Date Thesis Awarded

5-2009

Access Type

Honors Thesis -- Access Restricted On-Campus Only

Degree Name

Bachelors of Arts (BA)

Department

Philosophy

Advisor

Matthew C. Haug

Committee Members

Robert S. Leventhal

James Harris

Abstract

My claim in this essay is that Wittgenstein's discussion of rule-following and meaning leaves us with a radically novel conception of the meaningfulness of language and that this in turn underpins his rejection of Cartesian dualism and traditional assumptions about the self that inform both realist and solipsistic positions. These connections are based largely off the first part of the Philosophical Investigations. In tracing these connections I hope to defend Wittgenstein's position as a tenable alternative.

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.

Comments

Thesis is part of Honors ETD pilot project, 2008-2013. Migrated from Dspace in 2016.

On-Campus Access Only

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