

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS:
A STUDY IN LOCKEAN SYNTHESIS

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of History
The College of William and Mary in Virginia


In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

by
Carl Hinton
1987

APPROVAL SHEET


This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts




Carl Hinton


Approved, September, 1987



Dr. Edward P. Crapol



Dr. Philip J. Funigiello



Dr. James P. Whittenburg

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | Page |
|---|------|
| ABSTRACT | iv |
| INTRODUCTION | 2 |
| FORMATIVE INFLUENCES | 5 |
| The Rationalism of Locke and Others As Influences on John Quincy Adams | 5 |
| The Anglophobia of John Quincy Adams | 8 |
| THE DIPLOMAT AS A LOCKEAN ACTING PERSON | 11 |
| THE LOCKEAN BASIS OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF PRESIDENT JOHN QUINCY ADAMS | 45 |
| NOTES | 80 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 96 |

ABSTRACT

This paper is an analysis of the foreign policy of John Quincy Adams from 1814 to 1829 in terms of the ideas of the English philosopher John Locke.

Its main contention is that Locke influenced the thinking of Adams as he formulated such policies, whose purpose was to bring about a world order which both suited American national interests and satisfied a world-view greatly resembling that of Locke.

This world-view emphasized rationality, which wove a fine balance between pragmatism and morality. It had as its basis knowledge, perception, action, and belief in the efficacy of property, all being made to intellectually interact to produce views marked by both fairness and a sense of historical inevitability.

Adams applied these precepts throughout his career as chief American negotiator of the Treaty of Ghent, Minister to Great Britain, Secretary of State, and finally, President of the United States.

He maintained these principles throughout, when dealing with Britain over issues arising from the War of 1812, and over Oregon, trade, and boundary disputes; when dealing with Spain over American expansion and the Latin American republics; when dealing with France, Russia, and Greece; and when dealing with the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine.

The result was a series of policies which were consistent, yet pragmatic.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS:
A STUDY IN LOCKEAN SYNTHESIS

INTRODUCTION

There was a remarkable resemblance in the political and philosophical thinking of two men who lived more than a century apart. One, an Englishman, John Locke, lived from 1632 to 1704; the other, an American, John Quincy Adams, lived from 1767 to 1848. Locke was born in Wrington, Somerset, the son of an attorney, and was reared in a liberal Puritan environment. He attended Oxford University, studied philosophy and medicine, and graduated in 1656. He then taught there, lecturing in Latin and Greek. Later, he became associated with the great scientist, Robert Boyle, and the great physician, Thomas Sydenham. In 1667 he became associated with the Earl of Shaftesbury as physician and diplomat, and in 1683 had to flee to Holland because of Shaftesbury's opposition to the Stuarts. After William of Orange ascended the English throne in 1689, Locke returned, and in 1691 he was invited to reside at Oates, the home of Sir Francis and Lady Masham. During this period, his two most important works, the Essay Concerning Human Understanding and the Two Treatises of Government, were published. He died in Oates.¹

John Quincy Adams was born in Braintree, Massachusetts, the son of a future President of the United States and founding father of the Republic. He was educated both in Europe and at Harvard College, and in 1790 he was admitted to the bar. In 1794 he was named Minister to the Netherlands, and later he served as

Minister to Prussia. In 1797 he married. He then served as a Federalist United States Senator from 1803 to 1807, breaking with his party over Jefferson's Embargo Act. Around this time he was also Boylston Professor at Harvard. In 1809 he was named Minister to Russia, and then he was chief American negotiator for the Treaty of Ghent which ended the War of 1812. From 1815 to 1817 he was Minister to Great Britain. He then served as Secretary of State under President James Monroe, and was subsequently elected President of the United States by the House of Representatives in a four-way race. From 1830 until his death in 1848 he was a United States Congressman from Massachusetts. He died in Washington, D.C.²

Despite these national and temporal differences, the ideas of the two men resembled one another greatly, particularly in regard to government and the self. This is particularly evident in the following concepts: (1) The state as a condition of moral order; (2) The self as defined by consciousness; (3) The self as thought and action; (4) The production of property as the definer of self; and (5) Knowledge as a state of being certain.³

Nowhere was the manifestation of these concepts more apparent than in Adams' career, first as a diplomat, and then as President of the United States. This paper will outline the salient conceptual influences on that career, and that career itself, from 1814 to 1829, when he was, in turn, chief American negotiator at Ghent, Minister to Great Britain, Secretary of State, and President of the United States. During this time, he united a life of contemplation and a life of action,⁴ being the quintessen-

tial embodiment of Lockean action in his negotiations with the Spanish over Florida; his formulation of the Monroe Doctrine; his efforts at insuring that the United States would eventually acquire the Oregon Territory; and his Presidential dealings with various European and Latin American nations in regard to trade, national sovereignty, and other matters. By his actions in these areas, Adams synthesized the political, the philosophical, and the pragmatic, and integrated them into his thinking about international relationships. In doing this, he developed and brought to bear certain formative influences and realized a profound individuality.

FORMATIVE INFLUENCES

The Rationalism of Locke and Others As Influences on John Quincy Adams

John Quincy Adams' ideas had a particular continuity with those of his father,⁵ one of the founders of the American Republic, and John Adams was an avid student of Locke, the philosopher whose understanding of politics most influenced the thinking of the Founding Fathers.⁶ What is more, John Quincy Adams was part of an intellectual environment which was permeated with the influence of Locke,⁷ an influence from which both Federalists and anti-Federalists drew guidance.⁸ For example, John Adams insisted that he and his contemporaries were concerned with establishing a new and purified type of political community which would be founded upon, among other things, Christianity and Lockean precepts,⁹ and thus his library contained volumes of Locke.¹⁰ Moreover, John Adams further insisted that the works of the great political philosophers, such as Locke, Milton, Sidney, and Harrington would convince any candid mind that a republican form of government was best.¹¹

Moreover, the mind of John Quincy Adams was very receptive, as he early on took pride in the accomplishments of the American Revolution and the Republic, and was very precocious, applying himself to more serious matters than those which a very young man, even in his day, would normally occupy himself with.¹² As an indication of this receptivity, one may cite the emphasis which he would

later place upon natural law. This can be traced back through his father, and thence back to John Locke.¹³ However, his father was not the only avenue of transmission of this influence. In the larger environment, Locke's ideas were passed into the general discourse in New England by way of pamphlets, newspapers, and sermons.¹⁴

Subsequently, John Quincy Adams accompanied his father to Europe, where he cultivated a voracious appetite for books, which he collected at least from 1779.¹⁵ After his return to the United States, he entered Harvard College, where he was further exposed to Locke, having to endure a rigorous examination on the subject.¹⁶ Its library also included Locke, as well as Algernon Sidney, Harrington, and others whom its benefactor, Thomas Hollis, hoped would imbue the Harvard students with a devotion to free constitutional government.¹⁷ It is interesting to note that Adams acknowledged that Harvard introduced him to all the prosperity that ever befell him.¹⁸

Later, John Quincy Adams' explicit references to Locke are not numerous, but they are quite trenchant. The following are examples of such references:

- (1) Concerning Locke's denial of innate ideas: He appears to reason in such a manner that I am very much inclined to think him right.¹⁹
- (2) You have learnt from Mr. Locke, that all human ideas are ultimately derived from one of two sources; either from objects perceptible to the senses, or from the reflections of our own minds upon such objects. It is equally clear that language, the purpose of which is to communicate our ideas, must be composed of words, the first drawn from ideas of sensation.²⁰
- (3) In an address to his constituents in 1842, Adams defended

Locke and Sydney against Filmer and Hobbes, contending that the consent of society needed to institute a valid government is part of the constitution of society.²¹

- (4) When the question of the separation of powers was uppermost in Congressional discussions, Adams went straight to Locke, for he regarded him as the true originator of the theory.²²

What is more, Locke was the prototypical rational man, and John Quincy Adams placed particular importance upon the type of reason that deals with abstraction and theory as the source of an understanding of life.²³ This was true in foreign affairs, as well as in other endeavors.

However, there was more than the influence of Locke here. Adams was the product of the eighteenth century, and therefore manifested many of the intellectual trends and traditions of that century. What is more, he believed that the study of law, supported by wide reading in history and politics, offered the best training for public service and high office.²⁴ Therefore, as Secretary of State, he recommended Grotius, Vattel, and Montesquieu as theoretical foundations of foreign policy.²⁵ In addition, he studied Burlamaqui at Harvard and had his works in his library.²⁶ Adams was also a lifetime admirer of Cicero.²⁷

A study of such writers would tend to reinforce a world view imbued with rationalism, order, and balance; one which combined the moral and the pragmatic. The following examples of their thinking illustrate this:

(1) Grotius maintained that natural law was the basis for legislation for countries as well as for individuals, and he advocated respect for life and the ownership of property.²⁸

(2) Vattel stated that respect which others had for the rights of domain and property constituted the security of our actual possessions, and that there must be a balance of power in order to

control the authority of aggressive states.²⁹

(3) Montesquieu examined monarchy, republic, and despotism, and espoused a balance of powers in government and a separation of authority. ³⁰

(4) Burlamaqui believed in natural law and its relationship to God, human intellect, and innate moral responses, and considered natural law to be the foundation of domestic and international law. ³¹

(5) Cicero was the moral philosopher of Rome, and a practical guide to the good life.³²

What is more, all his life, John Quincy Adams was also devoted to the works of Aristotle, Virgil, Plutarch, Erasmus, Pope, Bolingbroke, Lord Kames, and Jefferson, which upheld the belief that there was a moral order in the universe; that the community of man should live within that order; and that government was established with that end in mind.³³

The writings of these thinkers, therefore, provided a firm conceptual reinforcement for Adams' rationalist tendencies. These tendencies were reflected in his desire that his policies be judged by their standards of propriety, accuracy in reflecting international conditions, and possible contribution to the nation's well-being.³⁴

The Anglophobia of John Quincy Adams

Counterpoised to these rationalist influences was one that was pre-eminently irrational: Adams' Anglophobia. He revealed it early on, as negative references to the British abound in his letters and other sources. For example, in a letter of April 12, 1794 to his father, which was written from the Netherlands, where he was American Minister, he stated that "the general dis-

position of the French ruling powers has been constantly favorable to us, and the British government, acrimonious, jealous and under the guise of fair pretensions, deeply malignant.³⁵ It was a fear and distrust which could perhaps only have arisen out of a sense of betrayal, as Britain transgressed the orderly and abstract reality of balance and social contract which Adams had envisioned. There was, perhaps, even a feeling akin to that of a child having discovered, at last, that his parents were not perfect. It manifested itself in a concern about the special relationship between Britain and rebellious governments, taking the forms of both ideology and commerce, as well as power relationships as such.³⁶

For example, again while he was American Minister to the Netherlands, Adams wrote very disapprovingly of the British control over the Dutch government, lamenting its unwillingness to negotiate with France.³⁷ He even condemned the British national character, considering them an "object of aversion."³⁸ He applauded any British setback, and he condemned the supposed British efforts to aggrandize themselves.³⁹ Therefore, he would gleefully anticipate a decline in British power. Because of this, he looked with favor upon the British war with Napoleon, believing that a few more years of peace in America and war in Europe would so bankrupt and exhaust Britain that all her possessions in the New World would fall to the United States.⁴⁰

On a more theoretical level, Adams believed that the dependence of the American colonies upon Great Britain was a "dependence of parchments of proclamations unsanctioned by the

laws of nature, disavowed by the dictates of reason." Again,⁴¹
this transgressing of natural law was the theme of another
utterance: "Britain, inspired by the shibboleth, 'Rule Britan-
nia! Britannia rule the waves!', foisted upon the world a jus-
tice in maritime matters widely divergent from the requirements
of natural justice."⁴²

His antipathy could even approach the concept of a Mani-
chean dualism. For example, Adams stated, "Unconditional surren-
der to British overlordship would be anathema"; or "The combined
purpose of all other commercial nations should be to counteract
this overwhelming power of Britain."⁴³ Such feelings could reach
such a level of intensity that he sometimes invoked scriptural
injunction to show America's right in relation to Britain.⁴⁴

In short, the Anglophobia of John Quincy Adams was based
upon a combination of empirical, emotional, and theoretical fac-
tors. One must understand this in analyzing his actions towards
Britain while he was a diplomat, Secretary of State, and Presi-
dent of the United States.

THE DIPLOMAT AS A LOCKEAN ACTING PERSON

John Quincy Adams is considered perhaps the most accomplished diplomat in American history. What is more, he had a considerable talent for abstract theory and its practical application to American nationalism.⁴⁵ He therefore accomplished his tasks by gathering multitudes of empirical data for use in governmental decisions, and then subjecting it to the most rigorous analytical processes. With the ideas, or mixed modes,⁴⁶ formulated from this effort he produced courses of action involving dealings with Great Britain, France, Russia, Spain, and other countries, both in regard to the continental expansion of the United States, and in regard to the maintenance or establishment of American rights in more non-contiguous areas such as Latin America and the British West Indies. This integrated process involved the choosing of ideas, and their subjection to a process of free variation which, according to Locke, are a series of relations, of simple ideas conflated in different ways. The fashioning of the mental structures which are the product of this process is a function of consciousness, which is the primary quantity which defines the self. Intimately related to this is the Lockean concept of freedom as power, or the ability to bring into significant effect the concepts arising from that consciousness.⁴⁷

The acting out of these concepts involved complex efforts

which were integrated by a conceptual model of the international environment which was quite Lockean. It involved the concept of moral order, which Adams first applied to the United States. He regarded America as a unique social compact which had its genesis in the Declaration of Independence. Furthermore, he regarded the United States as the first nation in the world which derived its principles from the laws of nature, and as a "moral person" (an entity acting in conformance with those laws) in the family of nations.⁴⁸ He juxtaposed this unique compact, in which men lived in harmony with each other and exercised their rational thinking abilities in order to maximize individual happiness, with the relationships of nations to each other. This individual happiness could only be possible within an environment of freedom and individual initiative. In the international arena, this was the state of nature, in which nations lived according to their own laws, and recognized no others. In such a situation force would inevitably have to be used in order to protect human freedoms. Because of this inevitable possibility, Adams believed that a strong militia and navy were necessary for the protection of the United States against aggression.⁴⁹ Locke, too, realized that men engaged in the social compact would not long be secure in that interaction of relationships without external means of assuring it. Therefore, in creating an environment of security in which war would be unnecessary, he considered foreign policy to be the ultimate determinant of the structure of society.⁵⁰ This line of thinking reveals a degree of pragmatism which marked the actions of both men.

Adams also discerned the basic importance of foreign policy. To him, war would only be the last resort when the ideas resulting from reasoned consideration could not go into effect. Before such a calamitous occurrence, every reasonable man should be aware that rational statesmen would abide by international law, and that this awareness would be an important integrating idea of the nature of society, and of the international order in general. This belief was a guiding idea in John Quincy Adams' diplomatic efforts. As a case-in-point concerning this belief, there is an 1806 address, where Adams, as a United States Senator, stated in Congress: "Ministers are the only instruments by which war is averted when it approaches, or terminated, and this consideration surrounds their sanctity."⁵¹ Similarly, there is an 1823 letter of instruction to Benjamin Rush, United States Minister to Great Britain: "The policy of the United States, with reference to foreign nations, has always been founded upon the principle of natural law, peace with all mankind."⁵²

Nevertheless, seeking to achieve or maintain peace while being concomitantly armed for war did represent something of a moral dilemma which Adams must have found difficult to resolve. One must explain this apparent contradiction in terms of the richness of ideas which he had at his command due to his variegated background of education and experience, and how this was intimately related to his personal freedom, or freedom of action. According to Locke, the existence of the nature of things circumscribes one's actions because it circumscribes thoughts.⁵³ That is, the constituents of external reality, because

of their discrete and relatively rigid nature, are self-limited in their capacity for interaction, both in situ, and in their susceptibility to transformation by thought. What is more, a nation-state such as the United States, being a "moral person", must consist, as a person, of the combined consciousnesses of all its citizens, deriving those consciousnesses from their environment and institutionally and culturally integrating them into a coherent structure called a nation, by a process of mutual interaction over time. This coherent structure is preserved over time, indeed, over the generations, by a collective knowledge of values, events, and other culturally shared experiences congruent with what was immediately past, which was, in turn, known to be related to what was immediately its precedent.⁵⁴ Such a process of national delimiting also affected the thinking of Adams in another way---his recognition of geographic factors as the foundation of national interests and diplomatic advantage.⁵⁵ The state was therefore the basic unit of conceptual homogeneity in the world.

It is thus not surprising that John Quincy Adams believed that the individual owed the exercise of all his faculties to the service of the nation-state.⁵⁶ In effect, he wanted the United States to be a closed system of the interaction of ideas, its richness internally generated. He thought about this matter in insular terms. A portion of his 1802 address to the Massachusetts Charitable Fire Society is instructive: "The largest portion of this Continent is united under a social compact, which makes its inhabitants equal fellow-citizens of one great and

growing empire."⁵⁷ Because Adams possessed this robust Americanism and nationalism, but at the same time believed that "violence and persuasion, being in their nature as opposite to each other, as light and darkness, can never exist together"⁵⁸, he wished to preserve that conceptual input by diplomacy, for his own edification and, in turn, for the edification of others. The boundaries of the state must not be transgressed by war, and the collectively creative must not be destroyed. How conscious he was of this collective can be illustrated in an 1810 quotation from Boylston lectures at Harvard: "None of us liveth to himself, and as we live to our families, by the intercourse of more intimate society and mutual good offices, so we live to our country, and to mankind in general, by the performance of those services, and by the discharge of those labors which belong to the profession we have chosen as the occupation of our lives."⁵⁹ By this effort, John Quincy Adams would realize his moral and intellectual potential by means of the exchange of ideas and perceptions with other citizens of the nation-state. In turn, the existence of the nation-state would be continuously reinforced by the reaffirmation of the consciousnesses of its constituent parts. As a result of this, a vast increase in the richness of ideas would ensue, thereby progressively contributing to the general welfare, or, in Adams' words, "the individual enjoyment of progressive improvement and individual discovery"⁶⁰. Self and state would therefore be intimately associated in a free and fruitful relationship.

The Lockean belief in the state as a moral person can thus

be equated with the person as a being defined by consciousness. Both would have the right to defend themselves in order to maintain their boundaries of individuality. Actions toward that end, if tending towards the preservation of that moral person, would be moral by implication, because such consequent action would be a function of the exercise of reason used to protect one's freedom. Locke was quite explicit about this: "The state of war is a state of enmity and destruction . . . ; it being reasonable and just I should have a right to destroy that which threatens me with destruction."⁶¹ Likewise, Adams maintained: "For my part I cannot imagine a possible state of the world for futurity in which the United States shall not be a great naval and military power . . . And as we have begun and made some progress in it already, I doubt whether we shall ever have again so favorable an opportunity for accomodating our permanent political system to it as the present."⁶² This declamation was made within the context of the War of 1812, but no such interpretation can be placed upon a statement of Adams' later years: Philosophically speaking, I believe that war was not a corrupter, but rather a purifier of the moral character of man, that peace was the period of corruption to the human race."⁶³ Towards the end of his life, it seems that he had evolved an extreme manifestation of certain previous tendencies of his thinking. The United States has here become more than merely a moral person; it has become an empyrean entity forever beyond the corrupting influence of the amoral European states, or despotisms. The individual collective consciousness has become, in effect, solipsistic, unin-

volved with the connotative differences of moral definition which are often a function of cultural differences.

However, many years before this aberration, Adams could express an attitude which could only be interpreted as a feeling that it would be considered a moral act for a nation to either live in peace with its coeval fellow nations, or to engage in war with one or another of them in order to protect the individuality of the collective national moral person. An 1816 letter to his father is illustrative of this belief:

Whatever may be the natural and necessary propensities of mankind to war, my special duty at present is to preach peace . . . It was a war from which, if the account of disgrace and glory were fairly balanced, we should have something, but not much to boast of. May we do better the next time! and that we may do better, let us not be hasty to enter upon the contest. At the same time it is not 'ignoble ease and peaceful sloth' that I would counsel. An efficient revenue and a growing navy, these are the pillars of my peace. 64

The apparent dichotomy of feeling is evident here, in this case involving Adams' feelings concerning Great Britain and its then recently concluded war with the United States. Anxious for the security of his country because he was an integral part of the interaction of ideas that defined its collective nature, by striving to maintain its profile of individuality, he strove to maintain his.

It may be said that xenophobia would be a logical development of such feelings, and so it was.⁶⁵ It was an antipathy which Adams could express with crushing philosophical puissance. A passage from his 1821 address commemorating the signing of the Declaration of Independence is a good example of this Anglophobia: "The connexion between the British government and the Amer-

ican people was unnatural; and it was in the moral order that it should be dissolved."⁶⁶ This was a truly Lockean utterance, assuming, as it did, the self-evidence of the moral order to men of reason, and the logical acts inevitably flowing from those reasoned perceptions.

The natural manifestations of such moral order, the definitive dissolution of the colonial bonds connecting Great Britain and the United States (and therefore the erection of a stable, mixed mode idea structure, free of empirical perturbations), occurred with the signing of the Treaty of Ghent on December 14, 1814, with the formal ratification exchange on January 8, 1815.⁶⁷ Thus ended the War of 1812, "The Second American War for Independence", and the man who was in charge of the American side of the negotiations which brought this about was John Quincy Adams. However, he was notably assisted by Henry Clay and Albert Gallatin.⁶⁸ At Ghent, Adams could, in effect, attempt to realize his Lockean self, for as long as America remained subservient to Britain in any way (such as by continuing to acquiesce in the British impressment of American seamen), the structure of ideas defining the conscious national self would remain subservient to the idea of Britain as the power to invoke idea. The idea would exist autonomously, with virtually infinite potential to frustrate. It would be up to man's reason to forego this quandary with solutions, and this reasoning process would be eminently Lockean. Its basis would lie in the belief that all ideas are extracted from experience by reflection and sensation, and then, in turn, projected beyond experience.⁶⁹ Since they exist as mental

structures separate from the person from whom they are derived, or to whom they will be assimilated, it is up to man's reason to perceive the agreement or disagreement between those ideas in order to produce knowledge.⁷⁰ Again, according to Locke, knowledge bears the same relationship to an individual as his behavior, character, or properties.⁷¹ Therefore, one's knowledge helps to define one's individuality. Britain, by being hostile to its former colonies, with its impressment of American seamen, denial of the entrance of American merchant vessels into the harbors of its West Indies colonies, continued disputes concerning the border between the United States and Canada, disputes concerning fishing rights off the Canadian coast, and other exactions, produced the empirical basis for the forced elimination of certain courses of action by the Americans. This was because the perceived field of action believed by the Americans to be a legitimate potential area of opportunity and national growth, was already occupied by adamant British power. Locke maintained that action is the power to modify a substance from without, and the power to bring into view for consideration that which is extrinsic, and that action depends on will.⁷² Therefore, the perception of Britain as powerful and superior would preclude the free exercise of will due to the elimination of many of the elements of choice. If man does not act in accordance with his will, then his actions and the products of those actions cannot be considered his own. And, since his actions and products are an extension of himself, an alienation from one's own environment of ideas can occur, resulting in a species of identity

denial. This consideration is particularly important in Locke, because he denied the legitimacy of defining personal identity as a merely physical persistence over time.⁷³ Thus, consciousness and knowledge must be considered particularly important as the definers of such identity. At the level of the nation-state, this British suborning of will could result in the undermining of the national sense of selfhood, with the resultant paralysis of the ability to fashion by that will the structures of ideas dealing with national growth, a sense of national identity, or the ability to alter the environment for a peculiarly national purpose.

John Quincy Adams was deeply aware of this danger, and he therefore strove to effect the realization of American national identity. In bringing this about, it can be said that he rendered an inestimable service to the United States by his uncompromising stand for American rights at Ghent.⁷⁴ Always guided by the idea expressed in his Newburyport Oration: "In the struggle of resistance against a common oppressor, coalesced spontaneously into one people by moral centripetal impulse",⁷⁵ he consistently rejected the British contention that the War of 1812 annulled all previously existing treaties between the two nations.⁷⁶

He maintained this and similar positions despite being caught between British arrogance, on the one hand, and his dislike for certain other members of the American delegation, on the other. Henry Clay drew Adams' especial ire because he considered him a man who was more interested that the war should con-

tinue than that it should end, and perhaps a reminder to Adams that he was also caught in the Lockean quandary of both necessary peace and necessary war?⁷⁷ The idea of America, held in common as a mixed mode, had to be preserved by war, as a defense against harm coming from foreign quarters; yet, in order for the moral person of America to prosper and grow, the production of ideas within an ordered background had to be effected--a background which could only be brought about by peace.

Adams perceived the nature of this conceptual process. For example, in his Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory, he stated: "The powers of the imagination are not confined to the reminiscence of ideas which have been admitted to the mind through the medium of the senses; they extend also to the combination of such ideas into forms different from any of the combinations of nature. It is the union of these two powers in the faculties of man, which opens a new creation to the mind."⁷⁸ With that statement he expressed the Lockean concept of the two sources of ideas,⁷⁹ and it would obviously be an intellectual synthesis of this type, in international affairs, which could follow a peace with Britain. However, the existence of an enemy nation would preclude the free interaction of these two types of ideas, as minds would be constantly drawn back to the overwhelming entity threatening the very dissolution of the conceptual underpinnings of the state. This vectoring of American minds towards a single predicative object would obviously preclude the interactive realization of intellectual potential, which Adams--and Locke--envisioned.

Therefore, at Ghent, Adams would strive assiduously for a world in which there would not only be an absence of conflict, but also the perception of the absence of the potential for conflict. Britain he considered the chief barrier to that realization. In his 1808 letter to Harrison Gray Otis, he stated: "The great obstacle which has always interfered in the adjustment of our differences with Britain, has been that she would not acquiesce in the only principle upon which fair negotiations between independent nations can be conducted, the principle of reciprocity."⁸⁰ In other words, John Quincy Adams wished that Great Britain would enter into the commonality of the "state of nature", a condition in which all sovereign states were equal, and had the equal right to be free from the domination of any other nation.⁸¹ This was congruent with the thinking of Locke, not only on the level of the nation-state, but also as it applies to the individual.

As an illustration of this, Adams always insisted upon maintaining personal dignity, not only as a representative of the United States, but also as a free individual who acted to effect the state of nature on a personal scale by seeking to restrain men from invading the rights of others. To this end, he always sought to moderate the behavior of the British negotiators Goulburn, Lord Gambier, and the others.⁸² However, he believed that his efforts were in vain. A single comment from his diary suffices: "The tone of all the British notes is arrogant, overbearing, and offensive. The tone of ours is neither so bold nor so spirited as I think it should be. It is too much on

the defensive, and too excessive in the caution to say nothing irritating . . . But in this opinion I am alone.⁸³ He thus maintained an adamant individuality through all the sparring and emotional counterpoint, and through all the issues, such as whether the Indians should be treated as sovereign nations, or whether the United States was planning to conquer Canada.⁸⁴

Nevertheless, the treaty ending the War of 1812 was signed. But it left many disputes between Britain and the United States unresolved. They included the fixing of the boundaries between the United States and Canada; fishing rights on the Grand Banks, off the Canadian Atlantic coast; the impressment of American seamen; the lack of British respect for American neutral rights; the right of blockade at sea; and the question of whether Britain and the United States had the right to maintain naval forces on the Great Lakes.⁸⁵ In short, the treaty merely imposed a status quo ante bellum, with no improvement of that condition. Adams would have much to say about these questions in later years, not only in regard to the maintenance of the equality of nations, but also, by implication, in regard to property rights in their broadest, Lockean sense--as the protection of the means of sustenance.

After the conclusion of the negotiations at Ghent, Adams was named Minister to Great Britain by President James Madison. In this office he initiated conversations which were to result in the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1818, whereby the boundary⁸⁶ between Canada and the United States was demilitarized. He also constantly brought up all the other questions left outstanding

by the Treaty of Ghent. In Lockean terms, such agreements were simply conditional accords in which certain retrenchments in the compass of action were permitted in order to allow a comparative freedom of action to both parties in separate spheres.⁸⁷ Indeed, what would be involved would often be actual physical retreat, in this case involving military forces so as to prevent violent confrontations. To Locke, therefore, freedom was the ability to act or not to act, according to choice, or will.⁸⁸ Additionally, according to the Lockean concept of ideas being derived from experience,⁸⁹ if physical freedom is circumscribed, the capacity of the individual to synthesize ideas from his environment is also circumscribed. Therefore, with Adams again, there would be a compelling necessity to enter into treaty agreements with Britain, on behalf of the United States, due to a congruence of Lockean political, i.e., pragmatic, and philosophical determinants.

In 1817 Adams was named Secretary of State by President James Monroe. He brought to this office a sense of the highest moral standards. For example, as a United States Senator in 1806, he maintained that "A foreign minister does not represent the person of his master, but only him in his affairs, and is therefore not entitled to his immunities."⁹⁰ He also brought to this position a belief acquired from his European experiences that neutrality was essential for the continuance of American Constitutional union, and even independence, at that time in American history.⁹¹

With these profound beliefs as part of his world-view,

Adams could effect a personal Lockean synthesis of American foreign policy, basing it upon the concept of a world in which all nations engaged in reciprocal relationships as equals, none under the domination of another. It would be the world as the state of nature, but also the world as a function of enlightened pragmatism. To render this idea a reality, he would engage himself very actively; first, by gathering empirical data as input for use in governmental decisions; secondly, by applying his great talent for diplomacy, accompanied by his native training and interest in this type of endeavor, to prescient analyses of both the internal and the diplomatic dynamics of European and other states. Into this alchemy of ideas and actions he also brought his wide experience and his extensive background in academics, languages, and law.⁹² Here, one can again notice the Lockean interaction between ideas, extrinsically generated, and ideas as a result of reflection upon the properties and characteristics of the first type. This interaction produces understanding,⁹³ which could range, in Adams' case, from a discerning of British motives in their attempt to hold onto the Oregon Territory, to an anticipation of the policies which the European leaders were likely to pursue in regard to one another.⁹⁴ And, he would cast wide this net of meticulous action. For example, his diplomatic instructions to American foreign service officers concerning their duties are considered to be masterful. Illustrative of this is an 1818 instruction to George Washington Campbell, American consul in Russia, in which Adams takes time to delineate that Campbell's duties

are intimately related to the history of United States trade relations with Russia; the trading practices of the Russian merchants; the possible role of Russia as a naval power; and possible Anglo-Russian conflict in the Northwest, all in copious detail.⁹⁵ Such meticulousness and richness of ideas truly represented the Lockean effectuation of freedom. He could act, and he knew his actions would have effect.

He would now apply his mind, broadcast, in an environment where will and action could often follow each other in order to produce change or interaction. This change could be defined by three concepts of Locke: (1) The self as thought and action; (2) The vital necessity for producing property; and (3) Knowledge as the state of being certain.⁹⁶

In order to determine how Adams produced this synthesis in his thoughts and actions between the philosophical and the pragmatic, there will now be an analysis of one of his most important acts as Secretary of State--the formulation of the Monroe Doctrine. He began to formulate it as early as January, 1819, when he advocated that the United States should recognize the new Latin American governments, and that Great Britain should do likewise in concert with the Americans.⁹⁷ By this act, which warned against European interference in Latin American affairs (and also sought to bind Great Britain by principle so that it would not acquire the former Spanish colonies for itself),⁹⁸ these new republics, recently having forcefully severed their ties with Spain, and unused to governing themselves in a responsible manner, could be brought into the con-

cert of nations.

However, the evolution of the Doctrine from its first formulation to when it was decided upon by President Monroe in 1823 was complex, reflecting its varying antecedents in thought and action. Its first explicit statement came in a conversation between Adams and Baron Tuly, Russian Minister to the United States, in which Adams stated that he expected that Russia would not encroach upon the North American continent, and in return, that the United States would not interfere in European affairs.⁹⁹ He would utilize this principle of the mutual exclusion of national sovereignty many times in carrying out his plans for America's destiny.

These plans required a seamless definition of the self as thought and action, or the causing to carry through of a policy as a direct result of intellect and will. In defining the self as thought and action, Locke considered action to be an active power which effectuates the passive power of thought by producing an effect as the active manifestation of that thought which originated as an impression from something extrinsic. This extrinsic impression is refashioned by the mind into an entity which is paradigmatically derived from what produced it, but bears little resemblance to that. Richness of thought and richness of action interact in a type of free variation of ideas and perceptions to lend the thinker a greater and greater degree of self-definition as will, the whole determining the degree of freedom one possesses. One can see how this freedom of action, in Adams' case, in interaction with a freedom of

thought derived from the multitude of ways and applications of the paradigmatic concept of "Britain as the arrogant aggressor", lent him an individual profile--and will--in driving through his individual concept of the Monroe Doctrine.

An impetus for that anger which Adams possessed in regard to the British was provided by a confidential letter from George Canning, the British Foreign Secretary, to Richard Rush, the American Minister to Great Britain, which suggested that a joint Anglo-American declaration be promulgated, declaring that the Spanish recovery of its South American colonies which had successfully revolted was hopeless.¹⁰¹ President Monroe apparently favored the proposal, but Adams consistently opposed any joint action with the British.¹⁰² He had to take into account many factors which determined his actions towards Spain, and European intervention would have the potential for bringing forth a systematic matrix of actions. For example, the reactionary Holy Alliance created the spectre of European intervention in Latin America in the interest of reimposing the status quo ante.¹⁰³ At same time, the United States was in a delicate relationship with Spain over the question of a potential American conquest of its non-revolting American colony, Cuba.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, Adams was afraid that should the United States agree to the British proposal for joint intervention, it would find itself at a distinct disadvantage because of the vastly greater British military power. Indeed, such an intervention would probably result in the former Spanish colonies falling to Britain, or the United States, nolens volens, supporting a closed system of Bri-

105

tish commercial imperialism in regard to Latin America.

Again, one can see how fearful Adams was that America would be subordinated to the exigencies of British power and British policy. This imperial control would obviously be detrimental to the development of a mature sense of freedom among the people of the new Latin American republics. Being politically immature, these people lacked the actuality (as opposed to the potentiality) of reason in their dealings with the outside world--and with each other. According to Locke, human freedom is based upon man's reason, by which he can interpret the sensory information from which the richness of ideas arises, and discover the law of nature. This law of nature expresses the obligation through which this freedom receives its intention
106
and meaning. Furthermore, the people of Latin America, untutored in the blessings of freedom and reason, would be awash in sin, for the ultimate source of man's reason is God.
107
Thus, the denial of reason would take on a moral dimension, and in regard to these emerging nations, there can be no doubt that Adams considered their independence from this perspective. In writing of the new South American republic of Colombia, for example, he expressed these views:

The republic of Colombia, if permanently organized to embrace the whole territory which it now claims, and blessed with a government effectually protective of the rights of its people, is undoubtedly destined to become hereafter one of the mightiest nations of the earth.

He goes on to describe Colombia's location, resources, and other features. Then:

But it is the man placed in a Paradise like this that

nature with her loudest voice exclaims, 'God to thee has done his part--do thine' If the natural advantages bestowed upon the Columbian territory were to be improved by its inhabitants only for purposes of empire that which nature has bestowed as a blessing upon them would in its consequences prove a curse inflicted upon the rest of mankind.¹⁰⁸

However, in addition to these proximately moral views, Adams has expressed another Lockean concept. In this statement, the beneficent use of the environment takes on a teleological import, as he believed that the progressive improvement in the condition of man was the purpose of a superintending God.¹⁰⁹ And, intimately related to this view was the Lockean concept of property. By property, Locke meant life, liberty, and property, in that property is what man extracts from nature by his own efforts and fashions for his own sustenance, life and liberty being the inevitable result.¹¹⁰ In short, it is the material result of the "free variation" in which one engages with ideas as the definer of self. It is thus another delineator of self, of freedom and happiness in the individual, and of the will of God. It is the radius of freedom extracted from an often reluctant environment. This linking of reason with morality, and, in turn, with the obligation to beneficially improve the environment, was a Lockean synthesis which marked John Quincy Adams' Latin American policies. Two further examples of his thinking in this area are illustrative. The first consists of a portion of a letter to Smith Thompson, Secretary of the Navy: "But while the Government of the United States have thus taken every occasion offered them in the course of events to manifest their good wishes in favor of the South Americans, they have never lost sight of the obli-

gations incumbent on them, as avowedly neutral to the contest
¹¹¹
 between them and Spain." The second consists of a portion of a
 letter to Joaquin de Anduaga, Spanish Minister to the United
 States: "It is the mere acknowledgement of existing facts, with
 the view to the regular establishment with the Nations newly
 formed, of those relations, political and commercial, which it
 is the moral obligation of civilized and Christian Nations to
¹¹²
 entertain reciprocally with one another." Moralism and pragmat-
 ism were seamlessly interweaved.

The question must now arise as to how such thinking could
 be applied to the governments of these nations themselves.
 According to Locke, in the formation of the state, the indivi-
 dual entered into an agreement not only to obey the government,
 but also to submit his property to the jurisdiction of that
 government. But Locke stated that governments exist as agents
¹¹³
 to secure property. Therefore, governments exist not so much to
 impose restraint as to facilitate the self-individualization of
 the person as one who is defined, and whose freedom is defined
 by, the ability to accumulate property. By taking upon them-
 selves the function of guarantor of property, governments thus
 obligated themselves to act in a reasonable manner, and thus in
 accordance with God's will, in order to guarantee man's intel-
 lectual freedom, the power to acquire and manipulate ideas.
 Paraphrasing Locke: "If man is the creature of God, he is the
 property of God. But, he can only be the property of God if God
 owns his body, his work, and his product, which are an exten-
¹¹⁴
 sion of the person." The right to property would therefore be

of divine origin. Moreover, because each person is a product of God, he must preserve himself in order that such work not be defiled. Thus, Locke called for the protection of property as a moral imperative--property as what inheres to the individual and, by implication, property as it comprises the totality of the state. This state Locke defined as the exclusive right to a particular part of the earth's surface.¹¹⁵ Hence, from the previous argument it may be concluded that only states which protect property are moral states, and only moral states have a right to exist.

From this it may be stated that as far as Adams was concerned, in order for the moral imperative to have effect, the sanctum sanctorum of property, protected by the state, should not be interfered with, and the protection of property and the preservation of territorial integrity were synonymous. The Latin American states should be left alone. He strove to put this policy into effect. Again, illustrative of this was his strenuous objection to amending a dispatch to Richard Rush concerning the official reply to Foreign Secretary Canning's proposal of joint Anglo-American action to protect the new Latin American republics. The amendment appeared to admit that the United States would not object to an arrangement by which special favors, or even a restoration of authority, could possibly be conceded to Spain. Such interference could not be allowed.¹¹⁶ The amendments were rejected.

With the free variation of thought and the moral imperative in regard to allowing the Latin American nations to deve-

lop unhindered depicted, it would now be appropriate to examine the structure of this process in Lockean terms, and to provide further examples of it concerning the Monroe Doctrine. The free variation in Adams' manipulation of ideas, in this instance, proceeding from a firm basis in the acute perception of relationships, was redolent of the Lockean belief in intuitive knowledge as the perception of the agreement or the disagreement of two ideas, immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other ideas.¹¹⁷ Such a manipulation of ideas would consist primarily of the analysis of the consequences of those intuitively perceived relationships. To Adams, one of these relationships consisted of his profound understanding of Europe and its connection with the New World.¹¹⁸ At the same time, it may be said that this very intuitive facility was the result of profound study, experience, and analysis, the product of assiduous effort, so much so that the result would be an instant grasp of the paradigmatic. Indeed, he provided himself with the richness of ideas to make this possible at an early age because of his varied and comprehensive education. Therefore, at each stage of his analytical thinking, Adams conformed to Locke's belief that each part of a process of reasoning must be supported by intuitive evidence.¹¹⁹

This acquisition of knowledge as the state of being certain led him to a degree of belief in values which could almost be accounted religious dogma. A manifestation of these beliefs was his diplomatic correspondence, which was, like most of his writings, based upon profound knowledge and careful study. As a

case-in-point concerning the Monroe Doctrine, there is his 1823 letter to Richard C. Anderson, American Minister to Spain, in which an intuitive grasp of the inevitability of human progress is combined with an intuitive belief in the efficacy of principle as the guiding force in international relations. A few passages are illustrative of Adams' thinking as he applies principle to an empirical situation: "The European alliance of emperors and kings have assumed as the foundation of human society the doctrine of unalienable allegiance. Our doctrine is founded upon the principle of unalienable right." Or: "Civil, political, commercial and religious liberty are but various modifications of one great principle founded in the unalienable rights of human nature, and before the universal application of which the colonial domination of Europe over the American hemisphere has fallen, and is crumbling into dust." One can discern here the manner in which the activating idea of principle formed the unifying force of the ideas of Adams, lending them a paradigmatic mixed mode integration as knowledge. The process was distinctly redolent of Locke, and produced a distinct force of action. The Monroe Doctrine--largely the handiwork of Adams, especially the non-colonization paragraph--was enunciated by President Monroe in a message to Congress on December 2, 1823.¹²¹

But there were other ideas of Locke which John Quincy Adams strove to apply. One of these was the question of order in relation to God's will. It was a question which the acquisition of Florida brought out for him, because he regarded the signing of the treaty with Spain which brought this about to be

the most important act of his life, a working out of divine providence.¹²² It represented for him the transfer of sovereignty from the chaotic will of a monarch to the ordered will of a government which was a social compact governed by reason: an ordering of reality according to the will of God, for the happiness of man. Concomitantly, it is not surprising that he believed that Europe was incorrigibly corrupt, and an adherent of outmoded political practices, and that he was concerned for moral order and the community of men.¹²³ The bringing into being of this moral order resided in treaties, the use of military forces, and other means. The treaty with Spain was signed on February 22, 1819, after long and acrimonious negotiations between Adams and Don Luis de Onis. It not only ceded Florida to the United States, it defined the national borders in an exceedingly advantageous way¹²⁴ by favorably rectifying the limits of the Louisiana Purchase. It also provided for the American government to assume all the claims of its citizens against Spain up to \$5 million, and to renounce all claims to Texas.¹²⁵ With these measures, the social compact would now hold sway over an unprecedentedly wider area--an area in which reason and the will of God would prevail. Instead of the imbalance of human forces manifested in greed and malevolence, and institutionalized in monarchical rule, there would be order based upon rational choices, and justice in treatment and in the allocation of resources. There would be governmental and behavioral stability, for, as Locke maintained,¹²⁶ justice and truth are the common ties of society.

In order to understand precisely why and how Adams

acquired Florida for the United States, his actions must be explained in terms of these precepts. In 1818, because of the depredations of Indian raiders from Florida upon adjacent American territory and populations, General Andrew Jackson was dispatched with a military force to pursue them across the border. He occupied Pensacola, executed Arbuthnot and Armbrister, British subjects who had assisted the Indians, and performed other military acts to restore order.¹²⁷ To Don Luis de Onís, Adams defended Jackson's actions and urged Spain to honor the 1795 treaty with the United States in which Spain pledged to restrain the Indians in its colonies.¹²⁸ At once, one can see that the question of order arises. There was concern on the part of Adams for both the restoration of the status quo ante, in which at least the simulacrum of order prevailed, though it may not have been inherent, and the sanctity of treaties as freely-contracted obligations. In the latter instance, if the conditions under which the treaty was contracted had changed, the United States, as one of the freely-contracting parties, would have had the right to renounce that treaty and to act to defend itself in the interest of self-preservation.¹²⁹ Adams was quite explicit about this. In an 1818 letter to George William Erving he definitively condemned the Indians as savages, and declared that it was the duty of the United States government to protect its people and their property.¹³⁰ Here, in effect, he sought to utilize the power of the United States to bring about a condition of order in which men would not give way to their passions and act in a manner contrary to the law of nature. To Locke,

this law of nature was tantamount to the law of God, which is discerned by human reason.¹³¹ And, it is by reason that men determine precisely what their own best interests are.¹³² This process of determination is a function of the creative manipulation and interchange of ideas within a social environment. With such an arrangement determining judgements of value, voluntary association, and hence, an ordered psychological environment free of the negative emotional perturbations and inconsistencies of value characterizing non-social existence, must be implied. Therefore, to Locke, without the law of nature--and of God, and without the contractual consent of the members of that society, no social organization could be acceptable. Indeed, to Locke, the idea of consent was central to the very constitution of society.¹³³ John Quincy Adams held similar views. He believed that the first moral element of civil government was sympathy among the members who comprise it.¹³⁴ There is thus brought about a state of order, both in terms of action and in terms of thought.

With such unshakable moral beliefs forming so important a part of his world-view, it is not surprising that Adams vigorously defended Jackson's actions, even in the face of the opposition of President Monroe, Treasury Secretary William Crawford, War Secretary John C. Calhoun, and Attorney General William Wirt.¹³⁵ Andrew Jackson was, in effect, the moral agent who sought to impose--or reimpose--a state of interactive equilibrium among the members of the society delimited by the boundaries of Florida. In such an environment, again in a state of moral order, each person could pursue, by reason, his own means of

self-fulfillment. And, because of this, it may be said that Jackson was the unknowing actor bringing about a condition that Adams favored. This favor was backed by a powerful will marked by the belief that by his interpretation of divine thought, he could covenant with God, and thereby regenerate mankind.¹³⁶

But Florida was merely the prelude to the far larger question of the acquisition of the Oregon Territory. This was a complicated affair which involved not only Spain, but also Britain and Russia, and formed the grand theater within which Adams' Lockean ideas concerning the state as an ordered moral covenant could be played out. His desire to acquire this territory lay deep in his belief that it was in the order of nature that the moral improvement of man should keep pace with the multiplication of his physical capacities, comforts, and enjoyments.¹³⁷ Consequently, because of such a belief, it is not surprising that Adams alone among American statesmen understood the value of the Northwest.¹³⁸ To his way of thinking, only the Americans possessed this capacity in the highest degree, and this multiplicative effort was intimately related to the capacity to improve the environment by the creation and acquisition of private property.¹³⁹ To Locke, property amounted to an individual's moral power over his own, as it was his labor which acquired and "encloses it from the common".¹⁴⁰ Consequently, Adams may be said to have wished that as much of the North American continent as possible be placed under the improving hand of the American people so that the ordered, reasoned moral communitas would be as large as possible so that God's will could be done

as grandly as possible.

To accomplish this, Adams, both personally and through subordinates, engaged in what turned out to be a complex series of negotiations, sometimes alone; at other times in combination with other negotiations, such as those involving the Spanish cession, or the rectification of the American-Canadian border. Again, one may think of the intellectual processes of Adams as a free variation of ideas, or what Locke thought of as the putting together of simple ideas in new ways in order to produce complex ones.¹⁴¹ The complex idea of Adams was that of an integrated society rescued from the separate corruptions of particular European societies. The power to bring forth this idea lay in the ability to place under consideration ideas which were out of sight, and to do this at one's own choice, and then to compare which of them one considered fit. Thought would be followed by action in order to bring the idea into effect.¹⁴² Adams was therefore a person whose individuality was integrated by that complex idea "America as a social compact", so much so that he could stand up to any adversity. In his own words from the Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory: "The most strenuous energies of the human mind . . . are always employed, where they are instigated by the stimulus of the highest rewards."¹⁴³ Again, there was the free will under stimulus of incentive--the moral and the pragmatic combined. It is well that he thought this way because it would not be for many years yet before the United States would acquire the Oregon Territory.

As an illustration of Adams' determination to bring about

this synthesis of ideas in reality, one may again cite the 1818 letter to George William Erving:

Your authority and instructions are amply sufficient for the conclusion of a treaty and no alteration of them is deemed necessary. It is, however, to be remarked that the impression upon the public opinion of this country, of our unquestionable right to the Rio Bravo as the western boundary, is from day to day becoming stronger, and you will give it very distinctly to be understood, that in offering now to agree by treaty to the substitute of the Colorado, the United States will not hold themselves bound to abide by the same offer at any future period.¹⁴⁴

From what has been previously stated about Adams, it is evident that this statement was expressed out of a profound conviction of moral superiority. In terms of Locke, this action, and the complex of other actions determining his pursuit of this policy, sprang from an "uneasiness" which was a function of the perceived moral necessity to bring about the intended result-- a United States which embraced both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. Locke summed up this perception by maintaining that the greatest positive good determines uneasiness, and that uneasiness determines the will.¹⁴⁵

Compelled by a moral imperative of such scale and intensity, Adams was equally determined the following year. In a letter to Onis he stated". . . the proposal to draw the western boundary line between the United States and the Spanish territories on this continent from the source of the Missouri to the Columbia River cannot be admitted. I have to add . . . this government repeats the proposal contained in my letter to you of 31st October last; . . . But if your powers are incompetent to accept either of these offers, the President thinks it useless to pursue the discussion any further."¹⁴⁶ His intransigence

bore fruit. The treaty was signed in 1819.

Within this same complex of actions adumbrated by the moral imperative of American territorial expansion, John Quincy Adams also dealt with Russia concerning trade and the Pacific coastal boundaries. As early as 1783 he had had a negative opinion of that country, and in particular, its despotic rule.¹⁴⁷ However, his views subsequently moderated, particularly when he was American Minister in St. Petersburg. Indeed, he grew to praise Tsar Alexander I for his restrained European policies in regard to the Holy Alliance.¹⁴⁸ Nevertheless, a mildly positive view of Russia was not allowed to bring about an acquiescence in Russian attempts to claim the northwestern Pacific coast of North America. Again, Adams' concept of the expansion of the American moral covenant could not be denied. In an 1822 letter to the Russian Foreign Minister, Pierre de Politica, he firmly rejected the Russian claim that its sovereignty extended all the way to the fifty-first degree of north latitude and to within one hundred Italian miles of the coast, citing as reasons the right to navigate those waters as an inherent right of national independence, and the right of American citizens to trade with the Indians in the area.¹⁴⁹ Here, Adams obviously wished to establish a future American right of property. The people of the United States should be free to extract from the environment (in this case, by trade) what was necessary for their sustenance, and to produce property from it. The tangible realization of this right was provided by the American vessels which hunted the sea otter, and which, by their presence,

afforded the United States maritime supremacy on the Pacific
150
coast.

With this, it remains only to discuss some of John Quincy Adams' preliminary sparring with the British over the Oregon Territory and other matters. Again, his adamant position would eventually have an effect--the complete transfer of that territory to the United States. However, this would only occur many years later as an event witnessed by John Quincy Adams, Congressman.

In the negotiations over Oregon his Anglophobia once again manifested itself. It was evident both because he was against monarchies in general, stating quite categorically, "In the theories of the Crown and the Mitre man had no rights", and because he believed that Britain had sought to retard the full development of the potential of the American political realm as a social compact by first holding on to its American colonies as long as possible, and then by continuing to adopt an arrogant attitude in its relationship with a now independent United States. For example, in an 1816 letter to his father, he stated that "Wherever British influence extends, it is busy to blacken us in every possible manner."
151
152

As an illustration of this British abuse, one can study the matter of trade. Trade was quite important to Locke, as he maintained that it was very important in promoting the wealth and power of a nation.
153
Adams was in perfect accord with this. This favorable attitude towards trade was bound up with the recurring concept of property. The more goods, the more wealth

acquired by trade, the more a nation has to utilize in regard to manufacturing and acquiring property, or that which insures the survivability of that society. The British frustration of American trade designs may be looked upon as yet another method used by the British to frustrate the full development of the American society as a social compact. In a letter to Albert Gallatin and Benjamin Rush, American negotiators of an Anglo-American trade agreement in 1818, dealing in part with the British denial of American commerce with its West Indies colonies, Adams stated: "When the British ministry say against all this (trade with the West Indies), our ancestors established a system and therefore we must maintain it, we may reply, if your ancestors establish a system in defiance of the laws of nature, it is your interest and your duty to abolish it. But who can overlook or be blind to the changes of circumstances of the establishment and growth of the United States as an independent power . . ."¹⁵⁴ The obvious implication here is that the United States was in conformance with the law of nature, and that Great Britain was not.

According to Adams, an even more blatant example of this transgressive behavior was British intransigence in the complex and protracted dispute over the final ownership of the Oregon Territory. In that same letter to Gallatin and Rush, he stated that "the new pretension (after the disputatious negotiations at Ghent) however, of disputing our title to the settlement at the mouth of Columbia River, either indicates a design on their part to encroach by new establishments of their own upon the

forty-ninth parallel of latitude, south of which they can have no valid claim upon this continent, or it manifests a jealousy of the United States, a desire to check the progress of our settlement, of which it might have been supposed that experience would before this day have relieved them." He could well believe in the ultimate futility of the British attempts to frustrate American settlement in Oregon, as he believed in the Biblical command to "be fruitful and multiply" in its sanction of the supposed superior right of the American people to the area as compared with that of the British agent, the Hudson's Bay Company. He was thus prepared to prolong the diplomatic stalemate. He could picture Oregon ever more completely occupied by ever larger numbers of Americans. Every visualization of quantum increase; every visualization of new national prerogatives springing forth as a function of the increasing numbers; every visualization of the concomitant decline of British power in the area--they all represented expressions of self, and Adams' projection of himself into the future. This was, as Locke would put it, the continuation of individual existence commensurate with the succession of ideas in the mind.

THE LOCKEAN BASIS OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF PRESIDENT
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS

There will now be an examination of the foreign policy of John Quincy Adams in terms of Lockean content, essentially as an extension of his work as Secretary of State, and as a reflection of a Lockean concept of the Chief Executive. That is, Locke treated foreign policy as the "Federative Power", which is normally exercised by the head of state without subordination.¹⁵⁸ Likewise, Adams believed that the President was the supreme power in foreign affairs. For example, when he was President, he resented a Senate request for papers that required him to designate which of them were relevant to current negotiations and should therefore remain secret, maintaining that this was a violation of the rules on executive business.¹⁵⁹

As President then, Adams had to deal with many of the same problems he had dealt with as Secretary of State. They involved the stability and independence of the new Latin American republics; relations with France; and relations with Great Britain concerning the Oregon Territory, trade, and boundary rectifications. In addition, there were the problems of Greece, and of Cuba, a Latin American dependency which had remained in Spanish hands after other Spanish colonies in the New World had revolted. Throughout, analysis of each of these problems will again be in terms of such Lockean concepts as: (1) The state as a condition of moral order; (2) The self as defined by con-

sciousness; (3) The self as thought and action; and (4) Knowledge as the product of mind. These and subsidiary concepts provided a conceptual framework for a program of foreign relations that was at once both morally and pragmatically in the national interest. The result of such an ethic was a spirit of inventiveness and political compromise.¹⁶⁰ However, interaction among men within a Lockean framework would also produce moral restraint, and because of Adams' profound moral sense, his pragmatism was modified. As a result, his policies were characterized by an essential honesty--as President, as well as, indeed, as Secretary of State--for which he was widely respected by the diplomatic community both in Washington and in Europe.¹⁶¹ In terms of Locke, his concept of a foreign policy of equanimity was a mixed mode synthesis of ideas which produced a conceptual structure that was independent of the exigencies of empirical reality.

This combination of morality and pragmatism was also demonstrated in Adams' Secretary of State, Henry Clay. Like the President, he believed in balance and harmony in foreign affairs. But, whereas Adams relied upon conscience to impose order,¹⁶² Clay relied more upon creative calculation. In effect, their working relationship involved a dyadic Lockean synthesis.

At this point it would be relevant to discuss the question of the so-called "corrupt bargain" wherein Adams was supposedly electorally supported by Clay in the House of Representatives, where the 1824 Presidential election had been thrown when none of the candidates had received a majority of electoral votes, in exchange for being named Secretary of State.

Actually, it would appear that there was a conceptual interaction between the two men which presaged their subsequent relationship. For example, their thinking in foreign affairs had expanded well beyond the merely regional outlooks characteristic of the other candidates, Crawford and Jackson. Its basis was the exploitation of the initiatives of the Monroe Doctrine¹⁶³ in order to lend a positive effect to the course of change. In effect, such a policy represented a Lockean emphasis upon¹⁶⁴ action as the best evidence of principle.

In order to determine precisely how much congruence there indeed was between the thinking of the two men, Adams did arrange a meeting, however. He described it in his diary:

Mr. Clay . . . spent the evening with me in a long conversation explanatory of the past and prospective of the future . . . He wished me, as far as I might think proper, to satisfy him with regard to some principles of great public importance, but without any personal considerations for himself. In the question to come before the House between General Jackson, Mr. Crawford, and myself, he had no hesitation in saying that his preference would be for me. 165

The decision appears to have rested upon issue and belief, rather than corrupt patronage. What is more, the writer of a then anonymous letter accusing Adams and Clay of such corruption, Representative George Kremer of Pennsylvania, later could not, or would not, substantiate the charge before the House¹⁶⁶ investigatory committee which Clay had requested. Consequently, one may at least surmise that belief and conscience were far more evident here than sheer raw pragmatism.

A clue to the characteristics of Adams' conscience can be found in his attitude towards obtaining that very Presidency

itself. In order for there to be an absence of evil consequences accruing from his actions, there had to be equanimity of effort. Therefore, if he were to be elected President, it would have to be as the result of actions which did not cause strife and animosity. An 1818 passage from his diary is illustrative:

He (Everett) also asked me if I was determined to do nothing with a view to promote my future election to the Presidency as the successor of Mr. Monroe. I told him I should do absolutely nothing. He said that as others would not be so scrupulous, I should not stand upon equal footing with them. I told him that was not my fault---my business was to serve the public to the best of my abilities in the station assigned to me, and not to intrigue for further advancement . . . 167

Within a Lockean framework, his universe of moral beliefs, in interaction with his analytical mind, produced an integrated paradigmatic envisioned structure of actions by the buildup of simple ideas, existing passively in his mind, into complex ideas. The dynamic of their combining and recombining produced an outline of action, which could be powerfully put into effect.¹⁶⁸

This contained power of the mind was intimately related to intellectual and moral autonomy, which Adams possessed in abundance. In this instance, it focused upon an unwillingness to make political deals, as he stated: "If that office (the Presidency) was to be the price of cabal and intrigue, of purchasing newspapers, bribing by appointments, or bargaining for foreign missions, I had no ticket in that lottery . . ." A rigid moral belief here may be said to have caused Adams to produce, by a combination and recombination of ideas concerning the degrading consequences of alternative patterns of actions, a will to¹⁶⁹

resolve the uneasiness attendant to the temptations involved in wishing to be the President of the United States. From that resolution of uneasiness it would simply be one more logical step to project that effort to resolve contending forces into the social reality as a whole. An abstract balancing of social forces would be the justification for his effort as President, which would, in turn, regulate his desires, or personal ambitions. Rationality would be used to regulate all activities, both public and private, in a grand moral state. And, with this, there would also be a further strong abstract reason why he could never have entered into the "corrupt bargain".

In an individual sense, moral certainty was produced. For Adams, this could only have been the equivalent of knowledge. In a Lockean sense, moral knowledge, since it comes from God, is capable of real certainty, which is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. Moral ideas are complete, and hence, the perception of the agreement or disagreement among them produces real knowledge, unalloyed by misperception.¹⁷⁰ This certainty, in Adams' case, took on a Puritan cast, and guided his actions. Indeed, in 1826, he engaged in a public profession of faith, a tradition which had originated with the Puritans.¹⁷¹ By actively seeking the Presidential nomination, he would be lending credibility to faction, or political party, thereby lending legitimacy to conditions marking a departure from the homogeneously moral. The synthesis of true knowledge, and its resultant actions, would not occur.

In a more wide-ranging sense, a moralistic synthesis of

balance was characteristic of his "American System" in both
 foreign and domestic affairs.¹⁷² In the former, a good example of
 this would be the Monroe Doctrine. This document transformed
 the Lockean principles of self-determination, self-identifica-
 tion, and self-protection into the three ideological norms of
 American foreign policy.¹⁷³ It meant that a Lockean atmosphere of
 moral order in which reason prevailed would apply to the entire
 Western hemisphere, free of European interference. The United
 States would be hegemonous as the proclaimer to mankind of the
 inextinguishable rights of human nature, and the only lawful
 foundations of government.¹⁷⁴ Indeed, American diplomats in Latin
 America, under Adams' administration, operated within this con-
 ception.¹⁷⁵

At the same time, in a pragmatic synthesis characteristic
 of Locke, Adams believed in a balance of power among nations,
 an interactive state controlled by the reasonable perceptions
 and actions of reasonable men. It would be a projection of the
 moral person into the international sphere. Morality implies
 reciprocity, for only in this can respect for rights such as
 individuality and property be maintained, while at the same
 time preserving an atmosphere of freedom in which one can
 accomplish one's aims. With such a firm moral basis, Adams
 could have no doubt about the pragmatic aims with which such a
 morality was alloyed. At the same time, the adherence to such a
 synthesis meant that he could be an expansionist and an imperi-
 alist, but in the name of an idealism of anti-imperialism.¹⁷⁶ This
 ability to combine contradictions of thought and action into a

mixed mode synthesis was a measure of the power and flexibility of his mind.

Trade was a policy which manifested this. For Adams, its basic tenets were reciprocal equality of access to the world's markets in time of peace, and a preservation of neutral rights to that freedom of trade in times of war.¹⁷⁷ Trade would be based upon complex and involved ideas resulting from the gathering of data from trade, simple ideas, and the powerful combining of the empirical and the imaginative into concepts which were both abstract and applicable. Indeed, according to Locke, general and certain truths could only be founded upon the dispositions¹⁷⁸ and relations of abstract ideas. The true conception here would be a workable paradigm which would accomodate many contingencies of reality in order to bring about not only a conceptual enrichment for those immediately involved by opening up new opportunities for the reception of ideas and perceptions, but also a national enrichment. This controlling paradigm would exist as a sense of moral imperative which would project beyond experience into an integral view of the world. This view would grow out of the non-relativism of moral concepts, which exist¹⁷⁹ as immutably as the axioms of geometry, and which are therefore balanced and non-deformable in their application. This was reflected in the thinking of John Quincy Adams, as he regarded every public measure subjected to his consideration as essentially a Euclidean proposition.¹⁸⁰ Such balanced thinking extended into the reality of nations meant that all of them were equal in regard to their external relations.

However, this type of thinking was put to a severe test when he dealt with the issue of trade with the British West Indies colonies. Adams regarded this problem, and the right to colonial trade in general, to be, next to impressment, the most important problem between Great Britain and the United States since American independence had been won.¹⁸¹ In this instance, he was obliged to deal with statesmen who had perhaps not yet reconciled themselves to American independence, and who were, as a result, not yet ready to concede that the two countries were equals. The British statesmen, in effect, refused to conceive of the United States as a moral person, an entity possessing ethical legitimacy. According to Locke, ethical concepts are mixed modes.¹⁸² In this usage, they are scattered and independent ideas which are put together by the mind. They have no relationship to real beings.¹⁸³ They are universals, applicable in a protean manner. Thus, Locke believed that universals are made only when the mind abstracts, and abstraction is a mental operation which is distinct from sensation.¹⁸⁴ Nevertheless, before the ethical concept of the moral person could be synthesized, a balanced series of conceptualizations, unalloyed by prejudices, would have to occur, because the cognate ideas would be derived from empirical models. These empirical models were obviously negatively one-sided, involving memories of defeat in war, the betrayal of British institutions by a people who once called themselves Englishmen, and so forth. These empirically-derived ideas obviously could not be made to form the mixed mode of which the ethical concept consisted. An unbalanced synthesis

was the result; a syncretic concept involving a portrait of the United States as evil--despite the non-empirical potential of the mixed mode--rather than as an inherent constituent of a world moral order. And, since actions would put into effect such ideas, reciprocity of trade could not be accepted by the British as a policy with their one-time colony.

These ideas in mind, the British began to deal with the Americans over the issue of trade with their West Indies colonies. In this, they effected a supercilious assumption of superiority.¹⁸⁵ It was emotional, perhaps with a degree of revenge in mind. On the other hand, John Quincy Adams dedicated himself to a painstaking regulation of his activities in this sphere, as in all others, by conscience and a goal-oriented rationality. The goal in this case was trade expansion, which he and his Secretary of State, Henry Clay, would work towards.¹⁸⁶

Adams' dealings with the British had reached back through his tenure as Secretary of State to his efforts as chief American negotiator at Ghent in 1814. That has already been touched upon. And, they had always proved refractory. Nevertheless, the two countries had carried on a flourishing trade for years. After Ghent, he had signed a commercial convention of trade reciprocity in London which reflected this, and remained the legal basis for commercial relations between the two countries throughout this period.¹⁸⁷ What is more, on June 24, 1821, Parliament had passed an act which had opened certain British North American ports to commercial American vessels. In return, President Monroe had proclaimed American ports open to British ves-

sels employed in trade between the United States and the West
 188
 Indies. Here, because of the mutual perception of similar ideas,
 in regard to trade and other matters, there was at least the
 possibility of effecting a synthesis of a mixed mode of moral
 perception, which would have, in time, perhaps led to a belief
 in reciprocity arising in other areas. The possibility of a
 significant easing of tensions between the two nations presented
 itself.

However, such an occurrence was not to be, at least during
 the 1817 to 1829 period, when John Quincy Adams controlled Amer-
 ican foreign policy. For example, according to the 1821 Act,
 Britain retained certain protective duties which gave advantages
 to the commerce of her North American colonies in the West
 189
 Indies. What is more, Britain ignored the fact that the trade
 was strictly limited to certain enumerated colonial ports for
 American vessels and to certain enumerated articles, which
 excluded New England products such as fish and salted provi-
 sions, and that the United States did not gain access to the
 190
 indirect traffic through the West Indies.

One result of this egregious situation was the fact that
 tensions were heightened between New England, which relied heav-
 ily on fisheries, and the rest of the country, which was agri-
 191
 cultural. Centrifugal forces were at work, militating against
 the concept of the moral state. The fixed integrity of that
 moral concept had to be maintained for the mixed mode of moral
 perception to exist. According to Locke, power and action form
 192
 the greatest part of the mixed modes, and have the greatest

effect upon the mind. The actors in this instance would be New Englanders. The balanced, integral rationality of the moral perception would be, with this, the victim of empirical exigency existing independently of its empirical complement, i.e., the other areas of the country. Action had to be faced with counteraction. The synthesis of the moral state had to be allowed to proceed, certainly before its values could be integrated enough to be projected over the radius of the entire hemisphere. Adams acted.

In 1823 Congress, under his direction, opened American ports to British ships coming from colonial ports, but only from precisely those ports to which American ships were admitted.¹⁹³ Supposedly, the British would be forced by this to pragmatically act in order to produce an actual equilibrium of trade. There would be a comparison of ideas, this time embodied in causes and effects, in order to produce models of consequences.¹⁹⁴ This model would be a mode, called by Locke a relation, which would eventually evolve by a process of comparison into a mode more nearly resembling that of the moral equilibrium which Adams envisioned.

However, the situation did not resolve itself in that direction. Congress had also authorized the President to impose a ten percent discriminatory tariff on colonial goods transported in British vessels until Britain eliminated all colonial preferences.¹⁹⁵ Accordingly, on May 12, 1826, Huskisson, President of the British Board of Trade, gave a speech before the House of Commons, in which he stated that his country had been forced

into a situation of trade reciprocity in the first place because of the compulsion of the retaliatory duties enacted by the United States.¹⁹⁶ Britain then again barred American trade with its West Indies possessions.¹⁹⁷ British prejudices against Americans had produced an uneasiness in the combining of ideas, which militated against their resolution in terms of a moral equilibrium. Essentially, that was what Adams had feared. In 1823 he had informed Richard Rush that he doubted that counter-vailing American restrictions would enable American vessels to trade in equal competition with the British.¹⁹⁸ The British were simply not willing to formulate the moral paradigm, or mixed mode, of reciprocity of trade.

A somewhat similar situation prevailed with France, which evinced the same type of refractory behavior. But, at the same time, Adams could view that nation in a more considered light. For one thing, he saw that while France was cloaking its actions by rhetoric proclaiming the rights of man, it was actually engaging in plunder and conquest.¹⁹⁹ He also considered that, because of this, French ideology was a radical threat to the security of the United States, and that France itself was part of the overall problem of the instability of Europe.²⁰⁰ Now, instability implies irrationality, the greatest enemy of the moral universe that Adams wished to synthesize. The ideals of revolutionary France may be thought of as a concatenation of simple impressions and other types of information which were caused to combine in the mind in ways which did not serve moral ends. They would not be integrated into an autonomous concept, and

would lack the balance of moral order. One had only to look to the example of the Reign of Terror. To Adams, the theories growing out of the French Revolution were further from true democracy than the practices of the British House of Commons.²⁰¹ If those theories were a mixed mode of a complex form conceptually inimical to American interests, it had to be because the simple ideas of which it consisted were themselves inimical to American interests, since, although the ideas were subjected to free variation in the mind, that same mind varied collections of ideas only,²⁰² and not the original characteristics of the ideas themselves. There were limits to the mind's level of paradigmatic manipulation.

Adams sought a way out of the quandary of having the two most powerful European nations hostile to the United States. The solution was to use France as a counterweight to Britain.²⁰³ This idea would represent a congruence of Lockean political and philosophical ideas. Politically, since the relationships between nations are not naturally peaceful, like the state of nature between persons, a balance of power is the only rational solution.²⁰⁴ This condition of balance may be thought of as a mixed mode conceptualization in which the ideas "Britain" and "France", with all their attendant characteristics in regard to the United States, were first combined under the subsumption "Britain and France" in order to form relations of ideas. According to Locke, these relations consist of the consideration and comparison of ideas.²⁰⁵ They are then combined into ideas which are given the moral sanction of balance.

However, on a more mundane level, because of French hostility, there were trade difficulties. In 1822 France, which had signed a temporary agreement to reciprocally abandon discriminating duties over the next four years, repeatedly expressed its dissatisfaction with American tariffs on spirits and silk, and threatened to abrogate the agreement. In 1826 and 1827, after Adams had become President, the French began to rigidly enforce regulations which levied high tariffs on indirect American traffic. The United States eventually yielded to such pressure, reducing levies on French imports, such as wine, and, in effect, creating a barter arrangement, because the resulting increase in American sales of French products precisely offset the costs of American products, such as cotton, tobacco, and potash, to France. It was a forced, and not a natural reciprocity, and had been purged of any potential for a moral dimension. Since the basic ideas comprising the two mixed mode concepts of trade reciprocity were incompatible, and since mixed modes are abstract and complex concepts, their conceptual outlines could never be reconciled by empirically-derived ideas. Either trade was reciprocal, with its moral sanction, or it was not. The situation was disillusioning, and, in Adams, such a process produced stubbornness. An entry from his diary is illustrative:

Mr. Clay brought a written note from the French Minister, the Baron de Mareuil, requesting that I would appoint a time when he would come and offer me his congratulations on the New Year and present to me all the members of his Legation; which I declined . . . Mr. Clay had prepared an answer, expressing much acknowledgment for the kindness of the Baron, but that no

usage having warranted such a formality, I did not feel justified to introduce it. 207

Adams would brook no interference with his concept of moral order.

With Latin America also, there was an attempt at a genuine reciprocity of trade. Here, again, he called for treatment on a footing of most-favored, most friendly nation, and emphasized that American disagreements with the Latin American states arose from commercial discriminations which favored other nations, and privateers and paper blockades. He pointed to the commercial treaties which the United States had with Colombia and Central America as successful efforts to eliminate such practices and to establish reciprocity. It is important to note that Adams did not wish for European nations--especially Great Britain--to establish colonies in Latin America, with their closed systems of trade, because such a development would interfere with the existing rights of the United States. Hence, trade considerations may be understood as a factor in the American ability to integrate the Latin American republics into a moral universe under its leadership. This consideration was uppermost in the mind of John Quincy Adams. He was little influenced by the business community.

Balance and equanimity also characterized the efforts of Adams (and Clay) as they sought to resolve the problem of the northern boundary of the United States. This was very important to Adams, as he felt that the selfish and intriguing policies of Europe were a disturbing influence on American life. The boundaries of the moral state had to be precisely delimited in

order to reflect the definitive relinquishment of sovereignty by the chaotic and immoral monarch to that moral state in which God's will could be done. What is more, the constant invasion of foreign (British, Spanish, or Russian) elements across an inexact border would cause the untoward infusion of inimical concrete ideas into the thinking of the inhabitants of that state, thereby delaying the synthesis of the mixed mode abstract intellectual entity which comprised the idea of the moral state, or the state as a moral person. This was an old problem Adams had faced.

He endeavored to negate this process, especially in view of the fact that he believed that Great Britain was looking for territory everywhere, and because much of his effort was a continuation of policies he had pursued as Secretary of State. Therefore, both he and his Secretary of State, Henry Clay, attempted to bring about a settlement of the Canadian border, and to define the bounds of American sovereignty over the Oregon Territory. Thus, to Adams, the idea of the moral, rational state developing and gaining strength, unalloyed by foreign ideologies, had an air of inevitability. Because of this, he believed that all North America must, in time, fall into American hands. This conviction was, again, an instance of his trust in the efficacy of reason, as he had confidence in the achievement of virtue under the pressure of conscience and inborn will. In Lockean terms, the attainment of this state (of the realization of national destiny) would be the resolution of some uneasiness, resolving itself into a corporate moral person

characterized by the sum of the rights of all its members. In effect, there would be a stable institutionalization of the Lockean principles of self-determination (the self as thought and action), self-identification (the self defined by consciousness), and self-protection (the production of property as the definer of self)²¹⁵. As a corollary of this, since, according to Locke, if all men have rights, then boundaries are necessary,²¹⁶ the complete distinguishing of America, the moral person, from a world still largely controlled by chaotic and corrupt monarchies would inhere in the generalized corporate definition of those boundaries. What is more, to Adams, this moral person could then perpetuate itself, for to him, common sympathies belonged and were indispensable to the relations that were ordained by nature between the individual and his country.²¹⁷

One area of boundary instability was the northeastern corner of the United States. Here, Maine and Massachusetts asserted claims along the St. John River, so much so that an American settler, John Baker, was arrested by New Brunswick authorities for holding title to what they considered to be Canadian territory. Albert Gallatin, American Minister to Britain, was instructed to submit the dispute to arbitration, an arrangement completed in September, 1827.²¹⁸

Again, there was the idea of rational balance. In this instance, the purpose of the conceptual balance was the obviation of British hostility by reason, and the delimitation of the area over which Americans could exercise their will and their choice in synthesizing those elements from the environ-

ment necessary for the creation of the moral state. Again, in producing such a mixed mode, one had to be careful that ideas derived from a troubled reality--a reality disturbed by the untoward perception of British power--were not limited in number and range by such a consideration. Being so limited by a comparison of British actions with moral rules, for example, the free variation of ideas needed to produce a mixed mode synthesis could not take place. Such a situation would have been of particular importance to Locke, as he had human actions, particularly of moral significance, in mind when he discussed mixed modes. ²¹⁹ The effects of arbitration offered a greater possibility for the free variation of ideas than if all American ideas were simply concepts of British hostility.

The effects of such inimical thinking were obvious. For example, Adams put this entry in his diary for 1827:

He (Levi Lincoln) spoke of the late correspondence between his brother Enoch Lincoln, the Governor of Maine, and the Secretary of State, relating to our controversy with Great Britain concerning the Northeastern boundary, and expressed much regret at the temper which the Governor of Maine had exhibited in it . . . As to this Northeastern boundary, there was an express engagement which bound the partner to refer the question to the decision of a friendly sovereign, but the Commissioners had disagreed upon the facts, as upon everything else, and there was, and could be, no issue made up until a statement of facts could be agreed upon between the two Governments, to be submitted to the arbitrator. 220

In a Lockean sense, these negative feelings were the result of a comparison of action with rule, in a relation, which is ²²¹ another interaction of ideas, which is active, in comparison to the mixed mode endpoint of the process. The emotional situation was obviously unstable, so much so that the controversy

remained open for many years. This was primarily because the British wished to construct a military road across the disputed territory to the ice-free port of St. John, Nova Scotia.²²² It would appear that irreconcilably different ideas of actions, and hence, mixed modes, were involved, and since mixed modes are abstract, once formed, they would be peculiarly impervious to non-paradigmatic empirically-derived models of action.

The same irreconciliability involved the attitudes towards the other borders with British North American possessions. The negotiations for the settlement of the Great Lakes boundary collapsed in 1827, when Britain demanded access to the channel which was to the south, rather than to the north, of St. George's Island, in the Neebish Straits of St. Mary's River.²²³ This revealed, again, a very aggressive British attitude. To that, Adams could only counterpoise reason. However, it was a temporally effecting reason whose inevitability he believed the British would, in time, concede. Just as he believed that the British position in Oregon was hopeless because of the superior American population and material resources in the area, he believed that a rational consideration of the situation from their point of view would lead to a reciprocal state of affairs. The following illustrative passage was penned when Adams was Secretary of State, but the policies he subsequently followed as President were consistent with this way of thinking:

If the United States leave her (Great Britain) in undisturbed enjoyment of all her holds upon Europe, Asia, and Africa, with all her actual possessions in this hemi-

sphere, we may very fairly expect that she will not think it consistent either with a wise or a friendly policy, to watch with eyes of jealousy and alarm, every possibility of extension to our natural dominion in North America, which she can have no solid interest to prevent, until all possibility of her preventing it shall have vanished. 224

This was a reasoned, rationalist view of historical process, a natural and impersonal process of human forces, actions, and instincts, according to time and place. 225 Through this unfolding process, the "moral person" of the United States would most fully realize its individuality by being free to utilize the environment, without interference, for rational purposes of moral development and survival. Hostile forces embodied in ideas, being without a rational basis, i.e., one based upon the freedom and dignity of the individual, and thereby congruent with God's will, would inevitably be swept aside. This would occur because the freedom to labor to improve the environment by producing one's own property is an inherent right protected by a just government. 226 One would have far greater confidence that such property would be protected, and not confiscated, by a democratic, i.e., American, government, than by an arbitrary monarchical, i.e., British, government. Adams' distrust of such governments was uttered on numerous occasions. For instance, in his address of July 4, 1821 he declared: "In the theories of the Crown and the Mitre man had no rights." 227

This same distrust, of course, was evident in other border disputes. The American envoy to Britain, Albert Gallatin, could not obtain American access to the navigation of the St. Lawrence River in 1826. What is more, faced with British

intransigence over the question of the Oregon Territory, he was willing to push the forty-nine degree line far to the south after having crossed the line of the Columbia River. However, Adams and Clay, alarmed by Gallatin's propensity to give up so much, sharply limited his authority. A communication from Adams to Clay is quite explicit:

I propose to you to write him (Gallatin) a short letter immediately, stating that excepting any stipulation, involving a cession of territory, belonging to any state in the Union, or the abandonment express or implied, of the right to navigate the St. Lawrence, or the surrender of any territory South of Lat. 49. on the North-West-Coast, he will in all cases consider his Instructions as expressing our present views, and not as limiting his Powers. 228

A will was at work here, determined to see the United States expand across the North American continent. This message was simply another expression of Adams' belief that providence had created the United States for the purpose of civilizing North America, and through that example, to eliminate from the face of the earth all forms of European colonialism. This grand belief that he held as President, however, produced its own internally-generated moral sanction which led to a rational, displaced equilibrium. The implication of this sanction was reciprocity, that is, mutual non-interference. Hence, his declaration that the United States would not interfere with British sovereignty elsewhere in the world.

This matter of displaced equilibrium, in the sense that natural state boundaries should be allowed to evolve, free from colonializing interference, also arose in the matter of Greece. At first glance, it would appear that President Adams, in

adhering to Lockean principles, would commit the resources of the United States to assisting the Greeks in their attempt to rid themselves of oppressive Ottoman rule. However, since such precepts would emphasize the exercise of free and rational will in order to formulate policies in the national interest as maneuverings within a state of nature,²³¹ he would not allow moral considerations to become predominant in formulating policies towards Greece.

The problem began when Adams was Secretary of State. When the Greek revolt began in 1821, American public opinion was in favor of aid to the insurgents because they were considered to be the descendents of the Greek forefathers who had revealed their greatness in the arts, philosophy, literature, and government,²³² and because Turkish oppression was so brutal. However, by 1823, popular interest in their cause had waned, and Adams, as Secretary of State, strongly argued against American intervention because, among other considerations, he did not wish to needlessly antagonize the Holy Alliance.²³³ It might also be surmised that he opposed American aid to Greece because he was so guided by rationalism, in general. The Philhellenism which had so fascinated the American people was an emotional paroxysm, rather than a reasoned conviction. In Lockean terms, it was error caused by a lack of proofs.²³⁴ Since, to Locke, ideas are propositions dealing with logic and morality,²³⁵ and since knowledge is the result of a meticulous comparison of empirical ideas in order to discern their agreement or disagreement, a lack of ideas derived from the empirical environment was what

characterized such emotional feelings. Reason had not been brought to bear upon the problem, and it was reason which guided Adams.

The Greek problem reappeared after Adams had become President. In September, 1825 he sent William C. Somerville on a secret mission to Greece in order to investigate the progress of the revolt. He was to assure the Greek authorities that the American people wished that liberty and independence were re-established there. But, Somerville died en route, and three months later, in April, 1826, the Greek revolt was ruthlessly put down at Missolonghi. Nevertheless, Adams continued to encourage the Greek desire for independence,²³⁶ perhaps because of the emotional and timeless quality of the mixed mode concept "Greek self-government". In such a situation it could be said that Greece bore somewhat the same relationship to the Ottoman Empire that the United States bore to Great Britain, but without the obviating factor of a similarity of institutions, and hence the abstract transmutation of their conceptual characteristics into a mixed mode concept of morality, or some other conceptual generality. Ottoman repression had forced the Greeks to preclude certain courses of action which would have made them amenable to the kinds of perceptions necessary for the synthesis of a fully-developed knowledge leading to a sense of national identity. This sense of national identity would exist as the certainty of moral knowledge arrived at, as always, by examining the agreement or the disagreement of ideas.²³⁷ Actions would be judged by their denial or affirmation of that idea.

Since moral imperatives were involved here, Adams could not simply abandon interest in the Greek cause. However, within a Lockean framework emphasizing the rational working out of solutions to problems, he had to act pragmatically due to the severe limitations of American military power. No aid of that kind would be forthcoming.

Another--and far more important--area of Adams' moral concern was Latin America. The fate of the new republics there would preoccupy him as President as it had preoccupied him as Secretary of State, when he formulated the Monroe Doctrine. His actions in this area were determined by a mixture of rationalist pragmatism, a characteristic of the thinking of Locke, in which primacy was placed upon commercial reciprocity, and a desire that America exercise a moral tutelage over the South American republics. This was to be accomplished by the projection over the rest of the hemisphere of the coordinate state incorporated²³⁸ into the American constitutional system. The Monroe Doctrine was to be universalized, and all European powers excluded. As President of the United States now, instead of merely Secretary of State, Adams had more power to attempt to carry out this process. In a Lockean sense, he was motivated by an uneasiness in the form of the recognition of moral imperative. The greater the uneasiness, the stronger the will, and it is the will that²³⁹ directs our operative faculties to some action. This action would involve the founding of an international state which would be, in effect, bound by the social compact of which the United States was the exemplar. The test of its legitimacy would not

only be whether the new independent nations of Latin America accepted American tutelage, but also whether Spain, or the powerful nations of Europe, would succeed or fail in an attempt to reimpose a colonial state upon them. Adams conceived of this in starkly apocalyptic terms as a conflict between despotism and constitutionalism which would settle the fate of the world.²⁴⁰

In this effort the penetration of American ideas was crucial. Consequently, as early as 1810 the United States government had sent commercial agents to Argentina, which had recently begun to throw off Spanish rule. At the same time, the revolutionary governments in Latin America had sent agents to the United States to plead for American recognition of their independence.²⁴¹ Early in 1822, partly because of the achievements of the Spanish-American revolutionaries, and partly because of the ratification of the Florida Treaty with Spain, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams and President James Monroe felt that conditions were at last propitious for the recognition of South American independence.²⁴²

In the application of the rational to formulate this policy and to act, both moral and pragmatic ideas concerning the reactions of Spain and other European states, trade imperatives, the state of American military power, and so forth, were subjected, both individually and interactively, to a process involving the synthesizing of a mixed mode, an abstract concept of order. In a Lockean sense, the mind exercised an active power in combining a number of ideas, without examining whether they had existed together in nature, as long as they were con-

243

sistent in the understanding. Such a synthesis would produce a vigorous and coherent framework of policy, effectively activated whenever there was confrontation with a challenging situation. This framework was the Monroe Doctrine, which Adams continued to uphold as President, and in which the new Latin American nations expressed interest, perhaps in order to lend moral sanction to their actions; almost certainly to seek protection for their fragile independence. Indeed, Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico not only took a special interest in the Doctrine; they also urged the United States to agree to measures to insure respect for it.

244

These same Latin American nations continued to struggle against Spanish rule, and by late 1825 the final remnants of that rule on the American continents had been destroyed. In order to bring about a reasoned environment in which states tacitly recognized by the United States as independent could be coevals in the state of nature, and to regain the diplomatic initiative because Great Britain had already officially recognized Argentina, Mexico, and Colombia at the end of 1824, Adams entered into a diplomatic effort which was designed to bring about Spanish recognition of the new republics. Here, his Anglophobia again asserted itself, but instead of manifesting itself as an assertion of an independent stance for the United States, it manifested itself as an assertion of an independent stance for Latin America. As long as these republics could be subservient to Britain, because of its vast naval and economic power, the nascent ideas defining the conscious national sense

of selfhood of these nations would be subservient to the power of Britain to invoke idea, much as the United States had been during the years immediately following the American Revolution. In this instance, the idea was "Britain, the most powerful of nations". Since ideas are extracted from experience by reflection and sensation, and then projected beyond experience, the pursuit of aggressive policies by Britain in Latin America would militate against the creation of any mixed mode concept of national identity because such a process would cause the precluding, nolens volens, of certain actions and resultant experiences by the Latin Americans which would challenge British power. What is more, the crippling tutelage of Spain would serve somewhat the same function. For example, the South American states sometimes granted special favors and privileges to Spain as the price of their recognition. Fear of Spanish power was still evident.

Anglo-American rivalry was thereby set, and confrontations inevitably occurred. In Argentina, for example, Forbes, the American Minister, waged a one-man battle for years to thwart British commercial and political influence there. With such considerations in mind, then, the United States government negotiated a series of treaties with the Latin American states. Their basis was to be unqualified reciprocity and most favored nation treatment. With this arrangement a ground of equanimity would provide the proper array of ideas for the mixed mode synthesis of national identity--under American guidance. However, with the synthesis would come the "moral person", truly a

coeval with the United States and all other nations, thereby eliminating the possibility of American, British, Spanish, or any other conceptual or potential hegemony. The transcendently moral would triumph, and hence, what was at first both moral and pragmatic would become exclusively moral. Such would be the full realization of the potential of the ideas of Locke. Accordingly, in 1825, when Adams became President, the first United States legation in Spanish America was established in Bogotá, Colombia.²⁵²

However, this desire to eliminate foreign hegemony was not merely confined to the United States. Colombia and Mexico looked at Cuba and Puerto Rico, and noticed that they were still under Spanish rule. They thereupon prepared to launch military expeditions to liberate them. Adams urged them to desist, and to give time to Emperor Nicholas I of Russia and his allies to persuade King Ferdinand of Spain to save those islands by recognizing the independence of the Latin American republics.²⁵³ In other words, the United States would be content to see the islands remain in Spanish hands. Colombia and Mexico, if they had taken Cuba and Puerto Rico, would not have possessed sufficient military power to defend them. Thus, other European powers besides Spain would have invaded those islands,²⁵⁴ doubtless clothing their actions in moral terms.

In the event, another European power did attempt to move into Cuba, but not by means of military conquest. Canning, British Foreign Secretary, moved to prevent American domination of the Western hemisphere, though American and British policy--the

prevention of entrance into Latin America by any third nation--
 for the time being, coincided.²⁵⁵ In Lockean terms, the abstract
 mixed mode concepts held by Britain and the United States, each
 being voluntary concatenations of simple ideas, profoundly dif-
 fered. One was at once both pragmatic and moral, with these two
 components interacting with and modifying each other during
 modal formation; the other was merely pragmatic, mainly econo-
 mic. Yet, the short-term concepts were paradigmatically united
 by immediate knowledge. This knowledge consisted of the fact
 that the French commander in the Caribbean had standing orders
 to assist Spain in defending Cuba and Puerto Rico. Accordingly,
 Secretary of State Clay invited Canning to join the United
 States in declaring to the French that those two islands were
 not to be transferred to another European nation.²⁵⁶ Canning
 rejected this offer, so great was his distaste for the United
 States.²⁵⁷ His behavior may be thought of as having originated
 from a mixed mode compounded of his negative emotions concern-
 ing America, ideas about Spanish weakness, French power, future
 commercial advantages for Britain in Cuba, and so forth. These
 were the factors which, in Lockean terms, defined the type of
 action which constituted a given instance of behavior.²⁵⁸ They
 would define Canning's behavior as he subsequently prepared to
 present a case against the United States at the Congress of
 Panama.

This great assembly was to be the great legitimizing
 forum for American plans to place Latin America within its
 moral tutelage. So important was this to Adams that his Secre-

tary of State, Henry Clay, was preoccupied with it for most of his tenure. Having first been suggested by the Colombian Minister to the United States, José María Salazar, in 1824, the idea was eventually accepted by Adams after he became President. In practical terms, the Congress was to have the typical Lockean characteristics of the empirical and the moral. As Adams stated: ". . . And lastly, the Congress of Panama is believed to present a fair occasion for urging upon all the new nations of the South the just and liberal principles of religious liberty . . ." This utterance was in conformance with the Lockean belief that the moral status of political societies derives from their capacity to serve as instruments for man's struggles to discharge the religious assignments for which God had created him--and it was in conformance with Adams' beliefs. These took the form of a moral imperative, which his mother had inculcated into him even as a child, as she urged him to always turn to religion. Religion, a collection of simple ideas which formed a mixed mode of moral symmetry, was to be the basis of moral action, particularly on an anthropocentric plane.

Somewhat secularized, this moral action concerning the interrelationship of man with man would also be interpreted as bringing Latin America within the purview of the Monroe Doctrine. Of course, from the American point of view, the Congress of Panama would reaffirm that tenet. At the same time, the northern press advocated a Pan-American Congress in order to eliminate foreign commercial competition from potential American trade with South America. Again, with the absorption of

this idea by the administration, there was primacy placed upon the Lockean concept of pragmatism combined with morality. That is, commercial interests and the legitimization of an American moral imperium were both given high priority for the Congress, but by different interest groups, each rationally perceiving its interests.

At this point, the fate of the Congress must be depicted. Originally, it was the idea of Simon Bolívar, who issued a call for the Congress of Panama in a circular letter of December 7, 1824²⁶⁴. Five months later, after invitations had been offered to the United States by the Ministers of Colombia and Mexico, Secretary of State Clay endorsed acceptance, and Adams authorized him to do so, stating that such a Congress "might be highly useful in settling several important disputed questions of public law, and in arranging other matters of deep interest to the American Continent, and to the friendly intercourse between the American Powers . . ." Adams subsequently nominated Richard C. Anderson, Jr., of Kentucky, and John Sergeant, of Pennsylvania, as ministers, and William B. Rochester, of New York, as secretary to the mission.²⁶⁵

However, the announcement of American participation in the proposed Congress drew fierce partisan criticism which centered around the supposition that such participation would draw the United States into an "entangling alliance"²⁶⁶. It could be stated that there was a perception that the individuality of the moral person of the United States had to be preserved. By supposedly interacting with the ideas of the representa-

tives of the Latin American republics, individuality would be lost, because the mixed mode of ideas which defined the national self would be conceptually compromised. The sense of collective personal, i.e., national, identity, which is constituted by consciousness of self,²⁶⁷ would be obviated, the boundaries of the self eroded. What is more, there would presumably arise the possibility of an alienation of future from past national consciousness as entangling involvement with other nations would bring about thoughts and actions perhaps congruent with other national consciousnesses with their own unique mixed mode conceptualizations. In the words of Locke: "For it is by the consciousness it has of its present thoughts and actions that it is self to itself now, and so will be the same self, as far as the same consciousness can extend to actions past or to come."²⁶⁸ Translating this into empirical terms, what was feared was a loss of national sovereignty, and a concomitant loss of the clear perception of national interest.

The Congressional enemies of the Adams administration, led by the supporters of John C. Calhoun, therefore produced a report which called for pursuing commercial equality and maritime rights which would be realized through bilateral treaties; leaving religious matters to the domestic policies of the individual nations; and deferring concern for the fate of other Spanish colonies in America until actual danger arose.²⁶⁹ These men were not willing to see any coalition of other nations force their interests upon the United States. More abstractly, these men attempted to undermine the very Lockean basis of

American policy towards Latin America by limiting the legitimacy of the concept of moral order both spatially and temporally.

Nevertheless, Adams' appointments were confirmed by the Senate, and the House of Representatives approved the appropriations.²⁷⁰ As it turned out, this was a Pyrrhic victory. The Congress of Panama emerged as a sounding board for the anti-American propaganda dispensed by Canning's agent there, Edward J. Dawkins, and the American plenipotentiaries did not arrive in Panama until the Congress had adjourned, for the long Congressional debate had delayed their departure.²⁷¹ Dawkins therefore had an unimpeded opportunity to emphasize that Britain had refused to join the United States in advising Mexico and Colombia not to invade Cuba, for example, and by this and other statements, to put the United States in the worst possible light, and to concomitantly enhance British prestige in Latin America.²⁷² British naval and commercial superiority did the rest. Consequently, the Lockean relationship between idea and action was never more clearly--and negatively--shown. According to Locke, morality is the relationship of actions with rules of moral good.²⁷³ Therefore, morality must be actively promulgated. In order to be effected, principle cannot remain in an in vitro state. Nevertheless, Adams' caution and regard for Constitutional law remained the rule in American policy throughout his administration.²⁷⁴ There would be a Lockean balance between the moral and the pragmatic, and a dependence upon a humane law of nations, regardless of whether the idea and practice of it

could be successfully projected overseas.

John Quincy Adams, therefore, epitomized the moralistic and the pragmatic confluence of Lockean belief and action in his diplomatic career. Particularly relevant to his actions, and revealing a remarkable similarity to his own beliefs, were the concepts of Locke which involved moral order, the self, property, knowledge and thought. He synthesized these ideas, either deriving them from Locke, or developing them in a remarkable instance of parallel thought, into a powerful basis for action as a diplomat. They comprised, in effect, a universe of interpenetrating thought and action through which Adams was able to effect the empirical, and by that realize a large measure of self-definition and freedom, despite an often unsympathetic reality populated by politicians, diplomats, and others, both American and European.

Later, the Presidential administration of John Quincy Adams was, in foreign affairs, a function of his will. Again, it was a will which was at once both moralistic and pragmatic. On an even larger canvas he synthesized this into a mixed mode conceptualization which was used in formulating and effecting policies in regard to Great Britain, France, Greece, and the Latin American republics. Its Lockean corollaries involved the maintainance of that concept of self, whether defined by a continuing consciousness; thought and action; or knowledge, particularly moral knowledge. Intimately related to this was perhaps the supreme Lockean idea which John Quincy Adams embraced--the concept of the state as a condition of moral

order. With this, he was able to universalize and render corporate the Lockean synthesis and to apply it in a way which was consistent with both theoretical and practical considerations in regard to foreign policy.

NOTES

¹Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. "Locke, John," by James Gordon Clapp.

²Samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Union (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), pp. 4-8.

³Clapp article.

⁴William P. Lunt, A Discourse Delivered In Quincy, March 11, 1848 At the Interment of John Quincy Adams (Boston: Dutton and Wentworth, 1848), p. 33.

⁵Daniel Walker Howe, The Political Culture of the American Whigs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 312.

⁶Roger D. Masters, "Lockean Tradition in American Foreign Policy," Journal of International Affairs 21 (1967): 258.

⁷David D. Van Tassel and Robert W. McAhren, eds., European Origins of American Thought (Chicago: Rand McNally Co., 1969), p. 53.

⁸Robert H. Horwitz, ed., The Moral Foundations of the American Republic (Charlottesville, Va.: University of Virginia Press, 1986), p. 140.

⁹Page Smith, John Adams, Vol. 1 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1963), p. 235.

¹⁰Wilson Ober Clough, ed., Intellectual Origins of American National Thought (New York: Corinth Books, 1961), p. 12.

¹¹Benjamin Fletcher Wright, Jr., American Interpretations of Natural Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1931), p. 103. Lord Milton (Andrew Fletcher, 1653-1716), Scottish republican writer and orator; Algernon Sidney (1622-1683), English republican patriot, beheaded; James Harrington (1611-1699), English republican visionary, imprisoned.

¹²George A. Lipsky, John Quincy Adams: His Theory and Ideas (New York: Thomas Crowell Co., 1950), p. 7.

¹³Wright, pp. 10, 150, & 168.

¹⁴Evarts Boutell Greene, The Revolutionary Generation (New York: Macmillan Co., 1945), p. 138.

¹⁵David Grays Allen; Robert J. Taylor; Marc Friedlaender; and Celeste Walker, eds., Diary of John Quincy Adams, Vol. 1 (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1981), p. x.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 395, January 28, 1786.

¹⁷Smith, Vol. 2, p. 677. Thomas Hollis (1659-1731), successful London merchant and philanthropist.

¹⁸Greene, p. 381.

¹⁹Allen, et al., eds., Vol. 1, p. 395, January 28, 1786.

²⁰John Quincy Adams, Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory, Vol. 1 (Cambridge, Mass.: Hilliard and Metcalfe, 1810), pp. 249-250.

²¹Howe, p. 83. Robert Filmer (1588-1653), English political philosopher who defended absolutism and hereditary right; Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), English social philosopher who wrote that a strong government, especially an absolute monarchy, was necessary to control conflicting individual interests and desires.

²²Merle Curti, "The Great Mr. Locke: America's Philosopher, 1783-1861," The Huntington Library Bulletin 11 (1937): p. 136, quoting from John Quincy Adams Memoirs, Vol. 9, p. 226, March 28, 1835.

²³Lipsky, p. 69.

²⁴Bemis, JQA and the Union, p. 15.

²⁵Lipsky, p. 280. Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), Dutch jurist and theologian, one of the most celebrated scholars of his time; Emrich von Vattel (1714-1767), celebrated Swiss jurist and writer; Charles de Secondat, Baron de la Brede et de Montesquieu (1689-1755), brilliant and original French author who advocated liberty and humanity.

²⁶Allen, et al., eds., Vol. 2, p. 109, October 3, 1786; Ursula M. von Eckardt, The Pursuit of Happiness In the Democratic Creed (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), p. 181. Jean Jacques Burlamaqui (1694-1748), eminent Swiss jurist.

²⁷Howe, p. 44. Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 B.C.-43 B.C.), illustrious Roman orator, writer, philosopher, and statesman, killed by the soldiers of Antony.

²⁸Guide to American Law, 1983 ed., s.v. "Grotius, Hugo."

²⁹Ibid., "Vattel, Emrich von."

³⁰Ibid., "Montesquieu."

³¹Ibid., "Burlamaqui, Jean Jacques."

³²Howe, p. 44; T.A. Dorey, ed., Cicero (New York: Basic Books, 1965), p. 136.

³³Ralph Ketcham, Presidents Above Party (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1984), pp. 130-131. Aristotle (384 B.C.-322 B.C.), one of the most illustrious philosophers of antiquity; Virgil (70 B.C.-19 B.C.), one of the most noteworthy Latin poets; Plutarch (50-120), eminent Greek philosopher, and the greatest biographer of antiquity; Erasmus Desiderius (1467-1536), celebrated Dutch scholar and philosopher, pre-eminent as a restorer of learning; Alexander Pope (1688-1744), celebrated English poet and critic; Henry Saint John, Viscount Bolingbroke (1678-1751), eminent English author, orator, and politician; Lord Kames (1696-1782), eminent Scottish judge.

³⁴Norman A. Graebner, Foundations of American Foreign Policy (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1985), p. 147.

³⁵John Quincy Adams, "Letter to John Adams", April 12, 1794, quoted in Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed., Writings of John Quincy Adams, Vol. 1 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1913), p.183.

³⁶Morrell Heald and Lawrence S. Kaplan, Culture and Diplomacy (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1977), p. 87.

³⁷John Quincy Adams, "Letter to John Adams", December 21, 1794, quoted in Ford, ed., Vol. 1, p. 254.

³⁸Idem, "Letter to John Adams", October 31, 1795, quoted in Ford, ed., Vol. 1, p. 424.

³⁹Harold Temperley, The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-1827 (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1925), p. 169.

⁴⁰John Quincy Adams, "Letter to Thomas Boylston Adams", November 24, 1812, quoted in Ford, ed., Vol. 4, p. 407.

⁴¹John Quincy Adams, An Oration Addressed to the Citizens of the Town of Quincy (Boston: Richardson, Lord and Holbrook, 1831), p. 14.

⁴²John Quincy Adams, "Letter to Rufus King", October 3, 1796, and "Letter to Joseph Hall", October 9, 1796, quoted in Ford, ed., Vol. 2, pp. 33 & 33n.

⁴³John Quincy Adams, A Letter to the Hon. Harrison Gray Otis (Boston: Oliver and Munroe, 1808), pp. 13-14; John Quincy Adams, "Letter to Joseph Pitcairn", January 13, 1797, quoted in Ford, ed., Vol. 2, p. 75.

⁴⁴William Appleman Williams, ed., The Shaping of American Diplomacy (Chicago: Rand McNally Co., 1956), p. 63.

⁴⁵John Tebbel and Sarah Miles Watts, The Press and the Presidency (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 63.

⁴⁶A mixed mode is a conceptualization which draws its constituent ideas from various empirical sources which are then subjected by the mind to consideration, combination, and transformation to bring about an abstraction which can now be free of empirical disturbance. For a more detailed discussion of mixed modes see John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, book 2, chap. 22.

⁴⁷John Locke, The Works of John Locke, 10 Vols. (London: Thomas Tegg, 1823, Reprint ed. Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1963): An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, p. 212, book 2, chap. 27, pt. 10; book 2, chap. 2, pt. 2; book 2, chap. 20, pt. 8.

⁴⁸John Quincy Adams, An Address Delivered on the Occasion of Reading the Declaration of Independence (Washington, D.C.: Davis and Force, 1821), pp. 9, 13 & 21.

⁴⁹John Quincy Adams, "State of the Union Message of 1825", quoted in Fred L. Israel, ed., The State of the Union Messages of the Presidents of the United States, Vol. 1 (New York: Chelsea House-Robert Hector, 1966), pp. 235-236.

⁵⁰Richard H. Cox, Locke On War and Peace (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 172.

⁵¹U.S. Congress, Annals of Congress. 8th Congress, 1st session, 1803, p. 148.

⁵²John Quincy Adams, "Letter to Richard Rush", July 28, 1823, quoted in Stanislaus Murray Hamilton, ed., Writings of James Monroe, Vol. 5 (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1901), p. 361.

⁵³Thomas B. Silver and Peter W. Schramm, eds., Natural Right and Political Right (Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1984), p. 156.

⁵⁴Based upon Locke, Essay, book 2, chap. 27, pt. 10.

⁵⁵Graebner, Foundations, p. 178.

⁵⁶John Quincy Adams, "Letter to Francis Calley Gray", August 3, 1818, quoted in Adrienne Koch and William Peden, eds., The Selected Writings of John and John Quincy Adams (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), p. 293.

⁵⁷John Quincy Adams, An Address to Members of the Massa-

chusetts Charitable Fire Society (Boston: Russell and Cutler, 1802), p. 23.

⁵⁸John Quincy Adams, Rhetoric and Oratory, Vol. 1, p. 96.

⁵⁹Ibid., pp. 45-46.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 4.

⁶¹John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (London: Privately printed, 1690. Reprint ed. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1966), p. 10, chap. 3, pt. 16.

⁶²John Quincy Adams, "Letter to William Harris Crawford", September 14, 1814, quoted in Koch and Peden, eds., pp. 285-286.

⁶³Charles Francis Adams, ed., Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Vol. 12 (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1877), p. 38, May, 1844.

⁶⁴John Quincy Adams, "Letter to John Adams", May 29, 1816, quoted in Ford, ed., Vol. 6, p. 60.

⁶⁵For a more detailed discussion of his Anglophobia, see pp. 7-9 above.

⁶⁶John Quincy Adams, Declaration of Independence, p. 15.

⁶⁷Allan Nevins, ed., The Diary of John Quincy Adams, 1794-1845 (New York: Longmans, Green, 1928), pp. 116-117, April 1, 1814.

⁶⁸Henry Clay (1777-1852), Congressman, Senator, Presidential candidate, and Adams' Secretary of State; Albert Gallatin (1761-1849), Swiss-born, Secretary of the Treasury, diplomat, businessman.

⁶⁹David E. Soles, "Locke's Empiricism and the Postulation of Unobservables", Journal of the History of Philosophy 23 (1985): 344 & 347.

⁷⁰J.D. Mabbott, John Locke (London: Macmillan Co., 1973), p. 74.

⁷¹David M. Post, "Jeffersonian Revisions of Locke: Education, Property-Rights, and Liberty", Journal of the History of Ideas 47 (1986): 149.

⁷²Locke, Essay, book 2, chap. 21, pt. 27.

⁷³Ibid., book 2, chap. 27, pt. 9.

⁷⁴Fred Reinfeld, The Great Dissenters (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1959), p. 2.

⁷⁵John Quincy Adams, An Oration Delivered Before the Inhabitants of the Town of Newburyport (Newburyport, Mass.: Morss and Brewster, 1837), p. 11.

⁷⁶V. Dennis Golladay, "The United States and British North American Fisheries, 1815-1818", American Neptune 33 (1973): 249.

⁷⁷Koch and Peden, eds., p. xxviii; Locke, Second Treatise, p. 4, chap. 1, pt. 3.

⁷⁸John Quincy Adams, Rhetoric and Oratory, Vol. 1, p. 270.

⁷⁹Locke, Essay, book 2, chap. 1, pts. 3 & 4.

⁸⁰John Quincy Adams, Otis Letter, p. 25.

⁸¹Richard H. Cox, p. 148.

⁸²Nevins, ed., pp. 129-135, August 21-September 20, 1814. One can determine from these accounts the general contour of the negotiations. James, Lord Gambier (1756-1833), British admiral; Henry Goulburn (1784-1856), later Undersecretary for War and the Colonies, and Chancellor of the Exchequer.

⁸³*Ibid.*, p. 138, October 12, 1814.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 124 & 133, August 9, 1814 and September 1, 1814.

⁸⁵Koch and Peden, eds., p. xxviii; Lipsky, p. 25.

⁸⁶Lipsky, p. 27.

⁸⁷Richard H. Cox, pp. 152-153.

⁸⁸Locke, Essay, book 2, chap. 21, pt. 27.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, book 2, chap. 1, pt. 2.

⁹⁰U.S. Congress, Annals, p. 146

⁹¹Samuel Flagg Bemis, "John Quincy Adams and George Washington", Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society 67 (1945): 383.

⁹²Lipsky, pp. 61 & 27.

⁹³Locke, Essay, book 2, chap. 1, pts. 3 & 4.

⁹⁴Lipsky, p. 29.

⁹⁵John Quincy Adams, "Letter to Campbell", June 28, 1816, quoted in Ford, Vol. 6, pp. 366-380.

- ⁹⁶John Colman, John Locke's Moral Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1983), p. 89.
- ⁹⁷John Quincy Adams, "Letter to Richard Rush", January 1, 1819, quoted in Ford, Vol. 6, p. 525. Richard Rush (1780-1859), diplomat, statesman, Attorney-General, Secretary of the Treasury.
- ⁹⁸John A. Logan, Jr., No Transfer: An American Security Principle (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 171.
- ⁹⁹Nevins, ed., p. 306, November 21, 1823.
- ¹⁰⁰Locke, Essay, book 2, chap. 21, pt. 72.
- ¹⁰¹Nevins, ed., pp. 301n.-302n. This note refers to a private and confidential communication of August 20, 1823.
- ¹⁰²Ibid., p. 302, November 7, 1823.
- ¹⁰³Alejandro Alvarez, The Monroe Doctrine (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), p. 356.
- ¹⁰⁴Nevins, ed., p. 302, November 7, 1823.
- ¹⁰⁵Lipsky, p. 305.
- ¹⁰⁶John W. Yolton, ed., John Locke: Problems and Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 7.
- ¹⁰⁷Locke, Essay, book 4, chap. 17, pt. 4.
- ¹⁰⁸John Quincy Adams, "Letter to Richard G. Anderson", May 27, 1823, quoted in Koch and Peden, eds., p. 349.
- ¹⁰⁹John Quincy Adams, Declaration of Independence, p. 38.
- ¹¹⁰Locke, Second Treatise, p. 15, chap. 5, pt. 26; Ramon M. Lemos, "Locke's Theory of Property", Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy 5 (1975): 229.
- ¹¹¹John Quincy Adams, "Letter to Smith Thompson", May 20, 1819, quoted in William R. Manning, ed., Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin-American Nations, Vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1925), p. 104.
- ¹¹²Idem, "Letter to Joaquin de Anduaga", April 6, 1822, quoted in Manning, p. 157.
- ¹¹³Ellen Frankel Paul, "On Three 'Inherent' Powers of Government", Monist 66 (1983): 529.

- 114 Locke, Second Treatise, p. 5, chap. 2, pt. 6.
- 115 Richard H. Cox, p. 131.
- 116 Nevins, ed., p. 306, November 21, 1823.
- 117 Locke, Essay, book 4, chap. 2, pt. 1.
- 118 Frank J. Merli and Theodore A. Wilson, eds., Makers of American Diplomacy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974), p. 107.
- 119 Locke, Essay, book 4, chap. 2, pt. 7.
- 120 John Quincy Adams, "Letter to Richard G. Anderson", May 27, 1823, quoted in Koch and Peden, eds., p. 347.
- 121 Edward P. Crapol, "John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine: Some New Evidence", Pacific Historical Review 48 (1979): 416; Nevins, ed., p. 313, December 3, 1823.
- 122 Nevins, ed., p. 255, February 22, 1821.
- 123 Lipsky, p. 290; John Quincy Adams, "Letter to James Lloyd", October 1, 1822, quoted in Walter LaFeber, ed., John Quincy Adams and American Continental Empire (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965), pp. 27-29.
- 124 Nevins, ed., pp. 211 & 212, February 22, 1819. Luis de Onis y Gonzales (1769-1830), Spanish career diplomat.
- 125 Graebner, Foundations, p. 159.
- 126 David D. Van Tassel and Robert W. McAhren, eds., European Origins of American Thought (Chicago: Rand McNally Co., 1969), p. 50.
- 127 Nevins, ed., p. 255, February 22, 1821.
- 128 John Quincy Adams, "Letter to Don Luis de Onis", July 23, 1818, quoted in Ford, ed., Vol. 6, p. 387.
- 129 Locke, Second Treatise, p. 90, chap. 16, pt. 181.
- 130 John Quincy Adams, "Note to G. William Erving", November 28, 1818, quoted in Koch and Peden, eds., p. 300.
- 131 Colman, p. 31.
- 132 John Yolton, "Locke On the Law of Nature," Philosophical Review 67 (1958): 497.
- 133 Aldo Tassi, "Two Notions of Consent In Locke's 'Second Treatise'", Locke Newsletter 3 (1972): 27.

¹³⁴John Quincy Adams, Publicola Writings, Vol. 1, pp. 70-71, quoted in Lipsky, p. 155.

¹³⁵Nevins, ed., p. 200, July 17, 1818. William Crawford (1772-1834), previously a Presidential candidate, and later a United States Senator; William Wirt (1772-1834), also a noted writer; John C. Calhoun (1782-1850), at various times, a United States Senator, Vice-President, and Secretary of State.

¹³⁶Henry Adams, The Degradation of the Democratic Dogma (New York: Macmillan Co., 1920), p. 77.

¹³⁷John Quincy Adams, Newburyport Oration, p. 57.

¹³⁸James Truslow Adams, The Adams Family (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1930), p. 182.

¹³⁹Lipsky, p. 110.

¹⁴⁰James Tully, A Discourse On Property (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 114; Locke, Second Treatise, p. 17, chap. 5, pt. 32.

¹⁴¹J.L. Mackie, Problems From Locke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 112.

¹⁴²Locke, Essay, book 2, chap. 21, pt. 72.

¹⁴³John Quincy Adams, Rhetoric and Oratory, Vol. 1, p. 68.

¹⁴⁴Idem, "Letter to George William Erving", April 20, 1818, quoted in Ford, ed., Vol. 6, p. 307.

¹⁴⁵Locke, Essay, book 2, chap. 21, pts. 31 & 32.

¹⁴⁶John Quincy Adams, "Letter to Don Luis de Onis", January 29, 1819, quoted in Ford, ed., Vol. 6, p. 330.

¹⁴⁷Idem, "Letter to Abigail Adams", September 10, 1783, quoted in U.S. Department of State, The United States and Russia: The Beginning of Relations, 1765-1815 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 211.

¹⁴⁸Lipsky, p. 297. Alexander I (1777-1825?), Tsar from 1801.

¹⁴⁹John Quincy Adams, "Letter to Pierre de Politica", March 30, 1822, quoted in Ford, ed., Vol. 7, pp. 214-215. An Italian mile, or miglio, equals .621 miles.

¹⁵⁰Terrence J. Barragy, "The Trading Age, 1792-1844", Oregon Historical Quarterly 76 (1975): 200.

- 151 John Quincy Adams, Declaration of Independence, p. 5.
- 152 Idem, "Letter to John Adams", August 1, 1816, quoted in Koch and Peden, eds, p. 288.
- 153 Richard H. Cox, p. 179; Yolton, Problems, p. 147.
- 154 John Quincy Adams, "Letter to Albert Gallatin and Benjamin Rush", July 28, 1818, quoted in Ford, ed., Vol. 6, p. 396.
- 155 Ibid., p. 401.
- 156 Norman A. Graebner, Empire on the Pacific (New York: Ronald Press, 1955), p. 124.
- 157 Locke, Essay, book 2, chap. 14, pt. 3.
- 158 Idem, Second Treatise, p. 74, chap. 12, pts. 146-147.
- 159 Charles Francis Adams, ed., Vol. 7, p. 18, February 16, 1826.
- 160 These concepts are all derived from the empirical manner which Locke emphasized in his descriptions concerning the ways in which man interacts with his environment. At the same time, idea is the basis of that interaction, and it is these ideas which provide the means for that interaction to occur in a stable and creative manner.
- 161 Graebner, Foundations, p. 149.
- 162 Howe, p. 125.
- 163 Mary W. M. Hargreaves, The Presidency of John Quincy Adams (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1985), p. 38.
- 164 Locke, Essay, book 1, chap. 3, pt. 7.
- 165 Charles Francis Adams, ed., Vol. 6, pp. 464-465, January 9, 1825.
- 166 William G. Morgan, "John Quincy Adams Versus Andrew Jackson: Their Biographers and the 'Corrupt Bargain' Charge," Tennessee Historical Quarterly 26 (1967): 45.
- 167 Nevins, ed., pp. 193-194, March 18, 1818.
- 168 Locke, Essay, book 2, chap. 21, pt. 1.
- 169 Nevins, ed., p. 257, February 25, 1821.

- 170 Locke, Essay, book 4, chap. 12, pt. 3.
- 171 Howe, p. 58.
- 172 The "American System" was an integrated program of national improvements which involved public works, scientific enterprises, and other endeavors, all designed to effect a moral integration of the Republic, and subsequently, the Western Hemisphere. For a more detailed discussion, see, e.g., Hargreaves, chaps. 6-8.
- 173 Edward Weisband, The Ideology of American Foreign Policy: A Paradigm of Lockian Liberalism (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1973), p. 22.
- 174 John Quincy Adams, Declaration of Independence, p. 28.
- 175 Hargreaves, p. 127.
- 176 Howe, p. 46.
- 177 Hargreaves, p. 89.
- 178 Locke, Essay, book 4, chap. 12, pt. 7.
- 179 Yolton, Problems, p. 40.
- 180 John T. Morse, Jr., John Quincy Adams (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1898), p. 3.
- 181 John Quincy Adams, A Review of the Works of Fisher Ames (Boston: Everett and Munroe, 1802), p. 18.
- 182 Yolton, "Law of Nature", p. 489.
- 183 Locke, Essay, book 2, chap. 22, pt. 1.
- 184 Justus Buchler, "Act and Object In Locke", Philosophical Review 46 (1937): 33.
- 185 Heald and Kaplan, p. 49.
- 186 Hargreaves, p. 68.
- 187 Graebner, Foundations, p. 156; Vernon G. Setser, The Commercial Reciprocity Policy of the United States, 1774-1829 (New York: Da Capo Press, 1969), p. 187.
- 188 John Quincy Adams, "Letter to Richard Rush", August 27, 1822, quoted in Manning, p. 91.
- 189 Hargreaves, p. 94.

- 190 Ibid.
- 191 Ibid.
- 192 Locke, Essay, book 2, chap. 22, pt. 12. According to Locke, power is the ability to make or to receive change.
- 193 Graebner, Foundations, p. 156.
- 194 Locke, Essay, book 2, chap. 12, pt. 7.
- 195 Graebner, Foundations, p. 156.
- 196 Charles Francis Adams, ed., Vol. 7, p. 242, March, 1827. William Huskisson (1770-1830), English statesman and financier.
- 197 Graebner, Foundations, p. 156.
- 198 John Quincy Adams, "Letter to Richard Rush", June 23, 1823, quoted in Manning, p. 33.
- 199 Bemis, "Adams and Washington", p. 375.
- 200 Lipsky, p. 295.
- 201 John Quincy Adams, Publicola no. 8, quoted in Ford, ed., Vol. 1, p. 95.
- 202 Locke, Essay, book 3, chap. 5, pt. 3.
- 203 Graebner, Foundations, p. 154.
- 204 Masters, p. 262.
- 205 Locke, Essay, book 2, chap. 12, pt. 7.
- 206 Hargreaves, pp. 86 & 88.
- 207 Charles Francis Adams, ed., Vol. 7, pp. 100-101, January 3, 1826.
- 208 William S. Robertson, "The First Legations of the United States In Latin America," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 2 (1915): 198; John Quincy Adams, "To the House of Representatives of the United States", March 15, 1826, quoted in U.S. President, Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, ed. by James D. Richardson (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1897), Vol. 2, p. 329; John Quincy Adams, "To Richard C. Anderson, Jr., and John Sergeant", May 8, 1826, quoted in James F. Hopkins, ed., The Papers of Henry Clay, Vol. 5 (Lexington, Ky.: University of Kentucky Press, 1972), p. 317.

- 209 Hargreaves, p. 154.
- 210 Howe, p. 48.
- 211 Edward H. Tatum, Jr., The United States and Europe, 1815-1823 (New York: Russell and Russell, 1967), p. 219.
- 212 Temperley, p. 169.
- 213 LaFeber, p. 19. For a more detailed discussion of this subject, see pp. 37-43 above.
- 214 John Quincy Adams, Address to the Norfolk County Temperance Society (Boston: Russell and Cutler, 1842), p. 23, quoted in Lipsky, p. 74.
- 215 All these Lockean constants are intimately related to the maintainance of the self, through time, as a conscious and defined being fully capable of creative aggrandizement by the use of the environment, both physically and intellectually.
- 216 Paul, p. 530.
- 217 John Quincy Adams, Declaration of Independence, p. 14.
- 218 Hargreaves, pp. 116 & 118.
- 219 Colman, p. 116.
- 220 Nevins, ed., pp. 326-327, August 31, 1827. Levi Lincoln (1782-1868), governor of Massachusetts at the time.
- 221 Locke, Essay, book 2, chap. 28, pt. 8.
- 222 Bemis, Union, p. 456.
- 223 Hargreaves, p. 117.
- 224 John Quincy Adams, "Letter to Richard Rush", May 20, 1818, quoted in Manning, p. 67.
- 225 Hans Meyerhoff, The Philosophy of History In Our Time (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959), p. 5.
- 226 Locke, Second Treatise, p. 25, chap. 5, pt. 34.
- 227 John Quincy Adams, Declaration of Independence, p. 5.
- 228 Paul A. Varg, New England and Foreign Relations (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1983), p. 135; Hargreaves, p. 117.
- 229 John Quincy Adams, "Letter to Henry Clay", July 5, 1826, quoted in Hopkins, ed., Vol. 5, p. 521.

- 230 LaFeber, pp. 14-15.
- 231 Masters, p. 264.
- 232 Edward M. Earle, "American Interest In the Greek Cause," American Historical Review 7 (1927): 465.
- 233 Graebner, Foundations, p. 174. The Holy Alliance was formed in 1815 by Russia, Austria, and Prussia in order to suppress the democratic revolutionary movement in Europe.
- 234 Locke, Essay, book 4, chap. 20, pt. 2.
- 235 Geraint Parry, John Locke (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978), p. 29.
- 236 Hargreaves, pp. 120-121.
- 237 Locke, Essay, book 4, chap. 4, pt. 7.
- 238 Frank Tannenbaum, The American Tradition In Foreign Policy (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1955), p. 69.
- 239 Locke, Essay, book 2, chap. 21, pt. 40.
- 240 Bradford Perkins, "The Suppressed Dispatch of H.U. Aldington, Washington, November 3, 1823," Hispanic-American Historical Review 37 (1957): 487.
- 241 William S. Robertson, "The Recognition of the Hispanic American Nations By the United States," Hispanic-American Historical Review 1 (1918): 244; Idem, "Legations", p. 184.
- 242 Idem, "Recognition", p. 251. The Spanish acquiescence in an American takeover of Florida doubtless convinced the Americans of Spanish weakness. For more background, see pp. 33-37 above.
- 243 Locke, Essay, book 2, chap. 22, pt. 2.
- 244 Alvarez, p. 10.
- 245 Logan, p. 174.
- 246 Richard H. Cox, p. 151. The state of nature was supposedly a time in the distant past when men interacted peacefully, without government, by means of the mutual recognition of each others' inherent rights.
- 247 Hargreaves, p. 131.
- 248 Soles, p. 347.

²⁴⁹John Quincy Adams, "First Annual Message", December 6, 1825, quoted in U.S. President, p. 318.

²⁵⁰E.J. Pratt, "Anglo-American Commercial and Political Rivalry on the Plata, 1820-1830," Hispanic-American Historical Review 11 (1931): 317.

²⁵¹John Quincy Adams, "First Annual Message", December 6, 1825, quoted in U.S. President, p. 302.

²⁵²Robertson, "Legations", p. 193.

²⁵³Charles Francis Adams, ed., Vol. 7, p. 96, December 30, 1825. Nicholas I (1796-1855), Tsar from 1825; Ferdinand VII (1784-1833), King in 1808, and from 1814.

²⁵⁴Logan, p. 177.

²⁵⁵Ibid., p. 180. George Canning (1770-1827), British statesman, orator, and wit, Foreign Secretary from 1822.

²⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 181 & 183.

²⁵⁷Tatum, p. 181.

²⁵⁸Colman, pp. 121-122.

²⁵⁹Halford L. Hoskins, "The Hispanic American Policy of Henry Clay, 1816-1828," Hispanic-American Historical Review 7 (1927): 472; Charles W. Hackett, "The Development of John Quincy Adams's Policy With Respect to An American Confederation and the Panama Congress, 1822-1825," Hispanic-American Historical Review 8 (1928): pp. 508 & 513.

²⁶⁰John Quincy Adams, "Message to the U.S. House of Representatives", March 15, 1826, quoted in U.S. President, p. 336.

²⁶¹John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 125.

²⁶²LaFeber, p. 14.

²⁶³Francis L. Reinhold, "New Research On the First Pan-American Congress Held At Panama in 1826," Hispanic-American Historical Review 18 (1938): 342.

²⁶⁴Hargreaves, p. 147. Simon Bolivar (1783-1830), military liberator of Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and other South American countries.

²⁶⁵Ibid., pp. 149-150.

²⁶⁶Ibid., p. 151.

²⁶⁷Colman, p. 188.

²⁶⁸Locke, Essay, book 2, chap. 27, pt. 10.

²⁶⁹Hargreaves, p. 151.

²⁷⁰Logan, p. 191.

²⁷¹Ibid., p. 193; Samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), p. 77; Hargreaves, p. 157.

²⁷²Logan, pp. 193 & 195.

²⁷³Locke, Essay, book 2, chap. 28, pt. 14.

²⁷⁴Logan, p. 197.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Adams, Charles Francis (ed.). Memoirs of John Quincy Adams. 12 Vols. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1874-1877.

Adams, John Quincy. An Address Delivered on the Occasion of Reading the Declaration of Independence. Washington, D.C.: Davis and Force, 1821.

_____. An Address to Members of the Massachusetts Charitable Fire Society. Boston: Russell and Cutler, 1802.

_____. (ed.). The Duplicate Letters, the Fisheries and the Mississippi. Washington, D.C.: Davis and Force, 1822.

_____. Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory. 2 Vols. Cambridge, Mass.: Hilliard and Metcalfe, 1810.

_____. A Letter to the Hon. Harrison Gray Otis. Boston: Oliver and Munroe, 1808.

_____. An Oration Addressed to the Citizens of the Town of Quincy. Boston: Richardson, Lord and Holbrook, 1831.

_____. An Oration Delivered Before the Inhabitants of the Town of Newburyport. Newburyport, Mass.: Morss and Brewster, 1837.

_____. Parties In the United States. New York: Greenburg, 1941.

_____. A Review of the Works of Fisher Ames. Boston: Everett and Munroe, 1802.

Allen, David Grays, Robert J. Taylor, Marc Friedlaender, and Celeste Walker (eds.). Diary of John Quincy Adams. 2 Vols. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1981.

Butterfield, L. H., Marc Friedlaender, and Mary-Jo Kline (eds.). The Book of Abigail and John: Selected Letters of the Adams Family 1762-1784. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975.

Ford, Worthington Chauncey (ed.). Writings of John Quincy Adams. 7 Vols. New York: Macmillan Co., 1913.

- Hamilton, Stanislaus Murray (ed.). The Writings of James Monroe. 7 Vols. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1901.
- Hopkins, James F. (ed.). The Papers of Henry Clay. 8 Vols. Lexington, Ky.: University of Kentucky Press, 1972.
- Israel, Fred L. (ed.). The State of the Union Messages of the Presidents of the United States. 2 Vols. New York: Chelsea House-Robert Hector, 1966.
- Koch, Adrienne, and William Peden (eds.). The Selected Writings of John and John Quincy Adams. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946.
- LaFeber, Walter (ed.). John Quincy Adams and American Continental Empire. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965.
- Locke, John. Second Treatise of Government. London: Privately printed, 1690. Reprint ed. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1966.
- _____. The Works of John Locke. 10 Vols. London: Thomas Tegg, 1823. Reprint ed. Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1963.
- Lott, Davis Newton (annotator). The Presidents Speak. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961.
- Manning, William R. (ed.). Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin-American Nations. 3 Vols. New York: Oxford University Press, 1925.
- Muller, Julius W. (ed.). Presidential Messages and State Papers. 10 Vols. New York: Review of Reviews Co., 1917.
- Nevins, Allan (ed.). The Diary of John Quincy Adams, 1794-1845. New York: Longmans Green, 1928.
- U.S. Congress. Annals of Congress. (8th Cong.; 1st Sess.), 1803.
- _____. Congressional Globe. (27th Cong.; 1st Sess.), 1841.
- U.S. Department of State. The United States and Russia: The Beginning of Relations, 1765-1815. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980.
- U.S. President. Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1896. James D. Richardson (ed.). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1897.

Secondary Sources

- Aaron, Richard I. John Locke. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973.
- Adams, James Truslow. The Adams Family. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1930.
- Alvarez, Alejandro. The Monroe Doctrine. New York: Oxford University Press, 1924.
- Banninga, Jerald L. "John Quincy Adams' Address of July 4, 1821". Quarterly Journal of Speech 53 (1967): 44-49.
- Barragy, Terrence J. "The Trading Age, 1792-1844". Oregon Historical Quarterly 76 (1975): 197-224.
- Bemis, Samuel Flagg. John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949.
- _____. John Quincy Adams and the Union. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956.
- _____. "John Quincy Adams and George Washington". Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society 67 (1945): 365-384.
- Benns, F. Lee. The American Struggle for the British West India Carrying Trade, 1815-1830. Clifton, N.J.: Augustus M. Kelley, 1972.
- Bergquist, Harold E., Jr. "John Quincy Adams and the Promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine, Oct.- Dec. 1823". Essex Institute Historical Collections 111 (1975): 37-52.
- Bourne, Kenneth. Britain and the Balance of Power in North America. London: Longmans, 1967.
- Bowen, Catherine Drinker. John Adams and the American Revolution. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1950.
- Brody, Baruch. "Locke On the Identity of Persons". American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (1972): 327-334.
- Brooks, Philip Coolidge. Diplomacy and the Borderlands: The Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1939.

- Buchler, Justus. "Act and Object In Locke". Philosophical Review 46 (1937): 528-535.
- Cherno, Melvin. "Locke on Property: A Reappraisal". Ethics 68 (1957): 51-55.
- Clough, Wilson Ober (ed.). Intellectual Origins of American National Thought. New York: Corinth Books, 1961.
- Colman, John. John Locke's Moral Philosophy. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1983.
- Coughlin, Sister Magdalen, C.S.J. "California Ports: A Key to Diplomacy for the West Coast, 1820-1845". Journal of the West 5 (1966): 153-172.
- Cox, I. J. "The Southwest Boundary of Texas". Texas State Historical Association Quarterly 6 (1902): 81-102.
- Cox, Richard H. Locke On War and Peace. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960.
- Crapol, Edward P. "John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine: Some New Evidence". Pacific Historical Review 48 (1979): 413-418.
- Curti, Merle. "The Great Mr. Locke: America's Philosopher, 1783-1861." The Huntington Library Bulletin 11 (1937): 109-151.
- Dickinson, Edwin DeWitt. "The Analogy Between Natural Persons and International Persons In the Law of Nations." Yale Law Journal 26 (1917): 564-591.
- Dorey, T. A. (ed.). Cicero. New York: Basic Books, 1965.
- Dunn, John. The Political Thought of John Locke. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.
- Earle, Edward M. "American Interest In the Greek Cause." American Historical Review 7 (1927): 460-478.
- East, Robert E. John Quincy Adams: The Critical Years. New York: Bookman Assos., 1962.
- Eckardt, Ursula M. von. The Pursuit of Happiness In the Democratic Creed. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959.
- Encyclopedia of Philosophy, S.v. "Locke, John," by James Gordon Clapp.
- Flew, Anthony. "Locke and the Problem of Personal Identity." Philosophy 26 (1951): 53-68.

- Formisano, Ronald P. The Transformation of Political Culture. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983.
- Fronzizi, Risieri. The Nature of The Self. Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971.
- Golladay, V. Dennis. "The United States and British North American Fisheries, 1815-1818". American Neptune 33 (1973): 246-257.
- Graebner, Norman A. Empire on the Pacific. New York: Ronald Press, 1955.
- _____. Foundations of American Foreign Policy. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1985.
- Greene, Evarts Boutell. The Revolutionary Generation. New York: Macmillan Co., 1945.
- Grice, H. P. "Personal Identity". Mind 50 (1941): 330-350.
- Guide to American Law. 12 Vols. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1983.
- Hackett, Charles W. "The Development of John Quincy Adams's Policy With Respect to An American Confederation and the Panama Congress, 1822-1825." Hispanic-American Historical Review 8 (1928): 496-526.
- Hargreaves, Mary W. M. The Presidency of John Quincy Adams. Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1985.
- Heald, Morrell, and Lawrence S. Kaplan. Culture and Diplomacy. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1977.
- Hecht, Marie B. John Quincy Adams. New York: Macmillan Co., 1972.
- Horwitz, Robert H. (ed.). The Moral Foundations of the American Republic. Charlottesville, Va.: University of Virginia Press, 1986.
- Hoskins, Halford L. "The Hispanic American Policy of Henry Clay, 1816-1828." Hispanic-American Historical Review 7 (1927): 460-478.
- Howe, Daniel Walker. The Political Culture of the American Whigs. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979.
- Hoyt, Edwin P. John Quincy Adams. Chicago: Reilly and Lee, 1963.
- Illick, Joseph E. "John Quincy Adams: The Maternal Influence." Journal of Psychohistory 4 (1976): 185-195.

- Jackson, Reginald. "Locke's Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Qualities." Mind 38 (1929): 56-76.
- Johnston, Herbert. "Locke's Leviathan." The Modern Schoolman 26 (1949): 201-210.
- Ketcham, Ralph. Presidents Above Party. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1984.
- Lemos, Ramon M. "Locke's Theory of Property." Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy 5 (1975): 226-244.
- Leyden, Wolfgang von. Hobbes and Locke. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982.
- Lipsky, George A. John Quincy Adams: His Theory and Ideas. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1950.
- Logan, John A., Jr. No Transfer: An American Security Principle. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961.
- Lunt, William P. A Discourse Delivered In Quincy, March 11, 1848 At the Interment of John Quincy Adams. Boston: Dutton and Wentworth, 1848.
- Mabbott, J. D. John Locke. London: Macmillan Co., 1973.
- Mace, George. Locke, Hobbes, and the Federalist Papers. Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1979.
- Mackie, J. L. Problems From Locke. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976.
- Masters, Roger D. "Lockean Tradition in American Foreign Policy." Journal of International Affairs 21 (1967): 253-277.
- McLemore, Richard Aubrey. Franco-American Diplomatic Relations, 1816-1836. Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1972.
- Melden, Abraham I. Rights and Persons. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1977.
- Merli, Frank J., and Theodore A. Wilson (eds.). Makers of American Diplomacy. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974.
- Meyerhoff, Hans. The Philosophy of History In Our Time. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959.
- Morgan, William G. "John Quincy Adams Versus Andrew Jackson: Their Biographers and the 'Corrupt Bargain' Charge." Tennessee Historical Quarterly 26 (1967): 43-58.

- Morse, John T., Jr. John Quincy Adams. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1898.
- Nichols, Roy F. The Invention of the American Political Parties. New York: Macmillan Co., 1967.
- O'Connor, D. J. John Locke. London: Penguin Books, 1952.
- Parfit, Derek. "Personal Identity." Philosophical Review 80 (1971): 3-27
- Parry, Geraint. "Individuality, Politics and the Critique of Paternalism In John Locke." Political Studies 12 (1964): 163-177.
- _____. John Locke. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978.
- Paul, Ellen Frankel. "On Three Inherent Powers of Government." Monist 66 (1983): 529-544.
- Perkins, Bradford. "The Suppressed Dispatch of H. U. Aldington, Washington, November 3, 1823." Hispanic-American Historical Review 37 (1957): 480-485.
- Post, David M. "Jeffersonian Revisions of Locke: Education, Property-Rights, and Liberty." Journal of the History of Ideas 47 (1986): 147-157.
- Pratt, E. J. "Anglo-American Commercial and Political Rivalry on the Plata, 1820-1830." Hispanic-American Historical Review 11 (1931): 302-335.
- Reeve, Andrew. Property. Atlantic Heights, N.J.: Humanities Press International, 1986.
- Reinfeld, Fred. The Great Dissenters. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1959.
- Reinhold, Francis L. "New Research On the First Pan-American Congress Held At Panama in 1826." Hispanic-American Historical Review 18 (1938): 342-363.
- Riley, Patrick. Will and Political Legitimacy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982.
- Robertson, William S. "The First Legations of the United States In Latin America." Mississippi Valley Historical Review 2 (1915): 183-212.
- _____. "The Recognition of the Hispanic American Nations By the United States." Hispanic-American Historical Review 1 (1918): 239-269.

- Sahakian, William S., and Mabel Lewis Sahakian. John Locke. Twayne's World Leaders Series. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1975.
- Schochet, Gordon J. Life, Liberty, and Property. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1971.
- Setser, Vernon G. The Commercial Reciprocity Policy of the United States, 1774-1829. New York: Da Capo Press, 1969.
- Silver, Thomas B., and Peter W. Schramm (eds.). Natural Right and Political Right. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 1984.
- Simon, Walter M. "John Locke: Philosophy and Political Theory." American Political Science Review 45 (1951): 386-399.
- Smith, Page. John Adams. 2 Vols. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1963.
- Soles, David E. "Locke's Empiricism and the Postulation of Unobservables." Journal of the History of Philosophy 23 (1985): 339-369.
- Spahr, Margaret. "Sovereignty Under Law: A Possible Redefinition of Sovereignty In the Light of Locke's Theory of Liberty." American Political Science Review 39 (1945): 350-355.
- Squadrito, Kathleen M. "Locke's View of Dominion." Environmental Ethics 1 (1979): 255-262.
- Suits, David B. "On Locke's Argument For Government." Journal of Libertarian Studies 1 (1977): 195-203.
- Tannenbaum, Frank. The American Tradition In Foreign Policy. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1955.
- Tassi, Aldo. "Two Notions of Consent In Locke's 'Second Treatise'." Locke Newsletter 3 (1972): 26-32.
- Tatum, Edward H., Jr. The United States and Europe, 1815-1823. New York: Russell and Russell, 1967.
- Tebbel, John, and Sarah Miles Watts. The Press and the Presidency. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.
- Temperley, Harold. The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-1827. London: G. Bell and Sons, 1925.
- Van Tassel, David D., and Robert W. McAhren (eds.). European Origins of American Thought. Chicago: Rand McNally Co., 1969.

- Varg, Paul A. New England and Foreign Relations. Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1983.
- Weisband, Edward. The Ideology of American Foreign Policy: A Paradigm of Lockian Liberalism. Beverley Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1973.
- Wiggins, David. Sameness and Substance. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980.
- Williams, William Appleman. The Contours of American History. New York: World Publishing Co., 1961.
- _____ (ed.). The Shaping of American Diplomacy. Chicago: Rand McNally Co., 1956.
- Withey, Lynne. Dearest Friend: A Life of Abigail Adams. New York: The Free Press, 1981.
- Wojtyła, Karol, Cardinal. The Acting Person. Trans. by Andrzej Potocki. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1979.
- Wright, Benjamin Fletcher, Jr. American Interpretations of Natural Law. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1931.
- Yolton, John W. Locke: An Introduction. Oxford: Basil Blackwood, 1985.
- _____. "Locke on the Law of Nature." Philosophical Review 67 (1958): 477-498.
- _____ (ed.). John Locke: Problems and Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.
- Young, James Sterling. The Washington Community: 1800-1828. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966.

VITA

Carl Anthony Hinton

Born in Norfolk, Virginia, September 18, 1944. B.A. in History, Norfolk State College, Norfolk, Virginia, 1974. M.A. in Russian History, University of Maryland, College Park, 1978. Additional study in Library and Information Science at the University of Maryland, and in Secondary Education at Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia. Archives intern and candidate for M.A. in American History, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia, 1987.