The presented research seeks to further our understanding of the Supreme Court’s formation of judicial review through an historical and game theoretic analysis. Marbury v Madison (1803) has long been hailed as a foundational case in which Chief Justice Marshall outfoxed President Jefferson in a duel of wits. Yet, despite this claim, there are surprisingly few papers that apply modern game-theory to what is widely considered a landmark—and rather iconic—supreme court case. In my paper, I review this notion and, in doing so, come to better understand inter-institutional relationships and their corresponding game theoretic strategies. More importantly, however, I suggest that Supreme Court decisions are often manipulated by their environment. The decisions themselves are not made in a vacuum—if enough pressure exists, it is possible to alter the verdict of cases, thus altering the course of history.
deButts, Daniel R.
"A Game Theoretic Analysis of Marbury v Madison: The Origins of Judicial Review,"
James Blair Historical Review: Vol. 9
, Article 2.
Available at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol9/iss2/2