The presented research seeks to further our understanding of the Supreme Court’s formation of judicial review through an historical and game theoretic analysis. Marbury v Madison (1803) has long been hailed as a foundational case in which Chief Justice Marshall outfoxed President Jefferson in a duel of wits. Yet, despite this claim, there are surprisingly few papers that apply modern game-theory to what is widely considered a landmark—and rather iconic—supreme court case. In my paper, I review this notion and, in doing so, come to better understand inter-institutional relationships and their corresponding game theoretic strategies. More importantly, however, I suggest that Supreme Court decisions are often manipulated by their environment. The decisions themselves are not made in a vacuum—if enough pressure exists, it is possible to alter the verdict of cases, thus altering the course of history.

Appendix A (asymmetric) copy.pdf (33 kB)
Appendix A (asymmetric) copy.pdf

Appendix B (symmetric) copy.pdf (33 kB)
Appendix B (symmetric) copy.pdf

Appendix C (reality) copy.pdf (33 kB)
Appendix C (reality) copy.pdf