2005; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). Neoliberals however, as part of the effort to discipline higher education by starving it of funds, seek to strip higher education institutions of funding and force higher education institutions to act like market entities by competing on the market for resources (in the form of public/private partnerships) and students. Virginia policymakers want to ensure that Virginia public institutions can compete on the market. This drive for competition shapes the public good as competition in the global market.
References to knowledge based economy	(10) 2 TC: 2	Knowledge driven economy signifies a move away from traditional manufacturing economy toward an information based economy; i.e software, computer design, statistical information are the drivers of profit (Bell, 1999; Marginson, 2011). As such, advocates of the knowledge based economy want to spurn knowledge/information production which will lead to greater performance and economic success (Marginson, 2011). The public good, in a knowledge driven economy, refers to economic knowledge and augmenting one's competitive position in the global market. (Bell, 1999; Marginson, 2011). And this is clearly the intent of Virginia policymakers, to push higher education institutions to train citizens for the global market. Yet, as Sy (1999) points out,

		information and knowledge are more effective if thought of as a public good (singular) than a private market good. If information is considered a market good, residents of poorer areas will most likely be excluded from the information and will be unable to use this information to improve the quality of their lives (Sy, 1999). Perhaps more than this, residents without access to information will not be able to contribute to information generation, and thus the information that is produced will be produced only be certain actors with certain interests (Sy, 1999). TJ21 policymakers rely on the market conception of knowledge/information, but the market may not be the most efficient way to allocate and create information that is vital to the knowledge society (Stiglitz, 1999; Sy, 1999). As Marginson, Murphy & Peters (2010) demonstrate the global must be a fertile ground for creation; higher education institutions must draw on the various networks and linkages in the global age to create new answers to social problems. The TJ21 policymakers however only cast the global in terms of profit generation, and thus may limit the ability of higher education institutions to create new knowledge which can enhance and discipline the market. There is also no recognition of KM (Cooper, 2009). KM is integral for proper and targeted knowledge dissemination and use. Yet the only allusion to KM is the public-private partnership which is only one small fraction of KM (Cooper, 2013). KM should be an integral component of higher education institutions and the knowledge economy more general (Cooper, 2013).
References to Science Technology Engineering and Mathematics	(10)1, (16)1, (19)9 entire section TC: 11	STEM has become something of a neoliberal policy buzzword. Even President Obama lauds STEM initiatives. It goes without saying that STEM careers are of the utmost importance in the 21st century. However, the focus on STEM by policymakers is problematic. STEM disciplines are promoted because they have the ability to generate revenue (Rhoads & Torres, 2006; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Washburn, 2005). There seems to be little if any recognition by policymakers of TJ21of the humanizing powers that STEM disciplines possess (Suoranta & Vaden, 2007). STEM disciplines can help to alleviate poverty, world hunger, disease and host of other ills, but only if STEM disciplines are cast within a wider social justice background (Marcuse, 1992). Accordingly, in the TJ21 policy, there is no mention of the humanizing and social justice potential of STEM disciplines, only their profit making capabilities. This also aligns with neo-conservatism's relegation of the humanities and potential for the humanities to cause social disruption (Harvey, 2005;

		Newfield, 2008; Stanley, 2007)Thus, the push for STEM from the policymakers of TJ21 can only shape the public good in terms of potential profit and revenue, not social justice.
References to online instruction	(10)1, (16)2 TC: 3	Online courses have the ability to bring education to many underrepresented populations, such as rural and part-time students Thus, if used correctly, online education can be a tremendous facilitator of the public good. However, institutions have mainly looked to online classes as "cash cows" to generate profit, not for their democratic potential (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). In the TJ21 policy, policymakers urge institutions simply to increase their opportunities for online learning with no recognition of the reasons for this increase.
Elevation of status/prestige	(10)1 TC: 1	Institutional prestige has become very important as publications such as US World News and Rankings rank institutions like products.
References to Government Oversight	 TC: 23	The Virginia PBF policy establishes a hierarchal vertical chain of command with higher education institutions at the bottom, with the committee on top of the higher education institutions, SCHEV on top of the committee and finally the governor and General Assembly on the top. This strict oversight of higher education institutions is in clear contrast to the relationship of trust and the social contract which characterized government and higher education institutions relations for most of the 20th century (Burke, 2005). In addition, this strict government oversight of higher education institutions is also aligns with neo-conservative calls to regulate higher education and the knowledge produced from higher education institutions (Harvey, 2005; Newfield, 2008). Punitive and strict government oversight can limit trust between higher education institutions and policymakers, which can have detrimental effects on the fostering of the public good (Burke, 2005; Ramaly, 2006). The public good is based on dialogue and social criticism, which may be limited by stifling government control. In addition, KM will be integral to this , and government control may hamper higher education institutions to partake in KM because higher education institutions are urged to pursue only profitable ventures (Cooper, 2009).

Table 4E. Visual Representation of Hegemony Counts in Virginia policy.



Table 5E. Non-Hegemonic Chart

Number in parentheses refers to location in policy, the following number is the frequency, and TC is total count.

Private Non-market benefits and externalities	**Frequency Count/Location**	**How the public good is shaped by the term(s)**
References to health/life expectancy	(10)1, (16)1, (19)1 TC: 3	One of the most significant private non-market benefits of higher education is better health and longer life expectancy for the individual (McMahon, 2009). There were three references to health, but the policymakers were only promoting higher education institutions to train more health professionals because health professionals are identified as a crucial area. While training health professionals will help individual health, there is no recognition of the ability of higher education to directly influence an individuals' health and life expectancy.
References to poverty reduction/ assistance/financial stability	(10)1, (15)5, whole section, (17)1, (20)1, (21)1	References to some aspect of poverty reduction and/or assistance to struggling families is mentioned nine times in the policy, and is the topic of section 15. The policymakers do seem to recognize the

	TC: 9	growing plight of poorer families and their struggle to afford college (Lambert, 2014). In light of the public good however, and as mentioned earlier, there is no recognition of the reasons for this growing poverty, namely that neoliberal policies in the United States are perpetuating a growing income divide (Mallot, et al., 2013). Rather, Virginia policymakers have put the onus on the institutions to make tuition more affordable. Without the recognition of societal role in poverty creation and reduction, the public good cannot be accurately pursued because the root causes of suffering are not addressed. These causes are deliberate political maneuvers, but cast as technical and neutral occurrences (Edmundson & D'Orso, 2007).
References to general happiness	N/A	N/A
References to non-market knowledge and research/information content creators	N/A	N/A
References to art, literature, theater	N/A	N/A
References to cultural diversity	N/A	N/A
References to pedagogy	(10)1 TC: 1	Pedagogy can be a crucial method for shaping the public good (Pusser, 2006). There was only one reference to "pedagogical innovation" however and it was in the introduction of the policy. Further, there was no explanation or further discussion of what exactly this meant. This ambiguity however leaves the term open for many interpretations.
References to college mission	(10)1 (16)1, (17)1, (18)1 TC: 4	While the major intent of the policymakers is to structure higher education institutions like market goods and to be able to train workers, there were three references to honoring the unique mission of each higher education institutions in Virginia. Different higher education institutions with different missions can contribute to the public good, in line with their mission, in a variety of ways, such as through teaching or research (Pusser, 2006). The stress on honoring the unique missions of the various higher education institutions can be powerful method to promote the public good. Autonomy is crucial to allow

		higher education institutions to promote the public good (Pusser, 2006).
References to enhancing citizenship/public service/	N/A	N/A
References to liberal arts	N/A	N/A
References to externalities/social benefits	N/A	N/A
References to social transformation/social criticism	N/A	N/A
References to reduced Crime Rate	N/A	N/A
References to glo-na-cal/horizontal linkages	(10)1, (16)2 19(2) TC: 5	There were two references to resource sharing between higher education institutions in Virginia. Resource sharing was cast primarily as a way to save money and be efficient, but as Held (2002) notes, linkages between different institutions constitute global civil society. These linkages can be powerful methods for information sharing and for establishing networks to promote ideas and actions. Links between higher education institutions and other entities are integral to KM (Cooper, 2009). Public private collaboration is recorded here (and was recorded in hegemonic chart as well) because while the policy stresses the private sector, private could also mean private non-profit organizations. In the STEM section (19) along with the call for business and private sector partnerships there is also a call for collaboration with researchers (very vague) and educational experts. This could leave the door open for civic and charitable organizations.
References to social contract/state support/resident enrollment	(10)1, (14)5 whole section TC: 6	higher education institutions have a social contract with the state they are located in. Traditionally, taxpayers would allocate resources to higher education institutions and in return, higher education institutions would produce an educated and enlightened populace (Lewis & Hearn, 2003). The Virginia policymakers acknowledge that higher education institutions are supposed to serve Virginia residents and the state of

		Virginia. However, the traditional social contract emphasizes the creation of well-rounded citizens, not just consumers and workers in the global workforce. the Virginia policymakers have taken a narrow view as to what the public good entails (Calhoun, 1998; Pusser, 2006). The policymakers also mentioned that Virginia is dedicated to providing "sustainable state support." For higher education institutions. Yet, the state support is conditional on meeting certain metrics which some colleges may have difficulty meeting.
References to institutional autonomy	(10)1, (20)1 TC: 2	Institutional autonomy has become a heated issue (Courtier, 2005' Tierney, 2006). In Virginia, the 2005 restructuring act allowed Virginia higher education institutionsto gain more autonomy if they agreed to be held to higher accountability standards (implemented in 2011 TJ21). Autonomy can allow institutions to pursue issues and projects that align with their mission or the larger public good (Dee, 2006). However, this autonomy is usually understood as financial autonomy and the ability to raise tuition which will serious bar lower and middle income students, students which policymakers charge the institution with helping, from attending college.
References to pollution reduction/clean air	N/A	N/A
References to global citizenship, global public goods/national/regional local goods or publics	N/A	N/A
References to deliberate inter-generational concerns	N/A	N/A
References to just use of STEM	N/A	N/A

Table 6E. Visual Representation of Virginia Non-hegemonic Counts..



Table 7E. Presupposition Table.

Presupposition Type	**Location**	**How presupposition shapes the public good**
"the following purposes shall inform the development of funding policies, performance criteria… relieves the upward pressure on tuition associated with loss of state support due to economic downturns or other causes" (Change)	(10)	The volatile situation of declining state funding is cast as a neutral occurrence, mainly the result of economic downturns (Edmundson & D'Orso, 2007) and the deliberate move by policymakers to cause this is not mentioned. The use of the word "relieves" further implies that this volatile situation can be somewhat ameliorated by actions of Virginia policymakers and higher education institutions themselves, mainly by crafting quality performance criterion. The public good is framed as politically neutral, able to be improved by accountability policies, and thus the need for this change. higher education institutions cannot simply "relieve" tuition increases due to the overly complex political and organizational nature of tuition increases.
"The objective of this chapter is to fuel strong economic growth in the Commonwealth." (Existential)	(10)	This is an example of an existential presupposition because economic growth is cast as unquestionably desirable, as if higher education's main purpose is and has always been, economical. The public good is framed as inherently economical with no consideration of its non-market potential or other non-market public goods (Marginson, 2007).

		This policy is a Virginia policy, but gives no recognition of Virginia's place in a glo-na-cal network, save for competition (Marginson & Rhoades, 2002). There is no conception of global public goods or global harmony, just the global market (Kau et al., 1999). If strictly market terms are used to promote the public good, the "public good" becomes merely the aggregate of individual wills (Calhoun, 1998). However, the public good must be something more than a summation of individual self-interests if it is to be vibrant and truly beneficial for all (Calhoun, 1998).
"to promote university based research that produces outside investment in Virginia, fuels economic growth, triggers commercialization of new products and processes, fosters the creation of new businesses…" (change)	(10)	Undoubtedly, bringing business to Virginia, as well as the creation of new businesses is not a bad thing in itself. Personal and societal income enhancement has always been a key feature of higher education (Bowen, 1996; McMahon, 2009). However, the policymakers seem to agree that university research equates solely to capital creation and revenue enhancement. With that sentiment, policymakers want to *promote* higher education institutions to contribute to capital production, presumably on a higher level than they already are. Implicit in this is the idea that Virginia higher education institutions are not performing at a level commensurate with meeting marketplace demands or at least policymakers want to maintain Virginia higher education institutions ability to do this. The absence of any mention of the liberal arts, visual arts, social sciences other humanistic endeavors and the fostering of civic responsibility in the policy (as evidenced by the private non-market benefits and externalities chart) seems to further confirm that higher education institutions are supposed to be economic motors for their states and little else (Marginson, 2007). The TJ21 policymakers look to patents and commercialization only to raise revenue. However, As Stiglitz (1999) points out, the promotion of commercialization is delicate endeavor because the use of patents and trademarks are the police of knowledge. A polity must determine how knowledge and ideas will be distributed by setting appropriate limits on patents. A patent determines how long information can be restricted, and the longer it is restricted, the less people can use it. In addition, there is always the question of who owns what, which is another quagmire (Stiglitz, 1999). None of these delicate issues are broached by the policymakers of TJ21, especially the role of patents and copyrights in shaping the public good, only the lure of profit and revenue, which is common among

		neoliberal policymakers and higher education institutions administrators (Washburn, 2005).
"to establish a higher education funding framework and policy that promotes stable, predictable, equitable and adequate funding" (change)	(10)	The assumption here is twofold. The first assumption is that funding for higher education is not stable, predictable, equitable or adequate. This sentiment is accurate. Equality and adequacy in funding is sorely lacking. The second part of this assumption is that PBF models will somehow rectify this situation. This is a simplistic and naïve assumption due to the complexity of higher education institutions (Bohman & Deal, 2008). PBF models however, by basing funding on institutions meeting certain metrics mean that funding can be volatile if these metrics are not met. PBF policies do not have the power to rectify inadequate and inequitable funding from the state, but they do have the potential to make funding more volatile, especially if an institution is not built to meet financial metrics, such as a liberal arts institution.
"to allow these attributes to inform the development and implementation of…economic opportunity metrics" (change)	(10)	The policymakers want to allow colleges with unique missions the ability to have their unique missions inform the development of economic opportunity metrics. While the inclusion of colleges with unique mission in the formation of these metrics is essential to fostering the public good (Ramaly, 2006), the assumption of the policymakers is that all higher education institutions missions and goals can be quantified. How are the liberal arts, democratic participation and cultural diversity translated into an economic metric? While McMahon (2009) does offer support that some abstract ideas like happiness and health can be approximated with a dollar amount by statisticians, it would be foolish to assume that this dollar amount represents the entire impact of an abstract notion like health and happiness.
"…instruction funding may be increased or decreased for… (ii) meeting or not meeting targeted financial incentives…" (change)	(13)A	Virginia policymakers have created a funding mechanism that is, in part, predicated on meeting certain financial objectives. This is an assumption of simple causality: fund higher education institutions according to outcomes which will prompt higher education institutions to be more profitable and efficient. Higher education institutions are vastly complex and simple causation can obscure the complex mechanisms of higher education institutions as well as how higher education institutions promote the public good (Ramaly, 2006). This presupposition however is the essence of PBF funding, allocating funds for institutions meeting financial metrics. In a wider sense, policies promote desired behaviors as

		well (Allan, 2008; Hearn, 2001). The establishment of this funding mechanism promotes the desired behavior of higher education institutions becoming more closely aligned with the global market (Burke, 2005; Zumeta, 2011). A sizeable amount of funding is predicated on the assumption that higher education institutions should be meeting economic and marketplace metrics.
"each institution shall include in its six-year plan an institutional student financial aid commitment that…provides assistance to students from both low-income and middle income families" (existential) There were three more similar mentions of this in section 18.	(15), (18) TC: 2	Again, the policymakers have put the onus of cost reduction on the universities. This is misleadingly simple. This statement from the policy mandates that universities devise ways to provide assistance to low and middle income families. Of course, universities should be working to provide any type of assistance, but the statement assumes that universities should be the only entities held accountable for making college more affordable. There is no recognition of the role of political forces in driving up tuition and more generally the role of political forces in the public good. Instead, social events (such as rising tuition) is seen only a technical or structural occurrence without any political motivations (Edmundson & D'Orso, 2007).
"The Governor shall consider…and may fund targeted economic and innovation incentives…Such incentives may include…optimal year-round utilization of resources and other efficiency reforms designed to reduce total institutional cost." There was another similar mention of this in section (18)A	(16)	This implies that higher education institutions are inefficient or at least not using their resources in the best manner possible. This sentiment is indicative of many charges against higher education institutions by neoliberals that higher education institutions (and other public entities) are wasteful and inefficient (Newfield, 2008; Mallot et al., 2013). While not mentioned directly, many outside the academy bemoan the use of faculty governance and peer review as inefficient (Ramaly, 2006), so efficiency measures may impact these processes as well. The way to "tame" higher education institutions, and really all public institutions is to starve them of funds, ensure they are operating efficiently and made HEI behave like market goods (Harvey, 2005).

Table 8E. Social Actors Chart.

Number in parentheses refers to location in policy and TC is total count.

Social Actor(s)	Positioning	Location	How actor(s) frames public good
"Employers" "Marketplace"	"marketplace demand, earning potential, and employer satisfaction… can be used to assess degree programs"	(20) TC: 3 Emp- loyer	The ubiquitous use of the "market" in the TJ21 policy makes the market a sort of agentless entity. One in which is made to seem natural and neutral (Edmundson & D'Orso, 2007; Habermas, 1973). The market is taken to be an objective entity

		TC: 2 Market-place	with objective and seemingly common sense (Fairclough, 1989) demands which must be fulfilled. Higher education institutions are to tailor degree programs and PBF criteria to what the market demands and future employer's desire. The market demands and future employer's desire technical skills which can augment profit and revenue. Thus the public good that this agentless entity promotes is one based on the acquisition of practical skills (Calhoun, 1998; Mansbridge, 1998). Practicality and efficiency are the integral planks of the public good for these actors. But the market cannot be a simple place marker for the public good because higher education institutions relation to the public good is too complex. The marketplace is one method for KM, but it is an imperfect one (Cooper, 2009). Yet, the market is held up as the superior form of connection between institutions, the state and citizens.
"other degree-granting entities in the Commonwealth /non-public institutions"	"The role of nonpublic institutions in addressing the goals set forth in this chapter and make recommendations regarding such matters."	(10) (20) TC:	Non-public institutions are given a place at the table. Assumed in this is nonpublic not for profit as well as for-profit colleges (FPCU). FPCU's have radically different visions of the public good. Nonpublic non-profit institutions can find common ground with publics, but FPCU's generally value efficiency and practical interests. Further, FPCU's have had increasing power in state legislatures in determining assessments (Ramaly, 2006). The public shaped by FPCU's and Public universities are much different, but there is no mention of that in the policy. Section 10 urges increased enrollment at public and private nonprofit colleges, but the section also notes that all institutions and Section 20 allows for the creation of council of higher education representatives (one from each college) and private not for profit colleges are allowed on the council, but do not have voting power. However, in paragraph 6 of section (20), the term nonpublic is used (see left) without the designation of not for profit as in paragraph 6.
Virginians, Virginia	Term is interspaced throughout the policy	*	Virginia undergraduate students are a major focus of the policy. As part of the social contract between public higher education

undergraduate students			institutions in Virginia and the people of Virginia, the taxpayers of Virginia pledge resources to Virginia higher education institutions and in return Virginia higher education institutions are supposed to educate students. The policymakers do want to ensure that Virginia students are serviced by Virginia higher education institutions. Nonetheless, Virginia students are treated as passive actors. In this vision of the public good, student potential and advocacy is not recognized. Students are seen as having no active role in the functioning of Virginia higher education institutions except as receive the services and instruction of higher education institutions. There is no mention of student activism, civic participation or creativity.
Businesses/private sector	"fosters the formation of new businesses, leads businesses to bring their facilities and jobs to Virginia" "increased research, including regional and public-private collaboration" …shall cause to be formed a public-private partnership comprised of private-sector leaders…	(10) (16) (19) TC: 5	As might be expected, the private sector and businesses are given special attention (along with the market as an agentless actor). There are multiple references to businesses and private sector leaders. Public private partnerships are seen as a way to enhance the functioning Of course as Marginson (2007) notes, the public-private divide is not an either/or, the public and private spheres are necessarily dichotomous entities. For instance, public institutions can establish and facilitate markets and private institutions can contribute to the public good. Nonetheless, Virginia policymakers treat the private and public sector as two distinct entities. Further, many times the private sector can create public bads like pollution and financial insecurity (Kaul, et al., 1999). There is no recognition of the complex relationship between the public and private spheres, just a simple dichotomous understanding which can limit the perpetuation of the public good.
Public higher education institutions in Virginia, including Community Colleges	"To recognize that the unique mission and contributions of each institution of higher education…to afford these unique missions…appropriate safeguards, and to allow these attributes to	(10) TC: 9	There seems to be some measure of participation afforded to all higher education institutions in Virginia. All higher education institutions are invited to help shape funding policies, performance criteria and economic opportunity metrics in section (10) and (16). In addition, the policymakers stress that institutions with unique missions will be protected. This is

	inform the developments and implementation of funding policies, performance criteria, economic opportunity metrics and recommendations in the furtherance of this chapter's objectives."		an important feature of the policy, but it is also vague. As mentioned earlier, it will be difficult for liberal arts colleges or humanities departments within larger universities to contribute to what the policy terms "economic opportunity metrics." So, there is some institutional autonomy written in the policy, but that autonomy is mainly freedom within a neoliberal sense of contributing to the market. Marginson (2008) notes that the neoliberal conception freedom markedly differs from a true creative freedom. In neoliberal freedom, there is only a choice between predetermined outcomes, and while the policymakers do seem to acknowledge some sort of freedom for institutions, it is largely a bounded freedom to choose economic metrics. There is no freedom to partake in the wider sphere of KM, to advance goals of social justice, equity and humanism.
Faculty	"…the amount required to reach the Commonwealth's faculty salary goal of the 60th percentile of the most recently reported average faculty salaries paid by that institutions peer institutions…"	(13) (18) TC: 7	There are only two mentions of faculty in the policy. Both references pertain to faculty salary. Virginia policymakers have made a commitment to keeping faculty salaries in the 60th percentile of peer institutions. This is undoubtedly a good thing. Yet faculty are not factory workers who simply work for a wage. Faculty are characterized as a monolithic whole with no understanding of the vast differences between disciplines and the different bases of academic knowledge (Lattuca & Stark, 2009). Faculty are only considered as employees and not professionals.. Faculty creativity within their unique disciplines and academic freedom are required to help maintain a vibrant public good (Marginson, 2007; Pusser, 2006), both of which seem to be absent in this policy. Again, the faculty are not given freedom to pursue KM, or at least only given freedom to pursue KM in the market sphere.
Higher Education Advisory Committee	"The advisory committee shall consist of 10 members as follows: a representative of the Office of the Secretary of Education…who shall serve as chair…a	TC: 4	The committee is an important actor empowered by the policy. The role of the committee is to develop and review every five years: the methodology to choose the formula for enrollment funding and low income families, the creation of performance criteria and economic metrics for institutions to be measured by in order

	representative of the office of the secretary of finance…staff directors of the House Appropriations committee and Senate Finance committee…and the presidents…of five public institutions of higher education…two doctoral institutions, two comprehensive universities and one from the community college system…		to determine funding, as well as the authority to develop state goals under the 2005 restructuring act. The Committee then submits these recommendations to SCHEV, SCHEV then reports to the governor and General Assembly for approval. There seems to be an imbalance of power in the creation of this committee. The chair is a member of the executive department and five of the ten members are part of the executive department. The presidents of each college in Virginia choose the five presidents to sit on the committee. Further, there are 23 Community Colleges and 15 public institutions yet the community college system has only one representative. There is also no mention of liberal arts universities, PBI's or HBCU's only doctoral and comprehensive institutions. Many groups participate in the ongoing creation of the public good, however inequities between these groups can cause power differentials and different groups and interests to be marginalized (Calhoun, 1998; Mansbridge, 1998). Further, public higher education institutions must be vehicles of social criticism if they are to truly serve the public good (Pusser, 2006; Marginson, 2007). However, this ability of the public higher education institutions in Virginia may be seriously curtailed if the executive branch and presidents of five colleges are the determiners of funding criteria and performance metrics, and if performance metrics are one of the main determinants of funding.
SCHEV (State council of higher education in Virginia)	"The advisory committee shall submit its recommendations to the Council…"	(20) TC: 7	This adds a further layer of bureaucracy and hierarchal authority. Again, as stated above, higher education institutions need autonomy to contribute to truly contribute to the public good, and not just financial autonomy but academic freedom and creativity, to be able to act as a vehicle of social critique and progress (Marginson, 2007; Pusser, 2006).
Governor and General Assembly		*	The Governor and the General Assembly have the ultimate power, these entities make all final decisions. The hierarchal chain extending from the Governor and

		TC: 17 Gov. TC: 12 Gen. Ass.	General Assembly extends to certain secretaries in executive branch, then to SCHEV, then to the committee and finally to the individual institutions, which are further hierarchally arranged with doctoral and comprehensive institutions at the top and community colleges closer to the bottom and with liberal arts and HBCU's in an ambiguous position. This hierarchal positioning scheme does not lend itself to trust. During most of the 20th century, state governments and higher education institutions had a mutual relationship of trust (Burke, 2005; Lewis & Hearn, 2003). Higher education institutions were entrusted to produce educated citizens and a better society with university taxpayers dollars. Now, this trust has largely been replaced with hierarchy and performance criteria (Burke, 2005). This seems to have transpired in Virginia.

Appendix F

Texas

Table 1F. Input-Process-Output-Outcome Chart.

Number in parentheses refers to the location in policy and TC is total count.

Input	**Process**	**Output**	**Outcome**
Student success-based funding (1.2)	Provide incentives for supporting the five-year master plan developed (1.16-17)	For general academic teaching institution other than public state college: the success measures considered by the board under Subsection (d) must include: the total number of bachelor's degrees awarded by the institution (4.11-15)	The legislature finds that it is in the state's highest public interest to evaluate student achievement at institutions of higher learning and develop higher education funding policy based on that evaluation (2.10-14)
To secure an equitable distribution of state funds (1.9-10)	Funding policies shall: Provide incentives for programs of superior quality and for institutional diversity (1.12, 1.14-15)	the success measures considered by the board under Subsection (d) must include: the total number of bachelor's degrees in critical fields awarded by the institution (4.16-17)	Maintaining the state's competitiveness in the national and global economy (2.17-18)
Allocate resources efficiently (1.13)	Funding policies shall: Discourage unnecessary duplication of offerings between institutions and unnecessary construction on any campus (1.12, 1.18-20)	the success measures considered by the board under Subsection (d) must include: the total number of bachelor's degrees awarded by the institution to at-risk students (4.18-19)	…supporting the general welfare of this state (2.18.19)
Funding policies that promote postsecondary educational success based on objective indicators of	Emphasize an alignment with education goals established by the board (1.21-22).	the success measures considered by the board under Subsection (d) must include: the six year graduation rate of	The purpose of this section is to ensure that institutions higher education produce student outcomes that

relative performance…(2.14-16)		students of the institution (4.20-26).	are directly aligned with states education goals and economic development needs (2.19-22).
Student success measures achieved during the preceding state fiscal biennium by each o the institutions of higher education to which base funds will be appropriated (4. 8-10).	Reflect the role and mission of each institution (1.24)	the success measures considered by the board under Subsection (d) must include: The total number of the following awarded by the institution: associates degrees (5.18-20)	x
The legislature finds that it is in the state's highest public interest to evaluate student achievement at institutions of higher learning and develop higher education funding policy based on that evaluation (2.10-14).	The board shall include in its findings and recommendations to the legislature under Section 61.059: (1) an evaluation of the effectiveness of the student success measures described by this section in achieving the purpose of this section during the preceding state fiscal biennium (5.23-27, 6.1-2)	the success measures considered by the board under Subsection (d) must include: Bachelor's degrees under section 130.0012 (5.21)	x
Formulas for basic funding shall: Emphasize funding elements that directly support faculty (1.23, 2.1-2)	The board shall adopt rules for the administration of this section, including rules requiring each institution of higher education to submit to the board any student data or other information the board considered necessary for the board to carry out its	the success measures considered buy the board under Subsection (d) must include: Certificates identified by the board for purposes of this section as effective measures of student success (5.23-24).	x

	duties under this section (6.5-9)		
Formulas for basic funding shall: Reflect both fixed and variable elements of cost (1.23, 2.3-4)	For a public junior college, public state college, or public technical institute, the success measures considered by the board under Subsection (d) must include: successful completion of: (i) developmental education in mathematics (4.27-5.1-2, 5.5-7)	x	x
x	the success measures considered by the board under Subsection (d) must include: (ii) developmental education in English (5.8)	x	x
x	the success measures considered by the board under Subsection (d) must include: (iii) the first college-level mathematics course with a grade of "C" or higher (5.9-10)	x	x
x	the success measures considered by the board under Subsection (d) must include: (i.v) the first college-level English course with a grade of "C" of higher (5.11-12)	x	x
x	the success measures considered by the board under Subsection (d) must include: (v) the first 30 semester credit hours	x	x

	at the institution (5.13-14)		
x	the success measures considered by the board under Subsection (d) must include: (b) transfer to a four year college or university after successful completion of at least 15 semester credit hours at the institution (5.15-17)	x	x

Table 2F. Visual Representation of Virginia Input-Process-Output-Outcome Chart.



Table 3F. Hegemony/Discourse chart.

Number in parentheses refers to location in policy, the following number is the frequency, and TC is total count.

Hegemonic/Neoliberal Term/Notion	**Location/ Frequency**	**How the term shapes the public good**

References to the market/economic growth/ revenue and profit generation investment/ commercialization	2.17, 2.18, 2.22 TC: 3	While there are only three references to market growth, these three references are the ultimate outcomes of the policy; to ensure that Texas is competitive in the national and global marketplace. What is significant here is that there are no other outcomes of the policy. The public good (or more accurately aggregate private goods) is shaped in primarily market terms (Mallot, et al., 2013; Vestritch, 2008). As Marginson, Murphy & Peters (2010) demonstrate, the global must be a fertile ground for creation; higher education institutions must draw on the various networks and linkages in the global age to create new answers to social problems. The Texas policymakers however only cast the global in terms of the market, and thus may limit the ability of Texas higher education institutions to create new knowledge. The market however cannot produce public goods because public goods are non-rivalrous and non-excludable, and the market is geared to producing mainly rivalours and excludable goods, of course there is some wiggle room here (Marginson, 2007). But for the most part, there is market failure when it comes to the necessary production of public goods (Calhoun, 1998; Mansbridge, 1998; Marginson, 2007). Thus, with the sole outcomes market based, the public good promoted by the Texas PBF is market

		based which may not be able to produce non-rivalrous and non-excludable.
References to efficiency, optimal use of resources	1.13, 1.18 TC: 2	The Texas policymakers make two references to efficiency. Efficiency is one of the guiding criterion of neoliberalism and the accountability movement and thus a central plank of a neoliberal visions of the public good (Alexander, 2000; Fowler, 2009). Accountability, framed around the ideas of efficiency is the guiding principal of neoliberal policy (Prokou, 2013) and replaced the previous principle of social justice in the 1970s. Accountability to the state and efficiency in operations, at least in educational policymaking, largely dominates social justice concerns in relation to the public good (Prokou, 2013).
References to vocational/workforce training and human capital/ job creation	N/A	N/A
References to accountability and performance	1.21, 2.6, 4.2, 4.7, 4.14-15, 14.16-17, 14.18-19, 14.20-26, 2.12, 2.15, 2.16, 2.20, 2.21, 5.3-4, 5.5, 5.6-7, 5.8, 5.9-10, 5.11-12, 5.13-14, 5.15-17, 5.18-19, 5.20, 5.21, 5.23-24, 6.1-2 TC: 26	Performance based funding is rooted in the notion of accountability, of holding higher education institutions to certain standards of quality and to promote them to meet certain benchmarks (Zumeta, 2011). With 26 references, the Texas policymakers are obviously concerned with ensuring Texas higher education institutions meet certain goals and standards. These standards, as evidenced by the main outcomes of the policymakers are market driven.

		The board creates outcomes for higher education institutions to meet (outcomes which are rooted in neoliberalism and part of a much wider rhetoric) and these outcomes are the criterion for judgment of these higher education institutions. Since governance has a direct impact on how higher education institutions contribute to the public good, these outcomes and performance measures (which do not come from Texas policymakers but the wider neoliberal/accountability movement) the public good that Texas higher education institutions foster is largely shaped according to neoliberal ideas. (Tierny, 2006). Again, accountability, framed around efficiency, is the driving principle of neoliberal policies, (Prokou, 2013) and this overriding concern for accountability has trumped the concern for social justice and equity which can serious impact the generation of a vibrant public good. Again, accountability can hinder KM or at least direct it toward more market driven purposes (Cooper, 2009).
References to public-private partnerships and the expertise of the private sector	N/A	N/A
References to tuition un-affordability	N/A	N/A
References to competition	1.14, 1.16	The board shall provide incentives to inspire institutions

	TC: 2	to offer the best product. The use of incentives and competition mechanisms is a staple of neoliberalism (Giroux, 2011; Rhoads & Torres, 2006). The idea is to make institutions compete for incentives because without competition, higher education institutions are thought to be lazy and complacent (Alexander, 2000; Fowler, 2009). In the widest sense, competition is promoted by the Texas policymakers as a superior mechanism to foster the public good.
References to knowledge based economy	N/A	N/A
References to Science Technology Engineering and Mathematics	3.14-27 TC: 2	STEM is a major plank of neoliberal platforms.
References to online instruction	N/A	N/A
Elevation of status/prestige	N/A	N/A
References to Government Oversight	2.5, 2.11-12, 4.4, 4.12, 5.2, 5.23, 5.25-26, 6.3-4, 6.5-9 TC: 9	When the legislature or another entity such as the board (as in Texas) begins to create outcomes (see accountability), this decreases trust between higher education institutions and the legislature. While higher education institutions are asked for input in the Texas policy, the accountability system is still created for them and above them. Trust and social capital are essential to a vibrant public sphere, and especially vital for higher education institutions to contribute to it (Ramaly, 2006). The lack of trust can impede

		higher education institutions from truly contributing to the public good.

Table 4F. Visual Representation of Hegemony in Texas Policy .



Table 5F. Non-hegemonic Chart.

Number in parentheses refers to location in policy, the following number is the frequency, and TC is total count.

Private Non-market benefits and externalities	**Frequency Count**	**How the public good is shaped by the term(s)**
References to health/life expectancy	TC: 2	The health fields are mentioned with STEM and are considered critical fields See critical fields in presupposition chart.
References to poverty reduction/ assistance/financial stability	2.24-27(page break) 3.1-11 4.18-19	There is an entire subsection devoted to the definition of "at-risk" students, as well as an outcome measure devoted to aiding these students. At risk students are students who receive Pell Grant Funding, or 20 years older as entering as an undergraduate, scored lower than the national mean on the SAT or were part-time students. The policymakers

	TC: 2	recognize the existence of students in financial distress. This recognition is particularly important during a time when income disparity-and tuition – is increasing (Zumeta, 2011). Unfortunately, the policy does not connect the fact that the neoliberal underpinning of the policy, namely the attempt to make higher education institutions function like market entities, may be partly responsible for the tuition increase and the increasing inability for "at risk" students to afford college, or for them to have to work while attending college, or delay entry into college (Letizia, 2013). So, while there is necessary attention given to at-risk students, there is also a simple connection is assumed by policymakers; the idea that a top down approach/policy mandate may help to retain at-risk students, when in reality the situation is much more complex and nuanced (Bohman & Deal, 2008; Pusser, 2006). Simple assumptions can stymie the creation of the public good because the public good is created in a dialogue between heterogeneous actors and in the social and political conditions of any society and these complex factors cannot be neglected (Calhoun, 1998; Mansbridge, 1998; Marginson, 2007; Pusser, 2006; Ramaly, 2006). In addition, at risk students are only assumed to be at the community and state colleges, which are cast hierarchally lower than the research universities. The assumptions on the part of the policymakers is that struggling students are only located (or should only be located) at lower institutions. Assumptions of who should be where can lead to a stratified hierarchy of empowered-and less

		empowered-social actors which have an unequal ability to contribute to the public good (Calhoun, 1998; Mansbridge, 1998; Marginson, 2007; Pusser, 2006; Ramaly, 2006).
References to general happiness	N/A	N/A
References to non-market knowledge and research	N/A	N/A
References to art, literature, theater	N/A	N/A
References to cultural diversity	N/A	N/A
References to pedagogy	N/A	N/A
References to college mission	1.24 TC: 1	There is recognition of the unique role and mission of each institution. One of the policy recommendations of PBF 2.0 advocates was for policymakers not to create a universal design or standard, but rather to allow each HEI mission to inform the creation of metrics (Dougherty & Reddy, 2011; Miao, 2012). Despite this admission, and the clause in the policy, there seems to be a major contradiction because the bulk of the policy is dedicated to establishing uniform standards for institutions meet. The only differentiation is between larger research universities on the one hand and state colleges and community colleges on the other. Each set of colleges is supposed to adhere to different outcomes, which are elaborated in the policy. As Ramaly (2006) argues, each higher education institutions contributes to the public good in its own unique and complex way. However the differentiation in the Texas policy may not be enough to allow each unique college in Texas exercise its unique mission because only two types of institutions are recognized and more than this, each

		institution is prescribed certain outcomes it is supposed to promote without any regards for its unique mission.
References to enhancing citizenship/public service/	N/A	N/A
References to liberal arts	N/A	N/A
References to externalities/social benefits	N/A	N/A
References to social transformation/social criticism	N/A	N/A
References to reduced Crime Rate	N/A	N/A
References to glo-na-cal/horizontal linkages	N/A	N/A
References to social contract/state support/resident enrollment	N/A	N/A
References to institutional autonomy	N/A	N/A
References to pollution reduction/clean air	N/A	N/A
References to global citizenship, global public goods/national/regional local goods or publics	N/A	N/A
References to deliberate inter-generational concerns	N/A	N/A
References to just use of STEM	N/A	N/A

Table 6F. Visual Representation of Non-hegemonic Counts in Texas Policy.



Table 7F. Presupposition Table.

Presupposition Type	**Location**	**How presupposition shapes the public good**
"A BILL TO BE ENTITLED AN ACT relating to student success-based funding." (Existential)	1.1-3	The name of the act itself implies that higher education institutions in Texas may not have been promoting student success, and that the legislature needs to promote student success. Student success in the neoliberal sense implies quantifiable goals and standards, such as degrees awarded and credits earned. Success, measured so narrowly can stymie more complex visions of the public good and wider social benefits (Dougherty & Reddy, 2011; McMahon, 2009). PBF funding cannot measure the total impact of higher education institutions on a polity and the public good in general (Kallison & Cohen, 2011).
"To finance a system of higher education and to secure an equitable distribution of state funds…" (existential)	1.9-10	The phrase "to secure an equitable distribution" naturalizes the assumption that equity in institutional funding should be synonymous with quantifiable goals of success, at least in part. This phrasing implies that there is or should be no debate as what should constitute institutional success. However, institutional success is a complex and variable notion (Pusser, 2006; Tierney, 2006). Further, this narrow vision of

		success, and the assumption that this narrow vision of success is equitable, closes the door on other, more abstract ideas of success, such as social non-market benefits (McMahon, 2009). And as Cooper (2009) argues, the more visions of truth we have, the closer we can get to a workable truth. This may hold true for variable notions of the public good.
"allocate resources efficiency and provide incentives for programs of superior quality for institutional diversity…" (change)	1.13-15	The assumption is that prior to this act, resources were not allocated efficiently, now however with the introduction of PBF, resources will be allocated efficiently. Again, the assumption is that PBF funding, which is based on achieving certain success measures, at least in part (10% in Texas) is the most equitable way to distribute funds. The prior way, funding totally by enrollments, is deemed inefficient. Thus, the public good, by this term and the rest of the policy, is framed in efficiency and market terms (Prokou, 2013).
"discourage unnecessary duplication of course offerings between institutions and unnecessary construction on any campus;…" (change)	1.18-20	Again, like the above, the policymakers assume that prior to this act; there was great waste and inefficiency in college course offerings and unnecessary construction on campus. This ties to the belief that public institutions are inefficient and backwards (Harvey, 2005). The PBF policy intends to rectify this shortcoming of the Texas higher education institutions. While efficiency should be part of any vision of the public good, a myopic vision of efficiency can limit creativity and freedom (Fowler, 2009; Kallison & Cohen, 2011; Marginson, 2008; Prokou, 2013).
"Emphasize an alignment with education goals established by the board" (change)	1.21-22	This clause gives the impression that the board's educational goals are beneficial and necessary. These goals are aligned with neoliberalism (Pusser, 2006; Marginson, 2007). Neoliberalism has embedded itself as "common sense" (Fairclough, 1989; Harvey, 2005). However, there is no one vision of truth, not even a liberal or socialist one, rather truth, and the public good are socially constructed and need multiple voices to construct it (Kincheloe, 2007).

"The legislature finds that it is in the state's highest public interest to evaluate student achievement at institutions of higher education and to develop higher education funding policy based on that evaluation." (existential) Funding policies that promote postsecondary educational success based on objective indicators of relative performance, such as degree completion rates, are critical to maintaining the state's competitiveness in the national and global economy and supporting the general welfare of this state. There for, the purpose of this section is to ensure that institutions of higher education produce student outcomes that are directly aligned with the state's education goals and economic development needs."	2.10-22 Similar mentions of PBF and outcomes in 4.12-27 (page break) 5.1-27 (page break) 6.1-4	This clause perhaps more than any other illustrates the public good envisioned by the Texas policymakers. The public good they desire is one that is promoted by student outcomes. Texas policymakers believe that if higher education institutions promote student outcomes, that this will contribute to the public good of Texas. In the next two clauses (which are all included), the policymakers argue that if higher education institutions produce student outcomes, this will contribute to the public good because student outcomes ensure that higher education institutions are maintaining the state's competitive in the national and global economy. This is seen as an existential belief, but also a belief that should guide future policy. Yet, as has been argued elsewhere, this is a simplistic casual assumption (Bohman & Deal, 2008; Morgan, 2006).The fostering of a public good is a complex process (Calhoun, 1998; Mansbridge, 1998) and cannot be boiled down to simplistic causal economic arguments.
"Except as otherwise provided under Subdivision (2), the fields of engineering, computer science, mathematics, physical science, allied health, nursing, and teaching certification in the field of science or mathematics are critical fields. Beginning September 1, 2012, the board, based on the board's determination of those fields of study in which the support and development of post secondary	3.12-27	The Texas policymakers assume that STEM fields are the most crucial for the wellbeing and public good of Texas, as well as the best method to make Texas competitive in the national and global economy. The Texas policymakers have mandated that Texas higher education institutions follow this reasoning as well. This is narrow and shortsighted. For one, as McMahon (2009) argues, it is usually totalitarian countries such as Iran that promote engineering over social sciences. Without social sciences and the humanities, the rule of law in a society, democratic institutions, and the questioning of

education programs at the bachelor's degree are most critically necessary for serving the needs of this state, by rule may: designate as a critical fields a field of study that is not currently designated by this subsection…or removed a field…" (change)		authority on the part of citizens all suffer (McMahon, 2009). Newfield (2008) argues that conservatives specifically took aim at humanities and social science departments in higher education institutions after the events of the 1960s because they inspired dissent. Neoliberal freedom is market freedom, the freedom to make choices between products, but the freedom to create (Marginson, 2008; Stanley, 2007). Philosophical freedom and critical reflection can threaten the functioning of the market, ethics and morals can threaten the functioning of the market, thus STEM disciplines are not seen as threatening to the market because they are not thought to involve critical thinking (Marginson, 2008; Stanley, 2007). The public good is stripped of a critical element and is seen in terms of efficiency and practicality.
"The board shall adopt rules for the administration of this section, including rules requiring each institution of higher education to submit to the board any student data or other information the board considered necessary for the board to carry out its duties under this section." (existential)	6.6-9	The use of the word requires makes it clear that the board can mandate higher education institutions to produce information. The vertical chain of command, from legislature to higher education institutions is the formal method by which higher education institutionsujh benefit society (Richardson & Smalling, 2005). However, higher education institutions need some autonomy to truly contribute to the public good (Ramaly,2006). Higher education institutions are not accountable to outcomes and market only, but to the wider social needs of the state (Dee, 2006). Yet this clause, and the entire policy itself, restrains higher education institutions and does not let them foster the public good, but rather, mandates them to produce outcomes. Further, there this arrangement is seen as natural.
"Funding policies that promote postsecondary educational success based on objective indicators of relative performance." (existential)	2.15	Neoliberalism and its methods are naturalized and are usually taken for granted in US policymaking (Harvey, 2005). This taken for grantedness is clearly evidenced in the use of the term objective. There is a mistaken assumption that outputs and performance indicators are objective and scientific measurements and can

		yield objective information when in reality they are the political language of neoliberalism. As political language, they slant the public good toward a more neoliberal vision.
"At-risk student" means an undergraduate student of an institution of higher education:" (existential)	2.24 (first mention) 3.Bii	The determination of at-risk students places these students in a deficit position. The full-time, 18-24 year old, high achieving student is cast as the norm, when in reality, the "at-risk student" may be becoming the norm (Merisotis, 2011; Pusser, 2008). The attention to at-risk students may also be an implicit assumption on the part of Texas policymakers that Texas higher education institutions were not doing enough to help at-risk students, or at least that a recognition has to be made of at-risk students. The growth of at-risk students is largely connected to the decrease in public expenditure on higher education institutions (Mallot et al., 2013). The separation of the growth of at-risk students and the decrease in funding gives obscures the true, political functioning of the issue (Edmundson & D'Orson, 2007) and gives a false sense of simplicity.

Table 8F. Social Actors Table.

Number in parentheses refers to the location in policy and TC is total count.

Social Actor(s)	**Positioning**	**Location**	**How actor(s) frames public good**
Students enrolled in Texas Higher Education institutions	"A BILL TO BE ENTITLED AN ACT relating to student success-based funding for public institutions of higher education."	First mention 1.1-3 TC: 5	The policy is created for students, specifically for promoting student outcomes. However, students are not empowered, rather they are seen as passive actors with one purpose: to drive the national and global economy. Students are not viewed as citizens, but as workers. This aligns with the narrow vision of human capital espoused by many neoliberals; the view that higher education is akin to a monetary investment

			(Harvey, 2005; Giroux, 2011; Mallot, et al., 2013). However, unlike most neoliberal human capital theory, the Texas policymakers look to the social human capital benefits. Workers are not even viewed as individuals, but rather as methods to enhance the global economy. There is a further subset of students, at-risk students. At risk students are defined as part-time, working full time, receiving a Pell Grant, is 20 years older, or had not gotten above the national mean on the SATs. While the Texas policymakers recognize the growth of at-risk students, which is a correct observation (Pusser, et al., 2009), there is no real empowerment of these types of students. Instead, at-risk students are used as a type of bargaining chip. One of the outcomes based measures for Higher education institutions is to increase the number of at-risk students. However, while there is recognition of the growth of at-risk students, the situation promoting their growth, at least partially (sky-rocketing tuition) is helping to keep them from attending and completing college. So the seeming empowerment actually is a disempowerment.

Texas Higher Education Institutions	"A BILL TO BE ENTITLED AN ACT relating to student success-based funding for public institutions of higher education."	First mention 1.1-3 TC: 6	Texas higher education institutions are not empowered at all. Texas higher education institutions are confined and pigeonholed by strict accountability measures. Of course the goals of accountability measures are important goals, but as has been stressed throughout this study, higher education institutions need to be given some autonomy in order to contribute to the public good (Dee, 2006). Higher education institutions must be accountable to the social needs of the state; further, higher education institutions must engage in necessary social criticism of the government and private institutions (Dee, 2006; Marginson, 2007; Pusser, 2006). Higher education institutions must also engage in KM (Cooper, 2009). Yet, under neoliberalism, there is no recognition of social justice because social justice concerns can impede the functioning of the market (Harvey, 2005; Stanley, 2007). This reflects a larger shift of Higher Education policy. During the 1960s and early 1970s, many higher education institutions policies in the United States and Europe had a focus on social justice, whereas by the 1980s and continuing to the present, the focus had shifted to one of efficiency and accountability (Prokou, 2013). This shift has

			had the effect of stifling organic growth in higher education institutions. Texas higher education institutions are under the boot of neoliberalism and accountability, and thus, there potential to organically grow and meet the social needs of the state- and the public good-may be curtailed. Texas higher education institutions are divided up into public colleges/community colleges, which are seen as places as of remediation, and research universities which are seen as places of degree production. While these divisions may have precedent (Brint & Karabel, 1989), the policymakers may have further stratified community colleges/public colleges and Research universities and further disempowered community colleges and research colleges.
Texas Legislature	"BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISALTURE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS:"	First mention 1.4 TC: 4	The Texas policymakers have detailed exactly how Texas higher education institutions are supposed to contribute to the public good, and this is by bolstering the national and global economy (Bowen, 1996). In order to do this, the legislature has prescribed outcomes that higher education. There is a simple assumption that by higher education institutions meeting outcomes this will a) bolster the national and global

			economy and b) enhance the public good. The Texas legislature has set the terms of the new social contract between HEI's and the state of Texas (Kallison & Cohen, 2011). Texas higher education institutions are supposed to meet certain outcomes in order to contribute to national and global economy, and Texas higher education institutions are given support based on how well they meet these targets (Lewis & Hearn, 2003. However, PBF policies do not provide a true assessment of learning. Instead, legislatures and higher education institutions need a new social contract to measure civic contributions of Higher Education (Dee, 2006; Kallison & Cohen, 2011). Thus, the new social contract between Texas higher education institutions and the state of Texas, while it does promote important goals, still may be shortsighted because it does not allow Texas higher education institutions to grow organically and act as vehicles of social criticism and/or transformation which is integral to promoting a vibrant public good (Dee, 2006; Kallison &Cohen, 2011).
The Board	"emphasize an alignment with education goals	First mention 1.22	The board has tremendous power over Texas higher education institutions. The

	established by the board."	TC: 20	board had created educational goals which Texas higher education institutions have to adhere to.
State of Texas	"The legislature finds that is in the state's highest public interest to evaluate student achievement at institutions of higher education and to develop higher education funding policy based on that evaluation."	Prior to section 1 TC: 1	The policymakers directly reference the public good/welfare of the state of Texas. However the public good is only cast in terms of the national and global economy. Again, this is typical of neoliberal visions of the public good. (Harvey, 2004). More accurately, there is no true public good in neoliberalism, but rather, an aggregate of private and individual wills (Giroux, 2011; Mallot et al., 2013). Thus, the market emphasis of Texas policymakers does not recognize, or at least does not make mention of, a communal vision of the public good.

Appendix G

Arkansas

Table 1G. Inputs-Processes-Outputs-Outcomes.

Number in parentheses represents location in policy.

Inputs	**Processes**	**Outputs**	**Outcomes**
"The Department of Higher Education, in collaboration with the state college and university presidents and chancellors, shall develop funding formulas consisting of a needs-based component and an outcome-centered component which will, in principle, seek to provide fair and equitable state support to all post-secondary students…" (2.11-16)	"[state recognition of] (1) The different needs for the lower level, upper level, and graduate level instruction at the various institutions" (2.18-19)	"AN ACT TO PROMOTE ACCOUNTABILITY AND EFFICIENCY AT STATE-SUPPORTED INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION…" (1.9-10)	"The model shall hold universities accountable for increasing the educational attainment levels of Arkansas citizens by: Addressing the state's economic development and workforce needs" (4.6-9)
"[state recognition of] (2) The requirements for specialized equipment, labs, and smaller class sizes in some disciplines…" (2.20-21) 2	Satisfactory progression, matriculation 3.4-6 (6.12-17) (4.22-27)	Graduation rates...3.4-6 (6.12-17) (4.22-27)	"*Hold two year* colleges accountable for increasing the educational attainment levels of Arkansas citizens by: Addressing the state's economic development and workforce needs…" (4.31-32)
"The outcome-centered component shall constitute twenty-five percent (25%) of funding for two-year colleges and	"The department shall consider the unique factors of each two year college and university when developing the	"Certificate and degree completion" (6.21) 2	"EMERGENCY CLAUSE. It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that there is an

universities by the 2017-2018 school year and shall be phased in at a rate [of]five percent (5%) per year beginning in the 2013-2014 school year." 3	outcome-centered component…" (3.7-11)		increasing need to ensure accountability and efficiency with our limited financial resources in trying economic times; that clarifying the funding mechanisms for state supported institutions of education will allow the limited financial resources to be allocated in a fair and equitable manner; and that this act is immediately necessary because funding for state-supported institutions is necessary for the 2012-2013 academic year. (7.19-26)
"The needs-based component shall constitute seventy-five (75%) of funding for two-year colleges and universities by the 2017-2018 school year." (2.35-36) 4	"[state recognition of] (3) Unique missions such as agricultural extension services, research, medical sciences, workforce development, and public service and growth, economies of scale…" (2.22-23).	"number of graduates from underserved populations…" (3.21)	"Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this at being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on…" (7.26-29)
"The model shall ensure adequate, equitable, and stable funding and be based on reliable and uniform data. (3.34-35) page break (4.1-2). (5.22-24)	"End of course enrollment" 3. 14	"Degree completion" (4.30) 4	x

"Each university's total state funding received shall be calculated at: (95%) in 2013-14 for enrollment and (5%) for outcomes, and (75%)for enrollment in 2017-2018 and (25%) for outcomes." (4.36) page break (5.1-17)	"student retention" 3.15	"number of credentials awarded, including an emphasis on high-demand credentials…" (3.17-18)	x
"Each two-year college's total state funding received shall be calculated at: (95%) for enrollment and (5%) for meeting outcomes in 2013-2014 and (75%) for enrollment and (25%) for meeting outcomes in 2016-2017. " (6.28-36) page break (7.1-7.7) 7	"student progression toward credential completion…" (3.16)	Promoting increased degree production while maintaining a higher level of rigor…" (4.10-11) 6	x
	"research activity…" (3.20)	Minority students" "Economically (4.34)disadvantaged students;" "Nontraditional students" (4.35)	
x	"The model shall be simple to understand, sensitive to universities differing missions, and responsive to changes…" (4.3-4)	x	x
x	"…allowing for collaboration…" (4.13)	x	x

x	"…and minimal redundancy in degree offerings and competitive research" (4.13-14)	x	x
x	"The model shall address institutional accountability for the quality of instruction and student learning, including remedial instruction" (4.17-18) (6.4-6)	x	x
x	The outcome-centered funding formula model shall take into consideration, at a minimum: course completion…" (4.28-29)	x	x
x	"Critical needs shortage areas" (4.32)	x	x
x	"…promote a seamless and integrated system of postsecondary education designed to meet the needs of all students" (6.2-3)	x	x
x	"AN ACT TO PROMOTE ACCOUNTABILITY AND EFFICIENCY AT STATE-SUPPORTED INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION…" (1.9-10)	x	x

Table 2G. Visual Representation of Input-Process-Output-Outcome Counts in Arkansas Policy .



Table 3G.

Hegemony/Discourse chart

Number in parentheses refers to location in policy, and TC is total count.

Hegemonic/Neoliberal Term/Notion	**Location/ Frequency**	**How the term shapes the public good**
References to the market/economic growth/ revenue and profit generation investment/ commercialization	(1.13), (2.24), (3.8), (5.31-32), (7.19-28) TC: 5	Like all other policies examined in this study, the Arkansas PBF's main outcome is to address the state's economic development and workforce needs. Again, this is in direct alignment with neoliberal priorities and values, the smooth functioning of the market is valued above all, even if the market needs government intervention to sustain it (Harvey, 2005; Marginson, 2008). However, the Arkansas policymakers,

		more than simply aligning the policy with neoliberal values, they have declared an emergency (in section 8). Due to "trying economic times" accountability efficiency are necessary. This is strong language but by no means original. Rather, this is a manifestation of disaster capitalism (Klein, 2007). As Klein (2007) argues, neoliberals either trump up or downright create an emergency or crisis, and swoop in to fix it with neoliberal/free-market methods. Here, the Arkansas policymakers have seized on the current economic anxiety (created in large part by similar neoliberal policies) and seek to "rescue" higher education with further neoliberal interventions. It is very questionable of how well the public good can be served with neoliberal policy interventions modeled after the free-market interventions which, at least in part, help precipitate the current economic crisis (Prokou, 2013).
References to efficiency, optimal use of resources	(1.9), (5.36), (7.21), (4.15), (6.2) TC: 5	The five references to efficiency in the Arkansas policy are telling; they decry the supposed redundancy and waste in the public higher education system by calling to eliminate "redundancy in course offerings." While this is not to deny that redundant course offerings do not exist, this language mirrors the neoliberal attack on higher education institutions since the late 1970s (Burke, 2005; Harvey 2005; Prokou, 2013), that of waste and inefficiency.
References to vocational/workforce training and human capital/ job creation	(2.23), (4.7), (5.31), TC:3	See above.
References to accountability and performance	(1.9), (2.14), (2.30), (3.2-3) (3.4-6), (3.7-	What we may be witnessing the rewriting of the social contract between

	11), (3.12-21) (4.6-7), (4.10), (4.23-27), (4.28-35), (5.1-17), (5.29-30), (5.33), (6.4-5), (6.12-17), (6. 18-25), (6.28-36) page break (7.1-7), (7.21-24) TC: 19	the polity and higher education institutions. The public good in neoliberalism is not a communal thing, but rather an aggregate of individual wills (Calhoun, 1998; Giroux, 2011; Mansbridge, 1998). As Prokou (2013) has noted, the shift of higher education policy globally has been one from social justice to accountability. The 19 references to accountability (as well as the three references to efficiency) would seem to support Prokou's (2013) claim. There is no mention of social justice in this policy, but rather, an emergency of trying economic terms which demands accountability and efficiency measures to be implemented. A public good without a sense of social justice, equity or humanism (things which this policy does not promote) is not a real public good at all (Giroux, 2011).
References to public-private partnerships and the expertise of the private sector	N/A	N/A
References to tuition un-affordability	N/A	N/A
References to competition	(4.14) TC: 1	There was one reference to competitive research. This can be interpreted in a number of ways. For one, competitive research was mentioned in the same clause as eliminating redundancy, so it could refer to
References to knowledge based economy	N/A	N/A
References to Science Technology Engineering and Mathematics	(4.32), (6.22) TC: 2	While STEM is not directly mentioned, there are two references to "critical fields." Again, we cannot read the policymakers minds, but when critical fields were mentioned in other policies, they were defined as STEM fields.

References to online instruction	N/A	N/A
Elevation of status/prestige	N/A	N/A
References to Explicit Government Oversight	(Section 8, lines 7.19-35) TC: 1	The Arkansas policymakers have declared an emergency and outcome based measures as the only way to stave off disaster. What is paradoxical about this logic is that neoliberal policy recommendations are employed, but in a truly neoliberal vision of society, the market, not the government, would take care of all social problems (Harvey, 2005; Marginson, 2008). Thus, the intervention to make HEI's more market like entities violates a crucial principle of neoliberalism, or at the very least illustrates that some level of government intervention is necessary to support the market. The implication for the public good is an admission that government can and must be used to sometimes prop up the market and ensure favorable conditions for market functioning. While many neoliberals do begrudgingly admit that some government intervention is necessary (Plant, 2010), many do not. In short, the market cannot exist without some prior political agreement (Carrier, 1997; Marginson, 2008). See market growth also.

Table 4G. Visual Representation of Hegemony Counts in Arkansas Policy.



Table 5G. Non-hegemonic chart.

Number in parentheses refers to location in policy, the following number is the frequency, and TC is total count.

Private Non-market benefits and externalities	**Frequency Count/Location**	**How the public good is shaped by the term(s)**
References to health/life expectancy	N/A	N/A
References to poverty reduction/ assistance/financial stability	4.33-35 and 6.33-35 TC: 2	The graduation of low income, minority and nontraditional students is an outcome set for higher education institutions to reach. The recognition of changing demographics, income levels and status (i.e. part-time, students with familial obligations) is important because all three types of students are growing and higher education institutions need to understand their unique challenges and needs (Fowler, 2009). More diverse students (diverse in race, status, age etc) with a college degree means increased civic participation of these groups, and the more actors which participate equals a more vibrant public good (McMahon, 2009) Of course, as mentioned earlier, the growing income divide is making it more

		difficult to for low income students and nontraditional students to attend higher education. So the recognition of the growth of this type of student is positive, but there is no recognition of the causes behind this growth, which in part can be traced to neoliberal policies.
References to general happiness	N/A	N/A
References to non-market knowledge and research/information content creators	N/A	N/A
References to art, literature, theater	N/A	N/A
References to cultural diversity	TC: 2 (same as poverty reduction)	See poverty reduction.
References to pedagogy	(2.18-19), (4.18), (6.5) TC: 3	The first mention of pedagogy in line 2.18 calls for a clear differentiation of lower level, upper level and graduate level education at the various institutions. The other references call for addressing the quality of instruction and student learning. The question of what the policymakers consider good pedagogy however is unclear. We can infer from the outcomes of the policy that good pedagogy should be akin to workforce training and economic development. However, the policymakers do make two references to public service. The four references to pedagogy are important. Pedagogy is one of the implicit purposes of higher education (Lattuca & Stark, 2009). Thus, the quality of pedagogy has a direct impact on the public good. What is taught, how well it is taught and how learners can apply their knowledge are all problematic issues and difficult to assess, nonetheless, are crucial to any college's mission.
References to college mission	(2.22-23), (4.3-4), (4.12-13)	The first mention of a higher education institutions unique mission lists specific

	TC: 3	special higher education institutions missions; agricultural extension, research, medical sciences, workforce development and public service, growth and economies of scale. While some are vague (such as public service and growth) and while some align primarily with neoliberalism (workforce training), the recognition of individual missions especially that of public service, is a crucial factor in promoting the public good of any polity (Dee, 2006).
References to enhancing citizenship/public service/	N/A	N/A
References to liberal arts	N/A	N/A
References to externalities/social benefits	N/A	N/A
References to social transformation/social criticism	N/A	N/A
References to reduced Crime Rate/safety	N/A	N/A
References to interdisciplinarity/ global linkages	N/A	N/A
References to social contract/state support/resident enrollment	(4.7), (5.30) TC: 2	The Arkansas policymakers desire to increase the educational attainment levels of Arkansas citizens. In this statement, there is an implicit recognition of the social contract between a higher education institutions and the state it is located in, namely to educate the citizens of that state (Bowen, 1996; Lewis & Hearn, 2003). However, the policymakers specifically state that they want to increase the educational attainment of Arkansas citizens by addressing the state's economic development and workforce needs. The traditional social contracts between higher education institutions and polity are not strictly based on market links, but much broader and inclusive of diverse ideas (Bowen, 1996; McMahon, 2009).

		Neoliberalism is rooted in a firm individualist ethos (Harvey, 2005). However, Arkansas vision of the social contract is rooted in a more collectivist notion where the needs of the market and state subsume the needs of the individual, or at least the clause could be interpreted this way.
References to institutional autonomy	N/A	N/A
References to pollution reduction/clean air	N/A	N/A
References to global citizenship, global public goods/national/regional local goods or publics	(2.23), (7.28) TC: 2	There were two mentions of public service. The references were in regards to specialized institutional mission. See institutional mission above.
References to deliberate inter-generational concerns	N/A	N/A
References to just use of STEM	N/A	N/A

Table 6G. Visual Representation of Non-hegemonic Counts in Arkansas Policy.



Table 7G. Presupposition Table.

Presupposition Type	**Location**	**How presupposition shapes the public good**
"The Department of Higher Education, collaboration with the state college and university presidents and chancellors, shall develop formulas consisting of a needs-based component and an outcome-centered component which will, in principle, seek to provide fair and equitable state support to all postsecondary students…" (existential) "The funding formulas for two year colleges and universities shall be comprised of a needs-based component…and an outcome-centered component: (existential) "The funding formula model for universities shall serve as a framework for implementing the broad goals of the State of Arkansas and the Arkansas Higher Education Coordinating Board" (existential)	2.9-17 2.25-30 3.34-36	The use of the word "shall" in the presuppositions at left indicates that Arkansas policymakers assume that outcome-centered funding can provide fair and equitable state support to all public higher education institutions. This seems to be a universal assumption on the part of virtually all neoliberals and higher education policymakers that outcome based funding is equitable because it is aligned with the market (Dee, 2006; Tierney, 2006). This is an existential presupposition because there seems to be no debate regarding the potential of PBF policies (or at least there is some reservation, see below). The public good and its resources are cast as quantifiable entities and simple goals to be reached. These goals can further be achieved with simple policy measures. The public good in this view is simple and easy to classify. The phrase "in principle" seems to be recognition that outcome funding may not be a cure all, or it may give policymakers an escape option if PBF policies do not work as planned.
"The outcome-centered component shall seek to promote and increase the satisfactory progression, matriculation, and graduation of all students enrolled	3.4-6	The use of the word "shall" demonstrates two assumptions held by the Arkansas policymakers. The first is an unquestioned assumption that an outcome centered component can increase the desired outcomes, and thus an existential

in two-year colleges and universities" (change and existential) "The outcome-centered component may include without (a) End-of-course enrollment (b) Student retention (c) Student progression toward credential completion; (d) Number of credentials awarded, including an emphasis on higher demand credentials (e) Student transfer activity (f) Research activity: and (g) Number of graduate from underserved populations "…the Arkansas Higher Education Coordinating Board shall develop and outcome-centered funding formula model that implements the broad goals for the state in subsection (a) of this section and seeks to promote and increase the satisfactory progression, matriculation, and graduation of all students enrolled in state-supported institution of higher education." (existential) "The outcome-centered funding formula shall take into consideration, at a minimum:	3.12-26 4.22-27 (repeated again in 6.12-17) 4.28-35 (repeated again in 6.18-25)	presupposition. This is extremely simplistic casual reasoning, namely that a PBF policy can increase degree production and matriculation (Bohman & Deal, 2008; Morgan, 2006). Graduation and matriculation are events that ensue only by a complex array of external impacts and internal behaviors. Thus to assume that a policy can promote these desired behaviors is naïve. Many other actions need to be taken in order to promote degree increases, such as cultural shifts like college coaching and in the most extreme, income redistribution. The second assumption of the policymakers is that degree conferral and matriculation are the most beneficial outcomes that a college can produce. As Dee (2006) argues, in the highest sense, higher education institutions are supposed to contribute to the public good. Matriculation and diplomas should only be seen as outputs on the way to a much more pervasive outcome, that of providing wide reaching social benefits and the enhancing the public good (Dee, 2006; McMahon, 2009). The Arkansas policymakers do not recognize any higher call for higher education institutions to pursue, only limited outputs and outcomes rooted solely in the market. The public good is cast a causally simple notion, which can further be enhanced by increased higher education institutions outputs like degrees and matriculation. This is also a change presupposition because the writing of the clause makes is appear that prior AR HEI policy was not achieving these goals.

(a) Course completion (b) Degree completion (c) Critical needs shortage areas (d) Minority students (e) Economically disadvantaged students; and (f) Nontraditional students (existential)		
"The department shall consider the unique factors of each two-year college and university when developing the outcome-centered component, including utilizing variables that may be weighted to reinforce the mission of each two-year college and university…" (existential)	3.7-11	There is an implicit assumption that the unique factors of each two year institution can adequately be given due consideration with the implementation of outcome-centered funding, thus the label of existential. The recognition of individual missions was a recommendation by virtually all policy scholars who urged PBD funding (Dougherty & Reddy, 2011; Harnish, 2011; Miao, 2012; Quinterno, 2011). However, PBF policies, whole they are all different and unique, are mainly designed to make higher education institutions achieve alignment with the market (Mallot et al., 2006). Thus, there is an element at least of coercion in these policies which necessarily restricts higher education institutions autonomy to pursue the public good as it sees fit. And this autonomy is a staple of higher education institutions ability to pursue the public good (Dee, 2006).
"It is the intent of the General Assembly that the outcome-centered component of funding formulas for two-year colleges and universities become the primary component for funding purposes." (change)	3.27-29	The policy has the outcome centered portion of the funding increasing to 25% by 2018-2019. However, this clause makes it seem as if the policymakers will go increase the outcome funding portion to 100% in the future. Thus, it is a change presupposition because funding is not yet at 100%.
"The model shall hold universities accountable for increasing the educational attainment levels of Arkansas citizens by: Addressing the state's	4.6-9	This is an existential presupposition because the policymakers labor under the assumption that educational attainment is synonymous with the state's economic development. There is no mention of the social benefits of higher

economic development and workforce needs." (existential)		education or the traditional social contract of between higher education and the polity (Lewis & Hearn, 2003; McMahon, 2009). Again, the public good is assumed to be equivalent to the market.
"…and allowing for collaboration and minimal redundancy in degree offerings…" "The model shall promote a seamless and integrated system of postsecondary education designed to meet the needs of all students" (change)	4.13 4.15-16	These are blatant change presuppositions because the policymakers assume that the Arkansas system of higher education prior to the implementation of this policy was inefficient and unable to meet the needs of students. This rhetoric aligns with the larger rhetoric of neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005; Mallot et al., 2013; Prokou, 2013). Neoliberals hold that HEI's and public entities in general are not efficient and must be aligned with the market so they can stop wasting tax-dollars. The public good manifested by this version is grounded mainly in the notion of efficiency (Prokou, 2013).
"It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas that there is an increasing need to ensure accountability and efficiency with our limited financial resources in trying economic times; that clarifying the funding mechanisms for state-supported institutions of education will allow the limited financial resources to be allocated in a fair and equitable manner; and that this act is immediately necessary because funding for state supported institutions is necessary for the 2012-2013 academic year. Therefore, an emergency is declared to exist and this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety shall become effective on…"	7.19-29	Perhaps no statement/clause is more indicative of neoliberalism than this one. As mentioned earlier, this clause invokes a crisis and poses the free-market measures and accountability systems as the solution to that crisis. Klein (2007) describes this as disaster capitalism. This is right from the Milton Friedman playbook. Freidman argued that capitalists must take advantage of existing crises and in the most extreme, create a crisis and then exploit it. As Klein (2007) describes, the crisis used to be the means to the end (profit), whereas now the crisis *is* the end. She calls this: The Shock Doctrine." The passage at left is an existential statement because the policymakers take it for granted that there is a crisis: "Therefore, an emergency is declared." Who has declared this emergency? Does the Arkansas legislature have the ability or the knowledge to declare such a state? What are the roots of this emergency? As has been mentioned previously, the roots of this crisis are neoliberalism. The continued decline of state funds is not an accident, but rather a deliberate act to "discipline" higher education (Rhoads &

(existential)		Torres, 2006). And yet, at the same time, Arkansas policymakers have declared an emergency due to the decrease that they, or least those of their ilk, are supporting! Thus, the emergency and the pretext for capitalist and accountability interventions are disingenuous. The public good is cast as in danger, especially with the usage of the phrase: "this act being immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety." The very elements of public good are invoked and said to be danger. The public good shaped in this passage is one of fear and uncertainty. Accountability measures are promoted by the policymakers as the only way to restore the public good.

Table 8G. Social Actors Chart.

Number in parentheses refers to the location in policy and TC is total count.

Social Actor(s)	**Positioning**	**Location**	**How actor(s) frames public good**
Arkansas Department of Higher Education	"Funding formula-Department of Higher education." (first mention)	2.10 first mention TC: 4	The ADE is to work in collaboration with the presidents and chancellors of the various universities in the state to develop the needs and outcome funding portions of the formula. While on the surface it seems that the ADE and the various presidents have a significant amount of power, they really do not. Their power is circumscribed because they can only act within the confines of outcome based policies. The power structure looks like this 1. General Assembly and Governor

			2. Arkansas Higher Education Coordinating Board 3. (a) Arkansas Department of Education and (b) Arkansas College presidents and chancellors Outcomes are drafted by the ADE in collaboration with Presidents and Chancellors. The power relation between the ADE and the Presidents is unclear. This draft is then presented to the AHECB. The AHECB then must approve it and submit it to the General Assembly and the Governor. As with all the other PBF policies, there is a hierarchy created. In this hierarchy and HEI's themselves are not even represented, only the administration level with the presidents and chancellors. This vertical hierarchy, and the notion of government oversight, at least on the surface, is antithetical to neoliberalism, but on closer inspection, aligns with neoliberalism perfectly (Harvey, 2005). Neoliberals do not want government regulation of the market, but they generally desire regulation of entities which have the power to disrupt or question the market (Harvey, 2005; Stanley, 2007). Neoliberalism and neoconservatism find common ground in the suppression of forces which threaten the

			market (Harvey, 2005; Newfield, 2008; Stanley, 2007). While this policy has strands of neoliberalism and neoconservatism, it would seem that neoliberalism is the main outcome (market focus) but this outcome will be accomplished by using neoconservative methods (control).
State College and University presidents and chancellors	"The Department of Higher Education, in collaboration with the state college and university presidents and chancellors, shall develop funding formulas consisting of a needs-based component and a needs based component…"	2.11-14 (first mention) TC: 1	See above.
Postsecondary students	"…seek to provide fair and equitable state support to all postsecondary students across the state…"	2.15-16 (first mention) TC: 6	Postsecondary students are the focus of the policy. However there is an implicit assumption that equitable state support for all students can be achieved by implementing outcome based funding.
Public four year institutions in Arkansas	"The funding formula model for universities shall serve as a framework for implementing the broad goals..."	3.34-36 (first mention) TC: 8	Both community colleges and four year institutions are treated as completely passive actors. Community colleges and four year higher education institutions are not given any agency to promote their specific visions of the public good (Dee, 2006). Without agency, both community colleges and four year higher education institutions must submit to the

			outcome's laid down by the ABE and AHECB and ultimately the General Assembly. The curtailment of community colleges and four year higher education institutions agency is indicative of neoliberalism and neoconservatism . There has been a fear of the power of the public university since the 1960s to disrupt the status quo and the market (Newfield, 2008). It would seem that Arkansas policymakers have put restraints on Arkansas higher education institutions similar to the other states in this study. There is also no mention of faculty members or the role of staff. There is no mention of academic freedom. Academic freedom and institutional missions are important factors in higher education institutions producing the public good (Dee, 2006; Ramlay, 2006). Another crucial component to establishing the public good is KM (Cooper, 2009). All higher education institutions in Arkansas are restricted and made to pursue arbitrary outcomes, and thus their ability to pursue KM is most likely curtailed.
Two year colleges	"The funding formulas for two year colleges…:	2.28 (first mention) TC: 13	See above.

Arkansas General Assembly	"BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF ARKANSAS:"	1.23 TC: 4	The Pro Tempore of the Senate/Speaker of the House/Governor have to ultimately approve the outcome measures, which determine how the individual universities are funded. Thus, these three positions have been vested with tremendous power. Alexander (2000) argued that during the last half of the 20th century, state legislatures began to assume more control over higher education institutions because there was a growing consensus among policymakers and their private sector allies that higher education was too important to be left to the colleges themselves. Higher education institutions were seen as vital to workforce training and the growing global economy, and the could not be weighted down with the airy and abstract concerns they had pursued in the 1960s (Alexander, 2000; Newfield, 2008).
Pro Tempore of the Senate/Speaker of the House/Governor	"The Arkansas Higher Education Coordinating Board shall review the funding formulas set forth in this subchapter biennially and make written recommendations for appropriate modifications or changes to the President Pro	7.11-17 TC: 1	See above

	Tempore of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the **Governor** by October of the year prior to each regular session of the General Assembly.		
Arkansas Higher Education Coordinating Board	"The **Arkansas Higher Education Coordinating Board** shall review the funding formulas set forth in this subchapter biennially and make written recommendations for appropriate modifications or changes to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the **Governor** by October of the year prior to each regular session of the General Assembly."	7.11-17 (there are other mentions of the AHECB in the policy, but this is the clearest and most concise) TC: 6	While the ADE and the presidents and chancellors draft the outcomes to be reached, the AHECB must approve them. There are two layers of board oversight. And as Zumeta (2001) argues, boards, which at one acted as buffers from institutions from the outside world, are now increasingly stocked with corporate allies. The two layers of boards ensure that corporate interests, such as the ultimate outcome of the policy, workforce training, will be met.
Arkansas Citizens	"The model shall hold universities accountable for increasing the educational attainment levels of Arkansas citizens…" "Hold two-year colleges accountable for increasing the	4.67 TC: 2	Increasing the educational attainment levels of Arkansas citizens is one of the main outcomes of the policy. Arkansas policymakers are fulfilling part of the social contract between higher education institutions and the polity by ensuring that Arkansas higher education institutions are aiding Arkansas citizens. The way Arkansas policymakers intend

	educational attainment levels of Arkansas citizens…"	5.29-30	to accomplish this is by aligning citizen's interest with the market. This aligns with neoliberal theory (Harvey, 2005; Mallot, et al., 2013). The equation of human beings with market interests, the assumption that human beings are simply workers is the foundation of neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005; Mallot et al., 2013). Human beings are not assumed to have any other qualities except their abilities to truck and barter. The Arkansas policymakers do not mention social justice, social transformation or any other non-market potentials of higher education institutions (Newfield, 2008)
Minority/economically disadvantaged/nontraditional students	"The outcome-centered funding formula model shall take into consideration, at a minimum… (D) Minority students; (E) Economically disadvantaged students; and (F) Nontraditional students"	4.33-35 and 6.33-35 TC: 6	See non-hegemonic chart.

Appendix H

Composite Charts

Table 1H. Composite Hegemonic References Chart (42.5 Standard Pages)



Table 2H. Composite Externality Chart (42.5 Standard Pages)



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