Date Thesis Awarded
5-2014
Access Type
Honors Thesis -- Access Restricted On-Campus Only
Degree Name
Bachelors of Arts (BA)
Department
Economics
Advisor
Lisa Anderson
Committee Members
Rob Hicks
Christopher Freiman
Abstract
In our experiment, we have a multiple-round public goods game but with a probabilistic endpoint. This changes the Nash equilibrium, such that cooperation is the new equilibrium strategy. The experiment consists of two treatments, one with a single round per session (called the intertemporal treatment), and the second with multiple rounds per session. Experimental results suggest that contribution was indeed positive and consistent provided a high enough probability of the game’s continuation, but declined when probability fell.
Recommended Citation
Carlen, Daniel M., "Cooperation in a Repeated Public Goods Game with a Probabilistic Endpoint" (2014). Undergraduate Honors Theses. William & Mary. Paper 34.
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/honorstheses/34
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