

Title: Evaluating optimal removal of derelict blue crab pots in Virginia, US

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Abstract

Derelict fishing gear is a growing concern in many fisheries and coastal communities. Pots and traps are prevalent forms of derelict fishing gear with numerous documented harmful effects. In the Chesapeake Bay, US, a large blue crab (*Callinectes sapidus*) pot fishery produces high levels of derelict gear. From 2008 to 2014, 34,408 derelict pots were removed from blue crab fishing areas in Virginia. This research first evaluates whether observed increases in catch rates occurring contemporaneously with the removal program were the result of derelict gear removals. An econometric production model is then used to estimate marginal removal benefits and assess optimal removal levels. Fishing locations with removals during the removal program were estimated to have experienced increases in harvest per pot and harvest per trip of 22.35% and 34.68%, respectively. Optimal removal levels were found to depend on location-specific fishing effort, with high-effort areas yielding greater marginal removal benefits. Fishery productivity gains, though large, were found to last only one year following removals. Assuming a removal cost of \$100/pot, the optimal level of removals was estimated to be over 7,000 pots/year and would generate productivity gains of ~17-18%, yielding over US \$3M in annual net benefits to the commercial fishery. Optimizing mitigation and management strategies for derelict fishing gear and marine debris requires quantitative assessment of the benefits and costs of alternative policy measures.

Keywords: derelict fishing gear, blue crab, marine debris, translog production model, policy design

Highlights

- Removal of derelict pots in Virginia increased productivity by over 20%
- Optimal derelict gear removal policies balance marginal benefits and marginal costs
- In Virginia, optimal derelict gear removal would yield US ~\$3M in annual net benefits

1 **1. Introduction**

2 Derelict fishing gear includes nets, lines, pots and traps, and other recreational or
3 commercial fishing equipment that has been lost, abandoned, or otherwise discarded (UNEP
4 2005). It can make up a significant proportion of ocean-based marine debris in coastal areas
5 (National Research Council 2008) and may be caused by several factors, such as human error,
6 intentional abandonment, gear conflicts and vessel-gear interactions, vandalism and theft, faulty,
7 degraded, or failed equipment, and storms and weather (Macfadyen et al. 2009; FAO 2010;
8 Bilkovic et al. 2016; FAO 2016). The availability of synthetic materials in modern times has
9 increased the efficiency, durability, and lifespan of gear in many fisheries, and derelict gear may
10 persist in marine environments for several years (e.g., Havens et al. 2008; Gilman et al. 2013;
11 Maselko et al. 2013; Arthur et al. 2014; Uhlmann and Broadhurst 2015). The accumulation and
12 effects of derelict fishing gear (lines, nets, pots and traps) has been recognized as a global
13 problem (e.g., Hérbert et al. 2001; UN General Assembly resolution 59/25, 2004; Matsuoka et al.
14 2005; Bilkovic et al. 2012; Uhlmann and Broadhurst 2015; Richardson et al. 2019), and many
15 coastal areas are now grappling with how to most effectively assess and manage the issue
16 (Jeffrey et al. 2016; FAO 2016; Goodman et al. 2019).

17 Pots and traps are passive gear typically fished in large numbers and are thought to be
18 one of the most common types of derelict gear worldwide (Macfadyen et al. 2009; Richardson et
19 al. 2019). Many crustacean fisheries utilize pot and trap gear and are plagued by persistently high
20 gear loss rates (Jeffrey et al. 2016; Scheld et al. 2016), with storms and vessel-gear interactions
21 frequently noted as primary causes of loss (Antonelis et al. 2011; Bilkovic et al. 2016; Uhrin
22 2016; Richardson et al. 2019). Derelict pots and traps have been found to cause a variety of
23 detrimental ecological and economic impacts, such as bycatch mortality for target and non-target
24 species (Antonelis et al. 2011; Maselko et al. 2013; Bilkovic et al. 2016), habitat damage (Arthur
25 et al. 2014), and reduction of fishery harvests (Scheld et al. 2016). Additionally, many pots and
26 traps utilize vinyl-coated metal wiring or other plastic components and thus contribute to marine
27 plastic pollution, which may be in violation of international agreements if gear is intentionally
28 discarded or abandoned (e.g., Annex V of MARPOL, Basel Convention).

29 Harvest losses due to derelict pots and traps can arise as a result of reductions in
30 harvestable stock (Macfadyen et al. 2009; Bilkovic et al. 2012; Uhlmann and Broadhurst 2015)
31 as well as through gear externalities (Scheld et al. 2016; DelBene et al. 2019). High rates of

32 capture and mortality by derelict pots and traps can reduce the biomass available to commercial
33 and recreational fisheries (Antonelis et al. 2011; Bilkovic et al. 2016), though it is often uncertain
34 whether or not animals captured by derelict gear would have been caught through the fishery in
35 its absence. Reductions in gear efficiency of the active fishery—rates of catch and harvest—may
36 also occur, independently of any changes in stock abundance. It is widely accepted that fish and
37 crustaceans are frequently attracted to structure, floating objects, and complex habitat (Orth et al.
38 1984; Walsh 1985; Heck and Crowder 1991; Eggleston et al. 1998; Castro et al. 2002). Derelict
39 pots and traps may attract or capture target and bycatch species, making them unavailable to
40 commercial and recreational fishers, even if mortality does not ultimately result (Bilkovic et al.
41 2016; Scheld et al. 2016; DelBene et al. 2019).

42 In the Chesapeake Bay, derelict blue crab (*Callinectes sapidus*) pots are thought to cause
43 economic losses due to both reduced biomass and reductions in gear efficiency. Commercial blue
44 crab pots are 0.6m x 0.6m x 0.6m rigid wire mesh cubes with an upper and lower chamber and
45 have been found to fish for two years or more after becoming derelict (Havens et al. 2008).
46 About a third of harvesters in Virginia fish with vinyl-coated pots (DelBene 2020), which may
47 persist in the environment for longer. Bilkovic et al. (2016) estimated that derelict pots capture
48 approximately six million harvestable blue crab annually, of which roughly three million are
49 killed. The fishing mortality target reference point for the stock is set at 25.5% of mature
50 females, and typically between 20% and 30% of all adults are harvested each year (CBSAC
51 2019). This suggests that, of the three million blue crab killed annually by derelict pots, a little
52 under one million would have been captured in the active fishery had the derelict pots not been
53 present. Though significant, such losses represent less than 1% of total annual fishery harvests.
54 Losses arising due to gear externalities and competition between actively fished and derelict pots
55 are potentially much greater. Scheld et al. (2016) evaluated the effects of a six-year derelict pot
56 removal program on commercial blue crab harvests in Virginia by developing a production
57 model that incorporated spatially and temporally resolved data on harvests, fishing effort, blue
58 crab abundance, and removals. Comparing harvest model predictions under the removal program
59 that existed and a hypothetical scenario of no removals, the authors found that removing derelict
60 pots increased harvests by 27% (Scheld et al. 2016). A subsequent experimental study by
61 DelBene et al. (2019) demonstrated gear competition can reduce active blue crab fishery harvests
62 by more than 30%, suggesting economic losses arising due to derelict pots may be considerable.

63 Socially efficient environmental policies balance marginal social costs and marginal
64 social benefits (Baumol and Oates 1988). Control of marine debris and derelict fishing gear can
65 be viewed as a problem of waste management or environmental pollution control, and thus
66 balancing the incremental costs and benefits of marine debris reduction should be considered in
67 designing optimal policies (McIlgorm et al. 2011). Previous studies investigating the costs and
68 benefits of derelict gear removals have analyzed total or average values, assessing net benefits
69 and whether removals, in total or on average, are socially beneficial (e.g., Gilardi et al. 2010;
70 Antonelis et al. 2011; Scheld et al. 2016). Optimal program design requires analysis of marginal
71 removal benefits and costs however, such that a net benefit maximum can be identified.

72 This research addresses several remaining questions regarding the economic benefits of
73 derelict pot removals and optimal program design. The analysis of Scheld et al. (2016) occurred
74 directly following the conclusion of the removal program and the authors did not consider
75 potential lagged effects. It is therefore not known whether the harvest benefits of removals
76 arising from reduced gear externalities occur in only one season or across multiple years.
77 Additionally, harvest benefits were found to be larger in areas of high fishing effort, and it was
78 suggested future removals prioritize these “hotspots” (Bilkovic et al. 2016; Scheld et al. 2016).
79 Marginal benefits of removals were not evaluated as a function of fishing effort however, and it
80 is not clear what level of removals would maximize area-specific net benefits. This research aims
81 to address existing gaps in knowledge regarding fishery benefits of derelict blue crab pot
82 removals to facilitate design of optimal future removal programs in the Chesapeake Bay and
83 elsewhere.

84

85 **2. Materials and Methods**

86 *2.1 Data*

87 The Chesapeake Bay commercial blue crab fishery operates in inshore and nearshore
88 coastal environments and produces 30-40% of US commercial blue crab harvests valued at US
89 ~\$80M-\$100M annually (NMFS 2018). In Virginia, blue crab are targeted by a fleet of several
90 hundred small vessels, typically <10m, with pot limits ranging from 85 to 425 per license holder.
91 In a recent survey of licensed commercial blue crab fishers, individuals actively targeting blue
92 crab reported fishing an average of ~170 pots per day in 2018 (DelBene 2020). Each pot is

93 required to be fished individually and have its own buoy. Recreational vessel traffic, storms, and
94 abandonment are thought to be primary drivers of gear loss (Bilkovic et al. 2016).

95 Blue crab fishers in Virginia are required to submit weekly harvest reports to the Virginia
96 Marine Resources Commission (VMRC), who manage fishery resources within state waters and
97 restrict effort in the blue crab fishery through pot limits, seasonal and spatial closures, and limits
98 on which days of the week and times of day fishing is allowed. Harvest reports indicate total pots
99 or other gear fished, fishing location, and pounds of blue crab harvested. The VMRC delineates
100 fishing locations by local hydrographic features and natural markers (e.g., bays, creeks, or
101 sections of a river). In total there are 74 fishing locations defined throughout Virginia's tidal
102 waters, ranging in size from 1.7 to over one thousand square kilometers (~75% of areas are <
103 100 km²). Crabbing effort occurs within most of these fishing locations, though a large portion of
104 the central Chesapeake Bay is maintained as a spawning sanctuary where blue crab harvest is
105 prohibited during spawning season.

106 This analysis utilized non-confidential data on blue crab harvests and two measures of
107 fishing effort: number of trips and number of pots fished. Harvest and effort data were
108 aggregated across fishers by fishing location and year from 1994 to 2018. As not all locations are
109 fished in every year, the full dataset included 1,480 observations spanning 25 years and 72
110 fishing locations. The two fishing locations absent from the dataset were small bays off
111 Virginia's sparsely populated Eastern Shore. Annual data on total blue crab abundance was
112 obtained from the Chesapeake Bay Stock Assessment Committee's 2019 Blue Crab Advisory
113 Report (see CBSAC 2019). Abundance estimates were matched by year to commercial fishery
114 harvest and effort data and were used in subsequent modeling to control for inter-annual
115 fluctuations in stock size that influence harvest rates.

116 From 2008 through 2014, commercial crab fishers in Virginia were hired to remove
117 derelict blue crab pots during the winter closed season (December-March). The program
118 involved 70 participants in total, with 58-70 individuals conducting removals during the first four
119 years and a smaller group of 4-7 individuals participating during the last two years. Program
120 participants were restricted to working 49 days/year during the first three years, 24 days during
121 the fourth year, and 30 days/year during the last two years. All participants were paid a flat daily
122 rate for each day worked. Derelict pots were located by identifying buoys of abandoned gear or
123 using side scan sonar units to find pots with detached buoys. Side-imaging technology has been

124 shown to be effective at locating and identifying marine debris and derelict blue crab pots in the
125 Chesapeake Bay, the latter having a shape and dimensions relatively unique in this environment
126 (Havens et al. 2008). Program participants were instructed on proper retrieval techniques to
127 reduce bottom disturbance. Unbuoyed pots were retrieved using grappling gear raised slightly
128 above the bottom surface or lines embedded with bent nails. After removing a derelict pot,
129 program participants took a photograph, recorded the date and time of removal, and documented
130 additional data on pot condition, bycatch, and location (waypoint). Across six consecutive
131 winters, 34,408 derelict blue crab pots were removed from Virginia waters, an amount thought to
132 represent ~10-25% of the existing stock (protocols for debris removal, data collection, and debris
133 disposal were coordinated with NOAA Marine Debris Program personnel; see Havens et al.
134 2011, Bilkovic et al. 2014, and Bilkovic et al. 2016 for an overview of the removal program as
135 well as its ecological and economic impacts).

136 Derelict pot removals were matched by fishing location and year to blue crab fishery
137 harvest and effort data using recorded waypoints. A small number of removals (3.55%) fell
138 outside management area boundaries (e.g., due to GPS error or fisher error when logging data).
139 These removals were matched to the nearest fishing location. Removals always occurred during
140 the winter offseason and were matched to the following fishing season (e.g., a removal occurring
141 in December 2011 would match to 2012 fishery data). Of the 34,408 removals, 32,475 (94.38%)
142 were matched to fishing locations and years having observations of harvest and effort. Removal
143 efforts were concentrated during the first three years of the program (81.99% of all removals)
144 and were spatially heterogeneous. The number of fishing locations experiencing removals
145 averaged 36/year (62% of areas fished annually), though varied across years from 51 in 2010
146 (82% of areas fished) to 11 in 2013 (19% of areas fished). In total, there were 217 observations
147 of fishing locations with some level of removals across all six years of the removal program. Of
148 the 72 fishing locations with reported harvest and effort, 19 had no derelict pot removals in any
149 year. Removals ranged from one to 1,677 pots/location/year, with a median of 56 for fishing
150 locations and years with removals.

151

152 *2.2 Analyses*

153 The derelict pot removal program in Virginia was not experimentally designed to test the
154 effects of removals on commercial fishery harvest rates. Participating fishers were instructed to

155 spread removal efforts throughout areas where crabbing occurred, though pots were largely
 156 removed from places individuals had fished previously, were easily accessible, or areas where
 157 abandoned gear was visible. Consequently, simple comparisons of harvest rates between areas
 158 with and without removals are confounded by selection bias (e.g., perhaps areas with removals
 159 were better fishing locations to begin with). Furthermore, pre- and post-removal comparisons
 160 among locations with removals are problematic due to annual variation in blue crab abundance
 161 and contemporaneous management measures that might impact fishing effort. A variety of robust
 162 statistical approaches exist for identification of treatment effects from non-experimental data
 163 (see, e.g., Athey and Imbens 2017). This investigation utilized regression analyses including
 164 controls for spatial and temporal factors that might influence harvest rates and thus obscure the
 165 impacts of derelict pot removals on the commercial blue crab fishery.

166 To assess potential changes in harvest rates in response to derelict pot removals, harvest
 167 per pot and harvest per trip were calculated for each fishing location and year. The following
 168 panel regression model was then estimated:

169

$$170 \quad 1. \quad \theta_{it} = \alpha_t + X_{it}\beta + \varepsilon_{it},$$

171

172 where θ_{it} is the harvest rate (lb per pot pull or per trip) in fishing location i for year t ; α_t is an
 173 annual fixed effect; X_{it} is a $n \times 2$ matrix of covariates, where n is equal to the number of
 174 observations; β is a 2×1 vector of parameters to be estimated; and ε_{it} is a normally distributed
 175 random error term. The matrix X_{it} included two binary factors, one of which was set equal to one
 176 for all years if location i had removals in any year and set equal to zero otherwise (i.e., $X_{it,1} =$
 177 $1 \forall t \text{ iff } \sum_t R_{it} > 0 \text{ for location } i$, where R_{it} is the number of derelict pot removals in
 178 location i and year t). The second binary variable was set equal to one only in years when
 179 location i experienced removals and was zero otherwise (i.e., $X_{it,2} = 1 \text{ iff } R_{it} >$
 180 $0 \text{ for location } i \text{ and year } t$). Equation 1 therefore estimated the average change in harvest rate
 181 for areas with removals during the removal program, controlling for interannual shifts in the
 182 harvest rate across all fishing locations (e.g., due changes in blue crab abundance) as well as
 183 potential selection effects among fishing locations that experienced some level of removals (e.g.,
 184 if areas with removals were better fishing locations on average, independent of the removal
 185 program).

186 While equation (1) can be used to evaluate the average improvement in harvest rate
 187 following removal of derelict pots, optimal policy design requires estimating program benefits
 188 on the margin. A second model was used to resolve marginal benefits associated with removal of
 189 derelict pots:

190
 191 2.
$$H_{it} = q_{it} E_{it}^{\eta_e} S_t^{\eta_s}.$$

192
 193 Equation (2) is a modified Schaefer harvest specification, where harvest in location i at time t is
 194 modeled as a function of location and time specific catchability, q_{it} , fishing effort, E_{it} , and stock
 195 abundance, S_t . Two empirical models were estimated, one for each measure of fishing effort.
 196 Empirical specifications utilized a transcendental logarithmic functional form (see Christensen et
 197 al. 1973), which allowed estimation of flexible output elasticities and has been previously used to
 198 evaluate harvest response to derelict gear removals (see Scheld et al. 2016). The harvest model
 199 was specified as:

200
 201 3.
$$\ln(H_{it}) = \mu_i + \nu_t + \beta_E \ln(E_{it}) + \beta_S \ln(S_t) + \frac{1}{2} \beta_{EE} \ln(E_{it}) \ln(E_{it}) +$$

 202
$$\frac{1}{2} \beta_{SS} \ln(S_t) \ln(S_t) + \beta_{ES} \ln(E_{it}) \ln(S_t) + \beta_{ER} \ln(E_{it}) R_{it} + \beta_{SR} \ln(S_t) R_{it} + \beta_R R_{it} +$$

 203
$$\beta_{\sqrt{R}} \sqrt{R_{it}} + \beta_{R_{lag}} R_{it-1} + \varepsilon_{it},$$

204
 205 where μ_i is a fishing location fixed effect; ν_t is an annual fixed effect included for years during
 206 the removal program (2009-2014) to control for any unobserved contemporaneous changes in the
 207 environment or management that might affect harvest rates; E_{it} is a measure of fishing effort for
 208 location i and year t , which was either the number of pots fished or trips taken; S_t is an annual
 209 estimate of total blue crab stock abundance; R_{it} are the derelict pot removals from location i in
 210 year t ; R_{it-1} are the removals from location i during the previous year; and ε_{it} is a normally
 211 distributed random error term. Using the empirical specification in (3), catchability and elasticity
 212 parameters from (2) can be written as:

213
 214 4.
$$q_{it} = \exp\left(\mu_i + \nu_t + \beta_R R_{it} + \beta_{\sqrt{R}} \sqrt{R_{it}} + \beta_{R_{lag}} R_{it-1}\right);$$

215 5.
$$\eta_{e_{it}} = \beta_E + \beta_{EE} \ln(E_{it}) + \beta_{ES} \ln(S_t) + \beta_{ER} R_{it};$$

216 6.
$$\eta_{sit} = \beta_S + \beta_{SS}\ln(S_t) + \beta_{ES}\ln(E_{it}) + \beta_{SR}R_{it}.$$

217

218 Catchability (equation 4) was therefore modeled to be a function of location and time fixed
219 effects, contemporaneous derelict pot removals as well as their square root, and removals from
220 the previous year. Harvest elasticities for fishing effort and stock abundance (equations 5-6) were
221 modeled as depending on the levels of both inputs (effort, stock) as well as derelict pot removals.
222 Equations 2-6 thus incorporate derelict pot removals into the harvest model by allowing for
223 removals to affect production elasticities in addition to influencing catchability directly.

224 The marginal benefits associated with derelict pot removals were evaluated as the change in
225 the natural log of harvest corresponding to a change in removals:

226

227 7.
$$\frac{\partial \ln(H_{it})}{\partial R_{it}} = \beta_R + \frac{1}{2}\beta_{\sqrt{R}}(R_{it})^{-\frac{1}{2}} + \beta_{ER}\ln(E_{it}) + \beta_{SR}\ln(S_t).$$

228


229 Equation (7) indicates that marginal benefits were a function of parameters estimated in the
230 harvest model (equation 3) as well as levels of fishing effort, stock, and removals. Note that this
231 specification of marginal benefits does not include any potential lagged effects.

232 The models specified in equations 1 and 3 were estimated in R version 3.5.0 (R Core
233 Team 2018) with functions contained in the plm package (Croissant and Millo 2018). Both
234 models were fit using fixed effects (within) estimators, where fixed effects were by year or
235 fishing location for equations 1 and 3, respectively.

236

237 3. Results

238



239

240

241 **Figure 1.** Annual average harvest per pot (a) and harvest per trip (b). Points are weighted
 242 averages and lines are weighted standard deviations, where weights reflect location-specific
 243 fishing effort (pots, trips). Observations during years of the derelict pot removal program (grey
 244 shaded box) are separated into averages for locations with (black filled points) or without
 245 removals (grey open points). Means and standard deviations during the removal program for
 246 locations with and without removals are slightly offset horizontally to avoid overplotting.

247

248 Areas with removals during the removal program generally experienced higher average
 249 productivities when compared to areas without removals during the removal program as well as
 250 observations prior to the removal program (Figure 1). For both measures of fishing effort, four of
 251 the top five highest productivity observations occurred in locations with removals during the
 252 removal program. Panel regression models of harvest per pot and harvest per trip (equation 1),
 253 which included annual fixed effects and dummy variables to control for potential fishing location
 254 selection bias, indicated that areas with removals during the removal program experienced
 255 average productivity increases of 0.39 lb/pot (95% CI: [0.25, 0.53]) and 99.84 lb/trip (95% CI:
 256 [56.22, 143.46]; see Appendix Table A1). These increases represent 22.35% and 34.68% of
 257 median harvest per pot and harvest per trip across all observations, respectively.

258

Variable	Effort : Pots		Effort : Trips	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
v_{2009}	0.0309	0.0363	-0.0492	0.0428
v_{2010}	0.0276	0.0424	0.1012 *	0.0430
v_{2011}	0.1441 ***	0.0348	0.1645 **	0.0539

v_{2012}	-0.0936	.	0.0525	0.0524		0.0626
v_{2013}	-0.1491	***	0.0303	-0.1691	***	0.0437
v_{2014}	-0.0642	*	0.0257	-0.1120	**	0.0405
β_E	1.2429	***	0.2428	1.3340	***	0.2276
β_S	2.0144	*	0.9190	2.2032		1.5135
β_{EE}	-0.0263		0.0181	-0.0926	**	0.0347
β_{SS}	-0.2893	*	0.1472	-0.3939		0.2491
β_{ES}	-0.0031		0.0136	0.0394		0.0298
β_{ER}	0.0002	*	0.0001	0.0003	**	0.0001
β_{SR}	0.0001		0.0002	0.0001		0.0002
β_R	-0.0039	*	0.0016	-0.0032	*	0.0013
$\beta_{\sqrt{R}}$	0.0150	***	0.0035	0.0134	***	0.0038
$\beta_{R_{lag}}$	0.0000		0.0001	0.0000		0.0001

$R^2 = 0.81$

F-statistic = 153.53***

$R^2 = 0.70$

F-statistic = 98.70***


259

260 **Table 1.** Translog harvest model regression outputs. The unbalanced panel regression included
 261 1,480 observations from 72 fishing locations and 25 years. Coefficient standard errors were
 262 calculated using a robust covariance matrix following the approach of White (1980) and
 263 Arellano (1987). Statistical significance denoted as *, **, and *** corresponding to significance
 264 at the 5, 1, and 0.1% levels, respectively.

265

266 Two specifications of the harvest model were estimated, one for each effort measure
 267 (Table 1). Outputs from the two models were similar and indicated strong increases in harvest
 268 associated with increases in effort, while relatively weak harvest responses resulted from
 269 changes in stock abundance. Using regression model parameters, output elasticities (equations 5
 270 and 6) were estimated at covariate means. The percentage increase in harvest found to result
 271 from a 1% increase in fishing effort (i.e., $\eta_{e_{it}}$) was 0.93 (95% CI: [0.87, 0.99]) for an increase in
 272 pots and 0.99 (95% CI: [0.91, 1.07]) for an increase in trips. Conversely, the percentage increase
 273 in harvest found to result from a 1% increase in stock (i.e., $\eta_{s_{it}}$) was 0.25 (95% CI: [0.20, 0.31])
 274 for the pots model and 0.10 (95% CI: [0.01, 0.19]) for the trips model. The effects of derelict pot
 275 removals on harvest were consistent across the two models, which found positive and highly
 276 significant square root effects, negative and less significant linear effects, and positive, though

277 weak, interaction effects on output elasticity with respect to changes in fishing effort (i.e.,
 278 derelict pot removals resulted in improvements in location-specific catchability as well as gains
 279 in the productivity of fishing effort). Interestingly, both models found no evidence for lagged
 280 effects of removals on harvests.
 281



282
 283
 284 **Figure 2.** Contour plots depicting marginal benefits from derelict pot removals for models using
 285 pots (a) and trips (b) as measures of fishing effort. Marginal benefits correspond to the increase
 286 in the natural log of harvest from the removal of one derelict pot (i.e., $\partial \ln(H_{it}) / \partial R_{it}$). Marginal
 287 benefit levels are indicated on contour lines and plots display values across the interquartile
 288 range of observed location-specific fishing effort.
 289

290 Marginal benefits of derelict pot removals were found to be non-linear and depend on the
 291 level of fishing effort (Figure 2). Initial derelict pot removals generated the largest increases in
 292 harvests. For example, the first pot removed from an area experiencing 2009-2018 median levels
 293 of fishing effort and harvests was predicted to yield 943.66 lb (95% CI: [500.86, 1387.88]) of
 294 additional harvest over the course of a season in the pots model and 832.09 lb (95% CI: [346.68,
 295 1319.20]) of additional harvest in the trips model. These levels of increased harvest, though large
 296 in aggregate, corresponded to just an additional 0.01 lb per pot pull and 1.46 lb per trip for pots
 297 fished and trips taken in the location with the removal on average, respectively. The marginal
 298 benefits from additional removals declined quickly, with estimates of annual harvest gains of
 299 137.61 lb (95% CI: [59.71, 215.55]; pots model) and 116.66 lb (95% CI: [26.76, 206.62]; trips
 300 model) for the 20th derelict pot removed from an area with 2009-2018 median effort and harvest

301 levels. The predicted marginal benefits of removals were also found to differ considerably across
302 fishing locations depending on fishing effort levels, with removals from high-effort areas found
303 to be considerably more beneficial. For example, marginal benefits associated with the 10th
304 derelict pot removed from a fishing location in the 25th percentile of effort and harvest were
305 estimated to be 85.63 lb (95% CI: [35.40, 135.90]; pots model) and 68.53 lb (95% CI: [8.97,
306 128.15]; trips model). Whereas for a fishing location in the 75th percentile of effort and harvest,
307 these benefits were estimated at 1,035.03 lb (95% CI: [559.85, 1510.64]; pots model) and 917.01
308 lb (95% CI: [399.10, 1435.42]; trips model).

309 Estimation of marginal benefit curves for derelict pot removals allows consideration of
310 removal policies that maximize net benefits. If it is assumed that the cost to remove a derelict pot
311 is fixed at \$100/pot, and that additional blue crab can be sold for \$1/lb, the optimal level of
312 removals can be determined as a function of location-specific fishing effort. For fishing locations
313 in the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of effort and harvests, the optimal removal policies, where
314 marginal benefits equal marginal costs, are estimated at 8, 28, and 145 (pots model) and 6, 23,
315 and 133 (trips model) derelict pots removed annually. Under average levels of fishing effort and
316 harvest experienced for each fishing location from 2009-2018, it is estimated that the removal of
317 7,749 (pots model) and 9,535 (trips model) derelict pots annually would maximize net benefits,
318 i.e., this is the level of removals where marginal benefits are equal to (or slightly greater than)
319 marginal costs for each fishing location. Removals at these levels are predicted to produce
320 annual net benefits of $\$3.19 \times 10^6$ (95% CI: [2.38×10^6 , 4.16×10^6]; pots model) and $\$3.33 \times 10^6$
321 (95% CI: [2.08×10^6 , 5.35×10^6]; trips model). If optimal derelict pot removal programs were
322 implemented, average productivity of fishing effort is estimated to increase by 16.83% (pots
323 model) and 18.20% (trips model).

324

325 **4. Discussion**

326 This analysis investigated the effects of derelict pot removals on harvests in the
327 commercial blue crab fishery of Virginia. It was found that fishing locations that experienced
328 some level of removals during a large six-year removal program saw substantial increases in
329 productivity during years of removals (22.35% increase in harvest per pot and 34.68% increase
330 in harvest per trip, on average). The marginal harvest benefits associated with derelict pot
331 removals were found to decline quickly as removals increased, were larger in high-effort fishing

332 areas, and lasted for only a single fishing season. Assuming a removal cost of \$100/pot, and that
333 additional blue crab could be sold for \$1/lb, the optimal level of removals was estimated to be
334 over 7,000 pots/year. With aggregate fishing effort of ~230,000 pots and annual loss rates
335 ranging from 10-20% (Bilkovic et al. 2016; DelBene 2020), this analysis suggests removing
336 ~15-40% of the gear lost annually would produce net benefits for the commercial fishery of US
337 ~\$3M each year. While prior cost-benefit analyses of derelict gear removals have typically
338 considered the market value of bycatch as the primary or singular benefit arising from removals
339 (e.g., Gilardi et al. 2010; Antonelis et al. 2011), this study demonstrates that removal of derelict
340 blue crab pots can substantially improve harvest rates and gear efficiency—benefits that may
341 rival or exceed those arising strictly from reductions in bycatch mortality.

342 The findings presented here support conclusions from earlier investigations and add to a
343 growing body of evidence documenting the harmful effects of derelict fishing gear, including
344 economic costs related to reduced gear efficiency. Scheld et al. (2016) estimate the six-year
345 derelict pot removal program in Virginia increased harvests by 27%, while DelBene et al.
346 (2019), using an experimental approach, demonstrate the presence of derelict pots can reduce
347 harvests of blue crab in actively fished pots by more than 30%. These estimates are similar to the
348 increases in average harvest per pot and harvest per trip for areas with removals during the
349 removal program found in this analysis. The optimal level of removals estimated here is
350 predicted to increase productivity by ~17-18% per year, an amount somewhat lower than
351 observed impacts of the 2009-2014 removal program. This finding suggests that some removals
352 may have occurred at levels, or in locations, where marginal removal costs exceeded benefits,
353 and that program net benefits could have been greater with a more targeted approach. Results of
354 this research add to prior investigations finding that the presence of derelict pots can significantly
355 reduce harvest rates and impose large economic costs on the blue crab fishery of Virginia.
356 Similar analyses are lacking in other fisheries and coastal systems however, limiting the ability
357 to more broadly characterize commercial harvest impacts resulting from derelict gear.

358 Determining causal responses in non-experimental data can be challenging. This analysis
359 used statistical models that controlled for a variety of factors and exploited variation in derelict
360 gear removals over space and time to identify program effects and estimate marginal benefits.
361 Relatively fine-scale spatial resolution of fishery harvest and effort data paired with
362 georeferenced derelict pot removals facilitated this investigation and suggest a similar approach

363 may be feasible in other systems with well resolved spatial data. DelBene et al. (2019) observed
364 the effects of derelict pots on harvest rates were not constant over time, and it was speculated
365 that the gear competition effect may depend on the seasonal migratory or mating behavior of
366 blue crabs. This analysis utilized annual harvest and effort data and was therefore not able to
367 resolve seasonal differences in harvest rates resulting from derelict pot removals. Future research
368 should explore both the mechanisms and magnitudes of interactions between derelict and
369 actively fished gear across a variety of fixed gear fisheries to better understand this harmful and
370 costly externality.

371 This investigation is the first to assess marginal removal benefits and optimal derelict pot
372 removal policies. In determining optimal derelict pot removal levels, the marginal costs of
373 removals were assumed to be \$100/pot. Costs associated with removals depend on pot location
374 and condition (e.g., depth, substrate, buoyed/unbuoyed), removal method (e.g., grappling gear,
375 diver), as well as potential disposal or recycling costs. During the six-year derelict pot removal
376 program in Virginia, removal costs averaged \$122/pot. Total program costs included overhead
377 and fixed costs associated program implementation (e.g., purchasing side-scan sonar units),
378 suggesting marginal costs for removals on a continuing basis would be somewhat lower. During
379 later years in the program, when removal efforts targeted derelict gear hotspots, average costs
380 reduced considerably to ~\$60/pot. Additionally, cost-efficiency was not considered a central
381 objective of the program, which was initiated to provide supplementary income to commercial
382 fishers following a federally declared fishery failure (Havens et al. 2011). Antonelis et al. (2011)
383 conducted a cost-benefit analysis of trap removal in Washington's Dungeness crab (*Cancer*
384 *magister*) fishery, where side-scan sonar and divers were required for derelict pot location and
385 removal. In that study, variable costs were found to be \$92.66-\$193.00 per trap removed
386 (Antonelis et al. 2011). In Louisiana's blue crab fishery, removal of buoyed derelict pots has
387 been documented to be under \$20/pot (Arthur et al. 2020). While there is certainly a degree of
388 variation, a reasonable range for marginal removal costs of derelict pots and traps in coastal
389 systems is perhaps \$50-\$150/pot, and potentially much less for easily accessible buoyed gear.
390 For Virginia, this suggests optimal removal levels approximately between the contour lines of 4
391 and 5 in Figure 2.

392 There are a number of additional economic damages associated with derelict fishing gear
393 that were not addressed in this research, but which could increase the benefits associated with

394 removals. Habitat damage due to abrasion, smothering, and breakage of habitat features by
395 derelict gear has been observed in several fisheries (Donohue et al. 2001; Macfadyen et al. 2009;
396 Arthur et al. 2014) and may carry significant economic costs. In the Chesapeake Bay, overlap
397 and interaction between derelict pots and sensitive habitats, such as oyster reefs and sea grass
398 beds, is thought to be relatively minor however (Bilkovic et al. 2016). Navigational costs can
399 arise from derelict gear if it forces route changes, causes damage to vessels and equipment, or
400 leads to accidents, injury, or death (Johnson 2000; Cho 2004; Macfadyen et al. 2009). While
401 substantial numbers of derelict pots may accumulate in the many small tributaries of Virginia,
402 navigational issues related to derelict pots have not been well documented. Importantly, this
403 analysis did not consider the benefits arising from reduced mortality of blue crab and other
404 bycatch due to removal of derelict gear. Forty different species have been documented in derelict
405 blue crab pots removed from Virginia waters (Bilkovic et al. 2014). Some species, such as white
406 perch (*Morone americana*) and Atlantic croaker (*Micropogonias undulates*), are commercially
407 and recreationally valuable, while other species, such as diamondback terrapin (*Malaclemys*
408 *terrapin*), may hold non-use conservation value (e.g., existence value). To the extent that
409 removals reduced mortality of blue crab and other valuable species, our estimates of marginal
410 removal benefits are likely conservative.

411

412 **5. Conclusions**

413 Open access and common pool environmental resources frequently produce inefficient
414 outcomes (Stavins 2011). The broad extent and important role of externalities in the marine
415 environment is becoming increasingly recognized (Rickels et al. 2016), and marine debris is now
416 generally acknowledged to be an outcome of misaligned incentives and market failure
417 (McIlgorm et al. 2011; Newman et al. 2015; Vince and Hardesty 2018). Accordingly, economic
418 analyses and policy instruments that consider individual incentives have been argued as critical
419 in the reduction and control of marine litter (Oosterhuis et al. 2014).

420 Derelict fishing gear is a widespread form of marine debris that can be detrimental to
421 both biological resources as well as the human ability to utilize and derive value from coastal and
422 marine amenities. This investigation analyzed the marginal benefits of removals and found that
423 ~7,000 – 10,000 removals/year focused on high fishing effort (“hotspot”) areas would produce
424 over \$3M in net benefits for commercial blue crab fishers in Virginia. This level of removals is

425 thought to represent 15-40% of derelict pots lost annually. While our estimates of optimal
426 removal levels may be conservative, as only one economic benefit of removals was considered, it
427 is possible, or perhaps even likely, that it would never be optimal to remove all derelict pots
428 given strong diminishing returns. Nevertheless, international agreements (e.g., Annex V of
429 MARPOL) may obligate monitoring and mitigation of derelict gear where it is a source of plastic
430 pollution beyond what is economically optimal. Though commonly viewed as successful (e.g.,
431 Havens et al. 2011, Antonelis et al. 2011; Arthur et al. 2020), removal efforts in coastal areas of
432 the US often rely on inconsistent funding sources or unpaid volunteers. As some level of gear
433 loss is likely unavoidable (e.g., due to storms or vessel traffic), establishing regular sources of
434 funding for location and removal of derelict gear should be expected to yield environmental and
435 economic benefits and may be needed for compliance with international agreements.

436 Providing monetary incentives to fishers for collection and removal of marine debris has
437 been noted as a potentially low-cost solution supported by the fishing industry, despite failure to
438 promote long-term preventative behavioral change (Cho 2009; Oosterhuis et al. 2014).
439 Alternative management strategies, such as gear recycling programs, use of biodegradable
440 escape mechanisms, or marine spatial planning, have been suggested and may be effective at
441 reducing gear loss and its impacts (Macfadyen et al. 2009; Bilkovic et al. 2016). It is likely that a
442 combination of targeted removals and policies that work to reduce contributing factors and
443 incentivize or promote prevention would be most effective. Identifying long-term policy
444 remedies that are self-sustaining and supported by fishery stakeholders remains challenging
445 however (Goodman et al. 2019; DelBene 2020). Increased quantification of the marginal benefits
446 and costs associated with the reduction of derelict fishing gear and other forms of marine debris
447 can inform socially efficient future management and policy.

448

449 **Acknowledgments**

450 We thank P. Geer, A. Kenyon, and S. Iverson of the Virginia Marine Resources Commission for
451 data support in model development as well as Virginia commercial crabbers who took part in the
452 removal program. D. Stanhope and K. Angstadt provided technical support during the removal
453 program and contributed to on-going discussions during model development and analysis. The
454 authors also thank two anonymous reviewers who provided constructive feedback on an earlier
455 version of the manuscript. Derelict pot removal data collection was funded by NOAA/NMFS

456 through fishery disaster relief and also by NFWF and the Office of the Virginia Secretary of
457 Natural Resources. This paper is Contribution No. 4021 of the Virginia Institute of Marine
458 Science, William & Mary.

459

460 **Author Contributions** K.J.H and D.M.B. led derelict pot removal program; A.M.S. and D.M.B
461 compiled data; A.M.S. performed data analyses; and all authors contributed to writing.

462

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670 **Appendix**

Variable	Effort : Pots		Effort : Trips	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
β_1	0.3258 **	0.1209	116.0835 **	38.7349
β_2	0.3933 ***	0.0719	99.8421 ***	22.2363
	R ² = 0.07		R ² = 0.11	
	F-statistic = 16.80***		F-statistic = 14.34***	

671

672 **Table A1.** Equation 1 regression outputs. The unbalanced panel regression included 1,480
 673 observations from 72 fishing locations and 25 years. Coefficient standard errors were calculated
 674 using a robust covariance matrix following the approach of White (1980) and Arellano (1987).
 675 Statistical significance denoted as *, **, and *** corresponding to significance at the 5, 1, and
 676 0.1% levels, respectively.

677