Date Thesis Awarded

5-2024

Access Type

Honors Thesis -- Access Restricted On-Campus Only

Degree Name

Bachelors of Arts (BA)

Department

Philosophy

Advisor

Aaron Griffith

Committee Members

Matthew Haug

Brian Rabinovitz

Abstract

How do we perceive time? How should we understand it within our consciousness?

These two inquiries probe into the existence of time in our conscious experience. They anchor the concept of time experienced by us, from a first-person perspective. Therefore, this thesis attempts to understand time in a phenomenological approach. The realm it delves into centers not on the metaphysics of time. It does not seek to unveil the true essence of time. Specifically, it revolves around the writings of phenomenologists such as Edmund Husserl and Jean-Paul Sartre -- centering on Husserl's theory of inner time-consciousness and his tripartite temporal structure encompassing protention, primal impression, and retention and critically assessing their merits and limitations. In essence, this thesis argues that while Husserl's tripartite temporal structure undeniably exists in our conscious experience, it is insufficient. It is necessary to acknowledge the presence of an ego as another essential element. Time, together with self, constitute the two inseparable elements in the infrastructure of our conscious experience.

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