Date Thesis Awarded

5-2010

Access Type

Honors Thesis -- Access Restricted On-Campus Only

Degree Name

Bachelors of Arts (BA)

Department

Philosophy

Advisor

Matthew C. Haug

Committee Members

Neal Tognazzini

Michael Green

Abstract

This essay examines three of the intuitions underlying the contemporary debate concerning free will and moral responsibility. Those intuitions concern a requirement of control, of alternate possibilities, and of ultimate or original control, respectively. The author, arguing from the assumption that moral responsibility is logically possible, examines, clarifies and revises those three intuitions in order to allow that possibility. He also examines various conceptions of the self, argues that they do not allow for the possibility of moral responsibility, and offers his own account which, he argues, does allow for moral responsibility.

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.

Comments

Thesis is part of Honors ETD pilot project, 2008-2013. Migrated from Dspace in 2016.

On-Campus Access Only

Share

COinS