Date Thesis Awarded

4-2019

Document Type

Honors Thesis

Degree Name

Bachelors of Arts (BA)

Department

Philosophy

Advisor

Matthew Haug

Committee Members

Matthew Haug

Joshua Gert

Paul Kieffaber

Abstract

The question of whether cognitive access is a constitutively necessary part of phenomenal consciousness has been the center of the debate of consciousness for several decades. It has been recognized that there exists a methodological puzzle in the study of consciousness (Block, 2006; Phillips, 2018). The puzzle can be roughly described as follows: how can we empirically find out whether certain cognitively inaccessible states are phenomenally conscious or not, when the way we identify conscious mental states is always confounded with cognitive access? This thesis reviews two current approaches to solve the methodological puzzle - one approach appeals to the Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) and the other proposes to study consciousness as a natural kind. It is argued that both approaches failed, and the methodological puzzle remains unsolved.

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Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.

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