

EFFECTS OF PERSONAL SIMILARITY AND SITUATIONAL POSSIBILITY ON
^
ATTRIBUTIONS OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
INSTITUTIONALIZATION

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of Psychology
The College of William and Mary in Virginia


In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

by
Phyllis Oksner

1977


APPROVAL SHEET


This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts



Phyllis W. Oksner


Approved, May 1977


Kelly G. Shaver


Robert A. Johnston


Glen Shean


R. Wayne Kernodle


E. Rae Harcum, Chairman
Department of Psychology

To my parents, who have always encouraged me to
"hitch my wagon to a star".

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	v
LIST OF TABLES.	vi
LIST OF FIGURES	vii
ABSTRACT.	viii
INTRODUCTION.	2
METHOD.	18
RESULTS	30
DISCUSSION.	43
APPENDICES.	50
A. Bogus Subject Feedback	51
B. Participant's Consent Form	53
C. Stimulus Person Profile	55
D. Estimates of Personal Similarity and Situational Possi- bility	58
E. Written Instructions to Subjects	60
F. Attribution Measures	62
G. Social Distance Measures	67
H. Attitudes Toward Mentally Ill Persons	70
I. Biographical Information	73
J. Debriefing Outline	75
K. Disclosure Agreement	77
REFERENCES.	79

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author is greatly indebted to Dr. Kelly G. Shaver for his theoretical contributions to the current study, as well as his valuable assistance in the methodological design and interpretation of results. In addition, thanks are due to Dr. Robert A. Johnston for his critique of early drafts of the paper. This study was supported by a grant awarded in November 1976 by the Faculty Research Committee of the College of William and Mary.

LIST OF TABLES

Table		Page
1	Mean Similarity and Possibility Judgments Made by COM Subjects	31
2	Mean Estimates of Perceived Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility by Condition	33
3	Mean Scores for Attributed Responsibility by Conditions.	35
4	Mean Social Distance Scores by Condition	37
5	Mean Scores on Attitudes Toward Mentally Ill Persons Scale by Conditions.	39
6	Intercorrelations of Attribution of Personal Responsibility and Willingness to Interact by Condition	41

LIST OF FIGURE

	Page
1. Predicted Attribution of Responsibility and Social Distance (Willingness to Interact) by Condition.	16

ABSTRACT

In our everyday world we are constantly faced with the potentially difficult task of deciding who or what was responsible for a particular effect--trying to discern what personal factors as well as situational factors contributed to the observed outcome. The current research explored possible distortions of the attributed personal responsibility for institutionalization in a mental hospital as a function of perceived personal similarity to the stimulus person as well as likelihood of being in a similar situation (situational possibility). Female college students read about a stimulus person who was described as either personally similar or personally different from the subject. Descriptions of the stimulus person varied so as to describe either a high situational possibility situation or a low situational possibility situation. Attributed responsibility delineated along Heider's levels of responsibility indicated support for Lerner's "just world" hypothesis at the level of Foreseeability and Shaver's "defensive attribution" paradigm at the level of Intention. Social distance measures revealed greater willingness to interact with a similar disturbed stimulus person as compared to a dissimilar disturbed stimulus person. Implications stemming from current findings for methods of increasing community acceptance of deinstitutionalized clinical populations are discussed.

EFFECTS OF PERSONAL SIMILARITY AND SITUATIONAL POSSIBILITY ON
ATTRIBUTIONS OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
INSTITUTIONALIZATION

INTRODUCTION

As described by Shaver (1975) attribution processes are those cognitive events that enable perceivers to interpret the actions of other people. In recent years three major theories have been espoused to explain the interaction of personal and environmental forces in the production of observed events (Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967, 1971, 1973). Heider's "naive psychology" emphasizes the motivational and ability (personal forces) which must have been present in the actor in order for him to overcome the difficulty of a task (environmental force) that is observed to have been accomplished by the actor. Jones and Davis have added to Heider's original analysis consideration by the perceiver of what the actor might have done. Observers take into account the unique effects of potential actions in order to understand the actor's reasons for choosing one alternative of action as opposed to another. Kelley's attributional theory emphasizes the principle of covariation: a perceiver establishes the potency of a presumed cause by observing the occurrence of the effect in the presence of the cause and the nonoccurrence of the effect in the absence of the cause.

In recent years empirical investigations have drawn from these attribution theories to explain many kinds of subject responses, including attribution of ability (Jones, Rock, Shaver, Goethals, & Ward, 1968), responsibility (Shaw & Sulzer, 1964; Walster, 1966), emotional

state (Nisbett & Valins, 1971), insomnia (Storms & Nisbett, 1970) and motivation (Weiner, 1974). Of primary interest to the current research are the numerous experimental and theoretical papers which have dealt with attribution of causality for events, particularly for unfortunate events such as accidents (e.g., see reviews by Fishbein & Ajzen, 1973; Jones, Kanouse, Kelley, Nisbett, Valins, & Weiner, 1972; Shaver, 1975; Vidmar & Crinklaw, 1974). The three models of the attribution process mentioned above, as well as several reviews of the research literature (Brewer, 1977; Miller & Ross, 1976), have suggested that a perceiver undergoes a rational analysis of personal and environmental factors contributing to an event in order to interpret and understand those events.

Although rational attribution may be the general rule, there do seem to be some important exceptions. For example, drawing on earlier research by Walster (1966), Shaver (1970a, 1970b, 1973, 1975) has suggested that two variables--personal similarity and situational possibility--may combine to produce distortions in attribution. Shaver labels this motivated distortion of responsibility and blame defensive attribution, and theorizes that both personal similarity and situational possibility must be present in order for the full effects of attributional distortion to occur, proposing an interaction between the two factors. In instances of high situational possibility, high perceived personal similarity will result in exaggeration of responsibility to chance, while low perceived personal similarity will result in exaggeration of responsibility to the person. Under conditions of low situational possibility no significant judgmental distortions will occur. Situational possibility is typically operationally defined as the likelihood that one might find him/herself in the same situation

as the stimulus person.

Support for the idea of motivated distortion of attribution can be found in a study by McKillip (1972, reported in McKillip & Posavac, 1972) who reported that increased personal similarity between observer and "victim" of an automobile accident led to attribution of less personal responsibility for the accident than for dissimilar victims. McKillip and Posavac (1972) extended this investigation to include effects of severity of outcome and found that the similar victim was seen as less responsible for a serious accident than is a dissimilar victim. This effect was reversed, however, for attribution of responsibility of a mild accident. One may infer from this difference that subjects were not threatened by similarity to a victim of a mild accident and therefore did not distort attribution of responsibility.

In a very clever demonstration of defensive attribution, Younger, Arrowood and Harris (1977) illustrated the influence of personal similarity and situational possibility on the assignment of the effects of a "mild sexual transgression" on a romantic relationship. Subjects who were also romantically involved (personally similar) as well as the same sex of the transgressor (situationally possible) were less willing than opposite sex subjects (situationally impossible) to regard a mild sexual transgression as detrimental to an observed romantic relationship. The authors interpreted this effect as a defensive avoidance of assignment of severity of outcome when subjects were reading about a stimulus person with whom they might closely identify (personally similar as well as situationally possible). Subjects acted to avoid any possibility of future blameworthiness should they at some future time be in the same situation as the stimulus person, by reducing the negative

consequences (potential for blame) attributed to the transgression.

Schroeder and Linder (1976) have argued that in order for a threat to self-image to occur, and thereby result in a distortion of attribution, the actor rather than situational factors must be seen as primary cause agents. These authors argue that:

. . . Defensive attributions of responsibility may, then, be conceptualized as a two-step process. The observer must first perceive the actor as a primary causal agent of events for which the observer would not want to be blamed. Then, motivated by a need to avoid personal feelings of blameworthiness or vulnerability, the observer assigns a minimized degree of responsibility to the actor. Somewhat paradoxically, therefore, exactly those circumstances that heighten perceptions of the actor's causal role in an accident will lead to defensively lenient assignments of responsibility [p. 343].

It would appear, however, that in fact this potential to perceive the actor as the causal agent is already implicit in the defensive attribution literature reviewed above. The essence of defensive attribution is that within the context of an ambiguous combination of personal and situational causal factors and when threatened by potential blameworthiness or vulnerability, the subject maximizes responsibility to chance or situational factors.

An alternate theoretical explanation for motivated distortion of attribution has been proposed by Lerner and his colleagues (Lerner, 1965; Lerner & Becker, 1962; Lerner & Simmons, 1966; Lerner & Matthews, 1967; Novak & Lerner, 1968). This explanation holds that subjects have a need to believe in a "just world". In order to protect this belief, subjects will assign negative characteristics to a victim of negative consequences; put simply, the subject will devalue the victim in order to justify that "he got what he deserved". This tendency to derogate

an innocent victim presents problems for a subject who perceives himself similar to the observed victim. Empirical evidence has shown (Novak & Lerner, 1968; Lerner & Agar, 1972) that the observer will prefer to avoid contact with an innocent victim perceived as similar but will not devalue him. Lerner and Matthews (1967) have proposed that in such a situation the important dimension becomes perception of a common fate, not perceived similarity. In an experimental test of Lerner's premise of a "just world" leading to devaluation of the victim, however, Sorrentino and Boutilier (1974) found evidence more in support of a defensive attribution interpretation. After seeing a peer (victim) receive painful electric shock as punishment for errors in a serial learning task, subjects who saw the situation as highly possible to occur to them were significantly less likely to devalue the victim than subjects who did not anticipate being in a similar situation.

Chaiken and Darley (1973) have provided an additional empirical comparison between the models proposed by "defensive attribution" and "just world" for explaining motivated distortion of attribution. In an investigation of the effects of situational possibility and severity of outcome, Chaiken and Darley (1973) found that those subjects in a worker-supervisor cooperation task who were to be future supervisors attributed more responsibility to chance for a videotaped accident caused by another supervisor (high situational possibility) than did subjects who were to be workers (future worker--low situational possibility). This finding is in clear accord with a defensive attribution prediction of reduction of personal responsibility (and thereby greater attribution to chance or environmental factors) attributed to a stimulus person when the perceiver is aware that he may be

in the same position as the stimulus person in the future. The authors, however, cite the future worker-severe consequences condition as providing the critical comparison between the appropriateness of "just world" or "defensive attribution" for explaining their results which clearly indicate motivated distortion of attribution:

The just-world hypothesis predicts that the victim of the severe accident, the worker, is devalued in order to maintain a belief in justice. But the defensive attribution hypothesis suggests that people who perceive themselves as potential victims of similar accidents should not devalue the observed victim; to do so would be threatening to themselves. And this is what the data showed; only future supervisors reported disliking of the worker who was the victim of the severe accident; future workers did not. The tendency in the severe conditions for future workers to blame the supervisor does not restore justice. After all, the taped worker is still victimized by loss of earnings even if a culpable agent is identified. When the need for justice and defensive attribution work together, the joint effect is strongly present; when they conflict, justice, in the form of disliking the innocent victim, is not sought if this justice is threatening to the observer [p. 273].

Reluctance to assign blame for an accident to a person in a situation similar to that which the subject expected to be in was particularly strong when the consequences were severe.

Criticisms of the defensive attribution research have focused on the ambiguities inherent in the research designs which have made interpretation of the research impossible in terms of any consistent theoretical terms (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1973) as well as the inadequacy of empirical support for various defensive attribution hypotheses (Vidmar & Crinklaw, 1974). Fishbein and Ajzen suggest that one of the primary reasons why researchers in attribution have obtained ambiguous results is because they have failed to define levels of responsibility in the

questions asked of subjects. The authors propose that much of the ambiguity in research results might be cleared up if researchers delineate the questions asked of subjects according to the five levels of responsibility defined by Heider (1958): (1) Association,* the actor is held responsible for all effects that are in any way associated with him; (2) Commission, the actor is seen as instrumental in producing (contributing to) the observed effects; (3) Foreseeability, the actor is held responsible for those effects he could have foreseen; (4) Intentionality, the actor is held responsible for those effects he intended; and (5) Justification, the actor is held responsible only for those effects which were not justified. Vidmar and Crinklaw also cite delineation of levels of responsibility in the dependent variables used in attribution research as a means of refining the method of studying attribution processes.

A very recent argument against the motivated distortion attributional paradigm has been proposed by Brewer (1977). Her position cites attribution of responsibility (AR) as being the result of simple information processing which takes into account congruence (C), "the subjective probability that the outcome would be expected to occur given the action perpetrated by A" [p. 597], as well as prior expectancy (PE), "the subjective probability that the outcome would have occurred given prior conditions . . . in the absence of the perpetrator's intervention" [p. 597]. Brewer agrees that such factors as role similarity and severity of consequence may affect the congruence aspect of the simple additive equation proposed by her model ($AR = C - PE$), but she postulates that the resulting bias in information processing arises from a

*Labels were introduced by Shaw and Sulzer (1964).

need to reduce complexity of decision-making rather than from any self-protective motivational forces.

Taking into account these recent criticisms of past research in defensive attribution, the current research measured attribution of personal responsibility for institutionalization in a mental hospital. In response to Fishbein and Ajzen, dependent measures of responsibility were differentiated along Heider's five levels. Also, in response to Brewer's arguments, measures of prior expectancy as well as similarity (personal similarity and situational possibility) were made at two points in time during the experimental task. This procedure provided a comparison of subjects' perceived similarity before finding out that the stimulus person is institutionalized with subjects' perceived similarity at the end of the experimental task (measured between subjects--all subjects made only one estimate of similarity). Prior expectancy of institutionalization was also measured at both times. This procedure provided empirical measurement of the extent of engagement in self-protective defense measures such as denial of personal and situational similarity as a function of knowledge of the institutionalization of the stimulus person. It is the major proposition of this research that attributional processes, particularly those involved in defensive attribution, can be used to explain some of the results of Farina and his associates (particularly Ring & Farina, 1969) in their studies of interpersonal reactions to persons with histories of institutionalization.

An extensive line of research conducted by Farina and his associates (Farina & Ring, 1965; Farina, Holland & Ring, 1966; Farina, Allen, & Saul, 1968; Ring & Farina, 1969; Farina & Gliha, 1971; Farina,

Felner & Boudreau, 1973; Farina & Felner, 1973; Farina & Hagelauer, 1974; Farina, Thaw, Lovern & Mangone, 1974; Farina, 1975; Farina & Hagelauer, 1975) has dealt with the interpersonal consequences of having been institutionalized in a mental institution or even being perceived as having been institutionalized. In much the same way as Rosenhan (1973) found the once-given label of schizophrenia to have long-term effects on the attribution of behaviors to the illness, Farina and his associates have found that those persons with history of mental illness often experience negative experiences in their interactions with normals. Other researchers have typically obtained findings consistent with those of Farina with regard to the negative consequences of being perceived as having been institutionalized for mental illness (Whatley, 1959; Phillips, 1962, 1964; Novak & Lerner, 1968; Siassi, Spiro & Crocetti, 1973; Zimmerman, 1974; for a review see Rabkin, 1974). This negative response seems to be inversely correlated with educational level and positively correlated with age (Crocetti, Spiro & Siassi, 1971).

The conceptual framework for the current study was derived from a study by Ring and Farina (1969) in which Rorschach results given to subjects were manipulated so as to provide the subject with information that he was either psychologically similar to or dissimilar to a confederate thought to be an "ex-mental patient." One third of the subjects were told that their emotional stability as measured in terms of the norms for college students was in the bottom 5 percent (Emotionally Unstable condition). Another third of the subjects were given feedback which placed them in the top 5 percent in terms of emotional stability (Emotionally Stable condition). The remaining third of the

subjects "fell somewhere between the two extremes . . . in an attempt to induce uncertainty concerning how emotionally unstable they really were" [p. 684]. The purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship between perceived similarity and treatment of an ex-mental patient, so all subjects were asked to administer shocks to the ex-patient, ostensibly for incorrect responses in a learning task.

Those subjects who perceived themselves personally similar (i.e., emotionally unstable) to the confederate administered shorter duration of shock than did those subjects who perceived themselves as personally dissimilar (i.e., emotionally stable). Conversely, Milgram (1965) found a "negatively monotonic" relationship to exist between treatment of a "student" and perceived similarity. Wright (1960) and Yablonsky (1966), however, in studies of stigma assigned as a result of physical disability and race, had discerned a more curvilinear function existing between similarity and negative treatment.

Several other studies have investigated the consequences of a subject's perception of similarity to a stimulus person believed to have a history of mental illness (Novak & Lerner, 1968; Bennett, 1972; Zimmerman, 1974). In a study on "impression formation" subjects showed greater willingness to interact with a disturbed dissimilar partner than a similar one. Sorrentino and Boutilier (1974) have explained these seemingly incongruous results (in terms of expected favorable reaction to a similar other) by postulating that responsibility for a negative outcome of the interaction would be less difficult to attribute to a dissimilar "victim" than a similar "victim". Bennett's (1972) results confirmed a prediction of attribution of more behavioral manifestations of moderate mental illness to dissimilar "ex-mental patients"

than to similar "patients". Zimmerman (1974), however, obtained results that differed from many of these findings. In this study subjects received bogus psychological feedback which assigned them to "disturbed" or "adjusted" groups (and thereby personally dissimilar or similar). Subjects were found to prefer subsequent interaction with similar others rather than dissimilar--even when the similar other was known to have a history of hospitalization.

Assuming that perceivers find it threatening to discover similarities to mental patients, these results concerning institutional stigma seem very much like the process of defensive attribution of responsibility as outlined by Shaver (1970a, 1970b, 1973, 1975). Within the framework of defensive attribution, perceivers are expected to "make whatever attributions will best reduce the threat posed by the situation . . . a perceiver's own self-protective motivation can sometimes distort his attributions of responsibility" [Shaver, 1975, p. 110].

It would seem, then, that a loose interpretation of this model for assignment of responsibility may explain the results obtained by Ring and Farina (1969) in the study discussed above. In both the stigma study by Ring and Farina and in Shaver's model of defensive attribution perceived personal similarity to an actor led to more benevolent treatment of that actor (operationally defined as reduced duration of shock in the stigma experiment and reduction of personal responsibility in the attribution model). A problem with this comparison is the absence of manipulation of situational possibility in the Ring and Farina study, which has been suggested by Shaver (1973) to be necessary for defensive attribution to occur. Also, Zimmerman manipulated personal similarity without regard to situational possibility.

On the other hand, Bennett (1972) manipulated situational possibility but failed to deal with personal similarity.

To provide a precise test of the relationship between the assignment of stigma as a result of institutionalization and defensive attribution, this research explored possible distortions of the personal responsibility attributed for commitment to a mental hospital as a function of both perceived situational possibility and personal similarity to the stimulus person. The relationship between the attribution of personal responsibility and the assignment of stigma as measured by social distance within each condition was investigated.

Also, as mentioned above, in response to criticisms by Brewer (1977) that differences in attributed responsibility resulting from factors such as situational possibility and personal similarity are the result of attempts to reduce information processing complexity rather than motivated distortion, estimates of the Prior Expectancy of the negative consequence in the current design (institutionalization for mental illness) as well as estimates of personal and situational similarity were acquired from subjects prior to finding out that the negative consequence occurred, as well as after. The resultant three factor between-subjects design (Personal Similarity by Situational Possibility by Time of Estimate of Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility) provided an empirical test for the following hypotheses:

1) In accord with the model of defensive attribution:

- a. Personally Similar-High Situational Possibility subjects will reduce threat of future personal responsibility (and therefore more responsibility to chance or environmental factors) by assigning less personal responsibility

to the stimulus person as compared with subjects in the other three variations of Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility (see Figure 1).

- b. Personally Dissimilar-High Situational Possibility subjects will exaggerate the amount of personal responsibility assigned to the stimulus person for her institutionalization (see Figure 1).

2) With regard to social distance:

- a. Personally Similar subjects will demonstrate greater willingness to interact with the stimulus person than will Personally Dissimilar subjects. An interaction between Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility is expected such that willingness to interact is greatest under conditions of High Personal Similarity as well as High Situational Possibility (see Figure 1).
- b. Willingness to interact with a person who has been hospitalized for mental illness will be negatively correlated with attribution of personal responsibility for that institutionalization.

3) In opposition to Brewer's (1977) view of subjects as rational information processors who are not motivated to distort information given them, it is predicted that:


- a. Subjects who "commit" themselves to a level of Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility prior to learning that the stimulus person becomes institutionalized will rate themselves as more Personally Similar and will give higher estimates of Situational Possibility than will

Figure 1
Predicted Attribution of Responsibility and
Social Distance (Willingness to Interact) by Condition

PERSONAL SIMILARITY

○ — ○ PERSONALLY SIMILAR

△ — △ PERSONALLY DISSIMILAR



subjects who remain "Not Committed" until the end of the experimental task.

- b. "Committed" subjects will be more likely to engage in defensive attribution than will "Not Committed" subjects.

METHOD

Subjects

Eighty-four sophomore and junior undergraduate females at the College of William and Mary were selected at random from the student directory for participation in the current research. Subjects were contacted by phone and asked to participate in a study on "impression formation". All subjects were concentrating in a subject area other than psychology. Incentive for participation was provided by offering all subjects a ten percent chance of earning \$10.00 (through a raffle). Twenty-two additional subjects were recruited but did not report to the assigned room for participation. Data from four subjects were excluded from the analysis because these subjects reported that a member of their immediate family had been hospitalized for mental illness. There was an even distribution of subjects among the eight experimental conditions (n per cell = 10).

Independent Variables

Independent variables included Personal Similarity, manipulated by bogus psychological feedback given to subjects prior to the experimental task; Situational Possibility, the likelihood that the subject would experience a situation similar to that of the stimulus person; and Time of Estimate of Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility, either prior to finding out that the stimulus person has been institutionalized, or after receiving that information.

Personal Similarity. The manipulation of personal similarity was achieved by delivering bogus feedback to subjects following administration of the Rotter Internal-External Control Scale (Rotter, 1966). Feedback was given to subjects in the form of a bar graph with ten scales ostensibly based on the I-E questions shown as percentiles and identified only by number (see Appendix A). In the Personally Similar (SIM) condition the subject's percentile scores varied no more than 5 percentile points on each scale from the score of the stimulus person. The direction of the variability of scores from those of the stimulus person was randomized across scales. In the Personally Dissimilar (DIS) condition each scale score differed by a minimum of 40 percentile points (with direction and variability again randomized). This manipulation of personal similarity was included to test the hypothesis that as with the assignment of stigma, attribution of personal causality to mental patients will be significantly less under those conditions in which perceived personal similarity is high (i.e., if subjects are given bogus information as to their similarity to the stimulus person). In their study using a measure of the duration of shock administered in a learning task as the operational definition of differential treatment, Ring and Farina (1969) found this relationship between perceived psychological similarity and duration of shock to be "negatively monotonic".

Situational Possibility. Situational possibility, operationalized as the likelihood that the observer might find herself in a situation like that of the stimulus person, was manipulated by a variation in the description of the life circumstances of the stimulus person. The stimulus person was described as either a senior college student

at a "small, prestigious, liberal arts school", a situation very much like that of the subject (Situational Possibility--HIGH POS)^{or} as a "young mother with two children", a situation unlike that of the subject (Situational Possibility--LOW POS).

Time of Estimate of Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility. In order to test the validity of Brewer's (1977) interpretation of the findings in the defensive attribution literature as being a result of rational information processing rather than due to self-protective motivational forces, an additional variable of Time of Estimate of Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility was added to the typical defensive attribution model which only manipulates Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility. Half of the subjects made estimates of personal and situational similarity and likelihood of being in the same situation (situational possibility) prior to finding out that the stimulus person has been institutionalized (but after receiving information concerning Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility). These estimates of Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility served as checks on the manipulation of these variables. Also, having made these estimates these subjects were Committed (COM) to the level of similarity they had indicated. The remaining subjects did not make these similarity estimates until the end of the experimental task, and were, therefore, more free to deny the levels of Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility which had been experimentally assigned to them when answering the questions involving attribution and social distance. These subjects remained Uncommitted (NOT COM) to the experimental manipulations.

Procedure

Subjects reported to the social psychology laboratory at the College of William and Mary in small groups of no more than five per group. Three rooms within the lab were available for use so that no more than two subjects actually shared a room while completing the experimental task. All experimental sessions and debriefings were conducted by a female experimenter. Upon arriving at the experimental setting each subject signed a Participant's Consent Form which included the statement that the subject could terminate her participation at any point during the study (see Appendix B). Also included on this form was the subject's "raffle ticket". The subject completed the ticket and placed it in the raffle box prior to beginning any experimental tasks. This procedure was intended to assure the subject that her chance of winning one of the raffle prizes was entirely independent of her responses on the experimental task, or even her completion of the experimental task.

After completing the consent form and raffle ticket, the subject was given a copy of the Rotter Internal-External Control Scale (Rotter, 1966). Verbal instructions to the subject at this point were as follows:

As I told you when I talked to you on the phone, I am interested in studying impression formation. Past research in this area has indicated that individual differences and similarities between the perceiver, which is you, and the stimulus person, which is the person about whom you will be reading, may affect reactions to the stimulus person. Therefore, for the purpose of this research I have gathered some information about the stimulus person about whom you will be reading on certain personality variables, and at this time I need to gather the same sort of information about you. I assure you that none of this information is particularly personal

or threatening; it will merely allow me to give you some feedback as to how similar or different you are to the stimulus person you will be reading about.

When the subject had finished the Rotter Scale, the experimenter re-entered the experimental room. Verbal instructions given at this point dismissed the subject for ten minutes so that the experimenter could "score the subject's test". In reality, the feedback to be given the subject had been prepared in advance.

Random assignment of subjects to conditions was achieved by placing the experimental materials for all subjects into separate manila folders prior to the experimental session. The Personality Profile sheet was positioned in the folder so that it extended one and one-half inches from the top of the folder. This allowed the experimenter to assign subjects at random (by writing the subject's name on a Personality Profile) to experimental conditions (as determined by the stimulus materials) while remaining completely blind to the actual condition to which the subject had been assigned.

Manipulation of Personal Similarity. After the break, the experimenter delivered to the subject (in a manila folder) the "results" of her personality test, as well as the results "on the same test" of the stimulus person about whom she would be reading (see Appendix C). Written instructions to the subjects included the statement that the subject would be able to keep her own personality profile. This instruction was included to insure subjects that the experimenter would not be keeping any material with the subject's name attached. The complete written instructions written on the front of the manila folder read as follows:

This folder contains the results of your questions as well as the results from the same questionnaire of the person about whom you will be reading. Please examine your results carefully and COMPARE THEM WITH THE PERSON ABOUT WHOM YOU WILL BE READING. After you have compared the results, answer the question sheets provided. When you have completed all materials, return the sheets to the folder, except your personality profile. You may keep your profile.

The "test feedback" provided to subjects varied as described above to provide a profile either very similar to or very different from that of the stimulus person. The similarity (or difference) indicated by the scores was emphasized by a handwritten statement on the bottom of the subject's profile which read as follows:

Your results show that you are very similar (different) in personality to Sarah Jackson.

Manipulation of Situational Possibility. Experimental manipulation of Situational Possibility was achieved via the written description of the stimulus person about whom the subject would be reading. The written description for the High Situational Possibility (HIGH POS) condition read as follows:

You will be answering questions about Sarah Jackson based on limited information about her. Sarah is a student at a small, prestigious liberal arts college. The pressures of her classes are very similar to yours. She is a senior and is maintaining a "B" average.

Based on the information you have just read, please answer the following questions about Sarah Jackson.

In the Low Situational Possibility (LOW POS) condition Sarah was described as a "young housewife with two children":

You will be answering questions about Sarah Jackson based on limited information about her. Sarah is a young mother (twenty-one) with two children. The pressures of her situation are very different from yours.

Based on the information you have just read, please answer the following questions about Sarah Jackson.

Timing of Similarity Judgments. At this point, prior to any mention of Sarah Jackson's hospitalization for mental illness, half of the subjects in each condition answered several questions regarding their estimated personal similarity and possibility of being in circumstances like those of Sarah Jackson. Perceived similarity and possibility were measured by the following questions:

1. How similar in personality do you consider yourself to be to Sarah Jackson?
2. How similar are the pressures which Sarah Jackson experiences to the pressures which you experience?
3. What do you think are the chances out of 10 that you might find yourself in the same situation as Sarah Jackson?

Responses to the first two questions were made by checking one of seven answer choices ranging from "Very Similar" to "Very Dissimilar".

Response to the third question was made by circling a number between one and ten (see Appendix D).

Similarity and possibility estimates provided at this point (n = 40) provided a check on the manipulations of Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility. Those subjects not "committing" themselves to a level of similarity at this point (n = 40) received a "Prior Expectancy" question:

Estimate the probability that someone similar to Sarah Jackson in situation and personality would need to be hospitalized in a mental hospital.

_____ percent

The next written instruction (see Appendix E) to subjects directed them to insert Form A (which included the similarity questions for half the subjects and the Prior Expectancy question for the other half) into an envelope included in the packet and to seal the envelope. This

procedure prevented the subject from changing the information included on Form A after reading that Sarah Jackson was hospitalized for mental illness.

The next instructions to the subject described the procedure for answering the Likert-type attribution questions as well as for assigning the "responsibility" and "blame tokens" (see Appendix E). The next page of the experimental booklet for subjects in the High Situational Possibility (HIGH POS) condition contained the following additional information about Sarah Jackson:

Sarah Jackson had recently been under a great deal of pressure at school. The pressures of being a senior at a small prestigious school had become more than she could handle. One week-end, during exams, she became so depressed that she cried continuously and hysterically for seemingly no reason at all. Her roommate suggested that she should seek help at the university counseling center. The psychologist at the counseling center suggested that she should go to Westside Mental Hospital for a few weeks to pull herself together. Sarah has been at Westside for two weeks and is doing much better.

The Low Situational Possibility (LOW POS) condition described Sarah as:

. . . under a great deal of pressure at home. The pressures of being a young mother with two small children had become more than she could handle. One week-end she became so depressed that she cried continuously and hysterically for seemingly no reason at all. Her husband suggested that she should seek help at the local Crisis Intervention Center. The psychologist at the center suggested that she should go to Westside Mental Hospital.

Attribution Measures. Measurement of the subject's attributions of responsibility for Sarah Jackson's hospitalization was achieved through the subject's responses to several 7-point Likert-type scales (see Appendix F). These questions were delineated along Heider's levels of responsibility as follows:

Commission: Do you think Sarah contributed in any way to her hospitalization?

Foreseeability: Do you think Sarah could have foreseen the fact that she would be hospitalized?

Intention: Do you think Sarah intended to become hospitalized?

The subject was also asked to divide one hundred "responsibility tokens" and one hundred "blame" tokens among four factors: Sarah Jackson, the environment (especially her school/family), chance, or to other causes. The division of "responsibility" tokens task instructed the subject as follows:

Please divide the following responsibility tokens among the following factors which may have been responsible for Sarah's hospitalization: Sarah (S), the environment (E), chance (C), or other causes (O). Draw a circle around the number of tokens you wish to assign to each factor and label each circle with the abbreviation for the factor (S, E, C, O).

R R

R R

R R

R R

R R

As a final attributional measure subjects were asked to write a paragraph of advice to Sarah Jackson on how to avoid being hospitalized (in a mental hospital) in the future. Responses on this item were analyzed in terms of whether or not a paragraph was written as well as the number of words written. Also, responses were rated by two raters (one male, one female) to determine the number of suggestions to Sarah for personal changes which might prevent future institutionalization as well as environmental changes which would produce the same effect.

Social Distance Measures. Willingness to interact with the stimulus person was measured by several social distance questions (taken

from Oksner & Shaver, 1977). Willingness to interact was measured at several levels of intimacy:

How willing would you be to have a class with Sarah Jackson?

How willing would you be to work with Sarah Jackson?

How willing would you be to have Sarah Jackson as a member in a club that you were a member of?

How willing would you be to share a room with Sarah Jackson?

How willing would you be to have Sarah Jackson as a best friend?

Subjects responded to these questions on five -point scales ranging from "Definitely Willing" to "Definitely Not Willing" (see Appendix G).

Attitudes Toward Mentally Ill Persons. The Attitudes Toward Mentally Ill Persons scale (Davis, 1972) includes sixteen adjectives presented in a semantic differential format (see Appendix H). Sample adjective pairs include:

Good :___:___:___:___:___:___:___: Bad

Kind :___:___:___:___:___:___:___: Cruel

Passive :___:___:___:___:___:___:___: Active

Subjects responded to these adjectives by placing an "X" on the line which corresponded with their attitude toward mentally ill persons on each adjective pair.

Estimate of Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility for "Not Committed" Subjects. After answering all experimental questions, those subjects (n = 40) who did not answer questions concerning their Personal Similarity to the stimulus person as well as the likelihood that they would experience similar situations (Situational Possibility) prior to answering the experimental questions, answered those questions

after completing the Attitudes Toward Mentally Ill Persons questionnaire. Comparison of similarity estimates made at this point with estimates made earlier provided a measure of the extent of denial of Personal Similarity as well as Situational Possibility as a result of learning that the stimulus person is institutionalized for mental illness. Also, by considering the Time of Estimate of Similarity as a third independent variable, analysis of responses to dependent variables as a function of having "Committed" (COM) oneself to a level of similarity or remaining "Not Committed" (NOT COM) was possible. An additional comparison of the dependent variable "Prior Expectancy" over Time of Estimate was made possible by having "Committed" subjects make estimates of Prior Expectancy at this time.

Biographical Information. The final task required the subject to fill out a biographical questionnaire (see Appendix I). This information was used to eliminate from the analysis anyone whose immediate family included someone who was currently or had been mentally ill.

Age _____

Have you ever been hospitalized for mental illness?

Has anyone in your family ever been hospitalized for mental illness?

If so, what relation were they to you?

Debriefing and Payment of Subjects. When the subject was finished with all experimental tasks, the experimenter re-entered the experimental room to initiate debriefing. All debriefings followed a standard debriefing outline (see Appendix J). The major objectives of this session (after Ring & Farina, 1969) were to:

(a) to determine whether and to what extent subjects were suspicious about any of the deceptions employed

in the experiment . . . (b) to explain in detail the real purpose of the experiment and to justify its several deceptions, and (c) to allow subjects to express their feelings and make any comments they care to about the experiment [p. 685].

Prior to leaving the experimental setting all subjects were asked to sign a statement of promise not to disclose information about the experiment (see Appendix K). Also included on this form was the opportunity to request feedback on the completed study. All subjects were thanked for their participation and reminded that raffle prizes would be awarded on February 28, 1977.

Eight raffle tickets were drawn on February 28, 1977. Each winner received \$10.00. All subjects requesting feedback received a brief statement of the results on May 2, 1977.

RESULTS

Estimates of personal similarity and responses to the dependent variables dealing with attribution of responsibility, social distance, and attitudes toward mental illness were analyzed by a 2 x 2 x 2 analysis of variance (Situational Possibility x Personal Similarity x Time of Estimate of Personal Similarity). Pearson product-moment correlations were computed for attribution of responsibility and social distance measures. Checks on the manipulation of Situational Possibility and Personal Similarity were obtained by computing a 2 x 2 analysis of variance (Personal Similarity x Situational Possibility) on similarity estimates acquired from subjects prior to learning that the stimulus person has been hospitalized for mental illness.

Checks on the Manipulation of Situational Possibility and Personal Similarity

Similarity measures provided by half the subjects ($N = 40$) prior to receiving the information that the stimulus person has been hospitalized for mental illness, but after receiving information concerning their similarity (or dissimilarity) to the stimulus person indicated that subjects were aware of the conditions to which they had been assigned. Subjects in the Personally Similar (SIM) condition indicated that they felt more similar in personality to the stimulus person, $F(1, 36) = 55.94$, $p < .001$, than did subjects who had received personality profile feedback which emphasized how dissimilar (DIF) in

Table 1
 Mean Similarity and Possibility Judgments
 Made by COM Subjects

Similarity Estimate	Condition			
	SIM- HIGH POS	SIM- LOW POS	DIF- HIGH POS	DIF- LOW POS
Estimate of Personal Similarity ^a	5.50	5.40	2.30	1.40
Estimate of Situational Similarity ^b	5.40	1.80	5.80	1.10
Estimate of Likelihood of Being in a Similar Situation ^c	6.20	3.50	6.20	2.20

^aThe higher the mean score the greater the perceived similarity.

^bThe higher the mean score the greater the perceived situational similarity (indirect estimate of situational possibility).

^cThe higher the mean score the greater the likelihood of being in a similar situation (situational possibility).

personality they were to the stimulus person.

Subjects for whom the stimulus person was described as a "college student attending a small prestigious liberal arts college" (Situational Possibility--HIGH POS) perceived the situation of the stimulus person to be more like their own situation, $F(1, 36) = 145.88$, $p < .001$, than did subjects for whom the stimulus person was described as a "young housewife with two children" (Situational Possibility--LOW POS). Also, HIGH POS subjects indicated that they felt more likely to be in a similar situation to the stimulus person than did LOW POS subjects, $F(1, 36) = 27.43$, $p < .001$.

Perceived Situational Possibility and Personal Similarity by Time of Estimate of Similarity and Possibility Interactions

The data confirmed the expected interaction between estimated Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility to the stimulus person as a function of the time of Similarity and Possibility estimates. Subjects in the SIM condition rated themselves as more similar in personality to the stimulus person when similarity ratings were made prior to receiving the information that the stimulus person becomes institutionalized for mental illness, $F(1, 72) = 6.15$, $p < .05$. Rather unexpectedly, the DIF subjects rated themselves as less dissimilar when the ratings were made after learning about the institutionalization, especially in the LOW POS condition.

The same pattern was apparent for estimates of Situational Similarity* with HIGH POS subjects engaging in a denial of Situational Similarity across time of estimate but LOW POS subjects increasing their

*Question 2 of the "similarity" estimates was actually worded in terms of "situational similarity" as an additional indirect measure of Situational Possibility.

Table 2
 Mean Estimates of Perceived Personal Similarity
 and Situational Possibility by Condition

Similarity Estimate		Condition			
		HIGH POS- COM	HIGH POS- NOT COM	LOW POS- COM	LOW POS- NOT COM
Estimate of Personal Similarity ^a	SIM	5.50	5.10	5.40	3.50
	DIF	2.30	2.70	1.40	2.50
Estimate of Situa- tional Similarity ^b	SIM	5.40	5.20	1.80	2.70
	DIF	5.80	5.00	1.10	2.60
Estimate of Likelihood of Being in a Similar Situation ^c	SIM	6.20	2.70	3.50	2.70
	DIF	6.20	1.40	2.20	1.50

^aThe higher the mean score the greater the perceived similarity.

^bThe higher the mean score the greater the perceived situational similarity (indirect estimate of situational possibility).

^cThe higher the mean score the greater the likelihood of being in a similar situation (situational possibility).

estimates of Situational Similarity, $F(1, 72) = 6.73, p < .05$.

A significant Time of Estimate main effect for estimates of Likelihood of Being in the Same Situation (Situational Possibility) was witnessed such that all subjects made lower estimates of being in the same situation as the stimulus person when these estimates were made after learning that the stimulus person has been institutionalized,* $F(1, 72) = 39.22, p < .001$. Again, there was an interaction between Situational Possibility and Time of Estimate such that both HIGH POS and LOW POS subjects showed a decrease in likelihood estimates, with the decrease being more pronounced for HIGH POS subjects, $F(1, 72) = 18.88, p < .001$.

Attribution of Responsibility

None of the predicted interactions between Situational Possibility and Personal Similarity for attribution of responsibility reached conventional levels of significance. Main effects for situational possibility revealed that HIGH POS subjects attributed fewer responsibility tokens to the environment, $F(1, 72) = 5.31, p < .05$, and more responsibility tokens to "other causes", $F(1, 72) = 5.54, p < .05$, than did LOW POS subjects. In addition to these differences in token distribution, there was also a tendency, $F(1, 72) = 3.66, p < .07$, for subjects in the LOW POS condition to indicate that environmental pressures contributed more to the stimulus person's hospitalization.

*In the discussion of results to follow, reference to the two levels of Time of Estimate of Situational Possibility and Personal Similarity will be achieved by using the labels for the levels of this variable introduced in the Methods section: COM, "Committed"--estimates made prior to knowledge of institutionalization, and NOT COM, "Not Committed"--estimates made at the end of the experimental task.

Table 3
Mean Scores for Attributed Responsibility
by Conditions

Measure		Condition			
		HIGH POS- COM	HIGH POS- NOT COM	LOW POS- COM	LOW POS- NOT COM
Responsibility Tokens to the Environment	SIM	31.50	37.80	37.80	42.00
	DIF	34.10	35.60	43.20	40.70
Blame Tokens to the Environment	SIM	30.20	43.50	35.30	42.00
	DIF	36.50	32.40	42.50	38.50
Responsibility Tokens to Other Causes	SIM	21.00	18.60	14.00	16.60
	DIF	21.30	23.60	14.90	17.80
Contribution of Environmental Pressures ^a	SIM	5.50	5.70	5.50	5.90
	DIF	5.40	5.20	6.10	6.00
Intentionality ^b	SIM	2.70	2.80	2.00	4.00
	DIF	3.50	2.60	3.00	2.60
Commission (Contri- bution to Institu- tionalization) ^c	SIM	5.50	4.80	5.50	4.70
	DIF	5.20	5.30	4.70	5.40
Foreseeability ^d	SIM	3.60	3.00	3.00	4.60
	DIF	3.90	2.70	2.50	4.20

^aThe higher the mean score the more environmental pressures were viewed as contributing to the institutionalization.

^bThe higher the mean score the more the stimulus person was viewed as intending to become institutionalized.

^cThe higher the mean score the more the stimulus person was viewed as contributing to her institutionalization.

^dThe higher the mean score the more the stimulus person was viewed as being able to foresee her institutionalization.

Several interesting interactions were revealed between Personal Similarity and the Time of Estimate of that "similarity". To begin with, DIF-COM subjects thought the stimulus person intended to become institutionalized more than did subjects in the SIM-COM condition, whereas for NOT COM subjects this differential assignment of Intentionality was reversed, $F(1, 72) = 5.88, p < .05$. Also, SIM-COM subjects assigned fewer "blame tokens" to the environment than did DIF-COM subjects, with this pattern again reversing for NOT COM subjects, $F(1, 72) = 4.41, p < .05$. Finally, SIM-COM subjects perceived the stimulus person as contributing more to her institutionalization than did SIM-NOT COM subjects, while this pattern was reversed among DIF subjects, $F(1, 72) = 6.71, p < .05$.

An interaction between Situational Possibility and Time of Similarity Estimate revealed that HIGH POS-COM subjects thought that the negative consequence of becoming institutionalized was more foreseeable than did HIGH POS-NOT COM subjects, $F(1, 72) = 12.59, p < .001$. Conversely, LOW POS-COM subjects attributed less "foreseeability" than did LOW POS-NOT COM subjects.

Social Distance

Expected interactions between Situational Possibility and Personal Similarity for willingness to interact with a person who had been institutionalized were also not confirmed (F's all less than 1.1). There was a rather consistent main effect for Personal Similarity across levels of social distance such that SIM subjects indicated greater willingness than DIF subjects to Be in a Club with a stimulus person, $F(1, 72) = 6.77, p < .01$; Room with the stimulus person, $F(1, 72) = 4.43, p < .05$; and have the stimulus person for a Best

Table 4
Mean Social Distance Scores by Condition

Willingness to: ^a		Condition			
		HIGH POS- COM	HIGH POS- NOT COM	LOW POS- COM	LOW POS- NOT COM
Be in a Club With	SIM	4.10	4.50	4.50	4.40
	DIF	3.70	4.20	3.80	3.80
Room With	SIM	3.30	3.60	2.90	3.40
	DIF	2.80	2.80	2.60	2.70
Have as a Best Friend	SIM	3.10	4.10	3.50	3.70
	DIF	2.80	3.40	2.60	2.70

^aThe higher the mean score the greater the willingness to interact.

Friend, $F(1, 72) = 8.51$, $p < .01$. There was also a trend, $F(1, 72) = 3.66$, $p < .06$, for COM subjects to indicate less willingness to have the stimulus person as a Best Friend as compared with NOT COM subjects.

Attitudes Toward Mentally Ill Persons

Responses to the semantic differential adjectives in the Attitudes Toward Mentally Ill Persons (Davis, 1972) revealed several main effects for Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility. Subjects in the SIM condition considered mentally ill persons to be more kind, $F(1, 72) = 5.63$, $p < .05$, more soft, $F(1, 72) = 7.17$, $p < .01$, and more yielding, $F(1, 72) = 4.29$, $p < .05$, than did DIF subjects. There was also a tendency for SIM subjects to describe mentally ill persons as less strong (more weak), $F(1, 72) = 3.31$, $p < .08$.

HIGH POS subjects described mentally ill persons as being more calm than did LOW POS subjects, $F(1, 72) = 4.76$, $p < .05$.

In addition to the main effects, there were several interactions on the evaluative adjectives. When the stimulus person described had been in a low possibility situation (LOW POS), the SIM subjects tended to describe the mentally ill persons as being more deep than did the DIF subjects, but no such difference was evident for HIGH POS subjects, $F(1, 72) = 3.54$, $p < .07$. A two-way interaction between Personal Similarity and Time of Estimate of Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility showed SIM-COM subjects less likely to describe mentally ill persons as cold than SIM-NOT COM subjects, $F(1, 72) = 6.46$, $p < .05$. The trend was reversed for DIF subjects. A three-way interaction (Situational Possibility x Personal Similarity x Time of Similarity Estimate) was obtained on the adjective pair active-passive.

Table 5
 Mean Scores on Attitudes Toward Mentally
 Ill Persons Scale by Conditions

Adjective Pairs ^a		Condition			
		HIGH POS- COM	HIGH POS- NOT COM	LOW POS- COM	LOW POS- NOT COM
Kind-Cruel	SIM	4.70	4.60	4.90	4.10
	DIF	4.10	4.20	4.00	4.10
Hard-Soft	SIM	3.10	3.30	3.50	3.80
	DIF	4.10	3.60	3.90	4.10
Unyielding- Yielding	SIM	3.10	3.70	3.80	4.20
	DIF	4.30	4.60	3.80	4.50
Strong-Weak	SIM	2.60	3.00	2.60	2.80
	DIF	3.30	3.30	3.40	3.10
Calm-Nervous	SIM	2.70	3.10	2.40	2.20
	DIF	3.20	2.70	2.80	2.60
Deep-Shallow	SIM	4.40	4.70	5.10	4.60
	DIF	4.90	4.60	4.00	3.80
Hot-Cold	SIM	4.50	3.90	4.00	3.60
	DIF	3.90	4.20	3.60	4.20
Active-Passive	SIM	3.20	4.00	4.10	2.90
	DIF	3.60	3.60	3.70	4.00

^aMean scores indicate extent of agreement with the first adjective in each adjective pair.

Similar subjects who were HIGH POS-COM described mentally ill persons as being less active than did HIGH POS-NOT COM subjects. Similar subjects in the LOW POS-COM condition, however, rated mentally ill persons as more active than did LOW POS-NOT COM subjects, $F(1, 72) = 4.09$, $p < .05$. No systematic differences were noted among DIF subjects.

Correlations Between Attribution and Social Distance

Correlations for each "treatment group" between attributional and social distance measures produced some support for the predicted negative correlation between assignment of personal responsibility for institutionalization and social distance, especially at more intimate levels of social distance. SIM-HIGH POS-COM subjects showed substantially less willingness to Have a Class With the stimulus person, $r = -.65$, $p < .05$; willingness to Work With the stimulus person, $r = -.46$, $p < .10$; willingness to Share a Room, $r = -.62$, $p < .05$; and willingness to Have as a Best Friend, $r = -.69$, $p < .01$, when they thought the stimulus person could have "foreseen" her institutionalization. SIM-HIGH POS-NOT COM subjects also produced negative correlations between Foreseeability and willingness to Have a Class With, $r = -.47$, $p < .10$. Willingness to Share a Room With the stimulus person, $r = -.53$, $p < .10$, and to have the stimulus person as a Best Friend, $r = -.78$, $p < .01$, were reduced as a function of perceiving the stimulus person as having intended to become hospitalized.

Similarly consistent negative correlations occurred among DIF-LOW POS-NOT COM subjects. The more the stimulus person was perceived as having intended to become hospitalized (Intentionality), the less willing subjects were to Work With the stimulus person, $r = -.50$, $p <$

Table 6

Intercorrelations^a of Attribution of Personal Responsibility
and Willingness to Interact by Condition

Level of Responsibility by Condition	Level of Interaction				
	Class With	Club With	Work With	Room With	Best Friend
Commission^b					
SIM-HIGH POS-COM	.63*				
DIF-HIGH POS-COM			.51	.79**	.57*
DIF-LOW POS-COM					-.46
Want					
SIM-HIGH POS-COM		.55	.59*		
SIM-HIGH POS-NOT COM		.59*			
DIF-HIGH POS-NOT COM		-.50			
SIM-LOW POS-COM		.56*			
DIF-LOW POS-COM	.50				
Foreseeability					
SIM-HIGH POS-COM	-.65*		-.46	-.62*	-.69**
SIM-HIGH POS-NOT COM	-.47				-.65*
DIF-HIGH POS-COM		.52			.51
SIM-LOW POS-NOT COM				-.46	-.49
DIF-LOW POS-NOT COM			.58*		.41
Prevention					
SIM-HIGH POS-COM	-.46				
SIM-HIGH POS-NOT COM				-.55	
DIF-HIGH POS-COM					.59*
DIF-HIGH POS-NOT COM	-.53				
SIM-LOW POS-COM					-.75**
SIM-LOW POS-NOT COM					.46
DIF-LOW POS-NOT COM				-.41	-.70**
Intention					
SIM-HIGH POS-NOT COM				-.53	-.78**
DIF-HIGH POS-COM		-.58*			
DIF-HIGH POS-NOT COM	-.79**				
DIF-LOW POS-NOT COM			-.50	-.44	-.44

^aAll correlations of greater magnitude than .40 are reported.

^bContribution by stimulus person to institutionalization.

*_p < .05.

**_p < .01.

.10; Share a Room With the stimulus person, $\underline{r} = -.44$, $\underline{p} < .10$; or Have the stimulus person for a Best Friend, $\underline{r} = -.44$, $\underline{p} < .10$. Also, the more these subjects believed the stimulus person could have prevented her institutionalization, the less willing they were to Share a Room, $\underline{r} = -.41$, $\underline{p} < .10$, and to Have the stimulus person as a Best Friend, $\underline{r} = -.70$, $\underline{p} < .01$.

In contrast to the above mentioned pattern of negative correlations, DIF-HIGH POS-COM subjects revealed a positive relationship between seeing the stimulus person as contributing to her hospitalization and willingness to Work With the stimulus person, $\underline{r} = .51$, $\underline{p} < .10$; Share a Room, $\underline{r} = .79$, $\underline{p} < .01$; and Have as a Best Friend, $\underline{r} = .57$, $\underline{p} < .05$. Also there was a trend for increased willingness to interact as a function of perceiving the stimulus person as wanting to be hospitalized for SIM-HIGH POS-COM subjects (Club With, $\underline{r} = .55$, $\underline{p} < .10$; Work With, $\underline{r} = .59$, $\underline{p} < .05$). Several other correlations exceeded the .50 level (see Table 6); however, only those correlations which show a consistent pattern across various levels of social distance will be discussed.

Prior Expectancy

Judgments of Prior Expectancy ("estimate the probability that someone similar to Sarah Jackson . . . would need to be hospitalized in a mental hospital") were higher when made by subjects after finding out that the stimulus person was actually hospitalized as compared to Prior Expectancy judgments made prior to receiving this knowledge, $\underline{F} (1, 72) = 22.84$, $\underline{p} < .001$.

DISCUSSION

Results failed to support the experimental hypotheses for attribution and social distance measures which predicted an interaction between Situational Possibility and Personal Similarity. In view of past experimental evidence supporting this prediction (e.g., Chaiken & Darley, 1973; Younger, Arrowood & Harris, 1977) it appears prudent to consider aspects of the current research which may have led to failure to produce this interaction rather than to discount the basic paradigm for motivated distortion of attribution which led to the prediction of these interactions. Checks on the manipulations of Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility provided clear evidence that these manipulations were cognitively incorporated by the subjects. A possible explanation for the failure to support the Situational Possibility-Personal Similarity predictions within the current experimental design may be found in the operational definition of Situational Possibility. As described by Shaver (1973) situational possibility is defined as "the likelihood that the perceiver might find himself in similar circumstances" [p. 107]. The perceiver will be motivated to reduce the amount of personal responsibility assigned to a stimulus person whenever there is a possibility that the perceiver will find himself in a similar situation in the future. By assigning responsibility to chance or environmental factors the perceiver is in effect attempting to avoid future "blame". Although college female subjects in the

current study overwhelmingly indicated that their situation was more similar to the High Situational Possibility stimulus person, it is possible that they also perceived themselves as sometime in the future being a "young mother with two children". The threat of future "blame" may have been present for both HIGH POS and LOW POS subjects.

The main effects for Situational Possibility which revealed attribution of greater contribution to environmental pressure as well as greater assignment of responsibility tokens to the environment in LOW POS conditions may have been due to sympathy for a peer in a situation currently deemed as slightly socially undesirable ("young mother with two children"). This explanation is based on frequent informal comments made by subjects during the debriefing revealing awareness of the difficulties inherent in raising two young children. This result is then interpreted as an artifact of the current operational definition of Situational Possibility rather than a finding generalizable to more standard experimental manipulations of Situational Possibility.

Main effects for Personal Similarity provide additional experimental support to earlier findings (Zimmerman, 1974) that subjects prefer to interact with similar disturbed others rather than dissimilar disturbed others. This finding is in contrast to findings by Novak and Lerner (1968). SIM subjects indicated preference to be in a Club With and Room With the stimulus person as well as to Have the stimulus person as a Best Friend. Within the interpretation of the current manipulations of Situational Possibility indicating that both HIGH POS and LOW POS subjects perceived the situation as likely to happen to them at some point in the future, this observed preference to interact with the SIM stimulus person may be taken as support of the original

hypothesis concerning social distance and defensive attribution. That is, under conditions of high situational possibility subjects will act "defensively" to reduce the negative consequences (reduced willingness by others to interact socially) for institutionalization for personally similar stimulus persons as opposed to personally different stimulus persons. This reduction of the negative consequence by increasing willingness to interact with the stimulus person was observed, as expected, in subjects in the SIM condition. These subjects also tended to view mentally ill persons more positively (rated them as kinder, softer, less cold, and more yielding).

Of primary relevance to the interpretation of past, often ambiguous results as well as to future attribution research designs is the demonstrated denial of Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility engaged in by subjects as a function of learning about the stimulus person's institutionalization. Subjects who rated their "similarity" prior to reading about the institutionalization (COM) rated themselves as more personally similar, more situationally similar, and more likely to be in a similar situation as the stimulus person than did NOT COM subjects who had received the same information relevant to Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility. This finding would appear to be in contrast to Brewer's (1977) view of perceivers as rational information processors.

Even more monumental in terms of future attribution research are the interactions (admittedly unexpected) between several attribution and social distance measures and time of Estimate of Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility. It appears that subjects' ratings of Situational Possibility and Personal Similarity prior to

answering experimental questions served to enhance the subjects' awareness of the experimental conditions to which they had been assigned as compared with subjects who had not yet "committed" themselves to a particular level of similarity or dissimilarity. That is, if a subject has already estimated her level of similarity or dissimilarity, then she was more likely to respond to the attribution and attitudinal measures in a "defensive" manner than if she had not yet made these similarity estimates.* For example, DIF-COM subjects assigned greater Intentionality to the stimulus person as would be predicted by a defensive attribution model.** However, this trend of differential attribution of Intentionality was reversed for SIM-NOT COM and DIF-NOT COM subjects. Perhaps subjects are more successful in "denying" the "similarity" or "dissimilarity" information which they have been given if they have not yet answered questions requiring them to estimate their similarity to the stimulus person.

A similarly "defensive" reaction as a function of being "committed" or "not committed" to a level of Personal Similarity occurred in response to the adjective pair hot-cold. SIM-COM subjects rated mentally ill persons as being less cold than did SIM-NOT COM subjects. A reversal of this trend was observed for DIF subjects.

Interactions between Time of Estimate of Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility and Personal Similarity for Contribution

*In the discussion to follow reference to levels of Time of Estimate of Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility will describe the two levels as "COM" and "NOT COM".

**As discussed above, it may be that Situational Possibility was present for all subjects. Within this interpretation, therefore, this finding of differential attribution as a function of level of Personal Similarity may be considered support for defensive attribution.

to Institutionalization (Commission*) and assignment of "Blame Tokens" to the Environment are in conflict with the above mentioned support for defensive attribution. SIM-COM subjects rated the stimulus person as Contributing more to the Institutionalization than did DIF-NOT COM subjects (defensive attribution would predict the opposite). Also, DIF-NOT COM subjects assigned more "Blame Tokens" to the Environment than did SIM-COM, whereas defensive attribution would predict that the opposite trend would occur. ("If I am personally similar to the stimulus person I will avoid future blame being assigned to me by exaggerating the amount of blame assigned to the environment.")

An additional interaction was apparent between Situational Possibility and Time of Estimate of Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility for Foreseeability such that HIGH POS-COM subjects were attributed more Foreseeability than LOW POS-COM subjects. Again, this finding is interpreted as an artifact of the current operational definition of Low Situational Possibility ("young mother with two children") which produced an apparent "sympathy effect" for the LOW POS stimulus person.

Predicted negative correlations between social distance (as measured by willingness to interact) and attribution of responsibility were supported by SIM-HIGH POS subjects as well as DIF-LOW POS subjects. These negative correlations appeared to be particularly prevalent at the intermediate level of responsibility, Foreseeability. ("If I think the stimulus person could have foreseen her hospitalization I will be less willing to interact with her.") Defensive attribution theory

*Commission is the label assigned by Shaw and Sulzer (1964) to this second level of responsibility as delineated by Heider (1958).

predicts that subjects in the SIM-HIGH POS conditions will feel more threatened by future "blameworthiness" than will subjects in other conditions. The theory also predicts that these subjects will attribute less personal responsibility. As mentioned above, this finding was supported by the current research at the level of Intentionality but was reversed for Commission. ("Did Sarah contribute to her hospitalization in any way?") It may be that at the intermediate level of responsibility (Foreseeability) the threat of future blameworthiness is manifested in reduced willingness to interact, a sort of derogation of the victim as proposed by Lerner's "Just World" hypothesis (Lerner, 1965). However, at the next level of responsibility, Intentionality, defensive attribution seems to come into play. This explanation of the current results tends to support suggestions by Fishbein and Azjen (1973) that delineation of the levels of responsibility a la Heider (1958) might serve to reduce the ambiguity of attribution research findings.

It would appear, also, that perhaps some of the potential ambiguity of results in defensive attribution experimental paradigms may be reduced by enhancing subjects' "commitment" to the experimental condition to which they have been assigned by having subjects behaviorally indicate the extent of their Similarity or Dissimilarity to the stimulus person before finding out about the negative consequence in which the stimulus person has been involved and prior to answering experimental questions. It is feasible that this enhancement in future research of those factors deemed as essential for motivated distortion of attribution (defensive attribution) would result in a more accurate assessment of the strength of the phenomenon.

Finally, data provided at least partial support for the hypothesis that the more personally responsible the stimulus person is considered to be for the negative consequence (institutionalization in the current design) the less the subjects will be willing to interact with the stimulus person. If the subject views the stimulus person as responsible for the negative consequence which has befallen him/her, then the subject will feel more justified in being hesitant to interact with the stimulus person, especially at more intimate levels of interaction. Although this theoretical explanation of the relationship between personal responsibility and social distance requires much more empirical support than that which has been offered here, it could (if additional empirical support were provided) offer very valuable practical utility in promoting community attitude change to facilitate re-entry of clinical populations to community settings. It may be that an effective way to reduce often-witnessed hesitancy to interact with mentally ill persons would be to emphasize the contribution of environmental (non-personal) factors to the resultant mental illness.

APPENDICES


APPENDIX A

Bogus Subject Feedback



PERSONALITY PROFILE OF _____

PERCENTILE SCORE




Your percentile score on each of the personality scales has been charted above. It is not appropriate to tell you at this point what the scales stand for. This will be explained to you at the end of the experiment. This information is provided however so that you can see whether or not you are similar to or different from the person about whom you will be reading. Please compare your results with the results of

Sarah Jackson. (see next page)

Your results show that you are very similar in personality to Sarah Jackson. (4) 1

PERSONALITY PROFILE OF _____



Your percentile score on each of the personality scales has been charted above. It is not appropriate to tell you at this point what the scales stand for. This will be explained to you at the end of the experiment. This information is provided however so that you can see whether or not you are similar to or different from the person about whom you will be reading. Please compare your results with the results of

Irish Jackson. (see next page)

(4) 2

Your results show that you are very different in personality from Irish Jackson.

APPENDIX B
Participant's Consent Form

PARTICIPANT'S CONSENT FORM

I agree to participate in the project conducted by Ms. Phyllis Oksner which is involved with making decisions about people. I am fully aware that if I may wish to terminate my involvement at any point during my participation, I may do so.

Signature of Participant

-----TEAR-ALONG-DOTTED-LINE-----

RAFFLE TICKET

Name _____

Address _____


Telephone Number _____

APPENDIX C

Stimulus Person Profile

PERSONALITY PROFILE OF

Sarah Jackson




You will be answering questions about Sarah Jackson based on limited information about her. Sarah is a student at a small, prestigious liberal arts college. The pressures of her classes are very similar to yours. She is a senior and is maintaining a "B" average.

Based on the information you have just read, please answer the following questions about Sarah Jackson. (see next page)

(5) 1

PERSONALITY PROFILE OF

Sarah Jackson

You will be answering questions about Sarah Jackson based on limited information about her. Sarah is a young mother (twenty-one) with two children. The pressures of her situation are very different from yours.

Based on the information you have just read, please answer the following questions about Sarah Jackson.

(see next page)

(5) 2

APPENDIX D

Estimates of Personal Similarity
and Situational Possibility

1. How similar in personality do you consider yourself to be to Sarah Jackson? (Check one)

Very Similar

Moderately Similar

Slightly Similar

Not Particularly Similar or Dissimilar

Slightly Dissimilar

Moderately Dissimilar

Very Dissimilar

2. How similar are the pressures which Sarah Jackson experiences to the pressures which you experience? (7) _____
(Check one)

Very Similar

Moderately Similar

Slightly Similar

Not particularly Similar or Dissimilar

Slightly Dissimilar

Moderately Dissimilar

Very Dissimilar

3. What do you think are the chances out of 10 that you might find yourself in the same situation as Sarah Jackson? (9) _____
(Circle one)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

APPENDIX E

Written Instructions to Subjects

INSTRUCTIONS

This booklet contains additional information about Sarah Jackson. Before opening the booklet place the question sheet you have just answered (labeled QUESTION SHEET A) in the envelope included in your folder. Seal the envelope. DO NOT REOPEN THIS ENVELOPE.

Many of the questions you will be answering are in the following format:

How much do you enjoy being a student at William and Mary?
(put an X on the appropriate line for each answer)

Very Much: : : : : : : : Not At All
 1* 2 3 4 5 6 7

An X on line 1 would indicate that you like being a student at William and Mary very much; an X on line 2 would indicate moderate liking; an x on line 3 would indicate slight liking; an X on line 4 indicates that you have no opinion on the issue; an X on line 5 indicates that you are slightly unhappy at William and Mary; an X on line 6 indicates moderate unhappiness; and an X on line 7 indicates that you are not at all happy at William and Mary. For practice, place an X on the appropriate line.

*The numbers do not appear in the questionnaire. They are included here to facilitate explanation of the task.

A second type of question follows the following format:

Please divide the following happiness tokens among the four factors which may contribute to your happiness at William and Mary: yourself (Y), friends (F), classes (C), or other (O). Draw a circle around the number of tokens you wish to assign to each factor and label each circle with the abbreviation for the factor (Y, F, C, add O).**

H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
Y	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
H	H	H	H	F	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	C	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H
H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H	H

Note that all tokens are used in the task. It is not necessary, however, to assign tokens to all factors.

YOU MAY PROCEED TO THE NEXT PAGE.

**This example has already been completed for you.

APPENDIX F
Attribution Measures

PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ABOUT SARAH JACKSON.

Sarah Jackson had recently been under a great deal of pressure at school. The pressures of being a senior at a small prestigious school had become more than she could handle. One week-end, during exams, she became so depressed that she cried continuously and hysterically for seemingly no reason at all. Her roommate suggested that she should seek help at the university counseling center. The psychologist at the counseling center suggested that she should go to Westside Mental Hospital for a few weeks to pull herself together. Sarah has been at Westside for two weeks and is doing much better.

NOW, ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ABOUT SARAH JACKSON.
(PUT AN X ON THE APPROPRIATE LINE FOR EACH ANSWER)

1. Do you think Sarah contributed in any way to her hospitalization?

Contributed: _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ :Did Not Contribute
(16) _____

2. Do you think Sarah wanted to become hospitalized?

No: _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ :Yes
(18) _____

3. Do you think Sarah could have foreseen the fact that she would be hospitalized?

Yes: _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ :No
(20) _____

4. Do you think Sarah could have done anything to prevent becoming hospitalized?

No: _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ :Yes
(22) _____

5. How much do you think Sarah's academic pressures contributed to her needing to be hospitalized?

Contributed: _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ :Did Not Contribute
(24) _____

6. Do you think Sarah intended to become hospitalized?

No: _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ :Yes
(26) _____

PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ABOUT SARAH JACKSON.

Sarah Jackson had recently been under a great deal of pressure at home. The pressures of being a young mother with two small children had become more than she could handle. One week-end she became so depressed that she cried continuously and hysterically for seemingly no reason at all. Her husband suggested that she should seek help at the local Crisis Intervention Center. The psychologist at the center suggested that she should go to Westside Mental Hospital for a few weeks to pull herself together. Sarah has been at Westside for two weeks and is doing much better.

NOW, ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ABOUT SARAH JACKSON. (PTT AN X ON THE APPROPRIATE LINE FOR EACH ANSWER)

1. Do you think Sarah contributed in any way to her hospitalization?

Contributed: _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ :Did Not Contribute (16) _____

2. Do you think Sarah wanted to become hospitalized?

No: _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ :Yes (18) _____

3. Do you think Sarah could have foreseen the fact that she would be hospitalized?

Yes: _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ :No (20) _____

4. Do you think Sarah could have done anything to prevent becoming hospitalized?

No: _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ :Yes (22) _____

5. How much do you think Sarah's home pressures contributed to her needing to be hospitalized?

Contributed: _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ :Did Not Contribute (24) _____

6. Do you think Sarah intended to become hospitalized?

No: _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ :Yes (26) _____

7. Please divide the following responsibility tokens among the following factors which may have been responsible for Sarah's hospitalization: Sarah(S), the environment (especially her family) (E), chance (C), or other causes (O). Draw a circle around the number of tokens you wish to assign to each factor and label each circle with the abbreviation for the factor (S, E, C, O).

R
 R
 R
 R
 R

8. Please divide the following blame tokens among the factors which may be blamed for Sarah's hospitalization: Sarah (S), the environment (especially her family) (E), chance (C), or other causes (O). Draw a circle around the number of blame tokens you wish to assign to each factor and label each circle with the abbreviation for the factor (S, E, C, O).

B
 B
 B
 B
 B

9. Do you think Sarah will need to be hospitalized in the future (in a mental hospital)?

Yes: _____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____:_____ :No
 (52) _____

10. THIS QUESTION IS OPTIONAL

Can you write a short paragraph advising Sarah on how to avoid being hospitalized (in a mental hospital) in the future? If so, write your paragraph on the back of this sheet.

APPENDIX G

Social Distance Measures

11. How willing would you be to have a class with Sarah Jackson? (Check one)

Definitely Willing

Probably Willing

Undecided

Probably Unwilling

Definitely Unwilling

(63) _____

- 12.. How willing would you be to have Sarah Jackson as a member in a club that you were a member of? (Check one)

Definitely Willing

Probably Willing

Undecided

Probably Unwilling

Definitely Unwilling

(65) _____

13. How willing would you be to work with Sarah Jackson? (Check one)

Definitely Willing

Probably Willing

Undecided

Probably Unwilling

Definitely Unwilling

(67) _____

14. How willing would you be to share a room with Sarah Jackson? (Check one)

Definitely Willing

Probably Willing

Undecided

Probably Unwilling

Definitely Unwilling

(69) _____

15. How willing would you be to have Sarah Jackson as a best friend? (Check one)

 Definitely Willing

 Probably Willing

 Undecided

 Probably Unwilling

 Definitely Unwilling

(71)

APPENDIX H

Attitudes Toward Mentally Ill Persons

INSTRUCTIONS

On the next page you will find several adjectives which may be used to describe people. The adjectives are listed as pairs of opposites in the following manner:

FAT: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: THIN

Your task is to place an X on that line which best describes Mentally Ill Persons.

For instance, if you think Mentally Ill Persons are generally rather fat you might mark the item as follows:

FAT: _____: ~~_____~~: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: THIN

If you think they are generally thin, you might mark the item this way:

FAT: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: ~~_____~~: _____: THIN

IF YOU STILL DO NOT UNDERSTAND YOUR TASK, YOU MAY ASK MS. OKSNER TO EXPLAIN IT TO YOU IN MORE DETAIL.

MENTALLY ILL PERSONS

- GOOD: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: BAD (10a)
- EMOTIONAL: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: RATIONAL (12a)
- DISREPUTABLE: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: REPUTABLE (14a)
- STRONG: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: WEAK (16a)
- SHALLOW: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: DEEP (18a)
- PASSIVE: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: ACTIVE (20a)
- EXCITABLE: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: CALM (22a)
- KIND: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: CRUEL (24a)
- SOFT: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: HARD (26a)
- UNSUCCESSFUL: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: SUCCESSFUL (28a)
- EMPTY: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: FULL (30a)
- HOT: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: COLD (32a)
- PLEASANT: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: UNPLEASANT (34a)
- TENACIOUS: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: YIELDING (36a)
- GENTLE: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: VIOLENT (38a)
- SANE: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: _____: INSANE (40a)

APPENDIX I
Biographical Information

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION (DO NOT SIGN YOUR NAME TO THIS FORM!)

Age _____ (48a) _____

Have you ever been hospitalized for mental illness?

Yes _____

No _____ (50a) _____

Has anyone in your family ever been hospitalized for mental illness?

Yes _____

No _____ (52a) _____

If so, what relation were they to you?

_____ (54a) _____

Where do you work now?

_____ (56a) _____

How long have you worked at your current job?

_____ (60a) _____

What was the last grade you completed in school?

_____ (64a) _____

APPENDIX J
Debriefing Outline

DEBRIEFING OUTLINE

- I. How did you feel while answering the questions?
 - A. Did you feel any stress?
 - B. Were you suspicious of any of the information given to you?
- II. Disclosure of actual test results and necessity for deception.
- III. Assurance that all information will be kept anonymous.
- IV. Signing of statement to withhold disclosure.

APPENDIX K
Disclosure Agreement

I realize that it is very important not to tell anyone about any part of the study which I have just participated in until February 28, 1977. I understand that any such disclosure on my part will make me ineligible to win a raffle prize.

Signature of Participant

Do you wish to receive a summary of the results of this study?

No _____

Yes _____

If yes, please list your address below:

APPENDIX L

Summary Tables

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 1: PERSONAL SIMILARITY

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A: SIT POS-NOT	9.800	1	9.800	3.338
B: PERS SIM-NOT	140.450	1	140.450	47.835
C: ENVL SIM-EST	0.800	1	0.800	0.272
A * B	0.450	1	0.450	0.153
A * C	0.800	1	0.800	0.272
B * C	18.050	1	18.050	6.148
A*B*C	6.050	1	6.050	2.061
ERROR	211.400	72	2.936	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 2: SITUATIONAL POSSIBILITY

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A:SIT POS-NOT	217.800	1	217.800	101.433
B:PERS SIM-NOT	0.450	1	0.450	0.210
C:ENVL SIM-EST	2.450	1	2.450	1.141
A * B	1.250	1	1.250	0.582
A * C	14.450	1	14.450	6.730
B * C	-0.000	1	-0.000	-0.000
A*B*C	1.800	1	1.800	0.838
ERROR	154.600	72	2.147	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 3: LIKELIHOOD OF BEING IN SAME SITUATION

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A:SIT POS-NOT	54.450	1	54.450	17.788
B:PERS SIM-NOT	18.050	1	18.050	5.897
C:ENVL SIM-EST	120.050	1	120.050	39.218
A * B	1.800	1	1.800	0.588
A * C	57.800	1	57.800	18.882
B * C	1.800	1	1.800	0.588
A*B*C	2.450	1	2.450	0.800
ERROR	220.400	72	3.061	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 1: PRICE EXPECTANCY

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A:SIT POS-NCT	112.813	1	112.813	0.241
B:PERS SIM-NOT	475.313	1	475.313	1.016
C:ENVL SIM-EST	10695.316	1	10695.316	22.854
A * B	891.113	1	891.113	1.904
A * C	208.013	1	208.013	0.444
B * C	90.313	1	90.313	0.193
A*B*C	30.013	1	30.013	0.064
ERROR	33695.300	72	467.990	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 2: COMMISSION

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A:SIT POS-NOT	0.313	1	0.313	0.317
B:PERS SIM-NOT	0.013	1	0.013	0.013
C:ENVL SIM-EST	0.613	1	0.613	0.622
A * B	0.113	1	0.113	0.114
A * C	0.313	1	0.313	0.317
B * C	6.613	1	6.613	6.715
A*B*C	0.613	1	0.613	0.622
ERROR	70.900	72	0.985	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 3: WANTED TO BE HOSPITALIZED

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A:SIT POS-NOT	7.813	1	7.813	2.526
B:PERS SIM-NOT	7.813	1	7.813	2.526
C:ENVL SIM-EST	1.013	1	1.013	0.327
A * B	1.013	1	1.013	0.327
A * C	5.513	1	5.513	1.782
B * C	2.813	1	2.813	0.909
A*B*C	0.313	1	0.313	0.101
ERROR	222.700	72	3.093	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 4: FORESEEABILITY

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A:SIT POS-NOT	1.513	1	1.513	0.586
B:PERS SIM-NOT	1.013	1	1.013	0.392
C:ENVL SIM-EST	2.813	1	2.813	1.089
A * B	1.013	1	1.013	0.392
A * C	32.513	1	32.513	12.592
B * C	0.313	1	0.313	0.121
A*B*C	0.613	1	0.613	0.237
ERROR	185.900	72	2.582	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 5: PREVENTION BY SARAH

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A: SIT POS-NOT	1.800	1	1.800	0.932
B: PERS SIM-NOT	0.200	1	0.200	0.104
C: ENVL SIM-EST	0.450	1	0.450	0.233
A * B	1.800	1	1.800	0.932
A * C	2.450	1	2.450	1.269
B * C	0.050	1	0.050	0.026
A*B*C	0.050	1	0.050	0.026
ERROR	139.000	72	1.931	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 6: CONTRIBUTION OF HOME PRESSURES

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A: SIT POS-NOT	3.613	1	3.613	3.669
B: PERS SIM-NOT	0.013	1	0.013	0.013
C: ENVL SIM-EST	0.113	1	0.113	0.114
A * B	2.113	1	2.113	2.145
A * C	0.113	1	0.113	0.114
B * C	1.013	1	1.013	1.028
A*B*C	0.013	1	0.013	0.013
ERROR	70.900	72	0.985	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 7: INTENTIONALITY

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A: SIT POS-NOT	0.000	1	0.000	0.000
B: PERS SIM-NOT	0.050	1	0.050	0.020
C: ENVL SIM-EST	0.800	1	0.800	0.325
A * B	1.250	1	1.250	0.508
A * C	7.200	1	7.200	2.929
B * C	14.450	1	14.450	5.878
A*B*C	2.450	1	2.450	0.997
ERROR	177.000	72	2.458	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 8: RESPONSIBILITY TOKENS TO SARAH

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A: SIT POS-NOT	64.800	1	64.800	0.259
B: PERS SIM-NOT	252.050	1	252.050	1.008
C: ENVL SIM-EST	39.200	1	39.200	0.157
A * B	39.200	1	39.200	0.157
A * C	61.250	1	61.250	0.245
B * C	7.200	1	7.200	0.029
A*B*C	101.250	1	101.250	0.405
ERROR	17955.000	72	249.931	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 9: RESPONSIBILITY TOKENS TO ENVIRONMENT

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A:SIT PCS-NOT	762.613	1	762.613	5.313
B:PERS SIM-NOT	25.313	1	25.313	0.176
C:ENVL SIM-EST	112.813	1	112.813	0.786
A * B	17.113	1	17.113	0.119
A * C	46.513	1	46.513	0.324
B * C	165.313	1	165.313	1.152
A*B*C	4.513	1	4.513	0.031
ERROR	10334.700	72	143.538	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 10: RESPONSIBILITY TOKENS TO CHANGE

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A:SIT POS-NOT	3.613	1	3.613	0.073
B:PERS SIM-NOT	0.113	1	0.113	0.002
C:ENVL SIM-EST	108.113	1	108.113	2.197
A * B	32.513	1	32.513	0.661
A * C	37.813	1	37.813	0.768
B * C	5.513	1	5.513	0.112
A*B*C	9.113	1	9.113	0.185
ERROR	3543.100	72	49.210	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 11: RESPONSIBILITY TOKENS TO COTYER

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A:SIT POS-NOT	561.800		561.800	5.535
B:PERS SIM-NOT	68.450		68.450	0.674
C:ENVL SIM-EST	36.450	1	36.450	0.359
A * B	12.800	1	12.800	0.126
A * C	39.200	1	39.200	0.386
B * C	31.250	1	31.250	0.308
A*B*C	24.200	1	24.200	0.238
ERROR	7307.800	72	101.497	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 12: BLAME TOKENS TO SARAH

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A:SIT POS-NOT	74.113	1	74.113	0.203
B:PERS SIM-NOT	300.313	1	300.313	0.823
C:ENVL SIM-EST	70.313	1	70.313	0.193
A * B	0.613	1	0.613	0.002
A * C	32.513	1	32.513	0.089
B * C	40.613	1	40.613	0.111
A*B*C	391.613	1	391.613	1.073
ERROR	26273.300	72	364.907	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 15: BLAME TOKENS TO OTHER

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A:SIT POS-NOT	340.313	1	340.313	2.347
B:PERS SIM-NOT	332.113	1	332.113	2.290
C:ENVL SIM-EST	25.313	1	25.313	0.175
A * B	2.813	1	2.813	0.019
A * C	143.113	1	143.113	0.987
B * C	27.613	1	27.613	0.190
A*B*C	1.013	1	1.013	0.007
ERROR	10441.700	72	145.024	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 16: RECIDIVISM

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A:SIT POS-NOT	0.450	1	0.450	0.215
B:PERS SIM-NOT	3.200	1	3.200	1.526
C:ENVL SIM-EST	0.050	1	0.050	0.024
A * B	4.050	1	4.050	1.931
A * C	0.200	1	0.200	0.095
B * C	4.050	1	4.050	1.931
A*B*C	1.800	1	1.800	0.858
ERROR	151.000	72	2.097	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 17: GIVES ADVICE

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A:SIT POS-NCT	0.200	1	0.200	0.889
B:PERS SIM-NOT	0.200	1	0.200	0.889
C:ENVL SIM-EST	0.0	1	0.0	0.0
A * B	0.050	1	0.050	0.222
A * C	0.050	1	0.050	0.222
B * C	0.050	1	0.050	0.222
A*B*C	0.800	1	0.800	3.556
ERKOR	16.200	72	0.225	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 18: NUMBER OF WORDS IN ADVICE

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A:SIT POS-NCT	1240.313	1	1240.313	0.459
B:PEPS SIM-NOT	1178.113	1	1178.113	0.436
C:ENVL SIM-EST	738.113	1	738.113	0.273
A * B	3577.814	1	3577.814	1.323
A * C	241.513	1	241.513	0.089
B * C	1891.513	1	1891.513	0.699
A*B*C	1073.113	1	1073.113	0.397
ERROR	194753.900	72	2704.915	

LE NCNAME (CREATION DATE = 05/05/77)

***** ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE *****
 CLAS
 BY SIMEST
 PERSIM
 SITSIM

SOURCE OF VARIATION	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F	SIGNIF OF F
MAIN EFFECTS	0.637	3	0.212	0.692	0.999
SIMEST	0.612	1	0.612	1.996	0.158
PERSIM	0.012	1	0.012	0.041	0.999
SITSIM	0.012	1	0.012	0.041	0.999
TWO-WAY INTERACTIONS	1.037	3	0.346	1.127	0.344
SIMEST PERSIM	0.313	1	0.313	1.018	0.317
SIMEST SITSIM	0.612	1	0.612	1.996	0.158
PERSIM SITSIM	0.112	1	0.112	0.367	0.999
THREE-WAY INTERACTIONS	0.113	1	0.113	0.367	0.999
SIMEST PERSIM SITSIM	0.112	1	0.112	0.367	0.999
RESIDUAL	22.100	72	0.307		
TOTAL	23.887	79	0.302		

80 CASES WERE PROCESSED.
 0 CASES (0.0 PCT) WERE MISSING.

LE NCNAME (CREATION DATE = 05/05/77)

***** ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE *****
 CLUB
 BY SIMEST
 PERSIM
 SITSIM

SOURCE OF VARIATION	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F	SIGNIF OF F
MAIN EFFECTS	5.800	3	1.933	2.617	0.056
SIMEST	0.800	1	0.800	1.083	0.302
PERSIM	5.000	1	5.000	6.767	0.011
SITSIM	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	0.999
TWO-WAY INTERACTIONS	1.750	3	0.583	0.789	0.999
SIMEST PERSIM	0.050	1	0.050	0.068	0.999
SIMEST SITSIM	1.250	1	1.250	1.692	0.195
PERSIM SITSIM	0.450	1	0.450	0.609	0.999
THREE-WAY INTERACTIONS	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	0.999
SIMEST PERSIM SITSIM	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	0.999
RESIDUAL	53.200	72	0.739		
TOTAL	60.750	79	0.769		

80 CASES WERE PROCESSED.
 0 CASES (0.0 PCT) WERE MISSING.

LE NONAME (CREATION DATE = 05/05/77)

***** ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE *****
 WORK
 BY SIMEST
 PERSIM
 SITSIM

SOURCE OF VARIATION	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F	SIGNIF OF F
TOTAL	79.200	79	1.003		
RESIDUAL	72.000	72	1.000		
MAIN EFFECTS	5.500	3	1.833	1.833	0.147
SIMEST	2.450	1	2.450	2.450	0.118
PERSIM	1.800	1	1.800	1.800	0.181
SITSIM	1.250	1	1.250	1.250	0.266
2WAY INTERACTIONS	1.500	3	0.500	0.500	0.999
SIMEST PERSIM	0.050	1	0.050	0.050	0.999
SIMEST SITSIM	0.200	1	0.200	0.200	0.999
PERSIM SITSIM	1.250	1	1.250	1.250	0.266
3WAY INTERACTIONS	0.200	1	0.200	0.200	0.999
SIMEST PERSIM SITSIM	0.200	1	0.200	0.200	0.999

80 CASES WERE PROCESSED.
 0 CASES (0.0 PCT) WERE MISSING.

LE NONAME (CREATION DATE = 05/05/77)

***** ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE *****
 ROOM
 BY SIMEST
 PERSIM
 SITSIM

SOURCE OF VARIATION	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F	SIGNIF OF F
TOTAL	116.987	79	1.481		
RESIDUAL	107.499	72	1.493		
MAIN EFFECTS	8.637	3	2.879	1.928	0.131
SIMEST	1.012	1	1.012	0.678	0.999
PERSIM	6.612	1	6.612	4.429	0.037
SITSIM	1.012	1	1.012	0.678	0.999
2WAY INTERACTIONS	0.837	3	0.279	0.187	0.999
SIMEST PERSIM	0.612	1	0.612	0.410	0.999
SIMEST SITSIM	0.112	1	0.112	0.075	0.999
PERSIM SITSIM	0.112	1	0.112	0.075	0.999
3WAY INTERACTIONS	0.012	1	0.012	0.008	0.999
SIMEST PERSIM SITSIM	0.012	1	0.012	0.008	0.999

80 CASES WERE PROCESSED.
 0 CASES (0.0 PCT) WERE MISSING.

STATISTICAL PACKAGE FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES SPSSH - VERSION 6.00

FILE NONAME (CREATION DATE = 05/05/77)

***** ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE *****

BFRD
BY SIMEST
PERSIM
SITSIM

SOURCE OF VARIATION	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F	SIGNIFICANCE
MAIN EFFECTS	16.037	3	5.346	4.330	0.000
SIMEST	4.512	1	4.512	3.655	0.059
PERSIM	10.512	1	10.512	8.514	0.000
SITSIM	1.012	1	1.012	0.820	0.999
TWO-WAY INTERACTIONS	3.438	3	1.146	0.928	0.999
SIMEST PERSIM	0.312	1	0.312	0.253	0.999
SIMEST SITSIM	2.112	1	2.112	1.711	0.199
PERSIM SITSIM	1.012	1	1.012	0.820	0.999
THREE-WAY INTERACTIONS	0.113	1	0.113	0.091	0.999
SIMEST PERSIM SITSIM	0.112	1	0.112	0.091	0.999
RESIDUAL	88.899	72	1.235		
TOTAL	108.487	79	1.373		

80 CASES WERE PROCESSED.
0 CASES (0.0 PCT) WERE MISSING.

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 1: GOOD

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A: SIT POS-NOT	0.450	1	0.450	0.616
B: PERS SIM-NOT	0.000	1	0.000	0.000
C: ENVL SIM-EST	0.200	1	0.200	0.274
A * B	0.050	1	0.050	0.068
A * C	1.250	1	1.250	1.711
B * C	0.200	1	0.200	0.274
A*B*C	0.050	1	0.050	0.068
ERROR	52.600	72	0.731	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 2: RATIONAL

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A: SIT POS-NOT	2.813	1	2.813	2.408
B: PERS SIM-NOT	0.113	1	0.113	0.096
C: ENVL SIM-EST	1.013	1	1.013	0.867
A * B	1.013	1	1.013	0.867
A * C	1.013	1	1.013	0.867
B * C	0.313	1	0.313	0.268
A*B*C	2.113	1	2.113	1.809
ERROR	84.100	72	1.168	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 3: REPUTABLE

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A: SIT POS-NOT	0.613	1	0.613	0.727
B: PERS SIM-NOT	0.313	1	0.313	0.371
C: ENVL SIM-EST	0.613	1	0.613	0.727
A * B	2.113	1	2.113	2.506
A * C	0.313	1	0.313	0.371
B * C	0.313	1	0.313	0.371
A*B*C	0.013	1	0.013	0.015
ERROR	60.700	72	0.843	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 4: STRONG

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A: SIT POS-NOT	0.113	1	0.113	0.068
B: PERS SIM-NOT	5.513	1	5.513	3.310
C: ENVL SIM-EST	0.113	1	0.113	0.068
A * B	0.013	1	0.013	0.008
A * C	0.313	1	0.313	0.188
B * C	1.013	1	1.013	0.608
A*B*C	0.013	1	0.013	0.008
ERROR	119.900	72	1.665	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 5: DEEP

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A: SIT POS-NOT	1.513	1	1.513	0.821
B: PERS SIM-NOT	2.813	1	2.813	1.526
C: ENVL SIM-EST	0.613	1	0.613	0.332
A * B	6.613	1	6.613	3.588
A * C	0.613	1	0.613	0.332
B * C	0.113	1	0.113	0.061
A*B*C	1.013	1	1.013	0.549
ERROR	132.700	72	1.843	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 6: ACTIVE

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A: SIT POS-NOT	0.113	1	0.113	0.070
B: PERS SIM-NOT	0.613	1	0.613	0.379
C: ENVL SIM-EST	0.013	1	0.013	0.008
A * B	0.613	1	0.613	0.379
A * C	3.613	1	3.613	2.236
B * C	0.613	1	0.613	0.379
A*B*C	6.613	1	6.613	4.094
ERROR	116.300	72	1.615	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 7: CALM

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A: SIT POS-NOT	3.613	1	3.613	4.755
B: PERS SIM-NOT	1.013	1	1.013	1.333
C: ENVL SIM-EST	0.313	1	0.313	0.411
A * B	0.613	1	0.613	0.806
A * C	0.113	1	0.113	0.148
B * C	1.013	1	1.013	1.333
A*B*C	1.013	1	1.013	1.333
ERROR	54.700	72	0.760	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 8: KIND

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A: SIT POS-NOT	0.313	1	0.313	0.390
B: PERS SIM-NOT	4.513	1	4.513	5.631
C: ENVL SIM-EST	0.613	1	0.613	0.764
A * B	0.013	1	0.013	0.016
A * C	0.613	1	0.613	0.764
B * C	1.513	1	1.513	1.887
A*B*C	0.613	1	0.613	0.764
ERROR	57.700	72	0.801	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 9: HARD

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A: SIT POS-NOT	1.800	1	1.800	2.582
B: PERS SIM-NOT	5.000	1	5.000	7.171
C: ENVL SIM-EST	0.050	1	0.050	0.072
A * B	0.450	1	0.450	0.645
A * C	0.800	1	0.800	1.147
B * C	0.800	1	0.800	1.147
A*B*C	0.450	1	0.450	0.645
ERROR	50.200	72	0.697	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 10: SUCCESSFUL

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A: SIT POS-NOT	0.800	1	0.800	0.634
B: PERS SIM-NOT	0.800	1	0.800	0.634
C: ENVL SIM-EST	1.800	1	1.800	1.427
A * B	0.800	1	0.800	0.634
A * C	0.800	1	0.800	0.634
B * C	1.800	1	1.800	1.427
A*B*C	0.200	1	0.200	0.159
ERROR	90.800	72	1.261	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 11: FULL

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A: SIT POS-NOT	1.013	1	1.013	0.568
B: PERS SIM-NOT	1.013	1	1.013	0.568
C: ENVL SIM-EST	2.813	1	2.813	1.578
A * B	0.113	1	0.113	0.063
A * C	0.613	1	0.613	0.344
B * C	1.013	1	1.013	0.568
A*B*C	4.513	1	4.513	2.532
ERROR	128.300	72	1.782	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 12: HOT

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A: SIT POS-NOT	1.513	1	1.513	2.165
B: PERS SIM-NOT	0.013	1	0.013	0.018
C: ENVL SIM-EST	0.013	1	0.013	0.018
A * B	0.313	1	0.313	0.447
A * C	0.313	1	0.313	0.447
B * C	4.513	1	4.513	6.459
A*B*C	0.013	1	0.013	0.018
ERROR	50.300	72	0.699	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 13: PLEASANT

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A: SIT POS-NOT	0.313	1	0.313	0.304
B: PERS SIM-NOT	0.113	1	0.113	0.110
C: ENVL SIM-EST	1.013	1	1.013	0.986
A * B	0.313	1	0.313	0.304
A * C	0.613	1	0.613	0.597
B * C	0.613	1	0.613	0.597
A*B*C	0.613	1	0.613	0.597
ERROR	73.900	72	1.026	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 14: UNYIELDING

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A: SIT POS-NOT	0.450	1	0.450	0.268
B: PERS SIM-NOT	7.200	1	7.200	4.291
C: ENVL SIM-EST	5.000	1	5.000	2.980
A * B	4.050	1	4.050	2.414
A * C	0.050	1	0.050	0.030
B * C	-0.000	1	-0.000	-0.000
A*B*C	0.450	1	0.450	0.268
ERROR	120.800	72	1.678	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 15: GENTLE

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A: SIT POS-NOT	2.813	1	2.813	3.597
B: PERS SIM-NOT	2.113	1	2.113	2.702
C: ENVL SIM-EST	0.113	1	0.113	0.144
A * B	0.313	1	0.313	0.400
A * C	0.313	1	0.313	0.400
B * C	0.613	1	0.613	0.783
A*B*C	0.613	1	0.613	0.783
ERROR	56.300	72	0.782	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 16: SANE

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A: SIT POS-NOT	0.050	1	0.050	0.044
B: PERS SIM-NOT	1.250	1	1.250	1.098
C: ENVL SIM-EST	0.050	1	0.050	0.044
A * B	0.450	1	0.450	0.395
A * C	1.250	1	1.250	1.098
B * C	0.450	1	0.450	0.395
A*B*C	0.050	1	0.050	0.044
ERROR	82.000	72	1.139	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 13: BLAME TOKENS TO ENVIRONMENT

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A:SIT POS-NOT	308.113	1	308.113	1.375
B:PERS SIM-NOT	1.513	1	1.513	0.007
C:ENVL SIM-EST	177.013	1	177.013	0.790
A * B	90.313	1	90.313	0.403
A * C	52.813	1	52.813	0.236
B * C	987.013	1	987.013	4.406
A*B*C	56.113	1	56.113	0.251
ERROR	16128.100	72	224.001	

SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 14: BLAME TOKENS TO CHANCE

SOURCE	SUM OF SQUARES	DF	MEAN SQUARE	F
A:SIT POS-NOT	54.450	1	54.450	0.536
B:PERS SIM-NOT	48.050	1	48.050	0.473
C:ENVL SIM-EST	296.450	1	296.450	2.917
A * B	4.050	1	4.050	0.040
A * C	36.450	1	36.450	0.359
B * C	6.050	1	6.050	0.060
A*B*C	174.050	1	174.050	1.713
ERROR	7317.200	72	101.628	

REFERENCES

- Bennett, L. A. Perceived similarity: An influence on the attribution of mental illness? (Doctoral dissertation, Indiana University, 1972). Dissertation Abstracts International, 1973, 33, 3925 B.
- Brewer, M. B. An information-processing approach to attribution of responsibility. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1977, 13, 58-69.
- Chaiken, A. L., & Darley, J. M. Victim or perpetrator? Defensive attribution of responsibility and the need for order and justice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1973, 25, 268-275.
- Crocetti, G. M., Spiro, H. R., & Siassi, I. Are the ranks closed? Attitudinal social distance and mental illness. American Journal of Psychiatry, 1971, 127, 1121-1127.
- Farina, A. Some interpersonal consequences of being mentally ill or mentally retarded. In press, American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 1975.
- Farina, A., Allen, J. G., & Saul, B. B. B. The role of the stigmatized in affecting social relationships. Journal of Personality, 1968, 36, 169-182.
- Farina, A. & Felner, R. D. Employment interviewer reactions to former mental patients. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1973, 82, 268-272.

- Farina, A., Felner, R. D., & Boudreau, L. A. Reactions of workers to male and female mental patient job applicants. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 1973, 41, 363-372.
- Farina, A., Gliha, D., Boudreau, L. A., Allen, J. G., & Sherman, M. Mental illness and the impact of believing others know about it. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1971, 77, 1-5.
- Farina, A. & Hagelauer, H. D. Sex and mental illness: The generosity of females. Unpublished manuscript, University of Connecticut, 1974.
- Farina, A. and Hagelauer, H. D. Sex and mental illness: The generosity of females. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 1975, 43, 122.
- Farina, A., Holland, C. H., & Ring, K. The role of stigma and set in interpersonal interaction. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1966, 71, 421-428.
- Farina, A. & Ring, K. The influence of perceived mental illness on interpersonal relations. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1965, 70, 47-51.
- Farina, A., Thaw, J., Lovern, J. D., & Mangone, P. People's reaction to a former mental patient moving to their neighborhood. Journal of Community Psychology, 1974, 2, 108-112.
- Fishbein, M. & Ajzen, I. Attribution of responsibility: A theoretical note. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1973, 9, 148-153.
- Goffman, E. Stigma. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963.
- Heider, F. The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: Wiley, 1958.

- Jones, E. E. & Davis, K. E. From acts to dispositions. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.) Advances in experimental social psychology. Vol. 2. New York: Academic Press, 1965, pp. 219-266.
- Jones, E. E., Rock, L., Shaver, K. G., Goethals, G. R., & Ward, L. M. Pattern of performance and ability attribution: An unexpected primacy effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1968, 10, 317-340.
- Jones, E. E., Kanouse, D. E., Kelley, H. K., Nisbett, R. E., Valins, S., & Weiner, B. (Eds.). Attribution: Perceiving the causes of behavior. Morristown, N. J.: General Learning Press, 1972.
- Kelley, H. H. Attribution theory in social psychology. In D. Levine (Ed.) Nebraska symposium on motivation. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967, pp. 192-238.
- Kelley, H. H. Attribution in social interaction. New York: General Learning Press, 1971.
- Kelley, H. H. The processes of causal attribution. American Psychologist, 1973, 28, 107-128.
- Lerner, M. J. Evaluation of performance as a function of performer's reward and attractiveness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1965, 3, 355-360.
- Lerner, M. J. & Agar, E. The consequences of perceived similarity: Attraction and rejection, approach and avoidance. Journal of Experimental Research in Personality, 1972, 6, 69-75.
- Lerner, M. J. & Becker, S. W. Interpersonal choice as a function of ascribed similarity and definition of the situation. Human Relations, 1962, 15, 24-34.

- Lerner, M. J. & Matthews, G. Reactions to suffering of others under conditions of indirect responsibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1967, 5, 319-325.
- Lerner, M. J. & Simmons, C. W. Observer's reactions to the "innocent victim": Compassion or rejection? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1966, 4, 203-210.
- McKillip, J. Similarity and the attribution of responsibility. Paper presented at the meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Association, Cleveland, May 1972.
- McKillip, J. & Posavac, E. J. Attribution of responsibility for an accident: Effects of similarity to the victim and severity of consequences. Proceedings of the 80th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, 1972, 7, 181-182.
- Miller, D. T. & Ross, M. Self-serving biases in the attribution of causality: Fact or fiction? Psychological Bulletin, 1975, 82, 213-225.
- Nisbett, R. E. & Valins, S. Perceiving the causes of one's own behavior. Morristown, N. J.: General Learning Press, 1971.
- Novak, D. & Lerner, M. J. Rejection as a consequence of perceived similarity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1968, 9, 147-152.
- Oksner, P. W. The effect of institutional history and physical attractiveness on the assignment of social distance to a stranger. Unpublished manuscript, College of William and Mary, 1975.
- Phillips, D. L. Help sources and rejection of the mentally ill. Doctoral dissertation, Yale University, 1962.

- Phillips, D. L. Rejection of the mentally ill: The influence of behavior and sex. American Sociological Review, 1964, 29, 679-687.
- Rabkin, J. Public attitudes toward mental illness: A review of the literature. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 1974, 10, 7-33.
- Ring, K. & Farina, A. Personal adjustment as a determinant of aggressive behavior toward the mentally ill. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 1969, 33, 683-690.
- Rosenhan, D. On being sane in an insane place. Science, 1973, 179, 250-257.
- Rotter, J. B. Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. Psychological Monographs, 1966, 80 (1, Whole No. 609).
- Scheff, T. J. Being mentally ill: A sociological theory. Chicago: Aldine, 1966.
- Schroeder, D. A. & Linder, D. E. Effects of actor's causal role, outcome severity, and knowledge of prior accidents upon attributions of responsibility. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1976, 12, 340-356.
- Shaver, K. G. Redress and conscientiousness in the attribution of responsibility for accidents. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1970, 6, 100-110. (a)
- Shaver, K. G. Defensive attribution: Effects of severity and relevance on the responsibility assigned for an accident. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1970, 14, 101-113. (b)

- Shaver, K. G. Defensive attribution: Effects of situational possibility and personal similarity on the assignment of responsibility (mimeo). Reported in K. G. Shaver, Defensive attribution of responsibility, Washington: National Institute of Mental Health, 1971 (mimeo).
- Shaver, K. G. Intentional ambiguity in the attribution of responsibility: A reply to Fishbein and Ajzen. Unpublished manuscript, College of William and Mary, 1973.
- Shaver, K. G. An introduction to attribution processes. Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop, 1975.
- Shaw, M. E. & Sulzer, J. L. An empirical test of Heider's levels in attribution of responsibility. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1964, 69, 39-46.
- Sorrentino, R. M. & Boutilier, R. G. Evaluation of a victim as a function of fate similarity/dissimilarity. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1974, 10, 84-93.
- Storms, M. D. & Nisbett, R. E. Insomnia and the attribution process. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1970, 16, 319-328.
- Sulzer, J. L. & Burglass, R. K. Responsibility attribution, empathy, and punitiveness. Journal of Personality, 1968, 36, 272-282.
- Vidmar, N. & Crinklaw, L. D. Attributing responsibility for an accident: A methodological and conceptual critique. Canadian Journal of Behavioral Science, 1974, 6, 112-130.
- Walster, E. Assignment of responsibility for an accident. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1966, 3, 73-79.
- Weiner, B. Achievement motivation and attribution theory. Morristown, N. J.: General Learning Press, 1974.

- Wright, B. Physical disability-A psychological approach. New York:
Harper & Row, 1960.
- Yablonsky, L. Watch out, whitey. The New Republic, 1966, 154, 10-12.
- Younger, J. C., Arrowood, A. J., & Harris, V. A. Is love blind?
Defensive attribution and the perception of transgression.
Journal of Personality, in press.
- Zimmerman, J. S. A social psychological investigation of the mental
illness label. (Doctoral dissertation, University of Georgia,
1973). Dissertation Abstracts International, 1974, 34, 5215 B.

VITA

Phyllis White Oksner

The author was born in Harrisonburg, Virginia, on August 12, 1951. She graduated from Broadway High School, Broadway, Virginia in June 1969. She received a Bachelor of Arts degree from the College of William and Mary in June 1973. She was employed by the Tidewater Association for Retarded Citizens in the position of Volunteer Coordinator from March 1974 to August 1974. From August 1974 to July 1975 she served as Field Coordinator for a Social and Rehabilitation Services Grant for the Southeastern Virginia Training Center for the Mentally Retarded. She is presently a candidate for the Master of Arts degree in Psychology at the College of William and Mary.